SECRET PROPOSALS FOR DISARMAMENT
(1870)
It will be remembered that in October, 1868, the French Government had
practically suggested that Her Majesty's Government should 'give advice'
to Prussia on the subject of disarmament, and that Lord Stanley, who was
Foreign Secretary at the time had resolutely declined to do anything of
the kind. A fresh effort was now made in the same direction, no details
of which, so far as is known, have ever been made public.
_Mutatus mutandis_, there was a curious similarity between the language
held at Paris and at Berlin respectively. The French proclaimed that
they would not go to war with the Prussians, provided the latter did
nothing objectionable. The Prussians replied that they did not want to
go to war with France, provided they were allowed to do as they pleased,
and both asserted that the maintenance of peace depended upon England,
which they explained by affirming that England had only to declare that
she would join against whichever Power broke the peace; the real meaning
of this being that at Paris it was expected that England should announce
beforehand that she would side with France in case of war, while at
Berlin it meant that she should announce beforehand that she would side
with Prussia.
Early in January it had become known to the British Government, and
presumably also to the French Government, that Bismarck intended to
create a North German Empire, and that the King of Prussia was by no
means disinclined to become an Emperor, and it may have been this
knowledge which prompted the French Government to make another attempt
to induce England to suggest disarmament. It was felt that the only
chance of success was to set about the work as quietly as possible, and
if there was one individual who was better fitted than any other to
undertake this delicate task it was undoubtedly Lord Clarendon, who, as
has already been pointed out, was on intimate terms with the principal
personages concerned. Lord Clarendon was approached in January by La
Valette, the French Ambassador, and consented to make the attempt.
* * * * *
_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, Jan. 26, 1870.
I had a long talk with La Valette to-day about disarmament. It is no
new subject to me, but one which I have long had at heart, although
it presents serious difficulties on account of the King of Prussia's
obstinacy. He does not meditate, or desire war--far from it. But his
army is his idol, and he won't make himself an iconoclast. Not so
the Crown Prince, with whom I discussed the subject at great length
a year ago. Our relations with Prussia are very friendly, and
perhaps we are in as good a position as any other Power to make an
attempt to bell the cat, and Count Daru may be sure that I will do
all I can to meet his views, but I am sure that he will admit that
some tact and _ménagements_ are necessary. I spoke to Gortchakoff
in the summer about Prussian disarmament, and he entirely concurred,
though he said Russia would take no initiative.
Further letters from Lord Clarendon emphasized the necessity of keeping
the matter secret, and authorized Lord Lyons to assure the French
Government that it would not be compromised in any way, and that he
undertook the business with hearty good will, but with small hope of
success, as the King of Prussia was almost unapproachable on the subject
of the army.
On January 30th, M. Emile Ollivier called upon Lord Lyons.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, Jan. 30, 1870.
I have just had a visit from M. Emile Ollivier and we have spoken
confidentially on several subjects.
The thing uppermost in his mind was Disarmament. He said he was very
anxious that England should exert her influence with Prussia. He
explained the position of the present French Ministers with regard
to the subject. They depended, he said, principally on the great
agricultural population of France for support against Socialism and
Revolution. It was essential therefore that they should do something
for that population. To conciliate them, either taxes might be
remitted or the call upon them for recruits be diminished. There
were great difficulties in the way of remitting taxes, and when a
reduction of the army was proposed, the Ministers were met by the
Emperor and the military party with a declaration that it would be
unsafe to diminish the forces of France, while those of Prussia were
on their present footing--that the effect would be that Prussia
would make some attempt on Southern Germany, and war be the
consequence. If, however, Prussia would make a simultaneous
disarmament, all would, he thought, be well and a great security for
peace would be given. It was true that the Prussians urged that
their army was on a peace footing already, and that they could not
be expected to change their whole military system, but M. Ollivier
conceived that while no doubt the Prussian system enabled the
Government to call nearly the whole male population to arms, it
depended upon the Government to decide how many it would actually
call upon each year.
I explained to M. Ollivier the difficulty and delicacy of the
question, the peculiar views of the present King of Prussia, and the
small hope there could be of prevailing upon His Majesty to consent
to a reduction of the army. I said that it would be your special
care that the French Government should not be compromised by any
step you might take. I added that it was plain that the only chance
of success was to approach Prussia in a strictly confidential
manner; that any formal diplomatic move on our part would be
resented or misrepresented as a pretension to interfere in the
internal affairs of the country, and would expose France as well as
ourselves to a rebuff.
M. Ollivier said that he was extremely grateful to you, and that he
entirely concurred in the opinion that the move must be made in a
cautious and confidential manner. He was particularly alive to the
importance of not exposing France to the appearance of being
slighted; in fact, he would not conceal from me that, under present
circumstances, a public rebuff from Prussia would be fatal. '_Un
échec_,' he said, '_c'est la guerre_!' Those who had to render an
account to Parliament and the country were less able than the former
Government to put up with any wound to the national pride. Their
main object was peace, but they must show firmness, or they would
not be able to cope with Revolution and Socialism at home.
M. Ollivier went on to say that, whether we succeeded or not at the
present moment, it was very necessary that the way should be paved
for disarmament in Prussia, and that it should be felt that England
was in favour of it. The time must come when France would be obliged
to make a public proposal to Prussia to disarm: it was impossible
that the French Government could assume, in the eyes of France and
the world, any share of the responsibility for the present
exaggerated armaments and expenses. They would be obliged to show
the French people and the German people too where the responsibility
really lay. The best course would be to avoid, by a confidential
arrangement for simultaneous action, the necessity of claiming
special praise for either party, or throwing special blame on
either. If this could not be, the next best thing would be that
Prussia should be prepared to receive, in a proper spirit, a
proposal from France, and the confidential steps you thought of
would, in his opinion, certainly be likely to effect so much at
least.
He spoke with great affection of the Emperor, and assured me that
H.M. acted in the most perfect harmony and confidence with his new
Ministers, and that no difficulty had arisen on any subject, though
the Ministers had maintained and were determined to maintain their
independence and their authority as the responsible Government of
the country.
An opportunity for Lord Clarendon's good offices presented itself very
soon; Count Bismarck had written a despatch to the Prussian Minister in
London in which he alluded in complimentary terms to the friendly
interest which Lord Clarendon had always shown in the welfare of
Prussia, and the latter made this an excuse for communicating his views
on disarmament, the method selected being a memorandum which Lord
Augustus Loftus[15] was directed to bring to Bismarck's notice in strict
confidence.
