private letters you sent her with reference to what you said in one
of your letters of the probable designs of France in Belgium. Her
Majesty wished me to inform you that she had more than once called
the attention of the late Government to this subject. The King of
the Belgians in writing to her had repeatedly expressed his
apprehensions that either by means of a Customs convention or by the
purchase by a French company of the Luxemburg Railway to which
unusual privileges and advantages would be conceded by the French
Government, France might seek to obtain a footing in Belgium highly
dangerous to her future independence and neutrality. Her Majesty,
though hoping the King might exaggerate the danger, has invariably
expressed the strongest opinion that England was bound, not only by
the obligations of treaties, but by interests of vital importance to
herself, to maintain the integrity and independence as well as the
neutrality of Belgium; and that the best security for these
essential objects would be found in the knowledge that any
proceedings which seemed to threaten their violation would bring
England at once into the field.
Her Majesty did not mean that any official communication should be
made on the subject, but that the habitual language of our ministers
at Berlin and Paris should be such as to leave no doubt as to the
determination of England.
This communication from the Queen was followed not long afterwards by a
memorandum from Mr. Gladstone, laying stress upon the fact that the
'independence of Belgium was an object of the first interest to the mind
of the British People,' and hoping that it would be made clear to the
French Government 'that the suspicion even of an intention on the part
of France to pay less respect to the independence of Belgium than to the
independence of England would at once produce a temper in the country
which would put an end to the good understanding and useful and
harmonious co-operation of the two Governments.' This was very clear
language--especially for Mr. Gladstone--and the Ambassador was directed
to hint to the French Government that Belgium was under our special
protection.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, Feb. 16, 1869.
Baron Beyens, the Belgian Minister, comes to me frequently about the
Grand Luxemburg Railway affair, and is very naturally in great
tribulation both for himself and his country.
M. de La Valette also loses no opportunity of speaking to me about
it, and appears also to be very much disturbed. For my own part, I
can only preach in general terms conciliation to both.
I have found M. de La Valette calm and moderate, but I am afraid
there can be no doubt that the affair is extremely annoying to the
Emperor, and that His Majesty is very angry. M. de La Valette asked
me to call upon him to-day, and told me in the strictest confidence,
though he did not pretend to have absolute proof of it, that the
whole thing was instigated by Count Bismarck. He considered that
there were three possible solutions of the question.
The first, that France should at her own risk and peril annex
Belgium to herself. To this solution M. de La Valette was himself
utterly opposed.
The second was the adoption of retaliatory financial and commercial
measures. To this he was also opposed, considering it to be
undignified, to be injurious to the interests of Frenchmen, and to
constitute a punishment for all Belgians innocent as well as guilty.
The third course was to pursue the line already taken. To admit
fully the right of the Belgian Government to act as it had done, but
to declare in very distinct terms that it had been guilty of a very
_mauvais procédé_ towards France, and that the Government of the
Emperor was deeply wounded and very seriously displeased. He said
that he was about to prepare a despatch in the above sense.
I need not say that I did all in my power to strengthen his aversion
to the two first courses, and to induce him to soften the tone of
his communication to Belgium.
He seemed however to be afraid that the Emperor would be hardly
satisfied with so little, and he declared it to be quite impossible
that any friendship could hereafter exist between the French
Government and the present Belgian Ministry. In fact, he was far
from sure that his policy would be adopted.
He talks of Bismarck and his ways in a tone which is not
comfortable, and the irritation in France against Prussia seems to
increase rather than diminish. Certainly confidence in peace has not
increased lately.
M. de La Valette may have been calm and moderate, but his Imperial
Master was very much the reverse, and his conduct of the affair was a
striking instance of his ineptitude. He had thoroughly frightened the
Belgians, alienated public opinion in England, and aroused well-founded
suspicions throughout Europe that he intended to fasten a quarrel upon
Belgium in order to facilitate its eventual annexation. According to
Lord Clarendon, the idea that Bismarck had prompted Belgian action was a
complete mare's nest, but even if that were not so, it ought to have
been plain to the Emperor that if there was one thing more than another
which would gladden Prussia, it was a misunderstanding between France
and England. The feeling in England at the time may be judged by
Gladstone's language, who wrote to Lord Clarendon in March 12--
'That the day when this nation seriously suspects France of meaning
ill to Belgian independence will be the last day of friendship with
that country, and that then a future will open for which no man can
answer.'
This apparently was what the Emperor was unable to see.
'Bismarck is biding his time quietly,' wrote Lord Clarendon. 'If
France annexes Belgium and we take no part he will be delighted, as
France could no longer complain of Prussian aggrandisement. If we do
take part, he would be equally delighted at the rupture between
England and France, and would come to our assistance. Either way he
thinks Prussia would gain. Why should Napoleon and La Valette assist
him? A quarrel between France and England or even a coolness is the
great German desideratum.' 'I believe,' he adds in another letter,
'nothing would be more agreeable to Prussia than that the intimacy
between the two countries should be disturbed by a territorial
encroachment which would run on all fours with Prussian
aggrandisement.'
For some reason, which was not clear, the Emperor persisted in making
the question a personal one, announcing that he 'could not and would not
take a _soufflet_ from Belgium,' and the British Government became so
apprehensive of his attitude that the somewhat unheroic course was
adopted of sending a warning to the French Government, but leaving the
responsibility of presenting, or of withholding it, to the Ambassador.
* * * * *
_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, March 16, 1869.
We are very anxious about the Belgian business because more or less
convinced that the Emperor is meaning mischief and intending to
establish unfriendly relations with Belgium preparatory to ulterior
designs. It is very imprudent on his part, and he will only reap
disappointment, for even if he meditates war with Prussia he could
not undertake it upon a worse pretext or one less likely to win
public opinion to his side, as it would wantonly entail an
interruption, to use a mild term, of friendly relations with
England. It is unnecessary to say that we attach extreme importance
to the maintenance unimpaired of those relations, and it is
therefore our paramount duty to omit no effort for that object.
