THE ANGLO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT AND THE RUSSO-FRENCH DECLARATION
The details of the negotiations preliminary to the consummation of this
remarkable stroke of diplomacy have not been made public, but we are in
possession of some salient facts from which successive steps leading up
to the final conclusion may be inferred with tolerable certainty. It is
well known that Great Britain, which had always occupied a predominant
place in the foreign relations of Japan, had persistently opposed the
latter’s ardent wish and continual struggle to revise the humiliating
treaties which had, about 1858, been imposed by the Powers upon the weak
feudal Government of Yedo. In 1894, however, contrary to her past
policy, Great Britain led other Powers in according to Japan a cordial
recognition of the latter’s progress in various lines of her national
activity, and assenting to the revision of her treaties. During the war
with China in 1894–5, the British attitude was one of friendly
neutrality between the two Oriental Empires, but the events after the
conclusion of the war, especially the forced retrocession of the
Liao-tung Peninsula, closely followed by the tightening hold of the
Muscovites upon the Peking Court, seemed to have aroused the sympathy of
Great Britain with Japan, mingled probably with the fear of the loss of
some of her own predominant economic interests in China. From this time
on, the interests of the two Powers had been seen to coincide in the Far
East to an increasing degree, and the relations of their Governments had
steadily risen in cordiality.[397] At the rupture of the Boxer
insurrection in 1900, the Cabinet of Lord Salisbury manifested so much
faith in Japan as to request her immediately to dispatch large forces to
the relief of the besieged Legations at Peking, Great Britain going even
so far as to engage to undertake the necessary financial
responsibilities of the proposed expedition.[398] Both during the
campaign and throughout the negotiation for peace, the two Powers, as
well as the United States, conducted themselves together, as is apparent
from our foregoing discussion, in perfect harmony.[399] The common
danger in Manchuria still further cemented their friendship. All this
cordial relation, spontaneous as it was, would not, however, account for
the formation of a definite alliance between the two Governments. It
seems at least probable that the Anglo-German Agreement of October,
1900, as much by the importance of some of its principles as by its very
inefficiency, served as a natural step toward a more wholesome
alliance.[400] In this new direction, Great Britain is said to have
taken the initiative. This supposition will appear not improbable when
it is considered that her immense interests in China, which had begun to
be eclipsed by other Powers, would be best secured and promoted by the
maintenance of the integrity of China and the open door in her market,
and that this object could not be better assured than by an alliance
with the strongest Eastern Power, whose fast growing interests in the
neighboring lands were in a large measure identical with hers.
Suggestions for such an agreement are known to have been made by Great
Britain to Japan under the Itō Cabinet in April, 1901, and again under
the present Katsura Cabinet in July, but it was not till October of that
year that definite negotiations were opened by Japan. The Premier,
Viscount Katsura, seems to have ascertained in December that the elder
statesmen of the Empire were in hearty accord with the agreement toward
which the negotiations had pointed.[401] At this stage of the
negotiations, also, there had developed other circumstances under which
the “splendid” isolation of Great Britain appeared less tenable than
before. Half a year after the Anglo-German Agreement was rendered
valueless by the declarations of Herr von Bülow, the Czar paid a
significant visit, in September, not only to France, but also to
Germany. The ebullition of friendly sentiments between the heads of the
States was not less effervescent at Danzig than at Dunkirk. The
Russo-Chinese Bank presently floated a loan of 80,000,000 marks at
Berlin, thus insuring to that extent the interests of the Germans in
Russian success in the East. At the same time the situation in Manchuria
had been growing more serious than before, while Germany had seemed no
longer inclined to join Great Britain in the latter’s protests against
the menacing conduct of Russia. Grave as was the danger to the political
and commercial prestige of Great Britain in the East, her hands were
still closely tied by the vexatious South African question. If there
ever was need of an agreement with the rising Power of the Orient, it
had probably been never more keenly felt by the British Government than
in the last part of the year 1901. Side by side with these favorable
circumstances for an understanding, the student should not for a moment
lose from sight two fundamental conditions which drew together, not only
the Governments, but also the people, of Great Britain and Japan with
mutual attraction. One was sentimental: each of the two nations found in
the other, though in different ways from one another, something of a
counterpart of its geographical position, its material needs and
aspirations, and the energy and enterprise of its individual members.
