THE CONVENTION OF EVACUATION
It will be remembered that we left the Russo-Chinese negotiation
regarding Manchuria at the point where Prince Ching, either late in
February or early in March, presented a counter-proposal to the Russian
demands.[412] It has also been shown that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement
closely preceded, and the Franco-Russian Declaration followed, this
event. By that time the allied forces had gradually retired from North
China, and the Chinese Court, which had fled to Si-ngan, had retraced
its steps to Peking, arriving at the palace on January 7, 1902. The
political surroundings of the East seemed to have assumed a somewhat
more reassuring outlook, except in Manchuria, than they had worn at any
time since the siege of the Legations in 1900. The Russian Government
seized this opportunity to conclude with China, on April 8, 1902, along
the line suggested by the counter-draft of Prince Ching, the now
celebrated Convention providing for the evacuation of Manchuria, which
went into effect simultaneously with its signature. We subjoin this
important document,[413] together with the official statement with which
the former was published in the St. Petersburg _Messager Officiel_ of
April 12:—
“The grave internal disorders which suddenly broke out over the
whole of China in the year 1900, exposing the Imperial Mission and
Russian subjects to danger, obliged Russia to take decided measures
to protect her Imperial interests. With this object in view, the
Imperial Government, as is already known, dispatched a considerable
military force to Peking, which had been abandoned by the Emperor
and the Government authorities, and introduced a Russian army into
the frontier State of Manchuria, to which the disorders in the
Province of Pechili had quickly spread, and were manifested by an
attack upon the Russian frontier by the native chiefs and army,
accompanied by a formal declaration of war on Russia by the local
Chinese authorities.
“Nevertheless, the Imperial Government informed the Government of
the Emperor that Russia, in undertaking these measures, had no
hostile intentions toward China, whose independence and integrity
were the foundation of Russian policy in the Far East.
“True to these principles, Russia, as soon as the danger threatening
the Imperial Mission and Russian subjects was over, withdrew her
forces from Pechili before any of the other Powers, and, at the
first indication of peace in Manchuria being restored, declared her
readiness to determine, in a private Agreement with China, the
manner and earliest date of her evacuation of that province, with,
however, certain guarantees of a temporary nature, which were
rendered necessary by the disorderly condition of affairs in the
above-mentioned province.
“The conclusion of this Agreement dragged over many months, owing to
the difficult position in which the high Chinese dignitaries were
placed, being unable, in the absence of the Court, to decide upon
action, as becomes the Representatives of a perfectly independent
Empire.
“Latterly, however, the pacification of China has progressed with
notable success. After the signature of the Protocol of the 25th of
August (7th September), 1901, the Imperial Court returned to Peking;
the central lawful authority resumed its rights, and in many parts
of the Empire the local administrations were reëstablished. At the
first reception of the Corps Diplomatique in Peking, the Chinese
Empress expressed to the foreign Representatives her gratitude for
their coöperation in suppressing the disturbances, and assured them
of her unshakable determination to take every measure for the
reëstablishment in the country of the normal state of affairs
existing before the disturbances arose.
“This, indeed, solved the problem in which Russia was principally
interested when the disorders broke out in the neighboring Empire.
The Imperial Government, pursuing no selfish aims, insisted that
other Powers also should not violate the independence and integrity
of China; and that the lawful Government, with which Russia had
concluded various agreements, should be reinstated, and thus, when
the disorders were over, the friendly relations with China, which
had existed from time immemorial, should be continued.
“Taking into consideration that this was the only object with which
Russian troops were sent into the Celestial Empire, and that China
has given written guarantee for the maintenance of order in the
country, and repaid Russia with material expenses to which she was
put by her military operations in China, the Imperial Government
henceforth sees no necessity for leaving armed forces within the
confines of the neighboring territory. Therefore, by Imperial will,
on the 26th March (April 8) was signed by the Russian Minister at
Peking, M. Lessar, and by the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, the
following Agreement as to the conditions of the recall of the
Russian forces from Manchuria.
