THE RUSSO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS, I
It was in view of these dangerously unstable circumstances in Manchuria
and Korea that, on June 23, 1903, the four principal members of the
Japanese Cabinet[580] and five Privy Councilors[581] met before the
Throne, and decided on the principles upon which negotiations with
Russia should be opened.[582] Having thus formulated the policy to be
pursued, Baron Komura telegraphed to the Japanese Minister at St.
Petersburg, Mr. Kurino, on July 28, as follows[583]:—
[Illustration:
BARON KOMURA
_Japanese Foreign Minister_
]
“The Imperial Government [of Japan] have observed with close
attention the development of affairs in Manchuria, and its present
situation causes them to view it with grave concern.
“So long as it was hoped that Russia would carry out, on the one
hand, the engagement that she made with China, and, on the other,
the assurances she had given to other Powers, regarding the subject
of the evacuation of Manchuria, the Imperial Government maintained
an attitude of watchful reserve. But the recent conduct of Russia
has been, at Peking, to propose new demands, and, in Manchuria, to
tighten her hold upon it, until the Imperial Government is led to
believe that Russia must have abandoned the intention of retiring
from Manchuria. At the same time, her increased activity upon the
Korean frontier is such as to raise doubts as to the limits of her
ambition.
“The unconditioned and permanent occupation of Manchuria by Russia
would create a state of things prejudicial to the security and
interest of Japan. The principle of equal opportunity would thereby
be annulled, and the territorial integrity of China impaired. There
is, however, a still more serious consideration for the Japanese
Government. That is to say, if Russia was established on the flank
of Korea, it would be a constant menace to the separate existence of
that Empire, or at least would make Russia the dominant Power in
Korea. Korea is an important outpost in Japan’s line of defense, and
Japan consequently considers her independence absolutely essential
to her own repose and safety. Moreover, the political as well as
commercial and industrial interests and influence which Japan
possesses in Korea are paramount over those of other Powers. These
interests and influence, Japan, having regard to her own security,
cannot consent to surrender to, or share with, another Power.
“The Imperial Government, after the most serious consideration, have
resolved to consult the Russian Government, in a spirit of
conciliation and frankness, with a view to the conclusion of an
understanding designed to compose questions which are at this time
the cause of their anxiety. In the estimation of the Imperial
Government, the moment is opportune for making the attempt to bring
about the desired adjustment, and it is believed that, failing this
opportunity, there would be no room for another understanding.
“The Imperial Government, reposing confidence in your judgment and
discretion, have decided to place the delicate negotiations in your
hands.
“It being the wish of the Imperial Government to place their present
invitation to the Russian Government entirely on an official
footing, you are accordingly instructed to open the question by
presenting to Count Lamsdorff, Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Russia, a _note verbale_ to the following effect:—
“‘The Japanese Government desire to remove from the relations of the
two Empires every cause of future misunderstanding, and believe that
the Russian Government share the same desire. The Japanese
Government would therefore be glad to enter with the Imperial
Russian Government upon an examination of the condition of affairs
in the regions of the extreme East, where their interests meet, with
a view to defining their respective special interests in those
regions.
“‘If this suggestion fortunately meets with the approval, in
principle, of the Russian Government, the Japanese Government will
be prepared to present to the Russian Government their views as to
the nature and scope of the proposed understanding.’
“In presenting the foregoing note to the Russian Foreign Minister,
you will be careful to make him understand that our purposes are
entirely friendly, but that we attach great importance to the
subject.
“You will present the note to Count Lamsdorff as soon as possible,
and keep me fully informed regarding the steps taken by you under
this instruction; and immediately upon the receipt of an affirmative
reply from the Russian Government, the substance of our proposals
will be telegraphed to you.”
To this request of Japan, Count Lamsdorff expressed a perfect
agreement,[584] for, as he had very often said to Mr. Kurino, “an
understanding between the two countries was not only desirable, but was
the best policy.” “Should Russia and Japan enter into a full
understanding,” said he, “no one would in future attempt to sow the
seeds of discord between the two countries.”[585] The assent of the
Foreign Minister was later sustained by the Czar.[586]
Thus the way was opened for an amicable interchange of the views of the
two Powers. This auspicious beginning of the negotiations stands in
striking contrast to their disastrous end. The discrepancy was perhaps
in no small measure due to a political situation at St. Petersburg which
was completely beyond the control of Count Lamsdorff, and probably also
of the Czar. It should be remembered that Baron Komura, like Marquis
Itō, was of the opinion that the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement
with Russia was not only desirable, but also possible. The same belief
was strongly shared by Mr. Kurino. It is also difficult to suppose that
Count Lamsdorff entered upon the negotiations with a deliberate
intention to introduce into them insurmountable difficulties, as he was
presently obliged to do, so as to bring them to a complete deadlock. On
the contrary, his remarks quoted in the preceding paragraph seem to
indicate that he and Mr. Kurino had frequently talked of the wisdom of
coming to a perfect adjustment of the interests of the two Powers in the
East, and that he was gratified that the opportunity was offered by the
Japanese Government to give effect to what he had long considered “the
best policy.” About this time, however, it had begun to be surmised
abroad that the peace party, with which the Count and M. Witte were said
to be in sympathy, had been largely overshadowed by the less intelligent
warlike faction. It was unknown what were the results of the
observations of General Kuropatkin, the then Minister of War, who had
made a tour of the East between the end of April and the end of July.