I have accordingly, by the unanimous desire of the Cabinet, written
you a despatch calling the serious attention of the French Government
to the dangerous eventualities that we see looming in the distance,
but the mode of dealing with that despatch may be delicate and
difficult, and we therefore leave the decision on that point to your
discretion. You can either read it, or tell the substance of it at
once to La Valette, or you may keep it for a short time until some
crisis arrives when it could best be turned to account. I feel that
this is rather hard upon you, and I would much rather have been more
precise, but, on the spot, you will be such a much better judge of
opportunity than I can pretend to be here, and if the warning is to
have any success it will depend on its being given at the right
moment and in the right manner.'
One cannot help wondering whether a similar confidence in an
Ambassador's judgment is still shown at the present day, the views of
the so-called 'man on the spot' being now generally at a considerable
discount. In this case, Lord Lyons gave reasons showing that the warning
was not needed, and would not be of any advantage to Belgium, while
complaining that he disliked going about with a live shell in his
pocket. A few days later, however, Lord Clarendon wrote again saying
that he thought that the warning would have to be addressed shortly, as
public opinion in England was beginning to become excited, and attacks
were being made upon the Government for not using stronger language or
showing its determination to stand by Belgium, while the King of the
Belgians was anxious to make his woes known through the English press.
'If,' said Lord Clarendon, 'the Emperor attaches value to the English
Alliance he ought not to sacrifice it by a sneaking attempt to
incorporate Belgium by means of a railway company and its employés. If
he wants war it is a bad pretext for doing that which all mankind will
blame him for.'
It was not unnatural that Lord Clarendon should have felt uneasy at the
threatening development of this apparently insignificant railway
difficulty, because it was plain that the one object which the Belgians
were bent upon was to entangle us in their concerns, and to make us
responsible for their conduct towards France; nor, again, was this an
unreasonable proceeding upon their part, for Belgium was an artificial
state, and as dependent upon foreign guarantees for her existence as
Holland was dependent upon her dykes. Perhaps in order to reassure the
British Government, Marshal Niel's aide-de-camp and General Fleury were
sent over to London in April. They brought a message from the Marshal to
the effect that France was ready for anything, and that the Emperor had
only to give the word; but that to begin by a rupture with England about
a miserable Belgian difference would be a _sottise_. These visitors did
more to convince the French Ambassador in London that there was no
danger of war than all his correspondence with the French Foreign
Office, but Lord Clarendon continued to be apprehensive of the influence
excited upon the Emperor by shady financiers and by an untrustworthy
representative at Brussels.
* * * * *
_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, April 19, 1869.
I have never, as you know, felt any confidence in the soft sayings
and assurances of the French Government, but I did not think they
would have exposed the cloven foot so soon and completely as they
have done. No affair has given me so much pain since my return
to this place, and I foresee that out of it will grow serious
complications and an end to those friendly relations between England
and France that are so advantageous to both countries and which have
had an important influence on the politics of Europe.
What provokes me is that _sales tripotages_ should be at the bottom
of it all, and upon that I have reliable information. I know of all
the jobbery and _pots de vin_ that are passing, and yet it is to
fill the pockets of half a dozen rascals, just as in the case of
Mexico, that the Emperor allows himself to be dragged through the
mud and to imperil the most manifest interests of France.
The policy of the French Government is perfectly understood at
Berlin, where the leading object of Bismarck is to detach us from
France. We might to-morrow, if we pleased, enter into a coalition
with Prussia against France for the protection of Belgian
independence, which is a European and not an exclusively French
question; but we will do nothing of the kind so long as there is a
hope that France will act with common honesty. I wish you would
speak seriously to La Valette about the _tripoteurs_, and represent
the disgrace to his Government of playing the game of such people,
which will all come out and be known in the same way as the Jecker
bonds are now unanimously acknowledged to have been the cause of
that fatal Mexican expedition.
I send you rather a curious despatch from Loftus. Bismarck's ways
are inscrutable, and he is never to be relied upon, but he has had a
union with us against France in his head ever since the Belgian
business began, for Bernstorff, who never speaks without
instructions, has said on more than one occasion to Gladstone and to
me that though Prussia would not undertake to defend Belgium
single-handed, as that country concerned England more nearly than
Prussia, yet that we had but to say the word, and we should soon
come to terms. I treated this, as did Gladstone, rather as a _façon
de parler_ and a ruse to detach us from France, which is Bismarck's
main object, as I did not choose that Bernstorff should have to
report the slightest encouragement to the suggestion, but it _may_
come to that after all.
Colonel Walker, the British military attaché at Berlin, whom Lord
Clarendon considered to be one of the most enlightened and intelligent
men of his profession, was in London at the time, and he reported that
there was not the slightest sign of any active military preparation in
any part of Prussia, and that the idea of war was so much discouraged by
the military authorities that it was no longer talked of in military
circles, whereas formerly it had been the only topic of discussion. The
manoeuvres were to be held in the Prussian provinces most remote from
France, and there was a fixed determination to give the latter no cause
for offence, not from fear of that country, for there was a conviction
that Prussia would have the best of a war, but owing to internal
difficulties. Colonel Walker added that the mutual indisposition of the
North and South to each other was becoming so manifest that the
unification of Germany was far distant.
This comforting piece of intelligence Lord Lyons was instructed to
communicate to the French Foreign Minister.
The Luxemburg Railway difficulty was finally disposed of by a Commission
at London, but before this took place, the Belgian Liberal Minister, M.
Frère-Orban, found it necessary to pay a visit to Paris.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, April 28, 1869.
Frère-Orban had a farewell audience of the Emperor this morning. He
tells me that his Majesty was very gracious. Frère appears to have
insinuated that the business was finished. The Emperor expressed a
hope that something good would be done in the Commission. The
Emperor dwelt upon the necessity of France and Belgium being upon
the best terms in order to put a stop to all the ideas of annexation
which certain journals were continually putting forward. His Majesty
said that the annexation of Belgium to France would be disagreeable
to England, which would of itself be a reason sufficient to make him
averse from it. His Majesty had on his table the Arcolay pamphlet
which asserts that Prussia would be unable to defend South Germany
against France. He said that in an answer to this pamphlet published
at Berlin, the Belgian army was counted among the forces to act
against France, and observed that France and Belgium ought to be on
too good terms to render such an employment of the Belgian army
possible. Frère said that His Majesty had only to make Belgium feel
convinced that her independence was safe, in order to ensure her
sympathy with France. Frère appears to have been much pleased with
the audience on the whole, though he would rather the Emperor had
said distinctly that he did not expect any result from the
Commission, and looked upon the whole question as at an end. He is
very well satisfied with the result of his mission to Paris, as he
has placed the relations on a friendly footing, and conceded
absolutely nothing.
