COMBAT--ATTACK AND DEFENSE.
_General observations._ Decisive results are obtained only by the
offense. The attack leads, the defense must conform.
Do not contemplate a purely passive defense unless your mission
requires it.
Raw, untrained troops are not suitable for active offensive operations;
they are best utilized in defense, on the line of communications, or in
a pivotal position supporting the maneuver of the first line troops.
A purely passive defense may be adopted in the following cases:
(a) With inferior troops.
(b) To contain a larger force of the enemy.
(c) When expecting reinforcements.
(d) In delaying actions.
It is by no means to be understood, however, that a purely passive
defense should always be adopted in the above cases. This will depend
on circumstances. At times a vigorous offensive may offer the only
chance of success.
Fire superiority is the keynote of success.
Avoid too great dispersion of the front or separation of the troops in
a decisive action. A regiment united has greater fighting strength than
3 separated battalions. All movements should be simple. Complicated
maneuvers should never be attempted in battle. Make a conservative
solution--never attempt anything grotesque.
Avoid half-hearted measures. If the decision is to attack, all
available force should be thrown into the fight. This does not mean,
however, that no reserves should be kept in hand at the opening of the
attack.
Do not uncover the line of retreat unless the force is small and the
country friendly. If, however, circumstances permit this to be done
it will often force the enemy to also uncover _his_ line of retreat,
and may thus increase the fruits of victory. An advance guard should
usually not uncover the main body, though in a pursuit it may be
justifiable to do so in order to prevent the delay of the main body.
Put into the main fight all available force, calling in all detachments
within reach. The only detachments which are justifiable are (a) one
which contains a _relatively_ stronger force of the enemy and keeps it
out of the main combat, or (b) one which protects the flanks of the
main force, secures it against surprise, or covers its communications,
etc.
A detachment operating as a containing force separated by some distance
from the main body, should if practicable be relatively strong in
cavalry and artillery.
Night attacks are usually dangerous, and ordinarily practicable only
for small forces. Night movements, however, may be advisable under
certain conditions:
1. To seize a position prior to the enemy.
2. To gain ground over a fire swept zone.
3. To concentrate reserves for an assault, without detection
by the enemy.
4. To effect a withdrawal in safety.
5. In pursuit of a defeated force.
(See post for night attacks)
An attack order will be much more intelligently made when issued as a
result of an examination of the ground rather than from the map alone.
For small commands, some examination of the terrain by the commander
in person, will usually be possible, but for commands the size of a
division or larger, the examination may not be possible. Dependence
must then be placed upon the map supplemented by such reports as are
obtainable.
Attacks which offer no chance of tactical success should generally
be avoided. Combats which have no bearing on the general plan should
also be avoided, as a rule, even though they offer the chance of easy
victory.
Never neglect reconnaissance at any time.
Avoid splitting or mixing tactical units as far as possible.
Aggressiveness wins battles. If in doubt it is generally better to
attack. But _make sure_ that the advantage derived from victory will be
well worth the cost.
_Form of attack._ A turning movement should seldom be undertaken by a
force smaller than a division (except by cavalry, or in the attack of a
river line, etc.)
The usual forms of attack for a small force are but two in number:
(a) A frontal attack.
(b) A frontal attack with envelopment of a flank of the enemy.
A frontal attack with envelopment of both flanks, (rare--).
The advantages of a frontal attack are simplicity, speed and
directness. Its disadvantages are that it is usually very costly
(due to difficulty of obtaining fire superiority) and generally less
effective if successful than an enveloping attack. It is most commonly
employed in advance guard actions (see post).
The object of an enveloping attack is fire superiority. It usually
implies a considerable superiority of numbers and should ordinarily be
preferred to a frontal attack when practicable.
In deciding as to whether to attack, the commander must consider what
his mission requires, the nature and extent of the enemy’s defensive
line, the relative numbers of his own command and that of the enemy,
the strength and positions of the supporting troops of each and the
enemy’s probable intentions.
An attack usually implies superior force either in numbers or
quality of troops, hence if the enemy is equal or superior it would
generally be disastrous to attack him in position unless expecting
reinforcements. In such case an attack may be made in order to develop
the enemy’s strength, location and intentions, and hold him in position
until the arrival of reinforcements. The attack need not be pushed home
until the reinforcements arrive. Such an attack would generally be
frontal as this would be the safest procedure, usually least exposed to
counter attack, and would allow the reinforcements to envelop either
flank upon their arrival. In deciding on the method of attack, the
position of the enemy’s reserves should also be considered. Moreover
the enemy’s line might be too long to be enveloped after covering its
front.
If the enemy occupies a line too long to be enveloped, but which is
known to be lightly held, a frontal attack may be made with the object
of piercing the attenuated line. Such an attack would, of course, be
less costly than in the ordinary case, especially as the enemy almost
certainly would not fight to a decision. If the enemy is known to be
fighting a delaying action only, a frontal attack will as a general
rule most promptly drive him from his position, although this of
course depends to some extent on the nature of the terrain.
Finally if the enemy’s flanks rest on impassable obstacles, or if the
attack is a local operation on an extended and continuous line of
battle, a frontal attack is the only course open.
When practicable an enveloping attack is to be preferred and it becomes
a question of which flank to envelop. The following considerations will
be a guide to a decision on this point:
(a) Which flank allows the nearest approach under cover?
(b) Against which flank can an attack be more quickly launched
consistent with due preparation and without undesirable separation of
the attacking columns?
(c) Which flank has the better field of fire? (For the enemy).
(d) What bearing if any have the available artillery positions?
(e) Where is the enemy’s line of retreat and from whence will his
reinforcements (if any are expected) probably arrive? (The enemy will
withdraw more readily from an attack which threatens to separate him
from his line of retreat or reinforcements, unless he has a small force
and is in friendly country, in which case separation from his preferred
line of retreat is not so serious a matter.)
(f) In view of the direction from which our own reinforcements may
arrive, which flank is preferable?
(g) In view of the direction from which the enemy’s reinforcements
may arrive, and the position of our own line of retreat, which flank
may be more safely attacked? The possibility of a reverse must not be
overlooked.
_The best disposition for the attacking infantry is the primary
consideration in determining which flank to attack._
A consideration of these tactical questions will usually result in a
preponderance in favor of one flank. Always envelop that flank which
gives more promise of a tactical victory. If both flanks are promising,
then consider which attack would give the greater strategical results
if successful.
A simultaneous envelopment of _both_ hostile flanks would be rare, and
would ordinarily imply great superiority of forces. It will almost
invariably be better to concentrate on the enemy’s weaker flank.
The usual attack will then have two parts, the secondary or holding
(frontal) attack and the main or enveloping attack. They are, however,
never so called in orders as the expression, “secondary attack” is
objectionable, tending to diminish the ardor of the troops engaged
therein. Moreover, it is not always possible to foresee which attack
will actually be pushed home. The “secondary” may become the decisive
attack. There must be nothing either in the appearance or conduct of
the frontal attack to indicate that it is not being made in earnest,
for if the enemy perceives that this attack is not to be pushed, he
will contain it with a _relatively_ smaller proportion of his force and
concentrate against the main attack.
Generally the main attack is made stronger than the holding attack. The
strength lies in its depth of deployment, it may or may not be stronger
in total numbers according to circumstances. The difference of density
per yard is not manifested in the firing lines, however. The enemy
must not be permitted to judge the holding attack by any weakness in
its firing line. The difference lies chiefly in the supports. The main
attack must hold out stronger supports because usually it will have
more gaps from casualties, fatigued men, skulkers, etc. The main attack
is to be driven home at all costs. To do so the density of its firing
line must be maintained to the last. It must be expected that an attack
having a firing line density of 1 man per yard may need _supports_ of
equal or greater numerical strength before it will be able to throw the
enemy out of his trenches. The _firing line_ density of each attack
should therefore be essentially the same, say about 1 man per yard
of front. The main attack may hold out from each battalion say two
companies in support where the holding attack retains one. (See also
Chap. XVII).
Envelopment should generally be provided for in the first deployment,
not afterward. The enveloping attack may be extended during the action
by putting in the reserves. The defender also will probably extend his
line during the fight to meet the enveloping attack.
The main attack should generally be made as strong as possible. The
minimum number of troops should be assigned to the holding attack in
order to have all possible strength in the main attack (and reserves).
A usual disposition for a division would be: 1 brigade in the holding
attack, 1 in the main attack, 1 in the reserve.
The advance guard regiment in a brigade action, would generally be
assigned to the holding attack, covering the maneuver of the main body.
An enveloping movement must not expect to _enfilade_ the enemy’s line.
He will echelon his line to the rear and throw in his reserves to meet
it, so that it usually becomes merely a frontal attack in a different
direction. The advantage of envelopment is the convergence of fire as
against the divergence of the enemy’s fire. An enveloping attack should
be separated sufficiently from the holding attack and directed well
to the rear of the enemy, as it has strong tendency to join up with
frontal attack and become merely an extension of the latter on the same
line, thus sacrificing the advantage of converging fire. On the other
hand the separation should not be so great as to sacrifice co-operation
and mutual support. (For discussion of turning movements see Chap.
XVII.)