This mutual sympathy was largely intensified by, not, indeed, so much
the identity of their interests in the East, as the common principles
under which these interests would be best protected—the independence and
strength of China and Korea, and the equal opportunity therein for the
economic enterprise of all nations.
[Illustration:
COUNT KATSURA
_Premier of Japan_
]
The final outcome of the Anglo-Japanese negotiations was a remarkable
product, the like of which is seldom seen in history, especially when it
is considered that it united reciprocally two nations widely apart in
race, religion, and history, one of which had rarely in time of peace
entered into a regular alliance even with a European Power.[402] The
most striking, as well as the most important for our study, must be
regarded the entirely fair and open principles to which the Agreement
gave clear expression. These remarks may not be better substantiated
than by quoting the exact words of the document itself, and of the
dispatch inclosing the Agreement from Lord Lansdowne to Sir Claude
MacDonald, the British Minister at Tokio, which read as follows:—
“The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a
desire to maintain the _status quo_ and general peace in the extreme
East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the
independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and
the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those
countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree
as follows:—
“ARTICLE I. The High Contracting Parties having mutually recognized
the independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be
entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either
country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which
those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in
addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is
interested in a peculiar degree, politically as well as commercially
and industrially, in Korea, the High Contracting Parties recognize
that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures
as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if
threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by
disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the
intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the
protection of the lives and property of its subjects.
“ARTICLE II. If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defense of
their respective interests as above described, should become
involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party
will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent
other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.
“ARTICLE III. If in the above event, any other Power or Powers
should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High
Contracting Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct war
in common, and will make peace in mutual agreement with it.
“ARTICLE IV. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them
will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements
with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above
described.
“ARTICLE V. Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or
Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two
Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.
“ARTICLE VI. The present Agreement shall come into effect
immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for
five years from that date.
“In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have
notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five years
the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the
expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High
Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date
fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in
war, the alliance shall, _ipso facto_, continue until peace is
concluded.
“In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their
respective Governments, have signed this Agreement, and have affixed
thereto their seals.
“Done in duplicate at London, the 30th January, 1902.
“LANSDOWNE,
_His Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs._
“HAYASHI,
_Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty
the Emperor of Japan at the Court of St. James.”_[403]
“FOREIGN OFFICE, January 30, 1902.
“SIR CLAUDE MACDONALD [the British Minister at Tokio]:
“I have signed to-day, with the Japanese Minister, an Agreement
between Great Britain and Japan, of which a copy is inclosed in this
dispatch.
“This Agreement may be regarded as the outcome of the events which
have taken place during the past two years in the Far East, and of
the part taken by Great Britain and Japan in dealing with them.
“Throughout the troubles and complications which arose in China
consequent upon the Boxer outbreak and the attack upon the Peking
Legations, the two Powers have been in close and uninterrupted
communication, and have been actuated by similar views.
“We have each of us desired that the integrity and independence of
the Chinese Empire should be preserved, that there should be no
disturbance of the territorial _status quo_ either in China or in
the adjoining regions, that all nations should, within those
regions, as well as within the limits of the Chinese Empire, be
afforded equal opportunities for the development of their commerce
and industry, and that peace should not only be restored, but
should, for the future, be maintained.
“From the frequent exchanges of view which have taken place between
the two Governments, and from the discovery that their Far Eastern
policy was identical, it has resulted that each side has expressed
the desire that their common policy should find expression in an
international contract of binding validity.
“We have thought it desirable to record in the Preamble of that
instrument the main objects of our common policy in the Far East to
which I have already referred, and in the first Article we join in
entirely disclaiming any aggressive tendencies either in China or
Korea. We have, however, thought it necessary also to place on
record the view entertained by both the High Contracting Parties,
that should their interests as above described be endangered, it
will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may
be indispensable in order to safeguard their interests, and words
have been added which will render it clear that such precautionary
measures might become necessary and might be legitimately taken, not
only in the case of aggressive action or of an actual attack of some
other Power, but in the event of disturbances arising of a character
to necessitate the intervention of either of the High Contracting
Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its
subjects.