“AGREEMENT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA RESPECTING MANCHURIA
“His Majesty the Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, and His
Majesty the Emperor of China, with the object of reëstablishing and
confirming the relations of good neighborhood, which were disturbed
by the rising in the Celestial Empire of the year 1900, have
appointed their Plenipotentiaries to come to an agreement on certain
questions relating to Manchuria. These Plenipotentiaries, furnished
with full powers, which were found to be in order, agreed as
follows:—
“ARTICLE 1. His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, desirous of
giving fresh proof of his peaceable and friendly disposition toward
His Majesty the Emperor of China, and overlooking the fact that
attacks were first made from frontier posts in Manchuria on
peaceable Russian settlements, agrees to the reëstablishment of the
authority of the Chinese Government in that region, which remains an
integral part of the Chinese Empire, and restores to the Chinese
Government the right to exercise therein governmental and
administrative authority, as it existed previous to the occupation
by Russian troops of that region.
“ARTICLE 2. In taking possession of the governmental and
administrative authority in Manchuria, the Chinese Government
confirms, both with regard to the period and with regard to all
other Articles, the obligation to observe strictly the stipulations
of the contract concluded with the Russo-Chinese Bank on the 27th
August, 1896, and in virtue of paragraph 5 of the above-mentioned
contract, takes upon itself the obligation to use all means to
protect the railway and the persons in its employ, and binds itself
also to secure within the boundaries of Manchuria the safety of all
Russian subjects in general and the undertakings established by
them.
“The Russian Government, in view of these obligations accepted by
the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of China, agrees on its
side, provided that no disturbances arise and that the action of
other Powers should not prevent it, to withdraw gradually all its
forces from within the limits of Manchuria in the following manner:—
“(a.) Within six months from the signature of the Agreement to clear
the southwestern portion of the Province of Mukden up to the river
Liao-ho of Russian troops, and to hand the railways over to China.
“(b.) Within further six months to clear the remainder of the
Province of Mukden and the Province of Kirin of Imperial troops.
“(c.) Within the six months following to remove the remaining
Imperial Russian troops from the Province of Hei-lung-chang.
“ARTICLE 3. In view of the necessity of preventing in the future any
recurrence of the disorders of last year, in which Chinese troops
stationed on the Manchurian frontier also took part, the Imperial
Russian and Chinese Governments shall undertake to instruct the
Russian military authorities and the Tsiang-Tsungs, mutually to come
to an agreement respecting the numbers and the disposition of the
Chinese forces until the Russian forces shall have been withdrawn.
At the same time the Chinese Government binds itself to organize no
other forces over and above those decided upon by the Russian
military authorities and the Tsiang-Tsungs as sufficient to suppress
brigandage and pacify the country.
“After the complete evacuation of Manchuria by Russian troops, the
Chinese Government shall have the right to increase or diminish the
number of its troops in Manchuria, but of this must duly notify the
Russian Government, as it is natural that the maintenance in the
above-mentioned district of an over large number of troops must
necessarily lead to a reinforcement of the Russian military force in
the neighboring districts, and thus would bring about an increase of
expenditure on military requirements undesirable for both States.
“For police service and maintenance of internal order in the
districts outside those parts allotted to the Eastern Chinese
Railway Company, a police guard, under the local Governors
(‘Tsiang-Tsungs’), consisting of cavalry and infantry, shall be
organized exclusively of subjects of His Majesty the Emperor of
China.
“ARTICLE 4. The Russian Government agrees to restore to the owners
the Railway Shan-hai-kwan-Niu-chwang-Sinminting, which, since the
end of September, 1900, has been occupied and guarded by Russian
troops. In view of this, the Government of His Majesty the Emperor
of China binds itself:—
“1. In case protection of the above-mentioned line should be
necessary, that obligation shall fall exclusively on the Chinese
Government, which shall not invite other Powers to participate in
its protection, construction, or working, nor allow other Powers to
occupy the territory evacuated by the Russians.
“2. The completion and working of the above-mentioned line shall be
conducted in strict accordance with the Agreement between Russia and
England of the 16th April, 1899, and the Agreement with the private
Corporation respecting the loan for the construction of the line.
And furthermore, the corporation shall observe its obligations not
to enter into possession of, or in any way to administer, the
Shan-hai-kwan-Niu-chwang-Sinminting line.
