DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE IN KOREA, I
Manchuria, however, constituted only one half—perhaps the less important
half—of the great Eastern problem which perplexed the world and
imperiled the future life of Japan. In the other half, namely, Korea,
Japan was confronted by a situation similar and closely allied to that
in Manchuria, and more directly menacing to herself. Let us briefly
describe the evolution of the complex Korean question which ensued upon
the Chinese-Japanese war of 1894–5.
The war had arisen from the conflicting wishes of the belligerent Powers
regarding Korea, China asserting suzerain rights over the Peninsular
Kingdom, and the interests of Japan making its effective independence
imperative. Unfortunately, Korea’s lack of material strength rendered
her real independence impossible, and her strength could be secured,
from the Japanese point of view, only by a thoroughgoing reform of her
administrative, financial, and economic system, which had sunk into a
state of unspeakable corruption and decay. By her victory, the colossal
task devolved upon Japan of reforming the national institutions of a
people whose political training in the past seemed to have made them
particularly impervious to such an effort. Perhaps no work more delicate
and more liable to blunder and misunderstanding could befall a nation
than that of setting another nation’s house in order who would not feel
its necessity. In this difficult enterprise, the Japanese showed
themselves as inexperienced as the Koreans were reluctant and resentful.
Three million _yen_ were furnished by Japan to Korea in the interest of
various reforms, as also were numerous councilors, including such able
men as Shūichirō Saitō and the late Tōru Hoshi. Some of the others,
however, were either inferior in attainments or impatient of slow
processes. The entire movement was intrusted to the direction of the new
Japanese Minister, Count K. Inoüé, a generous, brilliant, and bold
statesman. He presented to the Korean sovereign a plan of reform, which
included the proposal to remove from her share of political control the
versatile Queen, whose family of the Min had grown powerful by means of
the abuses which the Count wished to eradicate. In this attempt, in
which he was largely successful, of drawing a line of demarcation
between the Court and the Government, he inevitably incurred the deep
ire of the family whose influence had been predominant both at the
capital and in the country. Other measures of his reform further
antagonized the official nobility of the Kingdom.[492] The influence of
the Count, however, was so great, and the training of Korean troops by
Japanese officers seemed so successful, that even the domineering Queen
was obliged to await a more favorable moment to regain her lost
prestige.
At that time Russia was represented at Seul by M. Waeber, who had been
in Korea for more than ten years, and whose personality and diplomatic
arts had won him warm friends in the Court, particularly the Queen and
her party. At one time, before the late war, when the ascendency of the
Chinese Resident, Yuan Shi-kai, had created disaffection among certain
Koreans, M. Waeber was said to have succeeded in quietly allying himself
with those people and promoting Russian influence over them.[493] It was
now again found possible for him and his talented wife to recommend
themselves to the large body of men and women whose feeling the Japanese
had in one way or another alienated, and slowly but surely to undermine
the latter’s influence in Seul.[494] The successful coercion of Japan by
the three Powers after the treaty of Shimonoseki must also have gone far
toward reducing the prestige of Japan in the eye of the Koreans, who are
singularly susceptible to the influence of events of this nature.
As soon as Count Inoüé left Seul, the Queen again came to the front. On
July 7, 1895, she suddenly accused of treason the most influential
member of the Cabinet and chief of the pro-Japanese party, Pak Yong-hio,
who again had to flee to Japan, where he had recently spent ten years of
a refugee’s life.[495] Count Inoüé returned to Seul, and again the Queen
held her breath. A Cabinet was organized of partisans of reform. The
Count was, however, relieved of his post late in July, and in September
was succeeded as the Japanese Minister by Viscount Lieutenant-General
Gorō Miura, a man of undoubted sincerity, but utterly without diplomatic
training. No sooner had Inoüé left Korea than the Queen reasserted
herself, increased the personnel of her household, and restored many of
her old extravagances so lately removed by the reformer. She had been
further embittered by the sharp rivalry shown against her and the Min by
the King’s father, Tai-wen-kun, and his party. The Queen finally planned
a _coup d’état_, early in October, with a view to disbanding the
soldiers trained by Japanese officers and replacing the progressive
Cabinet members with her friends. A crisis was imminent, and it was at
this juncture that some of the Japanese in Seul betrayed themselves into
a crime which caused a bitter disappointment and lasting disgrace to the
Government and the nation at home. Perceiving that a passive attitude
would result in a great calamity, certain Koreans and Japanese rose
early on October 8, to bring Tai-wen-kun out of his secluded residence.
