CHAPTER IX

THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

(1870-1871)

The investment of Paris being now imminent, the Diplomatists had to make

up their minds as to whether they should remain or leave, and the latter

course was adopted.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Tours, Sept. 19, 1870.

I was a good deal put out at having to leave Paris. The interest is

still there: there was no danger in staying, and of course the

Diplomatists could have got the Prussians to let them through the

lines. But as soon as Jules Favre himself advised that I should go,

I had nothing to say to my colleagues of the Great Powers, whom I

had withstood, not without difficulty, for some time. At all events

I could not have stayed if they went, without exposing myself to all

kinds of misrepresentation, and presenting myself to the public and

Foreign Powers as the special partisan and adviser of the present

French Government. The Representatives of the small Powers, or most

of them, want to be able to go home when they leave Paris, and are

very much afraid of the expense and difficulty of finding lodgings

here. Well they may be: I myself spent eight hours yesterday walking

about or sitting on a trunk in the porte cochère of the hotel, and

have at last, in order not to pass the night _à la belle étoile_,

had to come to a house out of the town.

I don't expect much from Jules Favre's interview with Bismarck, but

I am very impatient to know whether he was received, and if so, what

passed. I should be glad that Bismarck should distinctly announce

his terms, though I can hardly hope they will be such as France will

accept now. But it would be well, whatever they are, that the French

should know them, and thus get their minds accustomed to them, and

so know also what amount of resistance is better than yielding to

them. I myself think that the loss of territory and the humiliation

of France and the great diminution of her power and influence would

be great evils and great sources of danger: but, if we can have no

means of preventing them, I am certainly anxious that we should not

aggravate them by holding out hopes that our mediation could effect

a change, or rather by allowing the hopes to be formed, which the

mere fact of our mediating could not but give rise to. I have read

with great interest the accounts of your conversations with Thiers,

and have been still more interested by your correspondence with

Bernstorff on 'benevolent neutrality.' On his part it is just the

old story I used to hear in America from the Northerners: 'The

ordinary rules of neutrality are very well in ordinary wars, such

as those in which we were neutrals, but our present cause is so

pre-eminently just, noble and advantageous to humanity and the rest

of the world, that the very least other nations can do is to strain

the laws of neutrality, so as to make them operate in our favour and

against our opponents.'

Thiers himself was expected here yesterday. Jules Favre did not

say positively that he was coming here himself, but he gave me to

understand that it was not improbable he should do so. He must make

haste, for we hear that the railway we came by is already broken up,

and all the others were impassable before.

As Lord Lyons's departure from Paris to Tours was practically the only

action in the course of his career which was subjected to anything like

unfavourable criticism, it is desirable to point out that as far back as

August 31, Lord Granville had written to him in these words: 'I

presume that your post will be with the Government as long as it is

acknowledged; and that if the Empress and her Foreign Minister go to

Lyons or elsewhere, you would go too.' It is almost inconceivable that

any one should have advocated the retention of the Ambassador in Paris

after that city had been cut off from the outside world; some of the

members of the Government, it is true, including Jules Favre remained

there, but the _de facto_ Government of the country was temporarily

established at Tours, and when Tours seemed likely to share the fate of

Paris, the Government was transferred to Bordeaux. It was so obviously

the duty of diplomatists to remain in touch with the French Government

that the wonder is that any objection should ever have been raised, and,

as has already been narrated, Lord Lyons had been urged to move long

before he would consent to do so. The action of the Ambassador was the

subject of an attack upon him subsequently in Parliament by the late Sir

Robert Peel, which proved singularly ineffective.

Few people had anticipated much result from Jules Favre's visit to

Bismarck, and when the latter insisted upon a surrender of territory

being accepted in principle, the French envoy burst into tears.

According to Bismarck this display of emotion was entirely artificial,

and he even accused Jules Favre of having painted his face grey and

green in order to excite sympathy, but in any case it became perfectly

plain that no agreement was in sight and that the war would have to

continue. In justice to the French it must be said that Bismarck seemed

to have made his terms as harsh in form as they were stringent in

substance, and it was difficult to conceive any Government subscribing

to his conditions; as for poor Jules Favre he had to console himself by

issuing a stirring address to his fellow-countrymen.

Although the French public naturally began to display some impatience

and irritation at the slowness with which 'Victory' was being organized,

and to talk of Carnot, the old Republic, and the necessity of a Red

Republic if heroes were to be produced, the Tours Government continued

to hold its own fairly well; there was little trouble about the

finances; disorders were suppressed, and the arrival of Gambetta infused

a good deal of energy into the administration. After the manner of

French statesmen, Gambetta, upon his arrival at Tours, issued a spirited

proclamation, announcing _inter alia_ that Paris was impregnable, and

explaining that as the form of Government had changed from a shameful

and corrupt autocracy to a pure and unsullied Republic, success was a

moral certainty. Gambetta, who had assumed the office of Minister of

War, summoned to his assistance the veteran Garibaldi, and the arrival

of the former obviously embarrassed the peace-loving diplomatists, who

expressed regret that his balloon had not capsized on the way from

Paris.

By the middle of October, however, the French Government began to show

signs of wiser dispositions.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Tours. Oct. 16, 1870.

As you will see by my long despatch of to-day, I went yesterday with

the Comte de Chaudordy[23] into the questions of the '_pouce de notre

territoire_' and the '_pierres de nos forteresses_.' The fortresses

have in point of fact been tacitly abandoned for a long time,

provided the dismantling them only, not the cession of them to

Prussia is demanded.

M. de Chaudordy said that he would tell me what was in the bottom of

his heart about the cession of territory, if I would promise to

report it to your Lordship only in such a form as would ensure it

never being published now or hereafter, or even being quoted or

referred to.

Having received my promise and taken all these precautions, he said

that he did not regard some cession of territory as altogether out

of the question. The men at present in office certainly could not

retreat from their positive declaration that they would never yield

an inch of territory; but if the interests of France appeared to

require positively that the sacrifice should be made, they would

retire from office, and give place to men who were unshackled, and

not only would they abstain from opposing such men, but would give

them full support in signing a peace, which, however painful,

appeared to be necessary. M. de Chaudordy was convinced and indeed

had reason to know that the men now in office had patriotism enough

to act in this way in case of need, but he could not authorize me to

tell you this as a communication from the individuals themselves,

much less as a communication from the French Government. It would be

ruin to the men themselves and to the cause, if it should transpire

that such an idea had ever been contemplated at a moment like this.

For it to be carried into effect with any success, it must appear to

rise at the critical time out of the necessities of the hour.

He concluded by reminding me of my promise that what he had said

should never be published or even referred to.

I thanked him for the confidence he had placed in me, and assured

him that he need not have the least fear that it would be abused. I

said however at the same time that he must feel, as I did, that

however useful it might be to be aware of the disposition he had

mentioned, as entertained by the men in power, it would be very

difficult for a Government to make information, given with so much

reserve, the foundation of any positive measures.

This criticism was sufficiently obvious. If the information was never to

go beyond Lord Lyons and Lord Granville, of what practical use could it

be? It can only be supposed that those who sent Chaudordy, intended that

his confidential communication should somehow or other reach the

Prussian Government.

Hard upon Chaudordy, followed a man destined before long to achieve a

melancholy celebrity, General Bourbaki. General Bourbaki had been the

victim of a strange mystification, which resulted in his being permitted

to leave Metz upon a secret mission to the Empress at Chislehurst, and

when it was discovered that the whole thing was an ingenious fraud

perpetrated by one Regnier (probably with the connivance of Bismarck),

and that the Empress had never sent for him at all, he returned to

France, but was not permitted to re-enter Metz. Consequently, he

repaired to Tours and gave the Ambassador the benefit of his views.

General Bourbaki, as a professional soldier, took a most gloomy view of

the military situation. He did not think that an army capable of coping

with the Prussians in the field in anything like equal numbers could be

formed in less than five or six months, even with first-rate military

organizers at the head of affairs, instead of the present inexperienced

civilians. According to him, the Army of Metz was in admirable condition

and might perhaps break out, but even so, where was it to go? Its

provisions and ammunition would be exhausted long before it could get to

any place where they could be replenished. As the surrender of Paris was

really only a question of time, the most prudent thing to do would be to

make peace whilst those two fortresses were still holding out, and it

would be to the interest of Prussia to do so, because if Metz fell,

Bazaine's army would disappear, and there would be no Government left in

France with whom it would be possible to treat, and the Prussians would,

therefore, be forced to administer the country as well as occupy it. The

Provisional Government, who must have had a high opinion of Bourbaki,

offered him the title of Commander-in-Chief and the command of the Army

of the Loire, but he declined the honour on the ground that he would not

be given unlimited military powers, and that nothing could be effected

under the orders of civilians absolutely devoid of military capacity.