“3. Should, in the course of time, extensions of the line in
Southern Manchuria, or construction of branch lines in connection
with it, or the erection of a bridge in Niu-chwang, or the moving of
the terminus there, be undertaken, these questions shall first form
the subject of mutual discussion between the Russian and Chinese
Governments.
“4. In view of the fact that the expenses incurred by
the Russian Government for the repair and working of the
Shan-hai-kwan-Niu-chwang-Sinminting line were not included in the
sum total of damages, the Chinese Government shall be bound to pay
back the sum which, after examination with the Russian Government,
shall be found to be due.
“The stipulations of all former Treaties between Russia and China
which are not affected by the present Agreement shall remain in
force.
“The Agreement shall have legal force from the day of its signature
by the Plenipotentiaries of both States.
“The exchange of ratifications shall take place in St. Petersburg
within three months from the date of the signature of the Agreement.
“For the confirmation of the above, the Plenipotentiaries of the two
Contracting Powers have signed and sealed two copies of the
Agreement in the Russian, French, and Chinese languages. Of the
three texts which, after comparison, have been found to correspond
with each other, that in the French language shall be considered as
authoritative for the interpretation of the Agreement.
“Done in Peking in duplicate, the 26th March, 1902.”
“At the same time, M. Lessar handed a note to the Chinese
Plenipotentiaries, which declares, in the name of the Imperial
Government, that the surrender of the civil government of Niu-chwang
into the hands of the Chinese administration will take place only
upon the withdrawal from that part of foreign forces and landing
parties, and the restoration to the Chinese of the town of
Tien-tsin, at present under international administration.
“From the above, it is shown that the Imperial Government, in
complete adherence to its repeated declarations, commences the
gradual evacuation of Manchuria in order to carry it out upon the
conditions above enumerated, if no obstacles are placed in the way
by the unexpected action of other Powers or of China herself; that
the surrender of the civil government of Niu-chwang into the hands
of the Chinese administration is to take place according to a
written declaration given to the Celestial Government, only when
foreign forces and landing parties are withdrawn from the port, and
if, at the same time, the question of the restoration of Tien-tsin
to the Chinese has been conclusively settled.
“The Chinese Government, on its side, confirms all the obligations
it has previously undertaken toward Russia, and particularly the
provisions of the 1896 Agreement, which must serve as a basis for
the friendly relations of the neighboring Empires. By this defensive
Agreement, Russia undertook in 1896 to maintain the principle of the
independence and integrity of China, who, on her side, gave Russia
the right to construct a line through Manchuria and to enjoy the
material privileges which are directly connected with the above
undertaking.
“After the instructive events of the last two years, it is possible
to hope for the complete pacification of the Far East, and the
development of friendly relations with China in the interests of the
two Empires. But, undoubtedly, if the Chinese Government, in spite
of their positive assurances, should, on any pretext, violate the
above conditions, the Imperial Government would no longer consider
itself bound by the provisions of the Manchurian Agreement, nor by
its declarations on this subject, and would have to decline to take
the responsibility for all the consequences which might ensue.”[414]
The comparatively mild terms of this Convention may well be pointed
out.[415] Except in the negative reservations of Article 4, there is
found here no provision for the exclusive control by the Russians of the
mining and railway enterprises either in or out of Manchuria. On the
contrary, the sovereign rights in Manchuria, including those respecting
the disposition of military forces, will in eighteen months be almost
completely restored to the Chinese Government, and the entire agreement
will become operative from the very day of its signature. The Convention
seemed to confirm the avowed intention of Russia to love peace and
respect the integrity of China. It is not strange that Prince Ching
personally thanked Great Britain, Japan, and the United States for the
valuable support they had rendered China in the negotiations which had
terminated in the conclusion of this instrument.[416]
If, however, the subsequent conduct of Russia in Manchuria has appeared
to contradict the tenor of the Agreement, it is only necessary to point
out how elastic and expansive its terms are. Paragraph 5, Article 2, of
the Bank Agreement of September 8, 1896, imposing upon the Chinese
Government the duty to protect the Manchurian Railway and the persons
employed in it, is not only reinforced but also expanded so as to make
it incumbent upon China “to secure within the boundaries of Manchuria
the safety of all Russian subjects in general and the undertakings
established by them.” Unless Manchuria is considered a territory
distinct from the rest of the Chinese Empire, no Russians or other
foreigners have the right to reside in the interior save in the treaty
posts. Yet the Chinese Government is held responsible for the security
of the Russians and their enterprises in Manchuria, which is regarded
virtually as a Russian colony, into which immigrants from Siberia and
European Russia have been sent with wonderful rapidity. Nor does this
additional obligation on the part of China any longer bind her to a
private company called the Russo-Chinese Bank, but henceforth to the
Government of the Czar. The discharge of so onerous a duty is made a
condition for the Russian evacuation of Manchuria.
