KIAO-CHAU
Kiao-chau, in the Province of Shan-tung, was, as will be remembered, a
port marked in the so-called Cassini Convention for the use of the
Russian squadron. Its value as a commercial and strategical _point
d’appui_, as well as the greatness of the mineral wealth of Shan-tung,
must have been as well known to the Germans as to the Russians.[180] How
it happened that Russia forsook this important position, or, more
accurately, how Germany succeeded in securing its lease without a
protest from Russia, still remains to be explained. It is known,
however, that the offers which had been made by China, perhaps in
recognition of Germany’s service in the Liao-tung affair,[181] of a
docking and coaling station on the southern coast, had been declined by
Germany;[182] and also that Germany’s own attempts to secure a point on
the Lappa Island near Amoy, and later in Amoy itself, had never
materialized. As to Kiao-chau; the desire of Germany for its possession
had henceforth been often observed by the Chinese Minister at
Berlin,[183] but, for the realization of the desire, either the time was
not ripe, or the susceptibilities of Russia had to be considered. Toward
the latter half of 1897, however, the German Government seemed to have
concluded that a general partition of China was now a likelihood, for
which emergency Germany should prepare herself by obtaining a powerful
foothold on the littoral. Observe the following statement made, in a
retroactive manner, after the lease of Kiao-chau had been acquired, by
Herr von Bülow in the Reichstag, on April 27, 1898: “Mention has been
made of the partition of China. Such a partition will not be brought
about by us, at any rate. All we have done is to provide that, come what
may, we ourselves shall not go empty-handed. The traveller cannot decide
when the train is to start, but he can make sure not to miss it when it
does start. The devil takes the hindmost.... In any case, we have
secured in Kiao-chau a strategical and political position which assures
us a decisive influence in the future of the Far East. From this strong
position we can look on with complacency on the development of affairs.
We have such a large sphere of action and such important tasks before us
that we have no occasion to grudge other nations the concessions made
them. German diplomacy will pursue its path in the East as everywhere
else—calmly, firmly, and peacefully. We will never play the part of
mischief-maker; nor will we play that of Cinderella.”[184] Before this
glorious consummation was reached, Germany must have, it is presumed,
made diplomatic efforts to conciliate Russia, and it is in this
connection that it is alleged by some that the two Powers then matured
between themselves a compromise whereby Germany should not be molested
in her possible attempt to seize Kiao-chau at the first opportunity, and
Russia, in her turn, should be free to follow the precedent and demand
of China a lease of Port Arthur.[185]
However that may be, an opportunity for Germany’s action came when, as
is well known, two German Catholic priests were murdered by a mob in the
Kü-ye District, in Shan-tung, on November 1, 1897. The late Provincial
Governor, Li Ping-hing, who had recently been transferred to Sz-chwan,
was suspected of having instigated the crime. The Peking Government at
once ordered a strict search for the culprits, and in three weeks the
local authorities succeeded in arresting four of the guilty
persons.[186] It was too late. Three German men-of-war had arrived at
Kiao-chau, about November 17, to be joined later by several others, and
landed 600 marines, who seized the Chinese barracks of the port.[187] As
the Tsung-li Yamên had received no previous communication from the
German authorities regarding the demonstration, it “could only surmise
that Kiao-chau had been seized on account of the murder of the German
missionaries.”[188] The German Minister at Peking, Baron von Heyking,
then presented six demands, including the punishment of the late
Governor Li, an indemnity for the murdered, and the preference for
German capital and engineers in the future railway and mining
enterprises in the Province of Shan-tung—the desire for the lease of
Kiao-chau being still veiled,—and these demands were, with some
modifications, accepted by China. At this time, however, Prince Henry of
Germany, whom the Kaiser had bade farewell at Kiel in his celebrated
“mailed fist” speech, was on his way to China with his squadron. As soon
as he arrived, Baron von Heyking presented the long concealed demand for
a lease of the bay and the surrounding promontories of Kiao-chau. In the
face of the strong position and forces commanded by Germany, China had
no choice but to yield.[189] When she was finally, on March 6, 1898,
prevailed upon to sign the Agreement with Germany, the Government of the
latter declined to publish anything but its first section containing the
use and lease of Kiao-chau,[190] and the contents of its other two
sections concerning the railway and mining privileges granted to
