OUTPOSTS.
_Duties._ The duties of an outpost are to protect the main body so
that the troops may rest undisturbed, to screen them from hostile
observation, and in case of attack to check the enemy long enough
to enable the main body to make the necessary dispositions to meet
him. The outpost also performs such special reconnaissance as may
be directed by the superior commander. Often its duty will be to
gain touch with the hostile outpost line, when the latter is not
too distant, as this is the best possible means of security. Firing
upon, or otherwise harassing the enemy will not be indulged in unless
specially directed.
In general the duties of an outpost are reconnaissance, observation and
resistance.
In an advance the outpost is generally detailed from the advance guard.
In retreat the outpost for the night usually forms part of the rear
guard, or all of it, for the following day. If the command remains
in camp the outpost is relieved at daybreak, in order to have double
strength present at the time when the enemy is most likely to attack.
_Strength and composition._ The proper strength for an outpost is a
matter of judgment as it is very dependent on conditions. In general it
may be said to vary from about ¹/₂₀ to ⅓ of the command, ⅙ being about
an average. The only rule that can be given as to the strength of an
outpost is: “provide reasonable security with a minimum of men.” This
criterion, if intelligently applied, will produce satisfactory results.
The conditions to be considered in deciding the strength of an outpost
are:
(a) Size of command.
(b) Extent of front and number of roads to be covered, and
nature of terrain, including roads.
(c) Plans of supreme commander, whether for advance or retreat,
etc.
(d) Proximity, strength and aggressiveness of the enemy.
(e) Operations of friendly cavalry. Position of independent
(or advance) cavalry. Strength of cavalry assigned to
outpost.
(f) Weather and season, etc., etc.
As a rough guide it may be assumed that under ordinary conditions in
the presence of the enemy a battalion of infantry as a support, can
cover a front of not more than 2,500 yards, and a squadron of cavalry
about 3,500 yards. Of course the frontage of impassable obstacles
will be deducted from the total length of front. Then divide the
remainder by 2,500 which will give _approximately_ the number of
battalions required on the line of supports. To this must be added the
reserves, from ¼ to ½ the entire strength of the outpost, depending
on conditions, and the special troops, including cavalry. This rule,
however, is only a rough guide. If the enemy is known to be so distant
that an attack by his infantry is impossible the line of observation
may be drawn much closer to the camp and the strength of the outpost
greatly reduced. If cavalry efficiently covers the front of the command
a strong infantry outpost is usually not required. Finally if the enemy
is nowhere in the vicinity a regular outpost may be dispensed with, a
few exterior guards around the camp being sufficient for security in
such cases.
In a close country, especially at night, infantry is usually more
efficient than cavalry on outpost duty, as the movements of the latter
are generally confined to the roads. In open country and during the day
cavalry affords the greatest measure of security. In a close country
even the movements of infantry are to a large extent confined to the
roads. The enemy is not likely to advance in any force through a close
wood or thicket, especially at night. Hence outguards at the points of
passage and patrolling between, to such extent as conditions seem to
demand, will be the rule.
Mounted troops are very useful on outpost duty. For observation and
reconnaissance a few mounted men will often be more efficient than a
considerable body of foot troops. For resistance infantry, of course,
will be required; but when the front of the command is covered by an
efficient force of cavalry which is in touch with the enemy, timely
warning by the cavalry of any hostile movements will greatly relieve
the infantry of the burden of outpost duty, thereby conserving the
fighting strength of the foot troops. When no cavalry is available,
or when it is too weak to properly perform the duty of distant
reconnaissance, lack of observation must be compensated by considerably
increased power of resistance, which throws a heavy burden upon the
infantry outpost. The necessity for placing a considerable portion of
the infantry on outpost may thus often be avoided by the judicious
use of even a small force of cavalry. The prospective duties of the
infantry and cavalry in the immediate future should be carefully
considered in determining the relative proportions of the two arms to
be assigned to outpost duty. The commander must decide whether it is
more important under the existing conditions to conserve the strength
of the trooper and his horse for reconnaissance, or the energy of
the foot soldier for march and combat; bearing always in mind that
success in combat is the usual aim of military operations, and that the
judicious use of one cavalryman may enable a number of infantrymen to
rest in security. A reasonable compromise may thus be effected. Outpost
duty is very trying for both infantry and cavalry, and both should be
spared unnecessary duty of this kind. The commander should apportion
the burden between the two arms so as to keep his command as a whole in
the best possible condition to accomplish its mission.
In a retreat cavalry may temporarily replace infantry on outpost in
order to facilitate the withdrawal of the latter.
The outpost proper will ordinarily consist mainly of infantry. There
should, however, always be some mounted men attached, especially if
the front is not covered by the cavalry. These mounted men are used as
follows:
(a) Messengers.
(b) Patrols within the outpost lines, along the line of observation
and to the front.
(c) For detached posts or standing patrols at important
localities too far out for the infantry.
In cases (a) and (b) the mounted men are assigned to the reserve,
supports, and pickets.
Artillery is not usually assigned to an outpost. If present it would be
used to cover some important bridge or defile, or to keep the enemy’s
artillery out of range by preventing the occupation of positions too
close to the outpost. It would generally be with the reserve. Machine
guns are very useful. They may be used to defend bridges or defiles,
fire along the roads, etc. They are especially useful at night as their
fire is so easily controlled. They may be with the supports, usually
behind barricades, covering important roads, bridges or defiles.
Machine guns should be distributed by company or platoon, not as
individual guns.
Engineers may be used with a large outpost to assist in the preparation
of the position for defense, construction of obstacles, improvement of
means of communication, demolitions, etc. Upon the completion of their
tasks they camp with the reserve, or return to the main body.
Signal troops may be usefully employed to maintain communication with
the advance cavalry and different parts of the infantry outpost,
usually from the reserve to the supports and important detached posts.
They camp with the reserve, except such detachments as are out to
operate the signal apparatus.
Sanitary troops, except those regularly assigned to organizations, are
usually unnecessary. If present they are with the reserve.
All special troops should be under the orders of the outpost commander
only. They should not be placed under the orders of the support
commanders.
The various elements from rear to front of a large command in camp may
include:
(a) The camp of the main body with interior and exterior
guards, detached posts for protection of flanks, when
necessary, etc.
(b) The camp of the advance guard with necessary precautionary
measures.
(c) The camp of the reserve of the outpost, with guards, detached
posts, etc.
(d) The line of infantry supports (usually the line of resistance).
(e) The line of observation (outguards and sentries).
(f) Patrols in front of line of observation.
(g) Advance or outpost cavalry, with its patrols and necessary
security measures.
(h) The independent cavalry.
It would be exceptional for all these elements to be present in one
command. For economy’s sake some of them would be omitted or combined
with others. An outpost of two companies may or may not have a reserve.
A larger one usually would and a smaller one would not. In a small camp
the main body is usually close enough to act as the reserve of the
outpost. In a very small command the outpost may consist of outguards
only, without supports or reserve, or merely of sentries posted around
the camp. The main body remains in such a condition of readiness as the
situation demands.
