THE “CASSINI CONVENTION” AND THE RAILWAY AGREEMENT
Regarded, however, from a broader point of view, no one could predict a
happy consequence of so ominous a beginning, as has been described, of
the new Eastern situation. By her successful intervention, Russia had
conferred upon China a signal favor, for which a reward was expected;
but the reward, again, assumed such a form that it at the same time
served as a new favor looking toward a fresh reward, so that the final
resultant of the repeated process proved altogether out of proportion to
the initial deed of patronage. The first step of this process was a 4
per cent. loan[144] to China of 400,000,000 francs at 94⅛, and payable
in thirty-six years, beginning with 1896. Not only were these liberal
terms attended by no security, but also the interest was guaranteed by a
special edict of the Czar.[145] The loan was issued principally from
Paris in July, 1895,[146] and the income was intended to cover one
half[147] of China’s indemnity to Japan.[148] In order to facilitate the
transactions in connection with this loan, as well as to promote the
commercial relations between Russia and Eastern Asia, the Russo-Chinese
Bank was organized late in 1895. In August, 1896,[149] the Chinese
Government was induced to contribute 5,000,000 _taels_ toward the
capital of the Bank, which seem to have been paid out of the new
loan.[150] Later in the same year, Prince Ukhtomsky, president of the
Bank, who had come to Peking with an immense number of costly presents
to be distributed among the members of the Court, succeeded in securing
the consent of the Chinese Government to the Statutes of the Bank, which
were subsequently published on December 8.[151] The privileges of the
institution as enumerated in these Statutes included the receiving of
tax returns, management of local finances, coining, payment of the
interests of the public bonds, and construction of railways and
telegraph lines in China, in so far as concessions should be made by her
Government to the Bank. The latter now has more than thirty branches and
agencies in East Asia, and this professedly private corporation has
since proved to be a great instrument through which the Russian
Government has obtained from China enormous concessions in Manchuria.
Before we examine the nature of these concessions, it is important to
observe what took place between Russia and China through the official
channels. On March 27, 1896, the Eastern world was startled to see the
publication in the _North China Daily News_ of a treaty of defensive
alliance concluded earlier in the same year between Russia and China.
The Japanese Government had already, on March 16, been assured by the
Foreign Office at St. Petersburg that the treaty did not exist.[152] It
is not clear whether the denial referred to the particular treaty in
question or to any treaty of alliance whatsoever. However that may be,
the reported agreement[153] was of the most serious character, as will
be gathered from the following abstract. In recognition of the service
rendered by Russia regarding the matter of the Liao-tung Peninsula and
of the loan, the Chinese Emperor desired to conclude with Russia a
treaty of alliance; and, consequently, it was agreed, in secrecy, that,
if Russia should come in conflict with other Asiatic Powers, she should
be allowed to make free use of any port or harbor on the Chinese coast,
and, in case of urgent need, levy troops from among the Chinese people.
If a protest should be made by other Powers, China should answer that
she was powerless to resist Russian demands. If she should desire even
to render active assistance to Russia against the common enemy, she
might do so, but this point required further discussion. In view of the
great disadvantages of the ice-bound naval harbors of Russia, China
agreed to allow her in time of peace a free use of Port Arthur, or, if
the other Powers should object, of Kiao-chau. If the latter should be
found inadequate, Russia might choose any harbor on the coast of
Kiang-su and Che-kiang. If, on the other hand, China should be at war
with another Power, Russia should endeavor to effect a compromise
between the belligerents, and, if the effort should fail, it should be
the duty of Russia openly to assist China and thereby strengthen the
alliance between the two Powers. In regard to Manchuria, Russian
military officers should be free to travel along the eastern frontiers
of the Sheng-king and Kirin Provinces and to navigate the Yalu and other
rivers, the object being either to further trade or to patrol the
frontiers. When the Siberian Railway was completed, a branch line might
be constructed under the joint control of China and Russia, passing
through the Provinces of Heilung and Kirin, and reaching Talien or some
other place selected by Russia. In order to protect this line, Russia
might possess near Talien-wan an island and the opposite shore, fortify
them, and station there her squadron and military forces. If a war
should arise between Russia and Japan concerning Korea, China should
allow Russia to send her troops toward the Yalu, so as to enable them to
attack the western boundary of Korea.
