DIVISION TACTICS AND SUPPLY.
MARCHES.
A day’s march under ordinary conditions will be from 10 to 15 miles,
usually about 12. The rate of march, including halts, is 2½ miles
per hour. One day in each six or seven should be devoted to rest. In
a forward march in campaign the advance guard will ordinarily be a
regiment or a brigade. Units should not be split as a rule, to furnish
advance guards of a strength other than that stated. Artillery should
seldom be placed in an advance guard of a regiment but with a brigade
it would be usual to place a battalion of artillery. Other auxiliary
troops with an advance guard are the engineers, signal and sanitary,
each in numbers proportioned to the size of the advance guard, or in
accordance with the requirements of the situation. A reinforced brigade
as advance guard therefore, may consist of an infantry brigade, a
battalion of artillery, one company of engineers, one section of signal
troops, one ambulance company.
A commander for the main body may be designated. The division commander
may thus go wherever his presence is necessary; he will occasionally
review the division as it moves out in the morning, afterward joining
the advance guard. If combat is probable he should in all cases be with
the advance guard that he may have time to weigh the reports arriving
from the front and influence the very important first dispositions
of the advance guard. The march order will ordinarily prescribe the
initial point and time of departure of the main body, and the distance
at which it is to follow the advance guard, together with the route of
march. This gives the complete data required to enable the commander
of each organization (including the advance guard) to take his proper
place in the column of march thus insuring a systematic departure. If
a brigade be advance guard of a division it is not usually rotated
with other brigades on a single march of say a week. The component
elements of the brigade itself rotate in their security duties, but
the disadvantages of frequent rotation of brigades in the division are
generally believed to be greater than the advantages.
_Cavalry._ The divisional cavalry is made independent of the advance
guard whenever it has an independent mission. If the division is acting
alone this will be the usual case. Its strength should not be frittered
away; but for urgent tactical reasons one or two troops or a squadron
may exceptionally be attached to the advance guard. The cavalry if
camped with the division, is generally ordered to start from a half
hour to an hour after sunrise, with orders as to its special mission,
“to cover the march of the division,” “gain contact with the enemy and
observe towards ______,” etc. If the independent cavalry starts at
about the same time as the advance guard brigade the time stated will
be about one hour before the advance guard _clears_ its initial point,
the length of the advance guard with its intervals, being about an
hour’s march (for foot troops). It may be desirable to attach a pack
train to the cavalry. Avoid detail in orders to the divisional cavalry.
Tell the cavalry commander clearly what tasks he is to accomplish, the
means of so doing should be left to his judgment.
_Artillery._ The distribution of the artillery in the column of march
depends upon the tactical requirements. For its own security it should
never be too far to the front. Artillery needs a maneuvering zone,
and it should not have to countermarch to gain this. In an advance
guard of a reinforced brigade the artillery should be in the reserve,
and immediately preceded by a bn. or more of infantry, according to
the tactical situation. It would be inadvisable to have the artillery
forward with the support. The center of gravity of the artillery with
the advance guard, should therefore ordinarily be well to the rear
for security and maneuvering purposes, and of that with the main body
well to the front in an advance in the presence of the enemy. It is
usual in such case to have the artillery of the main body preceded by a
regiment of infantry (in the main body). When the tactical requirements
are less urgent, the artillery brigade (less the bn. with the advance
guard) may be between the brigades of the main body, or may even be
in rear of all the infantry of the main body. Heavy field artillery,
if present, would usually be placed in rear of all the foot troops of
the main body. Where the artillery as thus disposed forms too long a
column it is well to place a detachment of infantry in the middle. The
local conditions will indicate the correct course. Artillery combat
trains are seldom permitted in the main body ahead of foot troops; they
incommode the infantry in the column as well as delay the deployment of
the division. They should be routed immediately in rear of the special
troops at the tail of the column. Combat trains of artillery with the
advance guard, usually march with the advance guard.
The division marching in two columns, with the prospect of encountering
the enemy, will usually have artillery in each column. There may be
a regiment of artillery with each or more usually a battalion only
with the smaller. Whether or not a flank guard will contain artillery
depends upon its mission and the conditions. If the purpose of the
flank guard is reconnaissance only it should consist of cavalry alone,
and would have no artillery accompanying. If the flank guard be
composed of a regiment of infantry with some attached mounted troops it
would still be unwise to attach artillery. But where the flank guard
as a covering detachment is expected to fight decisively, or where
there is essentially double column formation for purposes of partial
deployment in marching to meet the enemy, its strength is made greater,
and it may include artillery. If the lateral communications between the
routes of the two columns are such that artillery from the main body
may be readily moved to the flank in case of need there will usually be
no occasion to attach artillery to the flank guard.
In a meeting engagement it is generally of vital importance to bring
the artillery into action with the least delay. For this purpose it
should be brought forward, either by giving it right of way over the
infantry, or preferably, by advancing it on a parallel road. Where
the situation permits it is best in such cases to have the artillery
advance on the parallel road farthest from possible interference by
the enemy, the infantry column taking the more exposed road. In either
case the artillery comes ahead at an increased gait. Where no parallel
route exists, and it is determined to give the artillery right of way
over the infantry, the latter may continue the march in the fields
alongside, or if this is not practicable they must halt off the road
until the artillery passes them. Right of way over the infantry is
given to the firing batteries only, the combat trains come forward
later as the situation permits.
_Engineers._ Engineers are used in an advance as pioneers and
pontoniers. Pioneers should invariably be attached to the advance
troops of a large command. They take up little road space and are
needed on every march. If it is known that bridging must be done during
the march the bridge train should be with the advance guard. It marches
in the intervals of the advance guard, or in that between the advance
guard and the main body. If it is known definitely that no bridging
will be needed the train should be in rear with the division trains.
It should never march with the combatant troops of the main body. If
the bridge conditions ahead cannot be learned definitely the equipage
should march with the advance guard, otherwise the progress of the
command may be greatly delayed. The road space for one division of the
advance guard (light) equipage, which will bridge a minimum span of
186 ft., is about 300 yards. A division of reserve (heavy) equipage,
with a minimum capacity of 225 ft., occupies a road space of about 400
yds. The capacity of this equipage can be increased by the amount of
material that can be obtained locally at the crossings.
_Signal troops._ On the march the radio sections of the signal troops
may be disposed as follows, 1 with the independent cavalry, and 1 with
the advance guard. A section, radio or even wire, may be sent with a
flank guard, or even with the trains, if on a separate road, or far
to the rear. A wire section may be placed at the head of the main
body, and the remainder of the signal troops at the tail thereof, in
rear of the engineers, or in the interval between the advance guard
and the main body. The duties of the signal troops on the march are
to maintain communication between the various detachments along the
line of march (always including division headquarters) and with the
independent cavalry by wireless. The signal troops may keep up moving
communication, or better establish stations along the line of march,
continually pushing out new stations to the front, and drawing in those
in rear as the column advances. Existing telegraph and telephone lines
may be utilized. Instructions to the signal troops would read “lines
of information will connect division headquarters with the advance
guard, flank guard, trains, etc.” As with all other officers who are
expected to exercise any degree of initiative, instructions in great
detail should not be given the signal commander. He should be told what
is desired and allowed to arrange details himself.
The starting hour of the division should not be too early. Large bodies
lack the flexibility of small, and it is exceptional that the division
starts before one hour after sunrise. It must be remembered that if the
division starts its march earlier than this, the advance guard, which
may have an hour’s march to clear its initial point, must start at an
unseasonable hour. If the mounted point starts at daybreak the head of
the main body will pass the same place about an hour after sunrise.
In a map problem or maneuver there is a tendency to endeavor to make
the utmost of the time available, but it should be remembered that if
much is expected from the division today, yesterday was probably as
hard a day, and tomorrow may call for even greater effort. Hence avoid
the early starting habit. Starting before daybreak, however, is less
objectionable than making camp in the dark. Large bodies cannot be
expected to form in column on the road before starting. Each element of
the command is responsible for reaching the initial point in time to
take its place in column without delay. Trains assemble off the road
until the troops have cleared and proceed as ordered. The commander of
the field trains is charged with the duty of arranging his wagons in
the order of march of the units to which they belong. Usually the field
trains of the division, including that of the advance guard, are united
in one body. If the situation of the trains requires a guard, one is
detailed for the purpose. Some mounted men should always be attached to
a train escort. Engineers are useful for this purpose, if their other
duties permit. They may constitute the entire escort. Their services
are valuable in facilitating the progress of the trains. Fig. XV shows
an arrangement of a division on the march.
The march outposting of a division does not differ in principle from
that of smaller bodies. Detachments of suitable strength up to a
battalion may be sent out to important crossroads, crests, bridges,
etc., and if desirable they remain there until the safety of the column
is assured.
ORDER FOR THE FORWARD MARCH OF A DIVISION.
1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
FREDERICK, MD.,
Field Orders, } 15 May, '16, 9 p. m.
No. 1. }
Geological Survey map.
Troops
(a) Independent
Cavalry:
Col. F.
1st Cav. (less 1 tr.)
1 radio sec. pack Sig.
(b) Advance Guard:
Brig. Gen. B.
Tr. A, 1st Cav.,
(less 1 plat.)
1st Brigade
1st Bn. 1st L. A.
Co. A, 1st Engrs.
1st Amb. Co.
(c) Main body--in
order of march:
1 plat. Tr. A, 1st
Cav.