Nor was it possible to discover what took place in the great conference
held at Port Arthur early in July, in which the General, as well as
Admiral Alexieff, MM. Lessar, Pavloff, Rosen, and Pokotiloff, took part.
However that may be, it could hardly be denied that henceforth the
Eastern affairs passed under the sway of a less thoughtful body of men
at St. Petersburg, and of that executive officer of great talent, but
strategist and diplomat of unknown value, Admiral Alexieff, at Port
Arthur. M. Witte was relieved of his Ministry of Finance, and
transferred to the presidency of the council of ministers, which was
known to be of small real authority. On August 13, an Imperial _ukase_
was published in the Russian _Official Messenger_, stating that, “in
view of the complex problems of administration of the eastern confines
of the Empire, we [the Czar Nicolas] found it necessary to create a
power capable of assuring the peaceful development of the country and
satisfying urgent local needs.” For this purpose, a special vice-regency
called the Far East was created out of the Amur and Kwan-tung
territories, and Admiral Alexieff was appointed Viceroy of the Far East.
He was vested with supreme power in the civil administration of the
territories, with the command of the naval forces in the Pacific and of
all the troops quartered in the country under his jurisdiction, and with
the management of the diplomatic relations of these regions with the
neighboring States. The Viceroy was released from the jurisdiction of
the Ministers at St. Petersburg, and the only control to be exercised
over him by the central power was through a special committee of
men[587] nominated by the Czar and presided over by himself.[588]
Statutes concerning this special committee of the Far East—which has in
itself no executive power—were promulgated on September 30.[589] When we
consider the probable state of Russian politics at the time, the
significance of thus elevating Alexieff and clothing him with enormous
powers could hardly be concealed. Henceforth the control of the Eastern
diplomacy of Russia seemed to have rested more with the Viceroy at Port
Arthur than with the Foreign Minister at St. Petersburg.[590]
Admiral Alexieff was appointed Viceroy on August 13. On the preceding
day,[591] the first Japanese note was handed to Count Lamsdorff by Mr.
Kurino, who had held it for about a week pending the Czar’s assent to
Japan’s proposition of July 28, already quoted. In this note, delivered
on August 12, Baron Komura wrote as follows:—
[Illustration:
ADMIRAL ALEXIEFF
_Viceroy of the Far East_
]
“In reference to my telegram of the 28th July, the Imperial
Government, after giving most serious consideration to the condition
of affairs in those regions where the interests of the two Powers
meet, have decided to propose the following articles as the basis of
an understanding between Japan and Russia:—
“1. ‘A mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial
integrity of the Chinese and Korean Empires, and to maintain the
principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all
nations in those countries.
“2. ‘A reciprocal recognition of Japan’s preponderating interests in
Korea and Russia’s special interests in railway enterprises in
Manchuria, and of the right of Japan to take in Korea, and of Russia
to take in Manchuria, such measures as may be necessary for the
protection of their respective interests as above defined, subject,
however, to the provisions of Article 1 of this Agreement.
“3. ‘A reciprocal undertaking on the part of Russia and Japan not to
impede the development of those industrial and commercial
activities, respectively, of Japan in Korea and of Russia in
Manchuria, which are not inconsistent with the stipulations of
Article 1 of this Agreement.
“‘An additional engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the
eventual extension of the Korean Railway into Southern Manchuria so
as to connect with the Eastern Chinese and Shan-hai-kwan-Niu-chwang
lines.
“4. ‘A reciprocal engagement that, in case it should be found
necessary to send troops by Japan to Korea, or by Russia to
Manchuria, for the purpose either of protecting the interests
mentioned in Article 2 of this Agreement, or of suppressing
insurrection or disorder liable to create international
complications, the troops so sent are in no case to exceed the
actual number required, and are to be forthwith recalled as soon as
their missions are accomplished.
“5. ‘The recognition on the part of Russia of the exclusive right of
Japan to give advice and assistance in the interest of reform and
good government in Korea, including necessary military assistance.
“6. ‘This Agreement to supersede all previous arrangements between
Japan and Russia respecting Korea.’
