THE RIFLE IN WAR.
In a decisive engagement (on the defensive) the firing line should
ordinarily be located a little down hill from the geographical crest,
rather than on the crest itself. This keeps the men off the skyline,
places them on the front slope where a better view of the foreground
is obtained (on or near military crest) and shots aimed at the firing
line are not so apt to go over the crest and possibly strike troops
in rear thereof. While a slight command (elevation above the enemy)
is desirable, it should not be so great that the grazing effect is
sacrificed and a plunging fire produced. If, however, the crest is not
a skyline, affords a good view of the foreground and has a reverse
slope perfectly defiladed, there is, of course, no reason then for
going down the slope. The disadvantages of going down the slope are
that supports coming into the firing line, or the latter itself in
case of retreat, may be exposed to hostile fire on the front slope.
As this is particularly disastrous for troops moving to the rear it
is frequently advisable in a retreat or delaying action to place
the firing line on the geographical crest instead of down the slope
therefrom. Also in such actions fire at the nearer ranges is not
usually contemplated, and hence there may be no necessity for occupying
the military crest.
The supports should be placed where they will be the least exposed to
hostile fire, while yet readily available. Ordinarily this will require
that they be intrenched close to the firing line. If, however, the
reverse slope of the ridge (on the front of which the firing line is
placed) is steeper than the angle of fall of the hostile fire a portion
of this slope will be defiladed from such fire, and the supports may be
placed thereon without being intrenched. They must not, of course, be
too close to the crest, since there is here a danger space, and on the
other hand they must not be as far to the rear as the place where the
hostile bullets strike the ground. By causing the men to lie down they
may be placed closer to the crest. The defilade on the reverse slope in
this case increases as the hostile firing line approaches, especially
if it is also moving down hill. If the reverse slope is such as to be
swept by the hostile fire the supports must generally be intrenched.
On a partially defiladed slope the supports may be held lying down in
a line of narrow columns. They may be moved nearer to the crest as
the enemy approaches and the defilade increases. If the supports can
conveniently be placed in rear of the flanks of the firing line, they
will be largely protected from fire directed at the latter.
The terms “front slope,” “reverse slope,” “down hill,” etc., are to be
understood as relative or comparative.
Position fire may be used either in attack or defense when conditions
are favorable. It is more characteristic of the latter, and is
permissible up to quite long ranges, 1,800 yds. or even more. The
desiderata for position fire are:
1. Troops available without detriment to other tactical operations
(usually reserves.)
2. Plenty of ammunition and facilities for supplying same.
3. A well selected position. It should generally be on a crest
and should have some command. If on a flank of the main
firing line it cannot accidentally fire on the men therein, will
not receive fire directed at them, and can cross fire with
them on any target. If in rear of the main firing line it
is best that the men in the second tier should not be able to
see the men in the first tier. If any of the latter are hit
by fire from their rear the effect is most demoralizing.
The relative vulnerability to frontal fire of small arms of different
formations (on level ground) is as follows: (beginning with the most
vulnerable)
Under aimed fire:
1. Column of platoons.
2. Line and column of squads, same.
3. Line of platoons in columns of squads.
4. Line of squad columns.
5. Line of platoon columns.
Under sweeping (unaimed) fire:
1. Line.
2. Column of platoons.
3. Line of platoons in columns of squads.
4. Line of squad columns.
5. Line of platoon columns.
6. Column of squads.
As the fire becomes oblique and approaches enfilade the relative
vulnerabilities of these formations are subject to progressive
change. Thus under sweeping enfilade fire the column of squads is
more vulnerable than line, since depth increases vulnerability as
the direction of fire becomes more oblique. Extreme precautions must
invariably be taken to guard the combatant troops against very oblique
or enfilade fire, inasmuch as it usually involves relatively great
losses, and produces a demoralizing effect out of proportion to the
actual number of casualties. It is for these reasons chiefly that the
flanks of a line are its most vulnerable parts.
Platoon and squad columns are the narrow front columns described in I.
D. R. They may be taken up at any time and from any formation. Platoon
columns are the more easily controlled.
In order to save time, avoid fatigue, and keep the troops in hand
it is advisable to remain in column of route as long as possible in
approaching the deploying position. But on the other hand no risk must
be taken of encountering hostile fire while in vulnerable formation.