The use of cavalry for the security of a stationary command has three
phases:
1. When the enemy is very distant the cavalry should be well out to the
front, observing him. In this case it does not come inside the outpost
line at night, but establishes rendezvous, and places an outpost for
its own protection. The cavalry is thus independent. The cavalry
commander should generally be allowed to select his own rendezvous
(one or more points) and make his own dispositions, the order from
the supreme commander designating the front to be covered, special
reconnaissance to be conducted, place where messages for the cavalry
will be sent, etc.
2. When the enemy is closer, but there is still room to interpose
the cavalry between the enemy and the infantry outpost line. In this
case the cavalry may, or may not come inside the outpost line at
night, depending on circumstances (see post). The instructions to and
dispositions of the cavalry commander would be similar to (1). In case
the cavalry withdraws at night it may leave standing patrols over night
at important points too far out to be occupied by the infantry.
3. When the cavalry is too weak in numbers to conduct distant
reconnaissance in the face of the opposing cavalry, or when the enemy
is so close that the cavalry is “squeezed out” by the firmer contact
of the infantry outposts. In this case some cavalry may be assigned to
the outpost for reconnoitering and visiting patrols, detached posts or
standing patrols, etc.
The strength and vigilance required of the infantry outposts will
obviously vary in these three cases.
An outpost entirely of cavalry may well be organized like one of mixed
troops, the horses of the outguards, and even those of the supports
(except such as are required for patrol and messenger duty) being to
the rear and unsaddled for the night (see post).
_Integrity of tactical units._ It has been stated as a general
principle that as few men as possible should be kept on outpost duty as
it is very fatiguing. Nevertheless in organizing an outpost and each of
its component parts the integrity of tactical units should be preserved
as far as possible. Above all, companies should not be so divided as to
interfere with their messing arrangements and other internal economies.
Hence the following rules concerning the sizes of different elements
may be observed, when tactical requirements do not necessitate a
departure therefrom:
If more than one battalion is required for an outpost it is well to
send an entire regiment. The troops in the reserve will get as much
rest as if they were camped with the main body, so long as there is no
attack.
If a support larger than a company is required it generally should
consist of an entire battalion, or at least two full companies.
A picket should consist of a number of full squads or platoons. If an
entire company is sent out as outguards, its cooks and kitchen police
should remain with the support to prepare meals.
A sentry squad should be a full squad (7 men and a corporal) rather
than 6 men and a corporal (the minimum number required). A cossack post
should consist of a half squad (4 men) and two halves of any squad
should be on adjacent posts, one commanded by the corporal, the other
by the senior private.
Better results are usually obtained by concentrating the patrols in
a few of the larger bodies, instead of attaching extra men to sentry
squads and cossack posts for this purpose. Of course adjacent cossack
posts and sentry squads should keep touch with each other, one man from
each making occasional visits to the adjacent posts between rounds of
the regular patrols from the larger bodies.
As the two sentinels of a sentry squad are posted together for mutual
support their range of vision is no greater than that of a cossack post
and they require twice as many men. A sentry squad is more efficient
than a cossack post as two men will naturally observe more than one and
each, feeling the presence of the other is relieved from the sense of
loneliness which affects the sentry of a cossack post. Also a sentry
squad, being larger, has more resisting power than a cossack post.
The requirements of the particular locality and situation must be
considered in deciding which form of outguard to employ.
_Location._ A camp site is not usually selected with a view to securing
a strong outpost position, although circumstances might demand or
permit that this be done. Other considerations usually govern the
selection of a camp site, and the outpost must make the best use
possible of conditions as they are found.
For a large command the outpost must hold the enemy beyond artillery
range of the main camp (about 5,000 yards off). For a smaller command
protection against rifle fire is sufficient. Thus for a division camp,
the line of resistance of the outpost should be distant 2 to 3 miles
or more from the main camp. For protection against rifle fire 1,000 to
2,000 yards, according to the terrain, is sufficient.
The first step is to select a line of resistance at a suitable
distance. The line should fulfill as far as possible, the requirements
of a defensive position (see “Combat”) except that if offensive
operations are not contemplated, an obstacle along the whole, or any
portion of the front, is an advantage. The best natural obstacles are
unfordable streams, swamps or morasses, impenetrable thickets, etc.
Artificial obstacles may also be constructed. They would generally be
limited to the roads, or to the most dangerous open ground. The line
of resistance should be as short as practicable. The flanks should
preferably be secured by impassable obstacles or by the flank of an
adjacent outpost.
An outpost placed to hold a river line may be directed to “secure
the line of the stream from ______ to ______.” This leaves its
commander free to select a suitable line of resistance. If the stream
is unfordable, resistance will probably be required only at the
bridges--the line of the stream between being simply patrolled, to
prevent the enemy from using ferries or ponton bridges. The duty may be
still further lightened by disabling some of the bridges.
The supports are usually placed on the defensive line selected and
constitute the “line of resistance.” Roads, however, exercise a very
great influence on the location of the supports, as they are the lines
by which the enemy is most likely to advance, especially at night. A
good rule for general guidance is to select that road by which the
enemy is most likely to make an advance in force, and place a strong
support where it can command the road with its fire. The remainder
of the outpost then conforms to this arrangement. Supports or strong
pickets are placed where they can command all the roads over which the
enemy might advance, as well as unobstructed country between the roads,
over which an attack might be made. The general method of locating an
outpost is to observe and guard the avenues of approach at points where
these avenues are crossed by the best natural line of resistance.
In exceptional cases the line of resistance may be at some locality in
rear of the line of supports. In such cases the reserve would generally
be placed on this line and would prepare it for defense. The supports
would then become merely reservoirs for the relief of the outguards. In
case of attack they would delay the enemy, and gradually fall back on
the defensive line in rear.
An outpost should generally not be placed so close to that of the
enemy that continual firing between the opposing lines would result.
It should, however, when in the near vicinity of a hostile outpost or
line of battle maintain contact with the latter by either mounted or
dismounted patrols, depending on the distance between the two lines,
as this provides the very best security. Such contact is especially
desirable when pursuing a retreating enemy, in order that his
withdrawal may be promptly detected.
Special mounted patrols may observe the flanks of the enemy’s outpost
line, but usually no attempt will be made to pierce the hostile
line of resistance in order to gain information concerning the main
force unless special orders to that effect have been received.
Information concerning the enemy’s main body is generally gathered by
the independent cavalry, or by special officers’ patrols sent out by
the supreme commander, or by his direction (see “Patrolling”). These
patrols have no connection with the regular outpost, the duty of the
latter being primarily security, rather than information.
A large outpost, having two or more regiments on the line, may be
divided into regimental sectors, each under a separate commander, and
each having its own sector (local) reserve, like a line of battle.
_Limits._ The front to be covered by an outpost, and the distance it is
to extend its protection to the flanks, are questions to be decided in
each case, and for which general rules cannot be given.