It is not generally known that this condition, otherwise so difficult,
was practically impossible so long as the presence of the Russian forces
kept the Chinese troops greatly reduced in number. The apprehended
disorder must come, as it always has done, and as none knew better than
the Russians, from the groups of unoccupied men, the so-called mounted
bandits (_ma tseh_), who infested the Provinces of Sheng-king and Kirin,
where they sided with whatever power suited their fancy and interest,
exercised their own law, and in one way or another kept the country in a
state of great instability. It should be noted that they were either
disbanded soldiers or the possible candidates for the Chinese troops to
be levied to safeguard Manchuria—for military life in China seldom
attracts peaceful citizens. So long as the presence of the Russian
forces rendered the regular service of the outlaws in the Chinese army
unnecessary, their means of subsistence would be derived less often from
a settled agricultural life than from plundering. Between March, 1902,
and August, 1903, a Russian officer successfully enlisted the service of
some 450 of these marauders, and employed them in the timber work which
the Russians secured in Eastern Manchuria in the name of one of the
chiefs of the bandits.[417] Before and after this period, however, the
Russian officers continually reported sanguinary conflicts with the
robbers, the fear of whom has seemed to constitute the main
justification for the steady progress of the Russian measures of
tightening a hold upon Manchuria.[418] Side by side with this grave
situation, we should also observe that the Convention provided that,
even after the evacuation, if an evacuation were possible, the numbers
and the stations of the Chinese troops, upon whom the duty of protecting
the rapidly increasing Russian subjects and properties in Manchuria
would devolve, should always be made known to Russia, so that
unnecessarily large forces should not be stationed. Russia would judge
whether the Chinese forces were excessive, and exert her influence to
keep them in reduced numbers,[419] while, at the same time, their
capacity as well for receiving the banditti into their ranks as for
affording protection to the Russian life and property would, to say the
least, soon reach its limits. Thus the explicit terms of the Convention
were constructed so as to be greatly neutralized, as it would seem, by
what was implied and could only be inferred by analysis. In the light of
these considerations may be seen the statement that, “undoubtedly, if
the Chinese Government, in spite of their positive assurances, should,
on any pretext, violate the above conditions [i. e., of the Convention],
the Imperial Government would no longer consider itself bound by the
provisions of the Manchurian Agreement, nor by its declarations on this
subject, and would have to decline to take the responsibility for all
the consequences which might ensue,”[420]—a reservation which Count
Lamsdorff considered “a very necessary one.”[421] In the same light,
also, one may read the statement made by Sir Ernest Satow to Prince
Ching, that “the Convention did not appear to His Majesty’s Government
to be entirely satisfactory,”[422] and also the pungent remark of Lord
Lansdowne to M. de Staal, that there were several points in the
Agreement which had caused much criticism in England, particularly those
provisions which limited China’s right to dispose of her own military
forces and to construct railway extensions within her own territory. “I
did not, however,” adds the Marquess, “desire to examine these
provisions too microscopically, and I shared his [M. de Staal’s] hope
that the Agreement would be loyally and considerately interpreted on
both sides, and that the evacuation of the province would be completed
within the appointed time.”[423]
The last but not the least difficulty about the Agreement was its
absolute silence regarding the so-called “railway guards,” organized
ostensibly by the Eastern Chinese Railway Company, whose existence would
make the promised evacuation almost entirely nominal. It will be
remembered that, so far as the published agreements between China and
Russia are concerned, one fails to find any conventional ground for the
organization of the railway guards, save in Article 8 of the
Statutes—not a Russo-Chinese agreement, but purely Russian
statutes—published on December 11/13, 1896, which provided: “The
preservation of order and decorum on the lands assigned to the railway
