THE OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA
We have given only an incomplete account of the manner in which certain
Powers seemed, during the years 1897 and 1898, to vie with one another
in transgressing, in effect, the principle of the territorial integrity
of the Chinese Empire, to which they at the same time professed their
adherence. Another principle, however,—that of the open door, or of the
equal opportunity in China for the commercial and industrial enterprise
of all nations,—was, as we have seen, not as openly ignored even by the
most aggressive Powers. The time arrived, in 1900, when the observance
of both principles appeared to be the only safeguard against a general
partition of China and an internal revolution through the length and
breadth of the vast Empire. The story of the Boxer trouble is too fresh
in every one’s memory to need to be retold. It was during this
insurrection, and during the march of the allied forces toward Peking
and the long negotiations which followed it, that all the Powers
concerned repeatedly and unequivocally pledged themselves to one another
to maintain the two cardinal principles of Chinese diplomacy. It now
belongs to us to relate, however, that it was in the midst of this
reiterated promise of fair play that the most acute stage of the
Manchurian question was reached. Evidence is abundant to show that
Russia was inclined greatly to underestimate the seriousness of the
troubles in North China, where a concerted action of all the interested
Powers was imperative, while in Manchuria, which Russia had for years
regarded as her sphere of influence,[263] she carried forward aggressive
measures with great rapidity and on an enormous scale. Thus, even so
late as June 20, when the railway communication of Peking with Tientsin
had been cut for three weeks;[264] when Prince Tuan and his anti-foreign
counselors swayed the Court, and the Tsung-li Yamên had long proved
utterly impotent to cope with the situation;[265] when the 6000 Chinese
soldiers sent against the Boxers around Tientsin betrayed themselves
into inaction;[266] when the international relief corps of marines led
by Admiral Seymour had already been forced backward;[267] when the
Boxers had at last poured into Peking[268] and held the foreigners in
siege for a week, killing many Chinese as well as the Japanese
Chancellor Sugiyama;[269] and when the Taku forts had been taken by the
allied squadron,[270] only to infuriate the anti-foreign sentiment all
over North China;[271] when no news had been received by him even from
Tientsin and Taku for the past four days,[272] and after he had
dispatched 4000 Russian soldiers for the disposal of M. de Giers at
Peking,[273]—Count Muravieff still held an optimistic view, and supposed
that the trouble would be over within two weeks, saying that Middle and
South China were under a greater peril than the North.[274] This last
assertion, which he made more than once,[275] is significant when we
consider that Middle and South China included regions where British
interests were predominant. Although Russia persistently declared her
firm intention to act in concert with other Powers in North China, it is
not altogether impossible to suppose, as it has been alleged, that she
was not unwilling to divert the attention of Great Britain and others
from North China, where Russia would not have hesitated, if possible, to
render her sole assistance to China to suppress the insurrection. At
least, Russia declared it to be one of her objects in China to “assist
the Chinese Government in the work of reëstablishing order so necessary
in the primary interest of China herself;”[276] at least, the
pro-Russian Li Hung-chang expressed, on June 22, an otherwise
inexplicable confidence in his ability to restore peace.[277] The real
siege and firing of the Peking Legations had begun two days before, on
June 20, the day when Count Muravieff uttered his optimistic remarks at
St. Petersburg. The latter died the next day, and was succeeded in the
Foreign Ministry by Count Lamsdorff. On June 26, the Russian Government
ordered the mobilization into Manchuria of six large corps of troops
from Hailar, Blagovestchensk and Habarofsk, Vladivostok and Possiet, and
European Russia.[278] One estimate put the number of the Russian
soldiers who had arrived in Manchuria by August at 30,000.[279] It is
not easy to determine whether Russia took the offensive in the great
Manchurian campaign which now began, or whether hostile acts of the
Chinese precipitated it, but it seems safe to say that rumors of
impending dangers had been abundant before the Russian troops poured
into the territory,[280] and also that the dispatch of the latter
apparently provoked more extensive outrages of the rioters than would
otherwise have been the case. We hear of the destruction of the railway
and burning of religious establishments near Liao-yang and Mukden only
from the end of June and beginning of July,[281] and the alleged
determination of the Chinese troops to drive out all Russians from
Manchuria was reported in the Russian _Official Messenger_ toward the
middle of July.[282] Just at this time riots occurred in the Liao-tung
and its vicinity, communication by the Amur ceased, and Blagovestchensk
was suddenly bombarded by the Chinese, followed by the slaughter of
thousands of Chinese inhabitants by the Russian soldiers under General
Gribsky.[283] Toward the south and east, the depot of Ninguta was
destroyed, and several Russians were murdered at An-tung, about July 20.
The Russian troops, many of whom had now arrived at different points in
Manchuria, captured Hun-chun on July 27, Argun on July 30, Haibin on
August 3, and Aigun and San-sin soon afterward.[284] Even the treaty
port of Niu-chwang had also been seized, for which conduct the British
and American consular agents could not find sufficient justification. On
August 5, the port was placed under the civil administration of Russian
authorities, under which injustice and disorder were said to have much
increased.[285] It was on August 14, the day when the allied forces had
almost reached Peking, that General Groderkoff in command of the
northern army of the Manchurian invasion wrote to the Minister of War at
St. Petersburg: “Fifty years ago Nevelskoy raised the Russian flag at
the mouth of the Amur, on its right bank, and laid the foundation for
our possessions on that great river. Now, after hard fighting, we have
taken possession of the right bank, thus consolidating the great
enterprise of annexing the whole of the Amur to Russia’s dominions, and
making that river an internal waterway and not a frontier stream,
whereby free and unmolested navigation of that artery through one of the
vastest regions of the Empire has been secured.” Indeed, by the time
when the Peking Legations were relieved, the major part of Manchuria had
been reduced under a military occupation by Russia.[286] This may be
said to mark a new stage in the development of the Manchurian question,
for no longer was this vast territory a mere sphere of Russian
influence; it was a prize of conquest.[287] The problem for the
Government of the Czar henceforth seemed to the outside world to be not
so much how it might tighten its hold upon Manchuria, as how it might
convert the temporary occupation into a permanent possession.