A division advances into action in columns of brigades, the brigades
later divide into regimental columns, the regiments into battalion
columns, and so on. The advance into an engagement should be made in
column of squads until the probability of encountering hostile fire
necessitates deployment. After deployment, and before opening fire,
the advance may be made in line of platoon or squad columns, thin
successive lines, etc., depending upon the terrain and the nature of
the enemy’s fire.
The vulnerability of all formations is reduced by rising ground (rising
with respect to the firers) but line is relatively less vulnerable than
column formation. This applies to aimed fire only. Hence in advancing
down a slope under aimed fire a line of skirmishers will be the least
vulnerable formation. In all other cases of frontal fire of small arms
on any kind of ground and under either aimed or sweeping fire platoon
or squad columns will be the least vulnerable.
Squad or platoon columns in the advance are not deployed until they
reach the place where it has been decided to establish a firing line.
Supports moving into the line in narrow columns deploy just before
reaching the line.
If the distance from the supports to the firing line be quite short
the former may go forward as skirmishers and drop at once into their
place in line. If the distance is somewhat greater and the fire heavy,
squad columns may be used, as these can deploy with less exposure
on the firing line than platoon columns. Where the supports have a
considerable distance to advance, platoon columns allow better control,
especially in broken and diversified terrain. If the enemy’s fire be
very oblique, lines are to be preferred to columns for the advance.
Successive thin lines may be advantageously employed in such cases.
(See post.)
Rising ground (with respect to the firer) decreases vulnerability by
plunging effect (decrease of swept space). Falling ground (reverse
slopes) equal to or less in slope than the angle of fall increases the
vulnerability or swept space. Slopes (reverse) steeper than the angle
of fall are completely defiladed from fire. But of course troops placed
close to the crest may be hit unless they lie down.
An average burst of 3" shrapnel covers an ellipse about 200 yds. long
by about 20 yds. wide at a range of 3000 yds. Errors in range and
burst are greater and more frequent than errors in direction. Frontal
shrapnel fire, if properly ranged and burst, will cover 18 to 20 men
in a line of skirmishers (at 1 yd. intervals) even with an error in
direction, or will involve 3 squad columns at 8 yd. intervals, 24
men. Slight errors in range or burst would afford little immunity.
Under such fire, accordingly, squad columns are more vulnerable than a
line of skirmishers. The more oblique the fire, that is the nearer it
approaches enfilade, the greater the vulnerability of both formations.
This is for the reasons that a single shrapnel, correct in range,
direction and burst, will involve a greater number of troops than where
the fire is frontal, and errors in range or burst afford less immunity.
On the other hand errors of direction of oblique or enfilade fire
afford greater immunity to both formations (line of skirmishers and
squad columns) but are of less frequent occurrence than errors of range
or burst. Errors of all kinds in oblique or enfilade fire favor the
line of skirmishers more than the line of squad columns. Under shrapnel
fire, therefore, whether frontal or oblique, a line of skirmishers is
less vulnerable than a line of squad columns. Squad columns accordingly
should not be used except to facilitate an advance over rough ground
and reduce the period of exposure. They are more conspicuous and hence
are more apt to draw fire and furnish better targets than a line of
skirmishers. They should be deployed whenever the terrain permits easy
progress in line.
Under frontal shrapnel fire a line of platoon columns, properly
conducted, may afford an advantage over line of skirmishers. The
columns should have an interval of 30 to 35 yds. and advance
erratically. Whereas errors in direction afford little protection to a
line of skirmishers, an error in direction of from about 10 to about
20 or 25 yds. would cause the shrapnel to burst between two adjacent
platoon columns without hitting either. As the fire becomes oblique the
vulnerability of platoon columns rapidly increases. Under very oblique
or enfilade shrapnel fire they are suicidal.
Successive thin lines, if judiciously employed, may afford considerable
immunity from rifle, machine gun and shrapnel fire, both frontal and
oblique. This formation gives but 2 men in the swept space of a single
shrapnel. The hostile artillery can scarcely afford to use shrapnel
against such lines as the probability of hits is not sufficient to
warrant the expenditure of ammunition. Machine guns, which are most
effective against masses of troops, would seldom be used against such
attenuated lines. Similarly these lines are less apt to draw aimed
rifle fire than a denser formation. Under continuous fire they are,
in the aggregate, as vulnerable as the same number of men in a single
line although it will require more of the enemy’s time and ammunition
to make the same number of hits. They are most advantageous when not
subject to continuous sweeping (unaimed) fire.
