FURTHER DEMANDS
Russia did not wait long before reaching another “starting-point.” No
sooner did the effort of Viceroy Chang Chih-tung and the late Viceroy
Liu Kun-yi to create among the Representatives of some Powers a
sentiment in favor of opening all Manchuria to foreign trade, so as to
forestall the annexation of the territory by Russia, miscarry,[379]
than Sir Ernest Satow reported from “a thoroughly trustworthy source,”
on August 14, 1901, that Russia was resuming her negotiations with
China to bring about the signature of the amended Manchurian Agreement
of the preceding March.[380] Lord Lansdowne at once instructed him to
inform the Chinese authorities, if his advice was requested, that the
proper course for them to pursue would be to call the attention of the
Powers to the matter and to communicate the text of the provisions in
question, should they prove inconsistent with the treaty obligations
of China to other Powers or with the integrity of the Empire; so that
the British Government should be ready to advise whether an infraction
of its treaty rights was involved, or whether the provisions were in
any other way objectionable.[381] It does not appear that Russia
exercised great pressure upon China for the conclusion of the
Agreement. Toward the end of the month, M. de Giers was replaced as
Russian Minister at Peking by M. Paul Lessar, formerly a railway
engineer on the Afghan frontier, and a man of delicate health but
brilliant parts. Meanwhile, the peace commissioners of the eleven
Powers had at last, on September 17, 1901, succeeded in signing at
Peking with the two Chinese Plenipotentiaries the final Protocol
between China and the Powers for the resumption of their friendly
relations.[382] It seems that, when the affairs in North China were
thus finally settled, Russia felt herself freer than she ever had been
to deal independently with China concerning the Manchurian question,
which the Powers had allowed to remain. Moreover, the Imperial Court
was expected shortly to return to the capital, and the Chinese
Government began to look anxiously for the withdrawal of foreign
troops from the realm. Seizing this opportunity, M. Lessar seems to
have mooted, probably on October 5,[383] a new convention of
evacuation, whose comparatively mild terms commended themselves
powerfully at this moment to the Chinese commissioners, especially to
Li Hung-chang.[384] Considering the feeble attitude of China, it would
have been extremely difficult for the interested Powers to protest to
her against the acceptance of the Russian demands, had not the
Viceroys Liu and Chang, after learning their contents, again strongly
reminded the Emperor and the Empress Dowager of the direct peril to
the reigning dynasty which might result from acceding to the Russian
proposals. In accordance with the wishes of the Court, the dying Li
Hung-chang is said to have, on his sick-bed, seen M. Lessar, and
appealed to the Russian friendship toward China to modify the terms of
the proposed amendment.[385] Li soon passed away, on November 7,
leaving the gravest problem of China in a state of extreme
uncertainty. As to the contents of the Russian proposition, it is
interesting to observe that they were presently revealed from a source
whose veracity could hardly be questioned. On December 11, Prince
Ching disclosed them to Mr. Conger.[386] They coincided with those
that the latter had reported to Secretary Hay on the 3d, namely, that,
stated briefly, Russia should evacuate Manchuria, under the usual
conditions, in three years; that China should protect the railways and
Russian subjects in the territory; that she might station, in places
other than lands assigned to the Railway Company, mounted and foot
soldiers, whose numbers should, however, be determined by an agreement
with Russia, and who should exclude artillery; that troops of no other
nationality should be employed in protecting the railways; that the
Anglo-Russian Agreement of April, 1899, should be strictly adhered to;
that subjects of no other nationality should without Russian consent
be allowed to build railways or bridges in Southern Manchuria; and
that the Shan-hai-kwan-Niu-chwang-Sinminting Railways should be
returned to China after her payment to Russia of the expenditure
incurred by the latter in their occupation.[387] Prince Ching, it
appears, presented a counter-proposition to the Russian convention,
which, among other things, seems to have requested that the evacuation
of Manchuria should be completed within one year, instead of three, as
was provided in the original draft. Russia’s reply to this arrived in
Peking the last of January, 1902, agreeing to reduce the period of
evacuation from three to two years.[388] At the same time, however,
the Russian Government now strongly supported, in addition to the
proposed convention, a separate agreement proposed by the
Russo-Chinese Bank. The latter, according to Prince Ching, contained,
besides the railway concessions already granted to the Bank, provision
that China should herself undertake all industrial development in
Manchuria, but if she required financial help from the outside,
application should always first be made to the Russo-Chinese Bank;
only when the latter did not wish to engage in the work might citizens
of other countries be allowed to undertake it. A clause was also to be
inserted, the practical value of which is not clear, that citizens of
every country should have the same rights as they then did to trade at
the open ports and in the interior.[389] Prince Ching was obliged to
acknowledge to Mr. Conger, on January 19, 1902, that, owing to the
pressure which Russia increased simultaneously with the apparent
concessions she had made, she would yield no further, and “he was
convinced that, if China held out longer, they would never again
secure terms so lenient; that the Russians were in full possession of
the territory, and their treatment of the Chinese was so aggravating
that longer occupation was intolerable; that they must be got out, and
that the only way left for China to accomplish this was to make the
best possible terms. The only terms that Russia would consent to were
the signing of both the Convention and the Russo-Chinese Bank
Agreement.”[390]
[Illustration:
LI HUNG-CHANG
]
It is unnecessary to say that against the Russian demands Great Britain,
Japan, and the United States had separately and more than once entered
firm protests at Peking. The conduct of the first two Powers, however,
is not shown in the published documents. Secretary Hay reminded the
Russian and Chinese Governments, on February 3, of the repeated
assurances made by the Czar’s Foreign Minister of his devotion to the
principle of the open door in all parts of China, and said: “An
agreement whereby China gives any corporation or company the exclusive
right or privilege of opening mines, establishing railroads, or in any
other way industrially developing Manchuria, can but be viewed with the
greatest concern by the Government of the United States. It constitutes
a monopoly, which is a distinct breach of the stipulations of the
treaties concluded between China and foreign Powers, and thereby
seriously affects the rights of American citizens.”[391] To this note,
the interesting reply of Count Lamsdorff, signed by himself, was: “...
