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[Illustration:
MAP SHOWING “THE REGIONS WHERE THE INTERESTS OF THE TWO POWERS MEET”
]
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFLICT
ITS CAUSES AND ISSUES
BY
K. ASAKAWA, PH. D.
_Lecturer on the Civilization and History of East Asia at Dartmouth
College; author of the “Early Institutional Life of Japan,” etc._
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
FREDERICK WELLS WILLIAMS
_Assistant Professor of Modern Oriental History in Yale University_
_ILLUSTRATED_
[Illustration: The Riverside Press]
BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY
The Riverside Press, Cambridge
1904
COPYRIGHT, 1904, BY HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN & CO.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
_Published November, 1904_
------------------------------------------------------------------------
INTRODUCTION
The issues of the conflict that forms the topic of this little volume
are bound inevitably to influence the future of the civilized world for
many years. Dr. Asakawa presents them with a logical thoroughness that
reminds us of the military operations of his countrymen now in evidence
elsewhere, and recalls very pleasantly to my own mind the sane and
accurate character of his scholastic work while a student at Yale. It is
the sort of presentation which a great subject needs. It is content with
a simple statement of fact and inference. It is convincing because of
its brevity and restraint.
The generous and almost passionate sympathy of our countrymen for Japan
in this crisis of her career has aroused some speculation and surprise
even amongst ourselves. The emotion is, doubtless, the outcome of
complex causes, but this much is obvious at present: the past
half-century has brought both America and Japan through experiences
strikingly similar, and their establishment at the same moment as new
world Powers has afforded both the same view of their older competitors
for first rank among nations. Both have earned their centralized and
effective governments after the throes of civil war; both have built
navies and expanded their foreign commerce; both have arrested the
belated and rather contemptuous attention of Europe by success in
foreign wars. No state of Christendom can appreciate so well as America
the vexation of enduring for generations the presumption or the
patronage of those European courts who have themselves been free for
less than a century from the bonds that Napoleon put upon the entire
Continental group; and Japan has suffered under the same observance.
With the acknowledgment of the existence of these two Powers of the
first class on either shore of the Pacific, the bottom drops out of that
system whereon was based the diplomacy of nineteenth-century Europe, and
the jealousy with which they are both regarded establishes a certain
_rapprochement_ between the two newly arrived nations.
The attitude of the American people does not appear to me to be greatly
influenced by prejudice against Russia. It is likely, indeed, that we
had less to fear directly from the ambition of the Great Colossus than
any other state. Yet we have been among the first to discern that Japan
is doing the world’s work if, by reducing the pressure of Russia’s
assault upon Eastern Asia, she removes China in the crisis of her
awakening from the list of those derelict states whose present
decrepitude offers such deplorable temptation to the military nations of
the West. There would seem to be fresh need, moreover, of convincing
modern statesmen that a policy of conducting diplomatic intercourse by
means of tergiversation and lies is unprofitable in the long run, and
therefore unjustified by the most cynical school of political ethics.
Without debating the righteousness of her pretensions, it is obvious
that Russia cannot proceed further in her headway without materially
affecting the legitimate ambitions of other peoples of proved vitality,
nor can her characteristic diplomacy secure success without debauching
the political morality of Christendom. While apprehension of Russian
aims need not involve dislike of the Russian people, we have an abiding
idea in this country that both alike lie under a necessity of
chastisement, and that Japan, as the only nation now really at home on
the Pacific, is the hand to hold the rod.
In conclusion—if I may be allowed to extend these reflections a little
further—the situation before us suggests the possibility that Asia may
at this moment be passing the threshold of a renascence similar to that
which awakened Europe at the opening of the sixteenth century from the
lethargy of her dark ages. As the able editor of the _North China
Herald_ has observed, native Asia from Korea to Siam is to-day no more
deeply immersed in the mire of poverty, ignorance, and superstition than
was Europe in the Middle Ages, nor was the task of relief and
enlightenment less hopeless to human agencies then than now. Yet with
the Age of Discoveries came not only new worlds and new paths of
commerce, but the end of the tyrannies of scholasticism, the church, and
the despot. Within a century were laid all the foundations of these
political and intellectual institutions that distinguish Europe and her
children to-day. A like reconstruction may be effected in Asia during
the century just begun. The parallel is not altogether inadmissible, and
it may be pushed even further. For as the newly awakened Europe of the
sixteenth century developed one monster Power whose aggrandizement
threatened the liberties of all the rest, so has the present era brought
forth a monster fearful in the same fashion to Asia. It was England, a
naval folk and a new Power, that struck at Spain three centuries ago,
and by that brave adventure not only won wealth and prestige for
herself, but rid Europe of a great menace. It is Japan, also a naval
race and a new—so far as Continental history is concerned—that strikes
at Russia and hopes by her success both to avert the undoing of the
ancient states about her and to establish herself as mistress in her own
waters. Confident in their understanding of their great mission, we of
America may rightfully bid the dazed Asiatic seek his salvation from the
children of the Rising Sun, and declare in the Sibylline utterance of
the Psalmist, “The dew of thy birth is of the womb of the morning.”
FREDERICK WELLS WILLIAMS.
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT,
November, 1904.
PREFACE
This is an attempt to present in a verifiable form some of the issues
and the historical causes of the war now waged between Russia and Japan.
Powerfully as it appeals to me, I would not have discussed a subject so
strange to the proper sphere of my investigation, had it not been for
the fact that no one else has, so far as I am aware, undertaken the task
in the same spirit in which I have endeavored to write these pages.
Although I deeply regret that I do not read the Russian language and
cannot do full justice to the Russian side of the question, the
impartial reader will observe, I trust, that this work is neither a plea
for the one side nor a condemnation of the other, but a mere exposition
of the subject-matter as I comprehend it. When the author offers what he
considers a natural explanation of a question, the reader should not
read into it a moral judgment. Indeed, I earnestly wish that the kind
reader would thrash out of these pages every grain of real prejudice.
Nor can I welcome a greater favor from any person than a more complete
and just statement of Russia’s case than I have been able to make. After
having said so much, it is unnecessary to tell the reader how, when the
substance of the introductory chapter to this volume was published last
May in the _Yale Review_, some of its critics ascribed to the writer
motives utterly foreign to himself. One of those alleged motives was
that I had sought to prove that the American trading interest in
Manchuria and Korea would be better served by a final victory of Japan
than by that of Russia. I neither proved nor disproved such a theme, but
I did state that Japan’s interest demanded the maintenance in those
regions of the principle of the impartial opportunity for all nations.
Whether the result of this policy would prove better or worse for the
interest of any one nation than the effect of an exclusive policy, did
not concern me. It did not and does not belong to me to appeal to the
commercial instinct of the reader, or even to his sympathy with, or
antipathy to, either of the present belligerents. My only plea is that
for truth.
The substance of the introductory chapter, as has been said, and also a
brief summary of the body of the volume have been published in the _Yale
Review_ for May and August of the present year. I am greatly indebted to
the editors of the _Review_ for allowing me to use the material in the
preparation of this work. I also wish to express my sincere thanks to my
friends who have encouraged me in the publication of this volume.
ASAKAWA.
HANOVER, NEW HAMPSHIRE,
August 30, 1904.
CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTORY 1
Economic issues: (1) Japan’s side; transition from an
agricultural to an industrial stage, pp. 1–10; community of
interest between Japan and Korea and Manchuria, 10–32. (2)
Russia’s side, 32–47; comparison, 47–48; political issues,
48–51; summary, 51–53; conclusion, 53–61.
Supplementary Note 61
CHAPTER I. Retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula 65
Primorsk and Sakhalien, 65–67; intervention of 1895, 68–77;
its historical significance, 77–78; its effects on Japan,
78–82.
CHAPTER II. The “Cassini Convention” and the Railway Agreement 83
The Russo-French loan and the Russo-Chinese Bank, 83–85; the
agreement of alliance, 85–87; the “Cassini Convention,”
87–95; the railway agreement of September 8, and statutes of
December 23, 1896, 95–100.
CHAPTER III. Kiao-chau 101
The seizure of Kiao-chau, and the Agreement of March 6, 1898,
101–105; the conduct of Great Britain, 106–109.
CHAPTER IV. Port Arthur and Talien-wan 110
Russian warships at Port Arthur, 111–112; British demand for
the opening of Talien-wan, 113–118; Port Arthur and
Talien-wan, the British and Russian Governments, 118–125;
Wei-hai-Wei, 125–129; the Agreement of March 27, 1898, and
supplementary agreements, 129–132; the administration of the
leased territory, and Dalny, 132–134.
CHAPTER V. Secretary Hay’s Circular Note 135
The circular of September, 1899, 135; the Powers’ replies,
136–138.
CHAPTER VI. The Occupation of Manchuria 139
Russia’s attitude toward the Boxer trouble in North China,
139–143; the Manchurian campaign, 143–146.
CHAPTER VII. North China and Manchuria 147
Characteristics of Russia’s diplomacy regarding Manchuria,
147–148; the distinction made between North China and
Manchuria; the circular note of August 25, 1900, 148–155.
CHAPTER VIII. The Anglo-German Agreement 156
The Northern Railway affair, 156–157; the Anglo-German
Agreement of October 16, 1900, 157–158; the Powers’ views,
158–160; Germany’s view, 160–161.
CHAPTER IX. A _Modus Vivendi_: the Alexieff-Tsêng Agreement 162
Peace negotiations at Peking, and Russia’s Manchurian policy,
162–165; the Alexieff-Tsêng Agreement of November, 1900,
165–168; the protests of the Powers, 168–169; Count
Lamsdorff’s explanation, 169–172.
CHAPTER X. A “Starting-Point”—the Lamsdorff-Yang-yu Convention 173
The Lamsdorff-Yang-yu Convention, 173–176; China’s appeal,
and the Powers’ protests, 176–178; Russia detached herself
from the allies, 178–181; the amendments of March, 1901,
181–182; the British and Japanese remonstrances, and
withdrawal of Russian demands, 182–188.
CHAPTER XI. Further Demands 189
M. Lessar’s demands in August, 189–190; in October, 190–193;
protests, replies, and delays, 193–196.
CHAPTER XII. The Anglo-Japanese Agreement and the Russo-French
Declaration 197
A growing sympathy between Great Britain and Japan prior to
the conclusion of the agreement, 197, 198; diplomatic steps
toward the conclusion, 199–202; the Agreement of January 30,
1902, 202–209; the Russo-French declaration of March 16,
209–213.
CHAPTER XIII. The Convention of Evacuation 214
The Russo-Chinese convention of April 8, 1902, 214–226; an
analysis of the document, 226–232.
CHAPTER XIV. The Evacuation 233
The first evacuation, October 8, 1902, 233; the nominal
character of the evacuation, 234–237; Niu-chwang, 237–238.
CHAPTER XV. Demands in Seven Articles 239
The second evacuation, 239–241; new Russian demands, April 5,
1903, 241–244; the opposition of three Powers to the demands,
244–246; Count Lamsdorff’s disclaimer, 246–248; Count
Cassini’s statement, 248–251; diplomacy at Peking, 251–256.
CHAPTER XVI. Diplomatic Struggle in Korea, I 257
Japan’s failure and Russia’s success at Seul, the murder of
the Queen, 257–261; the flight of the King, 262–263; the
Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol, June 6, and the Komura-Waeber
Memorandum, May 14, 1896, 263–268; a decline of Russian
influence, 268–271; the Nishi-Rosen Protocol, April 25, 1898,
271–272.
CHAPTER XVII. Diplomatic Struggle in Korea, II 273
Pavloff and Hayashi, 273; the Masampo affair, 274–278;
abortive loans, 278–280; Russians and pro-Russian Koreans at
Seul, 280; the bank-note trouble, 281–282; the Keyserling
whaling concession, 282–283; the Tumên River telegraph lines,
283–285; the Seul-Wiju Railway, 285–289; the Yong-am-po
affair, 289–295.
