DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE IN KOREA, II
From 1899, both Japan and Russia were represented at Seul by new
Ministers, Mr. G. Hayashi and M. Paul Pavloff. The latter had been the
_Chargé_ at Peking, where he had recently made a brilliant success in
securing for Russia a lease of Port Arthur and Talien-wan, and the right
to connect these ports by rail with the great Siberian line. The
contrast of character between the bold and ambitious Pavloff and the
slow, tenacious Hayashi was an interesting index to the dramatic
struggle which ensued in Korea between the rival Powers. For five years
after the arrival of the diplomats, the desires of Russia and Japan
seemed to clash, not only in Seul, but also in all directions within the
Peninsula. Nearly every move made by either Power was countervailed by
the other, Russia in most cases being the prime mover and Japan closely
disputing the action of her rival. The feeble Government of Korea was
sorely vexed between the vigorous demands and protests of the contending
Powers, while the flexible will of the Emperor[516] and the discord and
venality of his servants aggravated the endless confusion of the
situation. Let us now briefly observe how this keen rivalry manifested
itself in the south, at the capital, and in the north of Korea.
In South Korea, nothing better could be desired by Russia than a lease
of Masampo, a harbor unsurpassed for its naval facilities and most
admirably situated as a connecting-point between Vladivostok and Port
Arthur. An opportunity came in May, 1899, when Masampo, together with
two other ports, was opened for foreign trade, for the foreigner is at
liberty to purchase land within the three-mile radius of an open port.
In the same month, M. Pavloff with the Military _Attaché_ visited
Masampo on his way home on a furlough, and was met there by Admiral
Makaroff, commander of the Eastern squadron of the Russian navy, and,
after making an extended survey of the coast and the harbor, selected
the most strategic site on the foreshore, which he earmarked by setting
up posts at its limits. This large lot, M. Pavloff notified the local
authorities, would presently be purchased by a private Russian steamship
company as the site for a dock and coaling-sheds. It was not till July
that M. Stein, interpreter at the Russian Legation, went to the port
with a view to effecting the purchase of the selected lot, which, to his
chagrin, had already been bought by certain Japanese subjects from its
legitimate owners. In vain the Russian _Chargé_ demanded the Seul
Government to cancel the contract and resell the land to the Russian
company, for, as the Government repeatedly explained, the authorities
had no right to interfere with the alienation of private land by its
owners within the three-mile radius of any treaty port. As unavailing
was the request of the _Chargé_ upon Mr. Hayashi to induce the buyers to
relinquish even a portion of the purchased lot. Then the local
authorities at Masampo were approached by the Russian Representatives,
and consequently the deed of purchase was for a long time withheld by
them, though it was at length given to the new owners. On September 14,
M. Stein, now the _Chargé_, notified the Korean Government that, under
the instructions of the Russian Foreign Minister, he would be obliged to
take liberty of action in order to protect Russian interest, if the
Japanese contract was not canceled; on October 4, again, he threatened
that a forcible seizure of land would result from the non-compliance of
the Korean Government. The replies of the latter were unalterably firm
in refusing to annul a lawful transaction.[517] In the mean time,
Russian diplomatic agents, naval officers, and engineers from Seul and
Vladivostok were frequently visiting Masampo, and buying from the
natives tracts of indifferent value.[518] In March, 1900, M. Pavloff
returned from his furlough, and demanded the signature of the Masampo
lease-contract in quite indefinite terms which he had previously framed.
On March 16, Rear Admiral Hilidebrand came to Chemulpo with several
war-vessels, and proceeded to Seul, where he was magnificently received
by M. Pavloff and had an audience with the Emperor. Two days later, the
lease agreement was signed[519] by the Korean Foreign Minister and M.