In communicating to Lord Lyons a copy of this memorandum it is
instructive to learn that the British Cabinet Ministers, with one
exception, were kept in ignorance of Lord Clarendon's action. 'I have,'
he wrote on February 3, 1870, 'only mentioned the matter to the Queen
and Gladstone, both of whom highly approve. The Queen will be ready
to write to the King of Prussia whenever I think her doing so may be
useful. You will be able to assure Daru that I have in no way
compromised the French Government.'
The memorandum which, it was faintly hoped, might impress the
flinty-hearted Bismarck ran as follows:--
* * * * *
_Lord Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus._
Foreign Office, Feb. 2, 1870.
A few days ago, Count Bernstorff read to me a despatch from Count
Bismarck concerning the German Confederation which contained some
allusions to myself that gave me particular satisfaction, as a proof
that Count Bismarck recognized the sincerity of my interest in the
welfare and greatness of Germany.
If I am not mistaken in this I hope he will not think that I abuse
the confidence he seems disposed to place in me by asking him
privately through you to consider a subject that I have long had at
heart, and in making this request, it is, I am sure, unnecessary for
me to disclaim any intention to interfere in the internal affairs of
Prussia--such an intention would be alike presumptuous and useless.
But it is in the general interest of Europe, of peace, and of
humanity that I desire to invite the attention of Count Bismarck to
the enormous standing armies that now afflict Europe by constituting
a state of things that is neither peace nor war, but which is so
destructive of confidence that men almost desire war with all its
horrors in order to arrive at some certainty of peace--a state of
things that withdraws millions of hands from productive industry and
heavily taxes the people for their own injury and renders them
discontented with their rulers. It is a state of things in short
that no thoughtful man can contemplate without sorrow and alarm, for
this system is cruel, it is out of harmony with the civilization of
our age, and it is pregnant with danger.
To modify this system would be a glorious work, and it is one that
Prussia, better than any other Power, might undertake. She would not
only earn for herself the gratitude of Europe, but give a great
proof of her morality and her power; it would be a fitting
complement of the military successes she has achieved.
I know full well the difficulties that would beset such a course of
policy. I know how great and deserved is the King's parental feeling
and affection for his army--that he would view its reduction with
pain, and that he might not think it safe to diminish its numerical
force; but His Majesty is wise and foreseeing, and his moral courage
is always equal to the measures he believes to be right, and should
Count Bismarck think it not inconsistent with his duty to recommend
a partial disarmament to the King, I cannot but consider that the
moment is a singularly propitious one for the purpose.
The great standing army of France would of course come first under
the consideration of the King, but France has been never more
peacefully disposed than at the present time, under a responsible
Government which cannot make war 'for an idea,' because it
represents a nation that is determined to maintain peace so long as
there is no just cause for war, and because the Emperor entirely
shares the feelings of his people. I know that the present
Government of France will seek for popularity and power in a
peaceful policy and in economy, notwithstanding the vast and
increasing wealth of the country and the almost proverbial
indifference of the people to taxation.
There would consequently, I am convinced, be no opposition on the
part of the French Government to a reduction of the army _pari
passu_ with Prussia. For reasons, however, quite intelligible,
neither Government may choose to take the initiative in such a
proposal; but if I had authority to do so, I do not doubt that the
Queen would allow me to sound the ground at Paris, in a manner
entirely confidential, that should in no way compromise either
Government, whatever might be the result of the suggestion.
Pray read this letter to Count Bismarck with the sincere expression
of my esteem.
With all due respect to Lord Clarendon, this lecture (for that is what
it amounted to) betrayed some want of appreciation of the real
situation, for he seems to have regarded the Prussian army as largely
the plaything of the King, and not to have fully realized the great
object for which it was intended. Were he alive at the present day his
moralizings on the iniquity of armaments would presumably be still more
condemnatory. Lord Lyons's comment on the communication was, that if the
Prussians would not listen to Lord Clarendon, they would certainty not
listen to any one else, but he so little expected success that he
regretted that the French Government had raised the question at all. If,
he pointed out, the Prussian Government would not agree to disarm, the
new French Ministers would be very angry and might turn round and say,
'If you will not disarm, you must mean ill towards us, and we would
rather fight it out at once, than ruin ourselves by keeping up, for an
indefinite time, war establishments.' No doubt it would be an excellent
thing if Prussia would take the opportunity of disarming while the
French Government and the French nation were in the mood, for the happy
moment might pass away, and war might again be looked upon as a remedy,
though a desperate one, against socialism and revolution. Evidently he
had small belief in the efficacy of the step.
The forebodings entertained both by Lord Lyons and by Lord Clarendon
himself were very shortly realized. In a few days there arrived from
Lord Augustus Loftus a long letter reporting his conversation with
Bismarck, from which the following extracts are quoted:--
* * * * *
_Lord A. Loftus to Lord Clarendon._
Berlin, Feb. 5, 1870.
I read your private and confidential letter to Count Bismarck.
* * * * *
He first observed that he should wish to know what guarantee you
could give, or propose should be given, for the maintenance of
peace, or the security against danger. 'You,' he said, 'live in a
happy island and have not to fear an invasion. For 250 years Germany
has been exposed to and suffered French invasion; no one can accuse
us of being aggressive; Germany, as now constituted, has all that
she wants, and there is no object of conquest for her. But our
position,' he added, 'is an exceptional one. We are surrounded by
three great Empires with armies as large as our own, any two of whom
might coalesce against us.' He then reverted to March of last year.
He said that he was aware that at that moment, had it not been for
the influence of M. Rouher, an occupation of Belgium would have
taken place. Although there had been no direct understanding with
England, it was felt and known at Paris that Prussia would have
supported England, if action had been taken. It was this knowledge
that warded off action, and Belgium was saved. He had not at the
time mentioned the imminence of the danger to the King, for he was
afraid that His Majesty would have taken military measures which
would have rendered the situation more critical. He then observed
that in 1867 he had had a conversation of several hours with the
Emperor Napoleon. He had discussed with him the causes which had led
to the overthrow of Louis XVI., Charles X., and Louis Philippe--that
their fall was owing to want of energy and decision. He had told the
Emperor that, when he was travelling in dangerous company, the only
thing to do was to have a revolver in his pocket. The Emperor
had adopted this principle; he had the army with him, especially the
Guards; but Bismarck observed that lately one or two cases had
occurred which proved that the army was beginning to be tainted with
socialism. Bismarck said that the Emperor had had but two courses to
pursue; either to grant more internal liberty, or war; and the
Emperor had told him very clearly that if the one failed, there
could be no other alternative. 'Now,' said Bismarck, 'this danger
occurred only 10 months ago, and who can say that it may not occur
again?'
