A “STARTING-POINT”—THE LAMSDORFF-YANG-YU CONVENTION
It was as early as January 12 that the Japanese Government had made
inquiries directly at the Russian Government regarding the contents of
the Agreement reported to have been made between Count Lamsdorff and
Yang-yu at St. Petersburg.[341] The report was apparently premature, for
its contents were unknown for more than a month after, and even on
February 18, Dr. Morrison reported from Peking that, according to a
telegram to the Chinese Government from Yang-yu, it would be several
days before Count Lamsdorff and M. Witte could settle the terms between
themselves of the new agreement they wished to propose.[342] The _Times_
correspondent, however, was able to send certain preliminary articles
which, he said, had been verbally communicated by M. Witte to
Yang-yu.[343] On February 27, Sir Ernest Satow[344] and Dr.
Morrison[345] simultaneously reported the contents of the agreement
which Yang-yu had been called upon by Count Lamsdorff to sign, and which
he had telegraphed to Peking on the 23d. The proposed convention was,
according to Dr. Morrison, obviously intended to exist side by side with
the Alexieff-Tsêng Agreement concluded in the previous November. The
substance of this convention, the authenticity of which the same writer
claimed to have been admitted by the Russians in Peking, was as
follows:—
1. “The Emperor of Russia, being desirous of manifesting his
friendship for China, ignores the outbreak of hostilities in
Manchuria, and agrees to restore the whole of that country to China,
to be administered in all respects as of old.
2. “By the 6th Article of the Manchurian Railway Agreement, the
Railway Company was authorized to guard the line with troops. The
country being at present in disorder, the number of those troops is
insufficient for the purpose, and a _corps_ must be retained until
order is restored and China has executed the last four Articles of
the present convention.
3. “In case of emergency the troops retained in Manchuria shall
render every possible assistance to China in preserving order.
4. “Chinese troops having been the greatest aggressors in the recent
attacks on Russia, China agrees not to organize an army until the
railway is completed and opened to traffic. When military forces are
organized eventually, their numbers shall be fixed in consultation
with Russia. The importation of arms and munitions of war into
Manchuria is prohibited.
5. “As a measure for the preservation of Manchuria, China shall
dismiss from office all Generals-in-Chief (Tartar Generals) and high
officials whose actions conflict with friendly relations, and who
are denounced for that reason by Russia. China may organize mounted
and foot police in the interior of Manchuria, but their numbers
shall be fixed in consultation with Russia.
“Cannon shall be excluded from their armament, and no subjects of
another Power shall be employed in the execution of the functions.
6. “In accordance with the understanding formerly accepted by China,
no subject of another Power shall be employed to train naval or
military forces in the Northern Provinces (i. e., Provinces in North
China).
7. “The local authorities nearest to the neutral zone referred to in
Article 5 of the Liao-tung Agreement (of March 15/27, 1898) shall
make special regulations for the preservation of order in the zone.
“The administrative autonomy of Kin-chow shall be abolished.
8. “Without the consent of Russia, China shall not concede mining,
railway, or other privileges to another Power, in the countries
adjoining Russia, that is to say, in Manchuria, Mongolia,
Tarbagatai, Ili, Kashgar, Yarkand, Khoten, etc. China shall not
herself construct a railway in those countries without Russia’s
consent.
“Outside of Niu-chwang, land shall not be leased to the subjects of
another Power.
9. “China is under obligation to pay Russia’s war expenses and
indemnities to the Powers. The amount of indemnity due to Russia,
the dates of payment, and the security, shall be arranged conjointly
with the Powers.
10. “The amounts due for damage done to the railway, for the
property of the Company’s employees which was stolen, and for losses
caused by delay of the works, shall be arranged by the company with
China.
11. “An understanding may be come to with the Railway Company to set
off the whole or part of the above indemnities against privileges of
other kinds. This may be arranged by an alteration of the existing
Railway Agreement (of August 27 / September 8, 1896), or by the
concession of further privileges.