and its appurtenances should be confined to the _police agents_
appointed by the Company. The Company should draw up and establish
police regulations.”[424] This right of Russia to police the railway
lands seems to have been tacitly perpetuated by the present Convention
of 1902,[425] and, from this, it may perhaps be assumed that the Chinese
Government had some time before April 8, 1902, agreed to the statutory
rule of Russia which has just been quoted. However that may be, a
permission to establish a police force could scarcely justify the
organization of railway guards selected from the regular troops and
receiving a higher pay than the latter. Moreover, it still remains to be
officially declared that the numbers of the guards would not be
determined by Russia at will and without consulting China. These guards
seem to have numbered only 2000 or 3000 before the Manchurian campaign
of 1900, but in October of that year Mr. Charles Hardinge, the British
_Chargé d’Affaires_ at St. Petersburg, wrote to Lord Salisbury: “I learn
that active recruiting for this force is now in progress, and its
numbers are to be raised to 12,000 men under command of officers in the
regular army. Intrenched camps are also being constructed at all the
strategic positions along the line.”[426] Then, on the eve of the
termination of the first period of evacuation in 1902, it was reported
by Consul Hosie: “I am credibly informed that the number of the military
guard of the Russian railways in Manchuria has been fixed at 30,000
men.”[427] Latterly, the name has been changed to the “frontier guards,”
which, after the beginning of the present war, were said to have been
made up of fifty-five mounted squadrons, fifty-five foot companies, and
six batteries of artillery, aggregating 25,000 men, instead of 30,000,
and guarding the railways in sections of thirty-three miles.[428] There
is no intention here to maintain the accuracy of these reports, or to
decide whether the numbers are adequate for the purpose in view, but one
would be tempted to think that the Russian Government made a regrettable
omission in the new Manchurian Agreement, when it made no reference to
the forces which were justified by no open contract with China, and,
theoretically speaking, were not incapable of an indefinite expansion.
-----
Footnote 412:
It was said with a great deal of probability that the conclusion of
the Anglo-Japanese Agreement had had a reassuring effect upon Prince
Ching in his struggle to refuse Russian demands.
Footnote 413:
The following is the French text, which is considered as the standard
in the interpretation of the Convention (_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No.
54, inclosure):—
“Sa Majesté l’Empereur et Autocrate de Toutes les Russies et Sa
Majesté l’Empereur de Chine, dans le but de rétablir et de consolider
les relations de bon voisinage rompues par le soulèvement qui a eu
lieu en 1900 dans le Céleste Empire, ont nommé pour leurs
Plénipotentiaires, à l’effet d’établir un accord sur certaines
questions concernant la Mandchourie:—
“Les susdits Plénipotentiaires, munis de pleins pouvoirs, qui ont été
trouvés suffisants, sont convenus des stipulations suivantes:—
“Article 1. Sa Majesté Impériale l’Empereur de Toutes les Russies,
désireux de donner une nouvelle preuve de son amour de la paix et de
ses sentiments d’amitié envers Sa Majesté l’Empereur de Chine, malgré
que ce soit de différents points de la Mandchourie situés sur la
frontière que les premières attacques contre la population paisible
Russe aient été faites, consent au rétablissement de l’autorité du
Gouvernement Chinois dans la province précitée, qui reste une partie
intégrale de l’Empire de Chine et restitue au Gouvernement Chinois le
droit d’y exercer les pouvoirs gouvernementaux et administratifs,
comme avant son occupation par les troupes Russes.
“Article 2. En prenant possession des pouvoirs gouvernementaux et
administratifs de la Mandchourie, le Gouvernement Chinois confirme,
aussi bien par rapport aux termes que par rapport à tous les autres
Articles, l’engagement d’observer strictement les stipulations du
contract conclu avec la Banque Russo-Chinoise le 27 Août, 1896, et
assume, conformément à l’Article 5 du dit contrat, l’obligation de
protéger par tous les moyens le chemin de fer et son personnel, et
s’oblige également de sauvegarder la sécurité en Mandchourie de tous
les sujets Russes en général qui s’y trouvent et des enterprises
fondées par eux.