CHAPTER XVIII. The Russo-Japanese Negotiations, I 296
Japan’s invitation to negotiate, July 28, 1903, 296–299;
Russia’s assent, 299; political changes in Russia, and the
Viceroy of the Far East, 299–302; Japan’s first proposals,
August 12, 302–307; negotiations transferred to Tokio,
307–308; Russia’s first counter-proposals, October 3,
308–311; Russian diplomacy at Peking, 311–318; the
development of the Yong-am-po affair, 318–323.
CHAPTER XIX. The Russo-Japanese Negotiations, II 324
Japan’s second proposals, October 30, 324–328; Russia’s
second counter-proposals, December 11, 328–329; Japan’s third
proposals, December 23, 329–331; pacific declarations of
Russia, 331–332; Russia’s third counter-proposals, January 6,
1904, 332–335; new ports opened in Manchuria, 335; Japan’s
fourth proposals, January 13, 335–339; military activity of
the Russians, 339–341; the termination of the negotiations
and the rupture of diplomatic relations, February 5–6,
341–344; the first acts of war, 345; the Russian Manifesto
and the Japanese Declaration of War, January 10, 345–348.
Supplementary Note to Chapter XIX 348
The Russian _communiqué_, February 18, 348–349; the Russian
statement of February 20, 349–351; Japan’s reply to the
above, March 3, 352–354; the Russian note to the Powers
regarding Korean neutrality, February 22, 355–356; Japan’s
reply, March 9, 357–360; Russia’s counter-reply, March 12,
360–362.
CHAPTER XX. Chinese Neutrality and Korean Integrity 363
Japan’s advice to China to be neutral, 363, 364; Secretary
Hay’s note, 364–365; China’s own declaration, 365; Japan’s
pledge to China, 366; the Korean-Japanese alliance, 366–368;
its nature analyzed, 368–372.
INDEX 373
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
PAGE
MAP SHOWING “THE REGIONS WHERE THE INTERESTS OF THE TWO
POWERS MEET” _Frontispiece_
COUNT CASSINI, RUSSIAN MINISTER AT WASHINGTON, AND
FORMERLY AT PEKING 90
COUNT LAMSDORFF, RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER 146
LI HUNG-CHANG 193
COUNT KATSURA, PREMIER OF JAPAN 202
M. LESSAR, RUSSIAN MINISTER AT PEKING 255
M. PAVLOFF, LATE RUSSIAN MINISTER AT SEUL 276
Copyright, 1902, by George Grantham Bain
BARON KOMURA, JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER 296
ADMIRAL ALEXIEFF, VICEROY OF THE FAR EAST 303
MR. KURINO, LATE JAPANESE MINISTER AT ST. PETERSBURG 331
BARON DE ROSEN, LATE RUSSIAN MINISTER AT TOKIO 347
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFLICT
INTRODUCTORY
SOME OF THE ISSUES OF THE CONFLICT
The deeper significance of the present dramatic struggle between Russia
and Japan over territories belonging to neither of the contestants
cannot perhaps be understood, until we examine some of the issues at
stake between them. The more fundamental of these issues, however, as in
many another international crisis, seem to be oftener understood than
expressed, and hence understood only vaguely, although it may fairly be
said that they constitute the very forces which have with irresistible
certainty brought the belligerents into collision. For Japan, the issues
appear to be only partly political, but mainly economical; and perhaps
no better clue to the understanding, not only of the present situation,
but also, in general, of the activities at home and abroad of the
Japanese people, could be found than in the study of these profound
material interests.
Among the most remarkable tendencies of Japan’s economic life of recent
years has been the enormous increase of her population, along with an
immense growth of her trade and industries. The number of her
inhabitants increased from 27,200,000, as estimated in 1828, to only
34,000,000 in 1875, but since that year it has risen so fast that it is
to-day 46,305,000[1]—exclusive of the 3,082,404[1] in Formosa and the
Pescadores—and is increasing now at the annual rate of nearly 600,000.
At the same time, the foreign trade of Japan has grown from 49,742,831
_yen_ in 1873 to 606,637,959 _yen_ in 1903. Up to the end of May, 1904,
the total amount showed 274,012,437 _yen_, as compared with the
248,506,103 _yen_ of the same period of 1903.[2] The significance of
these figures must be seen in the light of the important fact that the
bulk of the increase in population and trade has been due to the
decisive change of the economic life of the nation from an agricultural
to an industrial stage. The new population seems to increase far more
rapidly in the urban than in the rural districts, for if we consider as
urban the inhabitants of communities containing each more than three
thousand people, the ratio of the urban population to the rural may be
estimated as 1 to 3. If only towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants each
are included in the urban class, it is seen that their population
increases annually 5 or 6 per cent., while the corresponding rate with
the rural communities never rises above 3 per cent. and is usually much
lower.[3] This comparatively rapid growth of the cities also indicates
that the new population must be mainly supported by commerce and
manufacture.
In 1903, 84.6 per cent. of the total export trade of Japan consisted of
either wholly or partly manufactured articles.[4] On the other hand,
agriculture has progressed only slowly,[5] and is no longer able either
to support the increased population or to produce enough raw articles
for the manufactures. The average annual crop of rice may be put at 210
million bushels, and that of barley, rye, and wheat, collectively called
_mugi_, at 94.3 million bushels, while the average annual consumption of
these cereals may safely be estimated, respectively, at 228.3 and 106.7
million bushels. In years of poor crops, the importation of rice, wheat,
and flour amounts to large figures; as, for instance, in 1903, they
together were imported to the value of about 67 million _yen_.[6] Raw
material and food-stuffs, consisting of cotton, wool, rice, flour and
starch, beans and oil-cakes, the importation of all of which was next to
nothing twenty years ago, were in 1903 supplied from abroad to the value
of 169,600,000 _yen_, or 53.5 per cent. of the total imports of
Japan.[7] Japan will not only always have to rely upon foreign countries
for the supply of these articles, but also have to import them in ever
increasing quantities. Nor does agriculture occupy in the national
finances the position it once did, for in 1875 the land tax, the
incidence of which fell, as it still falls, very largely on the farmer,
supplied 78 per cent. of the total revenue of the state, while the
percentage fell, in the estimated budget for the fiscal year 1902–3, to
16, the actual amount also decreasing during the interval from 67.7 to
37 million _yen_, and the expenditures of the government, on the other
hand, increasing from 73.4 million in 1874, to the enormous figure of
223.18 million _yen_ in 1904–5.[8]
No one can say a cheerful word about agriculture in Japan or the life of
her farmer. Exclusive of Formosa, the development of which seems to lie
in the direction of industry and trade rather than agriculture, less
than 13,000,000 acres are under cultivation,[9] or, about 13 per cent.
of the extent of the country, while the arable area of the land cannot
possibly be increased by more than 10,500,000 acres,[10] so that the
_per capita_ share of arable land is less than one half of an acre,[11]
which is even below the corresponding rate in England and less than one
half of that in China. Japan’s agricultural life can, however, be no
more intensively improved than extensively enlarged. The sedimentary
soil so well adapted to the rice cultivation and so abundantly blessed
with moisture[12] is too minutely and carefully tilled, the climate
conditions are too cleverly made use of,[13] and, above all, the lots of
land are too diminutive,[14] to make the importation of new machinery
and methods always profitable or desirable.[15] The day-laborers on the
farm receive wages ranging between nine and fifteen cents, though the
latter have risen more than 100 per cent. during the last fifteen
years.[16] With this meagre income, some of the laborers have to support
their aged parents, wives, and children. The tenants, whose number bears
the ratio of about two to one[17] to that of the proprietors, live
literally from hand to mouth, and cannot always afford even the
necessary manure, and the proprietor’s profit hardly rises above 5 per
cent., while the capital he employs pays an interest of 15 to 30 per
cent.[18] and his local and central taxes further reduce his income. The
farmer would in many cases be unable to subsist, were it not possible
for him, as it fortunately is, to try his hand at silk-culture or some
other subsidiary occupation.
Japan’s agriculture, then, can neither be much extended nor be greatly
improved, can neither satisfy the old population nor support the new,
and, above all, can only produce smaller and smaller portion of the
necessary raw material for her growing industries. Under these
circumstances, it is becoming more evident every year that the time is
forever past when the nation could rely solely upon agriculture for
subsistence. It is hardly necessary to repeat the well-known law of
population—which is at the root of our subject—that every advance in the
economic life of a nation creates a situation which is capable of
supporting a larger population than in the preceding stage. What
agriculture cannot support, industry and trade may. Japan’s growing
population may only be supported, as it has already begun to be, by an
increased importation of raw material and food-stuffs and an increased
exportation of manufactures. Trade statistics unmistakably show that
such markets for her manufactures and such supply regions of her raw and
food articles are found primarily in East Asia, with which the
commercial relations of Japan have grown 543 per cent. since 1890, as
compared with the 161 per cent.[19] increase of the American and the 190
per cent. increase of the European trade,[20] until the East Asiatic
trade amounted in 1903 to 295,940,000 _yen_ in value, or 48.7 per cent.
of the entire foreign trade of Japan.[21] The following table gives a
comparison of the importation in the years 1882, 1902, and 1903, of what
may be considered as primarily East Asiatic products:[22]—
1882 1902 1903
Cotton 467,249 _yen_ 79,784,772 _yen_ 69,517,894 _yen_
Wool 3,397,564 4,811,811
Rice 134,838 17,750,817 51,960,033
Wheat 240,050 4,767,832
Flour 3,278,324 10,324,415
Beans 4,956,000 7,993,411
Oil-cakes 44,468 10,121,712 10,739,359
From these eloquent facts, the conclusion would seem tenable that,
should the markets of East Asia be closed, Japan’s national life would
be paralyzed, as her growing population would be largely deprived of its
food and occupation. These markets, then, must be left as open as the
circumstances permit, if Japan would exist as a growing nation. Observe
here the tremendous significance for Japan of the principle of the “open
door” as applied to East Asia—the principle, in a more accurate
language, of the equal opportunity in East Asia for the economic
enterprise of all foreign nations.[23]
In this great problem Manchuria and Korea occupy, perhaps, the most
important position, for they together receive a large portion of the
cotton yarn and cotton textiles exported from Japan, besides several
other manufactured goods and coal, and in return supply Japan with much
of the wheat and rice, and practically all of the millet, beans, and
oil-cakes, imported into the country. Let us briefly demonstrate these
statements by figures. First, consider the exportation of cotton yarns
and textiles from Japan to Manchuria and Korea. It is rather difficult
from the material on hand to estimate the exact ratio which the import
of these articles from Japan into Korea and Manchuria bears to the total
import of the same articles from all nations. In the case of Korea, we
can make an approximate estimate, as we possess both the export values
in Japan and import values in Korea, but with regard to Manchuria, we
know only the quantities, but not the values, of the cotton goods
imported. By assuming, however, that 40 per cent. of these goods
imported by the Chinese Empire from Japan go to North China (of which
Manchuria is here considered by far the most important part), it may be
said, roughly, that in 1903 about 6 per cent. of the cotton yarn
exported from Japan went to Korea and perhaps 40 per cent. to North
China. The average import of this article during the past two years was
probably 1,200,000 _yen_ in Korea and 8,000,000 _yen_ in North China,
making the total about 36 per cent. of the export value in Japan. On the
same basis of calculation, the average importation of cotton textiles
from Japan during the past three years was 3,190,000 _yen_ in Korea and
765,000 _yen_ in North China, or about 69.5 per cent. of the entire
export of these articles from Japan. These figures are only tentative,
but may serve to show that Manchuria receives comparatively much yarn
and Korea much textiles, and that they together receive at least a large
percentage of those articles exported by Japan, where their manufacture
occupies an increasingly important place in her economic life.[24] As to
the exportation of agricultural products from Manchuria and Korea, it is
seen that wheat is only beginning to be cultivated in Manchuria, while
the rice cultivation is there practically unknown except in a few places
near the Korean border, where during the campaign of 1894–5 the Japanese
troops introduced it. The position which Korea occupies in the
importation of wheat into Japan will be seen from the following table:—
Wheat imported into Japan, 1898–1902,[25] _kin_ = 1.325 lbs. av.