Pavloff, which, however, was of little practical use so long as the most
important tract had been bought by the Japanese. On the same day, the
Minister secured from the Korean Government a pledge not to alienate any
part of the Kojedo Island near Masampo and its surrounding territories,
Russia herself engaging not to seek such alienation on her part.[520]
[Illustration:
M. PAVLOFF
_Late Russian Minister at Seul_
]
No sooner did Russia appear to content herself with these valueless
formal pledges from Korea than she again sought to acquire land round
Masampo. At the close of March, M. Pavloff had almost succeeded in
securing the purchase of Nampo outside the three-mile limit of Masampo,
but the reminder of Mr. Hayashi, expressed through the Foreign Office of
Seul, that the foreigner was not entitled to own land beyond the fixed
radius of a treaty port, produced its desired effect. Nampo was
forsaken, and another lot inside the three-mile boundary was purchased
by the Russians.[521] In May, M. Pavloff wished to lease Tja-pok on the
inner shore of Masampo, but, finding again that a Japanese subject had
already leased it, finally acquired the lease of Pankumi upon the outer
shore, for the purpose of erecting a hospital, warehouses, and a
recreation ground, for the use of the Russian navy.[522] This
concession, however, has not been extensively utilized by the Russians,
owing probably to the inferior site of Pankumi.[523] Mr. Hayashi met the
Russian concession by acquiring, between May and October 29, 1901, about
forty acres of land within the treaty limits of Masampo as a settlement
for Japanese citizens.[524]
It is needless to add that the firm attitude of the Korean Government,
which alone saved Masampo from the fate of Port Arthur, was in the main
due to the persistent representations and support rendered to Korea by
Mr. Hayashi against Russian encroachment. For if the control of Masampo
was a matter of supreme importance for the Russian navy, Japan, on her
part, could not for a moment tolerate the presence, in the harbor so
near to herself, of a Power whose vast dominion was extending eastward
with tremendous pressure. Russia’s ill success at Masampo, however, was
not to mark the end of her activity on the southern coast of Korea,
which contains a few other harbors only second in importance to Masampo.
In one of these, Chinhai Bay, M. Pavloff made, about March, 1901, an
unauthorized demand for a lease, which again was refused.[525] From that
time till the opening of the Russo-Japanese negotiations in 1903, the
Russian Representative did not think the time opportune to prefer
further demands on this coast.
Turning now to the diplomacy at the Korean capital, we observe that its
first aim seems to have been to repeat the old policy of replacing Mr.
MacLeavy Brown, a British subject, as the Director-General of Korean
Customs, with M. Kir Alexieff, and also to put Korea under financial
obligation to Russia by means of a loan. In March, 1901, Mr. Brown was
suddenly ordered by the Korean Government, which acted obviously at the
instance of the Russian Representative, to vacate his residence and
surrender his post. The British _Chargé_, Mr. Gubbins, had barely
succeeded in prevailing upon the Korean Government to revoke the latter
half of the order, when in May another order was issued calling for the
delivery, not only of Mr. Brown’s official residence, but also of the
customs office building—an order equivalent to a dismissal from office.
From this predicament Mr. Brown was narrowly rescued by an earnest
representation made on May 5 by Mr. Hayashi to the Korean Emperor.[526]
By this time, the affair had been complicated by an agreement of a
5,000,000 _yen_ loan, which had been signed on April 19, between the
Korean Government and the French agent, M. Cazalis, of the Yunnan
Syndicate.[527] It is hardly necessary to give the detail of this
abortive agreement, for it was never ratified by the Emperor, but fell
through from the inability of the Syndicate to fulfill its terms.[528]
It is only necessary to say that if the loan had materialized, a large
control over the coinage, mining, and general finances of Korea would
have passed into the hands of the French subjects and perhaps also of
the Russo-Chinese Bank. This Bank, in the latter half of 1902, seems to
have offered a fresh loan through its agents at Seul, Gunzburg and
Company, under the condition that the firm should obtain a permanent
monopoly of ginseng, which had then been in the hands of the Japanese,
and also the right of working certain mines.[529] This proposition also
miscarried, evidently owing to the protest from the Japanese Minister,
who discovered in it a violation of the first Article of the
Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol of June 9, 1896. A Belgian loan, which was
rumored early in 1903, seems to have shared the same fate with all the
loans previously suggested.[530]
In this connection, it should be noted, in justice to all the parties
concerned, that toward the latter half of 1900 there was a movement in
Japan to suggest a loan to the Korean Government, but that the Premier,
Marquis Yamagata, declined to countenance the scheme.[531] He probably
did not wish his nation to become a party to a violation of an agreement
it made with Russia in 1896.
