A _MODUS VIVENDI_: THE ALEXIEFF-TSÊNG AGREEMENT
In the mean time, the Chinese Court[318] having largely emancipated
itself from the sway of the reactionary Prince Tuan and his associates,
the Representatives at Peking of the eleven interested Powers had agreed
in September to open discussions among themselves of the terms of peace
to be presented to the Chinese plenipotentiaries, Prince Ching and Li
Hung-chang.[319] The German Government, however, proposed, as a
prerequisite of peace negotiations with China, a drastic measure
demanding the surrender to the Powers of the chief culprits of the
recent trouble. The proposition meeting little encouragement from other
Ministers, Germany presented a new condition on October 3. The latter
was, however, supplanted by the basis for negotiations formulated on
September 30 and presented five days later to the Powers by the French
Minister.[320] His proposals, to which Russia immediately assented,[321]
and which with important amendments[322] and additions became the basis
of the Protocol signed on September 7, 1901, comprised the following six
points: (1) the punishment of the chief offenders designated by the
Representatives of the Powers at Peking; (2) maintenance of the
prohibition of the importation of arms into China; (3) indemnities for
the foreign governments, societies, and individuals; (4) establishment
of a permanent legation guard at Peking; (5) dismantlement of the Taku
forts; and (6) military occupation of two or three points on the road
from Tientsin to Taku, so as to keep open the passage between Peking and
the sea. It is needless for us to follow the negotiations which
proceeded at Peking after these proposals were made by France, but it is
important to observe that the French propositions were limited, in the
first place, to North China, and, in the second place, to those
questions in North China which concerned all the Powers alike. The
significance of all this, or at least of the prompt assent of
Russia,[323] may well be inferred from the opposition as readily offered
by the latter when Germany[324] and Japan,[325] respectively, urged that
a proper mention should be made in the peace protocol of China’s consent
to repair the murder of Baron von Ketteler and the Chancellor Sugiyama.
Russia maintained that “proposals of this nature, serving principally as
a satisfaction to be given to private views of one State, ought not to
enter into the common programme of the collective demands, which had as
their object the interests of all the Powers collectively and the
reëstablishment of a normal state of affairs in the Celestial
Empire.”[326] “In the Chinese question it is advisable,” said the
_Official Messenger_ of St. Petersburg, “not to lose sight of the
necessity of distinguishing clearly the questions which interest each of
the Powers in particular and those which affect the interests of all the
Powers in general.”[327] This distinction had been fundamental in the
Russian diplomacy in China since 1900, for, if one question of the
former class was allowed to be dealt with in the common deliberation of
the Representatives of all the Powers, why should not another question
of the same class be similarly treated? Or, in other words, if the
Sugiyama affair was referred to the collective council, the argument
that the Manchurian problem should be solved solely by Russia, without
intervention of the other Powers, would lose much of its force.[328] The
ultimate failure of Russian diplomacy—for diplomacy has failed when it
ends in a war, and, if Russia does succeed, her success will be that of
force, not of diplomacy—may be said to be largely due to the evident
contradiction of this fundamental distinction between North China and
Manchuria, upon which she sought to build her entire diplomatic
structure in this crisis. As a matter of fact, it was as impossible to
deny the profound interest felt by Great Britain and the United States,
and, above all, by Japan, in the economic development of Manchuria, as
it would have been to exclude Russia from the community of the Powers in
North China. It should be remembered that Russia herself persistently
maintained that the principle of the integrity of China applied also to
Manchuria, and she would have hardly antagonized other Powers had she
expressed an equally clear adhesion to the principle of the open door,
and made efforts to carry out pledges regarding both principles.
Events soon took place, however, which made other Powers skeptical of
Russia’s sincerity in her profession of even the principle of the
integrity of the Chinese Empire. The new question thus thrust upon the
attention of the Powers was of an extremely grave nature, for if the
sovereignty of Manchuria should eventually pass into the hands of
Russia, the treaty rights that other nations had acquired therein from
China might rightfully be terminated by Russia. Whatever her ultimate
objects, it was hardly politic for her to approach the difficult
Manchurian question at the time and in the manner selected by her. Dr.
George Morrison reported to the _Times_ on December 31, 1900, and Sir
Ernest Satow, the British Minister at Peking, confirmed it as
authentic,[329] that the delegates of Admiral Alexieff and the Tartar
General Tsêng-chi, of Mukden, had signed, in November last, an agreement
whereby Russia consented to return to the Chinese the civil government
of the Southern Province of Fêng-tien (Sheng-king) in Manchuria, on the
following conditions:—
1. “The Tartar General Tsêng undertakes to protect the province and
pacify it, and to assist in the construction of the railroad.
2. “He must treat kindly the Russians in military occupation,
protecting the railway and pacifying the province, and provide them
with lodging and provisions.
3. “He must disarm and disband the Chinese soldiery, delivering in
their entirety to the Russian military officials all munitions of
war in the arsenals not already occupied by the Russians.