_yen_ = 49.8 cents.
From │ 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902
Australia │ 4,339,845 5,554,513 18,423
│ 143,260 185,274 721
────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Korea │ 2,770,755 1,668,207 5,182,533 1,644,577 8,556,813
│ 72,698 71,764 132,734 43,875 237,217
────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Great │ 457,450
Britain │
│ 15,502
────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
The United │ 2,039,371 395,009 12,370,022 1,388,372 864
States. │
│ 71,173 14,697 400,829 43,720 43
────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Other │ 1,560 990 547 77,343
countries.│
│ 41 27 14 2,069
════════════╪══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Total │ 4,811,686 2,064,206 22,350,397 8,587,462 8,653,443
│ 143,913 86,489 692,341 272,869 240,050
A glance at these figures will show that the import trade of wheat, like
that of rice, is dependent on many fluctuating conditions at home and
abroad. The poor crop in Japan caused an enormous importation of wheat
in 1903 to the value of 4,767,000 _yen_. From the above table, it is
seen that Korea supplied during the five years, respectively, 57.5,
80.7, 23.1, 19.1, and 98.8 per cent., in weight, of the wheat imported
into Japan. As regards rice, the following table will show that in the
five years between 1898 and 1902 Korea supplied, respectively, 5.5,
26.5, 49.4, 46.8, and 19.8 per cent. in weight of the cereal imported
into Japan:—
Rice imported into Japan, 1898–1902,[26] _picul_ = 133⅓ lbs. av.
_yen_ = 49.8 cents.
From │ 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902
British │ 2,663,087 53,827 249,344 220,650 1,793,362
India │
│ 11,642,416 174,507 973,747 876,057 7,530,356
───────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
China │ 967,216 60,323 83,998 227,234 90,401
│ 3,989,422 231,625 327,673 867,272 341,689
───────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Korea │ 649,570 436,716 1,131,787 1,456,661 891,186
│ 2,704,887 1,689,909 4,694,166 6,009,641 3,961,312
───────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Dutch │ 403
Indies │
│ 1,816
───────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
French │ 6,445,390 956,142 726,859 919,774 1,324,789
India │
│ 25,762,726 3,354,095 2,739,752 3,199,420 4,651,395
───────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Siam │ 969,413 143,575 94,530 287,594 409,307
│ 4,114,065 510,007 284,178 926,486 1,265,970
───────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Other │ 1,576 9 58 25 27
countries│
│ 6,290 21 200 82 94
═══════════╪═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Total │ 11,696,252 1,650,592 2,286,979 3,111,938 4,509,072
│ 48,219,810 5,960,166 9,021,536 11,878,958 17,750,817
As will be seen in this table, much rice comes also from Saigon and
Bangkok, to which, however, Japan hardly exports anything. In Korea, on
the contrary, the greater her exportation of rice, the larger her
purchasing power of the goods from the country to which the rice goes.
In the case of beans and oil-cakes, Manchuria and Korea occupy in the
list of the importation of these articles into Japan an even more
important place than is the case with wheat or rice, as will be seen in
the following table:—
Beans and oil-cakes imported into Japan in _picul_ = 133⅓ lbs. av.
1902,[27] _yen_ = 49.8 cents.
From │Beans, pease, and pulse Oil-cakes
China │ 1,306,103 4,064,198
│ 3,524,138 8,656,775
───────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────
Korea │ 777,151 5,671
│ 2,254,899 12,331
───────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────
Russian Asia │ 545 345,022
│ 1,505 1,448,868
───────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────
French India │ 742
│ 2,178
───────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────
The United States │ 281
│ 2,405
───────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────
Other countries │ 545 846
│ 1,582 3,738
═══════════════════════╪═══════════════════════════════════════════════
Total │ 2,086,367 4,415,737
│ 5,786,707 10,121,712
An explanation is necessary that, to all probability, much of the
oil-cakes from Russian Asia was reëxported from Manchuria. In 1903,
beans and oil-cakes were imported to the value of, respectively,
7,993,000 and 10,739,000 _yen_. In considering all these facts as a
whole, attention is called to a point of immense importance, that
Manchuria and Korea supply Japan with necessaries of life, and receive
in return, in the main, useful goods, instead of wares of luxury. We
shall have occasion further to develop this point.
Let us now take a general survey of the position Japan holds in the
trade relations of Korea and Manchuria. In Korea, whence the Chinese
merchants withdrew during the China-Japan war of 1894–5 and were
replaced by the Japanese traders,[28] it is Japan alone of all trading
nations which enjoys a large share both in the import and export trade,
as is suggested in the following table:—
Japan’s export Total import of Japan’s import Total export of
to Korea Korea from Korea Korea
1902 10,554,000 _yen_ (13,823,000 _yen_) 7,958,000 _yen_ (8,460,000 _yen_)
1903 11,764,000 (18,207,000) 8,912,000 (9,472,000)
while the grains exported from Korea go almost entirely to Japan,
different ports of Korea present of course different characteristics in
their trade with Japan: as, for instance, at Chemulpo the Chinese
merchants still enjoy a considerable share in the import trade; at Seul
nearly all the export consists of gold bullion, which is almost
exclusively bought by the branch of the First Bank of Japan; while at
Fusan and Mokpo the Japanese monopoly of trade is almost complete. With
these variations, however, the Japanese merchants control the major part
of the trade of each port, and consequently of the entire trade of
Korea. They also carry a large amount of foreign goods to Korea, as seen
in the following table:—
Japanese goods Foreign goods
1902 9,344,859 _yen_ 1,209,332 _yen_
1901 10,410,563 961,897
1900 9,423,821 529,450[29]
The shipping also is largely in the hands of the Japanese. In 1903,
their share in the Korean shipping was as follows:[30]—
Vessels Tonnage
Korean 25 per cent. 9+ per cent.
Japanese 61+ 78+
Russian 2+ 9+
Others 11+ 4–
Turning to Manchuria, it is found that Japan controlled in 1902 more
than 44 per cent. of the shipping tonnage,[31] besides 40 per cent. of
the direct import trade and over 90 per cent. of the export trade, as is
shown below:[32]—
Exports (Japan) Imports (Japan)
1901 1,080,345_l._ ( 970,663_l._) 635,085_l._ (247,624_l._)
1902 1,130,429_l._ (1,041,395_l._) 695,020_l._ (280,843_l._)
Average five
years,
1896–99 and
1891 965,553_l._ ( 880,917_l._) 433,811_l._ (131,143_l._)
at Niu-chwang, which was then the only important port in Manchuria open
to foreign trade under the ordinary customs rules.[33]
In this connection, it should be remembered that both the Korean and
Manchurian trade are of recent origin. Niu-chwang was opened as a treaty
port in 1858, but its commercial importance may be said to date from
1899. Korea’s foreign trade did not begin till 1884, and it exceeded
10,000,000 _yen_ for the first time in 1895. The rapid growth of the
trade of these places has been largely due to the increasing trade
activity of Japan. In the case of Niu-chwang, it is true the development
of its import trade has been as much owing to the energy of the
Americans as to that of the Japanese, but its export business would be
meagre, and would consequently reduce the imports also, but for Japanese
activity. The recent increase in the production of millet in Manchuria,
for instance, may be said to be entirely due to Japanese trade at
Niu-chwang. Of the three staple products of Western Manchuria, tall
millet is consumed by the natives, and beans are partly consumed and
partly exported, while millet is cultivated purely for the purpose of
exportation. It began to be exported to Korea in August, 1901, and to
Japan in 1902. Since the latter year, Japan’s demand for millet has
steadily increased, and has caused a considerable rise in its price at
Niu-chwang. The cultivation of millet, therefore, is a pure gain that
has been created by the trade relations of Manchuria with Japan.[34] Far
more important than millet as articles for exportation are beans and
bean-cakes. The entire trade conditions at Niu-chwang may be said to
depend upon the amount of the sale of these articles. The more they are
sold, the greater is the importing capacity of the people of Manchuria.
The nation which buys beans and bean-cakes in the largest quantities
naturally commands the greatest facility in pushing their imports into
Niu-chwang. The exportation of these goods doubled during the ten years
between 1889 and 1898, while the amount of the bean production in
Manchuria for 1900 was estimated at between 1,930,000 and 2,450,000
_koku_. Both the production and the exportation must now be much
greater. The increase was due in the main to the growing demand in Japan
for beans and bean-cakes, as witness the following ratios of exports to
China and Japan from Niu-chwang:—
Beans Bean-cakes
To China To Japan To China To Japan
1889 98.0% 2.0% 95.8% 4.2%
1893 67.5% 32.5% 68.3% 31.7%
1897 60.7% 39.3% 50.2% 49.8%
In 1903, the ratios must have been much greater for Japan than for
China. The increasing demand for these products has induced many Chinese
to migrate from Shan-tung to Southern and Western Manchuria and
cultivate beans.[35] As regards the Korean trade, the following table
will speak for itself:—
Korean trade in Korean export Total Japan-Korea
merchandise of gold trade
1897 19,041,000 _yen_ 2,034,000 _yen_ 21,075,000 _yen_ 14,061,000 _yen_
1898 17,527,000 2,375,000 19,902,000 10,641,000
1899 15,225,000 2,933,000 18,158,000 11,972,000
1900 20,380,000 3,633,000 24,013,000 18,759,000
1901 23,158,000 4,993,000 28,151,000 21,425,000
1902 (22,280,000) 5,064,000 (27,344,000) 18,512,000
1903 27,679,000 5,456,000 33,135,000 20,676,000
If we examine the causes of the growth of individual open ports in
Korea, nothing can be plainer than that it has almost entirely resulted
from the increasing trade relations between Korea and Japan. It is
needless to mention Fusan, for its trade is nearly synonymous with its
Japanese trade. Kunsan was opened on May 1, 1899, and its population was
only 300 till two years ago, but the great demand by Japan for the rice
coming through this port has already tended to enlarge the number of its
inhabitants up to 2000 or more.[36] Similar remarks may be made of
Mokpo, Chinnampo, and other ports.[37] Most conspicuous, however, is the
case of Chemulpo. In 1883, when it was opened as a treaty port, it
contained only a few fishers’ houses, but now it holds a population of
15,000, and occupies a position in Korea similar to that of Shanghai in
China. Of the inhabitants of the ports, 8000, or more than a half, are
Japanese. Streams of Koreans also have flowed hither from inland towns,
for there the officials oppress people, while here they are so
constantly viewed by the foreigners that undue exactions are
impossible.[38] We have already noted the important fact that Korea and
Manchuria on the one hand and Japan on the other exchange, not wares of
luxury, but useful and necessary articles. We have now come to another
equally important fact, that the growth of the Manchurian and Korean
trade depends largely upon the commercial activity of Japan. From these
considerations, it would seem safe to say that the trade interests of
the three countries are largely _common_, for the more Korea and
Manchuria export to Japan, the greater will be their purchasing power of
Japanese goods, and, also, the larger the exportation from Japan to
Manchuria and Korea, the more readily they will dispose of their
products to her. On the one hand, Korea and Manchuria encourage the
growth of Japan’s manufacture, and supply her with food and manure; on
the other hand, the economic development and prosperity of Korea and
Manchuria must be largely determined by the increasing demand for their
products by Japan, and the easy supply of their wants from Japan. The
future growth of the three nations, then, must in a large measure depend
upon the intimate progress, of their trade interests, which, therefore,
not only are common, but should be increasingly common. If the history
of the past suggests the probable development in the future, there is
every reason to believe that, with reformed systems of currency and
improved and extended cultivation of land and means of transportation,
the trade of Manchuria and Korea will show a tremendous increase, and
then the community of interest between them and Japan will be most
profound.
This theme of the community of interest may further be elaborated.