In 1902–3, the interest of Russia was represented at Seul, not only by
her regular Representative, but also by Baron Gunzburg, who served as an
agent for many an economic enterprise in Korea proposed by the Russians,
by an Alsatian lady, Mlle. Sonntag, a relative of Mme. Waeber and an
influential member of the court circle, and, temporarily, by M. Waeber
himself,[532] who had come to Seul as special envoy of the Czar to
attend the fortieth anniversary of the accession of the Korean Sovereign
to the throne.[533] These persons were further supported by a few
Koreans who had lived in Siberia and adopted Russian citizenship, and
whose rapid promotion in office had excited jealousy among the nobility
in Seul.[534] Among the latter, also, there were Russian sympathizers of
the greatest political influence. Taking advantage of the continual
discord among the politicians in Seul, which at that time manifested
itself in the rancorous hatred between the supporters of the Crown
Prince and those of Lady Öm, who aspired to the position of the Queen,
the Russians succeeded in enlisting the good-will of the leaders of both
parties, Yi Yong-ik and Yi-Keun-thaik. Once a lad of mean birth in the
north,[535] Yi Yong-ik, by his unscrupulous methods, had amassed a large
fortune and risen to the Ministry of the Imperial Household, until, in
November, 1902, he found himself the object of a sharp opposition by Yi
Keun-thaik and a large section of the gentry of Seul. He at once took
refuge in the Russian Legation, and was then taken on board the
“Korietz” to Port Arthur, where he used his seal of the Imperial Estates
Board and transacted his official business as before.[536] On January
13, 1903, he returned to Seul, and used his influence to further the
already started obstruction to the bank-notes issued by the Korean
branch of the First Bank of Japan. These notes had first appeared in
May, 1902, and, beside the deplorable monetary system of Korea, met so
great a demand from the commercial world that, by the end of the year,
the amount issued had risen nearly to 1,000,000 _yen_ against a reserve
only a little below that sum.[537] Suddenly, at the instance of the
Russians who wished to issue similar notes from the Russo-Chinese Bank,
the Korean Government had prohibited the circulation of the Japanese
notes in December, 1902. The credit of the notes and the benefit of
their use had been so obvious, however, that, in spite of the Government
order, the Director-General of the Customs had still received payments
in them, and the Chinese Minister had advised his countrymen to continue
their use. The veto had then been removed, only to be renewed at the
return of Yi Yong-ik from Port Arthur. He had entertained the desire,
which has been found utterly impracticable, of himself establishing a
central bank and issuing paper notes.[538] He employed all the means at
his disposal to resist the opposition of the Japanese Representative,
who was now supported by his British colleague, Mr. Jordan. The
bank-notes were not reinstated till February 13, 1903, when a compromise
was at last reached with the Korean Government.[539] It is impossible to
establish the complicity of the Russian diplomats in Yi Yong-ik’s
obstruction, which thus ended in failure, beyond the fact that the
Korean politician had been in close touch with the Muscovites. From the
historical point of view, Russia could hardly have interfered with the
issue of the Japanese bank-notes without transgressing the third Article
of the Nishi-Rosen Protocol of April 25, 1898.
Thus far we have related the comparative failure of Russia’s diplomacy
in South Korea and at the capital. In the north, however, which was
conterminous with her dominion and with Manchuria, Russia achieved a
greater success. On March 29, 1899,[540] M. Pavloff succeeded, after his
earlier and much larger demands had failed, in leasing for twelve years,
for the use of Count H. Keyserling, a Russian subject, three whaling
stations[541] on the northeastern coast, each 700 by 350 feet in extent.
This concession was offset by one secured by a Japanese citizen, on
February 14, 1900,[542] which conferred upon him the right of whaling
for three years, subject to renewal, along the Korean coast, excepting
the waters for the distance of three _li_ adjoining the three provinces
on which the Keyserling concessions were situated and the Province of
Chul-la.
