THE ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT
When we recall that even before 1900 Russia desired to control the
railway enterprises, not only in Manchuria, but also on the right side
of the Liao River, it is not altogether strange that, simultaneously
with the occupation of Manchuria, the northern Chinese line was seized
by her troops. This action, however, did not stop at the Great Wall. Had
it not been for the protest of Great Britain, the Russians would have
seized the entire line from Niu-chwang up to Peking. During the latter
part of June, they captured the Tientsin depot, burned the office,
destroyed the safe and the documents it contained, and seized land, some
tracts of which had been owned by British subjects.[300] On July 8, the
Northern Railway was seized and the British engineer, C. W. Kinder, and
his staff were turned out,[301] and, in spite of the dissent of the
British and American commanders, the Admirals of the allied Powers voted
on July 16 that the Russians should manage the railway.[302] In August,
the Russians claimed also the line between Tong-ku and Shanhai-Kwan, on
the one hand, and the one between Tientsin and Peking, on the other,
thus completing the control of the entire connection.[303] British
protests were in a measure waived by the new Commander-in-Chief of the
allied forces, Count von Waldersee, who early in October assigned the
repair of the section up to Yang-tsun to the Russians.[304] About this
time, fifty miles of railway material belonging to a British firm were
seized at Niu-chwang by the Russians,[305] followed by the seizure of
the collieries at Tong-shan and Lin-si hitherto operated by the Chinese
Engineering and Mining Company.[306] Other incidents followed, greatly
to the annoyance of those whose interests had been invested in the
works. It was at this juncture that, on October 16, 1900, an Agreement
was signed between the Governments of Great Britain and Germany,
upholding the principle of the open door in China (Article 1),
disclaiming territorial designs upon China on the part of the
contracting Powers (Article 2), and supplemented by the following
(Article 3), embodying the well-known principle of the balance of power
at China’s expense: “In case of another Power making use of the
complications in China in order to obtain under any form whatever such
territorial advantages, the two contracting parties reserve to
themselves the right to come to a preliminary understanding as to the
eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own interests in
China.”[307] This is the notorious Anglo-German Agreement, the fate of
which has been an object of much ridicule among writers upon Chinese
affairs of recent years. The diplomacy which had resulted in the
conclusion of this Agreement has not been made known to the public, but
as to the circumstances which had caused the two Powers to negotiate, it
may safely be inferred that; so far as the British side was concerned,
the Russian conduct in North China was a potent factor.[308] As to the
deeper causes on both sides for the extraordinary _rapprochement_, it is
easy to speculate upon but unsafe to asseverate them.[309] The Agreement
further stated that other interested Powers should be invited to accept
the principles recorded in it (Article 4). It is interesting to see how
this peculiar combination of the principles of (1) the open door, (2)
the integrity of China, and (3) a balance between the Powers on the
Chinese ground, was viewed by the other Powers. Japan joined the
Agreement on October 29, as a signatory, but not as an adhering
State.[310] France, Austria, and Italy recognized as identical with
their own all of the principles proposed,[311] while the United States
did likewise with the first two, but expressed itself unconcerned with
the third.[312] As for Russia, she seized this opportunity to indulge
her diplomatic sarcasm. She declared that, from her point of view, the
Agreement “did not perceptibly modify the situation in China,” and the
second principle perfectly corresponded with Russia’s intentions, as
“she was the first to lay down the maintenance of the integrity of the
Chinese Empire as a fundamental principle of her policy in China.” Her
reply to the first principle was delicately expressed, as follows: It
“can be favorably entertained by Russia, as this stipulation does not
infringe in any way the _status quo_ established in China _by existing
treaties_.”[313] In other words, the open door may or may not apply to
other places not yet covered by the existing treaties and still open to
whatever development might take place. The evil genius of the third
Article of the Anglo-German Agreement was not less skillfully answered
by Russia: “The Imperial Government, while referring to its Circular of
the 12th (25th) August, can only renew the declaration that such an
infringement [by another Power] would oblige Russia to modify her
attitude according to circumstances.”[314] From these words, it was
plain that outside of the two contracting Powers, the Agreement could
not exercise great influence, and least upon Russia, which declined to
observe any new feature in the instrument. The virtue of the Agreement
was, moreover, seriously impaired by the insincerity of one of its
parties, and by the consequent difference of views between themselves.