“In handing the foregoing project to Count Lamsdorff,” wrote Baron
Komura to Mr. Kurino in the same dispatch which contained the
proposed Articles, “you will say that it is presented for the
consideration of the Russian Government in the firm belief that it
may be found adequate to serve as a basis upon which to construct a
satisfactory arrangement between the two Governments, and you will
assure Count Lamsdorff that any amendment or suggestion he may find
it necessary to offer will receive the immediate and friendly
consideration of the Imperial Government. It will not be necessary
for you to say much in elucidation of the separate items of the
project, as they are largely self-explanatory; but you might point
out that the project taken as a whole will be found to be little
more than a logical extension and amplification of the principles
already recognized by, or of conditions embodied in the previous
engagements[592] concluded between, the two Governments.”[593]
These articles are memorable, as their more essential features were
never altered in the later notes from Japan, as the persistent rejection
by Russia of the principles embodied in these articles inevitably ended
in hostilities, and, the most important of all, as much of the future of
the East would seem to depend upon whether these principles should win
or fail through the war. The principles were as obvious as the note was
“largely self-explanatory.” At their basis was the desire for a general,
lasting peace of the Far East, or, in other words, an effective
elimination of unnatural, irritating circumstances, so that the East may
develop its enormous material and moral resources, and thereby establish
with the West an intimate and mutually beneficial relationship. Upon
this fundamental desire were built two great principles, which had long
been the mottoes of Eastern diplomacy; namely, the territorial integrity
of, and the “open door” in, China and Korea. These principles, which
Russia had frequently avowed on her own initiative, Japan now requested
her to uphold mutually with herself. Side by side with these
considerations, the vested interests and the peculiar position,
respectively, of Russia in Manchuria and Japan in Korea, were to be
reciprocally recognized by the two Powers, in such a way, however, as
not to infringe the two great principles already named. Observe that the
Russian interests in Manchuria were not less respected than the Japanese
interests in Korea, nor was the Russian occupation of Manchuria more
guarded against than the Japanese annexation of Korea. The only ground
in the note for a possible misinterpretation was the Article which
provided for Japan’s sole right to advise and aid Korea for the cause of
the good government and reform of the latter. Experience had shown that
the independence and progress of Korea, upon which one half of Japan’s
own future rested, would be possible only by the internal reform and
development of the Peninsular Empire, and that, unfortunately, the task
of reform could not safely be left either with the indolent Korea or
with another Power, be it China or Russia, whose ultimate object would
be best served were Korea to remain feeble. The reform of Korea may
truly be called the penalty of Japan’s geographical position, and the
latter’s success in the fulfillment of this most delicate mission must
depend on her sense of just proportion and utmost self-control. And
nothing seems to kindle the Japanese nation with a higher ambition than
their profound determination to perform what they deem their historic
mission in the fairest spirit of human progress. Only along these lines,
moreover, by a peculiar coincidence of circumstances, the securest
interests of Japan as a nation seem to lie. For it appears to be her
singular fortune that her interests become every year more closely tied
with the best tried principles of progress. Upon fairness her life
depends, and upon it the natural growth of the millions of the East
would seem to rest. It appeared, therefore, evident to the Japanese
statesmen that in no other manner than along the course suggested by
their propositions to Russia could the welfare of all the interested
parties be assured, and the future repose and progress of the East
guaranteed. On the other hand, however, nothing could be more
distasteful to the party presumably in control of the Eastern policy of
Russia at the time than the reciprocal understanding proposed by Mr.
Kurino in his note of August 12.
Before replying to this note, Count Lamsdorff suddenly demanded, on
August 23, that negotiations should be conducted at Tokio instead of at
St. Petersburg, as had been desired by Japan[594]. This move of Russia
was closely parallel to the policy she once pursued in China regarding
the lease of Port Arthur, when she declined to negotiate at the Russian
Capital[595]. A discussion at St. Petersburg might save it from many of
the vexatious delays which would naturally attend its being held at an
Eastern capital, away from the Foreign Office of the Power whose
interest counseled procrastination. Of the several reasons presented by
Russia for her proposition, one was that the local knowledge of Viceroy
Alexieff had constantly to be consulted. Japan pointed out that the
proposed Agreement concerned matters of principle, and not of local
detail[596]. Her repeated request, however, to negotiate at St.
Petersburg was firmly refused by Russia, as was also Japan’s suggestion
that her note be made the basis of the discussion.[597] Negotiations
were therefore transferred to Tokio, and the Japanese note and the
Russian counter-note—the latter not then received—were together to serve
as the base of the _pourparlers_[598]. This question, which marked the
beginning of many long delays to follow, itself consumed two weeks
before any real progress of the negotiations could be made.
After a delay of nearly eight weeks, Russia, on October 3, sent her
counter-note, which, as will be seen from the following telegram of the
5th, from Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino, revealed the utter
irreconcilability of the wishes of the two Powers:—
“Baron Rosen [Russian Minister at Tokio] came back from Port Arthur
on the 3d instant. He called on me the same day, and handed me the
following as the Russian counter-proposals, which, he said, had been
sanctioned by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, upon the joint
representations of Admiral Alexieff and himself:—
“1. ‘Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial
integrity of the Korean Empire.