Farther north, upon the frontier, the long boundary line naturally
divides itself into two parts, namely, the Tumên River, separating Korea
from Primorsk of Siberia and the Kirin Province of Manchuria, and the
Yalu River, which borders upon the strategically most important Province
of Sheng-king of South Manchuria. Along the former stream, Russia
acquired by a treaty of 1884[543] the opening of the port of Kiong-hung
to the Russian land trade, and a free navigation of the Tumên. A dozen
years later,[544] when the Sovereign sojourned at the Russian Legation,
the Muscovites concluded an agreement with the Seul Government whereby
they were granted the privilege of mining gold and other minerals for
fifteen years, and coal for twenty years, in two districts near
Kiong-hung, as well as the right to construct a railway or carriage-road
from the mines to the shore. It has often been reported that the
poverty-stricken people as well as the venal officers along the river
have continually mortgaged their property to the Russians, who thus have
acquired extensive tracts of land, circulated Russian coins among the
natives, and otherwise implanted their influence far and wide. Then
early in 1902, M. Pavloff sought to make a step in advance in this
direction, when, without permission from Korea, a telegraph line was
extended from Possiet to Kiong-hung across the Tumên River. He desired
that the Seul Government should recognize the accomplished fact, and
Rear Admiral Skrydloff, commanding the Pacific squadron of the Russian
navy, visited the capital on February 17, and intimated his hope that
the question would be amicably settled. The Foreign Minister, Pak
Che-sun, however, successfully ordered on February 22 that the telegraph
line so surreptitiously built be removed. In the mean while, it was
discovered that the St. Petersburg Government had had nothing to do with
the building of the line which had recently been removed. M. Pavloff,
however, succeeded in securing the dismissal of Pak from his post. He
also persisted in demanding the right of the Russians to reconstruct the
line across the Tumên River. He was as much justified in preferring such
a demand, as was the Korean Government in refusing to accede to it. The
latter was probably apprehensive that its concession to Russia would be
followed by similar demands from other Powers. At present, the Korean
telegraph line reaches from Seul to Kion-song, some forty miles from
Kiong-hung.[545]
On the Yalu River, also, M. Pavloff desired a telegraphic connection
with Wiju from Port Arthur and from Harbin, which, after a failure in
May, 1902, was at last granted in April, 1903.[546]
More important, however, is the question of the Seul-Wiju Railway, which
had been the bone of contention between Japan and the allied Powers of
Russia and France, until the outbreak of the present war suddenly
changed the situation in favor of the former. By the temporary articles
of August 20, 1894,[547] Korea had granted a prior right to the Japanese
Government or companies to construct railways between Seul and Fusan.
The actual undertaking, however, was so delayed, that, on March 29,
1896,[548] Mr. James R. Morse, an American citizen, succeeded in
acquiring the Seul-Chemulpo concession, and began to build the line. In
October, 1898, Mr. Morse sold the concession to certain Japanese
capitalists, and the line, which was the first railway owned abroad by
Japanese subjects, has been in running order since July, 1900. The
contract for the other line—Fusan-Seul—was not made by the Japanese till
September 8, 1898.[549] Prior to this, on July 3, 1896,[550] a French
company had acquired a grant to connect Seul with Wiju on the Yalu by
rail. Finding, however, little prospect of starting the work within the
specified period of three years, the company tried to sell the
concession, first to the Russian Government and then to Japan, but
neither was prepared to accept the proposed terms. About 1900, Yi
Yong-ik instituted in the Imperial Household Department the Northwestern
Railway Bureau, over which he presided, with the express purpose of
building the line with Korean capital. The French Minister at Seul,
however, had a short time before obtained exclusive right to furnish
material and engineers for the building of the line, so that Korean
money and French skill were to be enlisted for the service.[551] After a
long delay, President Yi held a great undertaking ceremony on May 8,
1902, but it was patent to every one that no Korean capital was
forthcoming. As was expected, not a mile of rail having been laid, the
work was suspended in June, and indefinitely postponed.[552]
Considering, however, that a Seul-Wiju line would naturally pass through
the gold mines of Yun-san and Yin-san and the coal region of Ping-yang,
and the great agricultural province of Hwang-hai, as well as such
commercial centres as Kai-song, Ping-yang, Hwang-ju, and An-ju, the
advantages of controlling this line appeared too great for the competing
foreigners to leave its construction to the care of the impecunious
Korean Government. Particularly jealous were the Russians of the line
passing into the hands of their political rivals, for then—if,
furthermore, a railway connection were effected by the same rivals
between Wiju and Niu-chwang—the deep-laid design of Russia to make Dalny
the great trading port for Manchuria and North China would be seriously
upset by the railway reaching directly from the producing centres of
these regions and Korea to the port of Fusan, whence a ready
communication oversea might well radiate toward Japan, Europe, and
America. It was natural, therefore, for M. Stein, Russian _Chargé
d’Affaires_, again to recommend, as he did on February 15, 1903, the
honest Baron Gunzburg to the Korean Government, and to demand of the
latter on behalf of the Baron the right of laying the Seul-Wiju Railway.
