THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR
(1870)
Whilst the barren disarmament negotiations were proceeding, the internal
political situation in France had not improved. Though calm on the
surface, a section of the people was becoming more socialistic, and
socialism produced stagnation in business, a desire on the part of the
lower classes for revolution and a corresponding desire on the part of
the middle classes for a strong government again. Ministers were uneasy,
for although the new Constitution had been well received by the country
at large, its weak point lay in the right reserved by the Emperor of
appealing to the people, a right which nothing could induce him to
abandon, and which he was about to exercise by submitting the recent
Constitutional changes to a plébiscite. Theoretically, this should have
afforded gratification to the Republicans, as being in conformity with
their view that the public should decide everything directly itself, but
they were in reality well aware that the French people were not yet
Republican in sentiment.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, April 5, 1870.
There is a good deal of uneasiness in the French political world.
The great thing for the moment is that the Ministers should get a
good majority in the Chamber at the end of the debate on the new
Constitution which is now going on. They are afraid that some of
their usual supporters will abstain from voting. The 'Appeal to the
People' is so thoroughly Napoleonic an idea, and so completely in
accordance with the peculiar character and modes of thinking of
Napoleon III., that it would be very hard to make him give it up.
One cannot wonder at people's being distrustful of the use he may
make of it. The submitting the present changes in the Constitution
to a plébiscite is certainly legally necessary and admitted to be so
by all parties. What people are afraid of is that the Emperor will
insist upon calling for it in a Proclamation so worded as to make
the acceptance by the people a vote in favour of his person, as
against the Chambers and Ministers.
You will see from Claremont's report that the Government has agreed
to reduce the military contingent by another 10,000 men, making it
80,000 instead of 90,000 as the present Government proposed, and
instead of 100,000, as it was fixed by the late Government.
It was not surprising that the French Ministers, as well as many other
people, should feel suspicious about the plébiscite, and that frequent
councils should have taken place at the Tuileries with the object of
inducing the Emperor to consent that in future no plébiscite should be
submitted to the people unless it had first been voted by the two
Chambers. For one thing, it was feared that few people would care enough
about it to take much trouble to vote, and it really did not seem very
probable that a peasant would take a long walk to express his opinion on
the question of whether the Senate should have the power of originating
certain laws. Therefore the Ministerial crisis which arose, and the
Emperor's determination not to yield about the Appeal to the People,
were attributed to a Machiavellian plot on his part, and it was believed
that the return to personal government was to be brought about by
getting rid of the independent Ministers, Ollivier included. The belief
was possibly unfounded, but the Emperor's previous history had not
inspired his people with implicit confidence in him, and they were
always convinced that he had an incurable taste for conspiracy.
* * * * *
_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, April 13, 1870.
It is impossible not to feel very uneasy about the present state of
things in France and the sort of _locus standi_ that the enemies of
the Empire have obtained for suspecting the Emperor, who will be a
long time in recovering, if he ever does, the public confidence he
now seems to have lost. Revolutions are not made with half measures,
any more than with the proverbial rose water, and among the ships
that the Emperor was supposed to have burnt behind him when he
landed on the Constitutional shore, the plébiscite ought surely to
have been included. No doubt he would have divested himself of a
favourite weapon, but he should have foreseen the very serious
objections to it that would arise in the mind of the most moderate
friend of Constitutional Government, and he would have done far
better for himself to have given it up and taken his chance, for
with or without plébiscite, that is what he is now reduced to, and
his chances will be improved by endeavouring with sincerity to guide
the stream rather than oppose himself to it.
As the result of the crisis, both Daru and Buffet left the Ministry,
thus weakening the Cabinet and diminishing materially the chance of a
quiet and satisfactory establishment of Parliamentary Government. Thiers
was generally supposed to have been the principal mischief-maker.
Lord Russell was at this time in Paris, and in conversation with
Ollivier the latter expressed himself most confidently about the
plébiscite, and thought that if six million people voted it might be
looked upon as a decided success. Another opinion on the plébiscite was
volunteered by Mr. Gladstone. 'If the Emperor is really stickling for
the right to refer when he pleases to the people for an Aye or No upon
a proposition which he is to frame, that, in my opinion, reduces
Constitutional Government to an absolute mockery, just as it would
reduce to a shadow the power of a Legislative Assembly.'
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, April 21, 1870.
The prospects of the quiet establishment of Constitutional
Government are in some respects better and in some worse. They are
better inasmuch as men of property, bankers, and others, are giving
money and exerting themselves to obtain a decided success for the
Plébiscite. They are worse, inasmuch as the suspicion of the
Emperor's intentions appears to increase, and people become more and
more afraid that if he gets a really large majority on the
Plébiscite, he will revert to personal government. The imprudent
language of the Right and their undisguised avowal of their hopes
produce this feeling. The Emperor himself has neither said nor done
anything to warrant it.
Ollivier asked me what progress had been made in the disarmament
question. I made him understand, without going into details, that it
must be let sleep for the present, and he agreed immediately.
There is a hitch about the English evidence before the Parliamentary
Committee on the Régime Parlementaire. The Committee have proposed
that only one English witness shall be heard. Emile Ollivier will do
his best to put things straight. I told him that if a proper and
courteous answer was made to our tender of evidence, I would
undertake that we would not abuse their civility by asking for too
much of their time.
Emile Ollivier dines with me to-day, and will, I hope, learn and
profit by Lord Russell's instruction in Constitutional Government.
English manufacturers were naturally desirous of putting their case
before the Parliamentary Committee on the Commercial Treaty, but the
members of the Committee did not appear equally desirous of hearing
them. According to Lord Lyons, who, like all his official contemporaries,
was in principle a Free Trader, and felt compassion for the misguided
economics of continental nations, the majority of the Committee were
infected by a politico-economical heresy which took the form of
demanding that any advantages which foreign manufacturers might enjoy,
should be balanced by import duties, which they persisted in calling
'compensation.' His advice was that any English witnesses who might be
called, should confine themselves very closely to facts and not allow
themselves to be led into discussions on trade principles, 'as it is not
easy to reply in French to a Committee, of which the anti-Free Trade
members are much hotter than the Free Traders.'
As the date of the plébiscite drew near, Ollivier's confidence and
satisfaction continued to increase, but some discomposure was caused by
the hostile action of Thiers and his friends. No one had ever expected
that Thiers would long endure that any Government of which he was not a
member should go on smoothly, and in the present instance, he was able
to establish a plausible case by protesting that the Emperor, in
reserving the right to appeal to the people, was nullifying liberal
institutions. At an opportune moment, however, a plot against the
Emperor's life was discovered, in which a man named Beaury was
concerned, and although of small importance, it was considered likely
to produce a considerable effect upon public opinion.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, May 6, 1870.
I thought Emile Ollivier rather out of spirits yesterday, or at all
events not so confident as he is usually. He seemed to hope the
publication of the details of the plot would produce a great effect
and increase the 'Ayes' for the Plébiscite. That there really was a
plot is certain, but it may be doubted whether the conspirators were
numerous enough, or were men of sufficient note, to make the danger
so great as to frighten the voters. I am not surprised at La
Valette's being out of spirits, for the situation is really very
critical, and it is difficult to conceive any ending which will
place him and Rouher where they were again.