The great points now are for the Belgians not to sing songs of
triumph, and for us and everybody to avoid all appearance of having
exercised any pressure. The Emperor cannot safely take a snub from
any foreign nation, and he feels this very strongly.
It is to the Emperor's credit that, in spite of disastrous failures, he
always seems to have preserved a courteous and amiable demeanour. In
this particular case, it is probable that he did not know clearly what
he wanted himself, and that, misled by unscrupulous advisers, he
entertained vague notions as to the possibility of annexing Belgium, and
then withdrawing, as best he could, when the difficulties were realized.
At all events, the sole result was a rebuff and an increased want of
confidence in his integrity. In short, the mismanagement of this railway
affair, which should never have been allowed to attain so much
importance, and the collapse of his previous attempt upon Belgium,
justified the sneer levelled at him by Bismarck, who, as recorded by
Busch, remarked in 1870, 'He (Napoleon III.) should have occupied----and
held it as a pledge. But he is, and remains a muddle-headed fellow.' A
still more scathing definition was applied to him by his distinguished
countryman, M. Thiers--_une immense incapacité méconnue_.
The private correspondence in 1869 with Lord Clarendon, who was by far
the most voluminous letter-writer amongst English Foreign Secretaries,
contains references to many topics besides the relations between France
and Prussia, such as Tunis, the Eastern Question, Spain, the internal
situation in France, the inauguration of a new Prussian seaport, the
Suez Canal, and a host of other subjects. Amongst these may be mentioned
two projected visits of exalted personages. The Khedive Ismail was
expected in England, and there was some uncertainty as to how he should
be treated. In the previous year he had ingratiated himself with the
Sultan of Turkey by agreeing to pay an increased tribute, and as a
consideration had obtained the title of Khedive and the privilege of
securing the Viceroyalty of Egypt for his own family. Being of a vain
and ostentatious disposition, however, he had now fallen into disfavour
with his Suzerain by reason of the royal airs which he assumed and of
actions which seemed to imply that he considered himself to be an
independent ruler. 'Pray let me know,' wrote Lord Clarendon, 'how the
Viceroy is received at Paris. The Turkish Ambassador has been boring me
with protestations against the royal receptions already given to him and
which he fears may be repeated here. He yesterday showed me a telegram
from Constantinople, saying that _l'effet serait fort regrettable_ if
the Viceroy was lodged in the same apartment at Buckingham Palace that
the Sultan occupied. He declares that this voyage through Europe is to
dispose Governments favourably to recognize his independence, and that
he will be backed by France against his suzerain.'
Upon making inquiries at Paris it was found that the same question had
been raised there, the Turkish Ambassador having made a remonstrance
against the Khedive being lodged in the Elysée, and a special request
that at least the room in which the Sultan slept should not be
desecrated by his obnoxious vassal. The French Foreign Minister had
thereupon advised the Ambassador to consider the remonstrance about the
Elysée and the bedroom as _non avenue_, as it could only serve to make
the Ambassador and his Government look ridiculous. Nevertheless, M. de
La Valette admitted that the Viceroy was taking too independent a line,
and that the proposal to neutralize the Suez Canal was an Imperial
question which should originate from the Porte, and not from the
Egyptian ruler.
The other and more illustrious traveller was the Empress Eugénie, who
was desirous of attending the inauguration of the Suez Canal, and who
unexpectedly intimated that she wished to make a tour in India. Upon
this becoming known, Queen Victoria caused her to be informed that her
presence in any part of the British dominions would always be most
welcome, and that every arrangement would be made for her comfort and
convenience.
'The Empress talked to me last night,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'for a very
long time and with great animation, not to say enthusiasm, of her
project of going to India. She gives herself two months away from
France, during which she proposes to go to Ceylon and most of the
principal places in India except Calcutta. She repeated her thanks
to the Queen and to you, and said that as the Queen had never been
herself to India, she herself, as a Foreign Sovereign, could not
think of receiving Royal Honours, and besides, that she particularly
wished for her own sake to observe the incognito and to be allowed
to go about and see things in the quickest and most unostentatious
manner. I told her that she had only to let us know exactly what her
wishes were and every effort should be made to carry them out. She
particularly begged that her idea of going to India might not be
talked about, lest it should be discussed and criticized in the
papers. I cannot suppose she will ever really go to India, but she
is full of it now. La Valette will stop it if he can, for his own
sake; for he depends a good deal upon her support at the Palace.'
This journey, of course, never took place. La Valette prevented it by
representing to the Empress that if she went to Suez she must also go to
Constantinople, and thus sufficient time for a tour in India was not
available.
A trivial incident in French high society which occurred about this time
serves to show with what extraordinary facility the most exaggerated
statements can be circulated and credited. Writing to Lord Lyons, Lord
Clarendon stated that he had been informed that the former had been
placed in a most disagreeable position at a party given by Princess
Mathilde, at which a recitation had been delivered marked by the most
furious abuse of the English, and that the Emperor had gone up to the
reciting lady and ostentatiously complimented her.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, May 9, 1869.
The only foundation for the story you mention is the fact that I was
at a party at the Princesse Mathilde's at which a play was acted and
some verses recited. The room however was so small that only the
Emperor and Empress and some of the principal ladies had seats in
it. The rest of the company were dispersed in other rooms. For my
own part I was two rooms off, entirely out of sight and out of
hearing of the performance and recitation. Among the verses was, I
believe, an old ode of Victor Hugo's in praise of the First Emperor.
I have never read it, but I dare say it is not over-complimentary to
England. I hear the Emperor was affected to tears by it, but it
certainly neither placed me in an awkward situation, nor gave me any
emotion, for it was out of sight and hearing, and I did not know it
had been recited.