1st Bn. 4th Inf.
1st Brig. F. A.
(less 1 bn. and
C. Tn.)
2d Brigade (less
1 bn.)
3rd Brigade.
1st Engineers
(less 1 co.)
Artillery C. Tn.
3 Ambulance cos.
(d) Signal Troops:
Maj. K.
1. The frontier is being observed by hostile detachments. Their main
army is about BALTIMORE and WASHINGTON. The greater part of their army
is believed to be unprepared to move. One division and possibly more
are ready and may have moved toward the frontier.
Our army will advance so as to reach GETTYSBURG on the 18th.
2. This division is ordered to advance on GETTYSBURG and cover the exit
of the army from the mountains.
We will begin the march tomorrow.
3. (a) The independent cavalry will start at 5:30 a. m. and cover
the movement. They will reconnoiter TANEYTOWN and the roads leading
southeast therefrom.
(b) The advance guard will march on EMMITSBURG Turnpike and clear the
first railroad crossing north of town by 6:30 a. m.
The crossings of the MONOCACY and their approaches from the east will
be observed.
(c) The head of the main body will start from the first railroad
crossing north of town at 6:50 a. m. and follow the advance guard at
about one mile.
(d) The Signal battalion will march between the main body and the
advance guard, and will maintain communication with the cavalry.
[Illustration: Fig. XV]
[Illustration]
1st Bn. Sig. (less 1
Radio sec. pack Sig.)
(x) The outpost will stand relieved at 6:30 a. m.
(y) Hourly halts of ten minutes on the even hour.
4. The field trains will assemble north of the town after the troops
have cleared the place, and report to C. O. trains.
5. The Division Commander will remain in FREDERICK until 8:30 a. m. and
will then join the reserve of the advance guard.
A,
Maj. Gen.
Copies to:
Staff.
1st Brig.
2d Brig.
3d Brig.
1st Brig. F. A.
1st Cav.
1st Engrs.
Sig. Bn.
Director of Amb. Cos.
F. Tn.
Div. Tns.
Outpost.
Copy to Corps Hq. by mail, synopsis by wire.
1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
FREDERICK, MD.,
15 May, '16, 9:20 p. m.
Orders No. --
(Map reference)
1. For the march May 12, the trains will be divided into two sections:
First section, in order of march: Field trains, 1st section supply
train, 1st Am. Co., Engr. train.
Second section, in order of march: Field hospitals, 2d Am. Co., supply
train (less 1st sec.).
2. The 1st section will follow about two miles in rear of the troops.
The 2d section will follow the first at about two miles.
By command of Maj. Gen. A.
Copies to: B,
Staff. C. of S.
C. O. F. Tn.
C. O. Div. Tn.
The members of the division staff would do well to supply themselves
with diagrams to scale of the division on the march. (See Fig. XV.)
These are applied to the map and the position of any unit at any time
is thus approximately determined.
COMBAT.
To enter upon a deliberate and protracted engagement late in the
afternoon, especially with troops tired from a day’s march is
justifiable only under exceptional conditions. Even if the attack
be successful before nightfall there will hardly be enough daylight
remaining to reap the fruits of victory. If advancing in a single
column a division may require, depending upon the terrain, from 1½ to
2½ hours for deployment alone.
The desire to obtain fire superiority leads the attacker to an endeavor
to extend his line and overlap that of the defender, thus subjecting
part of the latter’s line to both frontal and oblique fire. Purely
frontal attacks may force the enemy back but have little prospect of
annihilating him. Nevertheless the decisive blow is not invariably
directed at the defender’s flank. Often a determined frontal attack
combined with a demonstration against the defender’s flank or pressure
against his line of retreat will have good prospects of decisive
results. Enveloping attacks, with their great extension of front
are a form of dispersion and subject to the risks thereof. A timid
commander will often allow too small an interval and too obtuse an
angle between his frontal and enveloping attacks, whereby the latter
fails of envelopment. A rash commander, on the other hand, may provide
at the outset too great an interval between the attacks, whereby they
fail of coordination and mutual support and run the risk of repulse
or even annihilation in detail. It is necessary then to find in each
case the golden mean between two undesirable extremes. Here again many
conditions enter into the problem and “rules” cannot be given. An
enveloping attack to be decisive must generally aim well to the rear.
It is a condition precedent to a successful envelopment, however, that
enemy be attacked in front with ample strength. The gap between the
attacks should, taken in connection with the nature of the terrain,
be such that the defender cannot advance against the holding attack
without exposing his flank to the envelopment. As the attacker moves
forward the gap between his forces will usually diminish and with
it the risk of a counter-attack against the troops in front of the
defender. The difficulty of coordinating the separated portions
is usually the greatest danger to be anticipated. The envelopment
should generally be provided for in the first deployment, as it is
much more difficult to secure when initiated after the opening of the
frontal attack by the employment of retained reserves. The troops for
the envelopment will often be ordered to a preparatory position from
which their attack is launched. As to which attack will be launched
first this will depend upon circumstances. Ordinarily the entry of
the enveloping troops into action will be the signal for the general
attack. Whether the troops holding the front will participate in the
assault depends also on conditions. They may be able to exercise a more
decisive influence by oblique or enfilade fire on the hostile troops
opposed to the envelopment. Great separation of the forces or obstacles
of the terrain between them are elements of danger to be given such
consideration as they may, in the particular case, demand.
Turning movements like envelopments, though to an even greater extent,
are forms of dispersion. They are usually to be condemned in the
operations of small forces, the weak detachments of which are too
readily and too quickly overwhelmed by superior strength when alone and
unsupported. They are of occasional application in the operations of a
division and of more frequent application by larger forces. In spite of
the risks involved in such maneuvers they will continue to be in favor
with bold commanders since they frequently promise decisive results
in case of success. Envelopments grade into turning movements and no
sharp line can be drawn between the two maneuvers. An envelopment so
separated from a holding attack by distance or natural obstacles as
to render co-operation and mutual support difficult or impossible,
partakes of the nature of a turning movement, and of the risks inherent
in this form of dispersion.
The plan of attack should generally be based upon the best dispositions
for the infantry, other elements conforming thereto. Cover for
advancing infantry is a prime consideration up to the opening of the
struggle for fire superiority. Afterwards the attacker’s own fire must
be his principal protection. The envelopment of a hostile flank, where
contemplated, should be provided for from the start; do not wait until
after the deployment is commenced. For the considerations determining
which flank to envelop see Chap. XI. The separation of the main and
secondary attacks depends upon the terrain, the relative sizes of the
opposing forces, the means of communication, the state of the enemy’s
morale, the mission, etc.
If the division is on the march it will often be advisable to issue two
orders, the first a development order, the second an attack order.
The order for attack indicates the front upon which the large units
deploy, and the portion of the enemy’s line they are to cover. The
brigades are directed to proceed to their assigned positions, where
they will usually await the order to attack. In a rencontre engagement
the units may attack at once. When all is ready the division commander
signals the advance. The telegraph is the best means of insuring a
properly timed advance. It has the advantage that it allows the attack
to be launched in the light of the latest information received by the
commander. Launching the attack at a stated hour, or by prearranged
signal (gun or flag) although frequently resorted to, has some
disadvantages. Communication by the signal troops on the field does not
ordinarily extend to organizations below a brigade. The position to
which the brigade proceeds for deployment should have covered approach.
It should be as close to the hostile line as will still enable the
brigade to effect its deployment without undue interference from the
hostile artillery. The distance will usually be from 1½ to 2½ miles.
The selection and placing of the reserves depends largely upon the
flanks, both friendly and hostile. Except for compelling reasons they
should be held intact at the outset. Ordinarily it is to be presumed
that the reserve will be eventually employed in the enveloping attack.
In such cases it would be posted in rear of the outer flank thereof.
If, however, there be a reasonable probability of its employment
elsewhere, it should be held at first in a more central position.
In rear of the inner flank of the main attack will ordinarily be a
convenient place in view of several possibilities. It should always
be under the immediate control of the supreme commander. When a force
has once been committed to an engagement it is by the prompt and
judicious use of the reserves alone that the commander can influence
the subsequent course of the action. The station of the reserve in the
preliminary disposition will ordinarily be from 2 to 3 miles from the
hostile line. Engineers upon completion of such special tasks as may be
assigned them will ordinarily join the reserve. For a purely passive
defense strong reserves are not usually necessary. Such reserves as are
held out should make preparations to cover the withdrawal, in case of
defeat.
The depth of deployment in the beginning of an attack will depend
upon a number of considerations. “Depth of deployment” as the term
is here used means the ratio of the total strength of the combatant
force to the deployed front in yards. The strength of the firing line
proper (in attack) should be about one man per yard of front. Depth
therefore depends on the relative strength of supports and reserves,
as compared to the firing line. It is measured in men, not in yards,
and is expressed as so many men per yard of deploying front. It has no
reference to the distance of the reserve behind the firing line. The
greatest care must be taken then that too many men be not committed
prematurely to the action. The combat, however, is decided by the
firing line. Retained forces which are not launched against the enemy
produce no effect on the result. To deploy an insufficient number of
men and then reinforce them by driblets is wrong. Distribution in depth
therefore, is a means to an end. It is necessary in the preparatory
stages of the fight to enable the commander to meet unexpected
developments, especially when the knowledge as to the strength,
dispositions and intentions of the enemy is insufficient. A force then
should go into action in a relatively deep formation, but it must
extend its front during the action, and when the decisive moment is
recognized every available man should be thrown in for the assault.