No matter whether any treaty of alliance had been signed between China
and Russia early in 1896, significant events soon followed which gave
rise to rumors of grave import. When it was resolved by China to send
Wang Tsz-chun to St. Petersburg as special envoy to attend the
coronation of the Czar, which was to take place in May of the same year,
M. Cassini, Russian Minister at Peking, is said to have intimated that
no one but Li Hung-chang was acceptable to Russia as the representative
of the Chinese Emperor. Li’s pro-Russian proclivities had been well
known, but he had up to this time been in disgrace for having concluded
the treaty of Shimonoseki so unfavorable to China. He now regained his
favor with the Court, and started on his mission to Russia, presumably
taking with him the draft of the Russo-Chinese convention which M.
Cassini had framed. The convention is reported to have been signed, to
avoid suspicion of other Powers, not at St. Petersburg, but at Moscow,
and, on the Russian side, not by M. Lobanoff, Foreign Minister, but by
M. Witte, Minister of Finance. When, however, the agreement was referred
to the Yamên at Peking for ratification, a large majority of the Chinese
Ministers are said to have disapproved the terms of Li’s treaty, until
the strenuous efforts of M. Cassini turned the tide and the convention
was ratified by the Emperor on September 30, 1896. This is the
celebrated “Cassini Convention.”[154] Let us now examine the more
important of its contents. The preamble explicitly referred, as also did
the treaty of alliance already summarized, to the favors done to China
by Russia at the close of the recent war. The body of the convention
falls, in its substance, into two large divisions, namely, the Articles
(1–6) relating to railway concessions in Manchuria, and those (8–11) in
regard to the disposition of certain ports on the Chinese littoral.
Russia was allowed to extend the Siberian Railway to Vladivostok across
Manchuria _via_ Aigun, Tsitsihar, Petuna, Kirin, and Kun-chun (Art. 1).
As regards the projected Chinese railroad between Shan-hai-kwan and
Mukden, if China should find it inconvenient to build it, Russia might
furnish capital and construct the line, China reserving to herself the
option of buying it after ten years of Russian management (Art. 2).
Another Chinese line in contemplation between Shan-hai-kwan and Port
Arthur and Talien-wan _via_ Niu-chwang, and its appurtenances, should be
built in accordance with the general railway regulations of Russia (Art.
4). The fifth Article was striking: All the railways built by Russia in
the Chinese territory were to be protected by the local Chinese
authorities, but in the more remote regions, where the necessary
protection was not available, Russia was allowed, in order to afford a
better protection to her railroad and property, to station special
battalions of Russian infantry and cavalry. Regarding the ports, it was
agreed that Russia might lease Kiao-chau for fifteen years for the use
of her squadron, but, in order to avoid suspicion by other Powers, she
should not immediately occupy the harbor or seize the points commanding
it (Art. 9). In view of the strategic importance of Port Arthur and
Talien-wan and their adjacent territories, China should in haste provide
for their adequate defense and repair their fortification, and Russia
should render all necessary aid for the protection of the two harbors,
and should not allow any other Power to attack them; if, for urgent
necessity, Russia should engage in a war, China should allow her, to
enable her to attack the enemy and defend her own position with greater
ease, temporarily to concentrate her military and naval forces in those
harbors (Art. 10). So long, however, as Russia was not involved in
hostilities, China should retain all rights in the control of Port
Arthur and Talien-wan, and Russia should not interfere with them in any
manner (Art. 11). In addition to these Articles, it was provided that,
if China should desire to reorganize the entire army of Manchuria on the
European basis, she should engage the services of Russian military
instructors (Art. 8). In the matter of mining, Russian and Chinese
subjects might, with the consent of local authorities, work all kinds of
minerals in the Heilung and Kirin Provinces, and in the Long White
Mountains (Art. 7).