With reference to Loftus's despatch, I sincerely hope that his most
confidential correspondent is not so well informed as he represents
himself to be, and that no change is really contemplated in the
_status quo_ of Hesse and Baden. It would be quite a mistake to
suppose that this is a moment at which it would be safe to defy
France. On the contrary, a war unmistakably provoked by Prussia,
would be hailed by many as a welcome diversion from internal
difficulties. So far as I can judge, _Ollivier is not the man to
shrink from one_. There is more security against a sudden surprise
than there was under the personal government, but there is also less
probability that the Emperor's health and personal views will
prevent war.
The plébiscite took place on May 8, and an ecstatic note from Ollivier
announced success.
* * * * *
_M. E. Ollivier to Lord Lyons._
Paris le 9 mai, 1870.
La Victoire est complète!
A Paris nous avons gagné cent mille voix, et jusqu'à présent voici
les resultats.
Oui 6.189.506
Non 1.305.881
manquent 37 arrondissements, l'armée, la marine, l'Algérie.
The complete returns showed that about 7,250,000 voted 'Yes,' and
1,500,000 'No.' The Minister was thus justified in his satisfaction.
Nearly all the big towns, including Paris, had voted against the
Government, as had been expected, but on the other hand the agricultural
population had showed itself to be practically unanimous in favour of
the Empire. One of the disquieting surprises was provided by the Army,
no less than 50,000 votes being recorded against the Emperor. Riots, as
usual, broke out in Paris after the voting was over, but were suppressed
without difficulty. In connection with these riots an ingenious but
discreditable device, was resorted to for the purpose of seducing the
soldiers in the Prince Eugène Barracks, these having been supplied by
the Republicans with _bons_ (orders for free admission) on the
neighbouring houses of ill-fame, on the presumption that the holders of
these orders would feel peculiarly aggrieved at being confined to
barracks.
The general impression created was that a large majority was safer than
a moderate one would have been, and much safer than a very small one.
This was the view entertained by Lord Clarendon, who had always
considered the plébiscite to be a great mistake, but was now anxious to
make the best of it, and instructed the Ambassador to congratulate
Ollivier and to express the hope that he would be able to surround
himself with Liberal Ministers determined to keep order. An Empire based
upon soldiers and peasants could not be said to be placed on a solid
foundation, and no effort should be spared to enlarge the basis.
The Imperial success at the plébiscite produced a sycophantic outburst
amongst the diplomatists at Paris, and a movement was promoted by the
Nuncio and Prince Metternich, the Austrian Ambassador, with the object
of asking for an audience, and offering the collective congratulations
of the Diplomatic Corps to the Emperor. The ineptitude of the proposal
was evident.
* * * * *
_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, May 12, 1870.
I wish the flunkeyism of the Nuncio and Metternich was displayed in
some other way than congratulating the Emperor on the success of his
foolish Plébiscite. It is an improper interference in the internal
affairs of France, which, if allowed, would justify a remonstrance
of the Diplomatic Corps against some measure they disapproved; but,
of course, we can neither oppose nor abstain, and it will be well
for you to join cordially. But I hope there will be no expression of
opinion in favour of the Plébiscite, or recognition of it as a
component part of Constitutional Government. We should be justly
condemned if we joined however indirectly in any such opinion. I
asked La Valette this morning whether such congratulations would be
agreeable to the Emperor, and he answered, with a shrug of the
shoulders: 'Il a le gout des compliments.'
Upon further consideration Lord Clarendon decided that it would be
unwise if the British representative took any part in the proposed joint
congratulation, as it was foreseen that it might provoke awkward
discussions in the House of Commons. Lord Lyons was therefore directed
to inform Ollivier at once, that, much as the British Government
sympathized with the Emperor and his dynasty, no worse service could be
done to him than by offering compliments upon his success. He would at
once be attacked for having invited or rather tolerated intervention in
the internal affairs of France, and the Queen of England, in an
analogous case, could not possibly accept such an address from
foreigners as that would imply a sort of right to interfere which might
prove extremely inconvenient. The Emperor would gain much more with the
nation by courteously declining to receive foreign opinions upon his own
acts and the domestic affairs of France, than by any assurance that
Foreign Governments were united in approving a measure about which there
existed a considerable difference of opinion in France. These views were
to be communicated to Ollivier in a friendly manner with the assurance
that they should be brought to the Emperor's notice.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, May 19, 1870.
I think we are well out of the scrape of the collective
congratulations. The notion was Metternich's and the Nuncio only
came into it to a certain degree, lest his refusing to do so should
give offence. So far as I know, the Nuncio has behaved very well,
and has not brought _us_ forward, but has simply told Metternich
that he found the Diplomatic Corps generally cold on the subject,
and therefore thought it better not to go on with it. Metternich
appears to have acquiesced. I have not seen him; he was out when I
called, which was, I think, lucky; and we have not met.
There is a Ball at the Tuileries on Monday, at which I shall
probably have a chance of saying something pleasant to Cæsar. I
shall be careful to keep within the terms sanctioned by Mr.
Gladstone. We may at any rate rejoice at the establishment of
Parliamentary Government in France, and hope, till we have evidence
to the contrary, that the means provided for upsetting it will not
be resorted to. The present Plébiscite was undoubtedly technically
necessary to the legality of the new Constitution, and as such was
insisted upon by Daru and other Liberals. Let us hope it will be the
last.
I have received the usual invitation in the name of the Emperor to
the function on Saturday evening. I must not leave the Embassy in
darkness if everybody else illuminates, but I think the idea a
foolish one, as being likely to give rise to street riots.
Two of the new Ministers are unknown to fame, but their appointment
is a relief to those who apprehended appointments from the Right.
There is no remarkable speaker in the Ministry except Ollivier
himself.
Gramont called upon me yesterday and was profuse in expressions of
friendship to England, to you, and to me.
The appointment, however, of the Duc de Gramont[17] could hardly have
been in the nature of a relief, for, as far back as the beginning of
1868, when Ambassador at Vienna, he had announced that he considered a
Franco-Prussian war unavoidable.
The formal announcement of the result of the plébiscite was made to the
Emperor on May 21, in the Salle des États of the Louvre, and must have
been one of the last, if not the very last, of the brilliant ceremonies
which marked the reign of Napoleon III. It was attended by all the
dignitaries of the realm, the Senators, the deputies, the civic
functionaries, the Diplomatic Corps; an imposing array of troops filled
the Place du Carrousel; and Cæsar himself, elevated upon a dais, replied
to the congratulations offered to him by the Chambers in a speech full
of those resounding and occasionally meaningless phrases which
invariably meet with a responsive echo in an assembly of Frenchmen. It
was, in fact, the final coruscation of the Imperial fireworks, and, in
the prosaic words of Lord Lyons, 'the ceremony went off extremely well.'
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
May 24, 1870.
I made a little speech to the Emperor about the Plébiscite at the
ball last night. I did not in fact go as far as Mr. Gladstone
allowed, but what I did say appeared to be to His Majesty's taste.
At all events he was extremely gracious and cordial. I don't know
that any one except the Prussian Ambassador has asked for a special
audience to deliver congratulations, but I have not made inquiries,
because I neither wished to put it into my colleagues' heads to do
so, nor to appear as if it seemed to me the natural thing to do. All
seems to be quite right with the Emperor and Empress, so far as H.M.
Government, and you in particular, and I am concerned. He has been a
good deal annoyed and disappointed by the tone of the English press.
After all, he has established a Constitutional form of Government,
more democratic than that which exists in England, and the worst way
to encourage him to persevere is to assume at once that he does not
mean to do so. Selfishly, we ought to remember that his influence in
the Government is the principal security we can have for _Free Trade
and cordiality between the two countries_.