Accompanied by two battalions of trained soldiers, the veteran statesman
rode toward the King’s palace, where he was to present a plan of reform,
but was opposed by the guard, who fired at his escort. In the midst of
the mêlée which ensued, some of the bravoes rushed into the Inner Palace
and murdered the Queen.[496] The deed was no less crushing a blow to the
Japanese nation than it was to the bereaved King of Korea, for the
former’s ardent desire always to adhere to the fairest principles of
international conduct was, for once, frustrated by the rash act of a
handful of their brethren at Seul. The pernicious influence of the Queen
passed away, and the power of the reform Cabinet was for the moment
assured, but only at the expense of a revolting crime which the Japanese
will never cease to lament. It is probable that the murder of the Queen,
as apart from the rise of Tai-wen-kun, was premeditated, and also that
Minister Miura had been prevailed upon to connive at the guilt. The
Japanese Government at once recalled and tried him and forty-seven other
suspected persons, and prohibited Japanese from visiting Korea without
special permission.
Mr. (now Baron) Komura, who presently succeeded to the Ministry at Seul,
seemed to reverse the policy of his predecessors and abstain from active
interference. The Korean Cabinet also appeared powerless to check the
Russian party, whose power was growing apace. Prominent politicians out
of office frequently conferred at the Russian Legation, where some of
them were even said to have taken refuge from the law. There a leader of
this party (who till May of the present year represented Korea at St.
Petersburg) matured a plan to overthrow the Cabinet, or, in case of
failure, to abduct the King and the Crown Prince to Vladivostok. The
plan, however, was discovered on November 28,[497] only to be followed
by another, which proved successful. In January, 1896, there took place
a slight uprising in Northern Korea, at the instigation, it was said, of
pro-Russian leaders. When the major portion of the army had been sent
out of the capital to suppress the alleged rebellion, 127 Russian
marines with a cannon suddenly landed at Chemulpo on February 10, and
immediately entered Seul. The next day, before dawn, the King, with the
seal of the state, as well as the Crown Prince and Princess and some
court ladies, fled in disguise to the Russian Legation, where the King
remained for a twelvemonth, till February 20 of the following year. At
his arrival at the Legation, an edict was issued proclaiming the Cabinet
Ministers guilty of treason, and ordering their decapitation. Another
edict canceling the order appeared too late, for the Prime Minister and
two other Ministers had been murdered on the streets in broad daylight,
and their heads exposed by the wayside, while three others had fled to
Japan for life.[498] The murders of February, 1896, would have come down
to history as more atrocious than the crime of October 8, 1895, had it
not been for the fact that the latter involved the life of a queen.
The King being virtually in the custody of the Russians, their
ascendency resulted as a matter of course. They secured, among other
things, an immense timber concession on the northern frontier and on
Uinung Island,[499] and a mining concession along the Tumên River.[500]
The Korean forces trained by Japanese officers were abolished in
May,[501] and the Japanese soldiers stationed at the ports and Seul also
were reduced in number.[502]
The Government at Tokio even appeared, for a time at least, to forsake
its historic policy of safe-guarding Korea’s independence by its sole
aid, but to seek Russia’s coöperation toward the same end. With this
object in view, Japan seized the occasion of the coronation of the Czar
to send Field Marshal Marquis Aritomo Yamagata[503] as special envoy to
St. Petersburg, with a commission to negotiate with the Russian
Government an agreement regarding the relative position of the two
Powers in Korea. The result was the following Yamagata-Lobanoff
Protocol, signed on June 9, 1896:—
“ARTICLE I. The Japanese and Russian Governments should, with the
object of remedying the financial embarrassments of Korea, counsel
the Korean Government to suppress all unnecessary expenses and to
establish an equilibrium between expenditure and revenue. If, as a
result of the reforms which should be considered indispensable, it
should become necessary to have recourse to foreign debts, the two
Governments should, of a common accord, render their support to
Korea.