Germany[191] in the Shan-tung Province, as well as a separate agreement
concerning the direct reparation for the crime of Kü-ye, have not, so
far as is known, been officially given to the world from Berlin.[192]
The act of Germany was a _débâcle_, and in the concessions she wrested
from China were involved questions of grave importance and
far-reaching consequences. In the first place, was not the lease of a
commanding port in reality an infringement of the territorial
sovereignty of the Chinese Empire? In the second place, how could the
preference given to Germany in the future railway and mining
operations in one of the richest of the eighteen Provinces be
reconciled with the principle of the equal opportunity for the
economic enterprise of all nations in China? If the action of Germany
could be, as it soon seemed to be, used by other Powers as a
precedent, would not the consequences for the cause, to say the least,
of the fair treatment and mutual harmony in China of the nations among
themselves be disastrous? It is interesting to observe the attitude
taken toward this incident by Great Britain, the Power which possessed
the greatest interest in insisting upon, as well as strongest power to
enforce, the two cardinal principles of the world’s diplomacy in
China, namely, the territorial sovereignty of the Chinese Empire and
the equality therein of economic opportunity for all nations. Official
dispatches of the day clearly indicate that, on the one hand, Germany
made efforts to allay the susceptibilities of Great Britain, and that,
on the other, the British remonstrances were not only so mollified as
to be ineffective, but were also turned in such a direction as only to
add to the dangers of the situation. Let us observe how this was done.
It was repeatedly declared, during the negotiations between Germany
and China, by the German Representatives at Peking and London and by
Herr von Bülow himself, that the northern port of Kiao-chau had been
chosen for its remoteness, for one thing, from the regions in which
England was directly interested; that nothing was being done during
the negotiations with China which would be embarrassing to Great
Britain; that Germany was raising no objections to the British terms
of the Anglo-German loan to China now under consideration; that the
management of the new colony would be found to be liberal, for the
German Government was convinced that the British system of
colonization was the right one; and that the Kaiser and his Government
were strong partisans of a good understanding between Germany and
England.[193] Beside these assurances from Germany, it is interesting
to note that, on December 1, 1897, Sir Claude MacDonald wrote from
Peking to the Marquess of Salisbury: “If the German occupation of
Kiao-chau is only used as a leverage for obtaining satisfactory
reparation ... for the murder of the German missionaries, the effect
on the security of our own people will be of the best. If, on the
other hand, the German object is to secure Kiao-chau as a naval
station, under cover of their demands for reparation, it is by no
means clear that their acquisition of it will prejudice our
interests.”[194] Whether or not this idea was indorsed by the British
Government, Sir Frank C. Lascelles, the Representative at Berlin, said
to Herr von Bülow, on December 30, “That, so far as he knew, Her
Majesty’s Government had raised no objection to the German ships going
to Kaio-chau. Should, however, a demand be put forward for exclusive
privileges, or should other countries seek to take possession of
Chinese ports, it would probably become necessary for Her Majesty’s
Government to take steps for the protection of her vast interests in
China.”[195] In this last sentence is seen a curse of China’s foreign
relations, that is, the idea of the balance of power—a balance between
foreign nations on her ground and at her expense. An offending Power
would not retrace its steps, and another Power would virtually
recognize them by itself demanding counterbalancing rights from China,
which might expect other Powers also to follow suit with little regard
to her primary rights of sovereignty. Germany could scarcely have felt
the force of the British protest which was, indeed, rather directed to
China than to Germany. The latter secured what she asked, and made
Kiao-chau as free a port as her treaty-tariff system would allow;[196]
but German claims to the sole right of railroad and mining concessions
in the province were speedily emphasized by the organization of the
_Schan-tung Eisenbahngesellschaft_, with a capital of fifty-four
million marks, and also of the _Deutsche Bergbaugesellschaft_.[197]
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Footnote 180:
Herr von Richthofen, now the Foreign Minister of Germany, and the
greatest authority on Chinese geology, wrote an article in the
_Kolonialzeitung_ of January 6, 1898, describing the mineral resources
of the province, and concluding that the Power which possessed
Kiao-chau would control the coal supply in northern Chinese waters.