“The principal obligations undertaken mutually by the High
Contracting Parties are those of maintaining a strict neutrality in
the event of either of them becoming involved in war, and of coming
to one another’s assistance in the event of either of them being
confronted by the opposition of more than one hostile Power. Under
the remaining provisions of the Agreement, the High Contracting
Parties undertake that neither of them will, without consultation
with the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power
to the prejudice of the interests described in the Agreement, and
that whenever those interests are in jeopardy, they will communicate
with one another fully and frankly.
“The concluding Article has reference to the duration of the
Agreement which, after five years, is terminable by either of the
High Contracting Parties at one year’s notice.
“His Majesty’s Government had been largely influenced in their
decision to enter into this important contract by the conviction
that it contains no provisions which can be regarded as an
indication of aggressive or self-seeking tendencies in the regions
to which it applies. It has been concluded purely as a measure of
precaution, to be invoked, should occasion arise, in the defence of
important British interests. It in no way threatens the present
position or the legitimate interests of other Powers. On the
contrary, that part of it which renders either of the High
Contracting Parties liable to be called upon by the other for
assistance can operate only when one of the allies has found himself
obliged to go to war in defence of interests which are common to
both, when the circumstances in which he has taken this step are
such as to establish that the quarrel has not been of his own
seeking, and when, being engaged in his own defence, he finds
himself threatened, not only by a single Power, but by a hostile
coalition.
“His Majesty’s Government trust that the Agreement may be found of
mutual advantage to the two countries, that it will make for the
preservation of peace, and that, should peace be unfortunately
broken, it will have the effect of restricting the area of
hostilities.
“I am, etc.,
“LANSDOWNE.”[404]
The singular nature of these documents stands out so clearly on their
face that it hardly needs a special reference. Not only has Manchuria at
last been clearly interpreted by both Powers as lying within the scope
of the Agreement, but it is explicitly admitted therein that Japan
possesses extensive interests in the Korean peninsula, which is for that
reason included in the sphere within which the contracting parties
unequivocally disavow aggressive tendencies. Nor does this sum up all
the difference between this and the Anglo-German Agreement, for, while
in the latter the denial of the parties’ aggressive designs was limited
to the period of the Boxer complication, and, moreover, coupled with a
reservation amounting to the recognition of the theory of readjusting
the balance between the Powers at the expense of China, the new alliance
unconditionally upholds the independence of China and Korea, and any
measure, either peaceful or warlike, taken by either party to safeguard
its interests, if they are in any way threatened, would by no means
alter its devotion to the principles of the territorial integrity of the
Chinese and Korean Empires and of the open door in those countries. The
alliance exists solely for the purpose of effectively safe-guarding the
interests already acquired by the two Powers on the common ground, and
it is implied in an unmistakable manner that those interests may best be
maintained by the total abstention, in any event, from all aggressive or
exclusive tendencies in China and Korea, and, what is equally important,
that the observation of these principles would forcibly tend to preserve
the general peace in the Far East. Owing to the covert violation of
these principles by another Power, however, peace has been broken, but
the Anglo-Japanese Agreement has not expired. The latter would, however,
fall to the ground the moment one of the parties, either as a result of
a war or otherwise, should attempt to depart from the principles of the
open door and the territorial integrity of the neighboring Empires.
Lord Lansdowne considered the Agreement “a measure of precaution,” and
hoped that it would “make for the preservation of peace, and that,
should peace be unfortunately broken, it would have the effect of
restricting the area of hostilities.” Presently these hopes were openly
seconded, but in reality neutralized, by the Russo-French Declaration of
March 17, which stated:—
“The allied Governments of Russia and France have received a copy of
the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of the 30th January, 1902, concluded
with the object of maintaining the _status quo_ and the general
peace in the Far East, and preserving the independence of China and
Korea, which are to remain open to the commerce and industry of all
nations, and have been fully satisfied to find therein affirmed the
fundamental principles which they have themselves, on several
occasions, declared to form the basis of their policy, and still
remain so.