In June Lord Lyons received his first request to take part in a division
in the House of Lords. As far as is known, he had never made any
declaration as to his political views, but apparently he figured on the
Whip's list as a Liberal or Whig, and Lord Clarendon wrote saying that
the Conservative Lords had determined upon the suicidal course of
throwing out the Irish Church Bill, and that as the House of Commons was
'capable of anything' it was imperative to prevent such a disaster; that
every vote in the Lords was of value, and that if he had no serious
objection it was desirable that he should come over and vote on the
second Reading. The answer to this appeal strikes one as a model of
common sense.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, June 6, 1869.
I am very much obliged by your kind consideration in not _pressing_
me on the subject of coming over to vote on the Irish Church Bill.
I will frankly say that I have a very strong disinclination to do
so. The professional objections are too obvious to mention, and I
have another feeling which would make me hesitate. I have as yet
never taken any part whatever in home politics. If I ever come to
live in England, I shall of course endeavour to take a political
line and to be of any use I can. In the meantime I should have great
difficulty in reconciling myself to the idea of now and then giving
a sort of blind vote, either for the sake of party, or from
deference to friends however much I might value and esteem them.
In other words, he knew scarcely anything about the merits or demerits
of the Bill which he was expected to support, and was, of all men, the
least inclined to give a vote on a question with which he was
unacquainted. Lord Clarendon, however, doubtless much against his
inclination, was compelled to return to the charge.
* * * * *
_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._
June 12, 1869.
I am writing in the Cabinet room, and by the unanimous desire of my
colleagues, to request that, unless you object to the Irish Church
Bill, you will come over and give us the benefit of your vote on
Friday.
It is not often that the vote of the Ambassador at Paris is wanted,
and if I remember rightly, Cowley only once or twice sent me his
proxy; but proxies are now abolished, and the real presence is
necessary. Every vote is of importance, as the question is one of
great gravity not only as respects the Irish Church but the conflict
between the two Houses that is impending, and that must if possible
be averted.
Gladstone has just expressed a strong opinion as to the duty of a
peer not to abstain from voting when he is not disabled from doing
so, and does not admit that diplomatic convenience is a sufficient
reason against his doing so.
I hope therefore you will come over if you are not opposed to the
Bill.
It being practically impossible to resist an intimation of this kind
from an official chief, Lord Lyons reluctantly went over to London to
vote, and as he had not yet even taken his seat, took the precaution of
asking a trusty friend in the Foreign Office to find out what the
necessary formalities were. The following somewhat naïve communication
possesses a modern interest as it discloses the fact that backwoodsmen
were as much in existence then as they are now.
* * * * *
_Mr. Staveley to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, June 16, 1869.
Not being able to get any reliable information in the Foreign Office
as to your _modus operandi_ in regard to taking your seat to-morrow,
I have been down to the House of Lords this afternoon and saw one of
the clerks in the Crown Office, who says that all you have to do is
to present yourself at the Peers' entrance to-morrow not later than
4.45 p.m., when you will receive from the clerk in attendance for
that purpose the necessary writ to enable you to take your seat.
Nothing further is necessary, and many peers presented themselves
and took their seats for the first time this session, for the debate
of Monday last, with no further formalities.
The obvious comment on this incident is that Mr. Gladstone and his
colleagues were totally wanting in a sense of proportion, and their
action justifies the belief that the eminent persons who govern this
country are sometimes literally incapable of looking beyond the next
division list in Parliament.
If a British Ambassador is to inspire confidence in his countrymen
it is all important that he should not be a partisan or dependent in any
degree upon party favours. The majority for the second reading of the
Bill was 33, and no fewer than 108 peers were absent from the division
unpaired. Yet because the whip (probably a person of very mediocre
intelligence) said that he wanted every vote that could be obtained, the
Ambassador was sent for, made to figure as a party hack, and forced to
give a vote on a question of which he had admittedly no knowledge, and
upon which his opinion was valueless. It will be seen later that similar
attempts to force him to vote were subsequently made by people who ought
to have known better, but fortunately without much success.
Towards the close of April, 1869, the French Legislative Session came to
an end, and with it expired the Chamber elected in 1863. The General
Election took place in May, and, as an insignificant number of
opposition deputies were returned, owing to the unscrupulous
intervention of the Executive, the results were received with much
satisfaction in Government circles. It was generally felt, however, that
even the huge Government majority would be more independent than in the
late Chamber, and that a very real control would be exercised over the
Ministers. It was even expected by some that the Emperor would formally
announce the acceptance of the principle of the responsibility of
Ministers to Parliament.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, May 25, 1869.
I understand that the result of the elections gives pleasure at the
Tuileries. The Imperialists generally seem very well satisfied.
They consider the result to be a complete defeat of the Orleanists,
a defeat of the Legitimists and a defeat of the moderate
Republicans; the Chamber being thus divided into supporters of the
dynasty and Ultra-Republicans. They think the prominence of the
_Spectre Rouge_ will frighten and unite the people at large, and
cause them to rally round the dynasty. I cannot help being afraid
that there are more _rouges_ elected than is very safe, and the
election of such a sanguinary socialist as Baucel both at Paris and
Lyons is an uncomfortable symptom. The opposition will not be
inconveniently numerous, and its violence will be in all probability
simply a source of weakness.
I could not get Rouher to listen to any hint to propose to Prussia
that a French vessel should be sent to Jahde,[14] though he seemed
willing enough to send one if invited. You have, however, I think,
entirely prevented them having any suspicion of our having been
coquetting with Prussia, or having been willing to curry favour with
her at the expense of France.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, May 29, 1869.
It is very generally believed that Rouher will be made the scapegoat
and placed in the honourable retreat of the Presidency of the
Senate. Since the great rally of the Moderates to the dynasty it has
become the fashion to throw upon Rouher personally the blame of all
the measures which he has had to defend. I don't know who can be
found to take his place as Government orator.
Speculation is occupied in divining how the Emperor will take the
elections. Some think that, finding himself in front of an
opposition of _Rouges_, he will again take the part of the Saviour
of Society and begin a new epoch of Cæsarism. Others, looking to the
comparatively large number of independent members, whose elections
the Government did not oppose, and to the liberal professions made
even by the official candidates, expect a formal announcement of the
responsibility of Ministers to the Chamber, and Parliamentary
Government in form and in fact. An opinion not the least probable is
that His Majesty will make no change, but appoint Ministers and
direct his policy more or less in deference to the Chamber,
according to circumstances.