While too great depth of deployment at the outset is a serious mistake
it is a less one than the opposite extreme of deploying from the start
on too broad a front. The decision as to the proper depth of deployment
in any particular case cannot be made a matter of rule, but calls for
all the skill and judgment of the commander. Success alone can justify
his dispositions. The criterion is this: at the decisive point were
the attacking (or defending) lines the strongest that it was possible
to have obtained? The following are some of the considerations which
influence the decision as to depth of deployment.
1. The fighting qualities of the enemy. Are his troops in retreat, have
they been defeated, are they of poor quality or low in morale? If so a
greater extension of front is permissible.
2. Is the force fighting alone, or as a part of a larger force? Is
it on the offensive or defensive, and if the former is it making a
decisive or merely a holding attack? Is the fight to be to a decision
or is it a delaying action? Is it a deliberately planned attack or a
rencontre? If fighting alone, if on the offensive, if in a decisive
engagement, if in a deliberately planned attack greater depth of
deployment at the outset will usually be advisable than in the contrary
cases.
3. Are reinforcements expected on either side?
4. The nature of the terrain, cover, security of the flanks. In
favorable terrain, particularly that which affords security to the
flanks greater extension of front is usually justifiable.
5. Are the enemy’s strength, dispositions and intentions accurately
known? If not it is better to have at first a relatively great depth of
deployment pending developments.
6. The frontage of units cannot be definitely fixed as it depends upon
the conditions and the object of the combat. Companies ordinarily
go complete into the firing line. Larger units ordinarily hold out
supports and reserves. The frontage of deployment does not increase in
proportion to the size of the force. It is usually relatively less for
large forces. The necessity for distribution in depth usually increases
with the size of the force.
7. The depth of deployment will be greater opposite the decisive points
in the front.
etc. etc.
In view of the great variety of conditions and the many considerations
which influence the decision it is impossible to enunciate arithmetical
rules for the depth of deployment in various situations. The following
figures can serve therefore, only as a very general guide.
The deployed front of a brigade of about 4,000 men (in division) at the
opening of a decisive attack against good troops should not usually
exceed 1,200 to 1,500 yards. The division, at have from 5 to 7 men per
yard of deployed front.
Artillery should be kept well in hand under the senior artillery
officers. This does not mean that the entire artillery brigade
need be in one mass. The terrain often will not permit of this.
Where practicable, however, it is desirable that regiments be not
sub-divided. One may be assigned in rear of each attack (the main
and secondary). Enfilade fire should be sought, as also the longest
continued fire on the hostile infantry, especially that opposed to the
main attack, over the heads of the advancing troops. This is usually
best obtained from positions behind the holding attack.
When combat is imminent certain trains are released from the division
train and ordered to designated localities. The artillery ammunition
is hastened to the front and placed at the disposal of the artillery
commander. It is posted at a convenient point or points a mile or so
in rear of the artillery positions. The position should be selected
with reference to the location of the roads. Small arms ammunition
is similarly brought forward and disposed for convenience of supply.
Usually the artillery ammunition will be required first and will be
given right of way. The sanitary and engineer trains are usually also
released. To avoid obstructing the roads wagons should be parked clear
thereof.
Ambulance Companies are stationed, according to the probable
necessities, usually one behind each brigade in the attacking line. The
considerations that govern the stationing of the ammunition companies,
point usually, to the same locality for the ambulance companies, about
3 to 4 miles from the enemy’s line. The remaining ambulance companies
are kept in hand well to the rear. Ambulance companies should not be
immobilized prematurely by the establishment of dressing stations.
Until the course of events indicates where these stations will most
be needed as well as how near the wounded they can be established, it
is usually unwise to set them up. The field hospitals should at first
remain well to the rear. Later they may be moved forward to or near the
dressing stations, if the course of the action and other conditions
permit. For the best performance of their functions it is desirable
that the field hospitals be located on a railroad or in a town,
preferably both. If the command advances after a successful action the
ambulance companies must be released, and the field hospitals should
advance and take over the wounded directly from the dressing stations.
Otherwise the ambulance companies and other available transportation
should be utilized to transport the wounded back to the field hospitals
at a point convenient for their care and further evacuation. During the
action one of the field hospitals sets up a station for the slightly
wounded.
Combat orders should cover the disposition of all trains which are
thereby released from the control of the commander of the trains,
including disposition of ambulance companies, field hospitals, slightly
wounded station, ammunition distributing stations, etc. All officers
concerned with the handling of the released trains should receive
copies of the orders. The commander of the trains need not invariably
be furnished a copy of the field order, but the necessary information
may be embodied in a brief order, thus:
“Division attacks hostile force at HUNTERSTOWN. Sn. Tn., Am. Tn.,
and Engr. Tn., released to MUMMASBURG to await orders from Chief
Surgeon, Arty. and Engr. commanders. Remainder of trains will park near
MUMMASBURG. Messages for Div. Hq. to GOLDENVILLE.”
Important messages, especially during combat, should preferably be
written rather than verbal, and this is true whether they be carried by
enlisted men or officers. When practicable, therefore, the person who
is to deliver the message should write it down as dictated, repeating
it afterwards in the presence of the officer by whom sent.
After combat the following must be attended to:
1. The wounded sent to the rear. The ambulance companies, if not
immediately required in the advance of the division, may, with other
available transportation, be used to carry the wounded to the field
hospitals or the latter come forward as noted above. In the evacuation
of the wounded to the rear, empty supply and ammunition wagons as well
as all impressed wagons are utilized as far as conditions permit.
If the combat is followed by a retreat the sanitary troops precede
the combatant forces, removing as many of the wounded as possible. A
suitable detail should be left for the care of the seriously wounded
that cannot be removed. None of the wounded, if it can be avoided,
should be abandoned to the enemy’s sole care. He cannot be expected to
attend them until all of his own are cared for.
2. Ammunition in men’s belts and combat trains should be replenished.
This should be accomplished at the latest by daybreak following. In the
operation orders this item is accompanied by an announcement of the
location of the ammunition company designated to make the issues.
3. Rations in the men’s packs and field wagons should be replenished
promptly.
4. Police of the battlefield when practicable.
5. Prisoners should be sent to the rear. The immediate escort will be
approximately 10 per cent of the strength of the prisoners.
6. Necessary instructions for trains.
7. The commander of the line of communications is given instructions
covering such of the following details as may be necessary:
(a) Information as to the situation.
(b) Re-supply of ammunition, rations, forage, medical supplies,
equipment, men and animals.
(c) Transportation for wounded and prisoners with necessary personnel.
(d) Such special instructions as the situation may demand.
ORDER FOR A DIVISION ATTACK
1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
GOODINTENT S. H.,
(Near GOLDENVILLE, PA.),
Field Orders } 2 April, '16, 11:15 a. m.
No. -- }
Gettysburg 3" map.
1. A hostile force of less than two infantry brigades and a regiment of
artillery has occupied the line hill 602--hill 597 and is intrenching
the four main spurs projecting west from that ridge. Red artillery has
been located between hills 602 and 601. The defeated Red cavalry has
reappeared on YORK TURNPIKE west of GRANITE HILL.
2. This division will attack enveloping the hostile left. March
conditions now cease.
3. (a) The 2d Bn., 2d L. A. will take position on the ridge southeast
of GOLDENVILLE and fire on the hostile artillery.
The 2d L. A. (less 2d Bn.), from a position east of HERMAN, will
support the attack of the 1st Brig.
The 1st L.A., from a position near VARNEY, will support the attack of
the 2d Brig.
(b) The 1st Brig. will attack the three northern spurs of the Red
position. Its right will follow the line J. WEAVER--farmhouse north of
592. Its left will not extend north of hill 574. The advance will not
be carried east of the HARRISBURG ROAD until further orders.
(c) The 2d Brig., moving via 608--513--511 road, will vigorously attack
the south spur of the Red position and envelop the hostile left. Its
right will not extend east of the FAIRVIEW S. H.--HUNTERSTOWN road.
(d) The 3d Brig. and 1st Engrs. (less Co. A), Gen. D comdg., will move
via GOLDENVILLE and 608 to 513 west of VARNEY and await orders.
(e) The 1st Cav. (less 2 trs.) will move to the vicinity of J. KAAS,
south of FAIRVIEW S. H. and wait in readiness to assist the 2d Brig’s.
attack. Reconnaissance will be pushed out towards HUNTERSTOWN,
BONEAUVILLE and east of GRANITE HILL.
Tr. B will remain at its present position and cover our left,
reconnoitering towards HUNTERSTOWN and NEWCHESTER and through
HEIDLERSBURG.
(f) 1st Engrs. (less Co. A) will join the reserve. Co. A (less mtd.
sec.) will remain at HERMAN. Mtd. sec. Co. A, will move north of the
CONEWAGO and destroy all bridges near NEWCHESTER.
(g) 1st Bn. Sig. will establish a wire line between each brigade and
these headquarters. Present radio distribution remains.
4. The 1st Amb. Co. will remain at HERMAN. The 2d Amb. Co. will move to
creek crossing south of 513. 3d and 4th Amb. Cos. will await orders at
621 crossroads west of GOLDENVILLE. Station for slightly wounded will
be at first crossroads west of GOLDENVILLE. Am. distributing stations,
1st Brig. and 2d L. A., at crossroads 679 on MUMMASBURG road; 2d and
3d Brigs. and 1st L. A., at BOYD S. H.