The Government, however, declined[553] to entertain the application, as
it was its intention to complete the line on its own resources, and not
to concede it to any foreign Power.[554] Later, another attempt was made
in August by the Seul Government to reopen the work of construction, for
which a French syndicate represented by M. Rondon was to supply all
machinery,[555] but, again, the lack of funds frustrated the attempt.
Since that time, no important development of this question had
transpired before the beginning of hostilities between Russia and Japan.
We have so far seen enough of Korean diplomacy to comprehend something
of the Russian method of furthering her influence over Korea, and of the
manner in which Japan struggled to safeguard her fast increasing
interests[556] in the peninsula and to maintain the terms of the Russian
agreements of 1896 and 1898. We have, however, reserved up to this point
the latest and most important question of the timber concession upon the
northern frontier. In no other matter had the characteristic method of
Russian diplomacy excited more apprehension in Korea and Japan, for
nothing could better illustrate the close connection, in the Muscovite
policy, of Manchuria and North Korea—a connection which appeared to
threaten at once the integrity of the two adjoining Empires and the
safety of Japan—than the Yong-am-po incident which arose in April, 1903,
in relation to the timber concession. The contract[557] for this
concession dated so far back as August 28, 1896, when the Korean King
was a guest at the Russian Legation. It had secured for a Russian
merchant at Vladivostok the right to organize a Korean lumber company
(Article 1), having a monopoly for twenty years of the forestry
enterprise round the Mu-san region upon the Tumên River and also on the
Uinung Island in Japan Sea (Article 2). The work, in order to be valid,
had to be begun within one year after the signature of the agreement
(Article 15). Only when work in these two regions should have been under
way, the company might, within five years[558] from the same date, start
a similar exploitation along the Yalu River (Article 2).[559]
Accordingly, the Russian syndicate undertook to fell trees at Mu-san in
1897 and again in 1898,[560] though never on a large scale.[561] On the
Uinung Island, however, where good timber had nearly been exhausted
after many years of cutting by the Japanese, the Russians had at no time
made a serious attempt to exploit it. Under these circumstances, the
right of the Russians to exploit forests upon the Yalu so late as 1903
was at least not clear.[562] Nevertheless, the extensive public works at
Port Arthur and Dalny and on the railways had created so great a demand
for timber, that the Chinese woodmen were cutting trees along the foot
of the Long White Mountains and sending them downstream to An-tung,
where alone the traffic annually aggregated the sum of 1,500,000
_taels_.[563] The Russians now seemed to have planned to exploit both
sides of the Yalu, and they would not have caused trouble, had they
employed legitimate means to accomplish their ends. On the Manchurian
side, finding that a foreigner could not get a timber concession from
the Chinese authorities, they used the name of a leader of the mounted
bandits whom a Russian military officer had befriended, and, after
securing a concession, employed those bandits in felling trees.[564] In
regard to the Korean side of the river, after nearly seven years’
inactivity since the grant of the concession, M. Stein, Russian _Chargé_
at Seul, suddenly notified the Korean Government, on April 13, 1903,
that Baron Gunzburg would henceforth represent at Seul the interest of
the timber syndicate, which would now commence its work upon the
Yalu.[565] Early in May, forty-seven Russian soldiers in civilian dress,
presently increased to sixty, besides a larger number of Chinese and
Koreans under Russian employ, were reported to have come to
Yong-am-po,[566] a point near the mouth of the river and rather remote
from the places[567] where actual cutting was in progress, and had begun