The order of the superior commander will indicate the approximate line
to be outposted and the limits of same. From these instructions it may
be inferred that he considers this the best line of resistance--this
being a certainty if he also says “in case of attack this line will
be held.” Hence the supports should be posted on or quite close to
the designated line. The orders also indicate the approximate extent
of front which the supreme commander desires covered. If the flanks
as indicated do not rest on impassable obstacles or connect with
adjacent outposts or detached posts from some other organization, some
provisions for the security of the flanks are usually required. If
detached posts are sent to the flanks by troops other than the regular
outpost, the latter has only to maintain communication with these. An
exposed flank should be bent slightly to the rear by refusing the line
of the outposts on that flank.
In deciding how far to the flanks to extend protection it is necessary
to consider the probable moves of the enemy. Where is he known to be
and what forces has he? Is it likely or even possible that he may make
an attack at night from the flank? If so it must certainly be guarded.
It is to be noted that protection to the flanks is much more necessary
for a small force than for a large one since the enemy does not have
to make such a long detour to turn its flanks. A very small force may
require an all-around outpost--one extending not only to the flanks but
even to the rear.
The flanks of an outpost may be covered by detached posts sent directly
from the reserve (of the outpost), from the camp of the advance guard
(or rear guard), or from the camp of the main body. In such cases the
regular outpost will connect with the detached posts on its flanks.
Such posts would be placed on important roads leading to the flanks, at
bridges, defiles, etc.
The distance to the flanks and rear to which the outpost should extend
protection is determined by conditions and the measures for security
adopted by the troops in rear. Thus the organizations in the main camp
may be directed to place detached posts at certain localities or they
may be ordered to “provide for their own security against attacks by
small bodies of the enemy,” or given some similar instructions. In
the absence of any special orders each organization will provide the
routine interior camp guards.
_Distances and intervals._ No fixed rules can be given for intervals
and distances, but there are certain precautions which should be
observed in distributing the parts of an outpost.
The distance between the main body and the outpost line (see ante) has
been stated to depend on the requirements that the latter must protect
the former from rifle or artillery fire, as circumstances require. Each
group must be sufficiently far in front of the larger group to the rear
to give the latter time to prepare for an attack before the advanced
group is driven in, but the distance should not be so great that the
advanced group cannot be conveniently relieved or supported, nor
communication readily maintained. The following distances may be used
as a rough guide to be departed from according to circumstances:
From the reserve to the supports about 1,000 yds.
From the supports to the outguards about 800 yds.
From pickets to sentry squads or cossack posts sent
therefrom, about 400 yds.
From reserve, a support or picket to the sentinel on
duty over same 100 yds.
From a sentry squad or cossack post to sentries of same
or from cavalry outguard to vedettes 40 yds.
In very close country all distances should be reduced. For a mounted
cavalry outpost, distances may be somewhat greater than for one
composed of infantry, or dismounted cavalry.
The advance (outpost) cavalry, if it is to come in at night and go out
again early next morning, should not be over four miles out, and 2½
to 3 would be better. The independent cavalry, as it usually does not
come inside the infantry outpost line at night, may be any reasonable
distance out, depending on the situation.
An outpost must always have sufficient depth from front to rear to
provide reasonable security. The enemy must be forced to _fight_ his
way through a considerable distance so that the large bodies in rear
may have ample time to make the necessary dispositions to meet him.
_The intervals_ between groups on the same line are even more difficult
to fix than distances, as they depend so much upon the nature of
the country. Thus where an outpost is placed on the near side of an
unfordable stream, outguards are needed only at the bridges, the
intervals between being simply patrolled.
As has been stated, in open country, the maximum sector or front for a
battalion of infantry as a support is about 2,500 yards. The front for
a company would then be about 600 yards. Sentry squads should generally
be not over 300 to 450 yards apart and cossack posts not over 250 yards
apart, unless there be active patrolling between them. In close country
the distances might be greater or less, depending on whether or not the
woods were impenetrable, and on the amount of patrolling. The distances
here given must be regarded as very rough guides only. Considering
the great variation in conditions rules for these distances cannot be
prescribed.
When an army bivouacs in line of battle a regular outpost is not
required as the troops are already formed to resist attack. In this
case, only sentinels in front of the line and patrols beyond are
required. A regular outpost would only interfere with fire from the
line of battle.
In guarding the line of a stream the supports or pickets are posted
where they can command the crossings, usually under cover some 300 or
400 yards back. At night the covering groups move up to the near end of
the bridge, and if machine guns are available they may be placed behind
barricades to sweep the bridge. A defile is guarded in the same manner.
At night a sentry squad should be placed at the far end of the bridge
or defile and patrols may be sent on beyond. If the bridge is to be
used by the army for its advance, it is usually necessary to hold the
far side. In this case a strong detachment is sent beyond the bridge
to guard its far approach and it would usually intrench a defensive
position and throw out a small outpost beyond. Such a detachment would
not be a true outpost but rather a covering force, and its defensive
works would be called a bridge head.
_The Reserve._ The reserve includes all outpost troops not specially
assigned elsewhere, and the special troops (engineers, signal and
sanitary troops). It should be posted in a central position where it
can readily reinforce any of its supports, preferably on the principal
road to the camp of the main body. Concealment is very desirable, also
covered approaches to the stations of the supports. Wood and water for
the camp are necessary. If placed on the line of resistance the reserve
will prepare the position for defense.
The camping arrangements of the reserve, such as internal and external
guards, messing arrangements, etc., are arranged by its commander
(either the outpost commander himself or a subordinate). They may
be covered by verbal instructions or routine orders, but would not
as a rule properly form a subject for field orders. The “2d outpost
order” (see post) may, however, prescribe whether or not fires will
be permitted in the camp at night. Detached posts to be sent from the
reserve should be covered by the orders of the outpost commander.
Some cavalry, or a number of mounted orderlies, should be with the
reserve for patrol and messenger duty. The main body of the advance
cavalry may retire to the camp of the reserve at night, or camp beyond
the outpost line, depending on the situation.
The artillery, if any be assigned to the outpost, is habitually
with the reserve. If it takes an exposed position for covering the
approaches to the outpost line it would have a support detailed from
the reserve.
The field trains of the outpost are usually at the reserve camp, whence
those of the supports may, in the discretion of the outpost commander,
be sent to join them. If an attack is feared the trains may be ordered
by the superior commander, to return to the camp of the advance guard
(or main body) sometime before daybreak the following morning. The
field trains of the supports may usually be allowed to join them and
remain at least until after supper, or else until just before daybreak,
being then withdrawn to the reserve camp. Field wagons should not be
allowed with outguards.
_The Supports._ Supports vary in size from a platoon to a battalion.
In an outpost of any size they would generally be not smaller than
a company. They consist mainly of infantry. A few mounted men,
generally at least three, should be attached to each support for
patrol and messenger duty. It may be better to use mounted orderlies
for this purpose, rather than to split up the cavalry into a number of
small detachments, although the latter may be necessary if extended
reconnaissance to the front is required. But it should be remembered in
this connection that when practicable it is better to use the cavalry
as “advance cavalry” rather than as part of the supports. The advance
cavalry even when withdrawing for the night is often required to
maintain touch with the enemy during the night by means of patrols,
and this of course relieves the supports of the duty of carrying on
any _extended_ or _distant_ patrolling, though they should not neglect
such local reconnaissance as security requires. If the cavalry is
too weak or for any other reason it is not advisable to use it as
advance cavalry it may then be split up and parts of it assigned to
the supports for more extended patrolling than they could conduct with
infantry alone.