12. “China shall, as previously agreed,[346] grant a concession for
the construction of a railway from Manchurian main line, or a branch
line, to the Great Wall in the direction of Peking.”[347]
There never appeared an authentic text of the convention from either the
Russian or the Chinese official sources, but its existence in some
drastic form was intimated by the Viceroys Liu and Chang, and by the
Court Ministers then at Si-ngan, as well as by the Chinese Emperor
himself.[348] Furthermore, it could be plainly inferred that no one but
Chinese diplomatic officials could have let out the terms of the
proposed convention, or else it would have been impossible for one to
believe that an instrument of so immense a scope and so arbitrary a
nature, as had been reported, could have emanated from Russia. If the
reported text was in the main authentic, as Sir Ernest Satow believed it
was,[349] it is little wonder that Russia exercised a vigorous pressure
upon the Peking Government for a speedy signing of the convention before
the arrival of effective protests from other Powers, her Minister at
Peking stating to Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang that the Agreement
concerned only Russia and China, and that the Peking Government should
not take any notice of what the foreign Representatives might say about
it.[350] The Court appeared seized by a panic, excepting the pro-Russian
Li Hung-chang, who pretended that he considered that the proposed
convention would not impair the sovereignty of China in Manchuria.[351]
The Emperor, declaring that “it was impossible for China alone to incur
the displeasure of Russia by remaining firm,” appealed, on February 28,
to Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and Japan to mediate.[352]
The British Government at once instructed Sir Ernest Satow to stay the
hand of Li, who was about to sign, till he had received the replies of
the four Powers whose mediation had been formally requested by the
Emperor, and also to urge the patriotic Yang-tsze Viceroys to
memorialize the Throne against the acceptance of the Russian
proposition.[353] The Viceroys, as well as several other subjects of
China, had already done so.[354] The British remonstrance to China
against entering into separate agreements with individual Powers was
repeated on March 20.[355] At the same time Germany suggested, Great
Britain and Japan seconding, that China should refer the matter to the
conference of the foreign Representatives at Peking, who were, it should
be remembered, in the midst of their difficult discussion of the
preliminary terms of peace between the Powers and China.[356] It is
unnecessary to say that Japan, in concert with Great Britain, strongly
urged the Chinese Government not to sign the convention separately with
one of the Powers, for such an act was contrary to the principle of
solidarity which then united the Powers, and an individual convention
with a Power would materially lessen the capacity of China to meet her
obligations toward all the Powers.[357]
At this point we have to record a singular conjunction of circumstances
which has caused criticisms not altogether favorable to Russia. It has
already been shown that she had frequently had recourse to acts which at
once placed her somewhat apart from the community of the Powers, and
also were liable to be interpreted as being designed to ingratiate
herself with the afflicted China. Thus Count Lamsdorff more than once
deprecated the continuance of the punitive expeditions which the allied
forces made to one place or another in the Province of Chili.[358] His
reasons were so apparently plausible that, under different
circumstances, he might have been supported by certain other
Powers.[359] These very Powers, however, most keenly resented Russia’s
detachment from the allies, when she definitely cleared herself from the
deliberation of the Representatives of the Powers at Peking in regard to
the punishment to be inflicted by the Chinese Government upon certain
provincial officials who had been directly guilty of outrages to
foreigners during the recent trouble. The peace commissioners had almost
disposed of the punishment question, in order next to attack the knotty
problem of the indemnity to be paid by China, but M. de Giers had been
instructed by his Government “not only to abstain from entering into any
discussion as to the nature or method of execution of the capital
sentence, but also to take no part in the further discussions relative
to the punishment to be inflicted on the Chinese dignitaries.”[360] “At
the meeting [of the peace commissioners at Peking] to-day,” wrote Sir
Ernest Satow on February 28, the day after he reported the draft of the
most exhaustive agreement broached by Russia upon China, and the very
day when the Chinese Emperor appealed to Great Britain, Germany, the
United States, and Japan to intervene, “we presented to our colleagues
our list of provincial officials, of whom ten were named as deserving
the death penalty and about ninety to be punished in a lesser degree.