What the Emperor will really do depends on the course of events. I
believe nothing of the stories of his having deep-laid schemes. It
is a pity that he has not stronger men in the Cabinet--men strong
enough to resist him in case of need--and to direct the Chamber. A
dissolution is hardly to be thought of at present. The people at
large would not stand being disturbed to vote again soon, and
consequently the votes would be few, and principally Republican.
There is danger in the influence of the Emperor's old political
friends, who want to regain their old position, and in some of the
influential military men who want a war for promotion and glory. And
there is danger in the position in which the Plébiscite has placed
him--owing mainly to the Republicans, who, much more than he is, are
to blame for making it a question between him personally and them.
The function of the 21st went off very well; indeed, wonderfully
well, considering how great a part of the audience was composed of
Senators and Councillors of State who have lost in importance by the
Constitutional change.
The excitement attending the plébiscite gave way before long to a
feeling of political lassitude, and to those surmises concerning the
probabilities of weathering the session which habitually preoccupy
Constitutional Governments. It is of more interest to turn for a moment
to a matter which is now fortunately viewed in a very different light.
Having been asked his advice on some question concerning Canada, Lord
Lyons wrote to Lord Clarendon the following as his deliberate opinion,
and it must be borne in mind that he had had exceptional opportunities
of studying the Canadian situation:--
I never feel comfortable about Canada and our North American
possessions. I do not believe we have the means of defending them
against the United States in case of war, and I am by no means
confident that the colonists would be unanimous and enthusiastic in
helping us to do so. I am afraid too that the colonists are
beginning to see that in matters short of war, we feel that we must
let the United States do very much as they please: in short that we
doubt our having the strength to resist them, and, unless under a
very strong provocation, have not the spirit to try. I was struck
by an observation made some time ago by the Governor of Newfoundland
respecting the French claims and the coast fisheries, viz. that the
Colonists felt that if the United States were their masters, the
questions would soon be settled in their favour. In fact it seems to
be in the nature of things that the United States' prestige should
grow and ours should wane in North America, and I wish we were well
and creditably out of the scrape.
In the course of the previous year he had already expressed the opinion
that the great problem for us in American politics was to find some fair
and honourable way of dissolving all connection between England and our
North American colonies.
Lord Clarendon on his side was equally emphatic. 'I agree,' he wrote on
June 1, 'in every word you say about our possessions in North America,
and wish that they would propose to be independent, and to annex
themselves. We can't throw them off, and it is very desirable that we
should part as friends.'
The views of Lord Stanley on this subject have already been quoted,
and, if search were made, no doubt it would be discovered that similar
sentiments were entertained by nearly all the mid-Victorian statesmen.
I have a clear recollection of hearing, less than thirty years ago, a
Cabinet Minister, who had been Colonial Secretary, express the opinion
that 'colonies were expensive luxuries which only a rich country like
England could afford to indulge in.'
One of the last letters written by Lord Clarendon refers to suspicions
created by the visit to Ems of the Emperor of Russia, the King of
Prussia, and Bismarck.
* * * * *
_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, June 8, 1870.
I have nothing of importance to write about.
Loftus says that the Berlin public is much _intrigué_ by the sudden
departure of the King and Bismarck for Ems, as the Czar was at
Berlin ten days before, when Bismarck pretended to be too ill to
come and meet him.
Bernstorff professes entire ignorance on the subject, and supposes
that, as Ems is now Prussian, the King thinks it necessary to give a
personal welcome to his Imperial relative.
This is possible, but not probable, and I suspect, though I can give
no good reason for so doing, that the more complete unification of
Germany occupies the Prussian mind, beginning of course by the
incorporation of Baden, and that it is thought desirable to get a
Russian sanction of the project, in the event of its leading to war
with France. One fails, however, to discover any reason why Russia
should make an enemy of France and endanger the peace of Europe in
order to justify the ambition of Prussia and enable the King to
unduly tax his subjects for an unnecessary army.
Lord Clarendon's suspicions in this case were as correct as his prophecy
with regard to the establishment of a Republic in France, although the
words 'unnecessary army' might be taken exception to in the light of
subsequent events. Benedetti[18] happened to be in Paris at the time when
Lord Clarendon's letter arrived, and he informed Lord Lyons that he
had 'entire confidence in the assurances of the King of Prussia and
Bismarck, and that he did not apprehend any danger to peace, unless
circumstances were too strong for His Majesty and his Minister, and this
he thought improbable.' The idea of circumstances being too strong for
Bismarck might fairly be classed with the danger to Prussia
threatened by the appointment of Monsignor Klazko.
Lord Clarendon died on June 27, and was succeeded at the Foreign Office
on July 6 by Lord Granville. The celebrated announcement that there
had never been so great a lull in foreign affairs was made upon the
authority of Mr. Hammond,[19] whose singularly faulty judgment and
unhappy prophecies have been already commented upon. At the same time,
it must in justice be admitted that appearances in the early summer of
1870 were unusually deceptive owing to the general calm which prevailed
in the diplomatic world.
When the Hohenzollern candidature thunderbolt fell in the early days
of July, the Duc de Gramont lost no time in intimating to the British
Ambassador that France would go to war with both Spain and Prussia
rather than allow a Hohenzollern to reign at Madrid. But although
Gramont seemed bent upon committing the French Government to this
course, he allowed it to be seen that he would be very grateful for any
exertion England might make to induce the King of Prussia to forbid his
kinsman to go on with his candidature. The election of Montpensier, he
said, might be looked upon as a _mauvais procédé_ towards the Emperor
and the dynasty, but the putting forward a Prussian was an insult and an
injury to all France. Similar language was held by the French Ambassador
in London.
* * * * *
_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, July 6, 1870.
Your telegram of yesterday arrived while we were debating the Land
Bill. It took Mr. Gladstone and me by surprise. I received your
despatch and private letter this morning, and on my return from
Windsor, M. de La Valette called on me. He held the same language to
me as that reported by you to have been held by Gramont. France
disclaimed all interference with Spain, but stated the arguments
which made the possession of the Crown of Spain by a Prussian Prince
dangerous to France. I am writing to catch the post, and I cannot
repeat to you all the reasons which he gave, concluding by assuring
me that the circumstances were of the gravest character, and that in
his opinion, the Government of the Emperor could not, under the
pressure of public opinion, admit a project of such a nature. He
added however that there was no reason why any preliminary means
should not be tried to avert so great an evil, and he addressed
himself to the Government of the Queen, on the strength of our
friendly relations, and our desire to maintain the peace of Europe,
to exercise all our influence upon Prussia and upon Spain to stop
the project.
I told M. de La Valette of the surprise which the matter had been to
H.M. Government, that I perfectly understood the unfavourable effect
which such an announcement was contemplated to produce in France,
although I did not agree with all the arguments which he had used
with respect to the importance to so great a nation as France of a
German prince on the throne of Spain.
I said it was a matter of some regret to me that such strong
language as that reported by you to have been addressed to the
Prussian Ambassador should have been used. But I added that it was
not so much a moment for the general discussion, as to see what
could be done.
I readily assented to his request to use what influence we might
possess both with Prussia and Spain, but without any pretension
to dictate to either Power, to induce them to take into the most
serious consideration all the bearings of this question, such as its
gravity required, and I promised to communicate with you, Lord A.
Loftus, and Mr. Layard at once.
It is very sad that I should be writing to you in the place of one
who would have had so much personal power in such a matter as this.
