NORTH CHINA AND MANCHURIA
The problem stated at the close of the last chapter forms an index to a
period of Eastern diplomacy the singular features of which hardly find a
parallel in the world’s history. The affairs of the Extreme Orient had
in general advanced to such a stage that no single Power could again
seek to enforce its will without due regard to the interests of some
other Powers. The Russian problem in Manchuria was, as will be seen
after a little reflection, of such a nature that it could hardly be
literally propounded before the world. The absorption of a vast and rich
territory in China by a Power whose policy was known to be aggressive
would at once arouse a determined protest of the Powers which were, from
interest and from conviction, committed to the principles of the
integrity of the Chinese Empire and the open door therein as the best
means of insuring a lasting peace in the Far East. The Manchurian
question had to be developed under a disguise until it would be, if
ever, safe to cast aside the veil. Hence began Russia’s long, laborious
effort to explain to the critical world certain crude facts and deeds in
Manchuria in the terms of some refined foreign phrases—phrases whose
significance in this particular case her rivals well knew, but which
they could not repudiate so long as they themselves upheld the
principles indicated by those phrases. However, the moment a complex
diplomatic machinery relies upon subterfuges for its success, its
ingenuity will be taxed to the utmost, or its unity will be in danger.
For it will not be easy to make the entire body of diplomatic agents
speak the same untruths at all places and at all times. As soon as one
pretext is uncovered, another must be invented, as it were, on the spur
of the moment, in order to cover the retreat from the last one—a
necessary change which might render a quick readjustment of the entire
organism to the newly created situation almost impossible. It would
indeed have been one of the most striking feats of the government of a
nation, if the artful diplomacy of Russia had been able to combat
successfully to the end, with the enemy’s weapon, the straightforward
statecraft of the partisans of fair play. Let us now observe in the
remaining chapters of this work how this process went on, and how it
finally defeated itself,—how ingenuity gave place to threats, and how
diplomacy ended in war.
As has been suggested, Russia avowed that a point in her policy in China
at the outbreak of the Boxer trouble was to assist the friendly
Government of that Empire in suppressing the insurrection and restoring
the normal order.[288] When, however, in spite of Count Muravieff’s
inclination to regard this matter lightly, all the Powers concerned
deemed the situation grave enough to justify sending forces to the
rescue of their Representatives and subjects in Peking, it became
necessary for Russia to act in concert with the others, instead of alone
assisting China. Russia promptly, on June 16,[289] declared her
intention to coöperate with the other Powers, and claimed, about a month
later, to have proposed to the Powers the following “fundamental
principles as their rule of conduct in relation to events in China,”
which principles were agreed to by the majority of the Powers:[290] (1)
Harmony among the Powers; (2) the preservation of the _status quo_ in
China prior to the trouble; (3) the elimination of everything which
might conduce to a partition of China; and (4) the reëstablishment by
common action of the legitimate central Government at Peking, which
would be able of itself to guarantee order and tranquillity in that
country.[291] Probably before these propositions were penned by Count
Muravieff, orders had been issued by Russia to mobilize large forces
into Manchuria. In this territory and in North China, events progressed
rapidly in the next few weeks, and, by the middle of August, the
Legations had been relieved, and the three Eastern Provinces had largely
fallen into the hands of the Russians. It is essential to bear in mind
this dual state of affairs, for henceforth it appeared that the best
efforts of Russian diplomacy were made at once, in one sense, in
reconciling to one another, and, in another sense, in insisting upon,
the widely different situations of Manchuria and of North China. On the
one hand, the principle of the integrity of China applied to both
regions alike, but, on the other, Russia steadily declined to admit that
Manchuria was within the sphere of the concerted action of the Powers.