It [the Russian Government] feels itself bound ... to declare that
negotiations carried on between two entirely independent States are not
subject to be submitted to the approval of other Powers. There is no
thought of attacking the principle of the ‘open door’ _as that principle
is understood by the Imperial Government of Russia_,[392] and Russia has
no intention whatever to change _the policy followed by her in that
respect up to the present time_. If the Russo-Chinese Bank should obtain
concessions in China, the agreements of a private character relating to
them would not differ from those heretofore concluded by so many other
foreign corporations.[393] But would it not be very strange if the
‘door’ that is ‘open’ to certain nations should be closed to Russia,
whose frontier adjoins that of Manchuria, and who has been forced by
recent events to send her troops into that province to reëstablish order
in the plain and common interest of all nations?... It is impossible to
deny to an independent State the right to grant to others such
concessions as it is free to dispose of, and I have every reason to
believe that the demands of the Russo-Chinese Bank do not in the least
exceed those that have been so often formulated by other foreign
companies, and I feel that under the circumstances it would not be easy
for the Imperial Government to deny to the Russian companies that
support which is given by other Governments to companies and syndicates
of their own nationalities. At all events, I beg your Excellency to
believe that there is not, nor can there be, any question of the
contradiction of the assurances which, under the orders of His Majesty
the Emperor, I have had occasion to give heretofore in regard to the
principles which invariably direct the policy of Russia.”[394] It should
be noted here that Count Lamsdorff’s statement, while it refers to the
Agreement with the Bank, which he supported, contains no reference to
the Convention proposed by the Russian Government.
Negotiations lagged, China probably declining to sign under the
remonstrances of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. On March
2, Prince Ching showed Mr. Conger a draft of his new counter-proposals,
which Japan was said to have wholly, and Great Britain in the main,
approved.[395] These proposals are interesting for their practical
identity, save a slight difference,[396] with the final Russo-Chinese
Convention of April 8, 1902, which will be fully treated in a subsequent
chapter. This fact is a conclusive evidence that after March, Russia
suddenly accepted nearly all of the counter-proposals made by China.
This abrupt condescension on the part of Russia is supposed to have been
partly due to an important event which had recently taken place in the
diplomatic world—the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement signed
at London on January 30, 1902, and simultaneously announced in
Parliament and the Imperial Diet of Tokio on February 12.
-----
Footnote 379:
The _Kokumin_, May 19, 1901.
Footnote 380:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 40. In No. 42 (August 21), Sir Ernest
gives, in three parallel columns, the original terms proposed by
Russia in February, the alterations of March, and the proposals now
made in August. The last two are nearly identical.
Footnote 381:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 41 (August 16).
Footnote 382:
See Mayers, pp. 283–318; or the Blue Book, _Treaty Series_, No. 17,
1902; _Final Protocol between the Foreign Powers and China for the
Resumption of Friendly Relations_.
Footnote 383:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 266.
Footnote 384:
See the summary of Li’s highly interesting letter of September 30,
which has just appeared in the London _Times_ for October 12, 1904, p.
6.
Footnote 385:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 266–267; The _Kokumin_, November 2, pp. 23, 30,
190–191.
Footnote 386:
The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. p.
272.
Footnote 387:
The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. p.
271. Compare a version in _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 266–267.
Footnote 388:
The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. p.
272.
Footnote 389:
The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp.
273–274.
Footnote 390:
_Ibid._, pp. 273–274 (Conger to Hay).
Footnote 391:
The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp.
926–928.
Footnote 392:
The italics in the quotation are the author’s.
Footnote 393:
Observe how powerfully Russia applies this argument. On February 4, M.
Lessar said that Russia was merely asking privileges in Manchuria
similar to those granted to Germany in Shan-tung.—The U. S. 57th
Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. p. 274. Russia, if
she would, could with a certain amount of impunity inquire of Great
Britain and other Powers how it was that they allowed Germany to
acquire her apparently exclusive rights in Shan-tung, and now objected
to Russia’s following her example only on a larger scale.
Footnote 394:
The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. p.
929.
Footnote 395:
_Ibid._, pp. 277–279.
Footnote 396:
I. e., the draft of March limited the period of evacuation to one
year, instead of a year and a half, as in the convention of April.