Objection was made only by the Russian Minister, who stated that he
could not accept our proposals unless he received fresh instructions,
and that his Government’s wish from the beginning had been to substitute
a less severe form of punishment for the death penalty. Both my French
colleague and I are of opinion that our death penalty list might justly
have included far more than what had been demanded, and is exceedingly
moderate in its reduced form.”[361] On March 15, that is, about the time
when the terms of her proposed agreement were, as will be presently
seen, modified by Russia in China’s favor, Sir Charles Scott wrote Lord
Salisbury that recently Count Lamsdorff had intimated that “he
considered the question of the punishment of Chinese officials at an end
as far as concerned Russia,” and that “he referred to the murders of the
missionaries as a subject in which Russia was not interested.”[362] Such
a remark was regarded as a radical departure from the diplomatic
amenities between the Powers. Russia might without offense have pleaded
her reasons against the opinion of the majority, and then dissented at
the final vote, but it was considered a very different matter for her to
declare, in such a way as would openly place the other Powers in a false
light in the eyes of the Chinese, that she had nothing to do with the
question. The act, it must be said, came with particular ill grace at a
time when Russia was believed to be negotiating an agreement with China,
separately, and in terms manifestly contrary to the fundamental
principles upon which the Powers’ diplomacy at Peking was based.[363] A
joint vote demanding the punishment of the officials had to be presented
to the Chinese commissioners, on April 1, with the signatures of all but
M. de Giers.[364]
Directly in connection with this episode may be considered the fact
that, at the urgent request of China, Russia had in the mean time
somewhat modified the terms of her proposition, about March 19, so as,
in brief, to allow China to station troops in Manchuria for the
protection of the Russian railways and the prevention of fresh
disorders, their numbers and posts to be determined by consulting
Russia; and also to prohibit the importation of arms and ammunition only
in accordance with the agreement with the Powers (Article 4); to exclude
cannon from the armament of the Chinese mounted and foot police forces
in Manchuria only until peace is restored (Article 5); to retain the
administrative autonomy of Kin-chow (Article 7); and to arrange with the
Company the matter of indemnities in accordance with the general method
used by the Powers (Article 10). The eighth Article was altered so as to
apply the exclusive measure only to Manchuria, and the sixth was
entirely expunged.[365] Simultaneously with these modifications in
China’s favor, Russia seemed to have suddenly increased her pressure
upon the helpless Court of China. Count Lamsdorff was reported[366] to
have declared to Yang-yu that he would withdraw the draft and break off
negotiations if it were not signed within two weeks from March 13. An
Imperial Decree, dated March 20, and addressed to Sir Chin-chen
Lo-fêng-luh, the Chinese Minister at London, stated: “The Manchurian
Agreement has now been amended, but the stipulated time within which the
Agreement is to be signed will soon expire. As the Marquess of Lansdowne
has advised us to wait for his reply [to the Edict of February 28], we
have now to command Lo-fêng-luh to ask Lord Lansdowne either (1) to help
us out of the difficulty, or (2) to ask Russia to extend the time
stipulated for signing the Agreement. Otherwise, we, being placed in
great difficulty, will be unable to oppose Russia any further. An
immediate reply is expected. Respect this.”[367] On the next day came an
urgent appeal from Yang-tsze Viceroys and Taotai Sheng, who requested,
under instructions from the Chinese Government, that Great Britain, the
United States, Germany, and Japan intervene to obtain an extension of
time with a view to the modification of the Articles regarding civil
administration in the Chinese garrisons in Manchuria, the exclusive
trading rights demanded by the Russians, and the proposed railway to the
Wall.[368] Six days later, on March 27, the two-week period expired, and
the Chinese Court, which still sojourned at Si-ngan in the Shen-si
Province, telegraphed to Sir Chin-chen Lo-fêng-luh, as follows: “We have
followed the advice of Lord Lansdowne, in not giving our authority to
sign the Manchurian Agreement. In your telegrams of the 20th[369] and
23d[370] instant, you have assured us of the moral support of England if
we followed her advice. Our Plenipotentiaries, Prince Ching and Viceroy
Li, report that Russia will now permanently occupy Manchuria, and that
the collective negotiations will have to be suspended. The Court feels
great anxiety about this matter. As Manchuria is the cradle of the
present dynasty, how could China tolerate a permanent occupation of that
region? We now apply for the positive assistance of England in bringing
about a satisfactory settlement between China and Russia, in order to
avoid a rupture with that Power, which could not fail to be detrimental
to the interests of China and the treaty Powers. Please lay the contents
of the telegram before Lord Lansdowne and request an immediate
reply.”[371] It is possible that these messages were simultaneously
repeated to some or all of the rest of the four Powers, and, if so, it
becomes tenable that, but for the protests of the Powers, Li Hung-chang
might have signed the agreement. Nor can it be denied that, even after
their final refusal to accept the Russian proposals, the Chinese
officials clearly apprehended that, failing the positive support of the
Powers, Manchuria would be _permanently_ occupied by the northern Power.