“2. ‘Recognition by Russia of Japan’s preponderating interests in
Korea, and of the right of Japan to give advice and assistance to
Korea tending to improve the civil administration of the Empire
without infringing the stipulations of Article 1.
“3. ‘Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the commercial
and industrial undertakings of Japan in Korea, nor to oppose any
measures taken for the purpose of protecting them, so long as such
measures do not infringe the stipulations of Article 1.
“4. ‘Recognition of the right of Japan to send, for the same
purpose, troops to Korea, with the knowledge of Russia, but their
number not to exceed that actually required, and with the engagement
on the part of Japan to recall such troops as soon as their mission
is accomplished.
“5. ‘Mutual engagement not to use any part of the territory of Korea
for strategical purposes, nor to undertake on the coasts of Korea
any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in
the Straits of Korea.
“6. ‘Mutual engagement to consider that part of the territory of
Korea lying to the north of the thirty-ninth parallel as a neutral
zone into which neither of the contracting parties shall introduce
troops.
“7. ‘Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as in all
respects outside her sphere of interest.
“8. ‘This Agreement to supersede all previous agreements between
Russia and Japan regarding Korea.[599]’”
In comparing this counter-note with the original note of Japan, it will
at once be seen that Russia seriously reduced Japan’s demands concerning
Korea by excluding her right of rendering advice and assistance to Korea
in the latter’s military affairs, and also by quietly suppressing the
important clause providing for mutual recognition of the principle of
the equal economic opportunity for all nations in Korea. Moreover,
Russia imposed upon Japan the following new conditions regarding Korea:
not to use any part of the territory for strategical purposes; not to
fortify the southern coast; and to consider the territory north of the
thirty-ninth parallel, covering nearly one third of the area of the
Empire, as neutral[600] between the two Powers. As regards Manchuria,
Russia silently discarded the two fundamental principles proposed by
Japan and often avowed by Russia herself, namely, China’s sovereignty
over it and the equal economic opportunity for all nations therein. On
the contrary, Russia requested Japan to declare Manchuria and its
littoral as outside of her sphere of interest. If the Power which
exchanged necessaries of life with Manchuria in fast growing quantities,
controlled more than ninety per cent. of the exports at Niu-chwang, and
numbered tens of thousands of its subjects residing in the Three
Provinces, should be required by Russia to declare itself uninterested
in Manchuria, the exclusive designs of Russia upon the territory would
seem to need no stronger proof. The general tenor of the note of October
3 was, thus, to exclude Manchuria from discussion, and, furthermore, to
restrict Japan’s influence in Korea. Russia explained that the question
of Manchuria rested between herself and China, and that she had no
reason to make any arrangement about it with a third Power. To this,
Japan replied that she had asked from Russia no concession of any kind
in Manchuria, but merely requested her to recognize anew the principles
which she had voluntarily and repeatedly professed. Such a recognition,
Japan contended, was of vital interest to her, inasmuch as the Russian
occupation of Manchuria would continually threaten the independence of
Korea.[601] It was evident from Russia’s counter-note that there lay an
impassable gulf between the propositions of the two Powers, not only in
the actual terms under discussion, but also in the principles involved
in them, for, to all appearance, nothing could prove more clearly that
Russia was bent upon absorbing and closing up all Manchuria, as well as
marking out Northern Korea as an eventual sphere of her influence, and
that she was unwilling to recognize the profound and increasing common
interest of Japan and Manchuria, and the vital importance to the former
of the independence, strength, and development of Korea.
The date fixed in the Convention in April, 1902, for the final
evacuation of Manchuria arrived on October 8, 1903—five days after the
Russian counter-note was received by Japan, but the day came and passed
with no sign of the evacuation. On the contrary, the Russian Minister at
Peking was engaged, regardless of the negotiations at Tokio between his
Government and the Japanese, in urging Prince Ching to change the terms
of the Convention. Those who had been impressed by the manner and
contents of the Russian reply to the Japanese note did not fail to
observe in M. Lessar’s conduct at Peking another proof of the slight
weight which the Russians attached to the overtures of Japan at least
concerning Manchuria. For, if Russia succeeded in securing China’s
consent to her new demands regarding Manchuria, which in every way
transgressed the principles contained in the Japanese note, the
Manchurian negotiations between Russia and Japan would become
unnecessary. The Russian course of action at Tokio and Peking was thus
consistent in ignoring Japan’s vital interests in Manchuria, and,
therefore, was regarded as consistently insulting to Japan. The secret
of the situation seemed to be, as has been already suggested, that the
centre of gravity of Russian diplomacy in the East had largely shifted
from St. Petersburg to Port Arthur—from Count Lamsdorff to the
inflexible Admiral Alexieff. Ever since the latter had convened, at Port
Arthur, early in July, a large council of the diplomatic, military and
naval, and financial agents of Russia in the Eastern Asiatic countries,
as well as General Kuropatkin, who was then traveling in the Orient, it
had appeared that the Viceroy of the Far East,[602] and not the Foreign
Office at the Russian Capital, was the guiding spirit of the Czar’s
policy in Korea, China, and Japan. Hereafter, Count Lamsdorff could
perhaps moderate the terms, and transmit to Japan the revised contents,
of the Viceroy’s unconciliatory views, but had otherwise lost the
control of the situation. The reason why Alexieff had risen to such a
great influence may not be known until the relations he had with M.