The greatest objection to successive thin lines as a means of advance,
is loss of time. Allowing a distance of 200 yds. between lines the
first and last would be separated by 1400 yds. and there would be an
interval of time of about 15 minutes before the last line arrived at
the advanced position. They are also more difficult to control than a
single line, whether skirmishers or squad columns. If the advanced line
is to be built up without disorganization--breaking up of squads, etc.,
the men should be trained to keep their eyes on the man of their own
squad next in front and to follow him into place.
Many considerations enter the problem of crossing the zone of artillery
fire. A formation that is correct one time may be wrong the next.
Platoon columns may be best under frontal shrapnel fire, and worst
under very oblique fire. Officers must learn by study and practice on
the ground the formations best suited to the conditions to be met.
They should understand the principles of vulnerability, observe the
direction, intensity and accuracy of the enemy’s fire, and adapt their
formations thereto.
The ordinary fire of battle is slow, controlled fire at will. It is
employed at both long and short ranges. Rapid fire is used when an
exceptionally favorable target appears for a short time, in a close
encounter with the enemy, to gain fire superiority just before an
advance, to increase dispersions when this is desired. Volley fire is
used in 3 exceptional cases: 1. For ranging. 2. For massed or favorable
targets. 3. To steady the men if they are getting out of hand. Slow
fire will generally be at the rate of 3 to 5 shots per minute. Rapid
fire should never be faster than 10 shots per minute. (See I. D.
R.) The tendency of soldiers generally is to fire too rapidly and
fire training should aim to control this tendency. Increase of rate
is accompanied by a rapid falling off in accuracy, and by waste of
ammunition. It also excites the men making the intelligent control and
direction of fire much more difficult.
In defense, fire may be opened, usually by specially designated troops,
at long ranges in order to compel an early deployment of the attacker.
This is particularly desirable in a delaying action. The attack, even
if it begins to suffer losses at long range, should generally reserve
its fire until effective range (1,000 to 1,200 yds.) is reached, and
if it can be reserved until within about 800 yds. of the enemy so much
the better. Experience indicates that an attack which is compelled to
open fire beyond effective rifle range has little prospect of success.
If the strength and position of the defender are unknown or imperfectly
known to the attacker and if he advances in a vulnerable formation,
better results may be obtained by the defense by withholding its fire
until the attacker is well within effective range. Thus if the attacker
is advancing in a vulnerable formation over a wide space visible to
the defense, especially if the position and strength of the latter
is unknown, a sudden outburst of fire may prevent the attacker from
establishing a firing line and compel him to retreat to cover. In such
a case the farther he has to retreat under fire the greater will be
his losses, and he may thus well be permitted to approach quite close,
say to 800 yds. or so. The attacker should not, however, be allowed to
approach too close to a covered position in which he might be able to
establish fire superiority. Thus fire by the defense should be opened
at such a time that the attacker will be more apt to retreat than to
rush forward to a covered position. If cavalry, mounted, approaches
a defensive position of whose presence it is unaware (ambuscade)
the defenders if secure from a mounted charge by reason of their
strength or an obstacle in their front, may allow the cavalry to
approach to point blank range (if it will do so) before opening fire.
The inevitable retreat of the cavalry under fire will then be most
disastrous. Artillery in column may be greatly damaged and prevented
from coming into action at ranges from 2,000 to 2,500 yds. by infantry
fire. Rapid or volley fire should be employed in such a case.
In his first firing position the attacker puts into the firing line
as many men and fires as many rounds as necessary to establish fire
superiority. Without such superiority of fire a further advance is
usually impracticable. The usual density of the firing line will be
about 1 man per yd. of front.
Visibility of the target decreases dispersions, but a very conspicuous
point on the hostile line (such as a prominent tree, etc.) may result
in bad distribution from the tendency of the firers to concentrate
their aim on the conspicuous point.