I hope Beust's meddling in the Belgian question has been merely an
awkward attempt to curry favour with the Emperor, but it may have
had the mischievous effect of encouraging fresh pretensions on the
part of France. Jealousy of Prussia will for a long time to come
ensure sympathy between France and Austria.
The complacent feelings with which the election results were at first
received at the Tuileries soon gave place to very different emotions. M.
de La Valette was under no illusion as to the unimportance of a victory
over the Orleanists, and had frequently assured the Emperor that they
had no real backing in the country, and that His Majesty's extreme
susceptibility with regard to the attention shown to the Princes of that
House by the Court and by society in England was totally unnecessary.
The more the elections were considered the less they were liked. It
began to dawn upon the Emperor that it had been a mistake to help the
Reds with a view to crushing the Orleanists or Moderate Liberals. A
majority in the Chamber was indeed secured to the official candidates,
but the moral weight of the votes given for them was small, for the
influence of the Government had been unsparingly and unscrupulously used
to secure their return, and even the official candidates had, with few
exceptions, been forced to issue very Liberal addresses. Fear of the
extreme men might bring the officials and the independent members
together in the Chamber, but it was generally realized that the
Government would have to go at least halfway to meet the Liberals. In
short, it was difficult to conceal the fact that the elections had not
resulted in a manifestation of confidence in the Imperial Government,
and that they had shown that the party bent upon revolution at any price
was dangerously large. Under these circumstances it was not surprising
that the French Government showed itself alarmed and irritable, and
although the country appeared to have declared against war there were
not wanting Imperialists who would have been ready to look upon a
provocation from abroad as a godsend.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, June 8, 1869.
The elections of yesterday in Paris seem to me satisfactory, for I
certainly prefer Orleanists and Moderate Republicans to Reds, and it
is a great thing to be rid of all the questions Rochefort's return
would have produced. In the Provinces the official candidates seem
to have had the worst of it.
The lessons to be drawn from the general election are not pleasant,
for it is impossible to find anywhere a symptom of approval of
personal government. It is not that the French desire a
Parliamentary government _à l'Anglaise_, but they are tired of the
uncertainty and disquiet in which they are kept by the fact that
peace and war, and indeed everything, depend upon the inscrutable
will of one man whom they do believe capable of giving them
surprises, and whom they no longer believe to be infallible. I don't
like the look of things. I dare say we shall be quiet for some time,
but like the French public, I live in dread of a surprise.
It is true that Fleury is likely to go as Minister to Florence,
though it is a secret. He would keep his office of Grand Ecuyer, but
he would go because he felt that he had lost his influence with
the Emperor and would not choose to stay here only to look after
horses and carriages. I don't think his departure a good sign. He
has lately been rather liberal in politics, and he is one of the few
men who would be certainly true to the Emperor and brave and
resolute if it came to actual fighting in the streets. The object of
his mission to Florence would be to manage the withdrawal of the
French troops from Rome. I have no doubt the Emperor wants to
withdraw them, but he wants also to be sure that the Pope will be
safe without them. I dare say, too, that His Majesty is angry about
the conduct of the clergy in the elections. They voted according to
their own predilections, and certainly did not make the support of
the Government a primary object.
General Fleury, a man of charming personality, and a prominent figure in
French society, was the author of the celebrated rejoinder, _Pourtant,
nous nous sommes diablement bien amusés_, upon an occasion when the
Second Empire was severely criticized some years later. Lord Clarendon
was another of those who felt misgivings over the elections. 'I feel
precisely as you do,' he wrote to Lord Lyons, 'about the elections and
the danger of a surprise that they create. Cæsar thinks only of his
dynasty, and I expect he foresees greater danger to it from responsible
Government than from war. It is not surprising that the French should be
exasperated at always living on a volcano and never knowing when it may
burst out and what mischief it may do them. The Bourgeoisie and the
_actionnaires_ must fear revolution, but they must be beginning to weigh
its evils against those which they are now suffering from. Fleury was a
friend of peace and of England, and I am very sorry that he should so
much have lost his influence as to make him accept a foreign mission.'
The elections were followed by a certain amount of rioting in Paris, and
some hundreds of persons were arrested, but the only effect of these
disorders was to strengthen the hands of those who advised the Emperor
to hold fast to absolute and personal government. The latter was quite
willing to sacrifice individuals to the Chamber, and was aware of the
necessity of making some concessions in a Liberal sense, but he
continued to resist any extension of the power of the Legislative Body.
The latter might have obtained what was desired by calm and patience,
for no minister would have been strong enough to successfully withstand
the demand, but it is not in the nature of Frenchmen to achieve
practical successes without noise and ostentation, and it was plain that
troublous times were ahead. Had Napoleon III. been wise he would have
taken the bull by the horns and announced something that would have
satisfied the Chamber and the country. Unfortunately, the one thing he
refused to give up was the one thing which his opponents were determined
to wrest from him--personal government.
In July the Constitutional agitation was advanced a stage by an
important interpellation of the Government demanding that the country
should be given a greater share in the direction of affairs and asking
for a ministry responsible to the Chamber. This demand was very
numerously signed, and much to the general surprise amongst the
signatures were many names belonging to the Government majority. It was
evident that the country and the Chamber were determined to put some
check on personal government.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, July 7, 1869.
We are going on here _à toute vitesse_, whither, it is not very
pleasant to think. A new form has been agreed upon for the famous
interpellation.