It is, of course, uncertain, and perhaps also immaterial, whether they
had voluntarily reached that conclusion, or whether the Russians had led
them to the belief by threats.
Let us now turn to see what explanations Russia had offered, for Japan
about January 12[372] and Great Britain on March 4[373] had made
inquiries at the Russian Government in respect to the actual text of the
Agreement. Lord Lansdowne repeated his query on March 9, adding that if
the version reported by Sir Ernest Satow was approximately accurate, it
was “impossible to describe it as a contract of a temporary and
provisional nature, and our treaty rights were certainly affected by
it.” Then, in his oft outspoken vein, the Marquess concluded: “On the
other hand, it is surely reasonable that we should ask his Excellency’s
[Count Lamsdorff’s] help in exposing the trick, and putting the saddle
on the right horse, if, as he suggests, garbled versions of the
Agreement are being circulated by the Chinese Government in order to
create dissension between the Powers; and you may state that to join the
Russian Government in exhibiting in its true light so discreditable a
manœuvre would afford the liveliest satisfaction to His Majesty’s
Government.”[374] Russia, however, would not communicate the text of the
proposed Agreement, and it was explained later by Count Lamsdorff that
there had been a “programme,” the detail of which had at one time or
another been under discussion, but there had never existed any regular
draft Agreement in twelve Articles; that the Czar had at no time given
him the full powers indispensable for concluding such an agreement, and
that in her negotiations with China [concerning the programme], three
different Departments of the Russian Government had been equally
engaged. These circumstances, and also “the unwise interference of the
press and public, which seemed to assert a very dangerous claim to be
admitted to a seat and voice in the councils of the Powers regarding
China,” made it very difficult for the Count to be as frankly
communicative as he would otherwise have wished to have been. Indeed,
“it would have been impossible for him to have discussed the details of
these negotiations with a third Government.”[375] To the Japanese
Minister, who had been instructed by his Government to make the friendly
proposal to Russia that the Representatives of the Powers at Peking
should be given an opportunity to consider the draft of the Manchurian
Agreement before it was signed, Count Lamsdorff replied in no less
interesting manner. He observed, on March 26, that the Agreement solely
concerned two independent States, and must be concluded without the
intervention of any other Powers, and politely but firmly declined to
consider any such proposal as was made by Japan. The Count added,
however, that “he could give an official assurance to the Japanese
Minister that neither the sovereignty and the integrity of China in
Manchuria nor the treaty rights of any other Power were affected by the
proposed Agreement; that it was of a provisional nature, and a necessary
preliminary to the Russian troops evacuating the province. Its early
signature was desired by his Excellency in order that the unjust
suspicions aroused by false reports with regard to it might be removed
by its publication.”[376] Satisfied neither with this statement nor with
China’s refusal to sign the Agreement, the Japanese Government is said
to have made a second protest at St. Petersburg in a more resolute tone
than in the first, on April 5.[377] On the same day, however, appeared
in the Russian _Messager Officiel_ a long statement recapitulating
Russia’s relations with China since the beginning of the Boxer affair,
and declaring that, owing to the publication in the foreign press of all
sorts of false reports of the alleged treaties with China, and to the
serious obstacles that had apparently been put in the way of China as
regards the conclusion of an agreement with Russia serving as “a
starting-point” toward the restoration of Manchuria to China, “it had
been found impossible immediately to take the measures contemplated for
the gradual evacuation of Manchuria.” The negotiations had been dropped.