“The two Governments consider that the observance of these
principles is at the same time a guarantee of their special
interests in the Far East.[405] Nevertheless, being obliged
themselves also to take into consideration the case in which either
the aggressive action of third Powers, or the recurrence of
disturbances in China, jeopardizing the integrity and free
development of that Power, might become a menace to their own
interests, the two allied Governments reserve to themselves the
right to consult in that contingency as to the means to be adopted
for securing those interests.”[406]
The St. Petersburg _Messager Officiel_ of March 20, published, with the
Declaration, the statement that the Russian Government had received the
announcement of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement “with the most perfect
calm,” for Russia likewise insisted on the maintenance and integrity of
China and Korea. “Russia,” it continued to say, “desires the
preservation of the _status quo_ and general peace in the Far East, by
the construction of the great Siberian Railroad, together with its
branch line through Manchuria, toward a port always ice-free. Russia
aids in the extension in these regions of the commerce and industry of
the whole world. Would it be to her interest to put forward obstacles at
the present time? The intention expressed by Great Britain and Japan to
attain those same objects, which have invariably been pursued by the
Russian Government, can meet with nothing but sympathy in Russia, in
spite of the comments in certain political spheres and in some of the
foreign newspapers, which endeavored to present in quite a different
light the impassive attitude of the Imperial Government toward a
diplomatic act which, in its eye, does not change in any way the general
situation of the political horizon.”[407]
It seems to be generally overlooked that, so far as the published
documents are concerned, there occurs no statement that the Russo-French
alliance extended from Europe to the Far East under precisely the same
conditions as those of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. In other words,
although the general principles of the latter are indorsed, one finds
nowhere that its terms of war and neutrality and its provisions
regarding the duration of the validity of the instrument have also been
reproduced by Russia and France in their mutual convention. Regarding
the precise conditions of their alliance, therefore, the world is left
much in the dark, save what it takes for granted. Nor are the principles
of the integrity and the open door of China and Korea so fully and
explicitly stated here as in the Agreement of the rival allies, while
the reservation at the end of the Declaration does not make it clear
that these principles may not be discarded, under certain circumstances,
according to the interpretations of the parties themselves of the means
to be taken to safeguard their interests.
Turning to the general tenor of the documents, the student will at once
observe their marked characteristics. It is at least singular, one would
think, that the “most perfect calm” and the “impassive attitude” of the
Russian Government should be expressed in so many words. If, again, the
allied Powers were, as they declare, in perfect accord with the
principles of Great Britain and Japan, it is not intelligible why they
should entertain, as it appears, so deep a suspicion toward the
“political spheres” in which the Russian calmness was said to have been
deliberately misinterpreted, and also toward the “third Powers” “whose
aggressive action” might “jeopardize the integrity and free development”
of China. This sense of distrust becomes all the more pronounced when it
is contrasted with the assertion that the agreement between Great
Britain and Japan brought no change on the political horizon of the
East. It was reported about the time when the Russian Minister and the
French _Chargé d’Affaires_ at Tokio handed the Declaration to Baron
Komura, that the allied Powers had made their Declaration because they
feared that Great Britain and Japan might, in virtue of the first
Article of their Agreement, object even to legitimate means of
protecting the French and Russian interests in the Far East.[408] If the
four Powers upheld the same principles, no such apprehension of two of
them against the other two could be either cordial or even justifiable.
Under these considerations, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that the
allied Governments of Russia and France must have been animated less by
the principles they professed than by the deep rivalry of their
interests with those of the other allies. For it is at least certain
that, ever since their memorable coalition with Germany in 1895, in the
coercion of Japan, Russia and France had acted in mutual good-will, the
former being mainly aided by the latter in Manchuria and Korea, and the
latter by the former in the southern Chinese provinces,[409] in their
diplomatic manœuvres in those countries and in their struggles with
Japan and Great Britain.[410] If the Agreement and the Declaration are
considered the formal expression of the cordial sentiment which had long
existed and been growing between the two sets of the Powers, they may be
said to have brought no change upon the political horizon; but it seems
impossible to deny that their publication greatly clarified the
political atmosphere in the East, and, in spite of the verbal meaning of
the declaration, not a little accentuated the widening contrast between
the two different policies upheld by the two powerful coalitions. In
this sense, the political evolution of the Far East may be said to have
now reached an important stage after the European intervention in Japan
in 1895.[411]
-----
Footnote 397:
The reader will remember the cordial exchange of views between the two
Powers when Wei-hai-Wei was leased to Great Britain in 1898. There
occurred in the East several affairs of minor importance in which the
British and Japanese authorities acted with mutual good-will; e. g.,
the arrangement for a British concession at Niu-chwang in 1899. See
_China, No. 1 (1900)_, pp. 215–218.
