DEMANDS IN SEVEN ARTICLES
The most important section of Manchuria, strategically, namely, that
part of the Province of Sheng-king which lies east of the Liao River and
the entire Province of Kirin, was to be evacuated, according to the
Agreement, before April 8, 1903. As that date drew near, and long
afterward, the disposition of the Russian forces appeared incompatible
with even the nominal withdrawal which characterized the first period of
evacuation. It is true that in the Sheng-king Province, except the
regions bordering on the Yalu River on the Korean frontier, the Russian
troops began to withdraw soon after the end of the first period, but
only “to the railway line.”[445] The important border regions,
especially Fêng-hwang-Chêng and An-tung, however, remained in Russian
occupation, the former still holding 700 cavalry in June.[446] From
March, there had been mysterious movements of small detachments of
troops toward this frontier,[447] of which Count Lamsdorff and M. Witte
alike professed a complete ignorance,[448] but concerning which M.
Plançon, the Russian _Chargé d’Affaires_ at Peking, had made an
explanation which seemed utterly unintelligible, that the Russian troops
had been moved in order to counteract a threatened Japanese movement. It
soon appeared, however, that the Russians had begun to cut timber on
both sides of the Yalu River,[449] and, with the consent of Admiral
Alexieff, had hired the services of some Russian soldiers,[450] some of
whom had gone to Yong-am-po on the Korean side of the Yalu.[451] The
detachments outside of Fêng-hwang-Chêng, amounting at first to only five
men at Tatung-kao and twenty at Yong-am-po, would have been small enough
to be ignored, had it not been for the significant fact that the
occupation of Yong-am-po, which will be discussed later on,[452]
constituted a menace to the integrity of the Korean Empire similar to
one which threatened China when Russia leased Port Arthur; for a railway
concession granted in the Russo-Chinese Agreement of March 27,
1898,[453] would bring this port into connection with the entire
railroad and military system of Manchuria and the great Russian Empire.
Further west, at Liao-yang, except the nominal withdrawal reported in
the previous August,[454] there was no indication of its
evacuation,[455] and at Mukden, the capital of Sheng-king, 3200
soldiers, who constituted the major part of the forces, were reported to
have evacuated,[456] but the remainder, after proceeding to the train,
suddenly returned and took up their old quarters,[457] some or all of
them wearing civilian dress.[458] It is unknown whither the 3200 men had
gone, but the Russian Consul merely moved to the railway outside the
town.[459] To the north, it was evident in May that the Province of
Kirin had hardly begun to be evacuated even in the nominal sense, as in
parts of the Sheng-king Province.[460] So late as in September, the
Russian authorities at Peking talked to Prince Ching of leaving 6000 or
7000 troops in the Kirin and Hei-lung Provinces for another year.[461]
Long before September, however, it had become apparent that the delay in
the second part of the Manchurian evacuation was due to no casual event.
The appointed time-limit, the 8th of April, had hardly been twenty days
past, with no signs indicative of a possible speedy withdrawal, when new
demands in seven articles of an highly exclusive nature, which the
Russian _Chargé d’Affaires_ had lodged at the Foreign Office of
Peking,[462] leaked out,[463] were confirmed by Prince Ching,[464] and
spread broadcast over the astonished world. Further evacuation was
probably implied, if not declared, to be dependent upon the acceptance
of these demands,[465] the most authentic version[466] of which is here
subjoined:—
“1. No portion of territory restored to China by Russia, especially
at Niu-chwang and in the valley of Liao-ho, shall be leased or sold
to any other Power under any circumstances; if such sale or lease to
another Power be concluded, Russia will take decisive steps in order
to safeguard her own interests, as she considers such sale or lease
to be a menace to her.
“2. The system of government actually existing throughout Mongolia
shall not be altered, as such alteration will tend to produce a
regrettable state of affairs, such as the uprising of the people and
the disturbances along the Russian frontier; the utmost precaution
shall be taken in that direction.
“3. China shall engage herself not to open, of her own accord, new
ports or towns in Manchuria, without giving previous notice to the
Russian Government, nor shall she permit foreign consuls to reside
in those towns or ports.