In the meanwhile, however, the explosion of Chauvinism in France and the
attitude of the French Ministers rendered the situation more alarming
from day to day. Undoubtedly the French Government desired and hoped to
carry their point without actual war, but Ministers had burnt their
ships and left themselves no means of escape if they failed in their
attempt to win a moral victory over Prussia. As Gramont remarked,
'_l'Avènement du Prince de Hohenzollern, c'est la guerre_!' It was
almost impossible to see what injury to French interests could be caused
by the presence of a Hohenzollern at Madrid, but the question had been
taken up as a point of honour, and was therefore more dangerous than if
treated from a material point of view. The Emperor, according to Lord
Lyons, remained at this stage of the crisis, very calm and extremely
confident that he would get his way without war. There was no doubt that
he was strongly averse from war, partly on account of his own views, and
partly on the ground of his ill-health, which would be a serious
drawback if he were forced to take the command of the army; but he also
felt that it would not be safe for him to submit to another rebuff from
Prussia, and his Constitutional Ministers were inconveniently anxious to
show their spirit.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, July 10, 1870.
The state of things to-day may be told in half a dozen words. If the
Prince of Hohenzollern's renunciation is announced in 24 or 48
hours, there will be peace _for the moment_. If not, there will be
an immediate declaration of war against Prussia. I cannot however
answer for even this situation lasting for the 48 hours. The French
are getting more and more excited. They think they have got the
start of Prussia this time in forwardness of preparation; that they
have a better cause of war, as being one less likely to rouse the
Germans, than they are likely to get again; and in fact that they
must have it out with Prussia sooner or later; and that they had
better not throw away this chance. When I say that I cannot answer
for things remaining in as favourable a situation as they are now,
for 48 hours, I mean that if the excitement goes on, the French may
choose to pick a quarrel on the form of the renunciation, or some
other pretext, even if the Prince retires.
End how it will, the whole affair is a terrible misfortune, for the
French and the Prussians will hate each other more than ever, and I
hardly expect to see their animosity come back to the quiescent
state in which it was a month ago.
Gramont says that, so far from the energetic language and
preparations of France thwarting your endeavours to preserve peace,
they afford the only chance of your succeeding.
I told him I did not at all agree with him.
This letter reveals two colossal errors on the part of the French. They
honestly thought that they were better prepared for war than the
Prussians, and they believed that the latter could be successfully
intimidated.
As late as July 12 Lord Granville still believed that Prussia did not
really want war, and hoped that the pressure applied to the Hohenzollern
Prince by Queen Victoria and other important personages would avert the
calamity. Writing on the same day, Lord Lyons said that he did not
despair of peace, but that the war feeling was very strong, both in and
out of the Ministry.
* * * * *
_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, July 13, 1870.
Nothing can be better than your work at Paris, and I only wish it
may prove successful. My colleagues and the House of Commons are
getting very angry, and Gladstone wishes me to use stronger language
to the French Government than would, in my opinion, be useful for
the object, although it is true that no nation is powerful enough in
these times to stand up against the public opinion of Europe.
Your telegram of this evening leaves some hope, but I very much
doubt whether, even if we are asked by France, we can exert any more
pressure on Prussia, who in substance has done all that we were told
to ask and all that Gramont said was necessary to put an end to the
dispute.
La Valette is very angry. He gets a communication from his Foreign
Office once in three days, and then there is hardly anything in it.
His argument to-day is probably not the one his Government uses. 'I
do not, like everybody else, suspect the French of having had a
project of going to war. But having got into the wrangle, having
found their warlike preparations so popular, and having roused
effectually the feelings of France and Prussia, they do not like to
abstain from a fight, which they think will come, and in which
during the next six weeks their enemies would be unprepared.
I have some thoughts of asking the Cabinet, if war is declared,
whether it would be wise to ask both Governments whether they are
prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium. It is always safer,
or at least, generally so, to do nothing; but both, in doubt, would
be more likely to give a favourable answer, than either flushed with
victory. Let me know what you think, and please make any other
suggestions which may occur to you if the emergency arises.
As far as I can judge, all the Neutral Powers are sincerely anxious
for peace. Italy, certainly so. The only thing which we have done,
of which I doubt, is having asked Italy a leading question about an
Italian Prince. They seem to wish to entangle us further in the
matter. It was of great importance before Spain and France were
reconciled, but now I presume it will be discreet to let this matter
remain in the hands of the parties concerned.
The phrase 'in which during the next six weeks their enemies would be
unprepared,' seems to imply that H.M. Government were singularly
ill-informed as to the true state of Prussian military efficiency.
Upon July 14, Lord Lyons reported that an article in the _North German
Gazette_ seemed to make war absolutely inevitable, and that Benedetti,
who was expected in Paris the following day, confirmed the accuracy of
the newspaper. Werther, too, the Prussian Ambassador, had announced to
Gramont that 'he had been granted leave of absence and was about to take
advantage of it immediately.' Even the guileless Hammond was alarmed.
'Why Bismarck went to Berlin instead of Ems, and finally retired to
Varzin without personal communications with his master, is not easy to
explain, and with a person of his character the proceeding is somewhat
suspicious.' The last hope of peace practically vanished when Bismarck
intimated that he could not recommend to the King for acceptance the
proposal made by H.M. Government.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, July 16, 1870.
It will be a miracle if we are as good friends with France six
months after the beginning of this wretched war, as we are now, and
it will require the utmost tact, prudence and consideration for
French susceptibilities to prevent all the improvement in feeling
between the two nations, which has grown up in the last twenty
years, being entirely destroyed.
We have already a question with Gramont about his assertion that we
recognized the justice of his complaint. I hope it may be possible
to let this drop, but if not it is to be noted that, my memorandum
correcting the assertion on your authority was in his hands the
night before he repeated the assertion in his declaration of
yesterday.
In referring to his declaration that if the Hohenzollern
renunciation were obtained, France would be satisfied, it may be
well to bear in mind that the exact words he used to me were: '_If
the Prince of Hohenzollern should now, on the advice of the King of
Prussia_, withdraw his acceptance of the Crown the whole affair
would be at an end.'
This point becomes of less importance as France now seems to set the
Hohenzollern affair aside altogether, and to rest her _casus belli_
wholly on the boast of the affront to Benedetti.
Above all things we must try and keep as much as possible out of
Blue Books. If it is absolutely necessary to have one now, pray let
me have the opportunity of looking over anything of mine which it is
proposed to publish, and suggesting omissions. It would also be a
great relief to me to be allowed to consult Gramont himself, as I
did La Valette on the Cretan Blue Book. The cases are not the same,
and I might not use the power, but I should like to have it. I am
the more alarmed with regard to Gramont, as his reputation for
inaccuracy is so universal, that there must be some foundation for it.
Newspaper correspondents, amateur travellers, and so forth, are
already tormenting me to get them leave to accompany the French
Army. I believe none are to be allowed; but if it be otherwise, I
think the danger of being held responsible for their indiscretions
would be so great and so damaging to our relations with France, that
I do not think I should be justified in applying for leave on any
private recommendation, however strong: in fact, I should not be
willing to apply on anything short of a distinct official order, in
each case from you; and such an order I should be sorry to receive.
I tremble at the thought of the Blockades. Those during the American
Civil War kept us in perpetual hot water and within an inch of war
with the United States, and the labours of working out the cases
without coming to a rupture was very nearly the death of me. Heaven
defend us from anything like an _Alabama_ case with the French!
It is important that I should know as soon as possible whether our
Embassy at Berlin might take charge of French subjects in Prussia.