* * * * *
He then went into an account of the hostility of the Muscovite party
towards Germany: of the dislike of the Czarewitch to everything
German, adding that whenever the Emperor Alexander dies, the
relations will undergo a great change.
* * * * *
He expressed a hope that you would say nothing at Paris on this
subject, as any refusal of Prussia to a proposal of disarmament
would make the position more dangerous.
He said that he did not dare even to name the subject of your letter
to the King, much less show it to His Majesty. He would get into a
fury and immediately think that England was trying to weaken Prussia
at the expense of France; nor was the present a judicious moment to
do so, for the King had only lately known what had taken place about
Belgium, and had in consequence expressed his cordial feelings
towards England. If the proposition came from France, the King would
view it as a ruse, but would not listen to it. Coming from England,
said Bismarck, it would make the worst impression on him.
I used all the arguments I could in support of your suggestion, and
read to him certain extracts from your other letter.
* * * * *
In conversation Bismarck remarked that Prussia might have acquired
South Germany without cost and risk, had she pleased to do so,
by which I understood him to refer to the cession of Belgium to
France.
* * * * *
I left your letter marked 'confidential' in Bismarck's hands, as
I thought it essential that he should reflect over the powerful
arguments it contains, but he expressly declined to lay it before
the King. He will answer it through Count Bernstorff. It is evident
to me that there is not the smallest chance of inducing the King
to listen to a reduction of his army, and I must fear that any
proposals to him of this nature would only make him suspicious and
distrustful of England.
In spite of the view expressed in the last paragraph, it may fairly
be presumed that Bismarck's alleged fear of the King of Prussia was
a shameless fabrication. There is nothing whatever in subsequent
revelations to show that he stood in any awe of 'Most Gracious,' and the
latter appears to have always been a more or less passive instrument in
his hands.
In forwarding this correspondence to Lord Lyons, Lord Clarendon observed
that his suggestion appeared to have been a complete failure, and that
Bismarck was evidently just as hostile to the idea of disarmament as his
royal master. Lord Lyons was directed to communicate the substance of
the correspondence to Count Daru, but only in general terms, as when
Bismarck's answer arrived in London, fresh light might possibly be
thrown upon the subject.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, Feb. 11, 1870.
When I went to see Daru yesterday he opened the conversation by
telling me that he had received a letter from La Valette, from
which he learned that Count Bismarck had refused to consent to your
suggestion that Prussia should disarm. Three reasons were, Count
Daru said, given by Count Bismarck, none of which appeared to have
any weight.
The first was that he could not even mention the subject to the
King. This device had, Daru said, been resorted to by Count Bismarck
in the affair of Luxemburg; in fact, it seemed to be the usual mode
which the Count took of avoiding any discussion which he did not
like; it was however the duty of Ministers to bring wholesome
proposals before their Sovereign, whether the proposals were
palatable or not. In fact, Daru seemed to think that if Count
Bismarck himself desired to disarm, he would be able to obtain the
consent of the King.
The second argument was that the neighbours of Prussia need not be
uneasy at her military strength, because she was not a conquering
Power. This, Count Daru thought, might have been said with reason,
if Prussia had made no acquisition since 1815; but to say so now, he
declared, to be simply preposterous. Prussia had shown herself to be
a particularly ambitious Power, and her ambition had been already
extremely successful. For his own part, he rather admired than
blamed her desire to aggrandise herself, but he could not be
expected to listen seriously to an assertion that her power was no
cause of alarm because she was not a conquering nation.
Count Bismarck's third argument was that Prussia was not nearly so
ready for war as France--that, in fact, she had only 300,000 men
under arms, while France had upwards of 400,000. This, also, Count
Daru thought, simply ridiculous. Prussia could, he said, at any
moment, without an act of the Legislature, without a law, without
even a Royal Decree, by a simple order of the Minister of War, call
an immense force into the field, a force, too, of trained men, at a
moment's notice. There was nothing in France like this.
Daru went on to say that Count Bismarck's arguments did not at all
mend the matter. France must act as if Prussia had simply refused
to disarm. How was this state of things to be dealt with?
'I have determined,' said Daru, 'to disarm, whether Prussia does so
or not. In fact, I have resolved to ask the Emperor at once to
sanction a considerable reduction of the French army. I cannot make
this reduction as large as I should have done, if I had more
satisfactory accounts of the intentions of Prussia. All I can
propose, is to reduce the annual French contingent from 100,000 men
to 90,000. As our men serve nine years, this will eventually effect
a reduction of 90,000 men--a real absolute reduction. I shall thus
give a pledge to Europe of pacific intentions, and set a good
example to Prussia. I shall probably add great weight to the party
in Germany which demands to be relieved from military burdens, and,
I trust, enlist public opinion everywhere on my side. I shall also
furnish Lord Clarendon with a powerful argument, if, as I sincerely
hope, he will persevere in his endeavours to work upon Prussia. I
beg you to give my warmest thanks to him for what he has already
done, and to express to him my anxious hope that he will not
acquiesce in a first refusal from Prussia.'
Daru went on to say that it appeared that Count Bismarck had been so
little aware that your suggestion had been made in concert with
France that he had particularly requested that the French Government
might not be made acquainted with it. He begged me to express
particularly to you his gratitude for the care you had taken not to
compromise the French Government.
He concluded by saying that he could not at the moment say for
certain that the reduction would be made in the French army, because
the Emperor's sanction had not yet been given. He was afraid His
Majesty would not relish the proposal, but he felt confident that
His Majesty would accept the advice of his Ministers.
I told him that my personal opinion was that the best chance of
obtaining a disarmament in Prussia was to set a good example and
leave public opinion in Germany to work without foreign aid. Demands
from abroad for disarmament seemed to me likely to irritate the King
in Prussia, and to give him and the military party grounds for an
appeal to national patriotism against foreign dictation. I thought
that the effect of the disarmament of France in strengthening the
feeling in Germany against military burdens would be very great if
it were not counteracted by appeals which might wound German
susceptibilities.