5. Messages to farmhouse west of J. WEAVER.
A,
Maj. Gen.
Copies to:
Staff.
1st Brig.
2d Brig.
3d Brig.
Arty. Brig.
1st Cav.
1st Engrs.
1st Bn. Sig.
Tr. B, 1st Cav. (extract)
(Report to Superior Commander.)
Note--As soon as the 2d Brig. has launched its attack and approached
the line of the 1st Brig., General A will order the latter to continue
its advance.
CAMPING.
The requirements of a division camp are of two kinds, tactical and
sanitary. Tactical considerations when present, take precedence in
every case. The tactical considerations are:
1. Mission of the command, orders from higher authority, contemplated
tactical operations in the immediate future, relations to other
friendly or hostile forces in the locality, etc.
2. Sufficient space to accommodate the command. There is a physical
limit to crowding as well as the disadvantage that may accrue due to
cramped dispositions, if attacked.
3. The site should, if practicable, be screened against hostile
observation. This is not always possible but the easy observation of
the main body by hostile patrols should be prevented.
4. Outpost line. The camp should have a defensible outpost line.
5. The network of roads and the location of water supply largely
determine the distribution of the troops in the site selected. It is
desirable that each fraction of the command have a road or a good trail
leading to its camp from the highway, so that it will not have to pass
through the camps of other organizations. For mounted troops this is
especially desirable.
6. Infantry should be camped in front of other troops that cannot so
readily defend themselves in case of a sudden attack.
7. The site of a crossroads usually aids in the fulfillment of
conditions 5 and 6. It has the added advantage that the command
occupies virtually a position in readiness. It is able to move to the
front or either flank, promptly, without confusion or countermarching.
8. Whether the command shall camp in depth or in mass depends upon
conditions, chief amongst which is the proximity of the enemy. Camping
in depth is the more convenient, facilitating both arrival and
departure; camping in mass the more secure.
The sanitary considerations are:
1. Water. Only the most compelling tactical necessities can outweigh
the need for an adequate supply of good water. Every separate water
shed should be utilized for a separate fraction of the command.
2. Mounted organizations should be down stream from foot troops.
3. Heat, cold, dust, wind and soil, are matters of importance in camps
to be occupied for some time. But usually little weight can be given
them in a one-night camp.
4. Fuel.
5. Drainage.
Sanitary conditions should be given all the weight that tactical
conditions will permit.
Fig. XVI illustrates a convenient arrangement of a division camp or
bivouac. The division has just arrived from the southwest, and is in
close contact with a force believed to be inferior, to the northeast.
The 2d Brigade which marched at the head of the main body during the
day, is assigned the site farthest from the highway because it can
reach it first. The brigade enters its camp via the road which turns to
the northwest from the highway at a point about 1,400 yds. northeast
of Taneytown. The 3d Brigade then marches directly to its camp,
opposite the 2d, without interfering with other troops. Water is ample
in quantity and convenient of access to both brigades. The Artillery
Brigade is assigned a camp under the protection of the infantry. It has
a separate water supply downstream of the foot troops.
It enters its camp by the lane shown, and distributes on each side of
this lane. The situation of the artillery here economizes in security
measures.
All three of these camps are of ample area, they are capable of easy
description in the halt orders. No one is contingent upon the others;
no organization need be ordered “next south of” or “immediately east
of” another. Each site can be described by identifying it with the
natural and artificial features, roads, railroads, streams, etc. Each
subordinate commander thus knows at once precisely where to go without
waiting to take the space left him by any other organization. Special
troops in this case are treated as a single body, the senior officer
commanding. Their site is convenient for the organization last to
arrive in camp. They have a good water supply opposite the artillery.
The Ambulance Companies are assigned to the site selected because it
gives them a separate source of water supply and places them near the
town so that some of the buildings could be used in case of necessity
for the sick of the command. No use is made of the stream flowing north
from Taneytown; it is probably polluted by the drainage of the town.
The advance guard, 1st Brigade reinforced, outposts the camp during the
night. It camps near Galt a mile and a half ahead of the division, and
places the 1st Infantry on outpost. The outpost line (see map) is about
a mile beyond the advance guard camp. The baggage section and one day’s
rations of the field trains join the troops. The division trains camp
in two sections as follows: First section, composed of remaining field
trains, 1st sec. supply train, 1st ammunition company, and pack train
are camped south of Taneytown. The second section, consisting of supply
train (less 1st sec.), ammunition train (less 1st Am. Co.), field
hospitals, and engineer train, is camped near Ladiesburg.
The main body of the division in this instance is not camped in column.
The 2d and 3d Brigades watch their own flanks with small detachments as
shown, thereby avoiding undue extension of the outpost line. The camp
is screened from any close view by the enemy.
The halt and outpost order should be issued well in advance so that
subordinate commanders may conduct their organizations to the places
assigned without countermarching, delay or confusion. One or two
hours before the close of the day’s march is not too early for the
issue of the order. The order designates the troops for outpost,
usually from the advance guard. The line to be outposted is given in
general terms only, from the map. The division commander cannot hope,
nor is it necessary for him to select the line on the ground. This
duty ordinarily devolves upon the commanders of the advance guard and
outpost. If the order is issued early enough a copy is sent to the
cavalry in front, otherwise special instructions must be sent them. The
instructions for the cavalry include the following: new information
of enemy and friendly troops, plans for the following day; mission
of the cavalry for the remainder of the day, when to cease work for
the night and where to camp (this last may be left to the judgment of
the cavalry commander in which case he reports his whereabouts to the
supreme commander), what troops are to be left out over night, what
troops are to be assigned to the outpost if any, and when they are to
report, location of outpost line, camp of advance guard, main body,
location of division headquarters, where the cavalry field trains will
be sent, place of issue of supplies, time and place for the next issue
of division orders, etc. The prompt and orderly distribution of the
troops to their camps at the close of a day’s march is necessary to the
maintenance of discipline and fighting efficiency, and is an index of
the competence of the division staff.
Other orders issued would include:
1. Orders as to time and place of making issues when this information
is obtained too late for insertion in the halt order. Routine orders
covering matters of general interest, not properly belonging in
operation orders.
2. Instructions to the Chief Quartermaster of the division concerning
the procurement of supplies, disposition of empty wagons, etc.
3. Instructions to the commander of the line of communications
concerning supplies, repair of railroads, movement of advance supply
depot, etc.
(See orders following).
ORDER FOR CAMPING AND OUTPOSTING OF A DIVISION.
To the Divisional Cavalry by mounted messenger (or wireless.)
1st Division, 1st Blue Army Corps,
TANEYTOWN, MD.,
10 Sept., '16, 2:45 p. m.
Commanding Officer,
1st Cav.
Division camps north of TANEYTOWN for the night. Advance
guard will camp near GALT and place outposts. Determine
first the location of the flanks of the enemy’s line near
KINGSDALE; second whether any hostile troops are on the
march between KINGSDALE and MCSHERRYSTOWN. Withdraw behind
the outpost line by 9:00 p. m. Your wagons will join the
advance guard at GALT. Division headquarters road jct.
1½ mile N. E. of town.
A,
Maj. Gen.
1st Division,
TANEYTOWN, MD.,
Field Order, } 10 Sept., '16, 3 p. m.
No. 3. }
Geological Survey map.
1. Our cavalry has been in contact with hostile cavalry since the
crossing of the LITTLE PIPE CREEK, and has been successful in driving
them back. It reports that it has developed the enemy holding a line
just south of KINGSDALE. The railroad bridges over the BIG PIPE and
LITTLE PIPE CREEKS have been destroyed.
2. The division will halt for the night.
3. (a) The advance guard will halt and camp near GALT, and will provide
for the security of the camp.
(b) The main body will camp as follows:
The 2d Brigade on the right bank of PINEY CREEK, south of the 469--526
road and north of the road leading west from this road junction. A
small detachment will be sent towards the high ground near 526 to
observe the roads leading towards LONGVILLE and 528.
The 3d Brigade on the left bank of PINEY CREEK, south of the 469--554
road and opposite the 2d Brigade. A small detachment will be sent
towards 554 to observe towards STUMPTOWN.
The artillery brigade (less the 1st Bn. 1st L. A.) on the right bank of
the tributary to PINEY CREEK which flows into the same at a point 200
yards southwest of this road junction.
The Signal Battalion, and 1st Engrs. (less Co. A.) on the left bank of
the tributary to PINEY CREEK and opposite the artillery.
The 2d, 3d, and 4th Ambulance Companies at the head of the stream at
the northern edge of TANEYTOWN.
4. The baggage section and one day’s rations of the Field trains will
join their organizations, those of the 1st Cavalry will join the
advance guard at GALT.
5. Division headquarters will be at this road junction.
A,
Maj. Gen.
(How and to whom communicated.)
1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
TANEYTOWN, MD.,
Orders } 10 Sept., '16, 3 p. m.
No. 2 }
1. The division camps tonight northeast of TANEYTOWN.
2. The first section of the division trains, less baggage section field
trains, will camp near the southwest exit of TANEYTOWN; 2d section at
LADIESBURG.
3. Distributing point near southwest exit of TANEYTOWN, 7:30 p.m.
4. Refilling point rail head, LITTLE PIPE CREEK (via MIDDLESBURG).
By command of Maj. Gen. A.