[Illustration:
COUNT CASSINI
_Russian Minister at Washington, and formerly at Peking_
]
Such are the contents, in brief, of the much debated “Cassini
Convention,” the existence of which has been as often alleged as denied.
The reported document may well be unauthentic, at any rate in several
important particulars. Its main interest consists, however, not so much
in the question of its literal authenticity, as in the important facts,
(1) that the subsequent course of events is largely foreshadowed in its
contents, and (2) that high Russian authorities have obtained, or at
least claimed, certain privileges which cannot be found in all the other
Russo-Chinese contracts that are known to us, but are in one way or
another reflected in the present convention. The universal belief in the
diplomatic world appears to be that, if the published text of the
Cassini Convention is untrustworthy, some of its substance must have
been contained in an agreement which Li Hung-chang signed in Russia in
1895, and in some later secret agreements. Nor is it impossible to
substantiate this belief from evidence of undoubted authenticity. Thus
M. Pavloff, the Russian _Chargé d’Affaires_ at Peking, said, on October
8, 1897, to Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Minister, that “shortly
after the return of Li Hung-chang from his mission to St. Petersburg,
the Chinese Government had informed the Russian Minister that they had
up intention of continuing the Northern line [beyond Shan-hai-kwan
toward Kirin], but if at any time they did continue it, owing to the
particularly friendly relations existing between the Russian and Chinese
Governments, they would in the first instance address themselves to
Russian engineers and employ, if necessary, Russian capital.”[155] It
will at once be observed that this closely corresponds to Article 3 of
the Cassini Convention. On this ground, M. Pavloff considered it a
“contravention of the agreement”[156] on the part of the Chinese
Government that the latter allowed British subjects, on June 7, 1898, to
furnish capital and the chief engineer for the extension of the Northern
line, and, repeatedly and in a manner highly irritating to the British
and Chinese Governments, demanded the replacement of Mr. Kinder and his
staff with Russian engineers.[157] It was again in the same spirit that
Russia succeeded in inducing England to insert in the additional clauses
of the Anglo-Russian railway agreement of April 28, 1899, a statement to
the effect that the Russians might extend the Manchurian Railway in a
southwesterly direction through the region traversed by the Northern
Chinese line built with British capital,[158] Count Muravieff explaining
that M. Witte attached importance to the insertion of this clause.[159]
Well he might, for no sooner was the Agreement concluded than Russia
pressed China, though without success, for the concession for a railway
reaching directly to Peking itself.[160] Again, if the provision in the
Cassini Convention that China should with all haste repair the
fortification of Port Arthur, with the assistance of Russia, and, in
case of necessity, turn it over to the use of the latter’s fleet (Art.
10), was false, it was not long before Count Muravieff could declare, in
December, 1897, that an “offer” had been made by the Chinese Government
to allow the Russian squadron to winter at the port.[161] More
significant still was M. Pavloff’s remark to Sir Claude MacDonald, that
“he must tell him frankly that the Russian Government intended that the
provinces of China bordering on the Russian frontier must not come under
the influence of any nation except Russia.”[162] Sir Claude pointed out
that Kirin, the probable terminus of the extension line, to which M.