_Advancing to the attack._ An attack should generally not be launched
until the strength of the enemy and the position of his flanks are well
established.
The attacking troops keep to the roads and remain in column as long as
practicable, in advancing to their deploying positions. If subjected to
artillery or long range rifle fire the advance should be made in some
less vulnerable formation. (See Chap. XVI.)
The attack should advance under such cover as is available as close as
possible to the enemy’s line before opening fire. It is desirable to
obtain a first position within 800 yards and seldom beyond 1,000 yards.
Fire superiority must be established in the first position. Otherwise
an advance is not practicable.
The main and secondary attacks (in an enveloping action) should
generally advance in conjunction with each other. Both should advance
from cover _when practicable_ and (particularly for the main attack)
have the element of surprise.
Cover for the advancing troops both before and after deployment is
the most important consideration, but must not be allowed to outweigh
_all other_ considerations. The best cover is fire superiority, as it
encourages the attacker while natural cover tends to enervate him.
Adjacent organizations endeavor to maintain contact during the advance,
but nobody waits for a laggard.
The various echelons of the attack generally move forward together--the
supports and local reserves keeping their distances from the firing
line as well as circumstances--especially cover for the advance--permit.
_Assignment of fronts._
_Every portion_ of the defender’s line must be covered by fire
throughout the attack. This is accomplished by assigning a portion
of his front to each organization in the attack. The front so
assigned should be about equal to the deployed width of the attacking
organization and opposite to it.
The brigade commander assigns fronts to the regiments, the regimental
commanders to their battalions, the battalion commanders to their
companies, etc.
These fronts should be assigned as accurately as the landmarks of
the terrain allow. Often the enemy’s line is so poorly defined or so
indefinitely located, that it is impossible to give an organization
anything more definite than a guiding point or general direction for
one flank. (See Chap. XVI.)
Great care should be exercised in the assignment of fronts. If the
adjacent flanks of two organizations advancing from slightly different
directions guide on the same point _in the enemy’s line_ during their
advance, they will arrive in a continuous line upon his front. If the
point is in advance of the line there will be crowding or overlapping,
which is objectionable as it causes confusion and may subject a portion
of one line to the fire of the other. Casualties during the advance may
tend to reduce this difficulty. If the guiding point is in rear of the
enemy’s line there will be a gap between the two organizations, which
however, may be filled if that is desirable. If the two organizations
are advancing in the same direction, contiguous to each other (as in
a frontal attack) no difficulty is encountered and the arrangement is
excellent.
The interior flank of the enveloping attack will usually be directed
on the supposed position of the flank of the enemy, or on a point a
little inside of it. Consequently, at the start, there may be no troops
opposite the enveloping attack, but the enemy may be expected to extend
his line promptly to meet it when he becomes aware of the envelopment.
(See Fig. IX.)
Each column assigned to the first line in attack should be instructed
(in orders) as to:
(a) The route to its deploying position, when necessary.
(b) Certain landmarks to guide it during the advance.
(c) The portion of the enemy’s line it is to cover--defined as
accurately as circumstances permit.
_Reserves._ Troops once committed to an attack can be withdrawn only
with the greatest difficulty. When once in action they are usually
beyond the control of the commander. It is by the judicious use of
his reserves alone that the commander can influence the course of an
action once he has launched his attack. Hence too many troops should
not be committed to the action at the outset. Especially if the enemy’s
strength and position are not yet fully developed should large reserves
be kept in hand. The defense, as it must meet the attacker’s moves,
usually employs larger _reserves_ than the attack.
The aim of all tactics, either in attack or defense, is the
concentration of overwhelming force at the critical point. Numerical
strength that furnished overwhelming force at the proper time may
be inferior at a later time. Rapidity of maneuver is equivalent
to increased numerical strength. Hence the value of motor cars in
effecting tactical or strategic concentration of troops.
A company ordinarily deploys on one line. A battalion holds out one or
two companies as local supports. These are used to replace losses in
the firing line during the advance over the fire swept zone.
Each regiment holds out one or two battalions as regimental reserves.
Their purpose is to carry the firing line into the assault.
Each brigade in attack ordinarily holds out a regiment as brigade
reserve. It is employed to reinforce the decisive attack, to secure
possession of the captured position, to meet the defender’s counter
attack, or to take up the pursuit of the defeated force.
The defense is characterized by small local supports and reserves, and
large general reserves, except in delaying actions. The reserves are
almost always employed to protect the flanks, although not necessarily
to furnish combat patrols. They should therefore generally be posted
near the exposed flank or the one that will need reinforcement. If
there be doubt as to which flank may need reinforcement the reserve is
held in a central position from which it can conveniently reach either
flank, or else divided.
If there is cover available the local supports may be within 50 yards
of the firing line. If no cover is available they should be farther
back. The general reserve seeks a convenient covered locality, behind a
flank or opposite the center.
_Protection of the flanks._ On account of the difficulty of changing
front during the action and the annihilating effect of enfilading
fire, the flanks of a line are its most vulnerable parts, and the most
_elaborate_ measures are habitually taken for their protection, both in
offense and defense, as they are the cynosure of attack.
The best protection for the flanks of the defender is afforded by
impassable obstacles, which render them absolutely secure from
envelopment. Next in order come a good field of fire and fortifications.
The cavalry or mounted men provide a measure of security for the flanks
by observation and if possible, resistance. It is also their duty to
maintain communication with any friendly troops in the vicinity--and
their orders should contain instructions to that effect. The supreme
commander (both in attack and defense) usually retains in his own hand
a few mounted men to act as messengers during the engagement. Artillery
favorably posted may also protect the flanks with fire.
Irrespective of the protection afforded by the other arms, infantry
patrols are placed to guard the flanks of a line. These are known
as “combat patrols” and should never be omitted either in attack or
defense during any stage of an action. Combat patrols are in the
nature of covering detachments whose principal function is to give
warning. Where resistance is needed in addition to warning, the patrol
is strengthened accordingly, and, if of some size, may be called a
covering detachment. Such a body accomplishes its purpose by taking
station at some convenient point on the exposed flank and covering it.
Here it halts in a defensive position or attitude, (it may intrench)
sending a few men to nearby points of observation. The bulk however is
held in hand ready to open fire on hostile reconnoitering patrols and
fight them off or to give prompt warning of the approach of any large
body toward the flank it is covering. It will open fire on the superior
force and fight until forced back, thus securing all possible delay in
order to permit of measures being taken to oppose the flank attack.
It is the duty of each organization on a flank to provide for the
security thereof without special orders to that effect. But a small
unit will not ordinarily detach any considerable portion of its
strength to a great distance for this purpose. Thus a battalion in
the first line may send out one or two squads or a platoon from its
supports, a few hundred yards to the flank, as a combat patrol. If
larger measures are necessary for security they should be taken by the
regimental or brigade reserve. The flanks of a line are usually its
most vulnerable parts and hence they demand special attention. The
protection of the flanks (either in attack or defense) is of such vital
importance that it should not devolve as a matter of course upon the
commanders of the flank organizations. The supreme commander should
make positive provision for flank protection in his attack (or defense)
order. In the absence of such orders the regimental (or battalion)
commanders on the flanks will take the ordinary precautions in the way
of combat patrols.
During the early stages of an action and before the regular attack is
launched, patrols should also be sent to the front (directly toward
the enemy) to feel his position by drawing his fire, and to examine
the ground over which the attack must be made. Such patrols may vary
in strength from a few individuals to a firing line making a frontal
attack. A reconnaissance in force therefore, may become a small
attack. It is generally not intended to push home unless the situation
developed as the reconnaissance in force proceeds, warrants a regular
attack. Small patrols in front of the line, must generally seek cover
before fire is opened. If necessary they withdraw to the rear or
flanks. While a defensive position is being prepared or occupied,
provisions should always be made for security to the front. Usually
some regiment will be directed to provide for this. If no special
instructions are given each organization watches its own front, and
flank (if exposed).
A flank combat patrol, except when sent out for the special purpose of
concerted participation in the defense (or attack) provides security
primarily by observation. Nevertheless it should have _some_ power of
resistance, at least enough to push back reconnoitering patrols of the
enemy. Hence 3 to 4 men would usually be insufficient; 2 squads to
a platoon is better unless the force is a very small one. From this
the flank groups may vary in size up to a battalion, placed for the
special purpose of active participation in the engagement during the
later stages.
Troops withdrawing from battle to camp should not uncover the front
they have been guarding until the outpost troops are in position.
_Ammunition._ The extra ammunition in the battalion combat trains is
habitually issued before an attack or in the occupation of a defensive
position, unless the orders expressly state that this will not be done.
The issue of ammunition is ordered by the battalion commander when it
becomes necessary for the battalion to separate from its combat train
upon entering an engagement.
The regimental commanders will give orders as to whether or not packs
are to be carried into action, and if not where they will be left.
It takes about 10 minutes to issue ammunition after the arrival of
the wagons. When the issue of ammunition is completed the wagons are
assembled at some convenient point by order of the supreme commander.
They may be sent to the rear to refill usually from the ammunition
train, or retained temporarily to transport wounded.