Korea and Manchuria may with profit remain open, not only for the
trade, but also for the emigration and industrial enterprise, of the
Japanese people. Since 1902 no passports have been required for
travelers from Japan to Korea, whither, in spite of the occasional
obstacles placed in their way by Korean officials, the emigrants have
proceeded, now for years, in increasing numbers, until there resided
in 1903 nearly thirty thousand Japanese in the Peninsula.[39] It takes
only thirteen hours on sea from Bakan in Japan to Fusan in Korea, and
the cost is even less than that of sailing to the Japanese colony of
Formosa, the former being fifteen _yen_ and the latter twenty. It
seems easier to go from Bakan to Fusan than it is from Osaka to the
Hokkaidō within Japan proper.[40] The expense of living in Korea is
also as low as one third the corresponding figure in Japan, a monthly
income of ten or thirteen _yen_ being considered sufficient to support
a family of three persons in a rented house.[41] It is not strange,
under these conditions, that the Japanese migrate to Korea, not always
singly, like the Chinese, but often in families,[42] so that their
settlements assume there a normal and permanent character unseen even
in Japan’s own island of Formosa. Nor are all these colonists mere
laborers like their brethren in Manchuria and the Hawaiian Islands,
but many are independent men of business. They also naturally manifest
a stronger sense of kinship and coöperation in Korea than the
merchants and capitalists do in Japan. In several Korean towns these
Japanese settlers have established their own municipalities, with
modern improvements, chambers of commerce, police, and public schools,
all of which compare favorably with those of the larger cities in
Japan, and the advantages of which are enjoyed by native Koreans and
resident Chinese. It is said that in some places the influx of the
Japanese and their investments have caused a rise in the price of land
and house rent.[43] In Fusan, the port nearest to Japan, the 10,000
Japanese who live there own large tracts of land and occupy the main
sections of the city. Here and everywhere else the Japanese colonists
seem to hold a position similar to that of the foreigners living in
the so-called settlements in the larger treaty ports of China.
Tourists are wont to contrast the clean and well-ordered streets and
the general energetic appearance of the Japanese quarters in Korean
cities with the comparatively filthy and slothful Korean quarters. The
branches of the First Bank of Japan have been issuing recently one-,
five-, and ten-_yen_ bank-notes,[44] which have been of immense value
to the foreign trade in Korea, the native currency of which is in a
deplorable condition.[45] The coasting and river navigation, so far as
it concerns foreign trade, is largely controlled by the Japanese, who,
besides, own the only railway line in operation in Korea, twenty-six
miles long, running between the capital, Seul, and its port
Chemulpo.[46] They are also building,[47] under the management of
substantially the same company, another and longer line—two hundred
and eighty-seven miles—between Seul and the port of Fusan, which
passes through the richer and economically by far the more important
half of the Peninsula.[48] It is not impossible to suppose that the
Japanese people will succeed in their efforts to secure the right of
extending this line beyond Seul up to Wiju on the northern border,[49]
and thence ultimately connecting it with the Eastern Chinese and the
Peking-Shanghaikwan-Sinminting Railways, so as to render the
connection by rail between Fusan and China and Europe complete.[50]
The Mitsui Produce Company, another Japanese concern, monopolized the
export of Korean ginseng, and, in 1903, despite the competition of the
Russian Baron Gunzburg,[51] succeeded in extending the term of the
monopoly for five years. Twenty to forty thousand Japanese fishermen
along the Korean coast report an annual catch amounting sometimes to
large figures.
No part of Korea’s economic life, however, would seem to be of greater
importance to her own future, or to depend more closely upon the
enterprise of the Japanese settlers, than her agriculture. If it is
remembered that nearly all her exports consist of agricultural products,
and also that they largely supply the needs of Japan, we can readily
comprehend the great community of interest felt by both countries in the
agriculture of the Peninsula. It is remarkable to note, to take a single
instance, that the production of cereals and beans (respectively about
eight and four million _koku_) in Korea has grown to its present
dimensions largely owing to the stimulus given to it by the increased
demand for these articles in Japan.[52] We shall presently note also
that, owing to the peculiar circumstances prevailing in Korea, her
purchasing power and general commercial activity are so completely ruled
by the conditions of her weather and crops as is seldom the case with
other agricultural nations. The Koreans are comparatively happy in good
years, while in bad years they are reduced to great miseries and bandits
infest all parts of the country. Upon the state of her agriculture,
then, must depend the trade conditions of Korea, as well as most of her
material strength and much of that of Japan. From this it is plain that
the profound community of interest of the two nations calls for both the
extension and the improvement of the agriculture of Korea. It is
estimated that the extent of her land under cultivation is hardly more
than 3,185,000 acres, or about 6.3 per cent. of the 82,000 square miles
known as the total area of the country,[53] and that there exist at
least 3,500,000 more acres of arable land, which would be fully capable
of sustaining five or six millions of new population, and of increasing
the annual crops of the land by not less than 150,000,000 _yen_.[54]
Unfortunately, however, the Koreans lack energy to cultivate those three
and a half million acres of waste land. For it is well known that the
irregular but exhaustive exactions of the Korean officials have bred a
conviction in the mind of the peasant that it is unwise to bestir
himself and earn surplus wealth only to be fleeced by the officials. His
idleness has now for centuries been forced, until it has become an
agreeable habit. It is in this state of things that is has often been
suggested that the cultivation of the waste lands may most naturally be
begun by the superior energy of the Japanese settlers.[55] Not less
important than the cultivation of new land is the improvement of old
land in Korea, where the art of husbandry is far less advanced than in
either China or Japan. Lots are marked out carelessly, improvements are
crude, and the manure most universally used is dried grass. The great
rivers with all their numerous ramifications are hardly utilized for the
purpose of irrigation, and the forests have been mercilessly denuded for
fuel and in order to forestall the requisition of the government,—which
formerly used to order without compensation the cutting and transporting
of trees by their owners,—so that a slight drought or excess of rain
works frightful disasters upon agriculture. Another serious effect of
the absence of a good system of irrigation is the comparative want of
rice land, which always requires a most careful use of water.[56] These
conditions are all the more to be regretted, when it is seen that the
soil is generally fair and the climate favorable. The cultivation of
rice is said to have been first taught by the Japanese invaders toward
the end of the sixteenth century, and yet, with all their primitive
method, the Koreans are already exporting rice to the value of four
million _yen_ or more. Sericulture is still in its infancy, while tea,
cotton, hemp, sugar, and various fruits are all declared to be tolerably
well suited to the soil. The Japanese farmer finds here, particularly in
the south, a climate and general surroundings very similar to his own,
and otherwise eminently agreeable to his habits, and, along with the
application of his superior methods of cultivation, irrigation, and
forestry, the common interests of his country and Korea are bound to
develop with great rapidity. The progress of agriculture would also
gradually lead the Koreans into the beginnings of an industrial life,
while the expanding systems of railways and banking would be at once
cause and effect of the industrial growth of the nation. Another
inevitable result would be the development of the economic sense and the
saving capacity of the Korean, the latter of which has had little
opportunity to grow, not so much because of his small wage and high rent
and interest, as because of the onerous, irregular local dues and the
systematic exactions in various forms by the official.[57] An advanced
economic life, itself necessitating a reform of the official
organization, would at least make it possible for the peasant to work,
earn, and save. Simultaneously and in increasing degree would his wants,
as well as his purchasing power, increase. Around the progress of
Korea’s agriculture, then, must be built all other measures of her
growth and power, as, for instance, transportation, industries, trade
and commerce, finance, political reform, and military strength. In no
other way can we conceive of the possibility of her effective
independence, the cause of which has cost Japan, and is now costing her,
so dearly. In no other light can we interpret the Korean sovereignty
under the assistance of Japan.
In regard to Manchuria, where the chances for development are far
vaster, the Japanese people do not possess there as large vested
interests, but entertain as great expectations for its future settlement
and industry as in Korea. It was estimated before the present war that
there resided more than ten thousand Japanese in Manchuria, who were
either under the employment of Russian authorities in public works along
the railway, or engaged in such small occupations as laundry work,
carpentry, restaurant-keeping, photographing, and hair-dressing,[58]
while many of the Japanese women, whose numbers in many a town
preponderated over those of men, had been allured by unscrupulous
parties, who consigned them to disreputable occupations. Merchants and
business men of greater capital and resources would be, as they often
have been, attracted to Manchuria, were it not for the exclusive, and in
the hands of some of their officials, arbitrary, measures of the
Russians.[59] Under normal conditions of peace and “open door,” the
immensely greater resources of Manchuria and the much greater
productiveness of its people[60] would seem to promise even a more
important economic future than in Korea.
In summing up our preceding discussion, it may be stated that the
natural growth or unnatural decay of the Japanese nation will greatly
depend—ever more greatly than it now does—upon whether Manchuria and
Korea remain open or are closed to its trade, colonization, and economic
enterprise; and that, in her imperative desire for the open door,
Japan’s wish largely coincides with that of the European and American
countries, except Russia, whose over-production calls for an open market
in the East.
Thus far we have discussed only Japan’s side of the economic problem in
Manchuria and Korea. Passing to Russia’s side, it is seen that her
vested interests in Manchuria are as enormous as her commercial success
there has been small. The building of the Eastern Chinese Railway has
cost the incredible sum of 270,000,000 rubles, making the average cost
per verst more than 113,000 rubles,[61] or over $87,000 per mile,
besides 70,000,000 rubles lost and expended during the Boxer outrages
and Manchuria campaign of 1900,[62] to say nothing of the normal annual
cost of guarding the railway by soldiers, estimated at 24,000,000
rubles.[63] The investments in permanent properties alone, besides the
railway, are moderately valued at 500,000,000 rubles.[64] In return for
these heavy outlays, the trade relations between Russia and Manchuria
have been most disappointing. Though it is not possible to obtain the
exact figures of the actual trade between Manchuria and European Russia,
we can establish approximate estimates in the following manner.
According to official returns, exports from Russia to her Far Eastern
Possessions were as follows:—
1900 56,000,000 rubles
1901 51,000,000
1902 38,000,000
The decline must be largely due to the decreased demand for military and
railway supplies, for it is seen that the falling-off has been most
conspicuous in iron and steel wares and machinery.[65] At the same time
there was little or no import trade from the Russian possessions in the
East into Russia, for the native products sent out from the former never
passed beyond Eastern Siberia. It would be interesting if we could find
out how much of these Russian exports went to Manchuria. The figures for
the Pacific ports are given as follows:[66]—
1900 51,157,000 rubles
1901 49,827,000
1902 37,704,000
If these figures are reliable, the difference between them and those
given above, namely:—
1900 less than 5,000,000 rubles
1901 more than 1,000,000
1902 less than 300,000
might be considered an approximate amount of the export trade from
Russia to Manchuria (and Mongolia, which imports very little from
Russia), for, of the Pacific ports, no other port but Vladivostok
reëxports Russian goods into Manchuria, which reëxportation seems to be
slight enough to be ignored. The approximate correctness of the figures
is further seen from the fact that of the total 8,193,000 rubles of the
Manchurian trade at Blagovestchensk, Habarofsk, and the South Ussuri
region—the three main points of transit trade with Manchuria—only one
half showed exports to Manchuria, and again, of this one half, only a
portion consisted of reëxported Russian goods. The South Ussuri
district, for instance, sent only 130,800 and 206,000 rubles’ worth of
Russian and foreign goods to Manchuria, out of the total export trade of
799,500 and 2,221,300 rubles, respectively, in 1898 and 1899.[67] On the
other hand, before the opening of the Manchurian Railway (which took
place in February, 1903), the _direct_ trade between Russia and the
interior of Manchuria must have been so slight as not to materially
affect the sum-total of the Russian-Manchurian trade.
This remarkably unfavorable trade between Manchuria and Russia was
probably due to a decreased demand for military supplies since 1900 (for
Russia has little to export from Manchuria, and Chinese teas have
largely gone through Kiakhta or by the Amur, rather than by the
Manchurian Railway), and also to the difficulty of further reducing the
freight rates on the railway,[68] and of competing successfully with the
American and Japanese traders in certain articles for importation.[69]
In spite of all the effort made by the late Finance Minister, M. Witte,
Russia is not yet primarily a manufacturing country, her exportation of
manufactured goods forming in fact only 2.5 per cent. of her entire
export trade, and at best remaining stationary during the three years
1900–2, as will be seen below:—
1900 1901 1902
Rubles Rubles Rubles
Total exports from Russia 688,435,000 729,815,000 825,277,000
Exports of manufacturers 19,553,000 21,039,000 19,263,000[70]
Russia’s commercial failure in Manchuria in the past would, however, in
no way justify the inference that the future will be as disappointing.