X
Asst. C. of S.
Copies to:
Staff.
C. O. Div. Tn.
C. O. F. Tn.
[Illustration: Fig. XVI CAMP OF A DIVISION.
_Contour interval 20 feet._
_Datum is mean sea level._]
Telegram to the commander of the depot at Frederick.
1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
TANEYTOWN, MD.,
10 Sept., '16, 3 p. m.
Commanding Officer,
Supply Depot, FREDERICK, MD.
1st Division camps for the night Sept. 10-11 one half mile
northeast of TANEYTOWN. Request that supplies for this
division for one day be sent by special train to arrive at
rail head LITTLE PIPE CREEK by 8 p. m. Also send 1,000,000
rounds small arms ammunition and 5,000 rounds artillery
ammunition to arrive at LADIESBURG by rail on the morning
of the 11th. You will have railroad construction crew ready
to start to replace bridges over LITTLE PIPE and BIG PIPE
CREEKS. Am sending estimates by motorcyclist.
A,
Chief of Staff.
Copies to:
Staff.
C. O. Div. Tn.
SUPPLY.
The division is the administrative unit for supply, and the tactics of
a division differ in principle from those of smaller units chiefly in
that they are concerned additionally with the handling of supply trains.
The vehicles, etc., with an infantry division as authorized by F. S. R.
1914 are as follows:
Guns 48
Other artillery carriages with firing batteries 78
Combat trains, including artillery, wagons 210
Field trains Baggage section, wagons 54
Ration section, wagons 124
Ammunition train, wagons 162
Supply train, wagons 126
Sanitary train, wagons and ambulances 90
Engineer train, wagons 9
Machine guns 40
Pack mules 273
The bakery train is not now a part of the division trains unless
specially attached. Ordinarily it is with the line of communications.
Bridge trains likewise are part of the division only when specially
attached.
In the U. S. service it is now provided that certain reserve (park)
intrenching tools for each battalion of infantry and each squadron of
cavalry will be carried in their combat wagons. A reserve of engineer
supplies including park intrenching tools, explosives, etc., will be
carried in wagons to be furnished for that purpose. These wagons will,
on the march in division, be consolidated into an engineer train, under
charge of the senior engineer officer of the division. It habitually
marches with the other trains of the division. (See Fig. XV.)
There are two sources of supply for armies in the field:
1. The theatre of operations; and 2. The base of operations. Supply
operations in the theatre are controlled directly by the commander of
the field forces, while the operations of supply from the home country
to the base depot, called “the service of the interior” are conducted
by the department commanders, and bureau chiefs, acting under the War
Department.
It is desirable to utilize to the utmost the produce of the theatre
of operations and this is particularly true of forage because of its
great weight and the drag on the operations of the army incident to its
transportation. Other supplies which may be obtained in varying and
usually uncertain quantities in the theatre of operations will include
food, medicine and surgical supplies, commercial tools and building
materials, fuel, wagons, automobiles and railroad rolling stock, etc.
Arms and ammunition, uniform clothing and equipment, and in general all
distinctively military supplies and equipment must be obtained from the
base.
Supplies are gathered in the theatre of operations by purchase or
requisition or both, as may seem most desirable. In friendly country
purchase is the rule while in hostile territory requisition is usual
although not invariable. Requisition will take the form either of
foraging or systematic collection at depots. Foraging is usually
conducted directly by the troops acting under their own officers
but where practicable collections are best made through the local
authorities. The collection thus taps a larger area, giving greater
results and a more equitable distribution of the burden on the
inhabitants. Supplies collected in hostile territory are acknowledged
by means of receipts given to the parties furnishing the supplies.
Such receipts will be redeemed generally by the invader in public
funds or captured public funds or by funds collected in the form of
contributions or tax levies, or the receipts may be presented to the
local government for redemption. Copies of these receipts are retained
by the officers giving them. Article 52, Sec. I, Hague Convention,
1907, reads: “The requisitions in kind shall as far as possible, be
paid for in ready money; if not a receipt shall be given, and the
payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible.” Moreover
there is nothing that will bring forth supplies more readily or in
greater quantity than cash payments.
In the theatre of operations the functions of the War Dept, and of
the various commanders are in general as follows: the War Dept,
designates the commander of the field forces, assigns him a definite
mission, prescribes the zone under his command, and supplies him with
means necessary to the accomplishment of his mission. The commander
of the field forces exercises supreme authority over all military and
administrative matters within the zone assigned him, organizing the
means placed at his disposal so as to insure efficiency, and directing
and controlling all operations necessary for the accomplishment of the
mission. The commander of the line of communications is responsible
to the commander of the field forces for the efficient operation and
defense of the line of communications and directs and controls all
administrative and staff services attached thereto.
Under the most favorable conditions, a large army cannot live wholly
off the country and supplies must be forwarded to it from its base.
This is especially true of armies which are stationary or nearly so
for considerable periods. The purpose of utilizing to the utmost the
supplies of the theatre is to increase the mobility of the army by
reducing the amount of transportation, and avoiding some of the many
restrictions inherent in a line of communications. But the size of
modern armies is increasing to such extent that dependence to any
great degree upon the supplies obtainable in the theatre is out of the
question. The attempt in such cases to subsist from the theatre instead
of increasing the mobility of the army would decrease its mobility,
and hence its operative superiority over the enemy. A better rule
would be to amass at the base depots a large reserve in excess of the
contemplated need.
_The operations of supply_ from the Service of the Interior to
the front are as follows: One or more points are selected in rear
of the troops (exceptionally they may be on a flank) having ample
communications with the producing districts of the home country, rail
or water, or preferably a combination of the two. These points should
be so situated as to have ample security from hostile incursion,
generally well to the rear. They should be equipped with store-houses,
barracks, corrals, shops, etc. To such a point are shipped the supplies
of food, ammunition, forage, medical and surgical supplies, and
equipment of all kinds, as well as men and animals. This point is known
as the base depot. From this base depot to the troops at the front,
supplies and reinforcements are sent over the “line of communications.”
This line may be either rail or water or both, but in some cases
nothing but a wagon road will be available.
The whole is under the charge of the commander of the line of
communications. This officer has the necessary staff. He commands
the base depot itself, as well as the line of communications, and
the troops detached for their security. He is the officer upon whom
devolves the duty of forwarding the necessary supplies to the troops at
the front. Frequently his influence upon the outcome of the campaign is
second only to that of the supreme commander in the field. He should,
of course, be under the orders of the supreme commander, though this
practice has been by no means habitual in the American service of the
past. He divides his line of communications into three services, (a)
defense, (b) supply, sanitary and telegraph, (c) military railways.
From the home country to the base depot supplies are transported by
rail or water or both; shipments must usually be broken at the base
depot, as the supplies must be stored each class in its appropriate
place until ready for distribution at the front. From the base depot
to the rail or water head is the zone of the line of communications.
At this rail or water head supplies are collected into what is known
as the “advance supply depot.” The carriers used in this zone are
usually directly controlled by the government, while those used for
transportation to the base depot are in the general case commercially
controlled.[7] The advance supply depot should be maintained as
close to the rear of the moving army, as is tactically and otherwise
possible. Herein lies the secret of successful administration of the
line of communications. If it is kept far to the rear of the troops,
there will result immense increase of labor for the draft animals, with
consequent loss of animals, destruction of the roads, inadequate supply
of the troops and greatly decreased mobility of the army. The positions
of the advance depot and of the refilling points are fixed from time to
time by the commander of the forces in the field.
[Footnote 7: “In time of war or threatened war, preference and
precedence shall, upon the demand of the President of the United
States, be given, over all other traffic, to the transportation of
troops and matériel of war, and carriers shall adopt every means within
their control to facilitate and expedite the military traffic.” Chap.
3591, Vol. XXXIV, U. S. Statutes at Large.]
From the advance supply depot to the troops is known as the zone of
the advance. In this zone, supplies are ordinarily hauled in wagons
and motor trucks. If rail or water transportation be established or
re-established ahead of the advance supply depot, it is of course at
all times utilized to the fullest extent. Also motor transport will
be utilized when conditions permit. Where wagon transportation is not
operative, for any cause, supplies may be hauled by pack animals,
coolies, etc. The trains of wagons or motor trucks are divided into
classes belonging to the Line of Communications and to the divisions or
supply units whatever they be. The management of these latter classes
is a part of the tactics of the Division.
The greater the number of lines of communication possessed by an army
the better. The confusion incident to the presence of the immense wagon
trains in the rear of a large force in the most favorable case is great
enough. It is therefore specially desirable that each supply unit
(Corps or Division) shall, so far as practicable have its own line of
communications either from the base depot itself or certainly from the
advance supply depots.
The supply unit here considered is assumed to be the division as given
in the F. S. R. It is in fact a body of troops whose length on a single
road is from 10 to 17 miles. If the marching column have a length
much greater than this, supply limited to a single road (unless it
be a good road on which motor transport is practicable) cannot keep
pace with the steady advance of the troops, unless occasional days of
rest be interposed. Two separate supply services can seldom operate
successfully on the same road at the same time.
Up to the advance supply depot the supply of all modern armies is,
in general, similar. Beyond this point there are differences. In the
American Service, the wagon or motor trains used in this zone are
of three general classes. The first is known to most armies as the
regimental train, the second as the administrative or supply train, and
the third as the general supply column sometimes called the auxiliary
train. Regimental and supply trains belong to the Divisions whilst
general supply columns belong to the Line of Communications.