During an action the ammunition _trains_, if likely to be required,
should be brought well to front, and their positions marked by red
flags or lanterns. The pack train may be ordered up to facilitate the
distribution of ammunition. In our service pack outfits are carried in
each wagon of the infantry combat trains, thus allowing the lead mules
to be converted into pack animals.
The ammunition carried in the men’s belts is 100 rounds, and the extra
ammunition in the combat trains, 120 rounds. Hence the engagement may
open with 220 rounds on the men, if all the extra ammunition in the
combat trains has been issued. The amount of ammunition expended at
each firing position will be that sufficient to establish (or maintain)
fire superiority. In first establishing fire superiority 25 to 100
rounds or even more may be expended. Usually at the succeeding halts
a lesser expenditure will be required. If, however, the advance be
checked by a loss of fire superiority the expenditure of ammunition
before advancing must be sufficient to reëstablish that superiority
without which a further advance is impracticable. Following are some
examples of actual expenditures:
Russians at Plevna (attack) 160 in 4 hrs.
Turks at Plevna (defense) 120 to 360 per day.
English in Boer War, 150 to 200 per day.
9th U. S. Infantry at Tientsin, 150.
Cuba, Spanish American War, July 1. Cavalry less than 100,
Infantry 20 to 85.
Russo-Jap. War. Japanese, 120 to 160 in heavy engagements.
With improved modern weapons having far greater efficiency than those
of former times, and modern facilities for the supply of ammunition it
is certain that the figures given above will often be greatly exceeded.
It is quite possible for an individual soldier to expend 1,000 rounds
or more during a single period of daylight, and the average consumption
of a body of troops in a protracted conflict may run to 500 rounds per
day or even more. Under these conditions very heavy demands will be
made on the ammunition supply service.
The defense, having better facilities for supplying ammunition, may
expend more than the attacker. Its better facilities for resupply give
the defense an advantage in this respect. Long range fire (beyond
1,200 yards), seldom advisable in attack, may be frequently employed
in defense when the conditions are favorable. If the attacker can be
brought under effective fire and forced to deploy beyond 1,200 yards,
he will have great difficulty in pushing home the attack.
The ammunition of the dead and wounded should be removed from their
persons, and advantage should be taken of cover, lulls in the action,
and all other favorable conditions to distribute ammunition. All
officers and non-commissioned officers are charged with the duty of
preventing the waste of ammunition.
_Intrenchments, obstacles, etc._ Intrenchments are habitually employed
by the defense, and when practicable may be utilized also by the
attack. Ground once gained by the assailant should be held tenaciously,
thus only can success be assured. Moreover a retreat under fire would
ordinarily result in greater losses than if the position were held. If
necessary to hold their position the attackers should dig themselves
into the ground. With the portable tools trenches may be dug in a
prone position, part of the line intrenching while the rest maintains
the fire. The attacker may also intrench under cover of darkness.
Shelter trenches providing considerable security against rifle fire may
be dug in 30 mins, or even less in favorable ground, with the portable
intrenching tool. These trenches afford only slight protection against
shrapnel fire and if they are to be occupied for any considerable time,
they should be enlarged to the kneeling or standing type. Greater
protection from shrapnel fire can be gained by the use of head or
overhead cover. Such cover requires several hours to construct and
would seldom be employed by the attack. (See table Chapter XII.)
The _invariable_ use of intrenchments in the attack, however, is
not advisable. The best means of gaining fire superiority and the
best protection against hostile fire is the attacker’s own fire. The
habit of intrenching tends to diminish the ardor of attacking troops.
Therefore the decision in this matter should not habitually be left to
the soldiers or the company officers. The order for intrenching should
generally emanate from the battalion or other superior commanders.
The object of intrenchments in defense is to economize men on the
firing line in order to hold a longer line, or permit the retention of
large general reserves for the decisive stages of the action. (See “The
organization of a defensive position,” post.)
Trenches should preferably be located and constructed by the troops
who are to occupy them. If there be time, communicating trenches and
shelters for supports and reserves may be constructed. The Engineers
perform the more difficult work, such as obstacles, heavy clearing,
communications, etc., works of general interest not properly part of
the task assigned to any line unit, and any works for which infantry
are not equipped or specially trained.
Obstacles along the front of a position may favor either the attacker
or defender. If they afford shelter from view while allowing easy
passage (like an open wood), they of course favor the attack and can
hardly be called obstacles, but must be classed as cover for the
advance. If, on the other hand, they hinder progress without affording
concealment (like a marsh or bog) they naturally favor the defense. All
artificial obstacles are of this latter kind.
Between these two extremes are many obstacles which according to
conditions may favor one side or the other. In general anything which
affords concealment, to that extent favors the attacker, and anything
that delays progress, to that extent favors the defender.
Obstacles tend to confuse and break up the attacker’s formations,
especially if they run obliquely to his line of advance.
An absolutely impenetrable obstacle along a portion of the defender’s
front, even if it conceals the attacker, is generally an advantage if
not too close (within about 300 yards) as it limits the attacker’s
advance to the open spaces. It is to be remarked, however, that few
obstacles are absolutely impenetrable. If such there be, however, as
for instance an unfordable stream, they give rise to special forms of
attack. (See “Attack of a River Line.”) If the defender contemplates
assuming the offensive a continuous obstacle in his front may be a
positive disadvantage. It may also entirely discourage the attacker and
cause him to turn the position instead of assaulting it. This may or
may not be an advantage to the defense, depending on its mission.
Artificial obstacles, usually constructed by the Engineers, may be
placed in front of a defensive position at effective ranges. The most
practicable forms are abatis, slashing and wire entanglements, or a
combination of these. Ordinary fences are obstacles serious to cavalry,
but less so to infantry. Barbed wire entanglements are the most
effective form of obstacles.
It is to be noted that obstacles _not covered by the fire of the
defender_ fall short of the full measure of usefulness, as the enemy
can remove then with comparatively little difficulty or loss.
The greatest obstacle to the attacker’s advance is a clear field of
fire. The defense, therefore, will usually take steps to clear the
front of the position, measure and mark ranges beyond 600 yds. (battle
sight range), etc. The infantry is provided with tools for light
clearing. The heavier work should be done by the engineers if any are
available. (See “The organization of a defensive position.”)
_Frontage in attack and defense._ A company (unless acting alone) goes
complete into the firing line. All larger units hold out a part of
their strength (usually from one-fourth to one-half) as supports and
reserves. Avoid splitting or mixing units.
[Illustration: Fig. IX]
[Illustration]
[Illustration]
The density of the _firing line_ in attack and defense is about 1 man
per yard. A 16 squad company can place 128 rifles (8 x 16) in the
firing line. Hence the frontage of any line will be equal to about 128
yards multiplied by number of companies in the firing line, plus or
minus about 20 per cent. Thus the front of a battalion with 3 companies
in the firing line would be from 300 to 450 yards. (But see also Chap.
XII.)
The expressions “1 man per yard” and “at one yard intervals,” are
usually intended to mean that each yard of the front is to be occupied
by one man. Actually, the interval or open space between the shoulders
of adjacent men in this case is about ½ pace (15 inches).
In defense or in the holding or secondary attack a battalion may
place 3 companies in the firing line. In the main (enveloping) attack
it would more commonly place 2 companies in the line. The companies
(of the leading battalions) not in the firing line are called local
or battalion supports. Each regiment may hold out 1 battalion as
regimental reserve, each brigade 1 regiment as brigade reserve, and
each division 1 brigade (and auxiliary troops) as general reserve.
Circumstances might cause the strength of these reserves to be greater
at the beginning of an action, but they seldom should be less. The
defense usually has weaker supports and local reserves, but stronger
_general reserves_ than the attack. As the defense must play to the
attacker’s move ample reserves must be held for the purpose. The
density of a defensive line is not subject to arbitrary rule, so
greatly does it depend on the mission and other conditions. In a
delaying action a greater extension is permissible than in a fight to a
decision. (See also Chaps. XII and XVII.)
PROBLEMS INVOLVING THE ATTACK OF A POSITION BY A SMALL INFANTRY FORCE
(Regiment or battalion.)
(See also “The Rifle in War,” Chap. XVI.)
The first stage of the action, which will be given in the problem,
opens generally with a report from the cavalry or by the advance
guard being fired upon, or some such occurrence to the front. If it
is certain that there will be an attack the commander will usually
order extra ammunition to be issued. The field trains are halted off
the road or sent to a safe place. The commander then rides forward to
the most advanced position possible where he can obtain a view of the
terrain and the enemy’s dispositions and receive reports from cavalry
or mounted patrols. The adjutant is usually with him and he sends word
for the column to continue its march or to halt at a certain point and
await orders. He directs his subordinate commanders to accompany him
or to follow him to the advanced position. If these subordinates are
not mounted make due allowance for that fact, considering the time it
will take them to get up. The circumstances may be such that it is not
advisable to separate all of his subordinates from their commands,
but generally he will direct them to proceed to the advance lookout
point. These subordinates will include the company (or battalion)
commanders, the adjutant, and the commander of the machine gun company
(or platoon). The quartermaster and surgeon are usually not called to
the front. Having reached the advance point, he directs his efforts
particularly toward ascertaining the location of the hostile flanks
and examines the ground from which he may launch his attack. Having
estimated the situation and his subordinates being assembled he issues
his orders. He must be very sure that every subordinate who has a task
to perform receives his orders. If any of these are not present the
orders must be sent to them, and the commander will usually direct his
adjutant to see that his orders are transmitted to any subordinates who
are not present. His actual orders will invariably be verbal. Sometimes
the problem will ask for his combined order. This means the order
for all parts of the force as it would be dictated to his adjutant
subsequent to the action. The actual orders may be issued piece-meal,
but generally try to issue the combined order and then direct the
adjutant to see that those not present are advised.