A number of methods are employed for designating and identifying
indistinct targets, of which the following is an example: A prominent
object in the near vicinity of the target is selected as a reference
point, and the exact position of the target indicated by reference
thereto, thus:
Direction to reference point: 1 o’clock (on a horizontal dial)
or to our right front.
Nature of reference point: Large white house.
Position of target relative
to reference point: 4 o’clock (on vertical dial)--3
fingers (90 mils, or 2 inches).
Range: 1,000 yds.
Objective: Skirmish line--length 4 fingers.
This means that the target is to the right of and below the reference
point a distance of 3 fingers, or the equivalent 90 mils or 2 inches.
In order to increase the dispersion at mid and long ranges combined
sights, 50 yds. under and 50 yds. over the estimated range are used in
all cases where the estimated range is 1,000 yds. or over. Combined
sights may be used inside of 1,000 yds. against an enemy on rising
ground, or the dispersion may be increased by rapid fire, or both
artifices may be employed. Battle sights are used habitually below 600
yds., or in repulsing cavalry, up to 900 yds.
Fire is usually directed on the most immediately threatening element of
the enemy. It may also be directed on targets which because of their
size or vulnerability are likely to render fire especially effective.
The attack concentrates its fire on the point where it is proposed
to deliver the assault. The defense usually concentrates on the most
advanced fractions or groups of the assailant, since these groups
will rapidly grow in size if permitted to hold their ground. Fire is
concentrated on critical points by increasing the rapidity of fire, by
putting more rifles in the line opposite these points, by the cross
fire of adjacent organizations, and by position fire of reserves and
machine guns.
While concentrating on the critical points, it is of the utmost
importance both in attack and defense that all parts of the hostile
line be kept under fire at all times. Otherwise the portions not
under fire will shoot with peace time accuracy or, in the case of
the assailant, will take advantage of the opportunity to push their
firing line forward. The front of the enemy is accordingly divided into
sectors which are assigned to the various fire units in order.
The covering of the entire front is insured by overlapping or switching
fire. Thus, in attack, the company target may be divided into two
parts, the first part being covered by the 1st and 2d platoons, the
other by the 3d and 4th. If there be but three platoons, those on the
flanks fire on their own halves of the target while the center platoon
covers the entire target. If two platoons only, each covers the entire
target. When a platoon ceases fire to advance, the other having the
same portion of the target, increases its rate of fire. Or the target
may be divided into a number of parts, one less than the number of
platoons. These parts are assigned to platoons and the odd platoon
fires on the target of the platoon that advances. In actual combat
the absence of prominent landmarks at the proper places may render it
impracticable to assign platoon targets. Too great refinement in the
size of targets and switching of fire may result in confusion. When
this is apt to be the case the whole target of the company may be
assigned to each platoon, care being taken that the fire is properly
distributed. To insure the covering of the entire front the targets of
adjacent companies on the firing line may be made overlapping.
The duties of the personnel in a fire engagement are as follows:
_The Major._
1. He assembles the Captains.
2. He designates the support and fire line companies.
3. He explains the situation and points out the objective.
4. He assigns sectors of the target to each fire line co.,
indicating the limits of these sectors, preferably by
prominent land marks, or by mils or fingers from some
reference point.
5. He orders the advance and designates the time and place
for opening fire.
6. He orders the supports into the firing line at the proper
time.
7. He sees that the extra ammunition is issued.
8. He observes the enemy, the effects of the friendly and hostile
fire, tactical changes on the battlefield, etc.
_The Captain._
1. He assembles his Chiefs of Platoons.
2. He explains the situation and points out the section of
the objective assigned to the company.
3. He assigns sections of the company target to each platoon,
indicating limits of each.
4. He estimates the range, or has this done by several skilled
men (called “range-finders”) and takes their average.
5. He gives the sight setting.
6. He orders the kind of fire.
7. He signals to the Major when he is ready to open fire.
8. He designates the time and place to open fire, or transmits
the order of the Major.
9. He sees that the extra ammunition sent him by the Major
is properly distributed, as well as ammunition from the
dead and wounded.
10. He watches the enemy, the effects of fire, and the tactical
changes on the battlefield.
11. In general he _directs_ the fire of his company.
_The Chief of Platoon._
1. He assembles the non-commissioned officers.
2. He explains the situation, points out the objective, and
indicates the section assigned to the platoon.