Supports are usually placed to cover the main roads. They will, of
course, not be on the roads, but either astride of them or in positions
on one side or the other from which they can command the roads and
adjacent country by their fire. A sentinel will be placed on the road
to challenge persons moving along it. He also serves as sentinel for
an examining post if one is required. If the bivouac of the support
is more than 100 yards from the road, an additional sentinel will
generally be necessary over the bivouac by night. Supports should
always be placed in a concealed position, and exercise caution not to
betray their location to the enemy.
A definite sector of the outpost line, with carefully defined limits,
preferably prominent natural objects, houses or the like, which must
not fall on or even near a road, is assigned to each support, and its
approximate station is designated. The support selects a good defensive
position near its designated post from which it can cover with fire the
most important road in its sector and the country adjacent thereto. If
possible it should cover two or more roads directly. If it cannot cover
all the roads in its sector directly it places outguards of sufficient
strength on the other roads, or closes them by destroying bridges or
placing obstacles. The support, if on the line of resistance, prepares
its position for defense by intrenching and clearing the field of fire,
etc.
A machine gun platoon may be assigned to each support.
The company wagons of a support may be allowed to join it, at least
until after supper, unless an attack is expected. If an attack is
expected wagons would remain with the reserve, where meals might also
be prepared. The outpost commander will give verbal instructions as to
fires, tent pitching, meals, etc. At the support these may be mentioned
in the night order if one is issued, inasmuch as they have a direct
bearing upon the question of security and are not merely routine
matters.
A good field of fire is the first requisite for the position of a
support when posted on the line of resistance, as would usually be the
case. Defensive strength is more important than ease of observation.
The two requirements that a support should have a good field of fire
and at the same time be in a concealed position may often conflict to a
greater or less extent. The trenches should be made as inconspicuous as
possible, and of course it is not necessary for the support to occupy
its trenches throughout the day--it may be placed in a covered position
near the trenches. At night the support will usually be perfectly
concealed in or immediately behind its trenches, unless they are on
the sky line. An ideal location for a support is at the far edge of an
open wood, or a wood with light underbrush as this will often afford a
good view to the front with concealment from view and a covered line of
approach and of retreat.
As a rule not more than 4 supports should be sent from any one reserve.
(An exception would be in an “all-around” outpost where all the
supports were approximately the same distance from the reserve and
readily reinforced.)
Supports are numbered serially from right to left.
_Outguards._ Outguards are stationary groups sent from the supports,
and their dispositions and duties are left to the discretion of the
support commander subject to the inspection of the outpost commander.
They are placed so as to cover all lines of approach. Outguards include
generally (a) pickets, (b) sentry squads, (c) cossack posts. Important
roads within the sector assigned to a support which cannot be directly
covered by it, are guarded by pickets from 2 squads to a company in
strength. Such pickets would be disposed in the same manner as a
support, intrenching if necessary and covering their own fronts with
small outguards. The outguards sent direct from a support are numbered
serially from right to left for that support, regardless of their
size. The smaller groups sent direct from a large picket are numbered
similarly for that picket, but are not included in the support series
of numbers.
Sentry squads normally consist of 8 men (including a corporal) and
post a double sentry. Cossack posts consist of 4 men and post a single
sentry.
The meals of the outguards are prepared at and sent to them from their
supports.
Outguards placed to command approaches may intrench their positions.
Outguards, as well as the sentinels posted therefrom should whenever
possible be concealed from observation by the enemy. It is their duty
to see without being seen.
Sentinels should be on duty not more than 2 hours in every 6. Visiting
patrols should have 3 full reliefs and be relieved at regular hours
when practicable.
_Examining posts._ Examining posts may be established on the principal
roads. They are usually near a support or picket; the sentinel on duty
over the bivouac serving also as sentry for an examining post.
_Communication._ Communication between all the different elements of
an outpost is of the utmost importance. Each stationary group should
know the position and strength of other groups in its vicinity, and
should keep in touch with them. In a large outpost signal troops
may be attached for this purpose (see ante). The usual method of
intercommunication will be by patrols. Patrols should, before dark, go
over the routes they will use at night, opening up and blazing trails,
where necessary. Routes of travel which would be used by the reserve in
reinforcing the line of resistance, and those from the supports to the
outguards should be cleared and marked, where necessary, so that they
can be used at night.
_Outpost patrols._ There are two general methods of providing security
on the line of observation:
1. By posting a number of small stationary groups at close intervals,
so that no considerable force can pass between them without being seen
or heard. This is called the “cordon system” of outposts.
2. By posting a less number of stationary groups at the more important
points only and covering the ground between groups by constant
patrolling. This second method is called the “patrol system” of
outposts.
As to which method is to be preferred circumstances will decide.
Sometimes both systems are employed on the same outposts. In any case
a considerable amount of patrolling is done by every outpost. Outpost
patrols are of two classes:
1. _Reconnoitering patrols._ These are patrols sent beyond the line
of observation to reconnoiter in the direction of the enemy, gaining
touch with him if practicable. The limit of their action is ordinarily
the hostile outpost line. These patrols may be mounted or dismounted.
Having a limited field of action and not being expected ordinarily to
offer resistance, they should usually be small--2 to 5 men. Patrols
on the important roads may well be commanded by officers if any are
available. If composed entirely of infantry, outpost patrols are
usually limited to a distance of not more than about 1½ miles from
their point of departure as they should ordinarily return inside
of 2 hours. Mounted patrols may, of course, go farther out and are
usually preferable to infantry patrols if available, except at night
when dismounted men are to be preferred for limited patrolling.
Reconnoitering patrols to the front usually travel on the roads. They
should give sentinels notice as to the probable time and route of their
return, exchange information with them, arrange for signals, etc. If
important information is to be gained, or if the distance to the front
is considerable, patrolling should be performed by special mounted
officers’ patrols. Such patrols would usually be sent from the reserve
or main body. The function of the _supports_ is primarily security,
rather than information, and it is difficult to coordinate the work of
the outpost if patrols are sent to a great distance from the supports
since these bodies are independent of each other. (See “Patrolling.”)
The duty of the outpost is primarily to provide _security_ for the
command. Such information as it gathers is usually limited to that
which is essential for security. Information of tactical or strategical
importance is obtained by means of special patrols, spies, etc. Any
information which the supreme commander specially desires will be more
certainly obtained by patrols sent out under his own orders.
2. _Visiting patrols._ These are patrols which maintain communication
between the different parts of an outpost and reconnoiter the line of
observation between the stationary groups. They do not ordinarily go
beyond the line of observation except when necessary to make special
examinations of localities immediately in front of the line. Visiting
patrols are always small, one or two privates and a non-commissioned
officer being usually sufficient. When the conditions are favorable,
mounted men may be used to advantage, but as there is usually
cross-country traveling to be done visiting patrols will ordinarily be
dismounted. The round of an infantry visiting patrol should therefore
usually be limited to less than 3 miles.
Both reconnoitering and visiting patrols should have three full
reliefs. This may not always be practicable in the case of
reconnoitering patrols, but in such case the duty must not be too heavy.