The order must cover the following points:
1. Information of the enemy, particularly his strength and the position
of his flanks. Information of our own and the enemy’s supporting troops.
2. This command (or We) will attack the enemy at once, making a frontal
attack (or enveloping his right flank). Former march conditions now
cease.
3. Cos. A and B will constitute the firing line, and will move via ----
under cover to ______ (edge of woods, ravine, crest, or other cover),
and will deploy, perpendicular to (or parallel to) ______ at one yard
intervals, Co. A on the left with its left flank ______ yds. from
______. Co. A will attack that section of the enemy’s line from ______
to ______ (inclusive or exclusive); Co. B, that section from ______ to
______ (inclusive or exclusive.) (Indicate clearly visible landmarks,
or give definite distances. Be sure that every part of the enemy’s line
is covered.) I will give the order for the advance (or to open fire).
The foregoing paragraph is for frontal attack. In case the attack is
enveloping, the order would be:
Cos. A and B will constitute the firing line. Co. A will move via
______ under cover to ______, and will deploy perpendicular to ______,
at 1 yard intervals with its left flank at ______ (or -- yards from
______) and when ordered to do so will advance and attack the enemy’s
line from ______ to ______ (inclusive or exclusive) directing its right
on ______, and moving to attack in conjunction with Co. B.
Co. B will move via ______ under cover to ______, deploying when
necessary perpendicular to ______, at 1 yard intervals with its left
flank on ______, (or -- yards from ______) and when ordered to do so
will advance and attack the enemy’s line north of ______ directing its
left on ______ (or will advance and attack the enemy’s left, etc.)
(No definite limits are assigned to the outside flank. The enemy may
not be opposite the enveloping attack when it is launched, but will
likely extend his line to meet it. If the two companies are separated
at the start and converge on the enemy’s line the orders would be
similar to those for an enveloping attack. Sometimes the enveloping
attack will be directed on an interior part of the enemy’s original
line in which case it will cover part of his front and also envelop
him. Instead of being ordered to deploy at 1 yard intervals, a company
may be ordered to deploy on a front of ______ yds.)
I will give the order to advance.
Lieut. Y, with your machine gun platoon and one platoon of Co. C, which
will report to you as escort, move via ______ to ______ (usually some
hill or crest). As soon as the attack is well developed open fire on
the enemy and assist the advance. You will provide protection for our
left flank (if he is on a flank).
The mounted orderlies under Lt. G (the adjutant or some officer
especially detailed) will patrol to ______ and ______, covering our
flanks and observing, etc.
Co. C will send one platoon (or such force) to report to Lieut. Y,
commander of the machine gun platoon, as escort. It will also send
a sergeant and ______ men (or such force) well to the right (or via
______ to ______) as right flank patrol (or to cover our right flank).
Note. It would generally be inadvisable to assign any considerable
portion of a _small_ force as an escort to the machine guns unless
it was necessary for effective fire, to place them in a very exposed
position (on a flank). It may be better to place the machine guns where
they will need no escort. In the actions of larger forces, however,
machine guns may often be employed with decisive effect against the
flanks of the enemy. In such cases they should be used in larger
masses, not by platoon. They are very effective in repelling surprise
attacks and are often employed in exposed positions without an escort.
The remainder of Co. C and Co. D, under my command (or under command
of ______) will constitute the support (or reserve) and will move via
______ under cover to ______ and there await my orders (or follow Co.
______ at ______ yards distance, or ______ yards in rear of the right
flank, or center, etc.)
4. When issue of ammunition is completed the empty ammunition wagons
will proceed to ______ and park off the road (return to ______ and
refill, or join field train.)
(Empty ammunition wagons may be used to transport wounded.)
A regt. aid station will be established at ______ (or location of regt.
aid station will be announced later.) The band will report to the
regimental surgeon (in a regimental action).
The company wagons (or field train) will halt off the road where they
now are (or proceed to ______, or take station on such road with head
at such crossroad, etc.)
(If no dressing station is to be established at first the order may
direct the sanitary troops to join the field trains or halt at some
other locality “in readiness.”)
5. Messages may be sent to ______ (generally name a definite point) (or
I shall be at ______, or with ______).
Explain how and to whom this order is delivered.
Make report to superior commander, by telegraph or telephone, mounted
messengers, or other available means. Sometimes it may not be possible
to report until after the action, but a report should always be sent as
soon as practicable.
The foregoing order applies to any force up to a regiment. A regiment
is assigned by battalions, each battalion being given its section of
the attack. Each battalion holds out its own support. The orders,
while covering all necessary points, must be so drawn as not to
hamper subordinates by invading their province, nor to destroy their
initiative by usurping their prerogatives. In the actual case the
commander will regulate his orders to suit the experience, capacity and
personal characteristics of the subordinate. In tactical problems the
assumption will be made that all subordinates are fully instructed and
competent, each within his own sphere and according to his rank.
Give the route to position for individual companies or battalions
especially when trouble might ensue from interference of organizations.
Thus to a battalion or lower commander say--“Move under cover via
______ to ______.” Be sure that available cover is utilized to the
utmost extent practicable in the special case. In a regimental action
the Colonel may direct that the packs be left in a convenient place on
going into action. The Majors always give the orders about issue of
ammunition, and see to the sending of combat patrols either as result
of the colonel’s orders or without special orders. But if no extra
ammunition is to be issued, or a portion of it only, the orders of the
superior commander should so state. In some cases it may be inadvisable
to issue _all_ the extra ammunition. In any case extra ammunition is
issued when the troops are compelled to separate from their combat
trains on going into action.
_Be sure_ that localities and dispositions are so described as to be
perfectly plain not only to your imaginary subordinates but also to the
_instructor_ who is to review your problem. Great care should be taken
to designate localities beyond the possibility of misunderstanding. Use
landmarks, not map-marks, in fixing a locality. In describing a point
by its reference number make sure there is no other point having the
same reference, or else say “Hill 622, 600 yds. NW. of SMITH F. H.,”
etc., etc.
Be very sure that none of the troops come under hostile artillery fire
in moving to their deploying position if it can be avoided.
_Before deciding on an attack_ the commander should satisfy himself
as to whether any reinforcements are on their way to the enemy, and
throughout the action he must be constantly on the lookout for such.
This is the special duty of the cavalry, or other mounted men.
_The enemy’s line_ and the portion assigned to each unit should be
designated as clearly as possible, preferably by landmarks, if there
are such. If there are no landmarks an organization may be directed to
attack the enemy’s front or his right wing, or for enveloping attack,
his right flank, etc., distances and other means of orientation being
given.
The attack orders for larger bodies, so far as the infantry is
concerned, are similar to the foregoing, but in much less detail.
The engineers in attack may remove obstacles, improve communications,
repair bridges or construct additional crossings. On the completion of
their tasks they usually join reserves. They may be used also as an
escort to the artillery.
Signal troops usually connect the position of the supreme commander
with the commanders of the main and secondary attacks, artillery
commander and reserves (if he is not with the reserve). Do not exceed
the limit of their capacity in wire and telephones. (See “Organization
of the U. S. Army,” ante.)
The sanitary troops establish the usual collecting, aid and dressing
stations, and take charge of the evacuation of the wounded.
There is ordinarily a dressing station established for each brigade,
and in addition a slightly wounded station for each division. The
dressing station should be near fuel and water, preferably in a village
or at least near some houses. It should be near the main attack but
not too close to an artillery position. It should be on the main
road to the rear and in a conspicuous place easily discovered. The
slightly wounded station should fulfill as far as possible the same
requirements, usually somewhat farther to the rear. For a force less
than a brigade a single dressing station serving also as a slightly
wounded station, would be established.
The supreme commander gives the orders to the sanitary troops, usually
after consultation with and upon the recommendation of the senior
medical officer. The location of the dressing station and, in a
division action, of the slightly wounded station, should be announced
to the command in orders. But in case of attack where developments
cannot be foreseen the order may say “location of dressing station will
be announced later.” In this case the sanitary troops halt off the road
at a designated place in rear, or remain with the trains. Usually they
will be at a place somewhat forward of the trains. (See also “Sanitary
tactics,” Chap. XV.)
The employment of small units in combat (except as part of a larger
force) will be exceptional in systematic warfare. For combat tactics of
small units see I. D. R., Part II, and F. S. R.
_Remarks concerning an attack by a reinforced brigade._ If an attack is
imminent the supreme commander should march with the advance guard.