4. “All forts and defenses in Fêng-tien not occupied by the
Russians, and all powder magazines not required by the Russians,
must be dismantled in the presence of Russian officials.
5. “Niu-chwang and other places now occupied by the Russians shall
be restored to the Chinese civil administration when the Russian
Government is satisfied that the pacification of the provinces is
complete.
6. “The Chinese shall maintain law and order by local police under
the Tartar General.
7. “A Russian Political Resident, with general powers of control,
shall be stationed at Mukden, to whom the Tartar General must give
all information respecting any important measure.
8. “Should the local police be insufficient in any emergency, the
Tartar General will communicate with the Russian Resident at Mukden,
and invite Russia to dispatch reinforcements.
9. “The Russian text shall be the standard.”[330]
In brief, the province was to be disarmed, its military government to be
in the Russian hands, its civil government to be placed under the
supervision of a Russian Resident, with additional duties on the part of
the Chinese to provide for the Russian military and to protect Russian
properties. The last provisions were coupled with the right of the
Russians to supply reinforcements, if the Chinese local police should
prove insufficient. The probable significance of this measure will be
fully discussed in connection with the Russo-Chinese Convention of April
8, 1902. As regards the Agreement now under discussion, Dr. Morrison
opined that it would necessarily be followed by similar agreements with
reference to the other two of the three Eastern Provinces,[331] and then
all Manchuria would be “a _de facto_ Russian protectorate, Russia by a
preëxisting agreement having already the right to maintain all necessary
troops for the protection of the railway.” It is needless to say that
the report of this Agreement caused universal amazement in the
diplomatic world. It soon became known[332] that the Chinese delegate
who signed it at Port Arthur had received no authorization to do so from
the Peking Government.[333] But the Japanese Government, hearing from a
reliable source that so late as the beginning of February, Russia was
pressing China to ratify the Agreement, undertook to express its opinion
to the Chinese Minister at Tokio, that the conclusion of any such
agreement would be a “source of danger” to the Chinese Government, and
that no arrangement affecting territorial rights of the Empire ought to
be concluded between the Chinese Government and any one of the
Powers.[334] At the instance of Japan, Great Britain also made precisely
the same representation to China,[335] Germany following the example in
slightly different language,[336] and the United States also reminding
China of “the impropriety, inexpediency, and even extreme danger to the
interests of China, of considering any private territorial and financial
engagements, at least without the full knowledge and approval of all the
Powers now engaged in negotiation.”[337]
It has often been reported in the press that the Agreement was never
ratified by either China or Russia. Before, however, any of the protests
of the Powers reached the Peking Government, Count Lamsdorff had, on
February 6, “very readily” explained the situation to the British
Ambassador at St. Petersburg. He said it was quite untrue that any
agreement which would give Russia new rights and a virtual protectorate
in Southern Manchuria had been concluded or was under discussion with
China, but “the Russian military authorities who had been engaged in the
temporary occupation and pacification of that province had been
directed, when reinstating the Chinese authorities in their former
posts, to arrange with the local civil authorities a _modus vivendi_ for
the duration of the simultaneous presence of Russian and Chinese
authorities in Southern Manchuria, the object being to prevent the
recurrence of disturbances in the vicinity of the Russian frontier, and
to protect the railway from the Russian frontier to Port Arthur.” “Some
of the details of the proposed _modus vivendi_ had been sent for
consideration to St. Petersburg, but no convention or arrangement with
the central Government of China or of a permanent character had been
concluded with regard to Manchuria, nor had the Emperor any intention of
departing in any way from the assurances which he had publicly given
that Manchuria would be entirely restored to its former condition in the
Chinese Empire as soon as circumstances admitted of it.”[338] A careful
reading of this statement, as typical of the many declarations made by
Russia in regard to Manchuria, will show how untenable is the popular
view that she persistently falsifies. There is here a fair admission
that a _modus vivendi_ was under way between the Russian military
officers in Southern Manchuria and the local Chinese authorities, and
that it was not of a permanent nature, nor was it concluded with the
central Government at Peking, and both of these points accord with the
reported facts. Nor can one deny the cogency of the argument that Russia
would evacuate Manchuria “as soon as circumstances admitted of it.” What
constituted the objectionable feature of the affair, from the standpoint
of the interested Powers, must have been that, inasmuch as Count
Lamsdorff would not publish the terms of the _modus vivendi_, it was not
possible for them to satisfy themselves that it contained nothing which
would render impossible the consummation of “circumstances” favorable
for evacuation, and eventually tend toward a “permanent” possession of
the territory by Russia. As matters stood, it would be as natural for
the Powers to entertain such a doubt, as it was for Russia to deem it
necessary to declare, in her circular of August 25, 1900, that she would
withdraw from Manchuria if, for one thing, no obstacle was placed in her
way by the action of other Powers. The doubt of the Powers was rather
intensified, if at all, by the further explanation by Count Lamsdorff on
February 6, that “when it came to the final and complete evacuation of
Manchuria, the Russian Government would be obliged to obtain from the
central Government of China an effective guarantee against the
recurrence of the recent attack on her frontier and the destruction of
her railway, but had no intention of seeking this guarantee in any
acquisition of territory or of an actual or virtual protectorate over
Manchuria, the object being to simply guarantee the faithful observance
in the future by China of the terms of the agreement [agreement between
the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank, September 28, 1896?],
which she had been unable to fulfill during the disturbances. The terms
of this guarantee might possibly form the subject of conversation here
between Count Lamsdorff and the Chinese Minister, or be left for
discussion at Peking.”[339] A month before this official statement of
Russia reached the London Government, the latter heard from the Japanese
Minister, Baron Hayashi, that Russia and China had already made at St.