Another visitor was M. Daniel Wilson, who achieved a sinister notoriety

during the Presidency of M. Grévy in connection with the alleged sale of

honours, etc. Wilson's object was to urge the desirability of summoning

a Constituent Assembly without delay, as he and his moderate friends

were convinced that such a body would be in favour of peace. He himself

considered the prosecution of the war under existing circumstances to be

a crime, and he was not disposed to allow the six or seven men who had

seized upon the Government, to achieve the ruin of France. Their only

excuse for postponing the elections was the difficulty of holding them

in the districts occupied by the Prussians, but if an armistice could be

obtained, that difficulty would disappear, and an armistice of only

fifteen days would make the resumption of hostilities impossible. The

interest attaching to this visit lay in the fact that a peace party was

now actually in existence, whereas the Provisional Government at Tours,

the Ministers left in Paris, and the advanced Republicans seemed to

be still fully bent upon war _à outrance_, and as little willing as

ever to hear of a cession of territory.

Bazaine capitulated on October 27, and shortly afterwards Thiers who had

returned to Paris from his circular tour round the Courts of Europe

proceeded to the Prussian Headquarters to discuss with Bismarck the

question of an armistice, a course of action which the Provisional

Government had agreed to, provided it were initiated by a third party.

The attitude, however, of Gambetta and his friends did not encourage

much hope of success.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Tours, Oct. 31, 1870.

Gambetta's Proclamation and the language Chaudordy has again been

directed to hold about cession of territory, will show you how vain

it is to try to induce these people to give a negotiation a fair

chance by abstaining during the course of it from violent and

imprudent language.

Nothing can look worse for France than things do at this moment. A

reign of terror, perseverance in hostilities until the country is

utterly ruined, a dissolution of all order and discipline in the

army, and a total disorganization of society might seem to be

threatened. I take comfort from the thought that much allowance must

be made for the first ebullition of grief and rage at the surrender

of Bazaine, and that some of Gambetta's fire and fury may be

intended to divert blame from himself for a catastrophe which he did

nothing to prevent. Anyhow things are gloomy enough, and I am

nervous and uneasy about Thiers and his mission, and should be glad

to hear that he was at least safe out of Paris again.

The news of the capitulation of Metz was at once followed by an

unsuccessful outbreak against the Government in Paris, headed by the

well-known revolutionary, Gustave Flourens, who seized the Ministers and

proclaimed the Commune at the Hotel de Ville. The Ministers, however,

were shortly liberated by the Garde Mobile and National Guards and order

was restored without much difficulty in the course of a few hours.

Flourens, who was subsequently shot by the Versailles troops during the

suppression of the Commune in 1871, was generally regarded as the most

formidable 'man of action,' and had lately been residing in London. It

is interesting to record the impression which the wasted potentialities

of England made upon this impartial visitor. _Me voici, avec mes amis

Félix Pyat et Louis Blanc à Londres, dans ce pays d'Angleterre qui

pourrait être si grand à condition de n'avoir point ni les Lords ni la

Bible!_ One almost wishes that he had been spared to witness the

operation of the Parliament Act.

The Paris Government, adroitly profiting by the overthrow of Flourens

and his friends, at once organized a plébiscite in the city, and emerged

triumphantly with over 500,000 votes recorded in their favour as against

60,000 dissentients. This was all to the good, as it showed that

moderate opinions were still in the ascendency, and whereas the fall of

Metz was at first received with frantic cries of rage and war to the

knife, people began to look a little more calmly on its effect on the

military situation, and hopes were entertained that the mission of

Thiers to Bismarck, which had been promoted by Her Majesty's Government,

would result in the conclusion of an armistice. These hopes were doomed

to disappointment, for after several interviews at Versailles, during

the course of which an agreement for some time appeared probable,

negotiations were finally broken off on the question of revictualling

the various fortresses, more especially Paris.

Thiers, who had repaired to Tours after the failure of his efforts, gave

Lord Lyons in strict confidence a full and interesting account of his

negotiations with Bismarck.

At the first important interview, which took place at Versailles on

November 1, no serious objection was raised to the proposals of the

French Government, and after a conversation which lasted two or three

hours, Thiers took his leave with good hopes for the success of the

negotiation.

The second conference, on the following day, passed equally

satisfactorily. On Thursday, the 3rd, Bismarck kept Thiers waiting a

short time, and said that he had been detained at a military meeting

held by the King. He seemed annoyed and irritable, and indeed on one

occasion, quite lost his temper. Nevertheless, Thiers resenting this, he

apologized and assumed a civil and indeed caressing demeanour. He

asserted that _les militaires_, as he always called them, made

objections to the proposed revictualling of Paris and that they also had

some reservations to make with respect to the suggested elections. _Les

militaires_ also urged that if, as proposed, Paris were to be

provisioned during twenty-five days' armistice, those days would be

absolutely lost to the German arms, and the surrender of the town

deferred for at least that time. On being sounded as to what might be

considered an equivalent, it appeared that two or more of the detached

forts, or some other concession equally inadmissible, would be demanded.

On finding, therefore, that Bismarck was unshaken in declaring that

positively _les militaires_ would not allow Paris to be revictualled,

Thiers had no alternative but to withdraw from the negotiation and to

request facilities for communicating the result to the Government in

Paris. _Les militaires_, it will be observed, played much the same

convenient part in this affair as the King of Prussia in the arguments

used against Lord Clarendon's secret disarmament proposals.

Upon the Paris Government becoming acquainted with these terms, Jules

Favre directed Thiers to break off the negotiations and leave Versailles

immediately; a decision which Bismarck stated caused him great regret

and induced him to suggest that elections should be held even while

hostilities were going on. He made no offer, however, of any concession

with regard to the revictualling of Paris.

The conclusion which Thiers arrived at was that there was both a

political and a military party at the Prussian Headquarters. The

political party, with which Bismarck himself to a great extent agreed,

was desirous of bringing the war to an end by concluding peace on

comparatively moderate terms. The military party held that the glory of

the Prussian arms and the future security of Germany demanded that the

rights of war should be pushed to the utmost, and that France should be

laid waste, ruined, and humiliated to such a degree as to render it

impossible for her to wage war again with Germany for very many years.

He could not, however, discover even among the most moderate of the

so-called political party any one who seemed to ask less than the

cession of Alsace and of that part of Lorraine in which German is

spoken. It seems clear that Bismarck impressed Thiers with his sincerity

at the commencement of the negotiations, and with the belief that he was

subsequently overruled by _les militaires_, but whenever it was

suggested that the armistice had been proposed to both parties by the

neutral Powers, Bismarck showed much 'impatience and annoyance.' He

showed Thiers the letters which the Emperor Alexander had written to the

King of Prussia. They were 'warm, earnest letters,' but written as from

a friend to a friend, without in the least assuming the tone of a

sovereign addressing a brother sovereign on a matter concerning the

relations of their respective Governments. Of Great Britain, it is sad

to learn, he spoke with 'special ill-humour.' One subject upon which he

touched is not without interest at the present day. He complained

bitterly of the treatment to which the crews of captured German merchant

vessels were subjected, and said that he should give orders to have an

equal number of French non-combatants arrested and treated in the same

way. When it was mildly suggested that this would hardly be in

accordance with international maritime law, he exclaimed with some

violence: 'Who made the code of maritime law? You and the English,

because you are powerful at sea, it is no code at all, it is simply the

law of the strongest!' To this Thiers appears to have retorted that he,

Bismarck, did not on all occasions seem disposed to repudiate the law of

the strongest.

So far as the convocation of a National Assembly was concerned Bismarck

alleged complete indifference, explaining that he had now two

Governments with which to treat, one at Paris, and the other at

Wilhelmshöhe, and although he expressed unmitigated contempt for the

Emperor Napoleon, he was nevertheless quite ready to make use of him

to attain his ends.

During the fruitless negotiations which had taken place, first when

conducted by Jules Favre, and secondly when conducted by Thiers, the

British Government found itself in a somewhat embarrassing position. It

was perfectly sincere in desiring to bring about peace between France

and Prussia, but it was unwilling to identify itself with the one

proposal which would have had that effect, viz. the cession of

territory, and the perplexity in which the English Ministers found

themselves is illustrated by a letter from Mr. Gladstone to Lord Lyons.