When the enemy is reported the supreme commander, accompanied by the
colonel of the advance guard regiment, rides rapidly ahead to some
point from which the enemy’s line can be seen. If the messages received
indicate that an attack is probable the brigade commander sends an aide
to the rear with such of the following orders as the situation may seem
to justify:
1. Infantry in main body to continue the march, closing up on the
advance guard, and halting when head of column reaches a point beyond
which it would be exposed to artillery fire.
2. Colonels of the infantry regiments in the main body, and the
artillery, engineer and signal commanders to join the supreme commander
or assemble at the head of the main body to await his return from the
front.
3. Disposition of the emptied ammunition wagons.
4. Artillery firing batteries to move promptly to the fore, passing
the infantry in front of them and taking post off the main road in the
vicinity of their combat position.
5. Field trains and sanitary troops to halt off the road at designated
localities in rear.
6. Any detachments within reach to rejoin as promptly as possible.
It may not always be practicable to carry out all of the above measures
until the supreme commander has estimated the situation and fully
decided to attack. As many as possible should be attended to in
advance, in order to save time.
Having reached the lookout point to the front the commander endeavors
to locate or verify reports concerning the location of the enemy’s
flanks, what intrenching he is doing, etc.
He then considers:
1. Does the mission of the command require an attack, or will an attack
best accomplish the mission?
2. Is there a reasonable prospect of success?
3. Shall the attack be frontal? Is the enemy’s line so attenuated
that it can probably be pierced by a frontal attack, or is such an
attack safer or for other reasons desirable? (Such as undue extension
necessitated by an enveloping attack.)
4. Shall the attack be enveloping; if so against which flank? (For
consideration of choice of flank see ante.)
5. From what locality can the friendly artillery best support the
attack? Between the main and secondary attacks or behind the secondary
is a good place, as here the artillery will be well protected, will
need no escort, can support both attacks and, in the latter case (from
behind secondary attack), can support the main attack with its oblique
fire up to the last possible instant. Probable positions of the hostile
artillery should be considered in connection with the selection.
6. Are there any strong positions, such as knolls or ridges which
should be occupied by infantry (and possibly machine guns) for the
protection of a flank (or both flanks)?
7. Where should the main and secondary attacks deploy? Can they reach
their deploying positions in concealment, or with very little exposure?
8. Where should the reserve be held? Generally in rear of the inner
flank of the main attack is a good place at first.
Having estimated the situation and made his decision the commander
waits for his subordinates to join him, or returns to the head of
the column, halting it when necessary (if not already halted) and
issues his orders verbally, using the map to orient and direct his
subordinates. It is necessary to note the positions of all elements of
the command before issuing orders.
The advance guard regiment will usually be assigned to the secondary
or holding attack, and the next regiment in rear to the main or
enveloping attack, the rear regiment constituting the reserve.
A front for each regiment in the fighting line is defined as accurately
as conditions permit, and the approximate deploying position of
each regiment is indicated. Ordinarily the regimental commanders
are permitted to conduct their regiments to the deploying positions
and deploy when necessary. But if there is any danger of confusion,
interference or unnecessary exposure the supreme commander may
designate routes to the deploying positions, which should be approached
as promptly as possible under cover.
The secondary attack may be ordered to “attack in conjunction” with
the main attack, or the commander may say, “I will give the order (or
signal) to attack.” In some cases however, the secondary attack may be
launched before the main attack, to divert the enemy’s attention from
the latter, etc. The main attack may be launched at once, or may await
a subsequent command or signal, pending completion of preparations.
Any _special_ provisions necessary for the protection of the flanks
(such as posting infantry and machine guns in commanding positions
on the flanks) should be ordered by the brigade commander. If not
ordered the regimental commanders will make such provisions as they
deem necessary for the protection of their flanks. If no arrangements
appear to have been made for this matter, the duty devolves upon the
commanders of the flank battalions in the firing line.
The cavalry, prior to the attack, feels for the enemy’s line and drives
in his cavalry. During the attack it operates on and covers the flanks,
while threatening those of the enemy. The bulk of the cavalry should
be placed on the flank where the enemy’s cavalry is known to be, or
on that flank which is more exposed. A smaller body of cavalry, or a
detachment of mounted men under an officer, covers the other flank. The
duties of the cavalry during an action are to force back the enemy’s
cavalry, to guard the flanks and threaten those of the enemy, and to
watch for and give timely notice of the approach of reinforcements for
the enemy, delaying their advance when practicable.
The artillery of the attack should be placed in one or more positions
from which it can support the infantry throughout the action.
Ordinarily it is best to hold the artillery in large masses, but
a division is permissible if the tactical situation demands. The
artillery of the attack usually directs its fire on that element
of the defense which is at the time the most threatening to the
attacking infantry. In the assault it supports the infantry to the last
practicable moment and then switches its fire to search the ground
occupied by the defender’s reserves, or that over which they must pass
in delivering a counter-stroke, etc. The artillery combat trains are
at the disposal of the artillery commander unless otherwise specially
ordered.
The reserve follows the main attack at a certain distance, or proceeds
to a convenient locality designated and awaits orders. Usually the
reserve will follow or be posted conveniently near the main attack, as
it is on this flank that it will ordinarily be used. Exceptionally it
may be posted in a more central position.
The engineers may be used to remove obstacles, improve communications,
etc. They then join the reserve.
The signal troops connect the commander with the main and secondary
attacks, the reserve and the artillery, to the limit of their capacity.
The field trains and sanitary troops are halted well to the rear. A
dressing station may be established by the first order, or announced
later.
After the issue of the extra ammunition the battalion ammunition wagons
are collected at some convenient point in rear.
The supreme commander should take station at some good lookout point
from which he can watch the progress of the action, and should
generally remain there. If possible this point should be near
the general reserve so that the commander can readily direct its
employment. The station must not be too exposed nor too near the
artillery.
Every fraction of the command must be accounted for in orders. Every
subordinate who has a special mission to perform must receive definite
orders concerning same.
_Remarks concerning advance guard action._ An advance guard action does
not, in its detail differ particularly from any other combat of all
arms, except that an advance guard has less independence of action than
a separate detachment.
It may result from:
a. Guarding main body against surprise.
b. Reconnoitering.
c. Pushing back reconnoitering forces of the enemy.
d. Pressing upon delaying forces of the enemy.
e. Pursuit of a defeated or retiring enemy.
f. Checking the enemy’s advance to give the main body time to
prepare for action.
g. Seizing and holding a position to cover the passage of the
main body through a defile or across a bridge. (In this
case the enemy must be kept well beyond artillery range
of the outlet of the defile.)
h. When the enemy is encountered in force on the defensive,
holding him in position and reconnoitering his lines (in
force, if necessary) while awaiting the arrival of the main
body.
In deciding what action to take on meeting the enemy the advance guard
must consider (a) Its mission, and also that of the main body, whether
aggressive or not. (b) The comparative strength of the enemy and his
apparent intentions. (c) The relative positions of the enemy, the
advance guard and the main body, as well as other hostile or friendly
troops. (d) Provisions for the security of the main body. This in
general means that its front must not be uncovered, except in pursuit
of a badly demoralized enemy.
In selecting flank to attack consider tactical success first and
strategical advantages second.
An advance guard, while usually acting aggressively, must not engage
in very doubtful enterprises, jeopardizing the safety of main body or
committing it to action against its will. The mission of the whole
command must be considered.
The advance guard by deploying for a frontal attack along the line of
advance keeps the main body covered, leaves the supreme commander free
to decide on which flank he will extend, and holds the enemy until he
can come up. Frontal attacks are therefore of frequent occurrence in
advance guard actions.
In pursuing a defeated enemy even if advance guard encounters him
in force a prompt attack, usually frontal, is advisable. It is not
necessary to drive it home if this does not seem advisable; and there
is usually little risk of a counter attack. But if enemy is still in
good morale and there is reason for caution, an advance guard may take
a position in readiness. If in doubt an attack is usually best, but the
advance guard must not risk the defeat of the entire force in detail
by a too impetuous attack on a greatly superior enemy. Good judgment
is required in handling an advance guard in such situations, and for
this reason it is advisable that the supreme commander be with the
advance guard on the march. It is the proper duty of the cavalry to
clear up the situation in advance. (See “Advance guards,” Chap. IV and
“Rencontre engagement,” Chap. XIII.)
_The occupation of a defensive position._ In selecting a defensive
position the following should be considered:
1. Is it necessary to take a defensive position, and has the time
arrived to do so? (See “Position in Readiness.”)
2. Must the enemy attack the position or can he march around it?
3. Are there good positions with clear field of fire for infantry and
artillery? (For delaying actions a good field of fire at long and mid
ranges is a prime requisite.)
4. Natural protection for both?
5. Line or lines of retreat secure and accessible to all parts of
the force? If there is but one line of retreat it should be central.
Several lines of retreat are often an advantage to the retiring force
if it is a large one, but on the other hand they may also favor the
enemy by allowing parallel pursuit. Good rallying points in rear?
6. Flanks secure?
7. Communications good to front, rear and flanks?
8. Ground favorable for cavalry action?
9. Good locations for attacker’s artillery within effective range, if
so are they registered?
10. Line enfiladed anywhere?
11. Obstacles to enemy’s advance, front and flanks? How do they bear
upon possible assumption of offensive if such is contemplated?