Daru seemed to agree generally with me, but not to be willing to say
anything which would pledge him to abstain from calling officially
upon Prussia to disarm, if it suited the home policy of the Ministry
to do so.
* * * * *
_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._
Feb. 12, 1870.
Daru seems to have taken Bismarck's refusal better than I expected.
We have not, however, got the definitive answer which is to come
through Bernstorff, and as Bismarck kept a copy of my letter I have
little doubt that he will show it to the King, though he pretended
to be afraid of doing so.
* * * * *
Count Daru may be sure that I shall not let the subject drop, though
I shall wish to proceed in it as I think most prudent. I have only
mentioned it to Gladstone among my colleagues, and of course, to the
Queen, who takes the warmest interest in the matter. I had a letter
from her yesterday, expressing a hope that the French Government
would not at present make any official _démarches re_ disarmament,
as she is sure, from her knowledge of the King's character, that it
would do more harm than good. I am quite of the same opinion and
think it would arouse German susceptibility, which is quite as great
as the French, whereas we want to make German opinion act in our
behalf.
Nothing is more likely to bring over Germany than France partially
disarming without reference to Prussia, and I sincerely hope that
this project of Daru's will be carried out. The Germans will be
flattered by it as a proof of confidence, and it will furnish them
with a fresh weapon against their war Budget.
* * * * *
Lord Clarendon's statement that he meant to persevere in his efforts
afforded much gratification to Count Daru. With regard to Lord
Clarendon's desire that the matter should be kept as secret as possible,
he explained that he had confined the knowledge of it as much as
possible to himself, Lord Lyons and La Valette, but that of course he
had been obliged to mention it to the Emperor and to Ollivier, and he
'seemed to be rather afraid that neither of these important persons
would be perfectly secret.'[16]
Bismarck's reply to Lord Clarendon did not afford much ground for hope.
* * * * *
_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, Feb. 19, 1870.
The day before yesterday, Bernstorff brought me Bismarck's answer to
my letter, and I enclose a translation.
It is courteous, but the intention not to disarm is manifest. I have
been detained so late at the Cabinet that I cannot write a letter
for you to read to Daru, so I have marked Bismarck's letter, and you
can extract the passages in the shape of a memorandum which you can
leave with Daru in the strictest confidence. I should much like to
hear what he will think of it, in order to shape my reply.
Bernstorff, who evidently spoke from a private letter of Bismarck's
that he did not show me, laid much stress upon the active ill-will
of Russia whenever the present Czar is gathered to his fathers--the
present Cesarewitch and the Slav races are very hostile to
Germany--(I believe this is true), and this hostility would be
encouraged, according to Bismarck, if German means of resistance
were weakened, it would invite coalition, under circumstances easily
imaginable, between Austria, Russia, and France against
Prussia--hypothetical cases of this kind are easily invented to
support foregone conclusions, but there is a _sort_ of opening as to
a conference between Powers as to proportionate reductions and
exchange of guarantees. I don't mean to lay much stress on this, nor
should I think that it would be productive of a practical result,
but you might allude to it as a sign that the negation is not
absolute.
Pray, however, lose no time in correcting the error into which Daru
has been led by La Valette as to an official despatch or a speech in
Parliament from me. I cannot conceive how he made such a mistake,
for I said nothing of the kind.
Bismarck's answer was of considerable length, and is quoted in full
because it is a document of historical interest. It will be observed
that it was in the main an amplification of the views expressed verbally
to Lord Augustus Loftus a fortnight earlier, and that it contained
specious arguments designed to impress upon Lord Clarendon the entirely
unaggressive nature of Prussian policy. The belief, however, of Lord
Clarendon and of the French Ministers, that Bismarck entertained no
suspicion as to how the proposal originated, implies a simplicity on
their part which he must have thoroughly enjoyed.
* * * * *
_Count Bismarck to Count Bernstorff._
[_Translation._] Berlin, Feb. 9, 1870.
Lord Augustus Loftus has read to me a private letter addressed to
him by Lord Clarendon on the 2nd Inst. Its object is to discuss with
me in a manner strictly private and confidential a plan for the
partial disarmament of the Continental Powers. After a few friendly
expressions concerning myself, which I cordially reciprocate, the
English Statesman proceeds to enlarge upon the hardships and burdens
imposed on the Nations of Europe by their excessive armaments;--He
conceives that it would be much to Prussia's credit and well worthy
of her great military renown if she were to co-operate in
endeavouring to alleviate those burdens; he thinks that the King our
August Master, sincerely attached as he is to his army, would not
shrink from the adoption of such a measure, provided he were
convinced of its justice;--he deems the present moment peculiarly
fitted for making this overture, on account of the peaceful
disposition of all the Powers and more especially of the Emperor
Napoleon and of his present Government; and he states his readiness,
provided he can count on our friendly assistance, to sound the
Emperor and his Government with a view to eventually opening
negotiations on the subject.
The English Ambassador has doubtless sent home a report of the
Verbal answers which I gave to the above communication.--In order,
however, to meet the confidence reposed in me by Lord Clarendon in
a similar spirit, I feel called upon to address you in a manner
equally confidential, and one which for that very reason admits of
my speaking with the utmost frankness.
Lord Clarendon cannot doubt, as indeed the opening observations in
his letter plainly shew, that I render full justice to the friendly
feelings and intentions which he entertains towards Prussia and the
North German Confederation.
I am convinced that no European State or Statesman exists who does
not wish to see the feeling of confidence strengthened and Peace
maintained; and further that no German Government would wish to
impose upon its people the maintenance of an army in excess of that
proportion for which the requirements of its safety imperatively
call.
Were the question officially put to us whether the diminution of our
military strength is compatible with the secure maintenance of our
independence, we should not decline to share in any deliberations
which might take place on the subject; and we should carefully sift
the question whether the great neighbouring Military Powers are
willing or able to give us guarantees such as would compensate
Germany for the decrease in the amount of Security which She has
hitherto owed to her armies.