* * * * *

11, Carlton House Terrace, Nov. 7, 1870.

I have seen your letter to Lord Granville in which you notice that

in a note to him I had expressed a hope you would not allow the

French to suppose we adopted their view as to integrity of

territory.

I do not recollect the exact words to which you may refer, but I

write a line lest I should by chance have conveyed a false

impression.

At an earlier stage of this tremendous controversy, the French took

their stand upon inviolability of soil. That ground always seemed to

me quite untenable in the case of a country which had made recent

annexations.

The French also declared that they would surrender neither an inch

of their territory nor a stone of their fortresses. This appeared to

me an extravagant proposition, and, what is more important, I

venture to say it was thought unreasonable by my colleagues and by

the country generally. It is possible that my note may have referred

to either of these views on the part of France.

But I am very sorry if I have conveyed to you on my own part, or by

implication on the part of any one else, the belief that we approved

of, or were in our own minds indifferent to the transfer of

Alsatians and Lorrainers from France to Germany against their will.

On this subject, I for one, entirely concur with the opinions you

have so admirably expressed in your letter, and I should be to the

last degree reluctant to be a party not only to stimulating a German

demand of this kind, but even to advising or promoting a compliance

with it on the part of France.

All this you will see is quite distinct from and consistent with the

desire which you and which we all entertain that the Defence

Government of France should not needlessly deal in abstract

declarations, and with a full approval of your reticence as to the

conditions of peace.

On the failure of the armistice I think the Cabinet will disperse,

as having nothing more to consider in the present circumstances. I

cannot help feeling doubtful whether the Prussians do not lose more

than the French by the unhappy failure of the negotiations.

We are all more grieved at the failure than surprised.

It is difficult to read much meaning into the above involved epistle.

How, for instance, could any fortresses be surrendered without Alsatians

and Lorrainers being handed over to Prussia? Put into plain language,

the letter presumably meant that H.M. Government was anxious to remain

friends with both sides, but was afraid to make the one recommendation

to the French which would have been of any use, and hoped that the

proposal of a cession of territory would eventually be made on the

latter's initiative.

Thiers, who in the course of his tour round the capitals of Europe had

vigorously denounced (especially to the Italians) the apathy and

selfishness of England, now intimated to the Ambassador that he was

willing to go back to London if he could contribute, by so doing, to

bring about an armistice and a peace, but received no encouragement;

partly because it was thought that the less the British Government

did, which appeared to be prompted by France, the more Bismarck might be

inclined to yield, and partly because it would cause irritation in

France, if Thiers made another formal expedition to England without

producing any marked result.

A momentary elation was just about this time produced at Tours by the

victory of General d'Aurelle des Paladines and the recapture of Orleans,

but Gambetta does not appear to have lost his head in consequence of

this temporary success or to have attached undue importance to it.

Gambetta's opinion was that France could hold out for four months, and

that the Germans would not be able to stay so long in the country. He

told Lord Lyons that he approved of the armistice on the terms proposed

by the Government of Paris, and implied that he did, rather than not,

approve of the readiness of that Government to conclude one still, if

through the representations of the neutrals Prussia should yet be

brought to consent to reasonable terms for one. He manifested great

indignation at Bismarck's contention that there was no Government in

France, maintained that the Government of National Defence was a

properly constituted Government entitled to exercise all the powers of

the nation, and said that there was no need whatever of a Constitutional

Assembly. As for General d'Aurelle des Paladines, his hour of triumph

was soon terminated; the Prussians drove him out of Orleans, and his

failure was ascribed by the Republicans to his action in proceeding to

venerate some relics in the Orleans cathedral.

In the meanwhile Mr. Gladstone's Government found themselves confronted

with a difficulty which had to some extent been foreseen, but which was

entirely unexpected at that particular moment. In the beginning of

November, Prince Gortschakoff issued a circular denouncing the clauses

of the Treaty of Paris which related to the Black Sea. Lord Granville

communicated the intelligence in a letter to Lord Lyons dated November

11.

* * * * *

Foreign Office, Nov. 11, 1870.

The shell has fallen suddenly. I expected it, but not in so abrupt a

form. If it was to come, I am not sure that I regret the way it has

done. Do not communicate officially my answer till the Russian

Government has received theirs: the messenger leaves London

to-night.

I am curious to hear what the Provisional Government will say. I

presume they will try to make a bargain on the subject. You will of

course explain to them that it is, at the very least, a more serious

subject for them than for us.

The handling of the matter is delicate and difficult. We are

unanimous about the first step, more in doubt about the next.

If Bernstorff gets permission to give a safe conduct to Odo Russell,

we mean to send him to-morrow to Versailles with our answer and a

private letter from me to Bismarck. I presume there is a private

understanding between Russia and Prussia, but it is not certain;

Bernstorff as usual was dumb, but intimated his surprise at the

form.

He tells me that my question will be met with a negative as to

provisioning Paris: the Generals will not hear of it. If so, I shall

ask whether he will still give facilities for an election without an

armistice, and then I shall request you to press the expediency of

summoning a Chamber on the Provisional Government--always declaring

that you do not wish to interfere with the self-government of

France.

Why it should have been assumed that the action of the Russian Government

was more serious as regards the French than ourselves, is not

particularly clear. Whatever the French Government may have said in

public on the subject, there can be little doubt that in secret they

hailed it as a welcome diversion which might be turned to advantage. If

it brought about a congress or conference, it might cause a stir amongst

neutrals resulting in a check to Prussia as well as to Russia. The

ingenious Thiers at once grasped at the possibility of forming an

European Alliance against these two Powers.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Tours, Nov. 14, 1870.

Thiers has just paid me so long a visit that he has left me very

little time to write. His notion is that England, Austria, Italy,

Turkey and Spain should now unite with France to check the

aggression of Prussia and Russia, and he thinks that without war

this would lead to a Congress in which all Europe would settle the

terms of peace. If England lets the occasion go by, it will, in his

opinion, be she, not France, who will have sunk to the rank of a

second-rate Power. I thought my prudent course was to listen and say

nothing, which, as you know, is easy with him; for he talks too well

for one to be bored with him, and is quite content to talk without

interruption.

He had a violent argument with Chaudordy in the presence of

Metternich and me on the subject of the elections. Chaudordy

maintains the Government view that they are impossible without an

armistice. Thiers took the other side, and at last cried out: 'They

will at least be much more free under the Prussians than under

Gambetta's Prefects!'

In 'Bismarck, his Reflections and Reminiscences,' there occurs the

suggestive passage:--

'It was consequently a fortunate thing that the situation offered a

possibility of doing Russia a service in respect to the Black Sea.

Just as the sensibilities of the Russian Court, which owing to

the Russian relationship of Queen Mary were enlisted by the loss of

the Hanoverian Crown, found their counterpoise in the concessions

which were made to the Oldenburg connexions of the Russian dynasty

in territorial and financial directions in 1866; so did the

possibility occur in 1870 of doing a service not only to the

dynasty, but also to the Russian Empire.... We had in this an

opportunity of improving our relations with Russia.'

There can hardly be a shadow of a doubt that the denunciation of the

Black Sea clauses was what is vulgarly called a 'put up job' between

Bismarck and the Russian Government, probably arranged at Ems in the

spring; but when Mr. Odo Russell made his appearance at Versailles in

order to discuss the question, Bismarck assured him that the Russian

action had not met with his sanction and added that the circular was

ill-timed and ill-advised. (In private, he subsequently expressed the

opinion that the Russians had been much too modest in their demands and

ought to have asked for more.) As, however, the face of the British

Government had to be saved somehow, a Conference in London was

suggested, and the efforts of Lord Granville were concentrated upon an

attempt to persuade the Provisional Government of France to take part in

it. This proved difficult, for the French made it clear that they were

not anxious to do so unless they could get some advantage out of it, and

intimated that they meant to accept aid from any quarter where it might

be obtained--even from the 'Satanic Alliance,' as Thiers called it, of

Russia. One of the difficulties encountered in dealing with the French

Government arose from the discrepancy between language used in London by

the French Ambassador and that used by Chaudordy at Tours. The latter

was not a Minister and the Government consequently did not feel bound to

support him. Chaudordy himself took advantage of his anomalous position

to talk freely and to treat what he had said, according to

circumstances, as pledging or not pledging the Government, and, besides

this, the Government at Tours was liable to be disavowed by the

Government at Paris.