12. Any rallying points or dead spaces for enemy within effective range?
13. Has position been improved as much as possible? Are ranges to
important points known?
14. Where is the main attack most likely to fall?
15. Are there good stations for the supports and reserves at proper
distance? Can reserves be held in safe place favorable for counter
attack?
16. Should the line be divided into sections? If so can the sections
support each other, and if there are any intervals are they well
covered?
17. Is the extent of the front suitable to the size of the command? Is
it approximately perpendicular to the line of retreat? To the line of
enemy’s advance?
18. Is the view good to the front and in the position itself?
19. Is the position well concealed from enemy’s view?
20. Are there any weak salients in the line?
21. Are there any advanced posts which should be occupied to prevent
the enemy from doing so, or to cause his early deployment, etc? Can the
troops be withdrawn from them in safety without masking fire of main
position? (Advanced posts should, as a rule, be avoided.)
A single position giving a favorable answer to _all_ these questions
will never be found. They indicate, however, the desiderata.
A defensive position should be occupied only when general direction of
enemy’s advance is known, and it is evident about where his attack will
fall. Otherwise take a position in readiness, from which a defensive
position may later be evolved.
Consider whether the mission is best accomplished by taking a position
farther to the front or one to the rear. Frequently there will be time
only to make the best of what is near at hand. It is to be remembered
in this connection, that a rencontre engagement usually favors
the stronger and more aggressive combatant. A weaker force should
generally therefore allow itself ample time to occupy and prepare
a defensive position, rather than risk a rencontre or at least a
premature engagement by pushing too far to the front. The time that a
smaller force can delay a larger one depends on the terrain, the time
available for preparation, and the absolute and relative strengths of
the combatants. To give a rough idea of the times that smaller bodies
can maintain themselves against larger ones it may be said that a
reinforced brigade in a hastily prepared position should ordinarily
be able to hold a division for some 2 to 3 hours; and that in similar
circumstances, a division should hope to maintain itself against a
corps for some 6 to 9 hours. Where the situation specially favors the
defender, he may, of course, be able to hold very much longer. Each
case is special and can hardly be said to have precedents.
The recent improvements in weapons have conferred greatly increased
powers of resistance upon the defense. Except small forces, which
cannot adequately secure their flanks nor block turning movements,
troops on the defensive in a prepared position can be driven therefrom
only with the greatest difficulty and, usually, a considerable
expenditure of ammunition.
Must the enemy attack the position selected, or can he turn it? If
delay only is the object this may be accomplished if enemy has to turn
the position. But if it is desired to bar his advance and court an
attack he should be both forced and enticed to attack. In such case
do not take a position which _appears_ impregnable or enemy may be
discouraged from attacking.
The artillery should not be posted so close to the infantry line that
it will draw fire upon it--five hundred yards or so behind the line is
best.
Obstacles in front of the entire position are seldom of advantage to
the defense. Obstacles which delay the enemy without concealing him,
such as marshy ground, are a strong element of defense. There must be
passages for the counter attack if such is contemplated, and in general
the bearing of obstacles upon the conduct of an active defense must be
carefully considered.
Consider which flank the enemy will probably attack and post the main
reserves behind that flank. If there is some doubt seek a central
position for the reserve from which it can reach either flank, or
consider the advisability of dividing the reserve.
If the force be a regiment assign sections of the line to battalions;
if a brigade, to regiments. Machine guns are not usually assigned to a
battalion section. Their proper function is for surprise of the enemy
at effective ranges, reinforcing weak portions of the line, etc. They
are usually left under the orders of the regimental commanders, but
may be assigned by orders of the supreme commander for flank defense
or for fire of position if the enemy has no artillery. (See “Machine
guns,” Chap. XIII.)
Openings in the line are sometimes permissible, provided they are
covered by the fire of adjacent organizations, or protected by
reserves. In fact slight openings all along the line will be the
rule, as it will seldom be practicable to occupy the entire front
continuously, unless the force be a very small one. In the order of
the supreme commander however, the assigned sectors will generally be
contiguous, the detailed organization of each being left to the sector
commander.
The density of the firing line in defense is seldom uniform. Some parts
of the line may be lightly held to allow more men where a greater
volume of fire is required. Obstacles in the front may also have an
influence on the density of the firing line. Hence the fronts assigned
to two regiments need not always be equal in extent.
In the early stages of a combat the defense, by reasons of its
intrenchments, concealment, superior fire discipline, and smaller
losses, may economize on men in the firing line and local supports _in
order to have larger general reserves_ to throw in at the decisive
point in the later stages of the action, or for a counter attack.
If ammunition is plentiful, long range fire, to force the attacker
to an early deployment, is permissible and often advantageous on the
defense. The limiting range of such fire, under good conditions, is
about 1,800 yards.
If a delaying action only is contemplated, the intention being merely
to force the attacker to deploy, the line may be very lightly held
and greatly extended with few local supports, or none at all, and
small reserves. Such tactics of course, may be risky. The position
should be promptly evacuated as soon as the attacker has completed his
dispositions for the attack, since it is very difficult to withdraw
infantry from a position after it is committed to action. Cavalry, by
reason of its superior mobility is better than infantry for delaying
actions. If there is a good line of retreat and cover for the led
horses close in rear, cavalry may allow the enemy to approach within
700 yards or less, before withdrawing. (See “Cavalry tactics,” Chap.
IX.)
Ranges to important points in the foreground should be determined
(and marked) if there is time. The field of fire is cleared and the
position intrenched to the extent that time allows, or conditions
require.
The instructions to “prepare the line for defense” cover the
construction of intrenchments and obstacles and the necessary clearing.
In this the engineers assist at the most difficult places. The
intrenching proper should usually be done by the troops who are to
occupy the trenches, but this rule is not rigid.
The supreme commander will direct in orders that the empty ammunition
wagons be assembled at a point (or points) in rear. Subsequently they
refill at designated point from the ammunition train, one or more
companies of which are ordered up for this purpose or, in a smaller
action, the combat wagons may be assembled and marched back to a depot
to refill. Empty wagons of all kinds moving to the rear may be utilized
for the evacuation of the wounded.
If the fight is to be to decision the artillery should if possible be
so located that it can be run up to a crest for direct fire in the
later stages of the defense.
When contact is established the cavalry uncovers the front and
transfers its activities to the flanks, reconnoitering those of the
enemy, and operating to his rear to observe the approach of possible
hostile reinforcements. In retiring to a flank the movements of the
hostile cavalry must be considered, and the enemy should be denied a
superiority in this arm on either flank if the strength of the cavalry
permits it. It is therefore inadvisable, unless greatly superior in
strength to the enemy, to disperse the cavalry. The bulk of it should
be kept in hand to oppose that of the enemy. A small detachment of the
cavalry may be used for observation on the other flank.
The advance guard regiment may be directed to provide for the security
of the command to the front until the position is occupied. Former
march conditions cease (if command has been on the march). In retiring
to its position the advance guard regiment must not mask the fire
of troops already on the line, or allow the enemy to follow it too
closely, and possibly gain an advantageous position.
Machine guns should be preferably near the flanks. If especially
desirable positions for dagger batteries are available they may be
used. (A dagger battery is one so situated as to be protected from
frontal fire and able to surprise the attacker by flanking or oblique
fire from a position at short range, such as a saddle in front of and
perpendicular to the line. See “Machine Guns”--post.)
Flank patrols (inf.) are sent out by the regiment on the flank without
special orders. But if special measures such as a strong flank guard
with a machine gun platoon, are required, the supreme commander should
order flank organization (or reserve) to provide for this. In general
it will be the duty of flank organizations to provide for security to
the flanks.
The reserve should provide for the security of the lines of retreat,
especially the bridges. They may be used to assist in preparing the
position for defense--preferably clearing rather than intrenching. They
will assemble at their designated post in rear on cessation of the
work. Same for engineers, who join the reserve when work ceases.
Dressing station will be established by order or the location of
dressing station may be announced later.
A usual formation for a brigade in defense is two regiments on the
line and one in reserve. If any departure from this is made it should
be in the way of a _larger reserve_ (except in delaying actions). (See
“Counter attack”--post.)
A defensive position should not be too strongly garrisoned at the
opening of the attack. The line should be held lightly with strong
general reserves until the attacker has shown his intentions. The
reserves are thrown in at the threatened point and used to deliver a
counter attack.
It is sometimes advisable to defend advanced posts (but not advanced
positions as a rule) to prevent enemy from seizing them too early.
They cannot be held to a decision. One determined stand is better
than several half-hearted ones. Especially is this the case if troops
retreating out of one position under cover of fire from another, mask
part of this fire, and arrive in disorder on the front. Also this means
a dispersion of troops, and a diminution of the defender’s fighting
strength at the very beginning of the action. One good prepared
position to be defended by all troops is preferable to a succession of
positions, in a decisive action.
An independent detachment is seldom justified in sacrificing itself. A
covering detachment must do so when necessary for the protection of its
main body.