See _China, No. 1 (1898)_, p. 21. The same authority had shown years
ago the advantageous position of Kiao-chau.
It will also be remembered that during the Chinese-Japanese war,
war-vessels of several Powers were temporarily anchored here, so that
the superb position of the port was familiar to every one.
Footnote 181:
“Considering that there has never been any disagreement existing
between China and Germany, and that the German Government came to the
assistance of China in securing the evacuation of the Liao-tung
Peninsula by the Japanese for which she has never been recompensed;
and further, as England, France, and Russia have taken maritime ports
in the East, and as Germany has no port as a rendezvous for her
vessels and for a coaling station, her position is not equal to the
other great Powers.”—The Tsung-li Yamên’s memorial to the Throne,
translated in Mr. Denby’s dispatch of March 9, 1898 (U. S. 55th
Congress, 3d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i, p. 189). The same
sentiment may have prompted the Tsung-li Yamên to make the offers
stated in the text.
Footnote 182:
_China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 25.
Footnote 183:
U. S. 55th Congress, 3d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. p. 189.
Footnote 184:
_China, No. 1 (1899)_, p. 67.
Footnote 185:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 355.
Footnote 186:
_China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 3.
Footnote 187:
_Ibid._
Footnote 188:
_Ibid._, No. 2. Cf. _House Documents_, op. cit., pp. 187–189, a
memorial of the Yamên to the Throne.
Footnote 189:
The lease was later fixed for ninety-nine years. The leased territory
covers about 540 square kilometres (208.4 square miles), including
about 80,000 inhabitants.
Footnote 190:
_Das Staatsarchiv_, Band 61, No. 11518.
Footnote 191:
Meyers, pp. 281–282; _China, No. 1 (1899)_, No. 65; _Tokushu Jōyaku_,
pp. 359–360, 363–365.
Footnote 192:
For the extraordinary proceedings of the German Minister in his
dealings with the Chinese Government, see _China, No. 1 (1898)_, Nos.
5, 6, 17, 20, 34, 35, 40, 53, 70, 73, and 113. Also see _Tokushu
Jōyaku_, pp. 355–357.
Footnote 193:
See _China, No. 1 (1898)_, Nos. 39, 49, 74. It is interesting to
observe that when, in order to restore the balance of power in the
Gulf of Pechili, which had been disturbed by the lease of Port Arthur
by Russia, England demanded the lease of Wei-hai-Wei, she took pains
to explain to Germany that her acquisition of the port, the meaning of
which was purely military, would in no way interfere with the German
interests in Shan-tung, and that there would be no attempt to make
railway connections with Wei-hai-Wei. An interesting diplomatic
correspondence followed this explanation, which it is hardly necessary
to describe. What is emphasized here is that England, in negotiating
the lease of Wei-hai-Wei, largely reciprocated the cordiality Germany
had shown in her occupation of Kiao-chau. See _China, No. 1 (1899)_,
Nos. 2, 8, 9, 10, and 31.
Footnote 194:
_China, No. 1 (1898)_, p. 20.
Footnote 195:
_Ibid._, p. 14, No. 39. Sir Claude MacDonald had already written to
the Tsung-li Yamên, on December 10: “I have the honor to inform your
Highnesses and your Excellencies that I have received telegraphic
instructions from Her Majesty’s Government to address the Yamên with
regard to the concession in Shan-tung which it is reported that the
German Government has asked from China. I am directed to state that
Her Majesty’s Government will demand equality of treatment for British
subjects according to the treaty rights possessed by Great Britain,
and that Her Majesty’s Government will require compensation on any
points in respect to which those rights may be disregarded.”—_Ibid._,
p. 28, inclosure in No. 70.
Footnote 196:
See _China, No. 1 (1899)_, p. 240, No. 322; _China, No. 1 (1900)_, pp.
12–13, 35, 146–147, 106, 233, and 241–244.
Footnote 197:
It is unnecessary to recount the painful negotiations in 1898–9
concerning the Tien-tsin-Ching-kiang railway concession, in which the
German claim in Shan-tung was strongly presented, and had to be
recognized to a large extent by the British Government. See _China,
No. 1 (1900)_, pp. 14, 16, 17–18, 33, 118, 121, 175, 180.