How serious the situation was considered to be in London may be judged

by the following two letters from Lord Granville to Lord Lyons.

* * * * *

Foreign Office, Nov. 28, 1870.

Pray exert all your influence to obtain the assent of France to the

Conference. It will of course be an annoyance to her that peace

instead of war prevails, and there is no doubt that a general

conflagration might be of advantage to her. But you may point out

that the very nature of the question almost precludes instant and

offensive war, and that hostilities distant in point of time would

be nothing but an embarrassment to her.

With regard to the Diplomatic position, it is a great step for the

Provisional Government that Prussia has asked us to obtain her

consent to a Conference. On the other hand, it would be a severe

blow to the Provisional Government if they were left out in the

cold, while the other Powers were settling a question of so much

interest to France.

If such an unfortunate state of things were to occur, we should do

our best to protect the dignity of France, but it would be

difficult. Do not encourage France to suggest delay.

* * * * *

Foreign Office, Nov. 30, 1870.

The French are unwisely playing the same game as they did under

Gramont about the Belgian Treaty. In each case, Bismarck had the

sense to do at once what was to be done.

It is an enormous step for the Provisional Government to be

recognized by Prussia, Austria, Turkey, Italy, and England as

capable of attending a Conference, and it will be very foolish of

them to lose the opportunity and remain out in the cold.

As London is the place, it would be my duty to issue the formal

invitations; at least I suppose so. Do your best to persuade them.

The Government here wish to hold their own, but are most desirous of

a prompt and peaceable solution of this 'Circular' question.

We shall adhere to anything we say, but you will observe that we are

not rash.

Turkey, Austria and Italy are not pleasant reeds to rest on.

If we go to war, we shall be very like the man with a pistol before

a crowd, _after_ he has fired it off. Do not let a pacific word,

however, escape your lips.

These two letters are a sufficiently clear indication of the highly

uncomfortable position in which H.M. Government found itself involved,

and of the urgent necessity of discovering some face-saving formula.

France being incapacitated, it could hardly be supposed that Austria and

Italy would go to war with Russia on account of a question whether

Russia should or should not maintain a fleet in the Black Sea, and

England with her ludicrous military establishments would therefore have

been left to undertake the contest single-handed, or, at most, with the

assistance of Turkey.

Ultimately, of course, a Black Sea Conference met in London, and a

French representative, the Duc de Broglie, put in an appearance just as

it was terminating, after ineffectual efforts had been made to secure

the presence of M. Jules Favre. Lord Fitzmaurice, in his 'Life of Lord

Granville,' has elaborately endeavoured to show that the Conference

resulted in a triumph for British diplomacy. If the acceptance of a

particular form of words (of which, by the way, no notice was taken by

Count Aehrenthal when he annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in defiance of

the Treaty of Berlin), constitutes a success, then Mr. Gladstone's

Government were entitled to congratulate themselves; but as the Russians

got their way and established their right to maintain a fleet in the

Black Sea, they could legitimately claim that for all practical purposes

the triumph was theirs.

In the course of his interviews with Thiers, Bismarck had denounced

England, and before the end of 1870 the feeling between England and

Prussia was anything but friendly. At the outbreak of hostilities

British sympathy had been almost universally on the side of Prussia, but

as the war progressed, public opinion began to veer round. The change in

opinion was due partly to sympathy with a losing cause, partly to an

impression that the Prussians were inclined to put forward unjust and

exaggerated demands, partly to the violent abuse which appeared in the

press of both countries, as well as to a variety of other causes. A

letter from Mr. Henry Wodehouse, one of the secretaries at the Paris

Embassy, shows that the Crown Prince of Prussia, whose Anglophil

sympathies were well known, deplored the tone of the German papers, and

alludes at the same time to a domestic squabble in high German circles,

thus showing that the Prussian Government as well as the French was not

entirely exempt from internal dissensions.

* * * * *

_Mr. Wodehouse to Lord Lyons._

Rouen, Nov. 16, 1870.

On Monday morning, before leaving Versailles, I had an interview

with the Crown Prince of Prussia at H.R.H.'s desire.

H.R.H. informed me that, at the last moment, when it was thought

that all was arranged for the Union of South Germany with the North

German Confederation, the Würtemberg Minister, instigated, it was

believed, by the Bavarian Government, had asked for a delay in order

to consult the other members of the Würtemberg Government, and had

started for Stuttgardt with this object. This sudden decision had

caused the King of Prussia and his Government very great annoyance.

H.R.H. spoke of the hostile tone lately adopted towards England by

the German press, which he assured me, was quite contrary to the

wishes of the Prussian Government, and that he himself much

regretted it, as he feared it would give rise to a spirit of

animosity between Prussia and England.

H.R.H. desired me to report this conversation to Lord Granville on

my arrival in England.

As was shown in the case of the American Civil War, it is extremely

difficult for a neutral to keep on good terms with both parties, however

much it may be desired to preserve an absolutely impartial attitude. The

French blamed us because they considered that we had not rendered them

the kind of assistance which they thought was due to them. The

Prussians, on the other hand, were always discovering grievances which

betrayed our partiality. Upon the whole it is not surprising that our

attitude provoked excessive irritation on their part, for we were

continually harping on and deploring the iniquities of war, while

perfectly ready to make a handsome profit out of it by selling anything

to the belligerents. The late Sir Robert Morier admirably described the

British attitude as it appeared to German eyes. "We sit by like a

bloated Quaker, too holy to fight, but rubbing our hands at the roaring

trade we are driving in cartridges and ammunition. We are heaping up to

ourselves the undying hatred of this German race, that will henceforth

rule the world, because we cannot muster up courage to prevent a few

Brummagem manufacturers from driving their unholy trade."[24] It is only

fair to add, however, that German censure was confined to England; the

Americans, who exported arms in just the same way, were never denounced,

but possibly this was due to the fact that they assumed a less

self-righteous attitude.

Whatever may have been Bismarck's private sentiments with regard to

England, he was not unconciliatory in public, and the various

difficulties which arose were settled satisfactorily. One of the last

unpleasant episodes was the sinking of several British merchant vessels

in the Seine by the Prussian artillery towards the close of the year,

for which compensation was demanded, and a passage in Busch's 'Bismarck'

shows his method of dealing with such matters. 'When the Germans, a

short time before the conclusion of the Preliminary Peace at Versailles,

sank some English coal ships on the Lower Seine and the English made a

row on the subject, the chief asked me (Lothar Bucher), What can we say

in reply? Well, I had brought with me some old fogies on the Law of

Nations and such matters. I hunted up what the old writers called the

Jus Angariæ, that is to say, the right to destroy the property of

neutrals on payment of full compensation, and showed it to the chief. He

sent me with it to Russell, who showed himself to be convinced by this

"good authority." Shortly afterwards the whole affair with the Jus

Angariæ appeared in the _Times_. We wrote in the same sense to London,

and the matter was settled.'

Mr. Odo Russell, whose presence at Versailles had been utilized to

ascertain what terms of peace were likely to be granted, wrote before

the middle of December that he was convinced that Bismarck would refuse

to treat except upon the basis of unconditional surrender, and the

failure of the sorties from Paris and of the operations near Orleans

caused Thiers to lose heart, although Gambetta was as determined as ever

to continue the struggle and to postpone the convocation of a National

Assembly for as long as possible. Thiers indeed went so far as to

declare in private to the Ambassador that further resistance was

useless, and that it was a crime as well as a folly to continue it. The

last disasters of the French, which were partly due to two shocking

pieces of bad luck--the balloon which should have brought Trochu's plan

for combined action with the Army of the Loire having been blown off to

Christiania, and a sudden rise of the Marne having rendered co-operation

with General Vinoy impossible--forced the Tours Government and the

Diplomatists to migrate to Bordeaux. An offer on the part of the Foreign

Office to send a warship to that port for the benefit of the Ambassador

and his staff was declined with thanks: 'Under ordinary circumstances, I

think I am better without one, and indeed personally I should be much

less afraid of the Prussians than of the Bay of Biscay.'

It used to be a tradition in after years that the sole perceptible

effect of the Franco-German War upon the British Embassy was that Lord

Lyons's footmen ceased temporarily to powder their hair, but to judge by

a letter to Hammond, Ambassadors suffered inconveniences as well as

humbler people.