_The Counter attack._ Every active defense should contemplate an
eventual assumption of the offensive. The defense, being intrenched,
not subject to losses nor exhaustion to such an extent as the attacker,
and being more easily supplied with ammunition and better able to
maintain an accurate, continuous fire, can use fewer men in its firing
line and supports. Hence the defense is characterized by large general
reserves. This feature should be developed to the utmost possible, the
defensive line being held with the least practicable number, in order
that the general reserves may be as strong as possible.
The general reserve is employed in three ways: (a) To extend the flanks
in order to meet the enemy’s enveloping attack. When the terrain
allows, the troops on the flank should be so disposed as to bring
oblique or enfilade fire to bear upon the enveloping attack. (b) To
reinforce critical points of the line, against which the enemy has
concentrated his force. (c) For counter attacks.
Counter attacks are perhaps less subject to rule than any other
tactical operation. They vary in size from small local counter attacks
to a general reversal of the situation and an assumption of the
offensive by the entire force of the defender.
The troops for the counter attack are kept well in hand and _concealed_
near the position from which it is proposed to launch the attack.
The proper time and manner of delivering a counter attack require
good judgment on the part of the commander. A counter attack to be
successful should be sprung as a surprise on the enemy.
The counter attack may be delivered just as the enemy has carried the
position and is disorganized and in confusion. It may be delivered
before his assault and while he is closely held within effective
range by the fire of the defense. A counter attack is naturally most
effective, when delivered from a flank. The attacker’s reserves will,
of course, be on the lookout for counter attacks, hence the defense
must hold out reserves to protect the counter attack. The most
favorable time, then, to make a counter attack, is when the enemy is
known to have thrown in his last reserve. He then has nothing to oppose
to the defender’s counter attack.
Supporting points in rear of the main line of defense aid in breaking
up an assault and contribute to the success of a counter attack.
The attacker’s artillery, after supporting the infantry to the last
practicable moment will probably switch its fire to search the ground
occupied by the defender’s reserves, or that over which they must
approach in delivering the counter attack. The artillery of the defense
should be posted and handled to meet this contingency.
If the attacker fails to establish fire superiority and his advance
is checked the defender increases the volume of his fire, reinforcing
his firing line if necessary. As the attacker wavers or starts to
withdraw, the defender assumes the offensive and advances against him.
If at the same time a strong counter-stroke can be launched against
the attacker’s flank, his repulse or even his utter rout is probable.
The nature of the terrain should, of course, be such as to favor the
assumption of the offensive, and the position should be selected with
this in view.
The commander of the defense should study the terrain and carefully
watch the progress of the action with a view to taking the offensive at
the proper moment.
From the foregoing considerations it is possible to draw the following
suggestions as to the conduct of an ideal active defense.
(a) Select a position whose front is such as to favor the assumption of
the offensive.
(b) Cover, concealment and good communications for the reserves are
essential.
(c) The position should be artificially strengthened to as great an
extent as time allows, or as conditions appear to demand.
(d) The defensive position should not be too greatly extended nor too
strongly garrisoned at the outset, and before the enemy’s intentions
have become manifest. The line may be extended and strengthened during
the course of the action, as the developments thereof may require.
At the opening of an engagement, however, a line lightly held, with
_strong reserves_, is characteristic of an _active_ defense.
(e) Compel the attack to deploy at long range.
(f) Meet the attacker’s envelopment by an extension of the line.
(g) Prevent the enemy from gaining fire superiority, reinforcing the
firing line if necessary. Cause him to throw in his supports and
reserves.
(h) Check the enemy’s advance in a position favorable for a counter
attack.
(i) Launch a strong counter attack against one of his flanks, holding
out some reserves to meet those of the enemy.
(k) As the counter attack rolls back the enemy, advance against him
along the whole line, the artillery following up the infantry.
It will not often be possible for the defender to regulate the course
of the action, unless he be nearly equal in strength to the attacker or
exceptionally favored by the terrain.
It will be usually a question of taking advantage of such opportunities
as may in the course of events be presented. The only rule that can be
given is that the defender should have large reserves and be constantly
on the lookout for a favorable opportunity to make aggressive use
of them. The most favorable opportunities for a counter stroke will
_usually_ be presented on that flank which the enemy is endeavoring to
envelop.
(For the use of auxiliary arms in combat see also “Artillery Tactics,”
and “Cavalry Tactics,” Chaps. VIII and IX.)
ORDER FOR A FRONTAL ATTACK BY AN ADVANCE GUARD.
Advance Guard, 1st Division, 1st Blue Army Corps,
ASH GROVE S. H., PA.,
Field Orders, } 1 July, '12, 9:05 a. m.
No. -- }
Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.
1. A hostile detachment consisting of 3 or 4 regiments of cavalry and
1 or 2 batteries of horse artillery occupies a defensive line across
the BALTIMORE TURNPIKE just east of GERMANTOWN. The left of the line
rests on the wood southeast of MEYER F. H., the right on the small wood
northeast of the B. D. SNYDER F. H. Our main body halts at LITTLESTOWN
until 10:30 a. m.
2. This advance guard will make a frontal attack on the hostile force
near GERMANTOWN at once, and clear the road to GETTYSBURG. Former march
conditions now cease.
3. (a) The 1st Battalion, 1st Light Artillery, will move at a trot
under cover to a position in the vicinity of Hill 607 and at once open
fire on the enemy and support the attack.
(b) The 1st Infantry will move north of the turnpike under cover to the
vicinity of road junction 584, deploying perpendicular to the BALTIMORE
TURNPIKE with its left resting thereon and, in conjunction with the
2d Infantry, will advance and attack that portion of the enemy’s line
north of the turnpike.
(c) The 2d Infantry will move south of the turnpike under cover to the
vicinity of GOUKER F. H., deploying perpendicular to the turnpike with
its right resting thereon, and will advance and attack that portion of
the enemy’s line south of the turnpike.
(d) The 3rd Infantry, in reserve, will follow the 1st Infantry to
the vicinity of road junction 584, and there await orders. 8 mounted
orderlies of this regiment will report to me at once.
(e) The 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, on withdrawing from the front will
cover our right, operating against the enemy’s left and rear. A half
troop under an officer will be sent to cover our left.
(f) Co. A, 1st Engineers, will repair the bridge on the BALTIMORE
TURNPIKE east of GIDD F. H., making it safe for the passage of
artillery, and construct two additional crossings for foot troops only
over ALLOWAY CREEK, one north of the turnpike the other south of same.
Upon the completion of this work the engineers will join the reserve.
4. The 1st Ambulance Co. will take a position in readiness off the road
just east of Hill 607. Location of dressing station will be announced
later.
When extra ammunition has been issued the empty battalion ammunition
wagons will assemble off the road opposite the 1st Amb. Co.
5. Messages to GIDD F. H.
A,
Brigadier General.
Verbally to Staff and C. O. of:
1st Inf.
2d Inf.
3d Inf.
1st Bn., 1st L. A.
Co. A, 1st Engrs.
Copy by aide to C. O., 1st Sq., 1st Cav.
Copy by mtd. messenger to C. O., 1st Amb. Co.
By mtd. officer:
Adv. Gd., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
1 July, '12, 9:08 a. m.
C. G., 1st Div.:
3 or 4 regts. Red Cavalry with 1 or 2 btrys. H. A. across BALTIMORE
PIKE, just east of GERMANTOWN, left near MEYER F. H., right near B. D.
SNYDER F. H. Am making frontal attack at once, 3d inf. in reserve, cav.
covering our right. Messages to GIDD F. H.
A,
Brig. Gen.
_Notes_: Considerable latitude has been allowed the artillery commander.
He is not told to reconnoiter advanced positions for the reason that he
always does this as a matter of course. Gen. A will consult him when
the time arrives to move the artillery forward.
The exact routes to their deploying positions are not prescribed for
the infantry regiments. Gen. A has no time to make a deep study of
the matter of cover. There is no danger of the regiments getting lost
or interfering with each other, and their colonels may be trusted to
lead them to their positions with as little exposure as possible,
reconnoitering in advance with mounted men as they proceed.
General A considers no special measures necessary for the protection
of his flanks, beyond those provided for in the orders to the cavalry.
In the absence of any special instructions the Colonels of the 1st and
2nd Infantry will take such measures as they deem necessary for flank
protection, using mounted and infantry patrols.
Very general instructions only, are given to the cavalry. Major
A is an experienced cavalry officer. He understands that he is
dealing with a large cavalry force which, while fighting a dismounted
action, undoubtedly has strong mounted reserves in hand. He therefore
appreciates the need for caution. He also understands that the enemy’s
most vulnerable parts are his groups of led horses.
All the bridges over Alloway Creek have been destroyed or injured
by flood and the creek is flowing bank full. The engineer commander
will at once despatch his mounted section with the necessary tools
to prepare crossings north and south of the turnpike for the 1st
and 2d Infantry. He will do this by repairing the old crossings if
practicable; and endeavor to finish the work promptly so as not to
delay the attacking troops in getting into position. Later the foot
section of the engineer company will improve these crossings (for the
use of the Division should it have to take part in the attack) and will
put the bridge near Gidd F. H. in good order.
The ammunition wagons are assembled in one place in order to have them
at hand when wanted. Without such orders they might be scattered all
along the road, interfering also with the movements of troops. General
A may use them later to transport wounded to Littlestown, at which time
also they would proceed to the division trains to refill.