[Illustration:
COUNT LAMSDORFF
_Russian Foreign Minister_
]
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Footnote 263:
It may reasonably be said that the meaning of the intervention of
Russia, France, and Germany, in 1895, in regard to Japan’s claim upon
the Liao-tung Peninsula may be gathered, in a retroactive way, from
Russia’s conduct in Manchuria since 1896. At any rate, M. Pavloff
declared, in October, 1897, that “the Russian Government intended that
the provinces of China bordering on the Russian frontier must not come
under the influence of any nation except Russia.”—_China, No. 1
(1898)_, p. 6. This declaration throws light not only on the
trans-Manchurian railway concessions and the lease of ports, but also
on Russia’s action respecting the Northern Railway extension and the
consequent Anglo-Russian agreement of April, 1899. In May, 1898, there
were already 200 Russian soldiers in Kirin, and in December, 2000 in
Port Arthur and Talien-wan, while many Cossacks guarded railway
construction, and many barracks were being hurriedly built, so that
there were sufficient indications even before 1900 that Russia
regarded Manchuria as her sphere of influence.
Footnote 264:
May 29.—_China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 5.
Footnote 265:
Cf. _China, No. 4 (1900)_, No. 1 (June 5).
Footnote 266:
_China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 94; _No. 4 (1900)_, No. 1 (June 8).
Footnote 267:
_China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 219 (June 16–26).
Footnote 268:
_Ibid._, No. 133; _No. 4 (1900)_, No. 2 (evening, June 13).
Footnote 269:
_China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 122 (June 13).
Footnote 270:
_Ibid._, Nos. 132, 148, 157, and 186 (June 17).
Footnote 271:
_Ibid._, No. 157.
Footnote 272:
_Ibid._, No. 159. It is true that some of these events had not been
known to Muravieff, but enough news had reached him to show the
extreme gravity of the situation.
Footnote 273:
_Ibid._, No. 149 (June 16).
Footnote 274:
_Ibid._, No. 159. Also see Nos. 43, 45, 48, 65, 58, 114, 120, all
indicating the optimistic view of the Count.
Footnote 275:
Cf. _ibid._, No. 120 (June 13).
Footnote 276:
_China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 149 (June 16). In the Czar’s reply to the
Chinese Emperor’s appeal for a friendly intervention, it was stated
that “the efforts of Russia had but one object in view, namely, to
assist in the reëstablishment of order and tranquillity in the Chinese
Empire, and, inspired by their traditional friendship for China, the
Imperial Government have decided to render to the Chinese Government
every assistance with a view to repressing the present troubles.” From
the Russian Official Gazette, as reported by Sir Charles Scott on
August 2, 1900; _China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 105. It is noteworthy that
Russia had raised objections to sending large forces from Japan to the
relief of Peking, one reason being that she supposed they would be
commissioned, not only to rescue the Legations, but also to suppress
rebellion and restore peace in Peking and Tientsin.—_Ibid._, No. 29.
Footnote 277:
_Ibid._, No. 175. A writer of diplomatic history of Russia, himself a
Russian, considers that the anti-foreign uprising was owing to the
conduct of other Powers [presumably in sending Christian
missionaries], in which Russia had never participated; and that,
therefore, it was purely accidental that she took part in the Boxer
campaign. See the _Tō-A Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 48, pp. 35–36.
Footnote 278:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 258. It is said that M. Witte was at the time
opposed to sending so large forces into Manchuria.
Footnote 279:
The _Kokumin_, March 8, 1901.
Footnote 280:
But how soon before the order of mobilization is unknown. Writing on
June 29 from St. Petersburg, Sir Charles Scott said that the Russian
Government was alarmed by some news received on that day of the
serious disturbances which had occurred near the Manchurian Railway,
and it was rumored that the Boxers were attacking and destroying the
line north of Mukden, and had cut off telegraphic communications with
Vladivostok. “The Chinese Legation [at St. Petersburg] is much alarmed
by this report,” continued the British Ambassador, “as they had been
seriously warned that the slightest movement against the safety of the
Russian line would be followed by an instant and forcible action by
Russia.”—_China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 240.
Footnote 281:
The _Kokumin_, March 8, 1901, etc.
Footnote 282:
_China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 47.
Footnote 283:
There were other cases reported of the slaughter of noncombatants. The
aggregate of those people killed was said to have reached 25,000. See
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 261, which gives a list of these cases in detail.
Footnote 284:
The _Kokumin_, March 8, 1901, etc.
Footnote 285:
See the reports of the British Consuls Hosie and Fulford and the
American Consul Miller, in _China, No. 5 (1900)_, p. 47; _No. 2
(1904)_, pp. 29–33, etc.; and the 57th Congress, 2d Session, _House
Documents_, vol. i. pp. 147–158. At one time the relations between the
American sailors and citizens and the Russian authorities were wrought
up to a high tension, and Mr. Miller used so strong language in his
correspondence with the latter that he had to be warned by Minister
Conger of Peking and Assistant Secretary Pierce at Washington.
Footnote 286:
See _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 258–262.
Footnote 287:
Count Lamsdorff said on November 22, 1903, to Mr. Kurino, Japanese
Minister at St. Petersburg, that “Russia once took possession of
Manchuria by right of conquest....” The _Kwampō_, March 24, 1904,
supplement, p. 8.