It is probable too that the social disorganization produced by the war

provided distinguished diplomatists, who are necessarily amongst the

most ceremonious of mankind, with some novel sensations. Upon one

occasion, when Lord Lyons had occasion to call upon Gambetta, the

Dictator was too busy to see him for some minutes, and deputed a

subordinate to make his excuses. The latter began his conversation with

the remark: 'Allons boire un bock!' a hospitable invitation hardly in

accordance with the traditions of conventional diplomacy.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Mr. Hammond._

Bordeaux, Dec. 12, 1870.

Many thanks for the _Bradshaw_ and the _Times_, and very many more

for your letter of the 7th, which has just arrived by messenger.

Not having the archives here, I cannot look up the regulations about

the expenses of an Embassy on its travels, as this is now. What I am

anxious about is that some compensation should be made to the junior

members who are with me, for the additional expense they are put to

by their migration. I am willing to do anything I can for them, but

there are of course limits to what I can afford, and it would be

utterly repugnant to all my feelings and principles, for me to have

an allowance for entertaining them. In old times, when manners and

feelings were different, this might do; but in the present day the

position of an hotel keeper for his subordinates is destructive of

discipline and comfortable relations between a chief and the members

of his Embassy.

The difficulty of finding lodgings and the prices are much greater

than they were at Paris. I have nothing but one room for study,

drawing-room, bedroom and all; and have just been asked six hundred

pounds a month for one floor of a moderate sized house.

The junior members alluded to included Malet and Sheffield. It had, of

course, been necessary to leave some of the staff at Paris.

In spite of Thiers's failure to obtain an armistice, the French

Government still made strenuous efforts in the same direction and even

succeeded in pressing the Pope into their service. The latter broached

the subject to Count Arnim, the Prussian Minister at Rome, proposing

that the revictualling of Paris should be accepted as a basis, and

received a severe snub for his pains. He was informed, 'in very harsh

terms,' that the proposal could not be considered, and further, that it

was impossible to negotiate with a nation whose bad faith was

scandalously exhibited by the daily appearance in arms of French

officers who had given their word of honour not to serve again during

the war. After much haggling, the French proposals resolved themselves

into three alternatives, each of which was categorically rejected by

Bismarck.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Mr. Layard._[25]

Bordeaux, Dec. 20, 1870.

The difficulty of communication is between this place and England,

and arises from the utter irregularity of all trains, caused by the

movements of the troops. St. Malo has become the usual port of

embarkation and disembarkation for our messengers.

Things are at present at a deadlock. The French want: either a peace

without cession of territory; or an armistice with the revictualling

of Paris for the number of days it lasts; or a European Congress to

settle the terms of peace between France and Germany. Bismarck

peremptorily rejects all three proposals, and does not say precisely

what his conditions of peace are. I suppose the King of Prussia

holds to taking Paris as a satisfaction to military vanity, and that

if the military situation continues favourable to Germany, he will

accept nothing much short of unconditional surrender, while Paris

resists. Of course, unless, by a miracle, Paris is relieved, its

surrender is a question of time--but of how much time? They declare

here that it can hold out without any very material suffering until

the middle of January, and for many weeks longer, if the population

will be content to live on bread and wine. But, supposing Paris to

fall, will peace be made? Here it is declared that the South will

still continue the war, and at any rate there seems to be every

probability that the violent party will not surrender its power

without a struggle. Then the financial question must soon become a

difficulty. I am told that since the investment of Paris began three

months ago, not less than thirty-two millions sterling have been

spent. It is however idle to speculate when events march so fast. I

can tell you little of the present state of the armies. Bourbaki is,

I believe, at Bourges, and Chanzy at Le Mans. I have a military

attaché,[26] Fielding, who has been with Chanzy's army during all the

affairs near Orleans and since, and who has the highest opinion of

his military talents.

The acceptance, pure and simple, of the Conference on the Russian

question arrived from Paris the day before yesterday.

Towards the close of December the remarkable elasticity of the French

character was manifested in a recovery from the depression which had

been produced by the failure of the sorties from Paris and the recapture

of Orleans by the Germans. The overpowering energy of Gambetta was

chiefly responsible for the creation of new armies, and the moment again

appeared unfavourable for peaceful counsels. Thiers and his party

considered that the Government was only pushing the country on to more

complete ruin, and were urgent in their call for a National Assembly.

The majority of the great towns of the South, Bordeaux included, were

against an Assembly or any interference with the existing Government,

and Gambetta and his adherents were determined to go on with the war and

keep themselves in power by all means available. Gambetta was the only

member of the Government outside Paris who counted for anything, and the

moderates were placed at a considerable disadvantage owing to Jules

Favre being detained there.

Thiers, who had never joined the Government, prognosticated that it

would immediately come to an end upon the fall of Paris, and that a

moderate (_honnête_) republic would be established in the greater part

of the country, while Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon and other places in the

south would set up a socialistic form of government, and do an enormous

amount of harm before suppression. In the opinion of competent judges,

if the country could have been fairly polled at this particular period,

the majority (consisting of course mainly of the peasants) would have

been found to be Bonapartist, in spite of all that had taken place. The

bourgeoisie and inhabitants of the smaller towns would have shown

themselves to be in favour of quiet and security of property, and would

therefore have probably voted for the Orleanists, as the best

representatives of those principles; and the masses in the large towns

would have turned out to be republican and socialist. A genuinely free

expression of opinion would, however, have been difficult to secure, for

Gambetta's prefects were, if anything, more unscrupulous than the

Emperor's and, under existing circumstances, had greater means of

downright intimidation.

In the closing days of 1870 fresh efforts were made by H.M. Government

to start the Black Sea Conference as soon as possible, and to persuade

the French to send a representative without delay. Under the

circumstances, it might have been supposed that they would have named

their Ambassador in London, but for some obscure reason, it was decided

that Jules Favre was the only possible man, and as he was shut up in

Paris it was necessary to obtain a safe conduct for him from the

Germans. The following letter is of interest as an impartial

appreciation of Jules Favre, and as containing some sage opinions upon

the question of the Black Sea and the Dardanelles.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Bordeaux, Dec. 26, 1870.

I did all I could in favour of Tissot. He would have been a much

more convenient plenipotentiary than Jules Favre and have

facilitated the business of the Conference and the speedy

termination of it. Jules Favre is, I believe an honest and really

patriotic man--by which I mean a man who will sacrifice his own

position and interests to what he believes to be the real good of

his country. But he has not hitherto shown himself to be a good

diplomatist or a skilful negotiator, and is too much led away by his

feelings to be a good practical man of business. He will at all

events go to London with a real knowledge of the state of things in

Paris, and if he thinks the convocation of a National Assembly

feasible and advisable, will have more means than any one else of

bringing it about in spite of Gambetta. It will be good too that he

should see for himself what the real feelings and intentions of the

English Government are. He is a man, who would, I should think, be

touched by real kindness and consideration for his country and

himself in these times, and sensitive in case anything like a slight

was put upon him or them--and particularly if the situation of

France were not taken very seriously by all who approach him. He was

a fierce and even truculent orator in the Chamber, but in private

life is mild and agreeable. His power of speaking may be an

inconvenience in the Diplomatic Conference, and I fancy he is led

away by his 'verve' when he does get into a speech, and says

sometimes things more forcible than judicious. I should think he

would never himself sign a peace by which territory was yielded, but

I conceive him to be a man who would make room for others to do so,

and help them, if he was really convinced that it was necessary for

France.

I suppose the Germans will make no difficulty about the safe

conduct: it is for their interest to have some influential member of

the Government who might enable peace to be made in an emergency, in

which Gambetta might, if unchecked, have recourse to desperate

measures.

At this moment I think the French have recovered their hope of

making a successful resistance to the Dismemberment of the country.

I am not very sanguine after all that has occurred, but I do think

the military prospects less gloomy than they have been since Sèdan,

or at all events, since Metz. You will, I conclude, soon have a

really trustworthy account of things in Paris from Claremont.

The Conference, I suppose, must end in Russia carrying her main

point practically, and therefore it only remains to make it as much

as possible an antidote to the scheme of raising her prestige in

Turkey, by the form she adopted, of setting the other parties to the

Treaty at defiance. I am afraid not much can be done towards this. I

should suggest a very careful consideration of the meaning of the

restoration to the Sultan of the right to open the Dardanelles and

the Bosphorus at pleasure, and a very cautious wording of the

article establishing it. Otherwise, considering the weakness of the

Porte, I am afraid the new right might become a snare and a danger

rather than a safeguard. It was so much easier for the Porte to say:

'I cannot' in answer to inconvenient importunity, than it will in

future be to say: 'I will not.' Even under the Treaty prohibition

the Turks had not the firmness they might have had in resisting

demands for vessels to pass. I can conceive circumstances under

which it might suit them to let a Russian fleet through into the

Mediterranean, if only to be rid of it for the time in the Black Sea.