All competent observers seem to agree that the undeveloped resources of
the 364,000 square miles of Manchuria are enormous.[71] Its unknown
mineral wealth, its thousands of square miles of land now under the bean
and millet cultivation, but beginning to yield to the wheat culture and
producing wheat at a market price of not more than forty cents per
bushel, and its extensive lumber districts, as well as its millions of
cheap and most reliable Chinese laborers,[72] would before long enable
the Russians successfully to convert Manchuria into one of the richest
parts of China and one of the richest countries in the world. A success
of such magnitude must, however, largely depend upon a systematically
protective and exclusive policy on the part of Russia, or, in other
words, upon the completeness with which Russia transfers the bulk of the
Manchurian trade from the treaty port of Niu-chwang, and, so far as the
Russian import from China is concerned, even from the once important
Russian port of Vladivostok, to the commercial terminus of the
Manchurian Railway—Dalny. Particularly in order to capture the import
trade into Manchuria of cotton goods and kerosene oil, in the face of
the great advantages enjoyed by American and Japanese competitors,
Russia must at all costs make Dalny overshadow Niu-chwang, so as to
bring the trade under her complete control. Nothing but a highly
artificial system could accomplish such wonders, for, under normal
conditions, teas for Russia would go by the less costly routes through
Kiakhta, or up the Amur, or by sea to Odessa; the native products of
Manchuria for exportation to Japan would be sent to Niu-chwang by the
nearest, cheapest, and most natural channel, the Liao River, and, when
the latter freezes between the end of November and March, by the
Shan-hai-kwan Railway; and, finally, the smaller cost of production and
lower rates of freight of the American and Japanese cotton fabrics would
completely outdistance the Russian. Let us observe with what artificial
measures the Russians have been meeting this situation. With a view to
diverting the tea trade from Vladivostok to Dalny, Russia imposed an
import duty of 3 rubles per pood from August, 1902, and increased it in
May, 1903, to 25.50 rubles,[73] which with other measures dealt a
crushing blow to the prosperity of Vladivostok.[74] This must at least
have stifled the transportation of tea up the Amur, without, perhaps,
affecting the inroad of teas through the old Kiakhta and by sea.[75] As
regards the export trade at Niu-chwang, the Russians took advantage of
the important fact that the Shan-hai-kwan Railway did not penetrate
sufficiently north to reach some producing centres of Western Manchuria,
while the waters of the Liao were navigable only 200 miles from the
mouth, and were, together with the harbor itself, ice-bound from
November till March. Dalny was nearly ice-free, and the Manchurian
Railway was available through all seasons. The only competitors of the
railroad would seem to be the small bean-carrying junks plying down the
Liao, which were both owned and loaded by the same Chinese merchants.
This competition the Russians met by greatly reduced freight rates of
the railway, which made it possible for every 100 poods of Manchurian
grain and beans to be carried 600 miles between Harbin and Dalny for
about fifty-seven cents gold, or $10 per ton.[76] From Dalny, heavily
subsidized Russian boats transported Manchurian exports to Japan at a
freight rate which, in conjunction with railway rates, amounted to the
saving by the shipper of 4.50 _yen_ per ton, as compared with the
railway-rates _plus_ the freight-rates of non-Russian vessels.[77] When
the flour industry of the Russian towns in Manchuria is developed,
Russian steamers may be seen carrying flour from Dalny, not only to
Japan, but to Chinese and Eastern Siberian ports. As for the import
trade of Manchuria, the Russians, who have ousted American importers of
kerosene oil at Vladivostok, seem to be now by energetic methods slowly
driving away the same rivals from Chemulpo and from Dalny.[78] Vastly
more important as articles for importation than kerosene oil are cotton
yarn and textiles, which are annually supplied from abroad to the value
of over 12,000,000 _taels_. By far the greater part of sheetings,
drills, and jeans comes from America. The Russians were not unable to
produce cotton fabrics almost as good as the American goods, but the
trans-Siberian freight was twice as expensive as the Pacific
transportation, and could not be expected to be further reduced without
great difficulty.[79] It was not impossible to suppose that the Russian
Government might ultimately apply to Manchuria the system of granting a
premium and an additional drawback on textiles made from imported
cotton, which had been in successful operation in Persia. There was no
question but that, together with the development of Manchuria under
Russian control, foreigners would lose most of their import trade in
lumber, butter, and flour, and here again the Russian success must
depend on the exclusiveness of their policy.[80] Mr. H. B. Miller, the
United States Consul at Niu-chwang, seems to have made a delicate
reference to this point when he said, in his report dated December 5,
1903: “The United States trade in Manchuria with the Chinese amounted to
several millions of dollars per year, and was almost entirely imports.
It had grown very fast, and would have had an extended and most
substantial increase without the Russian development, for the country
was being improved and extensively developed with a continual
immigration from other provinces in China, before the railway
construction began.”[81] Much has been said regarding the oft-reiterated
wish of Russia to keep Dalny as a free port, but it is well known that
it has recently been placed under a protective tariff.[82] We are not in
possession of the details of this tariff, but its general significance
can hardly be mistaken when we see how the Russians have been reducing
freight rates to the utmost, subsidizing their own steamers, and pooling
together their great banking and railway facilities, all for the
purpose, on the one hand, of developing Russian industries in Manchuria,
and on the other, of monopolizing the bulk of its trade.
Not only in trade, but in colonization also, the Russians have been
building up new cities and developing old ones under their exclusive
policy with an unheard-of rapidity. Dalny is a good example of the
former class. Still more conspicuous is the city of Harbin, the
so-called Moscow of Asia, the geographical and commercial centre and
headquarters of the railway work in Manchuria, which is said to have
consisted of a single Chinese house in 1898,[83] but now contains 50,000
people.[84] Well might Count Cassini, as he did, refer, not only to the
colonization, but to the general civilizing influence of the Russians in
Manchuria in the following language:[85] “Through the pacific channels
of diplomacy my government acquired privileges which, accepted in good
faith, have been exercised in a spirit of true modern progressiveness,
until now the flower of enlightened civilization blooms throughout a
land that a few years ago was a wild, and in many parts a desolate,
seemingly unproductive waste. Before the signing of the treaty which I
had the honor to negotiate in behalf of my Sovereign, giving to Russia
railroad and other concessions in Manchuria, no white man could have
ventured into that province without danger to his life.... Upon the
basis of the rights to commercial exploitation thus peaceably obtained,
Russia built a railway into and through Manchuria. She built bridges,
roads, and canals. She has built cities whose rapid construction and
wonderful strides in population and industry have no parallel, certainly
in Europe and Asia, perhaps even in America. Harbin and Dalny are
monuments to Russian progressiveness and civilization. These great
undertakings, wonderful even in a day of marvelous human accomplishment,
have cost Russia more than 300,000,000 dollars.” Without stopping either
to dispute the historical accuracy of Count Cassini’s statement or to
deny the wonderful work the Russians have accomplished in Manchurian
cities, it seems pertinent to call our attention to the exclusive side
of the Russian enterprise in this vast territory. Harbin is one of the
so-called “depots,” over eighty in number, which are found along the
whole length of the Manchurian Railway, each one of which extends over
several square miles, within which none but the Russians and Chinese
have the right of permanent settlement.[86] Russia would not consent to
the opening of Harbin (and, presumably, all other cities within the
“depots” of the Manchurian Railway) to foreign trade. Even outside of
these cities, the Russian Government appeared to be opposed to the
opening of new ports, and when it was no longer politic to continue the
opposition, Russia informed other Powers in 1903 that she had no
intention of objecting to the opening of new treaty ports “without
foreign settlements” in Manchuria.[87]
The meaning of all these protective and exclusive measures becomes
plain, when it is seen that the complete control of the economic
resources of Manchuria would give Russia, not only sufficient means to
support Eastern Siberia, but also a great command over the trade of
China and Japan. The latter country Russia might be able to reduce to
dire distress, when necessary, by closing the supplies coming from
Manchuria, upon which Japan will have to depend every year more closely
than before.[88] The success of these great designs on the part of
Russia would depend upon how completely protective and exclusive her
Manchurian policy can be made.
Coming from Manchuria to Korea, we find the economic position of the
Russians in a totally different situation, for either their vested or
even their potential interests in the Peninsula were slight, excepting,
perhaps, their already acquired timber concessions[89] on the northern
frontier and the Kaiserling whale fishery on the northeastern coast.[90]
It has been pointed out, however, that the fact that Dalny was not
altogether ice-free made Russia covet Chemulpo or some other trade port
on the western coast of Korea.[91] However that may be, it is safe to
say that Russia’s interests in Korea are slightly economic, but almost
wholly strategic and political.
Let us sum up our discussion at this point, and compare the economic
interests of Russia and Japan in Manchuria and Korea. In Manchuria, both
Powers seek trade and colonization, with the important difference that
Japan’s interests are actually great and potentially greater, while
those of Russia are both actually and potentially preponderant. A
difference of greater moment lies, however, in the fact that, so far as
her trade and industry are concerned, Japan’s interests call for an
equal opportunity there for all industrial nations, while Russia’s
interests may be maintained and developed only by a highly exclusive
policy. In Korea, its opening for the trade, settlement, and enterprise
of the Japanese is not only the most natural method of strengthening
Korea herself, but also a primary condition for the life and growth of
Japan. Russia’s economic interests there, on the other hand, may be
measured by the number of her resident subjects and the extent of their
enterprise, which are, outside of Yong-am-po, next to nothing. Her
interests, being, as we shall soon see, mainly strategic and political,
demand here also a policy directly opposed to the open door. If we now
consider Manchuria and Korea together, it may be said that Russia’s
economic interests are, even in Manchuria, rather for her glory as a
great, expanding empire than for any imperative need of trade and
emigration in that particular part of her Asiatic dominion, while
similar interests of Japan, primarily in Korea and secondarily in
Manchuria, are vital, as they are essential for her own life and
development as a nation. The case for Russia can, perhaps, never be
understood until her _political_ issues are examined.
Politically, also, the interests of the two Powers are found to be
directly opposed to one another. It has been rightly said that Manchuria
is the keynote of the Eastern policy of Russia. Besides its immense
wealth still unexploited, Manchuria possesses the great Port Arthur,
which is the only nearly ice-free naval outlet for Russia in her vast
dominion in Asia, while the 1500 miles of the Manchurian Railway,
together with the Great Siberian Railway, connect this important naval
station with the army bases in Siberia and European Russia, so that
Manchuria alone would seem to be politically more valuable for Russia
than the rest of her Asiatic territories. Without Manchuria, Russia
would be left inclosed in the ice-bound Siberia, with no naval or
commercial outlet during nearly five months of each year. With
Manchuria, Russia’s traditional policy, which has repeatedly failed
since Peter the Great on the Baltic Sea and other European waters, as
also on the Persian Gulf,—the policy of becoming the dominant naval
power of the world,—would at last begin to be realized. The very
importance of Manchuria for Russia, however, constitutes a serious
menace to Japan and to the general peace of the Far East. In the first
place, the Russian control of Port Arthur gives her a large measure of
control over the water approaches to Peking, while the Mongolian Railway
now reported to be in contemplation would bring Russian land forces
directly upon the capital of the Chinese Empire. The very integrity of
China is threatened, and a more serious disturbance of the peace of the
world could hardly be imagined than the general partition and internal
outbreaks in China which would follow the fall of Peking under the
pressure of Russia from Manchuria and Mongolia. Not less grave is the
fact that Manchuria is geographically and historically connected with
the Peninsula of Korea,[92] which makes Russia’s occupation of Korea a
necessary adjunct of her possession of Manchuria. Geographically
considered, there exists no abrupt change from the eastern part of
Manchuria to the northern half of Korea,[93] which fact goes far to
explain the Russian solicitude to obtain railway and other concessions
between the frontier and Seul. Even more serious conditions exist on the
southern coast of Korea, which contains the magnificent harbor of
Masampo, which constitutes the Gibraltar between the Russian fleets at
the ice-bound and remote Vladivostok and the incommodious and not
altogether ice-free Port Arthur, with no effective means of connecting
them. By controlling this coast, Russia would not merely possess a truly
ice-free, and the best naval port to be found in East Asia,[94] but also
at last feel secure in Manchuria and complete her Far Eastern design of
absorbing Korea and China and pressing down toward India. If, on the
contrary, another Power should control Masampo, it would be able to
watch the movement of the Russian fleets in their attempts to unite with
one another, and also seriously impede the greatest hopes of Russia’s
Eastern expansion. From Japan’s standpoint, the Russian occupation of
this section of Korea would not only possibly close Korea against her
trade and enterprise, but also threaten her own integrity. Only fifty
miles away lie the Japanese islands of Tsushima, which Russia has always
coveted, and which would have been hers had it not been for the shrewd
diplomacy of the late Count Katsu.[95] From Tsushima the mainland of
Japan is visible on the eastern horizon, so that the presence of Russia
at Masampo would arouse in the heart of Japan the most profound feeling
of unrest. Russia must have Masampo, and Japan must not let her have it.