Lord Clarendon does His Majesty the King full justice when he infers
that no considerations or feelings of a purely personal nature would
deter him from adopting a measure which he had once recognized as
right and proper, but Lord Clarendon will as readily understand that
however willing we may be to enter into a strictly confidential
interchange of ideas on this important question, we must reserve to
ourselves the Right of making a careful estimate of the relative
position of the Parties most deeply interested in the matter, and of
judging whether the concessions which we ourselves might probably be
expected to make stand in a fair and just proportion to those which
it would be in the power of other Nations to make. Our very
geographical position is itself wholly different from that of any
other Continental Power, and does not of course admit of comparison
with the insular position of Great Britain. We are environed on all
sides by neighbours whose military strength is of such a nature as
to form an important element in all political combinations. Each of
the other three great Continental Powers is on the contrary so
placed that at least on one of its frontiers it is not open to a
serious attack, and France is so situated as to be practically
secure from danger on three sides. These three Powers have of late
years considerably increased their military strength and have done
so in a proportion in excess of our own:--Austria and France have
remodelled wholly their military systems, so as to be able to assail
us at any moment with increased forces. The armies of Austria,
France and Russia, have each an army which, when on a Peace footing,
is superior in numbers to our own. Our system is moreover so to
speak so thoroughly transparent, that any increase in our effective
force can at once be appreciated; the amount of any addition or
decrease which we may make in our military force can therefore be
most accurately calculated.
The military systems of other Nations are of a different nature.
Even in the case of nominal Reductions they admit of the maintenance
or renewal of their full effective strength; they even admit of a
material increase of force being made without attracting notice or
at all events without entailing the possibility of proof.--With us
on the other hand, the whole military system, which from its very
nature is a matter of publicity, becomes more so owing to the nature
of our Institutions.
Under these circumstances, and in the event of a discussion on
measures of such great importance being actually opened, we must ask
ourselves what guarantees can be given to us that our Position as
regards other Powers will not be practically impaired by our
signifying our adherence to a system, which however just and
even-handed it might appear in its action, would in reality not deal
with equal fairness with all the Parties concerned.
Any weakening of Prussia's Power, any disturbance of the balance of
Power in Europe, can hardly be for the interest of England. It must
be acknowledged that whilst, on the one hand, the state of
preparation for War of the Great Powers gives rise to apprehension,
as set forth in Lord Clarendon's letter, still that very state of
preparation may on the other prove a practical guarantee that any
attempt to assail or to disturb existing Rights will be firmly and
effectively met.
Of this I conceive that the past year has afforded fresh proofs, and
Lord Clarendon, intimately acquainted as he is with the Events of
that Period, will be best able to judge of the truth of my Remark.
The maintenance of Peace has not been due merely and solely to
pacific views entertained by Rulers personally, for the Power and
readiness of neighbouring states has had great weight in affecting
opinion and in determining Resolutions. The Inclinations of a Nation
may be essentially peaceful, they may rest on a keen appreciation of
its own interests, but they are nevertheless liable to be suddenly
changed either by some unforeseen accident, or by fictitious
agitation. Under such circumstances, neither the most powerful
Monarch, nor the most influential Minister is able to estimate or to
guarantee the duration of peaceful Inclinations.
I am persuaded that when you submit these Remarks for Lord Clarendon's
consideration, he will not see in them a Refusal to enter into the
Views which he has so happily and eloquently set forth, but rather
as the expression of the very serious responsibility which rests
with a Minister who is called upon to advise his Sovereign in a
matter pregnant with such important consequences.
I can of course have no objection to your reading this letter to
Lord Clarendon, I must however ask you to make the communication in
the strictest confidence, in accordance with the character of
thorough privacy with which Lord Clarendon, with Great Tact and to
my entire Satisfaction, has invested the matter.
Bismarck's views, as set forth above, were communicated by Lord Lyons to
Count Daru on February 22, and the latter remarked that, upon the whole,
matters were rather better than he expected, as there was no categorical
refusal to consider the question of disarmament. In his opinion, that
question was a very simple one. The military forces of the great
Continental Powers bore a certain proportion to each other; in order to
maintain that proportion, very heavy burdens were imposed upon each
country, but if, by common agreement, each reduced its army by a certain
number of men, the same proportion would be preserved, while the burdens
were alleviated. If, however, a minute discussion of guarantees and
securities were began, very awkward topics might be brought forward. For
instance, the right of Prussia to garrison Mayence, was, to say the
least, doubtful, and the fortifications she was erecting on the North
Sea might give rise to comment. At this stage of the conversation, Lord
Lyons hastily intervened in order to point out the extreme disadvantage
of mixing up Mayence and the North Sea with the question of disarmament,
and Count Daru concluded by saying that he was quite content to leave
the matter entirely in the hands of Lord Clarendon, as nobody else could
manage it so well.
* * * * *
_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, March 12, 1870.
Outsiders are not always good judges, but it seems to me that
Ollivier makes enemies unnecessarily and gives certain pretexts to
the Imperialists, who of course work on the Emperor's mind against
his Government. I fear there will be a split one of these days.
I agree with you that Prussia will never declare that she will not
complete the unity of Germany, because she looks upon it as
inevitable. Nothing, as the King himself said to me, can prevent the
gravitation of the weak towards the strong, but that it would not
take place in his life, possibly not in that of his son.
France, if not grown wiser by that time, will probably consider it a
_casus belli_, but I don't see that it would make much difference
to her, as the whole military force of the South is now actually at
the disposal of the Confederation, and she would weld all Germany
together as one man if she attempted by force to prevent Bavaria,
Würtemberg, and Baden from joining the North, when they had
determined that it was for their own interest to do so.
I have fired another shot at Bismarck about disarmament, but I don't
expect better success from it than from the first. The King of
Prussia, a little time ago, told the Duke of Oldenburg, who pressed
him on the subject, that he would disarm if other Powers did the
same, so he is not so completely unapproachable as Bismarck would
lead us to suppose.
Lord Clarendon's second attempt upon Bismarck was made on March 9, and
took the form of a lengthy letter to Lord Augustus Loftus, in which the
arguments in favour of disarmament were reiterated and endeavours made
to convince Bismarck that Prussia had really no cause for uneasiness.
* * * * *
_Lord Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus._
Foreign Office, March 9, 1870.
I have delayed writing to request that you would convey to Count
Bismarck my cordial thanks for the courtesy and frankness with which
in a private letter dated Feb. 9th, he answered my letter to you on
the subject of partial disarmament.
The delay has been occasioned by my endeavours to ascertain
correctly the relative forces of the great military Powers, and I
hope that Count Bismarck will not consider that I trespass unduly on
his time and his confidence if I again revert to a subject which
more than any other I have at heart, and which an English Minister
may have some claim to discuss without suspicion of his motives,
because England is not a military Power, but is deeply interested in
the maintenance of peace, and the progress and prosperity of the
Continent.