to construct what was claimed to be timber-warehouses, but later proved
to be, besides some godowns, a blacksmith plant and a six-foot
mound.[568] At the same time, there was taking place a mysterious
mobilization of troops from Liao-yang and Port Arthur towards
Fêng-hwang-Chêng and An-tung on the other side of the Yalu.[569] The
Korean frontier officers reported that a panic had been created among
the inhabitants, and that the Korean-Manchurian commerce had
stopped.[570] Presently, the Russian soldiers at Yong-am-po were
reported to have been increased, first by 100, and then by 200, who
purchased from the natives, under the name of a Korean citizen and
against the wishes of the local authorities, fifteen houses and some
twelve acres of land.[571] When the Korean Government had, on May 15,
demanded of M. Stein to order the evacuation of the Russians,[572] M.
Pavloff, who had recently returned from his trip to Russia, requested,
on the contrary, that the Korean Government should protect the Russian
subjects at Yong-am-po.[573] A desultory discussion then ensued between
M. Pavloff and the Korean Government, while further increases of the
Russian forces at An-tung beyond the river were reducing the frontier
regions generally into a state of anarchy.[574] About the middle of
June, the Russians forcibly seized rafts belonging to some Koreans and
Chinese that came down the stream, and shot two Chinese who
resisted.[575] A Japanese-Chinese syndicate, also, which had secured a
timber concession in this region in March from the Korean Government,
reported that its rafts had been seized, and its work had consequently
been suspended.[576] Prior to this, four Russian war-vessels under
command of Admiral Starck came to Chemulpo in the night of June 5,[577]
and stayed there till the 11th. No matter whether there was any
significance in this act, it is sufficient to record that it took place
at this critical moment. Not the least serious feature of the affair was
the disagreement of opinion about it inside the Korean Government. When,
on June 11, the Council of State passed a resolution that the conduct of
the Russians upon the frontier was contrary to the treaty arrangements
between the two Powers, the Foreign Office, on the 14th, sought to
refute the ground in an elaborate note.[578] The gravity of the
situation as evinced in all these facts need hardly be pointed out.
Whatever the intentions of the Russian Government or even of its
Representative at Seul, the action of the Muscovites at Yong-am-po was
precisely of a nature to remind one of their previous fortification of
Port Arthur, which had eventually prepared their entry into the whole of
Manchuria. The fact that the occupation of Yong-am-po took place
simultaneously with the suspension of the evacuation of Manchuria and
with the active military connection between its army centres and the
Korean frontier, gave the present affair an exceedingly ominous
appearance. And yet, in the face of these perilous circumstances, the
Korean Government showed itself so impotent and so little alive to the
situation as to be divided against itself on a minor point of the law of
the case. In such a state of things, the usual method of Japan to resist
Russia through Korea would be utterly futile.
It is unnecessary to recall that any attempt upon the integrity of Korea
was in violation of the fundamental principle which formed the first
Article of the Nishi-Rosen Protocol of April 25, 1898,[579] as well as
against the spirit of this and the two other Russo-Japanese agreements
regarding Korea. These agreements seemed to Japan to have in one way or
another been palpably violated by the Russians in many of their actions
in Korea, to which the Yong-am-po affair was a climax. Under
circumstances so continually irritating to the peace of the East and so
threatening to her own vital interests, the Government of Japan now felt
justified, when the climax was reached, in opening _direct_ negotiations
with Russia, in order to arrive at such a definite understanding of the
relative position of the Powers in Korea, as would insure the mutual
benefit of the three nations concerned.