In concluding our discussion of the vital issues, both economical and
political, which are at stake, it would seem that Manchuria is for Japan
a great market as well as an increasingly important supply region of raw
and food products and a field for emigration, while for Russia it is the
keynote of her Eastern policy, and economically the most promising of
all her Asiatic possessions. On the other hand, Korea is essential for
Russia for the completion of her Manchurian policy,[96] and for
strengthening enormously her general position in the East. For Japan,
Korea is nothing short of one half of her vitality. By the opening or
closing, strength or weakness, independence or fall, of Korea, would
Japan’s fate as a nation be decided. On the contrary, Russia, with
Manchuria and ultimately Korea in her hands, would be able, on the one
hand, to build up under her exclusive policy a naval and commercial
influence strong enough to enable her to dominate the East, and, on the
other, to cripple forever Japan’s ambition as a nation, slowly drive her
to starvation and decay, and even politically annex her. From Japan’s
point of view, Korea and China must be left open freely to the economic
enterprise of herself and others alike, and, in order to effect that
end, they must remain independent and become stronger by their internal
development and reform.[97] Russia’s interests are intelligible, as are
Japan’s, but unfortunately their desires are antagonistic to each other,
so that a conflict between an open and an exclusive policy is rendered
inevitable. The series of events during the past decades, particularly
since 1895, which we shall narrate in this volume, has only served to
bring this conflict into a sharp clash in arms.
* * * * *
In closing, it may not be entirely out of place to attempt a speculation
upon the significance of the conflict, not to the belligerents, but to
the world at large. From the latter’s point of view, the contest may
fairly be regarded as a dramatic struggle between two civilizations, old
and new, Russia representing the old civilization and Japan the new. Two
dominant features, among others, seem to characterize the opposition of
the contending nations: namely, first, that Russia’s economics are
essentially agricultural, while those of Japan are largely and
increasingly industrial; and, secondly, that Japan’s strength lies more
on sea than on land, while Russia represents an enormous contiguous
expansion on land. It is evident that the wealth of a nation and its
earning capacity cannot grow fast under a trade system under which it
imports many and exports few manufactures.[98] The commercial prosperity
of Russia depended formerly upon its nearness, first to the trade route
with the Levant, and then to the free cities of Germany, but with the
fall of Constantinople and the decline of the Hansa towns the business
activity of Southern and Baltic Russia has in turn passed away. Then,
from the time of Ivan the Terrible, she unified her European territory,
and expanded eastward on land, until she had embraced within her
dominion much of Central and all of Northern Asia. For such an expansion
Russia seems to have been particularly fitted, for her primitive
economic organization suffers little from external disturbances, while
the autocratic form of her government enables her to maintain and
execute her traditional policy of expansion. But the real importance of
her expansion appears to be more territorial than commercial, for the
days of the land trade with the Orient are numbered. Even the great
Siberian Railway would not successfully divert the Eastern trade
landward.[99] If Russia would be prosperous she must control the Eastern
sea by occupying northeast China and Korea. Here she comes in conflict
with Japan, the champion in the East of the rising civilization. The
economic centre of the world has been fast passing to America, where
cotton, wheat, coal, and iron abound, the people excel in energy and
intelligence, and the government is servant to the welfare and progress
of the people. Japan has joined the circle of this civilization, ever
since the influence of the youthful nation of America was extended to
her through Commodore Perry[100] and Townsend Harris, and the spirit of
national progress through industry and education was eagerly adopted by
her. To-day, Japan stands within the range of the interests of the
British and American sea-power over the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian
oceans, while Russia, on the other hand, represents a vast expansion on
land.
The historical bearing of the effects of the old civilization to the
world may, perhaps, be best characterized by the one word—_unnatural_.
Observe, first, the effect of the policy of land aggression on the
internal affairs of Russia. The policy is costly. Hence the great
incongruity between the economics of the people, which are agricultural,
and the finance of her government, which would be too expensive even for
the most highly advanced industrial nation. Hence, also, it is, perhaps,
that the richer and more powerful her government becomes, the poorer and
more discontented her people seem to grow. Her administration must
naturally be maintained by the suspicion of her people and the
suppression of their freedom,[101] and the suspicion and suppression
must become more exhaustive as the disparity widens between rulers and
ruled.[102] Under these circumstances, a constitutional régime would not
be possible, for a free expression of the popular will would be hardly
compatible with a form of government which seeks to strengthen the state
at the expense of the nation. Again, consider the unnatural situation of
an agricultural nation competing in the world’s market with industrial,
trading nations which command a higher and more effective economic
organization. If Russia would sell her goods, her markets abroad must be
created and maintained by artificial means:[103] protective and
exclusive measures must be pushed to such an extent as to distance all
foreign competition, the interests of the consumer must be
disregarded,[104] and those of the growing industrial nations must be
sacrificed,[105] all for the sake of artificially promoting the belated
manufactures in Russia.[106] From this unnatural state of things would
seem to follow the Russian policy of territorial occupation and
commercial exclusion in the East, and also her free use of the old-time
intrigue in diplomacy; for it is Russia’s fortune that she would not be
able to compete freely with the new, growing civilization, whose open
arts she cannot employ to her advantage, but to whose advanced standard
of international morals she must appear to conform. Her position forbids
her to have recourse to an open policy and fair play, and yet she cannot
afford to overtly uphold the opposite principles.[107] On the other
hand, the new civilization, represented in the present contest by Japan,
relies more largely upon the energy and resources of the individual
person, whose rights it respects, and upon an upright treatment by the
nations of one another.
What is the goal of the warfare of these two civilizations? It is, it
may be said, the immensely rich and yet undeveloped North China, of
which Manchuria is a part, and to which Korea is an appendix. Over this
territory, the interests of Russia and Japan have come to a clear and
sharp clash, those of the former demanding the subjection and closure of
this great portion of the earth’s surface, and those of the latter
imperatively calling for its independence and progress.
Whoever wins, the issues are momentous. If Russia should win, not only
Korea and Manchuria, but also Mongolia would be either annexed by Russia
or placed under her protection, and Japan’s progress would be checked
and her life would begin to fail. Russia would assume a commanding
position over all the Powers in the East, while the trading nations of
the world would be either largely or completely excluded from an
important economic section of Asia. The Siberian railway system might at
last be made to pay, and Russia’s exclusive policy would enable her and
her ally France to divide the profit of the Eastern trade with the more
active industrial nations. The old civilization would enjoy an
artificial revival, under the influence of which China and Korea would
be exploited by the victors and, for the most part,[108] closed against
reformatory influences from abroad. All these momentous results would be
in the interest of an exclusive policy incorporating principles which
are generally regarded as inimical to freedom and progress. If, on the
contrary, Japan should win, the doubtful importance of the Siberian
Railroad as a carrier of the Eastern trade would in the mean time be
further overshadowed by the Panama Canal, and it would be compelled to
perform its perhaps proper function of developing the vast resources of
Siberia and Manchuria. The Oriental commerce would be equally free and
open to all; the Empires of China and Korea would not only remain
independent, but, under the influence of the new civilization, their
enormous resources would be developed and their national institutions
reformed, the immense advantages of which would be enjoyed by all the
nations which are interested in the East. There would naturally result a
lasting peace in the East and the general uplifting of one third of the
human race. Japan’s growth and progress after the war would be even more
remarkable than in the past. In short, East Asia would be forcibly
brought under the influence of the new civilization, the effect of which
would not be without a profound reaction upon Russia herself. Humanity
at large, including the Russians, would thereby be the gainer. The
difference in the effects of the outcome of the war, according to who is
the victor, would be tremendous. Which will win, the old civilization or
the new? The world at this moment stands at the parting of the ways.
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE
ON THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY[109]
According to an estimate made by a Russian expert of the carrying
capacity of the great Siberian railway system,[110] the Siberian section
alone will carry at least 190 million poods, and the Manchurian section
from 100 to 150 million poods, making a total of 300 to 350 million
poods, approximately. It is contended, however, that, while the present
conditions of the inhabitants of Siberia and Manchuria make it possible
for the railway to carry only raw and crudely manufactured goods, these
are the very articles whose cost would easily be raised by the long
distance over which they have to be carried by rail. In Europe, it never
pays to carry these articles for a longer distance than 2000 miles. Nor
would it in Siberia, unless abnormal reductions are made in freight
rates, or unless commerce and manufacture are artificially fostered in
Siberia and Manchuria. It is supposed, therefore, that it would always
be unprofitable to carry bulky, cheap goods between Europe and the East
on the Siberian Railway. China’s exports to Russia consist of such
costly goods as teas and silks, which may be profitably transported by
rail, but thus far even teas have only begun to be so transported under
more or less artificial measures in favor of the railway traffic at the
expense of the routes through Kiakhta, up the Amur, and by sea to
Odessa. As to Russian imports into China, cotton and woolen goods and
metals would never be carried by rail under normal circumstances.[111]
The benefit of the eight thousand versts of the railway from Moscow to
Dalny may be safely said to be as slight to the carrying trade as it is
great to the travelers and postal service between Europe and the East.
The statistics for 1899 and 1900 show that the bulk of the Russian trade
with China was carried on land, but that the land trade was decreasing
and sea trade increasing. See the following table (unit 1000
rubles):[112]—
│ Export Import Total Ratio
1899│Land 7,522 30,007 37,520 74%
│Sea 4 13,508 13,512 26%
────┼────────────────────────────────
1900│Land 6,678 29,779 36,457 69%
│Sea 24 16,166 16,190 31%
It should be noted, however, that the period covered by the table is not
only too short, but also precedes the opening of the Manchurian Railroad
to trade, which took place only in 1903. Nor should it be overlooked
that the figures indicate the China trade of _Russia_ alone.
Regarding the _European_ trade with China in general, M. Sorokin,
Assistant Director of Customs at Niu-chwang, is reported to have
remarked that the freight per pood from Europe to the East was five
rubles on land and 1.50 on sea.[113] Certain articles, such as
glassware, tobacco, and the like, seem to be carried from Russia to
China at two rubles by rail and one ruble by ships.[114] The sea route
consumes nearly two months, but, for bulky merchandise, it would be
impossible for the railway to compete with it.
It is interesting, in this connection, to remember that, from _America_,
the freight between San Francisco and the Eastern ports has been reduced
repeatedly during the last year, owing to the competition among the
shipping companies, so that the charge for flour does not seem to be
more than one mill per ton-mile, or forty cents a hundred pounds for
8000 miles.