During the day few, if any, visiting patrols will be required, except
in close country. Reconnoitering patrols may also be dispensed with
by day if there be available good observation points from which the
country for a considerable distance in front of the outpost line may be
seen. There should always be, however, sufficient patrolling to insure
vigilance on the part of sentries.
_The reserve_ sends visiting patrols, usually once an hour, and at
least once in two hours, to each support or detached post of the
outpost proper, or of its sector thereof. If practicable these patrols
should be mounted, for which purpose a few mounted men should be
attached to the reserve. In large outposts these patrols may be under
an officer. Two or three men will usually be sufficient. In some
cases the reserve may send out special reconnoitering patrols under
an officer beyond the line of observation, to gain information of the
enemy. (See ante.)
_The supports_ maintain patrol communication with adjacent supports and
send visiting patrols (usually one an hour) to each outguard (picket,
sentry squad or cossack post) sent out _directly_ from support. These
patrols are small (2 or 3 men) and _if practicable_ may be mounted. In
any case at least two or three mounted men should be attached to each
support for patrol and messenger duty. A support on the flank of an
outpost line maintains patrol communication with adjacent outposts or
detached posts.
The supports habitually send reconnoitering patrols along the important
roads in front of the line of observation. The duties of such patrols
are:
(a) To reconnoiter the country in advance of the line of
observation.
(b) To maintain communication with the advance cavalry.
(c) To gain and maintain contact with the enemy, if he be not
too distant.
If the enemy (or the advance cavalry) is more than 2 miles beyond the
supports the duties (b) and (c) cannot well be performed by infantry
(foot) patrols. If such duty (b) and (c) is required it generally
should be specified in the outpost orders, and a few mounted men should
then be attached to the supports for the purpose.
_The pickets_ maintain patrol communication with adjacent pickets
and patrols along the line of observation. These patrols are usually
small infantry patrols commanded by a non-commissioned officer or an
experienced private. In special cases, if so directed, large pickets
may send reconnoitering patrols beyond the line of observation; but
this duty is usually assigned to the supports, or if it be very distant
work, to the reserve or the cavalry (see ante).
_Sentry squads and cossack posts_ do no routine patrolling. They should
keep touch with adjacent posts between the rounds of the regular
visiting patrols from the pickets.
Patrol duty at night may be lightened by the use of prearranged signals
(matches or electric flashlight) from the outguards to the pickets or
supports. Care should be taken that such signals cannot be seen by the
enemy.
_Day and night positions and duties._
_Infantry._ The reserve proceeds to its camping place and the supports
to their posts immediately after the issue of the outpost order. If
the halt is made late in the afternoon the supports may be sent to
their approximate stations _before_ the issue of the full order, that
they may have time to prepare their suppers. Otherwise, if late, they
prepare supper at the reserve camp. Having arrived at their designated
stations the supports select and prepare their defensive positions (if
on the line of resistance) and reconnoiter the ground within their
sectors with a view to placing the outguards.
If the country is open and a good view to the front is obtainable the
outguards need not be placed until shortly before dusk. A single
sentinel at each support may be sufficient for security, especially if
cavalry is covering the front.
The outguards are placed in position shortly before dusk so that they
have opportunity to become familiar with the terrain in their vicinity
while there is still daylight.
In a close country where observation is limited, some or all of the
outguards may be in position during the day.
The visiting patrols should start their rounds as soon as the outguards
take position. Patrolling during the day should be held to the minimum,
but at night continued patrolling may be required.
The times for assuming night and resuming day positions are not
ordinarily mentioned in the first outpost order except for the cavalry.
Instructions for this are given verbally by the outpost or sector
commander when he makes his round (before dark) or may be embodied in
the second order. To avoid the necessity of sending a second message to
the cavalry (if it is out in front) the times when it is to withdraw
from the front and resume its day positions may be mentioned in the
first order.
Day positions should not be assumed until broad daylight (usually at
sunrise or later). If the outpost is to be relieved, the relief arrives
at the supports at daybreak, thus giving the outpost double strength at
the time when an attack is most to be feared.
_Cavalry._ The advance cavalry, during the day, will be in front of
the infantry. About half an hour or so after the infantry outpost has
assumed its night position, the bulk of the cavalry, if not too far
out, may be withdrawn behind the outpost line. In such a case the
cavalry would usually resume its day position by daybreak, or even
earlier, if an attack is to be feared; and should be well to the front
before the infantry outguards are withdrawn from their night positions.
In withdrawing behind the outpost line the cavalry will usually camp
with the reserve (of the outpost). Here it may be joined by its field
trains. While the cavalry can rest with greater security behind the
outpost line, and may have its trains, yet on the other hand this
necessitates a march to the rear of several miles, and making camp,
etc., often in the dark. Also the cavalry must be saddled up again
during the night in order to march out and resume its day positions by
daybreak or earlier, being thus deprived of much of its night rest.
The absence of the cavalry from the front increases the outpost duty
of the infantry. It will accordingly often be advisable to leave the
cavalry out over night. The particular circumstances of each case will
determine the proper course to pursue. The independent cavalry, being
usually 5 miles or more beyond the outpost line will habitually remain
out over night, providing for its own security.
Even when withdrawn for the night the cavalry should maintain touch
with the enemy by means of patrols, if practicable, unless this duty
is assigned to the infantry supports (or reserve) for which purpose
cavalry should generally be attached to the outpost for the night.
Standing patrols may also be placed at important points (crossroads,
bridges, etc.) too far out to be occupied by the infantry, during the
night.
To avoid a greatly extended infantry outpost line the cavalry may be
used by day and night to cover the country to the flanks by patrolling,
the central or more dangerous portion being held by the infantry
outpost. An example of this would be a river line, the section opposite
the enemy being held by the outpost, and the banks above and below
being patrolled by cavalry.
In issuing orders as to times for assuming night and day positions,
etc., it is better when practicable to use standard times rather than
references to “daybreak,” “dusk,” or “dark.” (See tables of sunrise and
sunset, Chapter VI. “Daybreak” is about an hour before sunrise, “dark”
about the same time after sunset.)
_Cavalry outposts._ An outpost consisting _entirely_ of cavalry would
be used only by a cavalry command. It is organized in a general way
quite like an outpost of mixed troops, but on account of its greater
mobility the distances between fractions may be somewhat greater. The
sentinels of a cavalry outpost may be mounted. From this extreme a
cavalry outpost may vary to one organized exactly like an outpost of
mixed troops, all the horses (except those of patrols, detached posts,
etc.) being at a safe place in rear and unsaddled for the night. This
latter form of outpost will usually be preferable, and is practically
essential if any determined _resistance_ is contemplated. A cavalry
outpost is usually not required to make as stubborn resistance as
one composed of mixed troops. If it is merely the advance or outpost
cavalry of a mixed command it would usually make no resistance, except
such as was necessary to insure its own withdrawal. The vigilance
required of the outpost proper may, especially in the case of cavalry,
be greatly diminished by the judicious use of mounted patrols to the
front and flanks and air craft to observe the avenues of approach.