-----
Footnote 516:
The sovereign of Korea, formerly King (_wang_), assumed the title
Emperor (_Hwang-ti_), on October 12, 1897, for, in the Chinese
language, the _wang_ may be a tributary prince, but the _ti_ is the
master of an independent state.
Footnote 517:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 747–751. See also _The Times_, August 30, 1899.
Footnote 518:
The _Kokumin_, October 10, 1899.
Footnote 519:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 751–752.
Footnote 520:
_Ibid._, pp. 752–753.
Footnote 521:
The _Kokumin_, April 1, and 3, 1900.
Footnote 522:
The _Kokumin_, May 25, 1900, and May 21, 1901.
Footnote 523:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 751.
Footnote 524:
The _Kokumin_, May 21 and November 1, 1901. The final agreement
between Hayashi and the Korean Foreign Minister was signed on May 17,
1902, and published in the _Kwampō_.
Footnote 525:
The _Kokumin_, March 20, 1901, and August 7, 1902.
Footnote 526:
_Ibid._, May 5 and 10, 1901.
Footnote 527:
The _Kokumin_, April 23, 24, May 3, June 9, 1901.
Footnote 528:
_Ibid._, May 18, 1901; January 19, February 1, correspondence dated
April 2, 1902.
Footnote 529:
_Ibid._, October 22, November 17, 1902.
Footnote 530:
_Ibid._, January 27, 1903.
Footnote 531:
From a statement made by an intimate friend of Marquis Itō, who, in
October, 1900, succeeded Yamagata in the premiership. See the
_Kokumin_, November 10, 1903.
Footnote 532:
From 1900 till May, 1903.
Footnote 533:
A Government can seldom afford so many foreign councilors and
commissioners as were found in Korea. Besides these and several other
Russians, there were in Seul, Mr. Masuo Katō, a Japanese adviser, Mr.
Sands, the once influential American adviser, several French
engineers, and a Belgian councilor to the ministry of internal
affairs.
Footnote 534:
The _Kokumin_, Seul correspondence, dated August 7, 1902.
Footnote 535:
The _Kokumin_, Seul correspondence, dated June 3, 1899; November 30,
1902.
Footnote 536:
_Ibid._, Seul correspondence, dated December 23, 1902.
Footnote 537:
See p. 23, above.
Footnote 538:
The _Kokumin_, telegrams, March 11, 26, 27, April 11, 1903.
Footnote 539:
_Ibid._, correspondence, February 2, 5, 9, 16, 18, March 4, 1903.
Footnote 540:
The contract is found in _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 800–806. Also see the
U. S. 56th Congress, 1st Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp.
484–488.
Footnote 541:
(1) Along the coast near Cape Tikhmeneff, Ulsan Bay, Kiong-sang
Province; (2) on the island of Ching-po, Ham-kiung Province; and (3)
at Chang-shing, Kang-wan Province.
Footnote 542:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 799–800.
Footnote 543:
_Ibid._, pp. 731–732 (August 8, 1884, o. s.).
Footnote 544:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 772–775, April 22, 1896.
Footnote 545:
The _Kokumin_, Seul correspondence, dated April 8, 1902.
Footnote 546:
_Ibid._, telegram, May 8, correspondence, May 11, 1902; telegram,
March 28, and correspondence, April 16, 1903.
Footnote 547:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 722.
Footnote 548:
_Ibid._, pp. 761–764.
Footnote 549:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 765–768. This contract includes certain
interesting provisions, which the reader may compare with those of the
Manchurian railways. There occur two exclusive measures, that none but
Koreans and Japanese may hold shares of the railway capital (Article
15), and that no other foreigners shall reside within lands assigned
for the depots (Article 5). The work should be begun within three
years after the signature of the contract, and be completed within ten
years hence (Article 10). After fifteen years of operation, the Korean
Government might purchase the entire line, and, if unable to do so,
the purchase would be postponed by periods of ten years (Article 12).
As soon as the Korean finances should admit, the railway might be made
a common work between the Koreans and Japanese (Article 13). The
laborers and the timber employed in the construction should as far as
possible be obtained in Korea (Article 6). The lands assigned for the
line and its depots shall belong to the company only so long as it
operates the road, and the Korean Government should furnish no other
lands to the company (Articles 3 and 8). It should be added that the
Japanese Government guaranteed a six per cent. interest for the
capital of the company.