The regimental train carries the immediate baggage, cooking utensils,
food, forage, and ammunition of the troops. The Field Service
Regulations give to these wagons the name field train and combat train.
The number of such wagons allowed each regiment is the subject of
regulations published from time to time; the more active the campaign,
the smaller being the allowance of regimental wagons. Regulations in
time of peace tend to increase the allowance of wagons to amounts that
can not be tolerated in aggressive campaign. The efficiency of troops
in campaign depends on their having as far as practicable daily access
to the regimental trains. When the trains are excessive in size, the
troops frequently cannot obtain daily access to them and the trains
are a drag on the operations. At the beginning of the Civil War,
regiments were allowed field trains of 10 to 13 wagons. At the close,
the allowance in the Appomattox campaign was 1 wagon per regiment and
about the same in the Western Armies. The regiments were of course
small. The F. S. R. at present allow to each infantry regiment 12
field wagons. These are habitually divided into two sections: (1) a
baggage section carrying baggage; and (2) a ration section carrying
rations and grain exclusively, and including rolling kitchens, if
supplied. For transportation of baggage each organization is assigned
its proportionate space on the vehicles of the baggage section. The
field trains are habitually routed on the march in a body, and usually
all the field trains of the different regiments are united in a single
body as the division field trains, marching in rear of the troops.
Combat wagons pertain to each battalion or squadron, etc. They are an
integral part of the battalion or squadron, and habitually march with
it in the column. Marching into probable action they remain loaded with
their combat unit until the last practicable moment, ammunition being
issued when it becomes necessary for the troops to separate from their
combat trains.
The administrative trains are known in the American Service as the
ammunition and supply trains. They carry ammunition, food and forage.
The ammunition train (of a division) consists of 6 wagon companies
of 27 wagons each, divided into 2 ammunition companies. They carry
the artillery and small arms ammunition of the division. A wagon will
carry about 100 rounds of light artillery or 30,000 rounds of small
arms ammunition. The food for men and animals is carried in a supply
train of 126 wagons or 4⅖ wagon companies. Pack trains are attached
when required. This supply train carries two days’ food and grain
for the division. It is divided into a first and a second section,
each carrying a day’s supply of food and grain for the division. The
composition of the supply train will be subject to modification to meet
conditions due to depletion of the division in campaign and the amount
of supplies obtained locally.
The supply and ammunition trains are the carriers generally used from
the advance supply depot to the field trains. The wagons are filled at
the advance depot (or where that depot is not sufficiently forward,
at refilling points) and they follow up the troops. Each day or as
often as may be necessary, supplies are issued from these columns to
replenish the issues from the field and combat wagons. The supply
trains are connecting links between the line of communications and the
immediate supply of the troops. From the supply trains to the troops
the carriers used are the field and combat trains of organizations.
The ration section of the field train carries for each man two days’
field and one day’s reserve ration, and for each animal two days’
grain ration. The soldier carries on his person at least two days’
reserve rations or more, according to the conditions of the case. In
the Civil War as well as in foreign wars there are innumerable examples
of the soldiers carrying, in cases of necessity as many as four or
five or more rations on the person. The _reserve_ ration, is the
simplest efficient ration. Its net weight is 2 pounds. The field ration
consists of the reserve ration in whole or in part, supplemented by
other articles. Reserve rations are consumed only in cases of emergency
by order of superior authority. They are renewed periodically to
prevent deterioration. The ration issued in the field will depend upon
the transportation facilities. Where these are inadequate the ration
will usually have to be diminished. Full field rations are issued
whenever practicable. Thus the division carries with it, in advance
of the supply depot 7 rations, 4 field and 3 reserve. By reducing the
ration, by carrying extra rations in place of some baggage, and by
living partly off the country, the division can subsist, when cut off
from its supply depot for a period much longer than 8 days. The exact
length of time will depend on all the circumstances of the case.
In addition to the regimental and divisional supply trains, the Line
of Communications must be prepared to maintain, usually, a class
of wagon transportation, called the general supply column, whose
business is to forward supplies from the advance supply depot to a
flying depot or refilling point where the supplies can be reached by
the division supply trains operating with the army. It will be shown
shortly that the division supply trains must keep up with their units
if the operations are to succeed. To this end, the advance supply
depot must be maintained closely in rear of the troops; but that the
operations of troops be not too intimately dependent on the location of
the advance supply depot, the commander of the Line of Communications
must be able to place supplies in emergency ahead of the advance
supply depot--within reach of the division supply trains. This is
accomplished by the use of the general supply columns of the Line of
Communications. The constitution of these columns is less the subject
of regulation allowance than that of regimental or divisional supply
trains. It will vary greatly with conditions whereas the other two
classes of wagon trains bear a reasonably fixed relation to the size
of the units. The general supply column may consist of army transport
or it may be locally hired or impressed. If a large army is operating
on a broad front and is limited to a single line of communications by
rail or river, it may tend to expedite supply to establish one or more
sub-supply depots on the same front with the advance supply depot.
The divisional supply trains and the general supply columns are not
usually reduced in numbers, due to the exigencies of campaign, in the
same proportion as are the regimental trains. Under recent legislation,
all the personnel of the field transport service, most of which was
heretofore civilian will now be enlisted--to the obvious improvement of
the service.
Fig. XVII[8] illustrates diagrammatically, after the manner of a
railroad graphic time table, the movement of supplies during 5 days
of a forward march, including a combat, of a division. (Reference 1
inch map, Geological Survey, Gettysburg and vicinity.) A Pennsylvania
division, based upon Gettysburg, is marching from Gettysburg to
attack a hostile force to the south. The Northern Central Railroad
has been interrupted south of Littlestown. It is intended to repair
this railroad as rapidly as possible, under cover of the advancing
division, for use as a line of communications. The division marches
from Gettysburg on the morning of June 2nd, on Emmitsburg, arriving
at the latter place shortly after noon, where it camps for the night.
Field wagons join the troops, and issue rations and forage for the
night. Supply trains following the division halt in rear, north of
Emmitsburg. After the issue to the troops the field wagons proceed
back to a designated point to which one section of the supply train is
forwarded. Here the field wagons replenish and return to their troops.
The emptied supply wagons thereupon are sent back to Gettysburg to
refill and afterward rejoin the division. They start at 6 p. m. and
reach Gettysburg at 10 p. m. That night while the teamsters and animals
get some rest, the wagons are refilled at the depot, and at 6 a. m.
June 3rd, they again take the road to rejoin the division at the front.
Early the same morning the division starts south towards Woodsboro. All
its trains are full, but the first section of the supply train is one
march to the rear. The division about 2:30 p. m. goes into camp for
the night, south of Woodsboro. Here the arrangements of the previous
evening are repeated. The field trains issue a day’s supply of rations
and forage to the troops, and proceed to the rear where they are met
by a section of the supply train; they replenish what they issued. If
nothing is purchased locally an entire section of the supply train will
be needed to replenish the issues from the field wagons. Habitually,
however, every exertion would be made to obtain from the locality all
the stores practicable, especially of the weighty forage item. The
purchase would be made by the Chief Quartermaster of the division, and
from his knowledge of the amount he can obtain locally, he is able at
once to determine how many of the wagons of the supply train will be
needed to replenish the field trains. Every wagon load of supplies thus
purchased locally saves a round trip of a wagon to the advance supply
depot.
[Footnote 8: Calculated for a supply train consisting of 3 sections,
each containing one day’s supply of rations and forage (grain only),
and an ammunition train of 6 wagon companies, 4 of small arms and 2 of
artillery ammunition. This is the tentative organization of 1914, but
the method indicated may be applied to any given organization of the
trains.]
[Illustration: Fig. XVII
Supply Service - Division
(<i>not drawn to scale</i>)
Ammunition Service - Division]
At 4 a. m. June 4th, the empty section of two wagon companies starts
back to Gettysburg to refill. It has 25 miles to go, and it reaches
Gettysburg at 7 p. m., having marched all day, except for a halt
for rest from 10 a. m. to 2 p. m. Meanwhile the first section, now
refilled, has joined from Gettysburg, and again the division has four
wagon companies of its supply train filled, as are also field wagons.
Meanwhile the troops have not drawn upon the reserve rations on their
persons. Up to this time there have been no expenditures of ammunition
or medical supplies, and there is nothing, therefore, for the trains
containing those supplies to do except to follow the division.
On the morning of June 4th the division meets the enemy, and attacks
him near Frederick. As soon as the attack is planned the trains are
halted in a place of safety near Woodsboro. Two wagon companies of
ammunition, however, are sent forward from Woodsboro, to stations
closely in rear of the division in action, for the purpose of
maintaining the ammunition supply during the action. The attack
terminates successfully, and the division camps for the night on the
field near Frederick, the cavalry moving out in pursuit of the defeated
enemy. The supply trains come forward from their halting place near
Woodsboro. The two wagon companies of ammunition, which replenished
the ammunition in the belts of the men and in the wagons of the
combat trains on the field of battle, then start for Gettysburg on
the afternoon of June 4th to refill. The wounded are transported by
ambulance to the field hospitals at Woodsboro, from which point they
will be taken to the rear by rail as soon as railroad communication
is re-established. The field trains issue to the troops or replace
expended reserve rations, and themselves replenish from the supply
train. The emptied section of the supply train then proceeds in the
early morning of June 5th to the rear to refill. Meanwhile word is
received that the line of communications will be extended by rail to
Woodsboro, probably during the afternoon of the 5th of June. Orders
are accordingly issued at 8 a. m., June 5th, directing the ammunition
wagons to return to Woodsboro, and directing the third section of the
supply train to stop at Woodsboro to refill instead of proceeding back
to Gettysburg. This order is not received by the ammunition companies
until nearly noon.