In Busch's 'Bismarck' there are many references to Jules Favre's

emotional disposition. At the first interview which took place, a French

peasant was told to keep watch outside the house where the Chancellor

and Favre were negotiating, and the latter was unable to resist the

temptation of making a speech to his fellow-countryman. 'Favre, who had

gone into the house with the Chancellor, came out and addressed his

countryman in a speech full of pathos and noble sentiments. Disorderly

attacks had been made, which, he said, must be stopped. He, Favre, was

not a spy, but, on the contrary, a member of the new Government, which

had undertaken to defend the interests of the country, and which

represented its dignity. In the name of International Law and of the

honour of France, he called upon him to keep watch, and to see that the

place was held sacred. That was imperatively demanded by his, the

statesman's, honour, as well as by that of the peasant, and so forth.

The honest rustic looked particularly silly as he listened open-mouthed

to all this high falutin, which he evidently understood as little

as if it were so much Greek.' Bismarck entertained a well-founded

contempt for rhetoric, and Jules Favre's eloquent verbosity was to him

only an instance of the way in which Frenchmen could be successfully

duped. 'You can give a Frenchman twenty-five lashes, and if you only

make a fine speech to him about the freedom and dignity of man of which

those lashes are the expression, and at the same time strike a fitting

attitude, he will persuade himself that he is not being thrashed.' It is

probable too that Jules Favre's inability to appreciate Bismarck's

undisguised cynicism contributed to the disfavour with which he was

regarded as compared with the other negotiator, Thiers. When during one

stage of the negotiations, Jules Favre complained that his position in

Paris was very critical, Bismarck proposed to him that he should

organize a rising so as to be able to suppress it whilst he still had an

army at his disposal: 'he looked at me quite terror-stricken, as if he

wished to say, "How bloodthirsty you are!" I explained to him, however,

that that was the only right way to manage the mob.'

Whatever the merits or demerits of Jules Favre, a disagreeable surprise

was inflicted upon both the British Government and the Government of

National Defence by a refusal on the part of Bismarck to give him a safe

conduct through the German lines. At first, difficulties were raised in

connection with alleged violations of flags of truce; but upon the issue

of a proclamation by Jules Favre, Bismarck took advantage of the

opportunity in order to prevent his departure for London on the ground

that it would imply an official recognition of the Government of

National Defence.

At all events, he made such stipulations about the way in which the safe

conduct should be applied for, that Jules Favre with his strong

sentimental character found it impossible to comply with them, and he

was also honourably reluctant to leave Paris just before the bombardment

was about to begin. Bismarck, it is clear, was determined that he should

not go to London if he could prevent it. The meeting of the Conference

was postponed and by the time the final arrangements in connection with

it had been made, negotiations for peace had begun and it became

necessary for Favre to remain in Paris.

At the close of 1870, the bombardment of Paris had not yet begun: the

French hopes of military success were based upon Generals Chanzy and

Bourbaki; the German terms of peace were still unknown, and there was

every sign that the extreme Republicans were disposed to break with

Favre and Trochu and to perpetuate their power by war _à outrance_ and a

_loi des suspects_, or reign of terror. The most surprising feature in

the situation was that Russia, who had been in fact an active ally of

Prussia, by undertaking to watch Austria, and had obtained nothing

whatever for France, was in much higher favour than the other blameless

neutrals, it being fondly imagined that the Emperor Alexander's

influence would be successful in obtaining favourable peace terms; and

so adroitly did the Russians play their cards, that they persuaded

Moltke that the 'malevolent neutrality' of England was the sole cause of

the continuance of the war. Such at least was the purport of a

communication which the latter made to Mr. Odo Russell at Versailles.

* * * * *

Bordeaux, Jan. 7, 1871.

The French claim a success at Bapaume, but prudent people are

already speculating on what the consequences of the fall of Paris

will be. It is very generally thought that Gambetta will place

himself at the head of the ultra-Republicans, throw himself into

Lyons, or some other southern town, and proclaim war and democracy

_à outrance_. But what will Bismarck do at Paris? Will he try to

obtain a government with whom he may make a reasonable peace, or

will he promote war and anarchy with a view to ruin France utterly,

and induce her to accept a monarch from his hand? In the former case

he will perhaps either summon the old Legislative Body, or get

together some meeting of Notables, who might appoint a provisional

government to sanction a National Constituent Assembly as soon as

possible, and in the meantime to treat upon the preliminaries of

peace. The Moderates and chiefs of the old parties (except the

ultra-Republican) might be not unwilling either to attend a summons

of the old Corps Législatif, or to some other temporary body; for

they are excessively dissatisfied with their present position, and

think they see symptoms of the approach of the reign of terror and

of a violent socialistic government.

As for Bismarck's notion of bringing back the Emperor at the head of

the captive army, it is, I suppose, very doubtful whether the

Emperor would give in to it, still more doubtful whether the

released army would, and quite certain that the country would loathe

a sovereign thus imposed upon it. If however Bismarck is bent upon

it, it must be supposed that he intends to make some concessions to

the Emperor to make his return to France palatable to the nation. If

so, Belgium will be in danger, and Holland also, and Bismarck may

return to one of his former projects of coming to an understanding

with France, through the Emperor, and dealing with the small states

just as he pleases. I suppose Russia will look after Denmark as well

as she can. These dangers may seem visionary but I don't think they

are so visionary as to make it superfluous to consider how

they may be guarded against. Hateful as it would be to the towns and

the educated classes, to have a sovereign imposed upon them by

Prussia, it must not be forgotten that the peasants are still

Bonapartists, and that a plébiscite in favour of the Empire might be

managed.

I think I have made them feel here that you have been very friendly

and considerate about Jules Favre.

At the opening of the year 1871, the hope of relieving Paris depended

upon the three armies which the energy of Gambetta and the Government of

National Defence had created in the North, Centre, and West, and on

paper the prospects of the French were far from hopeless, for their

forces in numbers far exceeded those of the Germans. In Paris alone

there were supposed to be something like half a million fighting men,

and the three armies above mentioned amounted to between four and five

hundred thousand men. The Germans had 220,000 men in position round

Paris, their forces in the provinces were numerically inferior to the

French armies opposed to them, and the strain upon them must undoubtedly

have been severe. The quality of Gambetta's levies, however, was unequal

to the task, and as each of the French armies succumbed in turn, the

fall of Paris became inevitable. The bombardment, which had been

postponed as long as possible, in the hope that internal disorders would

precipitate the capitulation, began in January.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Bordeaux, January 12, 1871.

If the telegraphic intelligence which is published as having come by

this balloon is to be depended upon, the Prussians have begun the

actual bombardment of the town of Paris itself, without giving

Diplomatists, Neutrals, or any other non-combatants a chance of

withdrawing. To say nothing of other feelings, this makes me very

uneasy about the English left in the place. Most of them have

perhaps only themselves to blame for staying in despite of warning

but there must be many who had valid reasons, or were without the

means to come away.

People are very much alarmed as to what may happen inside the town

for the last two or three days, if a surrender become inevitable.

There are two or three hundred thousand people (workmen and their

families) who have a positive interest in the continuance of the

siege, during which they are supported by the Government without

being called upon to expose themselves, or at all events without in

fact exposing themselves to much danger.

The intention of not listening to terms of peace, including any

cession of territory, whether Paris be taken or not, is as loudly

and as positively proclaimed here as ever. I am afraid Bismarck, who

certainly does not at all understand the French character, and who

does not appear to have a very delicate consideration for anybody's

feelings, may add to the difficulties of peace by the manner in

which his conditions are propounded, as well as by the substance of

them.

The Diplomatists here are beginning to talk hypothetically of what

they should do if one or more Governments should be set up in France

on the fall of Paris. I do not think much good comes of giving

opinions beforehand on supposed cases. It is of course clear that

the Diplomatic Body cannot go wandering about France in the suite of

any set of men, who are not beyond dispute the _de facto_ Government

of the country. And I suppose, _caeteris paribus_, if there be a

Government in the Capital that must be taken to be the Government

for the time being. It is so impossible to foresee what will happen,

that I do not ask you for instructions.