Parties of some strength may be sent to the front on important roads
to resist or delay an advance of the enemy by obstacles and dismounted
fire action. Their horses are held conveniently near under cover, to
facilitate withdrawal when further resistance is impracticable.
_March outposts._ Every command on halting, even temporarily, should
cover its front and flanks by temporary or “march” outposts. These
march outposts are withdrawn on resuming the march or, in case of
a halt for the night, when the regular outpost is in position. The
placing of march outposts is the special duty of the advance guard, and
is usually performed by the advance party. Cavalry covering the front
affords a considerable measure of security, but this should usually be
supplemented by small patrols of infantry or mounted orderlies, sent to
the front and flanks along the roads or across country when necessary.
On receipt of orders to halt for the night and establish outposts,
the cavalry with the advance guard, if not already there, should be
sent to the front to cover the movement of the outpost troops to their
positions. Patrols of mounted or dismounted men should be sent to the
front a short distance on all important roads, especially those on
which supports of the outpost are to be placed. These patrols, which
may be as strong as a platoon, proceed to some important point, such
as a hill or ridge, road junction, stream or defile. Here they satisfy
themselves that no enemy is near, returning at a designated time or
when recalled by a mounted messenger. If the enemy be encountered they
delay his advance, sending word to the rear and falling back gradually.
Patrols should also be sent to the flanks, if any danger is anticipated
in those directions. Mounted patrols of this kind may go out as much as
two miles; infantry patrols usually from a half to three-quarters of a
mile. The advance cavalry, if out, will usually be from 2 to 5 miles in
front, and will generally remain out until about dusk. Even when the
front is covered by the cavalry, however, patrols should be sent out on
the important roads on halting, unless danger from the enemy is known
to be out of question. If the halt be temporary these patrols rejoin
by the shortest practicable route as the march is resumed. If the halt
be for the night they are selected if practicable from the troops
intended for the outpost and join their organization when the outpost
has moved forward to its position.
_Outpost orders._ The formal orders covering the placing of an outpost
are as follows:
1. The halt order of the supreme commander which designates the troops
for the outpost and the approximate position of same, or directs the
advance guard (or rear guard) to establish the outpost on a designated
line. This order should be issued well in advance of the halt (1 to
2 hrs.) in order to allow subordinate commanders time to issue the
necessary orders before reaching the camping place.
2. The order of the advance guard (or rear guard) commander,
designating the troops for the outpost and the line to be held.
3. The first order of the outpost commander, designating the troops
for the outpost (under his command), the exact line of same, and the
composition and location of each support, with special instructions for
same. This order usually covers only the day positions of the infantry.
4. The 2d (night) order of the outpost commander, covering necessary
changes in the outpost dispositions for the night.
No. 2 is omitted when the entire advance guard goes on outpost duty.
No. 4 should preferably take the form of verbal instructions, unless
the command is large or extensive changes, such as might result from
additional information concerning the enemy, are necessary.
The orders for the dispositions and duties of the outguards and patrols
are given verbally by the support commanders. (Examples of outpost
orders follow. See also F. S. R.)
_Establishing the outpost._ The supreme commander’s halt order should
generally be issued from an hour to two hours before the halt. This
gives the advance guard and outpost commanders opportunity to estimate
the situation and issue their own preliminary orders before the halt.
If a command fatigued by a day’s march must wait under arms while camp
sites are selected, serious discontent will be the logical result. The
intelligent commander and his staff should generally contrive to select
the camp site in advance and route the various organizations to their
stations without delay, confusion or unnecessary movement. Herein is
found a test of the efficiency of the staff.
The halt order of the supreme commander must generally be issued from
the map, supplemented by such information as may have been received
from the cavalry, etc.
Having estimated the situation the advance guard commander issues his
orders, and gives the necessary instructions for placing the march
outposts. If practicable, he should make a personal examination of the
terrain to supplement the information obtained from his map, but in a
large command this might cause great delay, and the order may be issued
from a good map. The advance guard halts on reaching its camp site and
march outposts are at once sent out.
When the advance guard halts, the outpost commander with the troops
designated for the outpost, proceeds to the vicinity of the spot
selected, from the map, for the reserve camp. Here the outpost
troops are halted (usually by a staff officer) while the outpost
commander, accompanied by such of his subordinates as are mounted,
proceeds rapidly ahead to the designated outpost line for personal
reconnaissance. If it has been practicable to select the approximate
stations of the supports and determine their strength from the map
alone, they may be directed to continue the march beyond the reserve
camp, take their approximate stations and prepare their suppers. On
reaching a suitable lookout point on the outpost line the commander
sends a mounted messenger (usually an aide) with the orders to the
advance cavalry (when to withdraw for the night, standing patrols to be
left out, etc.). He then makes an examination of the ground and with
the aid of his map, issues the necessary orders to his subordinates. If
the subordinates are not mounted they usually assemble at the reserve
camp to await the return of the commander from his reconnaissance.
No rules for the procedure of the various commanders can be prescribed.
It is always advisable to place all troops in camp as quickly as
possible, so that the men can remove their accoutrements and rest.
On the other hand if outpost supports are placed from the map alone,
faulty dispositions necessitating a change of positions later on,
may result, and this is trying to the men and tends to weaken their
confidence in their commander.
The supports and detached posts having been placed, the outpost
commander, sometime before dark, makes an inspection of the entire
outpost line, examines the defense and security measures, and questions
the support commanders as to the dispositions they intend to make for
the night. He makes such changes as appear to be necessary, gives the
support commanders instructions as to when to take up night and resume
day positions, and orders any special reconnoitering which he desires.
If extensive changes are necessary particularly in view of fresh news
concerning the enemy, a second order should be issued, but generally
this will not be required.
Instructions for demolitions, obstacles, or other work of the
engineers, are usually given verbally. They may be briefly referred to
in orders so that the balance of the command may take notice.
In withdrawing to a camp after an engagement, if still in the presence
of the enemy, the troops holding the front (who will usually be
deployed in line of battle) should not retire from their positions
until relieved by the outpost, otherwise the security of the command
might be compromised.
_Outpost sketches and tables._ Each support commander makes a sketch
of his dispositions for the information of the outpost commander,
and the latter a sketch of the entire outpost for the information of
the superior commander. Tables, showing the number of men actually
on duty as sentinels or patrols by day and by night, may accompany
the sketches. These tables are particularly useful, as an examination
of them often indicates how the number of men on duty may be reduced
without loss of security. An example of such a table for the outpost
shown in the sketch herewith (Fig. VIII) follows:
[Illustration: Fig. VIII DIAGRAM OF OUTPOST]
SUPPORT NO. 1. _Day_ _Night_
Single sentinel at support (1 n. c. o.) 4 4
Officer and mounted orderly to visit outguards 2 and 3 0 2
Reconnoitering patrols beyond outpost line 4 8
_Outguards._
1. Cossack post at 0 4
2. Sentry squad at 0 8
3. Picket at
Single sentinel at picket 0 4
Cossack post at 0 4
Cossack post at 0 4
Patrol, 3 men, patrol along front and connect with
detached post from the reserve at 0 9
Patrol, 2 men, to connect with adjacent picket and
patrol along front 0 6
4. Cossack post at 0 4
SUPPORT NO. 2.