Bezobrazoff, the late von Plehve, and other influential politicians at
St. Petersburg of that day, become more clearly understood than they are
to-day. As to the probable views of the Viceroy regarding the situation
in the East, it is not hard to infer them from the diplomatic history in
China, Korea, and Japan, during the half year ending with February,
1904.
Let us make a brief review of the diplomatic manœuvres of the Russian
Representative at Peking regarding Manchuria, which proceeded much as if
his Government were not engaged in negotiations with Japan in respect to
the same territory. The secret Manchurian agreement which was reported
to have been concluded on July 20[603] was probably unfounded, and its
detail may otherwise be safely left unnoticed. The nature of the Russian
policy regarding Manchuria could, however, be inferred from the
remarkable exchange of views which took place at London in July between
Lord Lansdowne and the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff. In this
interview on July 11, the latter said, in effect: “Whatever may be the
result of the negotiations which are pending between Russia and
China, ... the Imperial Government [of Russia] has no intention of
opposing the gradual opening of China, as _commercial relations
develop_,[1] of some towns in Manchuria to foreign commerce, _excluding,
however, the right to establish ‘Settlements.’_ This declaration does
not apply to Harbin. The town in question being within the limits of the
concessions for the Eastern Chinese Railway, _is not unrestrictedly
subject to the Chinese Government_;[604] the establishment there of
foreign consulates must therefore depend upon the consent of the Russian
Government.”[605] The three conditions here printed in italics would
seem not only contradictory to the declaration made by Count Lamsdorff
to Mr. MacCormick on April 28,[606] but also almost tantamount to
opposing the opening of any new treaty port in Manchuria. For it was
well understood that the desire on the part of some Powers for the
speedy opening of some new ports in Manchuria was largely calculated to
prevent the aggressive and exclusive proceedings of Russia in that
territory. If, as Count Benckendorff suggested, the development of trade
relations was the sole reason for “gradually” opening some towns, if
foreign settlements should be excluded from the new ports, and if
Harbin, and logically all the towns situated at the “depots” of the
railway, could not be opened without Russian consent, Manchuria,
excepting the regions touching the few towns which had already been
opened, would remain open to the growing influence of Russia, but
practically sealed to the rest of the world.[607] This inference was
presently demonstrated by the new demands made at the Peking Foreign
Office by M. Lessar on September 6. These demands, presented, as they
were, in the midst of the Russo-Japanese negotiations at Tokio and on
the eve of the close of the period of Manchurian evacuation, deserve a
special notice. Briefly stated, M. Lessar requested: (1) that China
should not alienate, in any manner, any port, of whatever size, of
Manchuria to any other Power; (2) that Russia should be allowed to
construct wharves on the Sungari River, to connect them by telegraph,
and to station Russian troops to protect the telegraph lines and the
ships plying the river; (3) that Russia should be allowed to establish
post stations along the road from Tsitishar to Blagovestchensk; (4) that
no greater duties should be imposed on goods brought into Manchuria by
rail than those now imposed on goods transported by road or river; (5)
that after the withdrawal of the Russian troops, the branches of the
Russo-Chinese Bank should be protected by Chinese troops, but at the
cost of the Bank; and (6) that a Russian doctor should be appointed
member of the Sanitary Board at Niu-chwang. On these conditions, the
Russian forces would evacuate Niu-chwang and the rest of the Sheng-king
Province on October 8, the Kirin Province after four months, and the
Hei-lung Province at the end of one year.[608] Of these, the first
demand was interpreted to imply the prevention of the establishment of
new foreign settlements and concessions in any part of Manchuria. As to
the meaning of stationing troops along the Sungari and building a post
road from Tsitsihar to Blagovestchensk, it is instructive to observe
that Prince Ching opined that, if China conceded these demands and
Russia then nominally withdrew, the latter would still be in virtual
possession of the territory.[609] The British and Japanese Ministers at
Peking naturally warned China not to accept the Russian
propositions.[610] The Foreign Office, after some hesitation,[611]
finally refused all of the demands in a written note, on September
24.[612] This refusal, however, by no means terminated the Manchurian
negotiations at Peking. As the Chinese Government showed inclinations,
vacillating as they were, to sympathize with Japan in her efforts to
maintain the sovereign rights of China in Manchuria, M. Lessar is said
to have resorted to occasional threats that, if a war should occur
between Russia and Japan and the latter be defeated, China would repent
her sorry plight only too late, for then Manchuria would not be hers.