Chaudordy on the other hand, continues to press for the immediate

recognition of the Government of National Defence by England--saying

that they do not want any fresh letters of credence to be presented,

but would be quite satisfied with a simple note declaring that Her

Majesty's Government entered into official relations with the

existing Government in France. I conclude that Gambetta urges him to

do this, with a view to strengthen the position of the National

Defence Government or of what remains of it, if Paris falls; and on

the other hand Chaudordy himself would be very glad to have obtained

some decided result during his Administration of the _extra muros_

foreign Department. He has certainly on the whole acted with skill

in a very difficult position, and France and the Government ought to

congratulate themselves on having him to act for them. I don't think

that Jules Favre or any member of the Government would have done

anything like as well. But in France more even than in other

countries a little éclat is more appreciated than years of useful

unobtrusive labour.

Thiers has told me in the strictest confidence that when he was at

Versailles Bismarck offered to make peace on the basis of a

pecuniary indemnity, the retention of Strasburg and Alsace, and the

restoration to France of Metz and Lorraine. They seem to have

brought the matter sufficiently into shape to be submitted to the

Government at Paris. Thiers wanted Trochu, Picard and Jules Favre to

come to him to the outposts, but, as you may recollect, only Favre

came. Thiers offered to take upon himself the responsibility and

odium of signing a treaty on this basis, if the Government would

make him its plenipotentiary, but Favre declared that it would be

impossible even to mention any cession of territory even to the

people of Paris.

The most astonishing thing to me perhaps is the buoyancy of the

French finances. I understand that the Government have by strong

persuasion obtained from the Banque de France a new loan (it is said

of upwards of twenty millions sterling) and this will keep them

going for the present. There is already however, some difficulty in

circulating the 'bons du Trésor' even at a discount.

I had observed the advertisements in the second columns of the

_Times_ and thought of trying to get the paper occasionally into

Paris. In fact however the advertisers have exactly the same means

of sending letters and telegrams to Paris that I have. I will

nevertheless try. No special help can be expected from the

Government. It is only by using the thinnest paper and reducing the

despatches by means of photography that they can bring them within

the weight which pigeons or secret messengers are able to carry.

There is no reason for doubting the correctness of this important

statement made by Thiers, and it only shows how much more competent he

was to conduct the negotiations than Jules Favre, and what a much better

judge he was of the real situation than Gambetta. It would indeed be one

of the ironies of history if the failure of Picard and Trochu to meet

him at the outposts on that eventful day in November was the cause of

the loss of a province to France, and of a vast addition to the war

indemnity.

It was not long before a succession of hideous disasters demonstrated

the hopelessness of the French situation. General Chanzy, in command of

the army of the West, although in superior force, was completely

defeated at Le Mans on January 12th. On the 19th, the Northern army

under Faidherbe was defeated at St. Quentin and ceased practically to

take any further part in the war. On the same date a sortie from Paris

on a large scale was repulsed with heavy loss, and produced amongst

other results the resignation of Trochu, a sanguinary riot in the town,

and the liberation from prison of Flourens and other revolutionaries.

The crowning misfortune was the memorable _débâcle_ of Bourbaki, one of

the most tragic episodes in modern warfare. It was evident that further

resistance was useless, and the fictions which had so long sustained the

spirits of the defenders of Paris were finally destroyed. On January 23,

the unfortunate Jules Favre presented himself at Versailles and as there

was no further question of 'pas une pierre de nos forteresses etc.,' an

armistice was finally agreed to on the 28th. Under the provisions of the

armistice it was arranged that elections should be held as soon as

possible for a National Assembly in order that the question of the

continuance of the war, and upon what conditions peace should be made,

might be decided. Jules Favre, unlucky to the last, stipulated that the

National Guards should be permitted to retain their arms, a concession

which he had cause bitterly to regret before long.

The news of the armistice was received at Bordeaux with rather less

indignation than had been expected, but Jules Favre was loudly denounced

for not having included in it Bourbaki's army, the fact being that

Bismarck, who was well aware of the ruin which threatened the force, had

expressly refused to do so. Gambetta, while not actually repudiating the

armistice, issued violent proclamations, loudly denouncing its authors,

declaring that his policy as Minister of War remained unchanged, and

urging that the period of the armistice should be employed in organizing

the forces which were destined to free France from the invaders. These

proclamations were followed by a decree in which the liberty-loving

democrat enacted that no person should be eligible for the new Assembly

who was connected with the royal families which had hitherto reigned in

France, or any one who had served in any capacity as an official under

the Empire. This outrageous proceeding produced a protest from Bismarck

on the ground that it was a violation of the freedom of election

stipulated in the armistice, and as Gambetta continued recalcitrant, the

Paris section of the Government of National Defence, which included,

amongst others, Favre, Trochu, and Jules Ferry, issued another decree on

February 4, annulling that of Gambetta. Representatives of the National

Defence Government from Paris arrived at Bordeaux on February 6, and

upon that day Gambetta resigned the office of Minister of War, and

Emmanuel Arago was appointed in his place. As Paris was now again in

communication with the outside world, the opportunity was taken, not

only of cancelling Gambetta's decrees, but of getting rid of the

Delegation Government, of which he had been the virtual dictator.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Bordeaux, Feb. 7, 1871.

So far as we can judge here (and we have not very good means of

judging) the moderate Conservative 'Ticket' is likely to be carried

in most of the Elections. The result would be an assembly composed

of men who in their own hearts will wish for peace, and whose

Constituents will heartily wish for it. But there is always fear of

each individually thinking it necessary to express for himself in

public heroic sentiments, and of no one being willing to bell the

cat and sign or even vote for ratifying the Treaty. Much of course

will depend upon the terms. The cession of Alsace might possibly be

submitted to, if it were distinctly apparent that it was the only

means of saving Lorraine. The terms of the Armistice would make one

hope that Bismarck is at least willing to avoid propounding

conditions unnecessarily irritating.

Probably the most prudent thing for France to do would be to accept

anything like reasonable terms of peace at once--for every day's

delay in the departure of the German troops from the country,

retards most seriously the beginning of the recovery from the

misfortunes military, political, and financial, which are exhausting

the springs of life. It is nevertheless very probable that the

Assembly, or the Government it appoints, will make a solemn official

appeal to Europe for its mediation. They may also ground a special

appeal to Europe on the plea that the people of the Provinces to be

ceded, ought to have a voice in the matter. In fact they have much

to say to Europe, to which it will be difficult to make an answer.

Bismarck, however, seems to be ready to snap his fingers at Europe.

Chaudordy naturally declines as far as possible the responsibility

of talking or taking any measures, as he is now the servant of a

Government, whose existence will probably end in a few days.

Privately he urges strongly, with a view to public opinion in

France, that England should be very prompt in recognizing officially

the Government appointed by the Assembly. In this I think he is

right.

Prudent men (Thiers included) appear to think that at all events as

a temporary measure, a moderate republic, as the form of Government

least likely to produce dissension should be adopted. Indeed, of the

various pretenders, no one I suppose would wish to be in any way

responsible for such a peace as must be concluded. Some people

indeed apprehend that the Assembly may be too conservative, or as it

is called, reactionary, but I don't think this need give any one but

the Rouges the least uneasiness.

The appearance now is that Gambetta will not go beyond legal

opposition, and that he will content himself with putting himself at

the head of the ultra-democratic and '_guerre-à-outrance_' party in

the Assembly. In fact there is no symptom that an attempt to set

himself up, by the aid of the mob in the great towns, in opposition

to the Assembly would have any success. He is not himself by

character inclined to such courses, but he has people about him who

are.

Jules Favre is fiercely attacked first for having concluded an

armistice which did not comprehend the Army of the East, and

secondly for not having mentioned this exception when he announced

the armistice to the Delegation here. This last proceeding (which I

attribute to his want of business-like habits), is of course utterly

indefensible. It may however have been rather convenient than

otherwise to Gambetta, as it enables him to attribute to this cause

the flight into Switzerland, which I suppose, the Army of the East

must at all events have been driven to. The attack against him for

not surrendering Paris at discretion, and stipulating nothing for

the Provinces, seems to me to be more unfair--for what would the

Provinces have said if he had let loose upon them the forces, which

after the occupation of the forts might have been spared from the

German Army round Paris.

Barring accidents, there seems reason to hope that we shall tide

over the time to the meeting of the Assembly next week, pretty

quietly.

At all events the suspension of the bloodshed and other horrors is a

relief which I feel every moment. Four Prussian shells fell into the

small convent near the Val de Grace at Paris in which I have a

niece--but providentially neither she nor any of her fellow nuns

were hurt.