Pavloff had objected, was more than two hundred miles from the Russian
frontier, but the _Chargé_ had evidently marked out the entire
Manchurian provinces as a Russian sphere of influence. It may be said
that this claim even exceeded the Cassini Convention and verged to the
less trustworthy treaty of alliance. The attention of the reader may,
however, be called to a still more direct evidence than the veiled
remarks of M. Pavloff. In the official statement accompanying the text
of the Russo-Chinese Convention of April 8, 1902, which was published in
the _Official Messenger_ of April 12, occur the following words: “The
Chinese Government, on their side, confirm all the obligations they have
previously undertaken toward Russia, and particularly the provisions of
_the 1896 agreement_, which must serve as a basis for the friendly
relations of the neighboring Empires. By this _defensive agreement_,
Russia undertook in 1896 to maintain the principle of the independence
and integrity of China, who, on her side, gave Russia the right to
construct a line through Manchuria, and to enjoy the material privileges
which are directly connected with the above undertaking.”[163] It is
impossible to find any one contract concluded in 1896 which either might
be considered a “defensive agreement” or contains the points enumerated
in the quoted passage. The so-called Cassini Convention alone contains
the provisions about the railway, as well as Articles 9 and 10, which
may be said to “maintain the principle of the independence and integrity
of China.”[164] The coincidence becomes even more striking when we
consider, together with the Convention, the reported treaty of defensive
alliance of 1896, which may be regarded, if any, the preliminary plan of
the Convention. It is also interesting to note that when Dr. George
Morrison, the noted Peking correspondent of the _Times_, had an
interview with Prince Ching on March 19, 1901, and directly referred to
the supposed existence of a series of secret agreements between Russia
and China, beginning with the one which Li Hung-chang negotiated during
his mission in St. Petersburg, the Prince “assented without the
slightest demur.”[165] Finally, we are in possession of a vague
statement made by Count Cassini himself, who, in 1904, referred to the
treaty “giving to Russia railroad and other concessions in Manchuria,”
which, said he, “I had the honor to negotiate [at Peking] in behalf of
my Sovereign.”[166] The agreement of September 8, 1896, to which we
shall presently turn, “giving railway and other concessions in
Manchuria,” was concluded between the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg
and the Russo-Chinese Bank, and, unless Count Cassini negotiated it at
Peking at the same time that the Chinese Minister did at the Russian
capital, it may be inferred that the former, in his quoted statement,
referred to a “Cassini Convention.” It is not at all impossible,
however, that both he in China and Mr. Hu in Russia took part in the
negotiations which resulted in the conclusion of the agreement of
September 8, 1896.
Taking all these indications together, it seems almost safe to aver that
at least two important items of concessions—namely, railway grants and
the use of some ports for strategic purposes—must in some form have been
secured by Russia after 1896, and before the actual lease of Port Arthur
and Talien-wan in 1898. It is needless to say that these two objects,
railways and ports, possessed a political meaning of the greatest
moment, the ports affording the Russian navy a commanding point on the
Pacific coast, and the railways ultimately connecting that point with
the army bases in Siberia and European Russia.
Of these two items, it was the railways that first emerged from the
state of a preliminary to that of a final agreement between Russia and
China. And it was here that the Russo-Chinese Bank played a great rôle
for the Russian Government, for the Agreement of August 27 (September
8), 1896,[167] providing for the construction by the Russians of a
railway through Manchuria connecting the Trans-Baikal and South Ussuri
lines of the Siberian railway system, was concluded between the Chinese
Minister at St. Petersburg and the Bank. The latter undertook to
organize the Eastern Chinese[168] Railway Company with its accounts
separate from those of the Bank (Art. 1). It is instructive to note that
it is stated in the preamble of this Agreement that the Chinese
Government “intrusted”[169] the Bank to undertake the construction of
the line, and that the government agreed to contribute 5,000,000 _taels_
toward the capital of the Company.[170] The Russian troops should be
transported by the railway without obstruction and at half-fare (Arts. 8
and 9). Upon the basis of this Agreement were promulgated by the
Government of the Czar Statutes[171] providing for the construction and
operation of the railway. Nothing can better betray than these two
documents, the Agreement and the Statutes, that the enterprise was only
in a very limited sense an undertaking of a private company. In the
first place, the capital of the Company was divided into share-capital
and bond-capital, the former, not guaranteed by the Russian Government,
being limited to only 5,000,000 rubles, while the latter, which was
officially guaranteed, could be indefinitely expanded according to
necessity.[172] It in fact had already before the present war swollen to
the enormous sum of over 270,000,000 rubles.[173] In the second place,
the operation of the railroad was placed upon the uniform basis of the
Siberian system, and under the management of a board whose nominal
president was a Chinese,[174] but whose vice-president, who was to
assume the actual direction, was under the supervision of the Minister
of Finance.[175] Finally, but not the least in importance, was the
provision regarding the protection of the railway and its employees and
the policing of the lands assigned to the road and its appurtenances.