Particularly vigorous was his obstruction of the effort of the United
States Commissioners at Shanghai to secure the opening of new ports in
Manchuria to foreign trade.[613] In spite of all this, however, on
October 8—the very day once fixed for the final evacuation of
Manchuria—the American-Chinese treaty was signed, opening Mukden and
An-tung as treaty ports. The next day saw the conclusion of the
Japanese-Chinese treaty, bearing the date of October 8, which also
provided for the opening of Mukden and Tatung-kao. It was perhaps
nothing more than a singular coincidence of circumstances that Mukden
should be, as it was, occupied by Russian soldiers shortly after its
opening had been secured by the United States and Japan. Early in the
morning of October 28, 780 Russian soldiers with eight cannon suddenly,
without warning, rushed through the city gate and took possession of the
_Yamên_ of the Tartar General, Tsêng-chi, holding him in custody and
reducing the military forces under his control.[1] A generally accepted
ground for this precipitous act was naught more than that a subordinate
Taotai under the jurisdiction of the Tartar General had undertaken to
punish some recalcitrant bandits who had been under Russian employ. The
_Journal de Saint Pétersbourg_ explained, however, that the seizure of
Mukden was owing “to the apathy of the Chinese authorities, to the
non-execution of the promises made on their part, and to the agitation
which prevailed in the district.”[614] Mukden being the sepulchral city
of the reigning dynasty of China, its sudden occupation by the Russians
appeared to have aroused a bitter resentment among the educated classes
throughout the Empire.
Turning to the Korean frontier, the conduct of the Russians at
Yong-am-po[615] on the left side of the Yalu, near its mouth, had now
assumed an unmistakably political character. Early in July a telegraphic
connection had been made without permission with An-tung, a strategic
centre in Eastern Manchuria. At the instance of the Japanese Minister,
the Korean Government succeeded in enforcing the removal of the
line.[616] Late in the same month, the Commissioner of Forestry of Korea
and Baron Gunzburg visited Yong-am-po, and drafted an agreement leasing
the port to the Timber Company, nominally represented by the Baron. The
contract bore neither a definite period of time for the lease nor fixed
area of the leased territory, in the Korean text of the agreement, but,
according to the Russian document, the lease is said to have extended
over twenty years and covered a space equivalent to 204 acres. The
company also was granted, in the Korean text, judiciary rights over the
residents within the leased area.[617] At the same time, extensive works
had been started by the Russians at Yong-am-po, including the erection
of large brick buildings and the laying out of roads, streets, and light
railways, to be later increased by what was conceded to be a fort;
while, beyond the river, the military forces at An-tung and other
centres had been in the process of augmentation.[618] The situation had
now become so grave that Mr. Hayashi, Japanese Minister at Seul, was
obliged to enter sharp protests at the Korean Foreign Office against the
conclusion of the lease agreement,[619] and to urge again the opening of
Wiju, and now also of Yong-am-po, to foreign trade. Both the British and
American Representatives also pressed the Seul Government to open these
ports.[620] The Russian Minister, M. Pavloff, however, was as
strenuously opposed to the opening of these ports as Mr. Hayashi was to
the conclusion of the lease agreement. The conditions were almost
identical with those in 1898 under which Great Britain urged the opening
of Talien-wan, so as to counteract the Russian aggression upon it and
Port Arthur, and also with those in Manchuria, in this same year, where
the American and Japanese Governments demanded the opening of new ports
in order to prevent the exclusion of foreign trade and industry from
Manchuria under Russian rule. The struggle between the open and the
exclusive policy, however, continued much longer in Korea than in China,
owing largely to the extremely unstable political conditions at Seul,
which enabled the Russian diplomats oftener and longer to influence the
Korean court.[621] As regards the lease of Yong-am-po, the Korean
Government was now so alive to the serious nature of the agreement that
it proposed to modify its terms late in August.[622] M. Pavloff,
however, persistently urged the Korean Government to ratify the original
agreement. On August 27, for instance, he and Baron Gunzburg remained at
the Foreign Office from one to six o’clock in the afternoon, requesting
the immediate conclusion of the contract, until the Foreign Minister
escaped out of the door and tendered his resignation.[623] At the same
time, the conduct of the Russians on the frontier grew even more
menacing than before. The cutting of timber was started at different
points, where many Koreans were forced into unpaid service, and the
bandits in Russian employ created disorder among peaceful citizens.[624]
Moreover, according to the reports of Korean officials, the Russians had
occupied at Yong-am-po—now named Nicolas—a ground far more extensive
than the lease-area stipulated in the yet unratified agreement.[625] All
this while, the Russians at the Capital exercised a powerful influence
over both Yi Keun-thaik and Yi Yong-ik, two of the most noted
politicians at Seul, and over the strong party upholding the interests
of Lady Öm.[626] It was through these pro-Russian people that the unique
idea of declaring the neutrality of Korea before the outbreak of any
war—an idea which had more than once been unsuccessfully
proposed[627]—was again brought forward, and finally, early in 1904,
carried into effect in an awkward manner.[628]
Russian activity in Korea and Manchuria, which has been briefly
described, may be said to constitute the reverse side of the diplomacy
of the Czar’s Government at Tokio. The actual control of the Eastern
situation having probably passed from the central power to Port Arthur,
it was now founded, perhaps not upon greater practical wisdom than
before, but apparently upon a uniform basis. For the conclusion is
forced upon the student that Viceroy Alexieff’s policy must have been,
on the one hand, to deal with Japan’s overtures lightly and leisurely,
but, on the other, to hasten the establishment of Russian control in
Manchuria and upon the Korean frontier, so that Japan might in time be
compelled to bow to the situation and accept terms dictated by Russia.