I am pretty sure to be sounded very soon, and might perhaps be able
to soften the very bad impression a refusal would make, by
preventing the request being made. I should wish us to accept, and I
don't see why, as impartial neutrals, we might not take charge also
of the Prussians in Paris, if we were asked, though I would rather
avoid this if possible.
Just at this moment the _Liberté_ caused some embarrassment by
publishing more or less correct details respecting the secret
negotiations which had taken place earlier in the year between Lord
Clarendon and Bismarck on the question of disarmament. Lord Granville
had not been in the confidence of Lord Clarendon, and it now was
necessary to explain to him what had passed. How the _Liberté_ obtained
its information does not appear. Daru always stoutly maintained that he
had not mentioned the matter to any one except the Emperor and Ollivier,
and the disclosures involved not only a gross breach of confidence on
the part of some one--presumably a French Foreign Office official--but
also a danger that Bismarck might demand explanations. The tremendous
events, however, of the next few weeks, diverted attention from the
_Liberté's_ revelations. War was formally declared on July 19.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, July 19, 1870.
The war has been forced upon the Emperor principally by his
own party in the Chamber, the Right, and by his Ministers.
Constitutional Government has so far established itself that a
Ministry in a minority in the Corps Législatif is as much bound to
go out as a Ministry in the House of Commons. The Emperor was in a
bad position to resist, because after the line taken at the time of
Sadowa, it would have been too dangerous for him to be put forward
as the cause of France's truckling to Prussia. The whole affair is a
series of blunders which has culminated in an awful catastrophe.
Gramont told me this afternoon that La Valette wrote him a very
_bizarre_ story. La Valette said that it had been considered by the
British Cabinet whether they should not send an English force to
occupy Belgium during the war, which would be a strange way of
showing respect for Belgian neutrality.
I should myself be very sorry to see a British soldier landed on the
Continent, and seriously alarmed if any force that was landed was
under a hundred thousand strong.
Gramont told me also that Bray[20] had hit upon a combination to
which France would have no objection if it were possible. Bray
declared that Bavaria would be neutral if the neutrality of Baden
were secured. Gramont said however that of course to carry out such
an arrangement, the Prussian troops must retire from Rastadt.
He said he had just been informed that Italy had called out two
classes of her military contingent. He did not know what this might
mean. Italy has not yet made to France any declaration of policy.
Gramont concluded by saying that he supposed all the Minor States
would wait for a battle and then declare for the victor.
The neutrality of Belgium was, of course, one of the main preoccupations
of H.M. Government, but there is no reason to suppose that a British
occupation was ever seriously contemplated, and La Valette's report on
the subject was probably caused by the vanity of appearing to possess
special pieces of information which often leads diplomatists astray.
Belgium was not, however, the only country which had reason to feel
alarmed. The position of Denmark before hostilities actually began
between France and Prussia was both painful and critical. The Danish
Minister at Paris appeared at the British Embassy in great distress,
saying that he knew nothing of what his Government intended, and asking
for information; as it seemed quite likely that the Danish capital would
be occupied by whichever of the two opposing armies could get there
first. It was common knowledge that a great expedition was fitting out
for Copenhagen at Cherbourg, and that General Trochu, who passed for
about the best French general, was to command it. And if French forces
appeared off Copenhagen it would be impossible to restrain the people
from marching against the Prussians, although there was, as yet
apparently, no understanding between the French and Danish Governments.
On July 25 the _Times_ surprised the world by publishing the text of a
draft treaty concerning the annexation of Belgium which it was alleged
had been submitted by the French Government to Bismarck in 1866.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, July 26, 1870.
I have had some conversation with Gramont about the nefarious Projet
de Traité which the _Times_ has given to the world, but as he has
written to La Valette about it, I had better leave you to receive
from him the French version. The only curious, and to me quite new
statement which he made, was that Bismarck had at one time offered,
if France was afraid of the odium of occupying Belgium, to occupy it
first himself, and then to retire in apparent deference to
remonstrances from France, and so give France a pretext for
entering.
It has long been a common belief among diplomatists that France and
Prussia have at different times discussed the propriety of seizing,
the one upon Belgium, the other upon Holland. No such scandalous
iniquity has been contemplated since the partition of Poland, and it
is much worse than the partition of Poland, for there might be some
colourable assertions that Poland was turbulent, ill-governed, that
most of the population were serfs, and that she was an inconvenient
neighbour. But Belgium and Holland are free, extremely well
governed, and, to say the least, perfectly inoffensive neighbours.
One must leave it to the parties concerned to defend themselves from
the reproach of such odious projects, and I hope they will.
The insinuation in the leading article in the _Times_ that the
subject has been revived by France since the Hohenzollern crisis
seems to me to be extremely improbable.
Bernstorff's attempts to make you vouch for the authenticity of the
_Projet_, without committing himself, is as poor a little trick as I
ever heard of.
I send you in a despatch the official account of the cause of the
tardiness in producing Benedetti's despatch, that is to say,
delicacy on the part of Gramont. The version accepted by the public
is that the whole affair had been forgotten at the Ministère until
at last Benedetti himself remembered it and had it looked up.
With the object of prejudicing European opinion against Prussia, the
Emperor wrote the well-known letter to Gramont from Metz, on July 28,
accusing Bismarck of having proposed to France the annexation of
Belgium, but the sole result was that both parties were shown to have
played an equally sordid part in the transaction, and they were
consequently both induced to agree to the English proposal that they
should give a new and formal pledge not to violate Belgian integrity.
In a letter dated July 31, is a dispassionate analysis of the inadequate
causes which had brought about a rupture at that particular moment.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, July 31, 1870.
I see the public, with their usual tendency to attribute everything
to deep-laid plots and schemes, generally suppose that war was a
foregone conclusion on the part of France and of Prussia. I don't
believe it in the case of Prussia, and I know it not to be the fact
as regards France. Prussia threw the first stone, by bringing on the
Hohenzollern question. France made a peaceful settlement difficult
by Gramont's irritating declaration on the 6th. The cause of the
change from a mild to an irritating declaration was the arrival of
the report from the Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, that Thile[21]
pooh-poohed the French remonstrance, and said that the question
_n'existait pas pour le Gouvernement Prussien_. Then came the
great fault of France in not accepting the renunciation of the
Hohenzollern as a final settlement; but, even at the last moment the
declaration of the 16th would have concluded with a phrase leaving
the door open to the mediation of a Congress, if the article in the
_North German Gazette_ had not arrived, and convinced the French
that Bismarck had decided upon war. However, it is no use crying
over spilt milk.
I understand that the Emperor writes to the Empress that no great
action is to be expected for three or four days. At the French Head
Quarters there was an apprehension that the Prussians might attempt
to turn the right flank of the French Army.
Subsequent revelations have shown how profoundly the course of events
was influenced by the action of Bismarck in connection with the tone of
the German press, and by his distortion of the celebrated Ems interview
between the King of Prussia and Benedetti, but this was of course
unknown at the time.
One humorous incident in connection with the outbreak of hostilities is
worth recording. Animated by what Lord Clarendon would have called the
spirit of flunkeyism, the Paris diplomatists grew greatly excited over
the question of illuminations in the event of French victories. As was
only to be expected, the accommodating Austrian Ambassador was foremost
in advocating rejoicings, and he and his Italian colleague were bent
upon illuminating their Embassies, while the representatives of the
smaller Powers, such as Switzerland, who lived in less conspicuous
abodes, opposed the proposal, and were supported by the British
Ambassador. The question was referred home, and the Foreign Office took
the common-sense view that the Ambassador should not illuminate without
necessity, but should do so rather than cause trouble or give offence.