For further details of the Seul-Chemulpo and Fusan-Seul Railways, see
p. 24, and notes, above.
Footnote 550:
For the contract, see _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 770–772.
Footnote 551:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 768–770; the _Kokumin_, September 7, 1901.
Footnote 552:
The _Kokumin_, July 4, 1902.
Footnote 553:
It is said that the Russian Representative obtained a promise from the
Korean Government to grant to no other foreigners the right of either
the construction or the mortgage of this railway.—The _Kokumin_,
December 10, 1903. It now matters little whether this report was true
or not, since the Korean Government abrogated on May 18, 1904, all the
agreements it had concluded with the Russians.
Footnote 554:
The _Kokumin_, February 18, 1903; the _Dōbun-kwai_, No. 41, pp. 91–93.
Footnote 555:
The _Kokumin_, August 4, 1903.
Footnote 556:
See, e. g., pp. 10–30.
Footnote 557:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 781–791.
Footnote 558:
It is said that the time-limit was extended, on January 1, 1901, for
twenty years. See _Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 783.
Footnote 559:
The company agreed to pay to the Korean Imperial House, through the
Russo-Chinese Bank, a royalty amounting to one fourth of the annual
profit. The company was to furnish all the capital, and was exempt
from all kinds of taxes and dues (Articles 10, 11, 14).
Footnote 560:
The _Kokumin_, correspondence, April 18, 1903; _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp.
781–782.
Footnote 561:
Toward the end of May, 1903, simultaneously with their activity on the
Yalu, the Russian soldiers began again to cut trees at Mu-san.
Footnote 562:
Cf. Article 2 of the contract.
Footnote 563:
The _Kokumin_, correspondence, July 27, 1903. Lower down the stream,
at Tatung-kao, the amount sometimes reached the annual value of
7,000,000 _taels_.
Footnote 564:
See an address by Eitaro Tsuruoka, who has recently traveled in
Manchuria and is acquainted with several of the leaders of the
bandits. The _Dōbun-kwai_, No. 53 (April, 1904), pp. 1–14.
Footnote 565:
The _Kokumin_, April 23, 1903. The capital of the syndicate was
reported to be 5,000,000 rubles, of which 2,000,000 were said to have
been furnished by the Russian Government.—_Ibid._, correspondence,
June 19, 1903. This rumor was not authenticated. It is safe to say,
however, that Baron Gunzburg’s connection with the syndicate was
largely nominal. The present writer is not in a position to explain
the relation of the notorious M. Bezobrazoff to the timber work on the
Yalu.
Footnote 566:
The _Kokumin_, telegram, May 8 and 9, 1903.
Footnote 567:
Principally Mt. Paik-ma.
Footnote 568:
The _Kokumin_, telegram, June 11, correspondence, June 19, 1903. When
Japanese soldiers reached Yong-am-po soon after the beginning of the
present war, they found there a large warehouse, and fifteen large
brick and twenty or more smaller buildings. Rails had been laid
between the sea and the warehouse, which was also connected with the
Yalu by a new canal. A fort had also been left standing, but the guns
had been taken away.
Footnote 569:
_Ibid._, telegram, May 8 and 9, 1900. Cf. the _British Parliamentary
Papers: China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 115, 116, 128, 129, 131, 134.
Footnote 570:
The _Kokumin_, telegram, May 9, 1903.
Footnote 571:
_Ibid._, telegram, May 22 and 25, 1903.
Footnote 572:
The _Kokumin_, telegram, May 16.
Footnote 573:
_Ibid._, correspondence, May 20.
Footnote 574:
_Ibid._, telegram, June 13.
Footnote 575:
_Ibid._, telegram, June 17.
Footnote 576:
_Ibid._, June 16.
Footnote 577:
_Ibid._, telegram, June 6.
Footnote 578:
The _Kokumin_, correspondence, June 19.
Footnote 579:
See p. 271, above.