The proof of this policy had already seemed abundantly sufficient by the
time when the Russian counter-note reached Baron Komura on October 3. It
is impossible to tell whether, in framing such a policy, the Viceroy had
taken into consideration the fact that the entire nation of Japan felt
as one man that they had come to the greatest crisis known in their long
history.
-----
Footnote 580:
Viscount Katsura, Premier; Baron Komura, Foreign Minister; and Messrs.
Terauchi and Yamamoto, Ministers, respectively, of the Army and Navy.
Footnote 581:
Marquises Itō and Yamagata, and Counts Matsukata, Inoüé and Ōyama.
Footnote 582:
The Japanese dailies.
Footnote 583:
The _Nichi-Ro Kōshō ni kwan su ru Ōfuku_ (diplomatic correspondence
respecting the negotiations between Japan and Russia), dispatch No. 1.
This correspondence (hereafter abbreviated as _N.-R._) was presented
by the Japanese Government to the Houses of the Imperial Diet,
respectively, on March 23 and 26, and published in the _Kwampō_
(Official Gazette) of March 24 and 27, 1904. It contains fifty-one
dispatches, all telegraphic, covering the period of more than six
months between the opening of the negotiations and the severance of
all diplomatic relations between the two Powers, namely, between July
28, 1903, and February 6, 1904.
An authoritative English translation of this correspondence has been
issued from Washington, probably by members of the Japanese Legation
there. In the quotations from the correspondence that appear in these
pages, the language of the translation—accurate as it is—has been
largely changed, in order to make it coincide as closely as possible
with the literal meaning of the original.
Footnote 584:
_N.-R._, No. 2.
Footnote 585:
It is singular that even Count Lamsdorff should thus participate in
the characteristic plaint of the Russians that they are an object of
unjust machinations of other nations.
Footnote 586:
_N.-R._, No. 3, received at Tokio on August 6.
Footnote 587:
These men were, according to Article 2 of the Statutes of September
30, “the Ministers of the Interior, of Finance, of Foreign Affairs,
and of War, the head of the Ministry of Marine, and such persons as
His Majesty the Emperor may find it expedient to summon, either to sit
permanently on the committee, or to take part temporarily at its
meetings. The Viceroy of the Far East, being, by his duties, a member
of the committee, shall be present at the meetings when he is in St.
Petersburg.”
Footnote 588:
The _British Parliamentary Papers: China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 144.
Footnote 589:
_Ibid._, No. 155.
Footnote 590:
After the opening of hostilities in February of the present year, the
Russian Foreign Office made a statement of Russia’s case, in which it
was said that, when the Japanese Government proposed in August, 1903,
to open the negotiations, “Russia consented, and Viceroy Alexieff was
charged to draw up a project for a new understanding with Japan in
coöperation with the Russian Minister at Tokio....” See p. 327, note
9, below.
Footnote 591:
_N.-R._, No. 6.
Footnote 592:
Evidently the reference is to the three Russo-Japanese agreements
concerning Korea concluded in 1896 and 1898.
Footnote 593:
_N.-R._, No. 3, originally dated Tokio, August 6.
Footnote 594:
_N.-R._, No. 7.
Footnote 595:
The _British Parliamentary Papers: China, No. 1 (1898)_, Nos. 100 and
109.
Footnote 596:
_N.-R._, Nos. 8, 11.
Footnote 597:
_N.-R._, Nos. 10, 11.
Footnote 598:
_Ibid._, No. 14, September 7.
Footnote 599:
_N.-R._, No. 17.
Footnote 600:
The Russian Government explained later, in the note delivered on
January 6, 1904, that the creation of a neutral zone was “for the very
purpose which the Imperial Japanese Government had likewise in view,
namely, ‘to eliminate everything that might lead to misunderstandings
in the future;’ a similar zone, for example, existed between the
Russian and British possessions in Central Asia.”—_N.-R._, No. 38.
It is easy to see, however, that _neutralization_ is merely _common
appropriation_ in a negative form, and might, like cases of the
latter, as in Primorsk and Sakhalien, result in _absorption_ by one of
the two Powers between which the territory was neutralized.
Footnote 601:
_N.-R._, No. 20.
Footnote 602:
Before August 13, when he was appointed Viceroy of the Far East,
Alexieff was as yet Governor-General of the Kwan-tung region.