“ARTICLE II. The Japanese and Russian Governments should try to
abandon to Korea, in so far as the financial and economic situation
of that country should permit, the creation and the maintenance of
an armed force and of a police organized of native subjects, in
proportions sufficient to maintain internal order, without foreign
aid.
“ARTICLE III. With a view to facilitating communications with Korea,
the Japanese Government shall continue to administer the telegraphic
lines which are actually in its possession.
“It is reserved to Russia to establish a telegraphic line from Seul
to her frontier.
“These various lines should be purchased by the Korean Government,
as soon as it finds means so to do.
“ARTICLE IV. In case the principles above expounded require a more
precise and more detailed definition, or if in the future other
points should arise about which it should be necessary to consult,
the Representatives of the two Governments should be instructed to
discuss them amicably.”[504]
A few days earlier, on May 14, there was concluded at Seul between M.
Komura and M. Waeber, the Japanese and Russian Ministers, a Memorandum
dealing with matters of more immediate interest to the two Powers.[505]
M. Waeber agreed to advise the Korean King to return from the Russian
Legation to his palace, as soon as there was no more apprehension for
his safety, M. Komura pledging in return to keep the Japanese political
bravoes (_sō-shi_) in Seul under a strict surveillance (Article I.). It
was declared that the present Cabinet members[506] of Korea were noted
for generous and mild principles, and had been appointed to their posts
by the King of his own accord. The Japanese and Russian Representatives
should always make it their aim to advise the King to govern his people
in generous spirit (Article II.). The remainder of the Memorandum is
more worthy of record:—
“ARTICLE III. The Representative of Russia quite agrees with the
Representative of Japan that, at the present state of affairs in
Korea, it may be necessary to have the Japanese guards stationed at
some places for the protection of the Japanese telegraph line
between Fusan and Seul, and that these guards, now consisting of
three companies of soldiers, should be withdrawn as soon as possible
and replaced by gendarmes, who will be stationed as follows: fifty
men at Tai-ku, fifty men at Ka-heung, and ten men each at ten
intermediate posts between Fusan and Seul. This distribution may be
liable to some changes, but the total number of gendarme force shall
never exceed 200 men, who will afterwards be gradually withdrawn
from those places in which peace and order have been restored by the
Korean Government.[507]
“ARTICLE IV. For the protection of the Japanese settlements at Seul
and the open ports against the possible attacks by the Korean
populace, two companies of Japanese troops may be stationed at Seul,
one company at Fusan and one at Gensan, each company not to exceed
200 men. These troops shall be quartered near the settlements, and
should be withdrawn as soon as no apprehensions of such attacks
could be entertained.
“For the protection of the Russian Legation and Consulates, the
Russian Government may also keep guards not exceeding in number the
Japanese troops at these places, which will be withdrawn as soon as
tranquillity in the interior is completely restored.”[508]
A casual reading of these agreements will show how far the Japanese
Government had receded from the position she originally took in regard
to Korea. Ever since Japan concluded her treaty with Korea in 1876,[509]
which for the first time established the international position of the
latter State as a sovereign Power, Japan’s policy had been to uphold the
independence and the opening of the Peninsular Kingdom. From the strict
terms of this policy, Japan has allowed herself to depart twice,—in her
agreements, first, with China in 1885, and, again, with Russia in
1896,—not by forsaking its principles, but in each case by entering, in
the pursuit of the policy, into an impossible association with an
aggressive Power. In each of the two instances the attempt failed within
a decade, and resulted in hostilities. In 1885, Japan and China
simultaneously withdrew their forces from Korea, and thereby cleared the
ground for the renewed conflict of their opposing interests, which were
artificially placed on a par with one another. In 1896, Japan admitted
Russia’s right to build a telegraph line in North Korea which should
correspond to the Japanese line in the south, and to station in Korea a
number of troops equal to that of the Japanese soldiers. Despite the
millenniums of her historic relations with Korea, and the actual
preponderance of her interests therein, and after her successful
liberation of the Kingdom from Chinese suzerainty by a costly war,
Japan, now admitted into the Peninsular politics on an equal footing
with herself a Power which owed its bright success to a mere diplomacy
of less than two years’ standing, and whose policy seemed to be guided
by principles entirely at variance with the independence and strength of
Korea.