Double sentinel at support (2 n. c. o.) 4 8
Officer and 2 mtd. orderlies to visit pickets 2 6
Reconnoitering patrols beyond outpost line 8 16
_Outguards._
1. Cossack post at 0 4
2. Picket at
(out day and night)
Single sentinel at picket 4 4
Cossack post at 0 4
Cossack post at 0 4
2 patrols, 3 men each, patrol along front and connect
with adjacent pickets 0 18
3. Sentry squad at 0 8
4. Sentry squad at 8 8
(serves also as examining post)
5. Picket at
(out night and day)
Single sentinel at picket 4 4
Cossack post at 0 4
Cossack post at 0 4
2 patrols, 2 men each, patrol along front and connect
with adjacent pickets 0 12
SUPPORT NO. 3.
Single sentinel at support 4 4
Officer and mounted orderly to visit outguards 2 and 4 0 2
Patrol, 1 officer (or n. c. o.) and 4 troopers
maintain communication with cavalry post at
and detached post from main body at 0 15
_Outguards._
1. Sentry squad at 0 8
2. Picket at
Single sentinel at picket 0 4
Cossack post at 0 4
Cossack post at 0 4
2 patrols, 2 men each, patrol along front and connect
with adjacent picket 0 12
3. Cossack post at 0 4
4. Sentry squad at 8 8
---------
Total 50 226
A careful study of such a table and accompanying maps
or sketches will enable the outpost commander to
determine how he can economize men without loss of
security.
ADVANCE GUARD COMMANDER’S HALT ORDER.
_Par. 1._ Information of the enemy.
Location and security measures of independent cavalry, if known.
Location of adjacent bodies of friendly troops and of their outpost
lines.
Location of march outposts (these have been posted under verbal
instructions).
Camp of the main body, location of its headquarters.
Detached posts from the main body--strength, location.
_Par. 2._ Camp of the advance guard, location of its headquarters.
_Par. 3._ (a) Instructions to the advance cavalry, when not attached to
the outpost.
General orders as to country to be reconnoitered, any special tasks to
be performed, contact with the enemy.
Time to withdraw for the night, where to camp.
Time to resume day positions.
Instructions as to standing patrols to be left out over night--strength,
posts, special reconnaissance, etc.
The place to which messages for the cavalry will be sent.
(b) Instructions for the outpost. Troops, commander, location, line
to be held in case of attack (or “in case of attack the outpost will
be supported”), connection with other outposts or detached posts,
examining posts, any special instructions. (Camp of reserve of outpost
may be designated or this may be left to the discretion of the outpost
commander.)
(c) Camp of the remainder of the advance guard. Commander.
Conduct in case of attack.
Detached posts (if any), troops, commanders, duties.
Instructions for the camp (preferably conveyed in verbal instructions
or routine orders.)
Instructions to special troops, if any.
_Par. 4._ Instructions for field trains. Those of outpost generally
placed at disposal of its commander. May be directed to return to camp
of advance guard after supper or before dawn.
Field trains usually assemble at an early hour at a designated
locality, off the road, to join those of the main body (as they pass)
on resuming the forward march.
Instructions to sanitary troops.
_Par. 5._ Messages to _________________________.
Location of lines of information, if any.
Signature.
How and to whom communicated.
Report of dispositions to superior commander.
OUTPOST COMMANDER’S ORDER.
_Par. 1._ All the information contained in Pars. 1 and 2 of the Advance
Guard Commander’s order--or so much thereof as may seem necessary.
_Par. 2._ Troops for the outpost, commander. Outpost line “to be
held in case of attack,” or “in case of attack the outpost will be
supported.”
Connection with adjacent outposts (if any), or detached posts.
TROOPS:
(a) Outpost cavalry:
Commander.
Troops.
(b) Supports:
No. 1. Commander.
Troops.
etc.
(c) Detached post:
Commander.
Troops.
(d) Reserve:
Commander.
Troops.
_Par. 3._ (a) (Same as preceding order--if cavalry is attached _to
outpost_.)
(b) Instructions for supports, right to left.
Station. Sector to occupy or guard.
Special reconnaissance. Contact with enemy. Patrol connection
with adjacent outposts or detached posts.
Instructions as to examining posts, intrenching, obstacles,
demolitions, etc.
(c) Detached posts (from reserve).
Instructions similar to those for supports.
(d) Reserve. Camp, special duty. Conduct of in case of attack.
Special troops--duties. Engineers assist in clearing, construction of
obstacles, improvement of communications, demolitions, etc. Signal
troops--connect parts of outpost.
_Par. 4._ Instructions for field trains (and sanitary troops if any).
Wagons may join supports, usually return to camp of reserve after
supper or before dawn. Assembly for march in the morning. (See previous
form.)
_Par. 5._ Messages to __________________________.
Location of lines of information, if any.
Signature.
How and to whom communicated.
Report of dispositions to superior commander, with sketch of outpost
when prepared.
SECOND ORDER OF OUTPOST COMMANDER.
(It is usually not necessary to issue this order, especially in a small
command, as verbal instruction would suffice. If extensive changes are
necessary a second order would be issued before dark in this form.)
_Par. 1._ Additional information or statement, “No change in situation.”
_Par. 2._ The following changes are ordered for the night.
_Par. 3._ (a) Instructions for advance cavalry (if not covered in first
order).
Time to withdraw from night position, camp for the night (usually with
reserve), assignment of mounted men to the infantry supports for the
night (if any). Standing patrols to be left out over night, special
duties. Time for cavalry to resume day positions.
(b) Instructions for supports, any changes of position,
reinforcements, additional intrenching, additional security
measures, reconnaissance, etc.
Time to assume night and resume day positions. Patrol connection
with cavalry posts during the night. Instructions as to
camp fires, cooking, tent pitching, etc. (These camp details may
be covered verbally and omitted from order.)
(c) Instructions to reserve.
Detached posts, exterior guards or other security measures for the
night.
Instructions as to fires, cooking, tents, etc.
Reserve to be under arms at designated hour before dawn. (An extreme
precaution adopted only when an attack is feared.)
Additional instructions for special troops.
_Par. 4._ Additional instructions for field trains. Usually wagons at
supports to return to camp of reserve. Assembly of field trains in the
morning.
_Par. 5._ No change, (or messages to ______________________.)
Signature.
How and to whom communicated.
Report of dispositions to superior comd’r.
Note: It would be seldom that any outpost orders would contain _all_
the information and instructions set forth in the foregoing forms. On
the other hand under certain conditions special instructions might be
required. The forms indicate the subjects that should be considered.
Not all of these need in the usual case be covered by the orders.
VERBAL OUTPOST ORDER FOR A SMALL COMMAND.
Information of the enemy and our supporting troops.
Our main body camps at __________, with a detached post of (such
troops) at __________.
March outposts are now __________.
Troops for the outpost, commander, outpost line, conduct in case of
attack--usually “in case of attack this line will be held.” Such troops
under such commander will constitute Support No. 1, and will occupy (or
guard) the sector from such landmark to such landmark, both inclusive.