More than a hundred Deputies have signed the demand, and among the
signatories are to be found even some of the regular courtiers, such
as Prince Joachim Murat and the Duc de Mouchy. It is entirely
illegal for the Corps Legislatif to discuss the Constitution, but
things seem to have gone much too far for such scruples to have any
weight. It would be amusing, if it were not rather alarming, to see
the eagerness among men of all parties to be forward in the race
towards Liberalism. Rouher preaches patience and moderation, but the
Oracle from St. Cloud gives no certain response to the many votaries
who try to extract a declaration of its views. This it is, which has
been one of the main causes of the falling away of the Imperial
Deputies. To keep the majority together, it would have been
necessary that a distinct _mot d'ordre_ should have been given them,
the moment the Chamber met. No one is willing to take the unpopular
side without some assurance that he will not be thrown over by the
Prince he wishes to serve; and what is worse, the want of decision
shown has very much diminished confidence in the resolution and
ability of the Sovereign, and consequently the willingness of
politicians to throw their lot in with his. When one looks at the
position in which things stood, I will not say before the election,
but between the election and the meeting of the Chamber, one is
astonished at the rapid descent of the personal power and the
reputation. Whether concessions will come in time to enable him to
stop before he is dragged to the bottom of the hill, is even
beginning to be questioned.
The Prince de La Tour d'Auvergne, the French Ambassador in London, who
was much astonished at the number of persons who had signed the
Interpellation Demand, told Lord Clarendon that the French Government
had brought it entirely on themselves by the scandals perpetrated at the
elections. Both he and Lord Clarendon were convinced that Rouher was
destined to be the Imperial scapegoat. In this they were correct.
Rouher resigned; and La Tour d'Auvergne himself changed places with La
Valette.
* * * * *
_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, July 14, 1869.
When France enters upon a new road it is difficult to guess where it
will lead her to, and revolution may be looming in the distance, but
I think and hope it may be staved off for a time. The Senate will
probably put on as many checks as it dares, and the Emperor will
have a good many dodges for defeating his own programme, but he has
proceeded so unskilfully that he must have shaken the confidence of
those whose support he ought to reckon upon.
He should at once, after the unmistakeable verdict of the country
against personal government, have made up his mind how far he would
go with, or resist public opinion, and not have left his supporters
without that _mot d'ordre_ that Frenchmen cannot dispense with; but
his silence compelled them to speak, and no one will now persuade
the people that he has not yielded to the threatened interpellation.
If they are once thoroughly impressed with the notion that he is
squeezable they will continue to squeeze him, and the language held
even by his immediate entourage is ominous. The middle-class fear of
violent charges, and, above all, of the Reds, may come to his aid,
but he must be sadly in want of sound advice. Rouher's retirement,
even though it be temporary, is, I conclude, indispensable, but I
hope the Imperial confidence will not be given to Drouyn, who
besides being the most untrustworthy of men, is the most dangerous
of councillors. The point which concerns us most is the successor to
La Valette, whose resignation Prince La Tour bears with perfect
equanimity.
The ministerial changes seemed to produce no beneficial effects as far
as the Emperor's position was concerned, and the letters from the
Ambassador became increasingly pessimistic.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, July 27, 1869.
I grieve to say that the Emperor seems to lose ground. His own
partisans seem more and more to doubt his having energy and decision
enough to hold himself and them. What is serious is that this doubt
is strong among the generals. They would stick to him if they felt
sure of him, because a reduction of the army is one of the leading
doctrines of his opponents. Prince Napoleon has found an occasion
for having a letter published repudiating all responsibility for the
conduct of the Government of late years. I have been told very
confidentially that the Empress complained bitterly to the Grand
Duchess Mary of Russia of the inconstancy and ingratitude of the
French people, and said that if the people were tired of her and the
Emperor, they were quite ready to leave the country and save their
son from the dangerous and thankless task of trying to content
France. No one seems to apprehend any immediate danger. The general
impression is that if the Senatus Consultum is a fair execution of
the promises in the message, things will go on quietly enough until
the meeting of the Chamber, which may be safely put off till
December. The most hopeful sign to my mind is the reasonable and
Constitutional way in which the French seem to be getting accustomed
to work for Reforms. If the Emperor sees pretty clearly what to
yield and what to keep, and will express his intentions in time and
stick to them, all may go well yet. But can decision and firmness be
inspired, if they are not in the natural character, or the
reputation for them, if once lost, be recovered?
In spite of the evident deterioration in Napoleon's position and of the
growing distrust in him which was now universally felt, unfavourable
rumours as to the state of his health caused something resembling a
panic. The French funds, which were higher than they had ever been
before, fell suddenly in August. They had risen because the
Constitutional concessions were believed to make it certain that the
Emperor would not make war: they fell because alarming reports were
spread about his ill-health. As a matter of fact, he was suffering from
rheumatism, and there was no real danger, but there is always a
difficulty in ascertaining the truth about illustrious invalids. Much
inconvenience and delay, however, were caused by his indisposition, for
it seems to have been his habit to retire to bed at any hour of the day,
if he felt unwell, and there was no certainty of seeing him, even when
he made an appointment. As his plans depended upon his health, and as
there was further a certain amount of complication caused by the
projected visit of the Empress to the East, nobody quite knew what would
happen, and the _joueurs à la baisse_ profited by the situation to bring
off a big _coup_ on the Bourse.
* * * * *
_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._
Weisbaden, Aug. 31, 1869.
I hope the report given to you of the Emperor's health is correct.
The banker has told me to-day that he had not remembered for years
such a panic at Frankfort as was produced by the news that he was
dangerously ill. If his illness is not serious and he soon gets well
again, the fright will rather do good as making people awake to the
enormous importance of his life. Even, however, if he lives, your
able despatch describing the state and the prospect of affairs in
France gives cause sufficient for anxiety, and I have an instinct
that they will drift into a republic before another year is over.
Had Lord Clarendon lived a few months longer he would have been able to
congratulate himself upon one of the most accurate political prophecies
on record, for the Republic was actually proclaimed in Paris on
September 4, 1870. It should be added that his voluminous letters show
a thorough knowledge of and profound insight into French politics.
The political situation in France at the end of August, 1869, was, on
the whole, apparently somewhat more reassuring than had been the case
earlier in the year. The Emperor's message announcing a great
Constitutional reform had been read in the Corps Législatif in July,
and was followed by a general amnesty for all political and press
offences. The change of Ministry was well received, because it involved
the retirement of M. Rouher, the ablest supporter of the old system of
government, although it was known that many eminent deputies were
unwilling to take office until the Constitutional change had come into
effect. The general impression produced upon the public was favourable,
and although many Liberals were careful to declare that they accepted
the proffered changes simply as an instalment, only the
ultra-Republicans and irreconcilables affected to repudiate them and
treat them with contempt. Even the latter, however, were obliged to
express approval of the amnesty. Meanwhile the country had remained
calm, and so far, the stream of reform appeared to be flowing swiftly
and with unruffled surface. Close observers, however, were under no
illusion as to the critical situation which was concealed behind these
favourable appearances.
