CHAPTER V

SECRETARY HAY’S CIRCULAR NOTE

It is unnecessary for us to describe how, between 1897 and 1899, other

so-called spheres of influence and of economic concessions than those

already mentioned were marked out in China by the Powers, for, important

as they are in the general history of the modern East, they have little

bearing upon our immediate subject. It suffices to recall that the

process was begun by the German seizure of Kiao-chau; that unfortunately

Great Britain felt obliged to have recourse to the policy of the balance

of power; and that no other “sphere” had the grave significance and the

evil forebodings of the Russian territory of the Kwan-tung in Manchuria.

It was during this period that a Power whose position was so unique as

to justify the act appealed to the other interested Powers, in

September, 1899, to make declarations that they would observe the

principle of the equal economic opportunity for all nations in their

respective spheres of interest in China. The principle thus proposed by

the United States was stated to imply (1) non-interference with the

treaty rights and vested interests of each other; (2) the maintenance of

the Chinese treaty tariff, except in “free ports,” under the Chinese

management; and (3) no differential treatment in the harbor duties and

railway charges, in the spheres. The phrase “leased territory” was used

in connection with only the first of these three points, while the words

“spheres of interest” were applied to all three, so that it was

uncertain whether the second and third points were intended by Secretary

Hay to cover the leases, as well as the spheres.[257] In reply to this

proposition, Great Britain, which had stronger reason than the United

States to indorse a policy which had originated with her and which she

had long upheld in China at enormous cost, and Japan expressed their

unequivocal adherence to the proposed principle. Germany, France, and

Italy also assented, all except Italy, however, with the natural

reservation that the desired declarations would be made if all other

interested Powers acted likewise.[258] As regards the question whether

the three points applied to the leases and spheres alike, it is

interesting to note that Germany, France, and Great Britain replied, in

effect, in the affirmative, Germany using the expression “its Chinese

possessions,” and France employing the phrase “the territories which

were leased to her.” The statement used by Great Britain was the most

explicit and comprehensive, for she mentioned “the leased territory of

Wei-hai-Wei and all territory in China which may hereafter be acquired

by Great Britain, by lease or otherwise, and all ‘spheres of interest’

now held, or that may hereafter be held in China.” Beside these

assurances, the Russian assent was highly significant, which, with the

reservation similar to that of the other Powers, stated: “As to the

ports now opened, or hereafter to be opened, to foreign commerce _by the

Chinese Government_,[259] and which lie _beyond_ the leased territory to

Russia, the settlement of the question of customs duties belongs to

China herself, and the Imperial Government [of Russia] has no intention

whatever of claiming any privileges for its own subjects to the

exclusion of foreigners.” But “in so far as the territory leased by

China to Russia is concerned, the Imperial Government [of Russia] has

already demonstrated its firm intention to follow the policy of the

‘open door’ by creating Dalny (Talien-wan) a free port; and _if at some

future time that port, although remaining free itself, should be

separated by a custom-limit from other portions of the territory in

question_, the customs duties would be levied, in the zone subject to

the tariff, upon all _foreign_ merchants without distinction as to

nationality. With the conviction,” the Russian note concluded, “that

this reply is such as to ratify the inquiry made in the aforementioned

note [of the United States], the Imperial Government is happy to have

complied with the wishes of the American Government, especially as it

attaches the highest value to anything that may strengthen and

consolidate the traditional relations of friendship existing between the

two countries.”[260] On the strength of the various replies from the

Powers, however, the United States Government considered that “the

Declaration suggested by the United States on that subject [i. e., the

proposals about the Chinese trade] had been accepted by those Powers,”

and regarded the assent given by them “as final and definite.”[261] It

is interesting to note that no Power made a formal declaration[262]

suggested by Secretary Hay, who, however, seems to have deemed the

replies with reservations as equivalent to such a declaration. It is

problematical whether this exchange of notes did in the slightest degree

have the effect of changing the actual situation, at least so far as

Russia was concerned.

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Footnote 257:

_China, No. 2 (1900)_, No. 1.

Footnote 258:

_Ibid._, Nos. 2, 3, 4, and inclosures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, in No. 5.

Footnote 259:

The italics in the quotations are the author’s.

Footnote 260:

_China, No. 2 (1900)_, inclosure 6 in No. 5.

Footnote 261:

_Ibid._, No. 5, White to Salisbury, March 30, 1900.

Footnote 262:

Cf. _ibid._, No. 6.

The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and Issues · 第 5 / 20 章