The references given in this order (such as “the woods S. of MEYER
F. H.”) might not be readily understood at the time by General A’s
subordinates, who are not provided with 3" maps. At the time of giving
his orders General A would point out the various localities mentioned
to his subordinates (who are with him on Hill 607). Then by the aid of
their Geological (1”) Maps they can easily identify the places referred
to. The brigade adjutant in later writing up the order, would ascertain
the names of the various farm houses as far as practicable, as this is
the easiest and surest means of identifying them.
Following is the foregoing order reduced to smaller compass:
Adv. Gd., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
ASH GROVE S. H., PA.,
Field Orders, } 1 July, '13, 9:05 a. m.
No. -- }
Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.
1. A hostile detachment of 3 or 4 regiments of cavalry and 1 or 2
batteries of horse artillery is in position just east of GERMANTOWN;
right at small wood northeast of B. D. SNYDER, left at wood southeast
of MEYER.
Our main body halts at LITTLESTOWN until 10:30 a. m.
2. We attack at once.
3. (a) Artillery takes position near Hill 607 and supports attack.
(b) 1st Inf. moves north of turnpike to near road jct. 584, thence in
conjunction with 2d Inf. attacks enemy line north of turnpike.
(c) 2d Inf. moves south of turnpike to near GOUKER, thence at once
attacks enemy line south of turnpike.
(d) 3d Inf., reserve, follows 2d to near road jct. 584 and awaits
orders.
(e) Cavalry on withdrawing from front covers right and operates against
enemy’s left and rear. A half troop covers our left.
(f) Engineers make bridge east of GIDD passable for artillery,
construct two crossings for foot troops over ALLOWAY CREEK, north and
south of turnpike, join reserve.
4. Ambulance Co., and empty ammunition wagons east of Hill 607.
5. Messages to GIDD.
A,
Brig. Gen.
How and to whom transmitted, etc., etc.
The body of the order in this second example contains but half as many
words as the first and yet conveys all the instructions necessary in
this case. Thus for instance the guiding directions for the infantry
regiments in attack are omitted as it will be perfectly apparent that
they will use the turnpike which separates the enemy’s line into the
sectors assigned to each attack. A comparison of these two orders will
indicate how unnecessary verbiage may often be eliminated. It is to be
noted, however, that clearness is more important than brevity.
ORDER FOR AN ENVELOPING ATTACK.
Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
Hill 636 (1 mi. southeast of HUNTERSTOWN, PA.)
Field Orders, } 1 October, '12, 10:20 a. m.
No. -- }
Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.
1. A hostile detachment of 2 regts. of infantry, one or two btrys.
of field artillery, and a troop of cavalry, has taken up a defensive
position on the heights west of HUNTERSTOWN. Its right flank rests on
Hill 603, its left near HENDERSON MEETING HOUSE.
Our cavalry has driven in the hostile cavalry which retreated to the
north of HUNTERSTOWN.
2. This detachment will attack the enemy in its front at once,
enveloping his right flank. Former march conditions now cease.
3. (a) The 1st Bn., 1st Light Arty. will take a position near Hill 636
and support the attack.
(b) The 1st Inf. will proceed along main road to the edge of the wood
near road junction 585, deploying perpendicular to the road with its
left about 250 yds. south thereof. From here it will advance and attack
the enemy’s line north of Hill 603, directing its left on the hill and
moving to the attack in conjunction with the 2d Inf.
A half company will be sent to the vicinity of the orchard on Hill 592
to cover our right.
(c) The 2d Inf. will leave the main road near 606 and move via the
632--600--585 road, thence under cover to the small wood ½ mile east
of 572. From there, it will advance and attack the enemy’s line south
and west of Hill 603, directing its right on the eastern corner of the
orchard southwest of HUNTERSTOWN.
A half company will be sent to the orchard at 572 to cover our left.
(d) The 3d Inf. in reserve, will follow in rear of the right flank of
the 2d Inf.
(e) The cavalry will withdraw to and cover our right flank, operating
against the enemy’s left and rear. A half troop will be sent well to
our left. Reconnaissance to GOLDENVILLE and TABLE ROCK.
(f) The engineers will open up two trails through the thicket northeast
of HUNTERSTOWN, and then take station at the eastern edge of same.
(g) The signal troops will connect me with the 1st Inf. and the
artillery.
4. The 1st Amb. Co. will establish a dressing station south of the main
road at the stream crossing ⅓ mile west of 632.
When the issue of extra ammunition is completed the empty ammunition
wagons will join 1st Amb. Co. where they will be at the disposal of the
Chief Surgeon until further orders.
The field trains will halt off the road at place of receipt of this
order.
5. Messages to the reserve.
A,
Brig. Gen.
Verbally to Staff and C. O.:
1st Bn., 1st L. A.
Signal troops.
Co. A, 1st Engrs.
1st Inf.
2d Inf.
3d Inf.
Copy by aide to C. O., 1st Sq., 1st Cav.
Copy by mtd. messenger to C. O., 1st Amb. Co., F. Tn.
(Report of dispositions to C. G., 1st Div.--see ante.)
_Notes_: General A considers special measures necessary for the
protection of his flanks. The engineers are so placed as to guard
against a counter attack on the Blue right.
The cavalry amongst other duties watches for the approach of hostile
reinforcements.
As General A will be with the reserve regiment he does not need any
orderlies other than those of that regiment.
ORDER FOR THE OCCUPATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION.
Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
Road Junction 616, South of PLAINVIEW, PA.,
Field Orders, } 20 Sept., '12, 10:00 a. m.
No. -- }
Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.
1. A hostile force of all arms is moving northward on the
GETTYSBURG--HARRISBURG ROAD, advance party at the COUNTY ALMSHOUSE,
just outside of GETTYSBURG, at 9:00 a. m.
Our cavalry defeated the hostile cavalry near this point this morning
and is now engaged in delaying the enemy’s advance.
2. This detachment will take up a defensive position across the
HARRISBURG ROAD near road junction 561 to cover the crossings of the
CONEWAGO CREEK for our division. Former march conditions now cease.
3. (a) The artillery will take a position in observation on the north
slope of the ridge near Hill 707.
(b) The 1st Inf. will occupy the section from a point on the 666-576
road about 400 yds. southwest of 666 thence westward to the farm road
leading southwest from Hill 712. This regiment will provide for the
security of the entire command to the front until the position is
occupied.
The 2d Inf. will occupy the section from the left of the 1st Inf. to
a point on the nose about 200 yds. northeast of 561. A company with a
machine gun platoon will be sent to the woods about 700 yds. south of
PLAINVIEW and a half company to the woods about 1,500 yds. southeast of
PLAINVIEW.
The entire position will be prepared for defense.
(c) The 3d Infantry in reserve, will take position in mass near 605.
This regiment will provide for the security of the bridges 502W and
near HERSHEY MILL. 10 mtd. orderlies of this regiment will report to me
at once.
(d) The cavalry will continue to delay the enemy and when obliged to
fall back will cover our right. A half troop will be sent to cover our
left.
(e) The engineers will start work at once on the section assigned to
the 1st Infantry, assisting that regiment, and joining the reserve when
work ceases.
4. The 1st Amb Co. will take a position in readiness north of the
bridge 502W.
The field trains will park east of the HARRISBURG ROAD north of WERMAN
F. H.
The bn. combat trains and the caissons of the artillery when empty will
be sent to YORK SPRINGS to refill.
5. Messages to Hill 712.
A,
Brigadier General.
Dictated to Staff and C. O.:
1st Inf.
2d Inf.
3d Inf.
1st Bn., 1st L. A.
Co. A, 1st Engrs.
Copies by mtd. messengers to C. O., 1st Amb. Co. and Tns.
Telegram.
Detch. 1st Div.,
PLAINVIEW, PA.,
1 Oct. '12--10:05 a. m.
C. G., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
YORK SPRINGS, PA.
Red force all arms weak in cavalry, probably 2d Div., 1st Red Corps,
moved north from GETTYSBURG, starting 9:00 a. m. Detch. takes position
across HARRISBURG ROAD near 561 (GETTYSBURG-ANTIETAM map) to delay
advance. Cavalry covers right. Will guard bridges 502W and at HERSHEY
MILL for div. Telegrams to PLAINVIEW.
A,
Brig. Gen.
_Notes_: General A considers it unnecessary to mention to his own
troops, the enemy’s great superiority of strength, although it is
essential that he advise his superior. The fact that he is taking up a
defensive position is sufficiently suggestive.
The position is described in general terms only in Par. 2, and more
precisely in Par 3.
The Col. of the 1st Inf., without orders, will place a small combat
patrol to the right. General A has made special provisions (outside the
sphere of the Col. of the 2d Inf.) for the security of his left.
The expression “prepared for defense” includes (besides intrenching)
clearing foreground, measuring ranges, constructing obstacles, etc.,
all so far as time allows. The infantry will do the intrenching--the
engineers (if present) the special work. (See “Organization of a
defensive position.”)
The message contains all the information which the division commander
requires at this time. Upon approaching the position he will receive
personal advices as to the latest developments in the situation.