“Le Gouvernement Russe, en vue de cette obligation assumée par le
Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l’Empereur de Chine, consent de son côté
dans le cas où il n’y aura pas de troubles, et si la manière d’agir
des autres Puissances n’y mettra pas obstacle, à retirer graduellement
toutes ses troupes de la Mandchourie de manière à:—
“(a.) Évacuer dans le courant de six mois après la signature de la
Convention les troupes Russes de la partie sud-ouest de la Province de
Moukden jusqu’au fleuve Liao-ho, en remettant les chemins de fer à la
Chine;
“(b.) Évacuer dans le courant des six mois suivants les troupes
Impériales Russes de la partie restante de la Province de Moukden et
de la Province de Kirin; et
“(c.) Retirer dans le courant des six mois suivants le reste des
troupes Impériales Russes qui se trouvent dans la Province de
Hei-Lung-Kiang.
“Article 3. En vue de la nécessité de conjurer à l’avenir la
repetition des troubles de 1900, dans lesquels les troupes Chinoises
cantonnées dans les provinces limitrophes à la Russie ont pris part,
le Gouvernement Russe et le Gouvernement Chinois se chargeront
d’ordonner aux autorités militaires Russes et aux dzian-dziuns de
s’entendre en vue de fixer le nombre et de déterminer les lieux de
cantonnement des troupes Chinoises en Mandchourie tant que les troupes
Russes n’auront pas été retirées; le Gouvernement Chinois s’engage en
outre à ne pas former d’autres troupes en sus du nombre determiné de
cette manière par les autorités militaires Russes et les dzian-dziuns,
et lequel doit être suffisant pour exterminer les brigands et pacifier
le pays.
“Après l’évacuation complète des troupes Russes, le Gouvernement
Chinois aura le droit de procéder à l’examen du nombre des troupes se
trouvant en Mandchourie et sujettes à être augmentées ou diminuées, en
informant à temps le Gouvernement Impérial; car il va de soi que le
maintien de troupes dans la province précitée en nombre superflu
mènerait inévitablement à l’augmentation des forces militaires Russes
dans les districts voisins, et provoquerait ainsi un accroissement de
dépenses militaires, au grand désavantage des deux États.
“Pour le service de police et le maintien de l’ordre intérieur dans
cette région, en dehors du territoire cédé à la Société du Chemin de
Fer Chinois de l’Est, il sera formé, auprès des Gouverneurs locaux—,
dzian-dziuns, une gendarmerie Chinoise à pied et à cheval composée
exclusivement de sujets de Sa Majesté l’Empereur de Chine.
“Article 4. Le Gouvernement Russe consent à restituer à leurs
propriétaires les lignes ferrées de Shanhaikwan-Yinkow-Sinminting,
occupées et protégées par les troupes Russes depuis la fin du mois de
Septembre, 1900. En vue de cela, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
l’Empereur de Chine s’engage:—
“1. Que dans le cas ou il serait nécessaire d’assurer la sécurité des
lignes ferrées précitées, le Gouvernement Chinois s’en chargera
lui-même et n’invitera aucune autre Puissance à entreprendre ou à
participer à la défense, construction, ou exploitation de ces lignes,
et ne permettra pas aux Puissances étrangères d’occuper le territoire
restitué par la Russie.
“2. Que les lignes ferrées susmentionnées seront achevées et
exploitées sur les bases précises tant de l’Arrangement entre la
Russie et l’Angleterre en date du 16 Avril, 1899, que du contrat
conclu le 28 Septembre, 1898, avec une Compagnie particulière
relativement à un emprunt pour la construction des lignes précitées,
et, en outre, en observant les obligations assumées par cette
Compagnie, c’est-à-dire, de ne pas prendre possession de la ligne
Shanhaikwan-Yinkow-Sinminting ni d’en disposer de quelque façon que ce
soit.