The division continues south on the morning of the 5th, to the Potomac
River, where it camps for the night, its supplies being again issued,
as before. The division then rests for the 6th of June, and the
railhead is pushed forward to Frederick, closely in rear. The state of
the division supply is then as follows (on June 6th); one section of
the supply train with the division, another loaded section has just
arrived at Frederick from Gettysburg, and a third is filling at the
railhead at Frederick. The field trains and the men’s packs are filled.
Of ammunition supply, the men’s belts and the combat trains are filled,
two wagon companies of small arms ammunition and one of artillery
ammunition are with the division, while two other wagon companies, one
of each class of ammunition, are en route back to the division from
Woodsboro, where they refilled.
It will readily be apparent that with but three sections of the supply
train the division cannot move far from its advance supply depot
without falling behind in its supply if dependent on wagons. Or stated
differently, the supply depot must not be permitted to lag behind the
advance of the troops. The relations between steadily advancing troops
and the advance supply depot which are necessary to the maintenance
of a satisfactory state of supply, may be expressed in a simple way,
mathematically, as follows:
Let
n = the number of sections in the supply train, each
containing one day’s supply for the troops.
e = number of miles empty wagons can travel in one day.
f = number of miles loaded wagons can travel in one day.
y = average daily advance of the troops.
X = number of marches (day’s travel) to the rear for empty
wagons to reach the supply depot, average.
Then
ex = miles travel to rear by empties in one trip.
ny = miles the division advances between issues from the same
section, assuming that the sections issue in regular
rotation.
ex + ny = miles traveled by any section from the time it
loads to the time it issues.
This must equal the miles traveled loaded.
Therefore
ex + ny = (n - x) f =1=
f - y
x = n ----- =2=
f + e
x
y = f - --- (f + e) =3=
n
f + 3
n = x ----- =4=
f - y
The maximum marching capacity of the trains, round trip, (that is from
point of issue to next point of issue) is ex + (n - x) f.
The distance they _must_ march to overtake the division is 2ex + ny.
Hence
ex + (n-x) f > 2ex + ny
(n-x) f > ex + ny.
Let us now assign actual values to the various quantities, and solve
for x.
Make n = 3; f = 20; e = 28; y = 12.
Then the inequality reduces to
x < ½ march of an empty wagon, or x < 14 miles.
This is to say that if the troops advance steadily every day, at the
rate of 12 miles, and have 3 supply sections to serve them, and if
those sections can travel empty and loaded at the liberal rates of 28
and 20 miles per day, respectively, then the advance supply depot,
or refilling point must not lag farther to the rear than 14 miles,
or slightly more than one day’s march of the division, unless the
division is to draw supplies locally, or fall behind. How are these
figures reconciled with known practice? In campaign the troops subsist
to the utmost from the local resources along the line of operations.
Moreover large bodies do not keep up a rate of advance of 12 miles per
diem long. There are rest and combat periods, etc., which reduce y (in
foregoing discussion.)
Equation 2 may be considered an expression of the supply train radius
somewhat similar to the war ship’s steaming radius. For, let us
assume the Division is stationary; then y = O and from Equation 2 we
have x = ₆₀/₄₈ = 1¼. Hence the conclusion that when the Division is
_stationary_, the supply depot cannot be in rear more than 1¼ marches
of an empty wagon (35 miles for the value assumed above). The radius of
the supply train can be increased by having the field train go well to
the rear to meet it for refilling after the daily issue of rations in
camp.
Generally speaking, the refilling points should be kept within two
marches of the rear of the troops, if the latter are subsisting chiefly
from their base and are supplied by animal-drawn vehicles. If the rail
or water head cannot keep thus close, the operations of the forces
may be restricted and their mission may be frustrated, unless motor
transport be employed.
In order to keep the advance supply depot well to the front the
commander of the line of communications must maintain an ample and
efficient railroad or steamboat force for operation and for maintenance
and repair. This work pertains solely to the line of communications
personnel, and if the fighting troops are detached for repair work on
the line of communications the operations of the fighting forces cannot
fail to suffer.
The field bakery on the Line of Communication does not attempt to
keep pace with all the changes of the advance supply depot in a rapid
advance. Too much time would thereby be lost. When the bakery _does_
change station, reserves of baked bread should be provided beforehand.
It may be laid down as the ideal condition for supply in campaign
that the supply trains be always full, and never drawn from. How can
such ideal be approximated? 1. By living off the country, the field
trains every day drawing their supplies direct from the collection
depots. 2. By maintaining the advance supply depot so close to the
troops that the field trains may draw direct, or 3. By a combination
of 1 and 2. Another desideratum is that the reserve rations in the
men’s packs be not used oftener than is necessary to keep them from
spoiling. These two ideals give the daily rules of conduct for supply
officers in campaign. A portion of a supply train, when empty, has no
status with the command. The first duty of an empty supply train is to
proceed to refill and rejoin as soon as practicable. Similarly packs
should not be permitted to remain depleted, but should be refilled at
the first opportunity. The service of supply is considered good when
the transportation with the troops is kept at a minimum, and military
operations are not hampered by lack of food and other necessary
supplies.
In Sherman’s campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta, 136 miles, the
following places were successively used as advance supply depots:
Ringgold, Dalton, Resaca, Kingston, Allatoona, Acworth, Big Shanty,
Marietta. Counting Allatoona, Acworth and Big Shanty as a single
depot (they were on a single front) we find that the extraordinarily
vigorous railroad construction enabled the advance supply depot to be
pushed ahead six times; that these moves averaged 23 miles. The depot
was thus habitually within two marches of the troops. At Resaca and
again at Marietta Sherman accumulated a great quantity of supplies
as a precaution against his line being cut at points farther to the
rear. These depots and the critical portions of the railroad had to be
guarded constantly against the raids of the Confederate cavalry and the
intense hostility of the inhabitants. At Resaca, Kingston and other
points, where the tactical situation, and the condition of the railroad
permitted, supplies were carried forward by rail ahead of the advance
supply depots, and issued directly to the field wagons, thus keeping
intact the rolling reserve in the supply columns. Grant’s '64 campaign
against Lee exhibits similar activity under different conditions. His
line of communications was the open sea, and he utilized 5 depots, to
wit: Alexandria, Aquia Creek, Port Royal, West Point, City Point, thus
keeping within two or at most three marches of the troops.
The operations of the forces should be conducted so as to cover at
all times the advance depot. If the forces be cut off from their
supply depot and be unable to regain it, disaster must result. Where,
therefore, maneuvers to a flank are attempted, that necessarily tend to
uncover the supply depot, it is well that the depot be not too close to
the forces, and that it be well protected against raids, etc.
[Illustration: Fig. XVIII Supply Service - Division
(_not drawn to scale_)]
[Illustration: Ammunition Service - Division]
In the advance, the supply trains will ordinarily halt for the night
about half a march in rear of the division. The baggage section of the
field trains and one day’s ration from the ration sections join the
troops without delay, so as to provide the rations and utensils for the
preparation of supper. The baggage of the troops though reduced to a
minimum in campaign, is essential to the maintenance of their fighting
strength, hence the field wagons should always be permitted to join the
troops unless the tactical situation positively forbids. As soon as
practicable after the arrival in camp of the ration vehicles, they are
unloaded and, without delay, rejoin the grouped portions of the ration
vehicles. The baggage sections usually go to the same place early the
following morning. Empty ration vehicles at the time designated in
administration orders, proceed to the distributing or issue point for
the purpose of replenishing their supplies. This point is selected in
rear of the division, both for safety, and convenience, and because
it tends to equalize the travel of the field and supply trains. It
should be at some place easily described in orders. A road junction is
desirable as it facilitates approach and departure and affords space
for the movements of wagons. The distributing point may be at the camp
of the supply train, or it may be a point in advance thereof. In the
latter case the necessary wagons of the supply train are sent forward
to make the issue. It is essential that this point of issue shall lend
itself to an orderly issue without delay or confusion amongst the
wagons. Cavalry operating at a distance from the division must usually
expect to live off the country. A pack train may accompany the cavalry
when it is undesirable or impracticable for them to take their wagons,
or the cavalry may impress or hire wagons. Cavalry draws ammunition
from any source most convenient.
Issues of ammunition are made in essentially the same way as that of
rations, from the ammunition train to the combat wagons, at ammunition
distributing stations. The issues are not made regularly however as are
rations, but only as ammunition is expended.
The time and place of issue must be published to the command, in
operation or routine orders. When the local conditions permit, time may
be gained by having the wagons unload at the place of issue without
awaiting the arrival of the field wagons, and thence proceed at once
back to the advance supply depot. Supply trains are under the command
of an officer detailed for the purpose.
Figure XVIII issued by the War Department is intended to illustrate
diagrammatically the method of supplying troops in campaign.