Reconnaissance to __________.
(Support No. 2--instructions in same form.)
All supports will prepare their positions for defense. Planking of
bridges will be loosened and fords obstructed, etc.
Patrols will be sent to the line of __________ (usually enemy’s
outposts if not too distant.)
Three mtd. orderlies will report to each support.
Reserve. Troops, commander, camp, detached posts, distant patrolling,
etc.
Wagons may join their companies but will return to park south of the
reserve by 9:00 p. m.
Messages to __________.
ADVANCE GUARD COMMANDER’S HALT AND OUTPOST ORDER.
Adv. Gd., 1st Brig., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
TWO TAVERNS, PA.,
Field Orders } 20 June 1912, 2:20 p. m.
No. -- }
Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.
1. A hostile division advancing through CASHTOWN has occupied
GETTYSBURG. A hostile troop has been driven from ST. MARY’S REFORMED
CHURCH by our cavalry, which now occupies that place, observing the
line of ROCK CREEK and towards GETTYSBURG. March outposts are now
observing on the line of WHITE RUN.
Our army halts for the night with the left of its outpost at 550 (1⅔
miles north of TWO TAVERNS.)
Our brigade camps at GERMANTOWN with headquarters at the town hall and
sends a detached post of 1 platoon of infantry to the TRUSTLE F. H.
2. This advance guard will camp at TWO TAVERNS.
3. (a) The 1st Sq., 1st Cav. (less Tr.D) will continue to cover our
front until 7:00 p. m. when it will withdraw and camp at TWO TAVERNS,
north of the main road and east of LITTLE’S RUN. Day positions will be
resumed at 4:00 a. m. Half a troop under an officer will be sent at
once to the vicinity of BARLOW to watch the crossings at that place and
one mile south thereof, and patrol to the west and to GETTYSBURG on the
TANEYTOWN Road, throughout the night. One platoon under an officer
will be sent to report to the outpost commander.
(b) Lt. Col. B with the 1st and 2nd Bns. and 12 mtd. orderlies of the
1st Inf., and 1 platoon, 1st Sq., 1st Cav., will establish an outpost
on the line from the left of the army’s outpost through 525--479--Hill
449--to include the bridge 393W. In case of attack this line will be
held and the outpost will be supported. Contact will be maintained with
the cavalry post at BARLOW and the detached post from the main body
at TRUSTLE. An examining post will be established on the BALTIMORE
TURNPIKE.
(c) The remainder of the advance guard will camp at TWO TAVERNS; north
of the road and west of LITTLE’S RUN, under command of Major C. In case
of attack the outpost will be supported.
4. The field trains will join the troops. Those of the outpost troops
are placed at the disposal of the outpost commander. All field trains
will assemble on the BALTIMORE TURNPIKE east of 508 by 3:00 a. m.
tomorrow when Capt. X, Q. M., 1st Inf., will conduct them to join the
brigade train.
5. Messages to the school house at TWO TAVERNS.
A,
Colonel, 1st Inf.
Dictated to Staff:
Copies to C. O. of:
Outpost
1st Sq., 1st Cav.
1st Bn., 1st Inf.
2d Bn.
3d Bn.
M. G. Co., 1st Inf.
By mounted messenger to C. G. 1st Brigade.
Notes: The march outposts consist of small patrols of cavalry. They are
withdrawn by verbal instructions as soon as the outpost is in position.
In addition to these march outposts the advance guard, of course,
establishes the necessary guards for the security of the camp.
Here the cavalry is independent of the outpost commander. It comes in
at night leaving out a standing patrol at Barlow. During the night
some cavalry is assigned to the outpost for patrolling toward the
enemy. The patrols from Barlow are told to go _to_ Gettysburg, not
_toward_. Perhaps they cannot reach the town, but will go as close as
possible.
OUTPOST COMMANDER’S FIRST ORDER.
Outpost, 1st Brig., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
Farm house 1,000 yds. S. of
ST. MARY’S REFORMED CHURCH, PA.
Field Orders } 20 June, 1912, 4:20 p. m.
No. -- }
Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.
1. (Include in this paragraph pertinent information contained in Pars.
1 and 2 of preceding order, also information as to the location of the
headquarters of the advance guard and concerning the cavalry post to be
at BARLOW during the night.)
2. The 1st and 2d Bns. and 9 mtd. orderlies, 1st Inf., and 1 Plat. Tr.
A, 1st Cav., under my command will establish the outpost from the left
of the army’s outpost on the line through 525--479-Hill 449 to include
the bridge 393W. In case of attack this line will be held and the
outpost will be supported.
Troops
(a) Supports:
No. 1, Maj. B.
1st Bn. 1st Inf.
(less Co. D)
6 mtd. orderlies.
No. 2, Capt. D.
Co. D, 1st Inf.
1 Plat. Tr. A, 1st
Cav. (less 2 n.c.o’s
and 7 troopers.)
No. 3, Maj. D.
2d Bn. 1st Inf.
(less Cos. E & F)
2 n.c.o’s & 7 trprs.
Tr. A, 1st Cav.
(b) Reserve:
Capt. F.
Cos. E & F, 1st Inf.
3 mtd. orderlies.
3. (a) Support No. 1 will take post just west of 525, connect with the
left of the Army’s outpost, and guard the sector, stream just south
of the 529--550--516 road inclusive, ravine 400 yds. south of ST.
MARY’S REFORMED CHURCH inc. The line of WHITE RUN will be observed.
Reconnaissance to WOLF HILL and along the BALTIMORE PIKE to GETTYSBURG.
An examining post will be established on the BALTIMORE PIKE.
Support No. 2 will take post about 500 yds. west of 479 and guard the
sector, ravine 400 yds. S. of ST. MARY’S REFORMED CHURCH exclusive,
LITTLE’S RUN inclusive. Reconnaissance to the north and northwest from
DIENER.
Support No. 3 will take post near 491 and guard the sector LITTLE’S RUN
exclusive, 491--393W road inclusive. Limited reconnaissance from 418
west. Patrol connection will be maintained with the cavalry post at
BARLOW and the detached post at TRUSTLE during the night.
Each support will prepare its position for defense.
(b) The reserve will camp at the farm house 1,000 yds. south of ST.
MARY’S REFORMED CHURCH.
4. Company wagons may join their organizations but all trains will be
reported to Capt. X, Q. M. 1st Inf., at road junction 508 east of TWO
TAVERNS by 2:50 a. m. tomorrow.
5. Messages to the reserve camp and in case of emergency by duplicate
direct to advance guard comdr. at TWO TAVERNS.
B,
Lt. Col., 1st Inf.
Verbally to support commanders.
By Lt. T, Bn. Adjt., to C. O. Cav.
Copy with sketch of outpost to C. O. Adv. Guard.
Notes: The expression “limited reconnaissance” means within the limits
of an infantry patrol as Support No. 3 has not enough cavalry for this
reconnaissance after allowing patrols to go to BARLOW and TRUSTLE, as
these must be mounted on account of the distance. Support No. 2 will
place a picket at DIENER in accordance with its instructions. This
arrangement illustrates the statement that there can be no fixed rules
for the dispositions of an outpost.