I am as convinced as Count Bismarck himself can be that no German
Government would wish to impose upon its people the maintenance of
an army in excess of that proportion for which the requirements of
its safety imperatively call, and I would not desire the reduction
of a single regiment if I thought it would impair the independence
and the honour of Prussia, which in their plenitude I regard as
essentially beneficial to Europe.
But can it be honestly affirmed that the power and independence of
Prussia are menaced from any quarter? and, if not, surely the
military force of Prussia is excessive and entails upon other
countries the unquestionable evil of maintaining armies beyond the
requirements of their safety.
The only countries from which, owing to geographical position,
Prussia could anticipate danger are Russia, Austria, and France, and
can it be said that from either there is any real cause for
apprehension? In the conversation I had with Count Bernstorff,
when he communicated to me the letter of Count Bismarck, he dwelt at
some length upon the ill-will of Russia towards Germany, which might
take an active form on the death of the present Emperor, and for
which Prussia ought to be prepared, but Count Bismarck must know
better than myself that Russia has long since, and wisely, ceased to
aim at influence in Germany or intervention in German affairs, and
that all her energies are now directed eastwards with a view of
extending her territory and her commerce in Asia. Whatever
sentiments may be suggested in other quarters by a rapid development
of the present policy of Russia which has the entire support of
public opinion in that country, it appears certain that Germany can
have no danger to guard against from Russia, whatever may be the
personal feelings or opinions of the reigning sovereign.
On paper, and only on paper, Austria has an army of 800,000, but she
could not, even on the most pressing emergency, bring 200,000 men
into the field. Her finances are dilapidated and her internal
disorganization affords just cause of alarm. Danger to Prussia from
Austria must, for many years to come, be a chimera.
The military peace establishment of France is nominally greater than
that of Prussia; the former being 400,000 and the latter being
300,000; but the number of troops stationed in the costly and
unproductive colony of Algiers is not, and cannot ever be less than
60,000 men; other colonial possessions require military protection,
and as the garrisons in Lyons and other great towns necessary for
the maintenance of order are not less than 40,000 men, the
establishments of the two countries are as nearly as possible upon
an equality. Can this state of things be regarded as a menace or a
danger to Prussia? I am greatly mistaken if any Prussian statesman
or General would reply to this inquiry in the affirmative.
The question then to my mind appears quite simple. The military
forces of the great Continental Powers have a certain proportion to
each other; in order to maintain that proportion, very heavy burdens
are imposed upon each country, but if by common agreement, each
reduces its army by a certain number of men, the same proportions
will be maintained, while the burdens, which are fast becoming
intolerable will be alleviated.
Count Bismarck however thinks that if the question of diminishing
the military strength of Prussia is entertained, it will be
necessary carefully to inquire what guarantees can be given by
neighbouring Military Powers in compensation to Germany for a
decrease in the amount of security which she has hitherto owed to
her armies.
Upon this I would respectfully beg to observe that a minute
discussion of guarantees would be endless and dangerous. The
legitimate rights and precautionary measures of independent
Governments would be analysed in a spirit possibly of unfriendly
criticism, and if agreements were arrived at, constant vigilance
over their faithful fulfilment would be necessary, and this might
possibly give rise to the quarrels that the agreements were intended
to avert, and which would at once put an end to the compacts.
It is upon a dispassionate consideration of the probable course of
events that the question of partial disarmament should in my opinion
be decided, and in France (the only country with which we need
concern ourselves) what do we find? A nation resolutely pacific: a
Government depending on popular support and therefore equally
pacific: a responsible Minister declaring that France will not
interfere with the affairs of her neighbours, and the Sovereign
willingly assenting to a diminution of one-tenth of the annual
conscription without asking for reciprocity on the part of Germany,
and thereby showing his confidence in the King's declaration.
I venture to think that the present state of opinion in France,
founded as it is upon a true estimate of French interests, is a more
solid guarantee than any that the respective governments of France
and Germany could effect for their own security.
Count Bismarck will admit, and I am sure that a statesman so liberal
and far-sighted will admit without regret, that the people
everywhere are claiming and must obtain a larger share in the
administration of their own affairs, and that, in proportion
as they do so, the chances of causeless wars will diminish. The
people well understand the horrors of war, and that they, and not
their rulers, are the real sufferers: they equally understand and
will daily become more impatient of the taxation for those costly
preparations for war which in themselves endanger peace, and I
believe that there is at this moment no surer road to solid
popularity for Government than attending to the wants and wishes of
the people on the subject of armaments.
I have reason to know that the reduction in the French army would
have been carried further if the Government could have hoped that
the example would be followed by Prussia. Sooner or later, however,
this reason will be publicly assigned, and then upon Prussia will
rest the responsibility not only of maintaining so large a force
herself, but of compelling other countries reluctantly to do the
same.
It would be to me a matter of most sincere pleasure to think that no
such responsibility will rest on Prussia, but I should hardly have
presumed to recur to the subject if I had not gathered from the
patriotic letter of Count Bismarck that further discussion was not
absolutely precluded, and I had not therefore been encouraged to
hope that he might think it proper to make my suggestions known to
his Sovereign.
Bismarck's reply to this exhortation was equally long, and contained
some arguments of such a puerile nature that it can hardly be believed
that he expected them to be taken seriously.
* * * * *
_Lord A. Loftus to Lord Clarendon._
Berlin, March 12, 1870.
On the receipt of your private letter yesterday morning, I asked for
an interview with Count Bismarck, and he received me last evening.
I first observed that you would have hardly ventured to recur to the
subject of disarmament, had you not thought that his letter to Count
Bernstorff abstained from putting a veto on discussion, and from a
feeling that the King of Prussia would reap general esteem and
admiration in Europe by giving a patent proof of his Peace Policy,
whilst on the contrary, His Majesty might incur unpopularity if the
French should be enabled to say that they were compelled by Prussia
to keep up an armament against which the Nation is disposed to
protest.--I then read your letter to Count Bismarck. He listened
with great attention, merely making two observations during my
reading--
1st. That France had only 40,000 men in Algeria, and 2nd that the
Constitutional Government in France was only of three months'
existence, and therefore its stability could not be yet said to be
ensured. When I had finished, Count Bismarck stated that, as far as
France alone was concerned, Prussia and the North German
Confederation might not feel themselves endangered by a diminution
of the Army, but he said Austria and France might join together and
even the 250,000 men which you give to Austria might in conjunction
with France prove to be a serious embarrassment to Prussia. The
20,000 men which might perhaps be dispensed with, would then be just
the balance which might turn the Scale against Prussia.