“4. The authority of foreigners who may be engaged by China for the
administration of any affairs whatever, shall not be permitted to
extend over any affairs in Northern Provinces (including Chili),
where Russia has the predominant interests.
“In case China desires to engage foreigners for the administration
of affairs in Northern Provinces, special offices shall be
established for the control of Russians: for instance, no authority
over the mining affairs of Mongolia and Manchuria shall be given to
foreigners who may be engaged by China for the administration of
mining affairs; such authority shall be left entirely in the hands
of Russian experts.
“5. As long as there exists a telegraph line at Niu-chwang and Port
Arthur, the Niu-chwang-Peking line shall be maintained, as the
telegraph line at Niu-chwang and Port Arthur and throughout
Sheng-king Province is under Russian control, and its connection
with her line on the Chinese telegraph poles at Niu-chwang, Port
Arthur, and Peking is of the utmost importance.
“6. After restoring Niu-chwang to the Chinese local authorities, the
customs receipts there shall, as at present, be deposited with the
Russo-Chinese Bank.
“7. After the evacuation of Manchuria, the rights which have been
acquired in Manchuria by Russian subjects and foreign companies
during Russian occupation shall remain unaffected; moreover, as
Russia is duty-bound to insure the life of the people residing in
all the regions traversed by the railway, it is necessary, in order
to provide against the spread of epidemic diseases in the Northern
Provinces by the transportation of passengers and goods by railway
train, to establish at Niu-chwang a quarantine office after the
restoration of the place to China; the Russian civil administrators
will consider the best means to attain that end. Russians only shall
be employed at the posts of Commissioner of Customs and Customs
Physician, and they shall be placed under the control of the
Inspector-General of the Imperial Maritime Customs. These officials
shall perform their duties conscientiously, shall protect the
interests of the Imperial maritime customs, and shall exhaust their
efforts in preventing the spread of those diseases into the Russian
territories. A permanent Sanitary Board, presided over by the
Customs Tao-tai, shall be established. The foreign Consuls,
Commissioner of Customs, Customs Physician, and Agent of the Chinese
Eastern Railway Company shall be Councilors of the Board. As regards
the establishment of the Board and the management of its affairs,
the Customs Tao-tai shall consult with the Russian Consul, and the
Customs Tao-tai shall devise the best means to obtain funds
necessary for the purpose.”
These demands, as will be seen, comprised, besides the non-alienation of
Manchuria to any other Power, and the _status quo_ in Mongolia, drastic
measures of closing the former territory against the economic enterprise
of all nations but the Russians; and, in that respect, were
supplementary to the Agreement concluded a year before, which studiously
omitted clauses prejudicial to the principle of the open door. From the
standpoint of this last principle, therefore, no demands could be more
objectionable than those now presented by M. Plançon. The Empress
Dowager of China was said to have sneered at the report, and to have
remarked that, if she had been disposed to grant such demands, she would
never have requested the Powers to withdraw as soon as possible their
forces from North China.[467] Prince Ching not only considered the
Russian terms quite unacceptable, but failed to see any reason or right
on the part of Russia to impose fresh conditions which infringed China’s
sovereign rights. He accordingly refused to entertain these conditions,
perhaps on April 23.[468] The Japanese Government had already entered a
firm protest,[469] and was followed by that of the British Government,
which considered the demands as violating the most-favored-nation
clause, and otherwise highly inadmissible.[470] Before the British
protest reached him, Mr. Townley, the British _Chargé_, had assured
Prince Ching that the latter would receive from Great Britain similar
support in resisting the Russian demands to that which was given him
during the negotiation of the Manchurian Convention.[471] Soon
afterward, the United States Government also instructed Mr. Conger to
urge on the Peking Foreign Office the advisability of refusing the first
and second of the conditions laid down by Russia, and, moreover, made
direct inquiries at the Russian Government in a friendly spirit,
pointing out that the reported demands were not in accordance with the
proposed stipulations contained in the new draft treaty between the
United States and China, a copy of which was communicated to Count
Lamsdorff.[472] This latter act of Secretary Hay was promptly followed
by Great Britain, whose Government instructed its Ambassador at St.