At the coronation of the Czar, Korea was represented by an influential,
pro-Russian member of the Min family. It was then rumored that he
concluded with the Russian Government a secret agreement by which Korea
undertook to employ Russian military instructors and financial
councilors. However that may be, the Russian Representatives at Seul are
said to have since appealed more than once to the “secret agreement” in
their attempts to force the engagement of Russian service upon the
Korean Government.[510] If these reports were true, no better proof of
the light estimate with which Russia from the first regarded the
Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol could be found than her alleged agreement
with Min Yong-hwan, for the latter was a direct reversal of the first
two Articles of the former. Russia may be credited with having
succeeded, by her separate and mutually contradictory arrangements with
Min, Yamagata, and Li Hung-chang,[511] in simultaneously bringing the
three Eastern Powers to terms.
Whatever the truth of the reported Russo-Korean Agreement, Russia did no
sooner sign her Japanese Protocol of June 9, than she began to violate
its terms. In the same month, it was resolved that Korean troops should
henceforth be instructed under the Russian system of military education,
and accordingly, in October, three army officers, a medical officer, and
ten soldiers from Russia arrived at Seul. In April, 1897, M. Waeber was
urging upon the Seul Government the employment of 160 officers and
soldiers, and, despite the reluctance of Korea and inquiries from Japan,
three Russian officers and ten soldiers entered the capital in July,
whose service for three years was finally, on September 6, imposed upon
the Korean Government by M. A. de Speyer, the new Russian Minister. Thus
the royal guard and five battalions of the Korean infantry, numbering
about 3000, came under Russian instruction.[512] A month later, M.
Speyer requested that the control of all the receipts from the taxes and
customs be placed in the hands of one M. Kir Alexieff. At that time,
however, a British subject, Mr. MacLeavy Brown, had not served his term
as Financial Adviser and General Director of Customs of Korea. Failing
the assent of the Finance Department, M. Speyer pressed upon the Foreign
Department, which yielded at last. The British Consul, Mr. Jordan,
protested in vain, for, on October 26, the Korean King issued an edict
releasing Mr. Brown from his duties. A Russo-Korean Bank was soon
organized to transact the financial and economical affairs of Korea. On
December 27, seven British men-of-war visited Chemulpo, and Mr. Jordan
went thither, returning to Seul accompanied by a naval officer and ten
marines. Mr. Brown was consequently restored to his office, and M.
Alexieff had to content himself with a subordinate position under
him.[513]
It was a misfortune to Russia that her able representative at Seul, M.
Waeber, who had been in Korea since 1884, had been transferred to
Mexico, and was replaced by M. Speyer. The former diplomat’s pleasing
manners were succeeded by the latter’s overbearing conduct, which
appeared gradually to alienate from Russian influence many a former
friend of M. Waeber. The anti-Russian sentiment grew finally so strong
that a large number of intelligent Koreans organized the Korean
Independence Society, whose object was declared to be to restore the
military, financial, and political control of the Kingdom to the hands
of the Koreans. The impatient M. Speyer was reported to have written a
note to the Korean Government, on March 7, 1898, asking for a reply
within twenty-four hours to the query whether Korea was really in want
of the service of the Russian experts, whose position had become rather
precarious. The astounded Government replied politely but firmly in the
negative. Other events occurred which further evinced the arbitrary
attitude of M. Speyer. With an equally astonishing decision, he ordered,
on March 17, all the financial and military councilors to be recalled to
Russia. The Russo-Korean Bank was also disorganized. M. Speyer himself
leaving Korea in April, his post was occupied by the amiable M.
Matunine.[514] About this time, a new Russo-Japanese Protocol was signed
at Tokio between Baron Rosen, the Russian Minister to Japan, and Baron
Nishi, the Foreign Minister of the Japanese Government.
It is evident that the relaxation of Russia’s diplomacy in Korea was in
no small measure due to the swift movement of events, as well as her own
all-engrossing activity, in China. The Nishi-Rosen Protocol of April 25,
1898, concluded as it was at this unfavorable moment for Russia, was far
more in Japan’s favor than the agreements of 1896. It not only gave an
explicit recognition of the independence of Korea, but also incorporated
in the second Article the best principles of the previous agreement,
and, in addition, fully recognized the special economic interests of
Japan in the Peninsula. The entire Protocol deserves quotation:—
“ARTICLE I. The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia definitely
recognize the independence and the perfect sovereignty of Korea, and
mutually engage to abstain from all direct interference in the
internal affairs of that country.