The early reverses of the campaign were concealed from the public with
some success, MacMahon's defeat being known at the Embassy twelve hours
before the official announcement; but as soon as the truth came out, the
population of the capital seems to have believed that the Germans would
at once appear before Paris.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, Aug. 8, 1870.
If the panic in the army is as great as it is in the capital, it is
all over with France. One would think that the Prussians were
already in Montmartre. There must, it is supposed, be a great battle
fought before they can get there, and the French may win it.
I have been beset with Representatives of small Powers, all except
the Belgian, in consternation, and with Rothschilds and other
bankers in despair. They hope England will interfere to stop the
Prussian army on its road to Paris: not an easy task if the road is
open.
All Gramont could or would tell me was that the Emperor was
concentrating forces between Metz and Chalons, and that a great
battle was expected.
I was really ashamed to speak to him about our Treaty, but I thrust
your despatch on him, knowing you were anxious to avoid delay. He
said: _n'ayez pas peur, nous n'avons pas grande envie d'entrer en
Belgique dans ce moment_.
In the Chamber, no one, even on the Right, had the generosity to say a
single word in defence of the unfortunate Emperor when a declaration was
made from the Tribune that all the disasters were due to the
inefficiency of the Commander-in-Chief. Ollivier and his colleagues
resigned, and General Trochu, who had been given an unimportant command
in the South, was hailed as the possible saviour of the country, and
offered, in vain, the War Office in the new administration of Count
Palikao. It is instructive to note that Gramont (upon whom Bismarck
subsequently heaped the most savage contempt) denied to Lord Lyons that
he had ever been in favour of war. According to him, the strongest
phrase in the declaration of July 6 was inserted at the Council on that
morning, and was not in his draft, and he threw the blame of the
imprudent haste in going to war on Leboeuf's confident declaration that
neither France nor any other country had ever been so well prepared for
war before. Leboeuf's celebrated declaration about gaiter buttons has
always been cited as almost unequalled for fatuity, but it is an
undoubted fact that Gramont himself was convinced that a Franco-Prussian
war was inevitable, and he is not known to have discouraged the idea.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Aug. 16, 1870.
So far as we can conjecture, the military situation is very bad, and
the political is certainly as bad as can be. There are ups and downs
in the spirits of the French about the war, but the Emperor and the
dynasty seem simply to sink lower and lower. La Tour d'Auvergne[22]
speaks still as a loyal subject, but I know of no one else who does.
The Empress shows pluck, but not hope. She has sent her nieces away,
and she summoned the Bonapartes in Paris to the Tuileries yesterday,
and told them plainly that the time was come for them to look after
themselves.
No party wishes to come into office, with the risk of having to sign
a disadvantageous peace. It is this which has hitherto kept the Left
within bounds. They wish the peace to be made by the Emperor before
they upset him. No one can tell what the effect of a victory might
be; few people expect one, and fewer still believe that the effect
would be to set the Emperor on his legs again. The Paris population
so far seems to have behaved well.
The one thing, in fact, upon which there seemed to be general agreement
was that the Empire was doomed.
By the middle of August the feeling in Paris against England, produced
largely by articles in the London press, had reached a very disagreeable
point, and the Ambassador was obliged to ask that he might be spared
from having to make too many obnoxious communications to the French
Government; these communications consisting of complaints put forward by
the Prussian Government through the channel of the British Embassy at
Paris, which it was really the duty of the United States Legation to
deal with.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Mr. Hammond._
Paris, Aug. 23, 1870.
The last paragraph of your letter of this morning frightens me not a
little. You say the Prussians complain of a flag of truce being
fired upon and of field hospitals being shot at; and you add: 'You
will probably hear from us about these matters, if Bernstorff makes
a formal representation.' I hope this does not imply that you mean
to adopt all Prussian complaints as British, and make me the channel
of communicating them to the French Government. Please do not forget
that the United States Legation, not this Embassy, represents
Prussian interests in France, and that if you impose upon me such
works of supererogation as making unpleasant communications from
Prussia, you will expose me to well-merited snubs, and damage my
position so much that I shall be able to effect very little in a
real emergency. The particular things which you mention ought not to
be made the subject of diplomatic representation at all: they ought
to be discussed by Flag of Truce between the two Generals.
Why H.M. Government should have taken the inexplicable course of
gratuitously offending the French Government is not explained, but at
all events the practice was abandoned.
When, towards the end of August, it was announced that the Crown Prince
was advancing upon Paris, the Empress, the members of the Government,
and the Chambers, proclaimed their determination to stay in the town.
The Empress probably feared that if she once left, she might never
return; but the decision to attempt to govern a country from a besieged
town was so obviously unpractical that it can hardly have been taken
seriously, for it was plain that each party in turn would discover that
it was essential to be in communication with the outside world. The
Empress herself seems to have preserved her fortitude during this
unhappy period. 'I saw the Empress yesterday,' wrote Lord Lyons, on
September 1, 'for the first time since the war. She was calm and
natural, well aware, I think, of the real state of things, but
courageous without boasting or affectation. She let me know by La Tour
d'Auvergne that she would like to see me. She did not invite, nor did I
offer any advice or any assurances or conjectures as to what England or
any other Power was likely to do.'
Within three or four days of this interview the Empress herself was a
fugitive, the Empire had collapsed without a hand being raised to defend
it, and the mob, breaking into the Chamber, had called the Third
Republic into existence. The delight of changing one form of government
was so great that the French almost forgot for the moment that the enemy
was practically at the gates of Paris, but M. Jules Favre, the Minister
for Foreign Affairs in the new Provisional Government, lost no time in
communicating with Lord Lyons and sounding him with regard to mediation.
According to Jules Favre, the new Government had two courses of action
in view. The first was to proclaim loudly that France would fight to the
death rather than make any undue concessions to Prussia. This was the
course intended for public consumption. The second and practical course
was to accept cordially the intervention of Foreign Powers with the
object of restricting French sacrifices within endurable limits. In
other words, he thought that France ought to submit to paying the
expenses of the war, provided her territorial integrity remained intact.
As for agreeing to a cession of territory, no man in France would
venture even to speak of such a thing, and the Government and the people
were equally determined to perish rather than give way upon it. The
public, and in particular, the inhabitants of Paris were greatly averse
from any pecuniary sacrifice, but he (obviously considering himself
to be an exceptionally far-seeing statesman) felt so strongly that a
pecuniary sacrifice was necessary, that unless the principle was acceded
to, he should feel bound to leave the Government. If, therefore, foreign
Governments would offer mediation upon the basis of keeping French
territory intact, their intervention would be extremely useful and ought
to be admitted gratefully by France. If, however, Foreign Powers could
only mediate on the basis of a cession of territory, their interference
would be ineffectual and offensive, rather than agreeable to France.
It is rather surprising, in view of this artless opinion, to learn that
Jules Favre seemed to be pretty well acquainted with the feeling in
Germany; and, at all events, he realized that the one neutral Power who
was likely to influence Prussia was Russia. It is also rather surprising
to learn that he considered the immediate proclamation of a Republic to
be a mistake, due to the impetuosity of the Paris population, and
calculated to alienate the French provinces as well as foreign
Governments, and he was forced to admit that the new Government was
completely under the control of the mob.
On September 6, a surreptitious interview took place between Lord Lyons
and M. Thiers, who was not a member of the Government of National
Defence.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, Sept, 6, 1870.