Petersburg to address the Foreign Minister in language similar to that
used by the American Representative.[473] It may be safely inferred that
the Japanese Government also took a similar step. There thus resulted a
natural coöperation between the three Powers, whose straightforward
policy was clearly expressed by Lord Lansdowne as follows: “To open
China impartially to the commerce of the whole world, to maintain her
independence and integrity, and to insist upon the fulfillment of treaty
and other obligations by the Chinese Government which they have
contracted towards us.”[474]
According to the instructions he had received from his Government, Mr.
MacCormick, the United States Ambassador, had an interview with Count
Lamsdorff in the evening of April 28. The Count at once denied in the
most positive manner that such demands as were rumored had been made by
the Russian Government. He expressed surprise that they should have been
credited in any quarter, and that a friendly government like that of the
United States should be the only one to question him as to whether
Russia could have made demands some of which were on the face of them
ridiculous, as, for instance, those for the right of using China’s
telegraph poles and for the restriction of foreign trade in Manchuria.
It may be questioned whether Count Lamsdorff has ever made to a strong
Power another denial in as positive language, which was, one will soon
observe, as quickly falsified by subsequent events, as this remarkable
disclaimer of April 28, 1903. He went on to say that he could give the
United States Government the most positive assurances that Russia would
faithfully adhere to its pledges regarding Manchuria, and to her
assurances to respect the rights of other Powers. Moreover, American
capital and commerce were what Russia most desired to attract in order
to develop Manchuria. The Count also intimated that any delay in the
evacuation was due to the natural necessity of obtaining assurances that
China was fulfilling her part of the agreement. This could be better
ascertained by the Russian Minister, M. Lessar, who had been absent from
Peking on sick leave, but was about to return to his post, than by an
acting _Chargé d’Affaires_.[475] A careful reading of this disclaimer
will show that it denied that the reported demands had been made by
Russia, but it did not establish that no demands whatsoever had been
made by her. This consideration would seem to make it truly remarkable
that Mr. MacCormick should have been, as he was, entirely satisfied with
the result of the interview, and should have had no further remark to
make. He could perhaps have inquired whether M. Plançon had acted
without authorization, what were the conditions he had proposed, and by
what means M. Lessar was expected to obtain the assurances from China
that her obligations would be fulfilled.[476]
The positive statements of Count Lamsdorff were partly reinforced and
partly neutralized by the clever remarks made on April 29 by Count
Cassini, the Russian Ambassador at Washington, which appeared in the New
York _Tribune_ of May 1. He considered it unfortunate that Mr. Conger
should have been misinformed, by unreliable parties, of Russia’s
intentions in Manchuria, of which they were grossly ignorant,—a matter
which was regretted, he was sure, no less by the American Government
than by Russia. He, however, not only intimated that some sort of
negotiation was in progress between Russia and China regarding
Manchuria, but was bold enough to say that the United States would
assist Russia in quieting the uneasy sentiment caused by false reports.
He said:—
“Because of the singularity of the interest held by the United
States in Manchuria—for all the world realizes that yours is a
trade, not a territorial one—it lies within the power of your
Government to exert a powerful influence in the preservation of
peace there. Russia’s desire is also for peace, not disturbances, in
Manchuria, and it is to this end that negotiations are now
proceeding in Peking in the effort to establish a condition of
evacuation, and to safeguard Manchuria against a recurrence of the
troubles of 1900.
“Striking evidence of the direct effect in this country caused by
unrest in China was seen in 1900, when, I am told, many cotton mills
in the United States were forced to shut down until conditions in
China were again normal. This fact and the evidence the United
States has already given of its desire to make for peace are
sufficient assurance that the Washington Government will lend its
strong moral support to calm excitement wherever it has been aroused
by the incorrect reports from Peking.”