The preservation of the Monarchy and of order in France depended as much
upon the Emperor as it had done during the early years of his reign, and
he was far from being as strong as then. He had been at the head of the
Government for more than eighteen years, and the temperament of the
French seemed to preclude the idea that they could tolerate any rule for
a lengthy period. A young generation had sprung up free from the dread
of the bloodshed and disorder which accompanied the revolution of 1848,
and eager for change and excitement. The Emperor's foreign policy had
not of late years succeeded in gratifying the national pride, nor had
his recent concessions done as much as might have been expected to
recover his reputation. The ultra-Imperialists believed that if he had
shown resolution and decision immediately after the General Election, no
reforms would have been necessary; they thought that the reforms became
inevitable simply because he vacillated and gave his majority no
assurance of support. The Liberals had not much belief in his good
faith, and the friends of the Empire entertained a well-grounded fear
that the new powers granted to the people would be used for the purpose
of overthrowing the dynasty and establishing a republic. On the one
hand, there was an impression that the Emperor had no longer sufficient
firmness to resist these subversive attempts; on the other, the Liberals
found it difficult to believe that a sovereign who had for many years
exercised so directly, in his own person, absolute power, could ever be
brought voluntarily to abandon it. Thus there was apprehension on both
sides, and while some feared that the Emperor would be led from
concession to concession until he had no power left, others feared that,
finding it impossible to reconcile himself to his new position, he would
have recourse to some violent expedient, such as war or a _coup d'état_,
in order to extricate himself from his difficulties.
It was generally taken for granted that the choice lay between the
Bonaparte dynasty and a republic of an extreme character. The Emperor
still retained some personal popularity, but he no longer inspired the
fear and the admiration which had hitherto prevented revolutionary
attempts. His best chance seemed to lie in foreign Governments treating
international questions in such a way as to enhance as far as possible
his reputation, and it was certainly not to the interest of England that
he should be displaced, for his own commercial policy was decidedly
liberal, and it was highly doubtful whether the Corps Législatif would
be equally so, when it came to dealing with Tariffs and Commercial
Treaties.
When Lord Lyons returned from his leave in November, he found the
Emperor in good spirits, full of amiable sentiments with regard to
England, and very cheerful about the political prospects in France. He
did not appear to know much about the Porte and Khedive question,
which had for some time been giving rise to considerable trouble, but
responded at once to the Ambassador's appeal to his own _amour propre_
in favour of the Commercial Treaty, which seemed to be in jeopardy. The
Empress had gone to the East, and he was consoling himself for her
absence by giving small dances at the Tuileries for some American young
ladies.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, Dec. 3, 1869.
I am more than ever impatient to settle this Khedive affair because
I am afraid that I see symptoms of the French Press taking up his
cause against his lawful master. La Tour d'Auvergne's tenure of
office is very precarious, and if he goes before it is settled, his
successor is as likely as not to take the popular side, which in
France is undoubtedly that of the contumacious vassal. La Tour
d'Auvergne is himself uneasy, and it is apparent that it is only the
desire to act with us which keeps the Emperor from taking the
Khedive's side decidedly. If the Porte plays many more of these
pranks, it will bring about the independence of Egypt, or a quarrel
between England and France on the subject.
It is in vain to draw any conclusions from the proceedings of the
Deputies, or the innumerable commentaries made upon them. The
Ministers profess to be delighted with the elections of President
and Vice-Presidents, but then I cannot forget that they were
enchanted for the first few days with the results of the General
Election which produced the present Chamber. My own hope is that out
of the chaos a working Liberal-Conservative majority will be
developed; but who is to be the Minister? Emile Ollivier seems to be
losing, not gaining ground in the Chamber. If the Emperor goes
straight and throws himself a little more on the classes, who,
having something to lose, are naturally conservative, he may do well
yet. There is certainly a return of goodwill towards him. The fear
is that he may hope to strengthen himself by coquetting with his pet
ouvriers, who have so little gratitude for the really important
services he has rendered them. If reproached, they answer, he has
done something for us, but what have we not done for him? What I
mean by coquetting with them, is trying to gain by their support,
power, and popularity at the expense of the Chamber.
I can't pretend to say whether the new majority will hold together
when the question of distributing the places arises; whether they
will find it possible to get on with the Emperor, or (which most
concerns us) whether they can and will maintain the Commercial
Treaty. I am afraid we shall never again, either in political or
commercial affairs, have as good times as we had under the personal
power of the Emperor--by _we_ of course I mean the _English_.
With this sentiment Lord Clarendon fully concurred: the Emperor, he
said, was parting with power so reluctantly that he would create
distrust, but 'I quite agree with you that we shall never have such good
times again under a Parliamentary instead of a personal _régime_.'
A few days after this letter was written, La Tour d'Auvergne and his
colleagues were already anxious to resign, although the Emperor wished
to retain them. It was supposed that Drouyn de Lhuys would be one of
their successors: 'Angels and Ministers of grace, defend us!' was the
comment of Lord Lyons upon this rumour, which Lord Clarendon received
with equal apprehension. Another political event at this juncture was an
announcement by the Empress that she intended to keep aloof from
politics in the future, and to devote herself to works of charity--an
announcement which did not carry universal conviction at the time.
The Cabinet, which was in so shaky a condition, contained some nominal
free traders, and it was feared, not without cause, that the new
Government might denounce the existing Commercial Treaty, although La
Tour d'Auvergne expressed confidence that such would not be the case. 'I
have my misgivings,' wrote the Ambassador, sadly, 'for I am afraid the
country is Protectionist, and I think the Free Trade zeal in the south
will cool, as they become aware that we shall not retaliate.'
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, Dec. 21, 1869.