3. He sees that each n. c. o. knows the target and the sight
setting.
4. He signals the Captain when ready to open fire.
5. He transmits all orders of the Captain.
6. He controls the rate of fire, keeps his men steady and sees
that ammunition is not wasted.
7. He sees that fire is properly distributed over the assigned
front. (VERY IMPORTANT).
8. He watches the enemy and the effects of fire.
9. In general he carries out the orders of the Capt., _controls_
the fire, and enforces fire discipline.
_The Platoon Guide._
1. He verifies the sight setting.
2. He watches the firing line and checks breaches of fire
discipline.
3. He watches for signals from the Captain and transmits
them to the Chief of Platoon.
_The Squad Leader._
1. He sees that each man of his squad recognizes the target.
2. He sees that sights are properly set.
3. He transmits all commands and signals and sees that they
are obeyed.
4. He observes and regulates the conduct of his squad, abates
excitement and keeps his men steady.
5. He leads his squad and sees that all the men move forward
or halt at the command.
6. He assists generally in enforcing fire discipline.
7. He _may_ participate in the fire.
The foregoing includes all of the more important duties of subordinates
of various grades in the control and direction of infantry fire. Not
all of these instructions will be applicable to every case. Thus where
it was inadvisable to separate subordinates from their immediate
commands they would _not_ be assembled, but their instructions would
be conveyed to them, etc. In the event of a shortage of officers and
non-commissioned officers in a company possibly depleted in strength,
the Captain may give his orders direct to the entire company or the
chiefs of Platoon direct to their entire platoons. This will often
favor simplicity--which should be the first and last rule in all
tactical procedure.
The Captain’s orders would be about as follows: He explains the general
situation as in the orders of the battalion commander and indicates
the sector of front assigned to the company. He then says: “Reference
point, large white house at 1 o’clock; target 5 o’clock 3 fingers, line
of skirmishers 4 fingers long, range 1050 yds. Rear rank set at 50 yds.
more than range, front rank at 50 yds. less; 1st and 2d platoons, right
half of target; 3d and 4th platoons, left half. Fire at will.”
When the platoon commanders have signaled that they are ready, the
captain signals the battalion commander, and upon receiving the major’s
order, he orders or signals the company--“commence firing.”
A CATECHISM OF THE RIFLE IN WAR.
_Note._ The questions in this catechism are in the same order as the
preceding discussions.
1. In a decisive engagement how should the firing line (in defense) be
located with respect to the crest? With respect to the enemy? Why?
2. What can you say as to the position of the firing line in retreat,
delaying or rear guard action? Give reasons.
3. In (1) how should the supports be located with respect to the crest?
With respect to the firing line? Why?
4. Discuss position fire in attack and defense.
5. State the relative vulnerabilities of different formations under
aimed and sweeping fire, on level ground. What is the effect of oblique
or enfilade fire on the vulnerabilities of various formations?
6. What formations should be used in approaching the combat position,
and when are these abandoned? Why?
7. Discuss the effect of slopes on vulnerability.
8. When do squad and platoon columns deploy, (a) When they are in
advance? (b) When they are supports coming into the firing line?
9. What formations may be adopted in advancing under artillery
(shrapnel) fire? What are the effects of oblique fire?
10. Discuss the use of successive thin lines, skirmish lines and narrow
columns, in building up or reinforcing the firing line.
11. When is slow, controlled fire at will employed? Rapid fire? Volley
fire?
12. What should be the maximum and minimum rates of fire? Why?
13. At what ranges should fire be opened under various conditions in
attack and defense, and why? Discuss fully.
14. At what ranges may arty. in column be damaged by rifle fire, and
what kind of fire should be employed in such cases?
15. How many rounds should the attacker fire in his first position?
16. What is the proper density of the firing line in attack?
17. What effect has visibility of the target on dispersion and
distribution?
18. Discuss the methods employed for designating and identifying
targets.
19. Discuss the use of combined sights. Of battle sights.
20. At what should the attack fire? At what should the defense fire?
21. How is fire concentrated on critical points?
22. What is the reason for keeping all parts of the hostile line under
fire at all times and how may this be insured?
23. Discuss the duties of the personnel during the engagement. (Major,
Capt., Chief of Platoon, Platoon Guide, Squad Leader.)