According to Count Cassini, it was “because of the long standing and
genuine friendliness which, without exception, had characterized the
relations of these two great countries, as well as in recognition of the
frankness with which the American Secretary of State had dealt with my
Government in all diplomatic matters,” that the latter took pleasure in
assuring the United States regarding negotiations pending with another
Power, “even though in so doing all diplomatic precedent was broken.” “I
am not aware,” he said, “that any other Powers have received from the
Foreign Office [of St. Petersburg] such a statement as was handed your
Ambassador.” In referring to Mr. MacCormick’s interview, however, it
will be seen that Count Lamsdorff made no direct reference to the
negotiations at Peking, still less to their contents, and the assurances
he gave had before and have since been frequently and in similar terms
repeated to other Powers by Russia.
By far the most illuminating part of M. Cassini’s conversation was its
practical confirmation of the truth of one of the reported demands of
Russia which were considered the most objectionable, and which Count
Lamsdorff specifically denied, characterizing them “as on the face of
them ridiculous,” namely, that no new ports should be opened in
Manchuria for the world’s trade. “Of the opening of new treaty ports in
Manchuria,” said M. Cassini, “it is impossible for me to speak at
present, but it is the earnest conviction of those best acquainted with
the state of affairs there that such a move will not be to the best
interest of the territory. Were the question solely a commercial one, it
would be different. But open a treaty port in Manchuria, and close upon
the heels of commerce will follow political complications of all kinds,
which will increase the threats to peace.” In this statement Count
Cassini not only virtually contradicted Count Lamsdorff, but also, as we
shall soon see, was subsequently contradicted by the latter.
A careful reader of these words uttered by one of Russia’s greatest
diplomatic agents abroad will feel satisfied that, despite Count
Lamsdorff’s elastic statement to the contrary, Russia was actually
proposing some terms to China, and that one of those terms probably was
that Manchuria should have no more treaty ports. When diplomacy relies,
even to a slight extent, upon subterfuges, it risks a certain lack of
consistent unity among its exponents, and the rule could hardly have for
exceptions even such highly trained diplomats as Lamsdorff and Cassini.
Count Lamsdorff’s disclaimer was uttered on April 28, and Count
Cassini’s statement was dated April 29 and appeared in the press on May
1. In the mean time, the Foreign Office of Peking had refused the
Russian conditions in an official note. Yet, on April 29, M. Plançon
suggested that each condition might be answered separately, and the
suggestion was verbally refused by Prince Ching. Thereupon the Russian
_Chargé_ presented a note intimating that his Government wished to be
assured on the first three of the original demands, namely, whether a
territorial cession to another power in the Liao Valley was contemplated
by China; whether there was an intention to assimilate the
administration of Mongolia to that of China proper; and whether China
would permit the appointment of foreign Consuls in Manchuria in other
places than Niu-chwang. In reply, Prince Ching stated, naturally, that
there had never been any question of ceding territory in the Liao Valley
to a foreign Power; that the question of altering the administrative
system of Mongolia had been discussed, but it had been disapproved by
the Throne, and was not under consideration for the present; and that,
in regard to the appointment of new Consuls in Manchuria, it depended
upon the opening of new ports, which would be decided only by the extent
of the commercial development of Manchuria.[477] On the next day, or, as
the late Sir M. Herbert rather inaccurately wrote to Lord Lansdowne,
“two days after the Russian Government had categorically denied that the
demands had been made,” M. Plançon reiterated to Prince Ching, not
three, but all, of the seven conditions, and, consequently, the Chinese
treaty commissioners at Shanghai were instructed, for the present, to
refuse to their American colleagues the opening of treaty ports in
Manchuria, which the latter had been demanding. The United States
Government, however, taking little heed of M. Cassini’s argument,
instructed its commissioners at Shanghai, on the strength of Count
Lamsdorff’s denial, to insist upon the opening of new Manchurian
ports.[478] Against this demand, M. Plançon seems to have renewed his
pressure upon the Chinese Government several times during May,[479]
saying that he had received no instructions from St. Petersburg to
revoke his opposition.[480] At last, Secretary Hay instructed Mr. Conger
to suggest to M. Lessar, on the latter’s arrival at Peking, that a
simultaneous communication should be made by them to the Peking Foreign
Office to the effect that the Russian Government had, as Count Lamsdorff
had said, no objection to the opening of the treaty ports.[481] The
Russian Minister returned to Peking toward the end of May, and
telegraphed to his Government the suggestion made by the American
Government.[482] He, as well as M. Cassini, renewed the assurance that
Russia was not opposed to the opening of the ports, and Mr. MacCormick,
who returned on leave to Washington, confirmed the assurance.[483]
Secretary Hay now hoped that the only possible opposition to be met
would come from none but the Chinese Government, and requested the
support in the matter[484] of the British and Japanese Ministers at
Peking, which was willingly given. So late as on June 5, however, M.