The document was openly talked about in Germany as the Yang-tsze
Agreement, it being meant that Great Britain thereby pledged herself to
abstain from annexing the Yang-tsze Provinces, hitherto considered, much
to the jealousy of Germany, as a British sphere of interest.[315] More
momentous was the question whether the Agreement included in its scope,
not only the eighteen Provinces, but also Manchuria. The answer would,
of course, depend upon whether both parties would consider, under the
provision of the third Article, that they alike possessed “their own
interests” to protect in Manchuria. Seen in this light, it is not
strange that, in the opinion of Lord Lansdowne, the “Agreement most
unquestionably extended to Manchuria, which is part of the Chinese
Empire,”[316] while, from Count von Bülow’s point of view, “The
Anglo-German Agreement had no reference to Manchuria.” “I can imagine
nothing,” he added, “which we can regard with more indifference” than
Manchuria.[317] Evidently Germany had entered into the Agreement with
different motives from those of Great Britain, and perhaps also with
less zeal, if zeal there was.
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Footnote 300:
_China, No. 7 (1901)_, Nos. 21, 76, 81, 84, 86, 95, 103, 149, 153,
154, 174, 187, 189.
Footnote 301:
_Ibid._, Nos. 1 and 7.
Footnote 302:
_Ibid._, Nos. 2, 7, 9.
Footnote 303:
_China, No. 7 (1901)_, Nos. 11, 14, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 30, 35, 36,
57, 60, 103.
Footnote 304:
_Ibid._, Nos. 24, 27, 37, 38, 43, 50, 54, 55, 66, 68.
Footnote 305:
_Ibid._, Nos. 39, 77.
Footnote 306:
_Ibid._, 40, 78.
Footnote 307:
The _British Parliamentary Papers_, _Treaty Series_, No. 1, 1900.
Footnote 308:
On November 1, Lord Salisbury wrote to the British _Chargé_ at St.
Petersburg in unusually outspoken language, as follows: “In the event
of the Russians making any complaint of our having concluded the
Anglo-German Agreement without previously consulting them, you should
dwell on the fact that the conduct and language of Russian officers in
the Far East, in respect to the Chinese railway from Niu-chwang to
Peking, and the way in which the property of British subjects on that
railway has been dealt with by the Russian military authorities, has
caused much perplexity to Her Majesty’s Government. The Russian
Government have given us many satisfactory assurances with respect to
their intentions in these matters, but the little attention paid to
the avowed policy of the Russian Government by officers on the spot
has deterred us from fuller communication.”—_China, No. 7 (1901)_, No.
45.
Footnote 309:
See, for instance, the explanation offered in _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp.
384–386.
Footnote 310:
_China, No. 5 (1901)_, Nos. 4 and 7, inclosure 2.
Footnote 311:
_Ibid._, Nos. 6, 8, and 9.
Footnote 312:
The 56th Congress, 2d Session, _Home Documents_, vol. i. p. 355.
Footnote 313:
The italics are the author’s.
Footnote 314:
_China, No. 5 (1900)_, No. 5.
Footnote 315:
Also see the debate in the House of Lords, on August 6, 1901, between
Earl Spencer and the Marquess of Lansdowne. The _Parliamentary
Debates_, Fourth Series, vol. 98, pp. 1351–1365.
Footnote 316:
At the House of Lords, on August 6, 1901. The Japanese Government,
also, in its reply to a question of a member of the National Diet,
interpreted the Agreement to apply to the whole of the Chinese
Empire.—_Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 389.
Footnote 317:
At the Reichstag on March 15, 1901.—The London _Times_, August 6,
1901, p. 7. He is also said to have declared to the Russian
Representative at Berlin that Manchuria was outside of the sphere of
German commercial rights, and consequently had no relation with the
Anglo-German Agreement. It was reported even that Manchuria was
originally mentioned specifically in the British draft of the
Agreement, but the word was struck out at the request of Germany, and
the more abstract phrase, “spheres of influence,” was used
therefor.—_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 388–389.