The former duty was to be performed by the Chinese Government, but the
latter “was confined to police agents appointed by the Company. The
Company shall for this purpose draw up and establish police
regulations.”[176] In these police agents, ostensibly to be employed by
the Company, one may discern the origin of the famous “railway guards,”
later called the “frontier guards,” whose existence has become an
important problem since 1902 in connection with the Russian evacuation
of Manchuria. It should also be noted that this provision concerning the
police agents does not appear in the corresponding Article in the text
of the Agreement between China and the Bank, upon which the Statutes
were based, so that one is at a loss to know what was the conventional
ground for this Russian law, unless, indeed, it was the so-called
Cassini Convention, which was alleged to have provided for the
organization of Russian infantry and cavalry battalions in order to
protect Russian interests in the more remote parts of Manchuria.
It was agreed that the line should, after eighty years, come under the
possession of the Chinese Government, which might also buy up the road
and its appurtenances after thirty-six years.[177] It is interesting to
see that it also provided that during the eighty years of Russian
management, all commodities carried between China and Russia by the
railway should pay in China duties one third less than the ordinary
import and export duties in that Empire,[178] a provision hardly
reconcilable with the open door principle, and explicitly contrary to
the principles proposed by the United States to the Powers two years
later.[179]
The Eastern Chinese Railway Company was organized in February, 1897, and
the first sod of the Manchuria Railway was cut with great ceremony on
the eastern frontier of the Kirin Province on August 28, 1897.
To some this railway concession may have appeared at first to have been
intended merely to reduce the time and expense of completing the eastern
section of the Siberian Railway by allowing it to pass across Manchuria
through a route shorter and easier than the one along the Amur and
Ussuri rivers. Such a belief was, however, soon dispelled, or rather,
modified, by the acquisition by Russia of the lease of the greatest
naval harbor in the Yellow Sea, and, simultaneously, of the right to
join this naval basis by a new railway with the main Manchurian line, so
as to make complete the connection between Port Arthur and the army
centres in Siberia and Russia. The Russian lease of this port was,
however, preceded by and modeled after the German lease of Kiao-chau,
which should therefore receive our brief attention first.
-----
Footnote 144:
See Henri Cordier, _Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les
puissances occidentales_, 1860–1902 (3 vols.), vol. iii (Paris, 1902),
pp. 305–306. The loan contract, dated June 24, 1895, appears in
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 660–667.
Footnote 145:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 667–668.
Footnote 146:
Cf. Art. 15 of the contract.
Footnote 147:
The other half, £16,000,000, was supplied by some British and German
subjects by the contract of March 11, 1896, at 5% interest, and
repayable in thirty-six years. Another £16,000,000 loan was later
supplied by the same parties.—_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 668–673.
Footnote 148:
5,000,000 _taels_ were, however, as will be seen below, used for
another purpose.
Footnote 149:
The contract dated August 25, 1896.—_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 640–641.
Footnote 150:
According to a Peking correspondent to the _Kokumin_ (May 30, 1904),
the Chinese Government had been paying the stipulated 4% interest for
this sum to the French creditors, but the Bank had never repaid the
interest to China. Moreover, the Niu-chwang branch of the Bank, since
the Russians occupied the port in August, 1900, had been receiving the
returns of the Chinese maritime customs there, which finally amounted
to about 5,000,000 _taels_. Neither the principal nor the interest of
this sum had been paid by the Bank to the Chinese Government.
Footnote 151:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 642–660.
Footnote 152:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 231.
Footnote 153:
The Japanese text appears in _ibid._, pp. 231–234.
Footnote 154:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 234–236. A French translation is found in
Cordier, _Histoire_, vol. iii. pp. 343–347.
Footnote 155:
_The British Parliamentary Papers, China, No. 1 (1898)_, Dispatch No.
14, pp. 5–6. Cf. _China, No. 2 (1899)_, No. 2, in which M. Pavloff
claims to have secured in December, 1897, a repetition of this pledge.