He then reverted to France. He said although the Nation was now
pacific, you know as well as I do that a war cry may be raised in
France, on any emergency, and at the shortest notice.
If, said Count Bismarck, the present Constitutional Government had
been three years instead of three months in existence, then there
would be some chance for its duration and for the maintenance of
Peace. At the present moment, he observed, there was a party anxious
to restore the former state of things, a personal Government.
Amongst that Party, there was the Empress Eugénie, and they would
not be sorry to divert the public attention from home affairs by
raising some question of Foreign Policy.
He said that the Provincial Press of France (and he reviewed
articles from all the Small Provincial Papers) teemed with abuse
against Prussia.
There were other indications in Europe which did not leave him without
some disquietude for the maintenance of Peace.
He first alluded to the local provincial Press in France as
continually preaching antagonism to Prussia, then to certain reports
which had reached him of the purchase of horses in France, but to
these he did not attach much importance. He then referred to reports
he had received from the Prussian Minister at Copenhagen, who
observed, that if any State of larger dimensions were to do what
Denmark was now doing, some sinister design would evidently be
attributed to it.
He considered the appointment of Monsignor Klazko by Count Beust to
a post in the Foreign Office at Vienna as significative of the
intentions of Austria, and he observed that Count Beust was
intriguing with the Polish Party for some object which was not clear
to him. He then referred to Southern Germany and to the intrigues of
the Ultra-Montaine party, and cited a saying of the late Prince
Schwarzenberg 'that the three Empires (France, Austria, and Prussia)
should unite against the Heretics in Europe.'
To these observations I replied that the Safety of Prussia was
secured by her Military system which supplied necessary reserves and
Landwehr, without the incubus of such an enormous standing army, and
that Prussia was therefore in a position to be able to give an
example to Europe.
On the whole, although Count Bismarck appeared to be somewhat
incredulous as to the pacific appearance of Europe, he was less
decidedly opposed to any disarmament than on the last occasions I
spoke to him. He asked whether it was desired that he should mention
the subject to the King. I replied in the affirmative, and suggested
that he should have your Lordship's two letters translated and
submitted to His Majesty.
On my mentioning that any attempt at mutual guarantees would be very
unadvisable, he said that without some guarantee the question of
entertaining disarmament would be difficult; but he said it more as
a passing observation than as a fixed decision.
I am afraid that if the question of disarmament is entertained at
all (and probably neither the King nor Count Bismarck will like to
discard it entirely) it will be hedged round with so many
conditions, that it will be rendered impossible; great care will be
required that the question of disarmament shall not become a
question of Contention, and thus give a pretext for discussion, to
be followed perhaps by war.
I asked Count Bismarck casually what foundation there was for the
repeatedly recurring reports of General Fleury's attempts to bring
about a Russo-French Alliance.
Count Bismarck said that General Fleury on his arrival had acted
without instructions, and he attributed no importance to these
reports.
He said that at first the Emperor of Russia had rather been taken
in, and that he had written a letter to the King of Prussia (he did
not say on what subject), but that the King of Prussia had replied
in a manner most satisfactory and agreeable to the Emperor, and that
it was then that the Emperor of Russia sent the St. George to the
King of Prussia.
I could see that Count Bismarck has no fear of the Russian policy
towards Prussia, so long as the Emperor lives and that Prince
Gortchakow remains Minister.
I shall see Bismarck later, and will then inform you what view the
King takes of the proposal for disarmament.
This unpromising communication was transmitted to Paris, and Lord
Clarendon comforted himself with the thought that there was still a ray
of hope, as Bismarck had promised to bring the matter before the King,
and there might therefore be an opportunity of recurring to it later on.
Daru, too, did not look upon the position as hopeless.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, March 17, 1870.
I read to Count Daru this afternoon a memorandum giving a short
summary of the principal points in Lord A. Loftus's letter to you of
the 12th about disarmament.
He said that on the whole the impression made on his mind was good.
There was more disposition to consider the subject, and Count
Bismarck seemed rather to have sought to find something to say
against disarmament, than to have alleged reason which could be
supposed to have any real weight with him.
At all events, Count Bismarck mistook the state of France. The
people were honestly and sincerely pacific, and the Constitutional
system might be considered as firmly established. He would not deny
that the French were a proud and susceptible people, and that they
could be roused to war by their Government, if their honour or their
patriotism were appealed to. But the present Government were as
pacific as the people, and they had the full confidence of the
Emperor and the nation--of the nation, he said, not of the Corps
Législatif, whose support was not cordial--nor of the Senate, which
did not like them--nor of the countries, who hated them. Count
Bismarck would see in a few days, a series of measures which would
convince him that Constitutional Government was irrevocably
established in France. The Ministers had obtained, or were on the
point of obtaining, His Majesty's sanction to reforms which would
convince all the world that the Emperor had not only landed on the
shore of Parliamentary Government, but had burnt his ships behind him.
As to Count Bismarck's argument that Prussia must be prepared to
face the united armies of France and Austria, Count Daru remarked
that it was preposterous to maintain that any one Power of Europe
must endeavour to be a match for all the rest united. If Austria
united with France, Prussia might find allies also. It was not to be
supposed that all Europe would stand by and look on at a fight with
France and Austria on one side and Prussia on the other.
Finally, he repeated that on the whole, Count Bismarck's language
was more satisfactory than it had yet been.
The conclusion to be drawn from this conversation is that Count Daru
must have been more easy to please than most people; but all hopes
were shortly dashed to the ground when a letter arrived from Lord
Augustus Loftus reporting the result of his further communications with
Bismarck.