I have had conversations to-day, both with Thiers and with Jules
Favre. They think they can bring public opinion to accept a peace
with a large pecuniary indemnity to Prussia, but they are afraid of
being thought by the populace to be begging the aid of England at
this moment: so much so, that Thiers was afraid either of coming
here or of my going to his house, and asked me to meet him at
Alphonse de Rothschild's.
I put to him the extreme difficulty of inducing Prussia to accept
mediation without securing some cession of territory, and asked him
whether he would still be in favour of its being offered, even if
Prussia were almost certain to reject it. He considered the Pros and
Cons. On the one hand, he saw danger to France and to Europe, if the
neutral Powers should look quietly on, while France was being
destroyed, without any sort of mark of feeling, or of protest
against her dismemberment. On the other hand, he did not conceal
from himself that it might lower the authority of the other Powers,
and in some sort put a seal upon the predominance of Prussia, if
they spoke in vain and took no steps to give effect to their
language. After some consideration, however, he said he inclined
to the opinion that the offer should at all events be made.
I told Jules Favre that Thiers had hesitated about this. He answered
at once: 'I do not hesitate for a moment. I decidedly wish the
mediation, on the basis of the integrity of our territory, to be
made, whether Prussia accepts it or not.'
Jules Favre was very decided about the armistice. He thought France
could not herself ask for one, in her present position, but it was
plain enough (which is certainly not at all surprising) that he
would be very grateful to any neutral Power who would try to bring
one about.
Time presses, for the Prussians may be said to be almost literally
at the gates.
Thiers pointed out with all his clearness and eloquence the danger
to the different nations of Europe, of the predominance of Prussia,
and dwelt also a good deal upon the risk of a Red Republic, with a
foreign propaganda, etc., etc., if the present Government were
overthrown in consequence of further military reverses, or of a
disgraceful peace. He pointed out that, with the exception of
Rochefort, all the Provisional Government were Moderate Republicans
and honest men. Rochefort was, he said, very manageable and less
dangerous in the Government than out of it. He was in hopes order
would be maintained, but he did not shut his eyes to the fact that
the Government was without the means of resisting the mob of Paris,
if the mob should become excited or enraged by defeats.
There seems to me to be a great deal of depression in Paris. People
seem to feel that an obstinate defence of the town might only lead
to its destruction and leave France more at the mercy of Prussia
than ever. They have also a great dread, that while the respectable
citizens are on the ramparts, the Reds may pillage the town.
How all this may turn out, I do not pretend to guess. The first
days of a Revolution are generally those on which the mob behaves
the best. Hitherto everybody has behaved extremely well, and only a
few people have suffered from the unfortunate epidemic which
prevails and makes every one who cannot speak French well be taken
for a Prussian spy.
Jules Favre has not yet announced his appointment as Minister for
Foreign Affairs, nor, I think, seen any of the Foreign Diplomatists
except me. The circular which he has prepared for Foreign Powers
is very fierce in its language, but it mentions peace, and even
pronounces the word '_traiter_' and he seems to consider it rather a
bold step towards accustoming the people of Paris to the idea of
treating while the Prussians are still on French soil.
Lord Granville, as his letters show, was at first by no means anxious to
mediate, but altered his mind, because he was under the impression that
the change of government in Paris had made the Prussians more anxious to
treat. The French were not to be informed of this altered attitude on
the part of their adversary but were to be encouraged to put forward
'elastic' proposals, Bismarck having graciously intimated that he had
no objection to England becoming the channel of communication. The
objections to mediation were sufficiently obvious. If the basis of a
cession of territory were to be adopted, then it would be clearly
undesirable for any neutral country to attempt to exercise any pressure
upon France, and there would not be anything to be gained by such
action, for France could always obtain peace on these terms from Prussia
without foreign aid. If, on the other hand, mediation was adopted on the
basis of the integrity of French territory, there appeared to be little
or no chance of success.
In spite of the unpromising prospects various attempts were made to
sound the views of the Prussian Government with regard to an eventual
peace on the basis of integrity of territory. The Russians were
requested by the French to make known the terms on which the latter were
prepared to treat. Communications at Berlin were made by the Italian
Government, and the meddling Beust caused it to be announced to the
Prussian Government that France would accept an armistice on the
condition of territorial integrity. As he was a _persona ingratissima_
to Bismarck, his efforts were not likely to meet with much success, and
it was intimated to him and to the others that Bismarck reserved to
himself all discussions concerning the conditions of peace, and that the
Prussian officials at Berlin had no authority to enter upon such
matters.
Before anything definite was decided upon as to how the Prussian
Government was to be approached, Thiers started upon his historic
mission to the Courts of the various Great Powers with the object of
enlisting their practical sympathy on behalf of France.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, Sept. 12, 1870.
The provisional Government, though the most moderate and regular I
ever heard of, is sometimes a little sudden in its movements; and
accordingly Thiers's mission was announced in the _Journal Official_
before Jules Favre mentioned it to me, though I must do him the
justice to say that he came at an early hour for the purpose. It is
patriotic of Thiers to undertake it at his age, and with a prospect
at best of assisting to make a bitter peace just supportable. I am
glad you should hear from him the real state of things as to the
internal condition and prospects of society and Government in
France. He will also, I suppose, bring you the last word of the
Provisional Government on peace. My impression is that they will
give up almost anything to save territory; but they are, or at all
events believe themselves, capable of a great _coup de désespoir_
rather than yield that. The Reds within are more likely to give
permanent trouble than the Prussians without.
Some of my colleagues are I am afraid rather cross at my not setting
them the example of going off to Tours. The notion under present
circumstances seems to me most injudicious. Either the French will
make terms as soon as the enemy approach Paris, or being unable to
do so, they will stand a siege and announce a desperate resistance.
Upon this last contingency coming to pass we had better get out of
Paris as fast as we can; but if there is negotiation we may possibly
be of use here, while we could certainly be of none at Tours, to
say nothing of the absurdity of our going off under present
circumstances to Tours, without the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
The various interviews which took place between Thiers and Lord
Granville have been described at length by Lord Fitzmaurice. In the
main, the causes of the war, as expounded by Thiers, were in accordance
with those described by Lord Lyons in the letters previously quoted,
although he seems to have unjustly laid much of the responsibility upon
the Empress, and to have unduly exalted his own prescience, having
always been obsessed with the idea that he was a military genius. As for
the form of government in France, although an Orleanist himself, he
considered that Bonapartists, Bourbons, and Orleanists were all out of
the question for the time being, and that a Republic was the only
possible solution under existing circumstances. To put it shortly,
he had started on his mission through Europe in order to obtain
intervention, and had began with England in order to persuade her if
possible to use her moral influence in securing peace. This application
was supported by much high-sounding rhetoric on the subject of the
ancient friendship between England and France, and of the necessity of
the former retaining her due ascendency in the Councils of Europe, etc.,
etc., etc. Exhausted at the conclusion of his eloquent arguments, he
went to sleep, as recorded by Lord Granville, without waiting to listen
to the latter's reply, and the really practical part of the conversation
seems to have been the suggestion that the way should be paved by the
British Government for an interview between Jules Favre and Bismarck.
On the next day Thiers proposed that H.M. Government should at once
recognize the Republic; but to this Lord Granville demurred, on the
ground that it would be contrary to precedent, and that the Republic
had at present no legal sanction, because no Constituent Assembly had
yet decided on the future government of the country.
Upon the occasion of a third interview, Thiers's arguments seem to have
been still more forcible.
* * * * *
_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, Sept. 16, 1870.
I called again on M. Thiers at his request to-day. He thanked me for
the letter which I had written to Bernstorff, although he thought it
might have been in warmer terms.