Supply trains are commanded by officers detailed for the purpose. On
the march trains are made up to follow the division in the order of
their probable need for the day. If no combat is probable the field
trains would be at or near the head and the field hospitals near the
tail. If combat seems probable some ammunition should be held well
toward the head of the combined trains. For convenience of march
trains may be divided into two sections with an interval. A convenient
arrangement for an ordinary march, where combat is not probable, is
in two sections, as follows: 1st section. Field trains, 1st section
supply train, 1st ammunition co., engineer train. 2nd section. Field
hospitals, 2d ammunition co., 2d section supply train, pack train.
The first section may follow the troops at from 1 to 3 miles, and the
second section follow the first at from 1 to 2 miles.
Where danger threatens in front so that combat appears likely, the
trains should be halted well to the rear. They may be halted on the
road, or parked off the road at the place of receipt of the order, if
sufficiently well protected in such place, and if they are not thereby
a menace to the safety of the command. They should not be allowed to
pass a defile until the conditions on the far side are known to be
safe. During combat they should never be permitted to remain on the
hostile side of a river or defile, even if it be necessary to leave
them many miles to the rear. The necessary ammunition and sanitary
supplies are of course sent forward for their appropriate use in the
combat. In making a flank march the trains may be held closely in
rear in a single section, but if the danger be at all great it will
be safer to route the trains, with or without a guard, according
to circumstances, on a separate road on the unexposed flank. In a
retrograde movement the trains precede, usually alone but with a guard
if a flank is exposed. The field trains and the section that is to make
the next issue must not be sent too far away from the place where it
is intended to camp until the resupply is accomplished. In retreat the
service of supply is simplified.
The rate of march of a wagon train depends upon the condition of the
stock and rolling equipment, state of the roads, weather, wagon loads,
etc. 20 to 30 miles per day for empty wagons is, in the U. S., about
the best that can ordinarily be expected, and for loaded wagons, 15 to
22 miles. Wagon trains do not usually halt for rest, but roll along
to their destination. If the trip is very long or fatiguing, they may
halt, for several hours, unhitch and feed, and then resume. They do not
ordinarily halt for hourly rests, as do the troops. The speed of wagon
trains usually averages about 2 mi. per hour on all kinds of roads.
On good stretches of road it may reach 2½ miles, rarely better. Auto
trucks will average 5 to 10 miles per hour, depending on roads and
other conditions.
The amount of supplies that may be obtained from a given locality
depends on a number of factors; whether the community is agricultural
or otherwise, and if agricultural what are the ruling crops; the
transportation facilities, season of the year, etc. Rural communities
are usually well stocked with food supplies, especially in the fall.
Of forage especially there will usually be large supplies. Cities and
towns habitually maintain a reserve in their store-houses. This reserve
is more concentrated, and of greater variety, than the rural reserves.
It is not the policy of the American government in the early stages of
a war to strip a locality too closely of its supplies, particularly
in friendly territory, and this is also forbidden by the 1907 Hague
Convention. But in case of necessity the army must be supplied at any
cost. It may be said as a rough rule that a town of 10,000 inhabitants
has sufficient reserves of food always on hand to supply a force of
20,000 men for one day without great embarrassment to the population,
provided the commercial transportation facilities be not paralyzed.
Col. Hazenkampf in his work entitled “The supply of an army in time of
war,” says: “From the experiences of former wars we have come to the
following general conclusions:
1st. If the population of a given point or locality be equal to the
number of troops, it can supply them for a period of 4, but not more
than 6 days.
2nd. If the number of troops be half the number of the population, they
can be maintained at the expense of the latter for 1 to 2 weeks.
3rd. Lastly, the number of troops being a quarter of the number of
inhabitants, they can be supplied for a space of 3 or 4 weeks.”
These figures are too great for application to the American service.
The food thus obtained locally is not, of course, the balanced
regulation ration. In campaign, soldiers must take things as they come
and make the best of the food they get from day to day.
_Some Supply Data._
The following data will be useful in connection with the subject of
supply:
Standard gauge box freight cars in the U. S. have capacities varying
from 20 to 50 tons. Their inside cargo space is about 8 ft. X 8 ft. and
the length runs from 30 to 40 feet, or more.
Box cars for narrow gauge roads are similar in construction to, but
of smaller dimensions than those for a standard gauge road; they have
carrying capacities up to 15 tons.
Flat cars and gondolas have about the same carrying capacities as box
cars. An average car has a capacity of 80,000 lbs. They are designed to
carry heavy and bulky articles that will not be injured by exposure to
the weather.
The supplies of an army are bulkier than much of commercial freight.
The cars will not always be carefully loaded, nor their full capacities
realized. Allowances should be made for these facts in estimating the
number of cars required.
Day coaches accommodate comfortably 40 to 50 men, but 60 to 65 can be
crowded into them for short hauls.
Sleepers carry 3 men to a section, and have 12, 14 or 16 sections.
Wounded should not be packed in too closely; ordinarily each will
require an entire berth. A large box car will accommodate 20 to 25
recumbent wounded.
Ordinary stock cars carry 16 to 20 animals. For short hauls they will
carry 25. They are slatted but have no stalls. They are arranged for
feeding hay but not grain or water. Animals should be unloaded and
watered once in 24 or certainly 36 hours. Palace stock cars carry 16
to 24 animals. They are fitted with stalls and with arrangements for
feeding and watering en route. Care is necessary to see that the water
tanks are filled and tight.
In railroad movements a guard and unloading detail should be arranged
for when necessary. The details if desired may best be sent with the
leading train.
The table following gives the weights and cubic contents of various
rations for men and animals, and the capacities of carriers for careful
loading. If the loading is not carefully done the stated capacities
will not be realized and allowance should generally be made for this.
From this table the number of carriers of any class required for a
stated number of rations may be computed.
Thus assuming a division at approximately 20,000 men and 8,000 animals,
one day’s reserve rations will require 15 wagons, 1 day’s hay for
animals 46 wagons, 1 day’s grain for animals (250 rations to a wagon),
32 wagons. A 40,000 lb. box car, fully loaded, is equivalent to about
15 wagons; for ordinary loading (20% waste) about 12 wagons. In any
case the actual capacities of the cars available should be ascertained,
and 20% excess allowed for inefficiency of loading.
Beef is often transported on the hoof, 16 to 20 cattle to a car. For
fresh vegetables the required cubic capacity is computed.
ALLOWANCE OF FORAGE, AND APPROXIMATE WEIGHTS AND MEASURES OF FORAGE AND
SUBSISTENCE.
LEGEND:
A = Gross weight of one ration (lbs.).
B = Number of rations to a 40,000 lb. box car (36 by 8 by 8).
C = Part of box car required for one ration.
D = Number of rations to an Army wagon (2,765 lbs.).
E= Number of rations to an auto truck (3,000 lbs.).
F= Cubic feet to one ration.
G = Number of rations to a cubic foot.
H = Number of rations to a ship’s ton (40 cubic feet).
I = Part of a ship’s ton required for one ration.
----------+----+------+-------+-----+-----+-----+------+---------+------
Kind of | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I
ration. | | | | | | | | |
----------+----+------+-------+-----+-----+-----+------+---------+------
Forage: | | | | | | | | |
Oats-- | | | | | | | | |
Horse |12 | 3,333|.0003 | 230| 250|.39 | 2.564|102.6 |.00974
Mule | 9 | 4,444|.000225| 300| 333|.2925| 3.42 |136.75 |.0074
Hay-- | | | | | | | | |
Horse |14 | 1,571|.000636| 175| 175|1.12 | .893| 69.69[9]|.0143
Mule |14 | 1,571|.000636| 175| 175|1.12 | .893| 69.69 |.0143
Barley--| | | | | | | | |
Horse |12 | 3,333|.0003 | 230| 250|.312 | 3.205|128.2 |.0078
Mule | 9 | 4,444|.000225| 300| 333|.234 | 4.274|170.9 |.00585
Corn-- | | | | | | | | |
Horse |12 | 3,333|.0003 | 230| 250|.27 | 3.703|148.15 |.00675
Mule | 9 | 4,444|.000225| 300| 333|.2025| 4.94 |197.53 |.00511
Bran-- | | | | | | | | |
Horse |12 | 2,500|.0004 | 230| 250|.72 | 1.39 | 55.55 |.018
Mule | 9 | 3,333|.0003 | 300| 333|.54 | 1.85 | 74.07 |.0135
Subsistence:| | | | | | | | |
Garrison| 4.9| 8,226|.000122| 565| 600|.149 | 6.73 |269 |.0037
Travel | 4.1| 9,818|.000102| 675| 750|.129 | 7.76 |311 |.0032
Field | 3.0|13,428|.000075| 920|1,000|.111 | 9.04 |362 |.0028
Reserve | 2.0|20,142|.00005 |1,380|1,500|.074 |13.56 |543 |.0019
----------+----+------+-------+-----+-----+-----+------+---------+------
[Footnote 9: Compressed to 82 cubic feet per ton (2,000 pounds), the
minimum density for oversea shipments.]
The supply data and discussion in this chapter are to be regarded
as tentative and serving only for purposes of illustration. The
organization of the supply service as well as that of the tactical
units, varies from time to time and the latest tables of organization
issued by the War Dept, should be consulted. Moreover, it is certain
that any prescribed organization will be varied to a considerable
degree in actual campaign. So many conditions enter supply problems
that each must be solved in the light of those conditions. The
foregoing discussion is intended only to indicate the general nature of
the problem and the manner in which its solution should be approached.