Footnote 398:
See the _British Parliamentary Papers_: _China, No. 3 (1900)_, Nos.
146, 121, 129, 134, 141, 155, 169–171, 180–181, 188–189, 191, 193,
203, 210, 216, 238, 241, 212, 217, 224, 236, 246–247, 252, 260,
265–267; _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 122–124, 42, 4, 18, 23, 29, 32
(July 13, 1900), 41, 52, 57, 38.
Footnote 399:
Mr. Katō, Foreign Minister at Tokio at the time, remarked later that
even in matters about which the two Powers had not exchanged their
views, their Representatives at Peking acted in such mutual sympathy
that it was suspected that a secret understanding must have existed
between them.—_Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 411.
Footnote 400:
In this connection it was thought not improbable that Germany herself
might have informally suggested the feasibility of a triple alliance
between herself and Great Britain and Japan in the same line as the
Anglo-German Agreement, which Japan had joined as a signatory. In his
speech before the Reichstag, however, Herr von Bülow declared, on
March 3, that Germany was not the father of the Anglo-Japanese
alliance. At any rate, the German suggestion, if there was one, never
materialized, but gave place to another and still more important form
of agreement in which the world-politics of the versatile Kaiser
played no part.
Footnote 401:
The position which one of the elder statesmen out of office, Marquis
Itō, occupied in this diplomatic evolution, has been a subject of much
speculation. He was not only on his tour in America and Europe when
the Agreement was concluded, but also had made efforts at St.
Petersburg to come to an _entente_ with Russia. From this, it has even
been charged that he was opposed to an Agreement with Great Britain.
It now appears, however, that he had discussed the latter question
with Premier Katsura before he sailed for Europe, and that he
proceeded to St. Petersburg with a full authorization from the
Government to exchange views with Count Lamsdorff regarding Korea. In
the mean time, the Cabinet continued its negotiations with Great
Britain. Each must have kept the other well informed of the progress
of the respective negotiations, with this important difference,
however, that Marquis Itō apparently entertained the view, which the
Cabinet respected without accepting, that a British alliance would be,
not less desirable, but more difficult of realization, than a Russian
agreement concerning Korea. Unexpectedly to the Marquis, his effort
did not materialize as well as he had hoped, while, on the other hand,
it seemed as if his significant presence in Russia had hastened the
hands of the jealous British Foreign Office, which now put its seal
upon the terms as agreed upon with rather unexpected readiness.
Footnote 402:
The writer is indebted to the _Kokumin Shimbun_ for many important
suggestions regarding the negotiations between the two Powers which
resulted in the conclusion of the Agreement. _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp.
407–411, gives a brief explanatory view of the conditions under which
the Agreement was concluded.
Footnote 403:
_The British Parliamentary Papers, Treaty Series, No. 3, 1902:
Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan relative to China and
Korea, signed at London, January 30, 1902._
Footnote 404:
The _British Parliamentary Papers: Japan, No. 1 (1902), Dispatch to
His Majesty’s Minister at Tokio, forwarding Agreement between Great
Britain and Japan, of January 30, 1902_.
Footnote 405:
Observe the clearness of this statement. This idea is only implied in
the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. It is remarkable that an explicit
statement of this nature should come, as it did, from the Powers from
which it would have been less expected than from their rivals.
Footnote 406:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 50. The so-called triple alliance of Europe
was renewed in May, with a declaration that it, together with the
Russo-French alliance, maintained peace. The latter, as is shown here,
had extended itself from Europe to the Far East, owing largely to the
conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. The growing solidarity of
the world’s international politics may in some degree be discerned
here.
Footnote 407:
The _Evening Post_, March 20, 1902; _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 415–416.
Footnote 408:
The _Kokumin_, March 23, 1902.
Footnote 409:
See, for instance, _Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Documents
Diplomatiques: Chine, 1894–8_, No. 19 (p. 12); No. 36 (p. 29); No. 37
(p. 30); No. 61 (pp. 45–46); No. 65 (p. 49).
Footnote 410:
During the peace negotiations at Peking after the Boxer war, Russia
and France coöperated as closely as did Great Britain, Japan, and the
United States.
Footnote 411:
See pp. 77 ff., above.