“With regard to the question of the complete and final restitution of
this territory to China,” concluded the official statement, “it is
evident that it can only be accomplished after a normal state of affairs
has been reëstablished in the Chinese Empire, and a central Government
has been secured in the capital, independent and sufficiently strong to
guarantee Russia against the renewal of the disturbances of last year.
While maintaining the present temporary form of government with the
object of insuring order in the neighborhood of the vast Russian
frontier, but remaining unalterably true to their original programme, as
repeatedly formulated, the Imperial Government will quietly await the
future progress of events.”[378]
-----
Footnote 341:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 6.
Footnote 342:
_The Times_, February 20, 1901, p. 5.
Footnote 343:
_Ibid._ “The Chinese argue,” added Dr. Morrison, “that Russia, having
no interests south of the Great Wall, no missionaries, no trade, and
no troops, can reasonably expect in return benevolent treatment from
China in any agreement proposed outside the Great Wall, especially as
Russia is in military occupation.... Russia appears determined to
profit by the condition to which China is reduced by the action of the
other Powers, just as she profited by obtaining the Primorsk Province
after the war of 1860, and Port Arthur and Talien-wan subsequent to
the war of 1895.”
Footnote 344:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 14. Cf. _ibid._, Nos. 25 and 42.
Footnote 345:
_The Times_, February 28, 1901, p. 5.
Footnote 346:
See pp. 91–92, above.
Footnote 347:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 42. Other versions are similar in substance
to this one, which was forwarded by Sir Ernest Satow.
Footnote 348:
See _China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 16, 17, 32, 35.
Footnote 349:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 30.
Footnote 350:
_Ibid._, No. 18 (March 1).
Footnote 351:
_Ibid._, No. 15 (February 28).
Footnote 352:
_Ibid._, No. 16.
Footnote 353:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 21 (March 4).
Footnote 354:
_Ibid._, No. 31.
Footnote 355:
_Ibid._, No. 24.
Footnote 356:
_Ibid._, Nos. 22 and 23 (March 5).
Footnote 357:
_Ibid._, No. 28.
Footnote 358:
_China, No. 6 (1901)_, Nos. 61 (January 30), and 119 (February 20).
Footnote 359:
Cf., e. g., _ibid._, No. 62.
Footnote 360:
From the _Official Messenger_ of St. Petersburg of April 5, 1901;
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 22.
Footnote 361:
_China, No. 6 (1901)_, No. 135.
Footnote 362:
_Ibid._, No. 176. It may be remembered that Japan had even a stronger
reason than Russia to abstain from all the unpleasant questions
connected with the missionaries, but it is needless to say that, in
her joint action with other Powers in the matter of the official
punishment and other questions, she regarded missionaries and other
foreigners alike as subjects with certain inviolable rights.
Footnote 363:
Dr. Morrison wrote from Peking on March 3: “To render China more
willing speedily to sign the convention, M. de Giers has informed Li
Hung-chang that Russia will not participate in the demand for the
execution of ten provincial officials guilty of inhuman murders of
white men, whose death justice demands. Thus the murdered English men,
women, and children may be described as England’s contribution toward
securing to Russia the advantages derived from this convention.”—The
London _Times_, March 4, 1901, p. 5.
Footnote 364:
_China, No. 6 (1901)_, No. 234.
Footnote 365:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 28, 29, 42.
Footnote 366:
_Ibid._, Nos. 28, 30. Later confirmed by the Chinese officials. See
No. 33.
Footnote 367:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 32.
Footnote 368:
_Ibid._, No. 33.
Footnote 369:
Probably _ibid._, No. 31.
Footnote 370:
This telegram has not appeared in the Blue Books.
Footnote 371:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 35.
Footnote 372:
_Ibid._, No. 6.
Footnote 373:
_Ibid._, No. 20.
Footnote 374:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 26.
Footnote 375:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 39.
Footnote 376:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 34.
Footnote 377:
The _Kokumin_, April 6, 1901.
Footnote 378:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 37, pp. 17–23.