Footnote 603:
The Japanese dailies.
Footnote 604:
The italics in the quotation are the author’s.
Footnote 605:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 133 (Lansdowne to Scott).
Footnote 606:
See pp. 246–248, above.
Footnote 607:
It is highly interesting that at this moment, when the Russian
Government was, on the one hand, negotiating with Japan, and, on the
other, proposing new demands upon China, the Russian Ambassador at
London intimated the desire of his Government to come to an agreement
with Great Britain regarding their interest in China. It appears that
Russia wished Great Britain to declare Manchuria as outside of her
sphere of interest, in return for a similar declaration by Russia
regarding the Yang-tsze valley. Lord Lansdowne’s reply was
characteristic. “I repeated,” he wrote to Sir C. Scott, “that we
should be glad to arrive at one [i. e., an agreement with Russia], but
that it must, of course, include the Manchurian question. We could,
however, of course not come to terms unless we were fully informed as
to the intentions of the Russian Government [in Manchuria]. Count
Benckendorff again asked me whether, if we were satisfied upon this
point, we should be likely to _assist_ in bringing about an
arrangement between the Russian and Chinese Governments. I said that
we should certainly make no secret of our concurrence, if we were
thoroughly satisfied. Meanwhile, however, I was afraid that our
attitude must remain observant and critical.”—_China, No. 2 (1904)_,
No. 142 (August 12). Cf. No. 139.
The Russian Government could not have forgotten that Great Britain had
agreed with Japan, on January 30, 1902, that neither of the two Powers
should come to a separate understanding with another Power regarding
China or Korea without a full and frank discussion between themselves.
Footnote 608:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 147, 148, 149, 156.
Footnote 609:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 150.
Footnote 610:
_Ibid._, Nos. 149, 151, 153, 160.
Footnote 611:
_Ibid._, Nos. 147 and 156.
Footnote 612:
_Ibid._, Nos. 150 and 160.
Footnote 613:
See pp. 252 ff., above.
Footnote 614:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 159.
Footnote 615:
See pp. 289 ff., above.
Footnote 616:
The _Kokumin_, Seul telegrams, July 6, 10, 17 (1903).
Footnote 617:
_Ibid._, July 23, 27; August 2, 8, 18.
Footnote 618:
_Ibid._, July 27, etc.
Footnote 619:
_Ibid._, August 12, 14, 23 (cf. July 17, etc.).
Footnote 620:
The _Kokumin_, August 10, September 2, etc.
Footnote 621:
The opening of Wiju was once granted by the Foreign Office, but the
Emperor refused to sanction it.—_Ibid._, November 21. This is another
illustration of the peculiar circumstances at Seul, that there exist
two political centres, the Government and the Court. (The opening of
neither Wiju nor Yong-am-po had been effected before the outbreak of
the present war.)
Footnote 622:
The _Kokumin_, August 29.
Footnote 623:
_Ibid._, August 27, 29.
Footnote 624:
_Ibid._, September 29.
Footnote 625:
About 2¾ by 5¾ miles.—_Ibid._, November 1. Late in December, a report
reached the Korean Government from the frontier that the Russians had
forbidden all but their countrymen to enter into the Russian territory
at Yong-am-po.—_Ibid._, December 23.
Footnote 626:
Many stories have been told of M. Pavloff’s influence over the venal
politicians of Seul. Of these, two are given below, which are not
verifiable, but certainly interesting.
Yi Keun-thaik is said to have told the Emperor, late in December,
1903, that the following assurance had been given by the Russian
Representative: if the Korean refusal to open Wiju and Yong-am-po to
foreign trade should result in the mobilization of Japanese forces,
Russia would also dispatch troops against them; in 1894, Korea erred
when she relied on China, but Russia was not a China, and might
implicitly be relied upon.—The _Kokumin_, telegram, December 25.
One day, it is said, M. Pavloff remarked in the presence of the Korean
Emperor and his attendants: “The Koreans often rely upon Japan, or
else are afraid of her, but where in the world is Japan?” Then he
scanned a map through a pocket magnifier, and said: “Oh, I find a tiny
country called Japan in a corner of the Pacific Ocean. My Russian
Empire is the greatest country on the globe, spreading over two
continents. If Korea relies upon our Empire, she will be as safe as in
navigating a sea in a colossal vessel. Should Japan object to it, our
Russia would only have to do thus.” Here, placing a few matches on his
palm, he blew them off.—The _Kyōiku Jiron_.
Footnote 627:
In the latter half of 1900, for example.
Footnote 628:
Korean neutrality is said to have been telegraphed to the Korean
Representatives abroad through the French channel. It was not until
some time after the other Powers had received the declaration that it
reached Japan. Russia, it will be remembered, told the world that
Japan infringed the neutrality of Korea when the former’s warships had
an encounter with the “Variag” and “Korietz” at Chemulpo. See pp. 355
ff., below.