“3. Que si par la suite il sera procédé à la continuation des lignes
ferrées dans le sud de la Mandchourie ou à la construction
d’embranchements vers elles, aussi bien qu’à la construction d’un pont
à Yinkow ou au transfert du terminus du chemin de fer de Shanhaikwan
qui s’y trouve, ce sera fait après une entente préamable entre les
Gouvernements de Russie et de Chine.
“4. Vu que les dépenses faites par la Russie pour le
rétablissement et l’exploitation des lignes ferrées restituées de
Shanhaikwan-Yinkow-Sinminting n’ont pas été comprises dans la
somme totale de l’indemnité, elles lui seront remboursées par le
Gouvernement Chinois. Les deux Gouvernements s’entendront sur le
montant des sommes à rembourser.
“Les dispositions de tous les Traités antérieurs entre la Russie et la
Chine, non modifiées par la présente Convention, restent en pleine
vigueur.
“La présente Convention aura force légale à dater du jour de la
signature de ses exemplaires par les Plénipotentiaires, de l’un et de
l’autre Empire.
“L’échange des ratifications aura lieu à Saint-Pétersbourg dans le
délai de trois mois à compter du jour de la signature de la
Convention.
“En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs des deux Hautes
Parties Contractantes ont signé et scellé de leurs sceaux deux
exemplaires de la présente Convention, en langues Russe, Chinoise, et
Française. Des trois textes, dûment confrontés et trouvés concordants,
le texte Français fera foi pour l’interprétation de la présente
convention.
“Faite en double expédition à Pékin, le ..., correspondant au....”
Footnote 414:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 51, inclosure.
Footnote 415:
Glance over the comparative terms, shown in parallel columns, of the
Russian demands of February, the amendments of March, 1901, and the
present Agreement. _Ibid._, No. 42, inclosure.
Footnote 416:
See _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 55.
Footnote 417:
Mr. Eitarō Tsurouka, who has personally visited several of the chiefs
of the banditti, gives an extremely interesting account of their
origin, their relations to the Chinese authorities and Russian
officers, and the history of their affairs down to the end of
1903.—The _Tō-A Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 53 (April, 1904), pp. 1–14.
Cf. _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 130, inclosure.
Footnote 418:
About August, 1901, the British Consul at Niu-chwang, Mr. A. Hosie,
reported that the force then at the disposal of the Tartar General of
the Sheng-king Province was limited by the Russian authorities to 6500
men, which meant that over 10,000 men possessing firearms had been let
loose. The Chinese police force was insufficient to back the authority
of the Governor-General, and constant military expeditions by the
Russians were consequently rendered necessary.—_China, No. 2 (1904)_,
p. 33. Also see the _British Consular Report_ on Niu-chwang for 1901,
pp. 3–4.
Footnote 419:
Early in March, 1903, Prince Ching negotiated with M. Lessar about the
number of Chinese troops that should occupy the country after the
withdrawal of the Russians. “The Chinese Government were proposing to
send 18,000 men, whilst the Russian Legation considered that 12,000
men would be sufficient.”—_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 84 (Townley to
Lansdowne).
Footnote 420:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 38, already quoted in p. 225, above.
Footnote 421:
_Ibid._, No. 53 (Lamsdorff’s statement to Scott, on April 23).
Footnote 422:
_Ibid._, No. 55 (April 15).
Footnote 423:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 52 (Lansdowne to Scott, April 30). This
conversation had ensued from M. de Staal’s visit to Lord Lansdowne,
the purpose of which was, on the part of the Russian Ambassador, to
explain to the British Foreign Minister the unreasonableness of the
popular allegation that Russia had, in concluding the Agreement of
April 8, surrendered to the diplomatic pressure exerted by Great
Britain.
Footnote 424:
_Russia, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 6. Already quoted in p. 98, above.
Footnote 425:
Cf. the last clause of Article 3.
Footnote 426:
_China, No. 5 (1901)_, No. 23.
Footnote 427:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 63, September 9, 1902 (Hosie to Satow).
Footnote 428:
Telegraph from Miandonha [?], May 18, 1904. In the _Evening Post_ of a
few days later.