“ARTICLE II. Desirous of removing all possible causes of
misunderstanding in the future, the Imperial Governments of Japan
and Russia mutually engage, in case Korea should have recourse to
the counsel and assistance of either Japan or Russia, not to take
any measure regarding the nomination of military instructors and
financial advisers, without having previously arrived at a mutual
accord on the subject.
“ARTICLE III. In view of the great development of the commercial and
industrial enterprises of Japan in Korea, as also of the
considerable number of the Japanese subjects residing in that
country, the Russian Imperial Government shall not obstruct the
development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan
and Korea.”[515]
Each one of these three Articles should be carefully noted, for five
years later, in 1903, they, together with the last Article of the
Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol of June 9, 1896, became a conventional ground
for Japan’s direct negotiations with Russia which preceded the present
war. Particular attention is called to the third Article, wherein Russia
recognized for the first time the peculiar interest of the Japanese
nation in the economic development of Korea.
Less artificial as the Protocol was in comparison with the former
agreements, it was, however, hardly adequate as an instrument to
reconcile the conflicting interests of Russia and Japan. Fresh
complications could well be expected from the second Article, for it, on
the other hand, barred the reformatory attempts of a Power whose
interests demanded the independence and strength of Korea, and, on the
other, cleared the ground for the renewed activity of another Power
which had little intention to abstain from undermining the vital
interests of Japan. Under these precarious circumstances was opened the
second period of the Russo-Japanese relations in Korea.
-----
Footnote 492:
Cf. _Dōbun-kwai_, No. 49, p. 7.
Footnote 493:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 731–732.
Footnote 494:
_Ibid._, p. 740.
Footnote 495:
G. Takeda, _Kinji Kyokutō Gwaikō Shi_ (recent history of diplomacy in
the Far East, Tokio, 1904), pp. 22–23.
Footnote 496:
G. Takeda, pp. 25–30; Y. Hamada, _Nichi-Ro Gwaikō Jūnen Shi_ (ten
years of Japanese-Russian diplomacy, Tokio, 1904), p. 47. Also see the
_Korea Review_, July (pp. 331–336) and August (pp. 369–371), 1904.
Footnote 497:
G. Takeda, pp. 30–32.
Footnote 498:
_Ibid._, pp. 33–34; _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 740–741. See also the _Korea
Review_, August, 1904, pp. 377–378.
Footnote 499:
The contract dated August 28, 1896 (o. s.).—_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp.
781–791.
Footnote 500:
The contract of April 22, 1896.—_Ibid._, pp. 772–775.
Footnote 501:
G. Takeda, p. 45.
Footnote 502:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 740–741.
Footnote 503:
It is said that Marquis Itō himself had a mind to represent Japan at
the coronation, but the mission was finally intrusted to the Field
Marshal. It will be remembered that China sent Li Hung-chang for this
occasion.
Footnote 504:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 742–744; the _Kaitei Jōyaku Isan_, pp. 601–602;
the _Treaties and Conventions between the Empire of Japan and other
Powers_, p. 393.
Footnote 505:
See the same references as are given in the preceding note, pp.
740–742, 596–600, and 391, respectively.
Footnote 506:
Some of them were strongly pro-Russian.
Footnote 507:
These gendarmes had never been withdrawn before the present war broke
out. The Koreans frequently tried to cut the telegraph line.
Footnote 508:
Japanese soldiers in Korea before the present war were stationed to
the fullest extent stipulated in this Article. Owing to the small
number of the Russian residents in Korea, the Russian Government never
stationed as many soldiers in Korea as did the Japanese.
Footnote 509:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 714–717.
Footnote 510:
G. Takeda, pp. 50–51.
Footnote 511:
See pp. 87 ff., above.
Footnote 512:
G. Takeda, pp. 45–47.
Footnote 513:
_Ibid._, pp. 48–50.
Footnote 514:
G. Takeda, pp. 53–54, and Jumpei Shinobu, _Kan Hantō_ (the Korean
peninsula), pp. 505–512.
Footnote 515:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 744–745; the _Kaitei Jōyaku Isan_, p. 603; the
_Treaties and Conventions_, p. 394 (French text).