Cassini addressed a note to Mr. Hay, inquiring what was the meaning
attached by the United States Government to the term “treaty port,” and
what action it wished Russia to take. Mr. Hay could only refer, in
answer to the first query, to the correspondence which passed between
the Russian and the United States Governments in 1899,[485] and request,
in reply to the second, that Russia should inform China that it was
untrue that the former was, as had been stated by China, preventing the
opening of the treaty ports.[486] Secretary Hay was so urgent about this
matter that he considered it indifferent whether the opening was granted
in a treaty or, as a compromise, by a special Imperial edict.[487] M.
Lessar had the first interview after his return with Prince Ching on
June 10,[488] and, according to the Japanese press, renewed the original
seven conditions,[489] including the refusal of ports. The Prince was
believed to have refused to discuss any of the conditions except those
regarding the establishment of a sanitary board and the payment of
customs duties into the Russo-Chinese Bank at Niu-chwang, which might be
reconsidered. The Prince was then granted another five days’ sick leave,
returned to the summer palace, and declined to see any foreign
Minister.[490] Rumors were then afloat which would have one believe that
the Prince, in spite of the earnest protests of the British and Japanese
Representatives, was gradually yielding to Russian influence. It is at
least significant that at this critical point he informed Mr. Townley,
the British _Chargé d’Affaires_, on June 19, that an agreement would
soon be arrived at with Russia whereby Manchuria would be preserved to
China without any loss of sovereign rights. He added that China would
open treaty ports in Manchuria, if she saw fit, after the Russian
evacuation.[491] The significance of these remarks could easily be read
between the lines. Not only was the Russian evacuation uncertain, but
also it was no less patent to Russia than to China that, in the marts,
the opening of which was under discussion, namely, Mukden and perhaps
Harbin, as well as An-tung and Tatung-kao near the Korean boundary, the
immediate trade prospects were not considered so great as the political
danger which their opening might to some degree avert. Had the
evacuation been certain, and had the commercial consideration been the
sole question involved, it would have been unnecessary either to hasten
their opening or even to select those very places. Nor would MM.
Cassini, Lessar, and Plançon have been so strongly opposed to the
proposition. Seen in the light of these considerations, Prince Ching’s
new position appeared plainly to indicate the gaining of Russian
influence upon the helpless Foreign Office of Peking.
[Illustration:
M. LESSAR
_Russian Minister at Peking_
]
Nor for two years and a half since the first agreement was reported to
have been concluded between Admiral Alexieff and Tartar General
Tsêng-chi, had the Manchuria question vexed the world. If the question
had concerned none but Russia and China, and the former had been slow to
promise and loyal to her pledges and the latter strong enough to guard
her own interest, the uncertain conditions in Manchuria would not have
constituted, as they did, a grave and continual menace to the general
peace of the Far East. Unfortunately, the Russian pledges, on the one
hand, were attended by serious conditions, some of which it seemed
impossible to fulfill and others contrary to the recognized principles
of international intercourse to which Russia had professed constant
devotion, and, on the other, China had again and again shown herself
impotent to resist what she would otherwise reject. Above all, Great
Britain and the United States were, both from interest and from
principle, firmly committed in the East to a policy which was in
constant danger of being undermined by the conduct of Russia. For Japan,
however, the Manchurian question possessed an even graver significance,
for, with the fall of the Three Eastern Provinces into the Russian
hands, the independence of Korea, as well as the security of Japan
herself, would be threatened, while a consequent closure of Manchuria
against Japan’s economic activity would seriously maim her growth and
life as a nation. It was now considered, therefore, that the irritating
situation should no longer be allowed to continue, and that the time had
at last come when Japan should with determination deal _directly_ with
Russia, in order to effect once for all an arrangement satisfactory and
beneficial to all the parties concerned and to the world at large.