He informed me of his plan to go to Petersburg, by France, Turin and
Vienna. He said that by that way he should be within reach of
telegraphic and other news, and could be recalled, if wanted. He
should go back if his concurrence was absolutely necessary to the
conclusion of peace. He admitted that it would be most painful to
sign any peace at this time; that M. Jules Favre, on the contrary,
did not dislike the notion of it.
He spoke sanguinely of the defence of Paris: he counted the number
of armed men and the completeness of the ordnance. He gave some
credence to the report of General Bazaine's bold march. He then came
back to the subject of England's apathy: he dwelt upon the loss to
her dignity; the danger to her and to all Europe of the immense
preponderance of Germany. Austria must lose her German provinces.
What would not 60,000,000 Germans do, led by such a man as Bismarck?
I told him that I would not further discuss that matter with him,
and that his arguments went further than his demands. They were in
favour of an armed intervention. I had no doubt of what public
opinion here was on that point. He spoke of the sad task he had
undertaken, at his age, to go from Court to Court, almost as a
mendicant, for support to his country. I told him that it was most
honourable to him at his age, and after his long public life, to
undertake a task in which it was thought that he might be of use,
and that he ought not to be discontented with his mission here. He
could hardly have hoped, even with his ability, to change the
deliberate course of policy which H.M. Government had adopted, and
which they had announced to Parliament. But his second object, that
of explaining the necessity at this moment of the present Government
in France, and of the merits of M. Favre and General Trochu, and its
leading members, had had much effect upon me, and upon others with
whom he had conversed. We had also during his presence here arranged
the possibility of a meeting between M. Favre and Count Bismarck,
which if it took place (about which I was not sanguine) must, in any
case, be of some use.
We parted in a most friendly manner.
The offer to sound Bismarck on the question of receiving Jules Favre
was enthusiastically received by the latter, who had a strong personal
feeling on the subject. As, however, he had just concocted the
celebrated proclamation that France would never consent to yield 'a
stone of her fortresses or an inch of her territory,' he could hardly be
said to approach the question of peace in a practical spirit, nor did he
receive much assistance from his countrymen in general, for at that
period no Frenchman could be found who was willing to admit openly the
possibility of a cession of territory, whatever opinions may have been
entertained in secret. Shrewder judges than Jules Favre, who, although
able and honest, was too emotional for diplomatic work, suspected, with
reason, that Bismarck was determined not to negotiate through neutrals,
and not to negotiate at all except under the walls of Paris or in Paris
itself.
The emissary appointed to approach Bismarck was Malet, who was selected
because he was discreet, knew German well, and was already acquainted
with Bismarck, but no sooner had he been despatched than the Austrian
Ambassador, Metternich, announced that he had received authority from
Vienna to go in company with his colleagues to the Prussian
Headquarters. Efforts were made to stop Malet, but fortunately without
success, and the private letter from the latter (extracts of which have
already been published) recounting his interview, is a singularly
graphic and interesting presentment of Bismarck's real disposition.
* * * * *
_Mr. Malet to Lord Lyons._
Paris, September 17, 1870.
During my two interviews with Count Bismarck on the 15th he said
some things which it may not be uninteresting to Your Lordship to
know although from the confidential familiar manner in which they
were uttered, I did not feel justified in including them in an
official report.
He stated it was the intention to hang all persons not in uniform
who were found with arms. A man in a blouse had been brought before
him who had represented that he was one of the Garde Mobile: Count
Bismarck decided that as there was nothing in his dress to support
his assertion he must be hung, and the sentence was forthwith
carried into effect. His Excellency added, 'I attach little value to
human life because I believe in another world--if we lived for three
or four hundred years it would be a different matter.' I said that
although some of the Mobile wore blouses, each regiment was dressed
in a uniform manner and that they all bore red collars and stripes
on their wristbands. His Excellency replied that that was not
enough, at a distance they looked like peasants and until they had
a dress like other soldiers those who were taken would be hung.
He said. 'When you were a little boy you wanted your mother to ask a
lady, who was not of the best position in society, to one of her
parties, your mother refused on which you threw yourself on the
ground and said you would not rise till you had got what you wanted.
In like manner we have thrown ourselves on the soil of France and
will not rise till our terms are agreed to.' In speaking of the
surrender of the Emperor he observed, 'When I approached the
carriage in which the Emperor was His Majesty took off his cap to
salute me. It is not the custom for us when in uniform to do more
than touch the cap--however I took mine off and the Emperor's eyes
followed it till it came on a level with my belt in which was a
revolver when he turned quite pale--I cannot account for it. He
could not suppose I was going to use it but the fact of his changing
colour was quite unmistakable. I was surprised that he should have
sent for me, I should have thought I was the last person that he
would wish to receive him because he has betrayed me. All that has
passed between us made me feel confident that he would not go to war
with Germany. He was bound not to do so and his doing it was an act
of personal treachery to me. The Emperor frequently asked whether
his carriages were safe out of Sedan, and a change indicating a
sense of great relief came over him when he received news of their
arrival in our lines.' M. de Bismarck talked in the most
contemptuous terms of M. de Gramont, allowing him only one merit
that of being a good shot. He touched on the publication of the
secret treaty, but his arguments in defence of it were rather too
subtle for me to seize them clearly. He said the secret should have
died with him had France had a tolerable pretext for going to war,
but that he considered her outrageous conduct in this matter
released him from all obligation.
'If,' he remarked, 'a man asks the hand of my daughter in marriage
and I refuse it I should consider it a matter of honour to keep the
proposal a secret as long as he behaved well to me, but if he
attacked me I should be no longer bound. This is quite a different
question from that of publishing a secret proposition at the same
time that you refuse it; you must be a Beust or an Austrian to do
that.'
In talking of the scheme to replace the Emperor on the throne by the
aid of Bazaine and the French Prisoners in Germany, I asked whether
His Majesty was now in a state of health to be willing to undertake
such a work. He answered that he never in his life had seen the
Emperor in the enjoyment of better health and he attributed it to
the bodily exercise and the diet which late events had forced upon
him.
Count Bismarck spoke of Italy and appeared to think that it was in
immediate danger of Republican revolution. He said 'If,' as appeared
likely at the beginning, 'Italy had sided with France such a
movement would have broken out at once; we had everything prepared,
and could have forced on a revolution within three days after a
declaration of war.'
On leaving him he asked me if I had a horse, saying, 'I would offer
you mine but the French are in the habit of firing on our
Parlementaires and as I have only one I cannot afford to lose it.'
From the French point of view there was very little encouragement to
be derived from these frank and even brutal opinions, but one result
of some importance was obtained, for at the close of the interview,
Bismarck intimated to Malet 'as a friend' that if a member of the
Government of National Defence chose to come he would be happy to
receive him, and added that he need feel no anxiety as to the nature of
his reception. Upon returning to Paris, Malet gave this message to Jules
Favre at the British Embassy, and although the latter said nothing at
the moment, he proceeded shortly afterwards to Ferrières, where the
celebrated interview took place, and the opportunity of making peace on
easy terms was thrown away, for 'as an old friend' Bismarck had also
assured Malet that the Prussians were not going to ask for Alsace or
Lorraine, but only for Strasburg and Metz, as a precaution against
future attacks.
FOOTNOTES:
[17] As Minister for Foreign Affairs.
[18] French Ambassador at Berlin.
[19] 'The Life of Lord Granville.'
[20] Bavarian Minister.
[21] Prussian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
[22] Foreign Minister.