Footnote 156:
See _China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 28–29, modified Article 12. Sir Ernest
Satow, however, denied that any such agreement existed. See _China,
No. 2 (1904)_, No. 30, March 19, 1901.
Footnote 157:
See _China, No. 1 (1898)_, Nos. 13, 38, 26, 43, 111, 113, 115, 117,
121; _China, No. 2 (1899)_, Nos. 2, 9, 10, 52, 65; _China, No. 1
(1900)_, No. 321.
Footnote 158:
_China, No. 2 (1899)_, No. 138.
Footnote 159:
_China, No. 1 (1900)_, No. 148.
Footnote 160:
_Ibid._, pp. 112, 116, 120, 132, 160, 180, 214–215.
Footnote 161:
_China, No. 1 (1898)_, Dispatch No. 37, pp. 12–13, Goschen to
Salisbury.
Footnote 162:
_China, No. 1 (1896)_, p. 6, Conversation on October 18, 1897.
Footnote 163:
See _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 274–275.
Footnote 164:
See _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 274–275.
Footnote 165:
The _Times_, March 20, 1901, p. 5. This evidence, however, cannot for
a moment be considered equivalent to the others which have been cited.
Not only is it silent about the contents of the agreements, but also
the “assent” of the Prince may be due to some misunderstanding. In the
same article, Dr. Morrison goes on to say: “I have reason to believe
that the original Russian draft promised China protection only against
Japan, but was modified at the request of the Chinese to include
protection against aggression by all foreign Powers. China invoked its
provisions after Germany seized Kiao-chau, but Russia turned a deaf
ear.” This statement is again as vague as the reported text of the
treaty of alliance of 1896. It is to be regretted that the writer did
not explicitly state his “reason.”
Footnote 166:
The _North American Review_ for May, 1904, p. 683.
Footnote 167:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 495–498 (a Japanese translation). The present
writer is also in possession of the Chinese text. He is not aware that
its European translation has ever been published. Its contents are
found in Alexander Hosie, _Manchuria_, pp. 43–44.
Footnote 168:
The Manchurian provinces are called “the Chinese Eastern Three
Provinces,” and hence the name of this railway and of the Company. It
is essential to keep this line in mind apart from the Chinese Northern
railway system referred to on pages 156–157.
Footnote 169:
“Of her own volition,” as Cassini added. See the _North American
Review_ for May, 1904, p. 683.
Footnote 170:
According to Art. 12, these 5,000,000 _taels_ were to be returned to
the Chinese Government as soon as the line was in running order. It
will be remembered that the government was responsible for the
contribution of an equal amount of money to the capital of the
Russo-Chinese Bank. It is probable that the money has been transferred
from the Company to the Bank, so as to make it pay two bills, the one
after the other. It has already been reported that the money was
originally paid out of the Russo-French loan of 1895. If this report
is true, the whole arrangement may be characterized as extremely
clever on the part of Russia. Cf. p. 84, note 4, above.
Footnote 171:
Confirmed by the Czar on December 4/16, presented to the Ruling Senate
on December 8/20, and finally published in the _Bulletins des Lois_ on
December 11/23, 1896. See an English translation of their text in the
_British Parliamentary Papers, Russia, No. 1 (1898)_, and _China, No.
1 (1900)_, pp. 57–61; a Japanese translation in _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp.
495–500. At the further extension of the railway by the agreement of
March 27, 1898, supplementary statutes were promulgated on February 5,
1899. See _ibid._, pp. 516–520.
Footnote 172:
Articles 10–16.
Footnote 173:
Page 32, above.
Footnote 174:
The Chinese Minister to St. Petersburg at that time was appointed the
first president.
Footnote 175:
Articles 18–27; Agreement, Article 1.
Footnote 176:
Article 8. Compare Art. 5 of the Agreement, which contains merely the
former part of this arrangement, i. e., the protection of the railway
and its appurtenances by the Chinese Government.
Footnote 177:
The Agreement, Art. 12; the Statutes, Art. 2.
Footnote 178:
The Agreement, Art. 10; the Statutes, Art. 3.
Footnote 179:
See p. 150, note 1, below.