During 1901, according to the latest statistics available, the deficit
of the Ussuri branch of the Siberian Railway is said to have amounted to
$435,162, and that of the entire railway to $11,330,000.[115]
* * * * *
In this connection, it is interesting to note that this view is further
confirmed by no less authority than Count Cassini, the present Russian
Minister at Washington, who, in his statement given on April 9, and
published in the _North American Review_ for May, 1904, said:
“... Consider Russia’s position commercially toward Manchuria with that
of the United States. In this country [the United States] are made not
only the very materials that would find a sale among the people of the
province, but with American goods shipped by an all-water route, the
cost of transportation would be much lower than the cost of carrying on
the all-land routes to which Russia would be confined. Should Russia
ship by water to Manchuria from Odessa, the distance would still be too
great to make competition with the United States successful. From Moscow
to Port Arthur the distance by rail is 5000 miles. It is therefore easy
to realize the privileged position of the United States in competing
over an all-water route from the Pacific coast, with Russia over an
all-rail route.”[116]
-----
Footnote 1:
Official figures for December 31, 1903. The _Fourth Financial and
Economical Annual of Japan_, 1904 (hereafter abbreviated as the
_Fourth Annual_), published by the Department of Finance, Imperial
Government of Tokio, p. 5. The actual numbers may be even higher.
Footnote 2:
_The Monthly Return of the Foreign Trade of the Empire of Japan_ for
May, 1904, published by the Department of Finance, pp. 91–95.
Footnote 3:
_Japan in the Beginning of the 20th Century_ (hereafter abbreviated as
the _20th Century_), compiled by the Department of Agriculture and
Commerce, Tokio, 1903, pp. 53–58.
Footnote 4:
Or, 241,891,946 out of 285,971,623 _yen_. As the term manufacture is
expansive, the articles herein included should be enumerated. They
are: clothing, chemicals and drugs, metal wares, oil and wax, paper,
cotton yarn and fabrics, raw and woven silks, tobacco, and sundries.
Teas, grain, marine products and other food-stuffs, and furs, as well
as reëxported articles, are excluded. See the _Kwampō_ (Official
Gazette of Japan), No. 6199 (March 4, 1904), p. 77, table 7.
Footnote 5:
The crop of rice has increased since 1877 from 26.6 million to about
42,000,000 _koku_; that of barley, rye, and wheat from 9.6 million to
19 million _koku_. But the increase has been due more to an improved
cultivation than to an extension of acreage. Although the wheat,
barley, and rye land has grown from 2.35 million in 1877 to 4.43
million acres in 1901, the rice land has increased from 6,517,000 to
only 6,982,000 acres. The crops of hemp and rape are stationary, while
those of sugar, cotton, and indigo have largely fallen off. (These
figures have been converted from those in the _20th Century_, pp. 119
ff. One _koku_ dry is equivalent to 4.9629 bushels.)
Footnote 6:
These figures have been worked out from the _Kokumin Shimbun_
(National News, hereafter abbreviated as the _Kokumin_) of February 5,
10, and 19, 1904. Also see a table and comment in the _Tōyō Keizai
Shimpō_ (“Oriental Economist”), for May 5, 1903, pp. 17–19.
Footnote 7:
If sugar is added to the list, the figures will go up to more than 190
million _yen_, or 60 per cent. of the entire import trade.
Footnote 8:
289.2 million _yen_ in 1902–3. The _Fourth Annual_, pp. 4 and 9, and
plate 3. Also see the _Tōyō Keizai Shimpō_ (“Oriental Economist”) for
December 5, 1902, pp. 19–21 and chart.
Footnote 9:
Or, less than 7,000,000 acres of wet fields and less than 6,000,000 of
upland fields, the latter including mulberry and tea gardens, besides
fields for _mugi_, beans, and vegetables. Based on the _20th Century_,
pp. 95 ff.
Footnote 10:
This figure includes, however, all the land inclined at angles less
than 15°, so that, from the practical point of view, it may be
considered as highly exaggerated. The actual extent of the reclamation
of wild land advances at a slow pace outside of the still largely
undeveloped island of Hokkaidō. See _ibid._, pp. 95–96, 104.
Footnote 11:
Or, about 23,000,000 acres for nearly 47,000,000 people. If we take
only the land under cultivation, on the one hand, and only the farming
population, on the other, the ratio still remains the same, for then
we have 13,000,000 acres for 28,000,000 people. The aggregate of the
capital involved in the agriculture of Japan, including the value of
land, buildings, implements, and live stock, is estimated at
7,400,000,000 _yen_, while the annual crops return about 1,000,000,000
_yen_. See the _20th Century_, pp. 105–106.
Footnote 12:
The annual rainfall of Japan proper averages between 1300 mm. at
Awomori and 2040 mm. at Kagoshima. A fairly rich sedimentary formation
of soil is found everywhere, owing to the hilly nature of the country
and the short and rapid current of the rivers.
Footnote 13:
Wherever possible, the farmer contrives to raise more than one crop on
his land in different seasons during the year. In fact, more than 30
per cent. of rice land yields other crops besides rice, at places
_mugi_, indigo, beans, and rape being cultivated on the same piece of
land.
Footnote 14:
More than half of the wet fields of the country consist of lots
smaller than one-eighth acre, and nearly three fourths are each less
than one-quarter acre. The average size of the lots outside of Formosa
and Hokkaidō is put down as .1 acre for wet fields and .12 acre for
upland fields.
Footnote 15:
Compare the report of the U. S. Consul-General Bellows at Yokohama in
the U. S. _Consular Reports_, advance sheets, No. 1757 (September 24,
1903). In addition to the conditions here enumerated, it must be
remembered that there exists little or no pasture land in Japan, and
that nearly all the labor is done by hand, there being only 1,500,000
horses and 1,300,000 horned animals in the country. See the _20th
Century_, chapters on agriculture; the _Annual_, No. III, tables
x-xiii; J. J. Rein’s _Industries of Japan_, English translation, New
York, 1889, chapters on agriculture; and H. Dumolard’s _Le Japon
politique, économique et social_, Paris, 1903, pp. 109–121.
Footnote 16:
The _20th Century_, p. 117; Dumolard, pp. 112–113.
Footnote 17:
This ratio includes, however, in the tenant class those farmers who
are partly lessees and partly proprietors of small lots. In 1888, the
ratio between (1) independent farmers, (2) partly lessees, and (3)
entirely lessees, was 147:200:95. Since that time the ratio must have
grown in favor of the tenants. See the _20th Century_, p. 90.
Footnote 18:
See the U. S. _Consular Reports_, advance sheets, No. 1529 (December
26, 1902). In 1902 the total debts of the farming classes of Japan
were estimated at 400 million _yen_. Mr. S. Nakayama, in the _Tōyō
Keizai Shimpō_ (“Oriental Economist”) for July 15, 1902, p. 14.
Footnote 19:
In 1903, Japan’s American trade was much below that of 1902. The
latter showed an increase of 362 per cent. over 1890.
Footnote 20:
The actual figures were:—
European American Japanese
1890 57,200,000 _yen_ 36,700,000 _yen_ 45,700,000 _yen_
1903 166,900,000 _yen_ 95,900,000 _yen_ 295,900,000 _yen_
Footnote 21:
In East Asia are included Korea, China, Hong-kong, British India,
French Indo-China, Dutch East Indies, the Straits Settlements, Siam,
the Philippines, and Russian Eastern Asia. If Hong-kong, an
essentially transit-trade port, is excluded, the East Asiatic trade of
Japan amounts to 264,476,239 _yen_, or 43.6 per cent. of the entire
foreign trade of Japan. See the _Kwampō_ (Official Gazette of Japan),
No. 6199 (March 4, 1904), p. 74, table 4.
Of the three great divisions of Japan’s markets, Europe sells her
machineries and articles of general consumption, and buys in return
such peculiar products of her soil as silks and teas. East Asia,
including India and the southern islands, takes coal and manufactured
goods in general and furnishes cotton, food-stuffs, and other articles
of more direct need than the European goods. America occupies a unique
position in regard to Japan, as it combines to a large extent the
peculiarities of both Europe and East Asia: it exports to Japan cotton
and flour, besides machinery and goods of general consumption, and
imports from her, not only raw silk and tea, but also smaller
manufactured articles.
Footnote 22:
Oil-cakes are used as manure. As to rice, wheat, and flour, it is
unnecessary to say that their importation depends largely upon the
conditions of the crop at home.
Footnote 23:
The present author has often met persons who misinterpreted the “open
door” to mean the complete throwing open of a country to the ruthless
exploitation of the foreigner. The “open door,” it is needless to say,
merely negatives a differential treatment in favor of one or more
foreign nations at the expense of all the others. It does not
necessarily imply a wide opening, but an impartial, even if narrow,
opening for all nations.
Footnote 24:
Consult the British _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, Annual Series,
Nos. 2995 and 2999; the U. S. _Monthly Summary of Commerce and
Finance_, January, 1904, pp. 2410–1; the _Kokumin_, September 19–21,
1901; Minister Kiyoura’s address before the Osaka Chamber of Commerce,
February, 1904.
Footnote 25:
The figures were taken from the _Monthly Summary of Commerce and
Finance of the United States_ for February, 1904, p. 3006.
Footnote 26:
From _ibid._, p. 3006. In 1903, rice imported amounted to 51,960,000
_yen_ in value. The _Fourth Annual_, p. 77.
Footnote 27:
See the U. S. _Monthly Summary_, February, 1904, pp. 3006 and 3013.
Footnote 28:
At present, Chinese merchants in Korea compete with the Japanese only
at the ports on the western coast, principally in the import trade of
silk. The number of the Chinese residents in Korea is one tenth that
of the Japanese, or about 4000.
Footnote 29:
The _Kokumin_, January 30, 1904.
Footnote 30:
Based on the figures in the _British Diplomatic and Consular Report:
Trade of Corea for the Year 1903_, pp. 11–13.
Footnote 31:
Of the 1430 vessels, aggregating 1,104,000 tons, entered at and
cleared from Niu-chwang in 1902, the Japanese had 710 vessels and
491,000 tons, the British, 374 vessels and 350,000 tons, the Germans,
88 vessels and 73,000 tons, and so forth.—The _Kokumin_, April 29,
1904, from the _Tai Shin-Kan Bōyeki Chōsa Hōkoku_ (report on the trade
with China and Korea), compiled by the Department of Agriculture and
Commerce, Tokio, 1904. The Russians could show only 3 vessels and
1,223 tons, which was below their record for 1901 and less than one
half of the average of the five years 1886, 1897, 1898, 1899, and
1901.—The British _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, Annual Series,
No. 2999 (on Niu-chwang), p. 9.
Footnote 32:
_Ibid._, p. 8.
Footnote 33:
The direct import trade of any trading nation at Niu-chwang does not
represent the actual amount of the articles imported from the country
of that nation, for most of the foreign goods come to Niu-chwang
through some other distributing centres in China, such as Hong-kong or
Shanghai. The Japanese goods, however, are nearly all carried by
Japanese vessels. On the contrary, the American imports, besides
jeans, drills, sheetings, kerosenes, and flour, are not specified in
the customs returns of Niu-chwang, and consequently their nominal
figures are insignificant (7396 _l._ in 1901 and 4089 _l._ in 1902),
while Hong-kong, through which most of the American goods are imported
into Niu-chwang, showed, in 1902, 385,302 _l._, or 55 per cent. of the
entire direct trade. On the other hand, the estimate made by the
Bureau of Statistics, Department of Commerce and Labor, Washington,
showing 18,000,000 haikwan taels for the _real_ import of American
goods into Niu-chwang, seems to be pretty liberal. See British _D. and
C. Reports_, annual series, No. 2999, p. 8, and the U. S. _Monthly
Summary of Commerce and Finance_, January, 1904, p. 2328.
Footnote 34:
See the _Tsūshō Isan_ for January 22, 1903, pp. 10–11.
Footnote 35:
See the _Tōyō Keizai Shimpō_ (“Oriental Economist”), No. 165 (July 15,
1900), and No. 244 (September 25, 1902).
Footnote 36:
The _Kokumin_, November 26, 1903.
Footnote 37:
The _Annai_, pp. 58–61.