Bismarck stated that Lord Clarendon's letters had been translated and
laid before the King, and that the proposal had not been favourably
entertained by His Majesty. There were only two methods of reducing the
German Army, one to change the present legislative enactments, and
thereby the whole military system; the other, to reduce the term of
military service to two and a half years. The first was considered to be
impossible, and, as for the second, the King had resisted Parliament on
the subject for five years, and now declared that he would rather give
up his throne than yield. Further, the King viewed the proposal as being
put forward in favour of France and French policy, and without regard to
the safety of Prussia. To use Bismarck's own expression: 'It was the act
of a _cool friend_.' 'It is all very well for you,' said Bismarck,
'living in an island, where no one can attack you, to preach
disarmaments, but put yourselves into our skin. You would then think and
act differently. What would you say if we were to observe to you that
your navy was too large, that you did not require so many ironclads,
that you lavished too large a portion of the taxation of the country in
building ships, which in the peaceful disposition of Europe were not
required? If we recommended you to diminish your naval armament?'
To this home-thrust the Ambassador made the somewhat unconvincing reply
that as evidence of our pacific disposition we had just sold an ironclad
to the Prussian Government, and were ready to sell others--a reply
which was received with irreverent merriment; neither do the imposing
sentiments expressed respecting the general happiness and prosperity of
Europe seem to have made much impression upon the man of blood and iron.
The utmost that could be obtained from him was a vague statement that
the whole question would be discussed by the Parliament 'in a year or
so,' and that a decision must then be taken as to what was required for
the safety of the country. 'I saw,' wrote the Minister sadly, 'that it
was useless to pursue the question further.' Lord Clarendon realized
that the game was up.
* * * * *
_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, March 23, 1870.
I send you a copy of Loftus's letter, and you will, I am sure, agree
with me that more harm than good would be done by further pressing
the question of disarmament, after the very decided expression of
the King's opinion. You can tell Daru in mild terms the two
objections raised by His Majesty and that, on the whole, I consider
it better to wait and not to show much anxiety until the War Budget
comes to be discussed next year, when the example of France, as
regards military reductions, the pacific temper of her people, and
the consolidation of her institutions, cannot fail to have a
beneficial effect on the Federal Parliament. At present, it seems
that the Liberal party, upon which Bismarck must lean more and more,
would only support reduction on the condition that he would change
his policy and invite, or coerce the South into the Confederation.
Bismarck on this subject has behaved with prudence, at the expense
of popularity, as regards Baden (the sorest point with the French),
and he should not be pressed into a course he dislikes or thinks
dangerous to the continuance of good relations with France. He is
foolish about the press and always irritated by articles, however
worthless, against Prussia, which he usually thinks are written by
authority, or are the true manifestation of public opinion in the
particular country.
You will observe that the King thinks I have been acting in the
interest of France, and it is therefore not only on public grounds,
but as regards myself personally, that I am very desirous that the
most complete secrecy should be observed respecting the whole of
these unsuccessful negotiations, if they can be so called. I know
well the suspicious character of the King, and if he thought that we
had cast in our lot completely with France, he would straightway set
about a more intimate alliance with Russia which would not be for
the interest either of England or France.
Pray therefore impress upon Daru the necessity of complete
discretion.
Thus ended an attempt in the success of which no one probably felt much
confidence. Various conclusions may be drawn from the correspondence
quoted above. There seems to have been no doubt that the French
Government (whatever may have been the sentiments of the Emperor) was
sincerely anxious for a partial disarmament and the promised reduction
of the annual contingent by 10,000 men was evidence of good intentions.
There was, however, an essential difference between the French and
Prussian view as to what constituted conquest and aggression which in
reality precluded any real settlement.
Prussia held that it was not conquest or aggression to annex any German
States, while France considered that the annexation of any States south
of the Maine would be as much conquest or aggression on the part of
Prussia, as it would be, on the part of France, to annex them herself.
Prussia refused to declare that she would not complete the unity of
Germany. France, on her side, refused to declare that she would not
interfere to prevent it.
As for Bismarck's arguments against disarmament, some of them were
positively grotesque, and it must have required more than ordinary
assurance to contend, for instance, that Denmark and Monsignor Klazko
constituted a menace to Prussia, whilst the artifice of representing the
King as a sort of uncontrollable despot was too thin to deceive any one
of ordinary intelligence. On the other hand, Bismarck seems to have
displayed commendable patience and restraint when lectured on the
iniquity of the Prussian military system. Lord Clarendon's language
rather conveyed the impression that England stood upon a moral pinnacle
which entitled her to admonish other nations as to the errors of their
ways, but the claim was vitiated by the fact that she maintained, and
intended to maintain, a navy of overwhelming strength, while if her
military power was even more insignificant than it is at the present
day, the cost of the British Army amounted to much more than that of the
Prussian Army, and therefore the less said about unproductive
expenditure the better. If, in fact, the respective expenditure of the
two countries upon armaments is borne in mind it seems almost incredible
that Lord Clarendon should have ventured to preach economy to the
Prussian Government. During the previous year, the total British
expenditure upon armaments amounted to no less than twenty-four millions
and a quarter. Of this sum, rather more than fourteen millions were
allotted to the Army, and nearly ten millions to the Navy. Now the total
military and naval expenditure of the North German Federation at the
same period only amounted to ten millions eight hundred thousand pounds,
and the Prussian contribution towards the total represented a little
over seven millions. It might also be added that England was quite ready
at all times to supply to an unlimited amount, ironclads, rifles and
munition of war to any foreign customer, however depraved. And yet we
are pained and surprised when any one suggests that we are occasionally
hypocritical!
But the most striking conclusion to be drawn from the correspondence is
that Lord Clarendon, with all his knowledge of continental politics,
does not seem to have fully grasped the really essential fact; he seems
to have thought that by professions of friendship, by small concessions
on the part of France, and by the establishment of more liberal
institutions in that country, the threatened danger might be averted,
whereas it was the fixed and inexorable determination of Bismarck to
force a conflict upon France whenever the favourable opportunity should
arise. A high tribute to Lord Clarendon's statesmanship was, however,
paid by Bismarck at a later period. On making the acquaintance of one of
his daughters a few years later, he opened the conversation with the
singular remark that, never in the whole course of his life, had he been
so relieved as when her father died; and then proceeded to explain that
had Lord Clarendon lived, there never would have been a Franco-German
war. As he did not enter into details, it may be presumed that he
considered Lord Clarendon's influence to be so great that he might have
successfully persuaded the French to acquiesce in some insignificant
enlargement of Prussia.
All the participators in the disarmament negotiation appear to have kept
their counsel on the subject, and there is, at all events, no mention of
it in the two standard works which deal with Bismarck's career.
FOOTNOTES:
[15] British Ambassador at Berlin.
[16] Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon, Feb. 18, 1870.