Petersburg some arrangement regarding Manchuria,[340] evidently referred
to by Count Lamsdorff in the quoted passage as “an effective guarantee.”
-----
Footnote 318:
The Court had fled toward Ta-yuen-Fu before the allied troops reached
Peking, and thence started toward Si-ngan-Fu, the capital of many a
historic dynasty, on October 1.
Footnote 319:
Russia had early advocated accepting Li as plenipotentiary, while
other Powers were still skeptical of the nature of his credentials.
See _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 254, 356, 368, 371, 398, 401; _China,
No. 5 (1901)_, Nos. 5, 31, 111, 112, 128, 216; U. S. 56th Congress, 2d
Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp. 203–204, 305–306, 381–382. It
was not till September 20 that Li entered Peking. Prince Ching had
arrived there September 3. The appointment of the Prince as a
plenipotentiary is said to have been partly due to Japanese influence.
Footnote 320:
_Documents diplomatiques: Chine, 1899–1900_, No. 327 (p. 174). Also
see _China, No. 5 (1901)_, pp. 5, 46, 53–54.
Footnote 321:
_China, No. 5 (1901)_, No. 17.
Footnote 322:
For the Japanese amendments, see _ibid._, Nos. 60, 151, 178.
Footnote 323:
Russia openly declared in her _Messager Officiel_ of March 24 (April
6), 1901, that the Russian views regarding the settlement of the
trouble in North China, as distinguished from Manchuria, had “served
the French Government as a basis for the elaboration” of the latter’s
propositions.—_China, No. 2 (1904)_, pp. 20–21.
Footnote 324:
November 5.—_China, No. 5 (1901)_, No. 117.
Footnote 325:
November 28.—_Ibid._, Nos. 178 and 198.
Footnote 326:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 21.
Footnote 327:
_Ibid._, p. 20.
Footnote 328:
Russia allowed the question of the indemnity in Manchuria to be dealt
with at the general conferences at Peking together with the indemnity
respecting North China. In the matter of the punishment of guilty
local officials, from the discussion of which Russia abruptly withdrew
herself, the representatives of the other Powers included Manchuria in
their consideration.
Footnote 329:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 5 (January 4, 1901). Sir Charles Scott,
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported on January 5, that it appeared
to be generally believed there that “some provisional agreement, such
as that indicated, had been concluded by Russia with the local
authorities in Manchuria, and that she might eventually acquire by
treaty the right to finish building the railway line through Manchuria
to Port Arthur, and to protect it herself, the rights of the
Russo-Chinese Company being transferred to the Russian
Government.”—_Ibid._, No. 4.
Footnote 330:
The London _Times_, January 3, 1901, p. 3. In this and other reports
Dr. Morrison seems to have translated from Chinese texts.
Footnote 331:
The Russian _Official Messenger_ of April 6, 1901, stated that
“temporary agreements in writing (_modus vivendi_) respecting the
reëstablishment of the local civil administration in the _three
Provinces_ of Manchuria were, before all else, concluded between the
Russian military authorities and the Chinese tsian-tsiouns [Generals]
of the three Provinces.”—_China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 22.
Footnote 332:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 5 (January 4).
Footnote 333:
The Tartar General Tsêng-chi was degraded for this offense, but Russia
succeeded in reinstating him.—_The Times_, February 20, 1901, p. 5.
Footnote 334:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 8.
Footnote 335:
_Ibid._, No. 13 (February 13).
Footnote 336:
The opinion of the German Government was that China “should not
conclude with any Power individual treaties of a territorial or
financial character _before_ they can estimate their obligations
toward all the Powers as a whole, and _before_ the compliance with
such obligations is accepted.”—_Ibid._, Nos. 12, 13.
Footnote 337:
_Ibid._, No. 19 (February 19).
What action the remaining Powers took is not shown in the Blue Books.
Austria-Hungary and Italy are said to have also protested.
Footnote 338:
_China, No. 2 (1901)._
Footnote 339:
_China, No. 2 (1901)._
Footnote 340:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 6.