Thus, in her famous circular of August 25,[292] she declared, in regard
to Manchuria, where “temporary measures” of military occupation “had
been solely dictated by the absolute necessity of repelling the
aggression of the Chinese rebels, and not with interested motives, which
are absolutely foreign to the policy of the Imperial Government,” that,
as soon as peace was restored and the security of the railway was
assured, “Russia would not fail to withdraw her troops from the Chinese
territory, provided such action did not meet with obstacles caused by
the proceedings of other Powers.”[293] From these words it was evident
that Russia would not allow the Manchurian question to be discussed by
the Powers, for she would withdraw from it, as she had occupied it, on
her own initiative, and with no interference from others. More important
still was the fact that Russia, from this time on, pledged to evacuate
Manchuria under the apparently reasonable conditions—of the question of
the fulfillment of which, however, Russia would be the sole judge—that
peace and security was restored in the territory, and that other Powers
did not interfere with her intentions. As regards North China, the
circular bespoke a striking action on the part of Russia. Of the two
original intentions of Russia, namely, the rescue of the Russian
subjects in Peking and the assistance to China to restore peace, the
first had now been accomplished, but the second was hindered by the
absence of the Imperial Court from the capital. In these circumstances,
Russia, seeing no reason for maintaining the Legations and allied forces
in Peking, would now withdraw M. de Giers and the Russian troops to
Tientsin. It was explained later[294] that, while the action of Russia
was not a technical proposition to the other Powers, their concurrence
in these measures would conduce to the return of the Court to the
capital and facilitate the settlement of the affair between the allies
and China. It is interesting to see that at the same time the Chinese
Representative at St. Petersburg urgently begged Li Hung-chang to
memorialize the Throne to the effect that an edict should be issued to
show China’s severity and ability to maintain order when the European
troops were withdrawn, and the intention of the Court to return shortly.
The adoption of this course, it was thought, would allay the
apprehensions of the allies regarding the withdrawal of their troops
from Peking.[295] The Russian declaration, so far as it regarded North
China, in spite of her avowal that she would act strictly in concert
with the other Powers, was as surprising to some of the latter as it
must have been pleasing to China.[296] As might be expected, the Powers,
except France, doubted the practicability of so early an evacuation of
Peking.[297] A similar proposition by Russia, dated September 17, so far
as the withdrawal of the Legations to Tientsin was concerned, came to
the same result.[298] Russia, on her part, actually withdrew her troops
to Tientsin, but when peace negotiations were opened at Peking in
October, her Minister was obliged to be present there. In the mean time,
the different status in which Russia held Manchuria from North China was
made evident by the vigorous prosecution of the campaign in the former.
Ninguta, Kirin, and Tsitsihar fell into the Russian hands about the same
time as the evacuation of Peking was announced; Liao-yang was taken late
in September, and Mukden and Tieh-ling early in October.
Fêng-hwang-Chêng and An-tung were captured even so late as December. On
September 7, a solemn thanksgiving was held at the site of the burned
town Sakhalien on the right bank of the Amur across Blagovestchensk, in
which General Gribsky delivered a speech, and the high priest Konoploff
was reported to have said: “Now is the cross raised on that bank of the
Amur which yesterday was Chinese. Muravieff foretold that sooner or
later this bank would be ours.”[299]
-----
Footnote 288:
The circular note addressed to the Powers on June 3/16, _China, No. 3
(1900)_, No. 49; the letter to the Chinese Government on June 11/24,
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 18; the Czar’s reply to the Chinese Emperor,
_China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 105, etc.
The Emperor had sent a specially worded personal message to each of
the heads of the French, German, Russian, British, American, and
Japanese nations, once about July 19 and again on October 14, that is,
before and after the capture of Peking by the allied forces. In each
case the Emperor made a special appeal to the person addressed, and
begged him to take the initiative in coming to China’s assistance in
solving the situation. The various replies are highly instructive. It
seems that the Czar supposed that he had alone been singled out by the
Chinese Empire for the first special plea, and answered accordingly.
See _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 1, 51, 56, 61, 78, 79, 105, 113, 252;
_China, No. 5 (1901)_, Nos. 5, 24, 72, 108, 134, 174, 197; _China, No.
2 (1904)_, p. 18; 56th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol.
i. pp. 293–296.
Footnote 289:
_China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 149.