Nothing but absolute force will turn French Ministers and their
wives from their sumptuous official palaces. La Tour d'Auvergne,
whom I should indeed like to keep, is really anxious to go. I don't
feel sure that any of the others are. I suppose the Emperor must
change the Ministry as soon as the verification of powers is over,
but he has not made up his mind yet, and his hesitation is doing him
harm in all ways. There is, I believe, a Conservative reaction, or
rather a revival of the fear of the red spectre in the country. The
Emperor may turn this to good account, if he will govern
constitutionally through a Parliamentary Ministry, but it will not
sustain him in a return to personal government.
I don't think things look well for the Commercial Treaty, and the
notion of some Free Traders that it should be denounced on account
of its origin, and with a view to making a greater advance towards
real free trade, will probably give the _coup de grâce_ to it.
The difficulty of passing new free trade measures through the Chamber
would, I should think, be infinitely greater than that of
maintaining the present Treaty.
The formation of the new Government was not actually completed before
the end of the year, although the Emperor in true Constitutional fashion
wrote a letter to M. Emile Ollivier in his own hand, asking him to form
a Cabinet. There was a feeling that his Ministry would not be long
lived, and moderate men shrank from joining it, thus playing into the
hands of the revolutionary parties. Amongst those who thought that the
new Government would be short-lived was Lord Clarendon--
'Ollivier's task,' he wrote, 'requires tact, experience, firmness,
knowledge of men, and a few other qualities in which he seems
singularly deficient, and I cannot think his Ministry will last. La
Valette thinks that the object of the implacables is to discredit
the Chamber collectively and individually, so as to make its
dissolution appear a necessity; then to pass a new electoral law;
then to have a General Election with which the Government would be
prohibited from interfering; then to have a Chamber of Rocheforts
and Raspails, which would be more than the _commencement de la fin_.
'This is rather a gloomy view, expressed confidentially, of course,
and we must hope that the Emperor will be able to defeat intrigues
of the existence and gravity of which he must be well aware.'
As an instance of the general uncertainty prevailing, it may be
mentioned that M. de La Valette, until the contents of the Emperor's
letter to Emile Ollivier became known, was convinced that Imperial
indecision would take the form of resumption of absolute power.
The new ministry was finally completed in the early days of January,
1870, and proved to be considerably stronger than had been believed
possible. Some of the new Ministers had curious antecedents with regard
to the Emperor. Ollivier himself had previously been an opponent of the
Empire, and his father had been sentenced to be deported to Cayenne,
while Count Daru, the new Foreign Minister, had actually voted for the
Emperor's impeachment. It was creditable, therefore, that personal
matters did not exclude men from office. What chiefly concerned England
was the line which the new Government was likely to take with regard to
the Commercial Treaty which was about to expire. According to the
Emperor, there was nothing to fear, and he assured the Ambassador that
he had come to an understanding with Ollivier on the subject, but it was
ominous that several members of the Cabinet were ardent Protectionists,
amongst them being the Minister of Public Works. In conversation the
Emperor spoke cheerfully about the political situation, quite in the
tone of a Constitutional Monarch. The Empress, on her side, declared
that she had no _caractère politique_ in the State, and enlarged on the
enormity of the attacks in the press upon a person so entirely without
political position, attacks which were certainly odious, and generally
directed to matters unconnected with politics. As for the Ministers,
they all praised the Emperor, and declared that their relations with him
were perfectly Constitutional and satisfactory; everything seemed going
smoothly until the death of the journalist Victor Noir at the hands of
Prince Pierre Bonaparte once more threw politics into confusion. After a
certain amount of rioting, however, and much trouble caused by
Rochefort, things resumed their usual condition for the time being.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._
Paris, Jan. 18, 1870.
I am one of the hopeful, and I see or fancy I see signs of the
success of the present Ministry in their attempt to found
Parliamentary Government. But people are very uneasy, and the
tactics of the Revolutionists are to keep up an agitation enough to
paralyze trade, and make the peaceably-disposed think that the
present Government is not strong enough to be worth having. These
manoeuvres might lead to a resumption of personal power, which
would be almost as dangerous as a republican revolution.
People seem to find it difficult to believe that the Emperor will
abstain from intriguing against his Ministers. They say it is in his
nature to do so, and remind one that he set up a newspaper against
Rouher. The Ministers themselves, on the other hand, seem to be
thoroughly satisfied with His Majesty. Daru says that he and his
colleagues are confident of success; that they would have two or
three difficult months to pass, but that they expect to have
convinced the Republicans by that time that a revolution is hopeless.
He spoke with great satisfaction of the complete adhesion of the
middle class at Paris to the Ministry, and of the offers they make
of their services in case of need.
Claremont saw the Emperor this afternoon. He thought His Majesty
looking fat and heavy. He found an opportunity of making a remark to
him on the necessity of the Ministry being supported by the Chamber,
which seems to have been taken in good part.
I hear on good authority that the Empress professes to find much
greater good than she expected in the Parliamentary Government, and
that she says the Pierre Bonaparte affair would have been much more
disastrous under the old system. Several of the new Ministers and
their wives appeared last night at a ball at the Tuileries for the
first time since 1848. The Empress, as well as the Emperor, was
particularly gracious to them.
It may be mentioned in connection with the Tuileries balls, that the
Ambassador used to receive very numerous applications from persons in
English society who were desirous of being invited to these
entertainments, and it was usually not possible to satisfy their wishes.
After the fall of the Empire, this particular species of application
practically disappeared, there being apparently no overwhelming anxiety
to attend the Republican social functions.
Before the end of January an important debate took place in the Chamber
on the Commercial Treaty, M. Thiers appearing as the chief Protectionist
champion. Free Traders professed to derive some encouragement from it,
as a vote against the denunciation of the Treaty was carried by 211 to
32; but it was obvious that these figures could not be taken as a test
vote of the strength of the Free Trade and Protectionist parties, since
the votes of the majority were influenced by a variety of
considerations.
FOOTNOTES:
[11] The vanity which was responsible for Prince Gortschakoff's love
of conferences is frequently referred to in Busch's 'Bismarck.'
[12] Subsequently Lord Ampthill.
[13] Prussian Ambassador in London.
[14] Now Wilhelmshafen.