The elections to the new National Assembly took place on February 8, all

political groups participating, and resulted more or less in accordance

with general expectation. In Paris, where there were many abstentions,

extreme men like Louis Blanc, Victor Hugo, Gambetta and Rochefort were

returned, and the example of Paris was to some extent followed by the

big towns, but the general tone of the Assembly proved to be

conservative, and almost reactionary, the sole question submitted to the

candidates having been that of Peace or War. In effect, the feeling

apparently predominant in the minds of the majority of the electors was

aversion from the Government of National Defence, a feeling naturally

accentuated by the recent crushing disasters, and the result was to throw

discredit upon the Republican system of Government with which the

Ministers were identified. But although the Assembly was in reality

anti-Republican it was not the opinion of experienced politicians that

it would be advisable to proclaim a monarchy; still less, that any one

of the rival dynasties should be called immediately to the throne. On

the contrary, they considered that a republic, moderate in its

principles, and perhaps tacitly understood to be only temporary, would

best promote union for the present, and that under such a form of

Government it might be easier to obtain a ratification of such a peace

as appeared to be possible, and to carry the painful measures necessary

to give effect to it. It was also thought that if a monarchy were to be

established it would have a better chance of enduring if the dynasty

postponed its accession until the wounds from which the country was

suffering should begin to heal, and that the all-important choice of a

sovereign should be postponed to a calmer period. So far as could be

judged, if a dynasty were decided upon at all, the chances appeared to

be in favour of the House of Orleans, but there were nevertheless,

amongst the members returned, between one hundred and fifty to two

hundred Legitimist supporters of the Comte de Chambord, and not a few

Bonapartists.

As for the all-important question of peace or war which the Assembly was

to be called upon to decide, it was evident that the majority of the

electors, in voting against the existing Government, intended to vote at

the same time for peace, and therefore the majority of the members

entered it with pacific intentions; but they were not prepared to vote

for peace at any price, and although conditions which would have been

scouted two months earlier were now considered to be worthy of

discussion, the exaction of immoderate and humiliating demands might

again arouse the spirit of desperate resistance, especially when argued

under the excitement produced by heated parliamentary debates.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Bordeaux, Feb. 10, 1871.

Thiers, Dufaure, and Grévy are likely, so far as one can judge,

without knowing the result of the Paris elections, to take the lead

in the National Assembly. Grévy is avowedly a moderate Republican,

and the two others are for a moderate Republic, as a transitional

government to prepare the way for a Constitutional Monarchy. Such,

at least, are certainly Thiers's views, but I am speaking rather

without book about Dufaure.

What I am most afraid of is that Bismarck's conditions may be so

hard as to turn the really pacific Assembly into a war _à outrance_

one. The war could not in all probability go on long, but it might

give us three months more of bloodshed, destruction and misery, and

add to the difficulty of establishing eventually a good government

here. An Assembly elected two months ago would have been very

different from the present one, supposing one could have been

elected at all; but, two months ago, Gambetta would have been strong

enough to reject the armistice and refuse to convoke the Assembly.

His entourage had even now prepared warrants for arrest of his

colleagues, with a view to his assuming the Dictatorship and going

on with the war without an Assembly, but he is wiser and less wicked

than they. He will probably make a vigorous leader of the violent

Republican opposition in the Assembly.

Of course under present circumstances I have nothing to do but to

stay here, as it will be for the present the seat of government. It

will be a comfort to have a whole real government, and not half a

one, to deal with.

Chaudordy has at last come round to the opinion that a

plenipotentiary should be named to the Conference, simply to speak

for France on the Black Sea question, without any _arrière pensée_

about bringing in other matters. He said he would telegraph as well

as he could _en clair_ to let Jules Favre know this. Bismarck will

not let telegrams in cypher through, and there are no more pigeons.

What the French are craving for is some open, patent sympathy and

support from us. They would give us comparatively little thanks for

taking unostentatious steps in their favour with the Germans, though

such steps were much better calculated to obtain something for them.

The extreme desirability of showing some evident sign of sympathy with

France was impressed upon Her Majesty's Government who were urged to

lose no time in doing so, with a view to the future relations between

the two countries. The French, who certainty are not less prone than

other nations in seeking to attribute a large share of their misfortunes

to the shortcomings of other people, were inclined to put the blame of

their calamities and disasters as much as possible, upon the Neutral

Powers, who had not interfered actively in their defence; and England,

who had certainly exerted herself more than any other Power in seeking

practical means for making peace attainable, was very unjustly singled

out for peculiar obloquy. This feeling had arisen partly because the

long alliance between the two countries had made the French expect more

from England than from others; partly because other Powers had

ingeniously represented that their own inertness had been caused by the

unwillingness of England to come forward, and had also, on various

occasions, put England forward as the leading Power among the Neutrals,

in order to give her the greatest share of the unpopularity which

accompanies neutrality. French feeling was, therefore, at the time

highly irritable on the subject of England, and it was suggested that a

good impression would be created if Her Majesty's Government would be

very prompt in recognizing whatever Government were adopted by the new

Assembly, even if it did not assume a permanent character. Another

suggestion was, that if the terms offered by the Germans appeared

unendurably hard, the French might make an appeal to the rest of Europe;

that appeal would probably take the form of a request for the mediation

of the Great Neutral Powers, or for the assembling of an European

Congress, and an immediate compliance on the part of England with either

of these requests would go far towards re-establishing good feeling.

Even if Germany rejected all intervention, this would not affect the

impression made by the action of England in responding to the appeal of

France, and although more could probably be obtained by the exercise of

quiet and unostentatious influence upon Germany, yet nothing that might

be obtained in that way would have anything like the same value in the

eyes of France as an open declaration of sympathy with her and an avowed

advocacy of her cause, even if no practical result followed. In short,

what was required, at that particular moment, was a policy of

sympathetic gush.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Bordeaux, Feb. 16, 1870.

Your telegrams announcing that you have adjourned the Conference,

and that I may recognize the new Government immediately have been a

great satisfaction to me. I hope we shall bring French feeling round

to its old cordial state, if we can give them a little patent

sympathy in their misfortunes. The Commercial Treaty will be a

trouble hereafter, but it was in great danger even before the fall

of the Empire, and I hope will be let remain quiet until the time

approaches for giving the notice next February.

I had a confidential conversation with Thiers last night. He seems

to have taken already _de facto_ the direction of affairs, and will

probably be given it _de jure_ by the Assembly to-morrow. He is very

anxious to keep the three fractions of the Chamber who are for order

at home and for a reasonable policy about peace together, in order

to resist the Reds. He means therefore to take moderate Republicans,

Legitimists and Orleanists into his Ministry. Jules Favre is to be

his Minister for Foreign Affairs, and there will of course be

moderate Orleanists and Legitimists. If Thiers can succeed in

getting the united support of Orleanists, Legitimists, and moderate

Republicans, he expects to have a working majority of nearly

three-quarters of the Assembly. I suppose his difficulty will arise

from the impatience of the Orleanists, who are believed to have

nearly half the seats in the Assembly, and who are impatient and

hungry after their long deprivation of the sweets of power.

Thiers told me that he should take great pains to select men of

station and ability for his diplomatic appointments. In furtherance

of his policy of conciliating all parties, he supports M. Grévy, a

moderate Republican, for the Presidency of the Assembly.

I like Jules Favre and have a good opinion of his character, but I

don't think that he has hitherto shown himself to be skilful as a

diplomatist or a negotiator. Thiers says however that he now gets on

extremely well with Bismarck. There is however a very general

opinion that Thiers means to go himself to Versailles to negotiate

the Peace. He did not give me to understand that he intended to do

so, and there are serious inconveniences in the head of the

Government's being away from the Assembly and the centre of affairs,

to say nothing of the ordinary objections to the chief of a

Government conducting negotiations in his own person.

The feeling in the Assembly yesterday when Alsace and Lorraine were

mentioned was strong and universal, and gives reason to doubt

whether they will even now be brought to vote a cession of

territory. In that case I suppose the only remedy would be a

plébiscite, if a cession of territory is absolutely insisted upon.

The Assembly might refer the question to the people, and I suppose

that, in their present mood, the great majority of the population

voting secretly, would vote Peace and not War, and that the vote

might be taken in a very short time. I don't know however what the

Germans would say to the notion, and I don't think such a plan of

throwing off the responsibility worthy of the Assembly, or a happy

precedent for Parliamentary Government.

Of what Thiers means to do respecting the definitive government of

the country, he gave me no hint. His present policy is to try and

get France out of her present straits by the united help of all the

reasonable parties, and not to give any indication as to the future

which might have the effect of alienating any of them.