Footnote 290:
These principles, says Lord Salisbury, on July 15, “have never been
accepted by Her Majesty’s Government, nor have we as yet discussed
with other powers the circumstances to which those principles might
possibly apply.”—_China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 44. Secretary Hay thought
that the Russian _Chargé’s_ oral communication was “not explicit
enough” to enable him to comment upon the so-called fundamental
principles of Russia.—_Ibid._, No. 114. Later, about July 30, Mr. Hay
replied to Russia by referring to his own circular note of July 3, and
said that he deemed it “premature to forecast the means of bringing
about those results [i. e., the restoration of order and responsible
government in China].”—_Ibid._, No. 140. It is particularly remarkable
that two of the Powers most interested in the principles proposed by
Russia should be so conservative when the question was propounded by
that Power.
Footnote 291:
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, pp. 1 and 18.
It is interesting to compare these “fundamental principles” of Russia
with the principles laid down in Secretary Hay’s circular telegraph
addressed to the Powers on July 3, or probably some days before the
Russian note: “... The purpose of the President is, as it has been
heretofore,” it said, “to act concurrently with the other Powers,
first, in opening up communication with Peking and securing the
American officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in
danger; secondly, in affording all protection everywhere in China to
American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all
legitimate American interests; and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a
spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the Empire and a
recurrence of such disorders. It is, of course, too early to forecast
the means of attaining this last result; but the policy of the
Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring
about permanent safety, and peace to China, preserve Chinese
territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed
to friendly Powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for
the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of
the Chinese Empire.”—The 56th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_,
vol. i. p. 299. It will be observed that the American note is not only
probably earlier in date, but also much wider in scope, than the
Russian propositions, for the former contains the open door principle,
among others, which receives no reference in the latter. It should be
remembered, however, that the American note was not a proposition to
the other Powers.
Footnote 292:
_China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 256.
Footnote 293:
Statements of similar import occur in the _Official Messenger_ of
August 13, in the instructions given on October 25 by Count Lamsdorff
to the Russian Representatives abroad, and those on December 28 by
General Kuropatkin to the governors-general of the Amur and Kwan-tung
Provinces. See _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 259–260.
Footnote 294:
Cf. _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 267, 300, 314, 315.
Also see the most interesting Russian document, quoted in _China, No.
2 (1904)_, p. 20. One of its passages reads as follows: “It must not
be forgotten that an attack on the ancient traditions of the Chinese
and on the prestige of their Government might be attended by the most
disastrous consequences; all the more so that the international troops
cannot occupy indefinitely the capital of a country of 400,000,000
inhabitants, whose right to live at home as they please can hardly be
questioned.”
Footnote 295:
_China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 306. Also see No. 313.
On August 19 and 21, Li Hung-chang wired to Wu Ting-fang to urge upon
the United States Government that, inasmuch as the declared purpose of
the allies to relieve the Legations had now been accomplished, they
should suspend hostilities, withdraw their troops, and appoint envoys
to negotiate with China. See _ibid._, No. 239, and the 56th Congress,
2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp. 197, 288–290. We may
naturally infer either that Li sent similar telegrams to Russia, or
that Russia had consulted Li before the circular was sent to the
Powers, the general tenor of thought is so alike in the telegrams and
in the circular.
Footnote 296:
Russia herself was conscious of the fact that others attributed to her
the motive of ingratiating herself with China at a critical moment by
taking, separately from the other Powers, an action favorable to
China. See _China, No. 2 (1904)_, pp. 19–20.
Footnote 297:
See _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 275 (Austria); 280, 322, 328,
(France); 309 (Italy); 281, 293, 305, 317, 318, 321, 327, 335, 378,
383 (England); 307; _No. 5 (1901)_, Nos. 110, 124, 127 (Japan); _No. 1
(1901)_, Nos. 270, 315; 56th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_,
vol. ii. pp. 304–305, 378–379, 205 (the United States). As a matter of
fact, the Boxers still roamed about Peking, and the Chinese Court,
which had fled to Ta-yuen, was still under the control of Prince Tuan
and his associates. A hasty withdrawal of troops from Peking would
have been disastrous in its effect upon the foreigners and native
Christians.
Footnote 298:
See _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 356 (Russian proposition); 371, 395,
401 (England); 398 (Italy); _No. 5 (1901)_, No. 128, (Japan); _House
Documents_, op. cit., vol. i. pp. 203–204, 305–306, 381–382.
Footnote 299:
_China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 375.