-----
Footnote 445:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 57, inclosure (Hosie to Satow, November 7,
1902). Also No. 106 (Townley to Lansdowne, May 5, 1903).
Footnote 446:
_Ibid._, No. 128 (Hosie, June 22, 1903).
Footnote 447:
_Ibid._, No. 116 (April 8).
Footnote 448:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 75 (April 15); 113 (May 14).
Footnote 449:
For the Manchurian side, see p. 227, above. The timber concession on
the Korean side will be taken up in a later section.
Footnote 450:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 75, 115, 128.
Footnote 451:
_Ibid._, Nos. 115, 129.
Footnote 452:
Pp. 289 ff., 318 ff., below.
Footnote 453:
Article 8. See pp. 130–131, above.
Footnote 454:
See p. 235, note 4, above.
Footnote 455:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 130, inclosure (May 4, 1903).
Footnote 456:
_Ibid._, No. 71 (April 14).
Footnote 457:
_Ibid._, No. 122.
Footnote 458:
_Ibid._, No. 130, inclosure (May 4).
Footnote 459:
_Ibid._
Footnote 460:
_Ibid._, No. 137, inclosure (Consul Fulford at Niu-chwang, May 19).
Footnote 461:
_Ibid._, No. 156 (Satow to Lansdowne, September 10).
Footnote 462:
The author has been informed from a reliable source that the
_Chargé’s_ note containing those demands was dated April 5, 1903.
Footnote 463:
Again the revelation must have emanated from the Chinese official
circle. M. Lessar is said to have, about June 4, bitterly complained
at the Peking Foreign Office of their breach of faith, and requested
that there should be appointed two special Chinese negotiators, who
should be entirely responsible for the secrecy of the matter.
Footnote 464:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 81 (Townley to Lansdowne, April 24).
Footnote 465:
_Ibid._, No. 127.
Footnote 466:
_Ibid._, No. 94. Also see Nos. 77, 78, 81, 82, 86.
Footnote 467:
The _Kokumin_.
Footnote 468:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 78, 81, 127.
Footnote 469:
Perhaps on April 21.
Footnote 470:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 79 and 80 (April 23).
Footnote 471:
_Ibid._, Nos. 81, 82 (April 24).
Footnote 472:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 83, 85 (April 26 and 27). Cf. No. 82.
Footnote 473:
_Ibid._, No. 89 (April 28). It does not appear that this instruction
was carried out, for when Count Lamsdorff gave to the American
Ambassador a positive denial of the truth of the current reports, the
British Ambassador deemed it unnecessary to repeat the inquiry. See
_ibid._, No. 91 (April 29).
Footnote 474:
_Ibid._, No. 90, Lansdowne to Herbert (April 28).
Footnote 475:
Namely, M. Plançon. The same M. Plançon stated the next day to Prince
Ching that the delay in the evacuation was due to the military party
in Russia.—_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 95. The statements of the two
diplomats are not necessarily contradictory to each other.
Footnote 476:
For the interview between MacCormick and Lamsdorff, see _ibid._, Nos.
91, 92, 103.
Footnote 477:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 95.
Footnote 478:
_Ibid._, No. 98.
Footnote 479:
_Ibid._, Nos. 110 (May 8); 114 (May 19); 117 (May 23).
Footnote 480:
_Ibid._, No. 114 (May 19).
Footnote 481:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 117.
Footnote 482:
_Ibid._, No. 119.
Footnote 483:
_Ibid._, Nos. 119, 120.
Footnote 484:
_Ibid._, No. 120 (June 4).
Footnote 485:
See Chapter V., above.
Footnote 486:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 121.
Footnote 487:
_Ibid._, Nos. 117, 121.
Footnote 488:
_Ibid._, No. 123.
Footnote 489:
Cf. _ibid._, No. 125.
Footnote 490:
_Ibid._, No. 123, and the Japanese press.
Footnote 491:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 126.