Footnote 38:
Mr. Shiga’s letter, in the _Kokumin_, July 5, 1904.
Footnote 39:
In July, 1903, there were, besides soldiers, 26,705 Japanese in the
eight treaty ports and Seul and Ping-yang. To these must be added
about 4000 who lived on some islands and places outside of the treaty
ports. See the _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_ (Report of the Dōbun Association),
No. 41, pp. 95–96, and the _Tsūshō Isan_ for October 18, 1903, pp.
29–47; April 8, 1904, pp. 28–52. Mr. Yamamoto places the number of the
Japanese residents in Korea at 40,000. See his _Saishin Chōsen Ijū
Annai_ (latest guide for emigration to Korea; hereafter abbreviated as
the _Annai_), Tokio, 1904, p. 14.
Footnote 40:
The _Annai_, pp. 8–9, 19–20.
Footnote 41:
_Ibid._, p. 81.
Footnote 42:
In July, 1903, of the 26,645 Japanese in Korea, 15,442 were men and
11,263 women. It may be noted, in passing, that, in the case of
Manchuria, a great majority of the Japanese women residing there are
not the wives of the male settlers, and hence the comparative numbers
of men and women there should not lead us to a similar conclusion as
to Korea. This part of the problem of Japanese emigration opens up an
interesting social question, which it is hardly necessary for us to
discuss here.
Footnote 43:
From the legal standpoint, the Japanese had no right, outside of the
treaty settlements, to live or buy land.
Footnote 44:
On March 31, 1904, there were about 1,234,000 _yen_ of these notes in
circulation against a reserve of 944,000 _yen_. From the British _C.
and D. Reports_; _Trade of Korea for the Year 1903_, pp. 7–8.
The Russians and their sympathizers at Seul have more than once tried,
though unsuccessfully, to induce the Korean Government to suppress the
issue of the notes. See pp. 281–284, below.
Footnote 45:
The nickel coins of Korea have been so debased and so much
counterfeited that they are at a discount of much more than 100 per
cent.
Footnote 46:
The right of building this line was originally granted by the Korean
Government to Mr. Morse, an American citizen, in March, 1896, who,
however, sold it to a Japanese syndicate in November, 1898, and handed
the line over to the latter before it was completed. The whole line
was in working order in July, 1899. See p. 286 (Article 3), below.
Footnote 47:
Actual work was begun in August, 1901, but Japan’s want of capital was
such that by the first of December, 1903, only thirty-one miles from
both ends had been built. In view of the immense economic and
strategic importance of the line, the Japanese Government, which had
for a certain period of time guaranteed 6 per cent. annual interest on
25,000,000 _yen_, which was fixed as the minimum capital of the
company, now further promoted its work by liberal measures, so as to
make it possible for the company to complete the line before the end
of the present year. Both the Korean and Japanese Imperial Houses own
shares of the company.
Footnote 48:
The line passes through the richest and most populous four provinces
of Korea, which comprise nearly seven tenths of all the houses in the
Empire, and cover more than five sevenths of the cultivated area of
the country, with considerable capacity for future cultivation and
improvement. The road also connects places to which the Koreans flock
from neighboring regions for the periodical fairs held there. These
fairs occur six times each month, held alternately in different
places, besides great annual fairs in large cities. Among the
thirty-nine stations of this railroad, six will be daily seen holding
fairs, for which the traffic of passengers and merchandise through the
road will be considerable. It is safe to say that five sevenths of the
entire Korean foreign trade belong to the sphere controlled by this
line, and also that nearly all of this trade is in reality the fast
growing Japan-Korea trade. The effect of the completion of the line
upon this trade will be tremendous. See Mr. J. Shinobu’s _Kan Hantō_
(“The Korean Peninsula”), Tokio, 1901.
Footnote 49:
The French have an agreement with the Korean Government regarding a
Seul-Fusan railway. The Seul Government is to build it with its own
money, and the French to furnish engineers and material. Not a mile of
rail has been laid by the impecunious Government, and the present war
is rapidly changing the entire situation. A Japanese railway for
strategic purposes has already been started from Seul northward.
Another line, between Seul and Wonsan (Gensan), will also be built by
the Japanese in the near future.
Footnote 50:
It was one of the first propositions from Japan to Russia during the
long negotiations between them which have ended in the present war,
that Russia should not impede Japan’s possible attempt in the future
to extend the Fusan-Seul Railway in the manner above described. See p.
286 (Article 3), below.
Footnote 51:
A promoter of Russian interests in Korea, and to all intents and
purposes a semi-official diplomat for Russia, living at Seul and
observing the political barometer of the Court at close range. Another
person, perhaps less known to the outside world, but far more
influential at Court, is a woman, Fräulein Sonntag, a relative of the
wife of the ex-Russian Minister Waeber at Seul. See p. 280, below.
Footnote 52:
The _Kokumin_, January 15, 1904.
Footnote 53:
From an address by Mr. Suerō Katō, of the Department of Agriculture
and Commerce, who had studied the agriculture of Korea on the ground
three times in succession.—_Ibid._, May 27, 1904.
Footnote 54:
Calculated from the data given in the _Kokumin_ for January 8, 1904.
The official census of Korea for 1902 gives a population of 5,782,806,
but assuming that there live 145 people per square mile, which is one
half the density of the population in China, the Korean population
cannot be much below 12,000,000. The official record of the land under
cultivation is also untrustworthy for institutional reasons not
necessary to mention here.
Footnote 55:
The question of cultivating the waste land in Korea by Japanese
enterprise, however, has called forth a very delicate situation which
still awaits the most careful solution. The progress of this situation
will be a matter of great interest, but it is still too early to
discuss it. Cf. the _Korea Review_ for July and August, 1904, and
follow its subsequent numbers.
Footnote 56:
See the _Tsūshō Isan_ for August 3, 1903, and the _Kokumin_ for
January 7, 15, and 16, 1904.
Footnote 57:
The rent is of two kinds: either to be decided anew each year after
the harvest, or to deliver to the proprietor 50 per cent. of the crop.
It should always be remembered that a large majority of actual
cultivators are tenants, the proprietors being limited to a small
class of rich men, officers, and nobles. The daily wage of the laborer
on the farm averages 20 _sen_, but it is usually paid in kind, as are
debts and repayments in many cases. The standard of life of the Korean
farmer is perhaps lower than that of the Japanese, but apparently not
less comfortable. The national land tax is said to be mild and largely
discarded, but the house tax, special tax, local tax, and the like,
bring up the dues of the farmer sometimes to an unendurable extent.
The tenant, after paying his rent and other charges, is obliged to
sell what little rice is left to him at the earliest opportunity, so
that he henceforth becomes a buyer of rice, and consequently has
little to buy other articles with, and still less to save, until his
spring harvest of wheat comes in. Woe betide him when both the rice
and the wheat crops fail! See the _Kokumin_, January 13 and 14, 1904,
and the _Tsūshō Isan_ for August 3, 1903, p. 21.
Footnote 58:
An address by Mr. G. Hirose, a competent eye-witness, in the
_Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 48, November, 1903, pp. 15 ff. Official
census, however, gives only 2806 Japanese in Manchuria (December 30,
1903). See the _Tsūshō Isan_ for April 13, 1904, pp. 33–38.
Footnote 59:
Mr. Hirose, already mentioned, refers to a Japanese capitalist who
started a lumber business in Kirin Province and another who discovered
coal deposits near Harbin and began to mine them, both of whom, in
spite of the permits they had received from the Chinese authorities by
regular process, were driven away arbitrarily under threats of the
Russian military. The _Dōbun-kwai_, No. 48, pp. 21–22.
Footnote 60:
The so-called Manchus, the original inhabitants of Manchuria, have
migrated to China proper, which they conquered during the seventeenth
century. The present inhabitants of Manchuria are immigrant Chinese,
whose greater economic capacity has been rapidly developing this
immensely rich territory.
Footnote 61:
An official report of the Province of Amur, dated June 22, 1903,
denies that the actual cost of construction per verst was, as had been
alleged, 150,000 rubles, but 113,183 rubles. The _Tsūshō Isan_ for
August 8, 1903, p. 46. A ruble is equivalent to about 51.5 cents.
In this connection, it is interesting to note in M. Witte’s report to
the Czar after the former’s tour in the Far East in 1902, that the
Siberian Railway had cost 758,955,907 rubles, but, with the
Circum-Baikal section, would cost not less than 1,000,000,000 rubles,
excluding the salaries of officers, expenses for soldiers, the Pacific
fleet, harbor work, and the like. The _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 42, p.
30.
Footnote 62:
According to the “Past and Present of the Siberian Railway,” compiled
in 1903 by the government committee in charge of the railway, as
quoted in the _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 51, pp. 58–60.
Footnote 63:
M. Witte’s report of September, 1901, quoted in the _Kokumin_ for
October 1, 1904.
Footnote 64:
Consul Miller at Niu-chwang, in the U. S. daily _Consular Reports_,
February 15, 1904 (No. 1877), p. 8.
Footnote 65:
The _Tsūshō Isan_, November 25, 1903, pp. 16–18.
Footnote 66:
The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, July 30, 1903.
Footnote 67:
See the _Shiberiya oyobi Manshū_ (“Siberia and Manchuria”) Tokio,
1904, compiled by T. Kawakami, special agent of the Foreign Office of
Japan, who was sent to Siberia and Northern Manchuria to investigate
economic and military conditions there, pp. 94, 119–121, 124, 138.
Footnote 68:
For the relative advantages of the Manchurian Railway and the Amur
River, see the U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, August 5 and October 5,
1903, and January 19, 1904.
Footnote 69:
The Russia-China trade began more than 250 years ago. Before 1860, it
was carried wholly on land, and its balance was nearly even. Since
1860, when sea trade from Odessa was opened, the progress of this
trade has been slower than the general foreign trade of China, and its
balance has been heavily against Russia (6,702,000 against 45,945,000
rubles in 1900). More than half of the Russian imports into China
consists of cotton fabrics, and over 80 per cent. of the exports from
China to Russia are teas. Russia’s share in the entire foreign trade
of China has also fallen from 4.6 per cent. in 1899 to 4.4 per cent.
in 1900, 2.6 per cent. in 1901, and 2.3 per cent. in 1902, as compared
with the growing share of the trade by Japan amounting to 14.2 per
cent., 15.9 per cent., 15.7 per cent., and 18.4 per cent., in those
respective years. Of the Russian share of 2.6 per cent. in 1901,
Russian Manchuria occupied only 0.6 per cent. See the _Tsūshō Isan_,
July 8, 1903, pp. 1–4; T. Yoshida’s _Shina Bōyeki Jijō_ (Trade
Conditions in China), Tokio, 1902, pp. 128–129, etc. For the gold
values of the figures up to 1903, see the British _D. and C. Reports_,
annual series, No. 3280.
Footnote 70:
From Russian official figures quoted in the _Tsūshō Isan_, November
25, 1903.
Footnote 71:
The reader is recommended to the reports of the United States Consul
Miller at Niu-chwang, particularly those which appeared in the daily
_Consular Reports_ for January 21 and 24, and February 5, 1904 (Nos.
1856, 1858, and 1869). Reference should also be made to the ex-British
Consul at Niu-chwang, Alexander Hosie’s _Manchuria_, London, 1901 (new
edition, New York, 1904).
The resources of Eastern Manchuria are well described in the _Tsūshō
Isan_, October 13, 1903, and those of Northern Manchuria in the
_Shiberiya oyobi Manshū_, Tokio, 1904, compiled by the Foreign Office
of Japan, pp. 427–485.
Footnote 72:
The present population of Manchuria is differently estimated between
the limits of 6.5 and 15 millions. Probably there are more than 10
millions. Immigration was said to have been progressing rapidly under
the Chinese rule.
It is noteworthy that Siberia, with a larger area than Manchuria,
contains only about 8,000,000 inhabitants. The productive capacity of
the Manchurian population must be measured, however, not only by their
larger numbers, but also by their far superior economic training.
Footnote 73:
The _Tsūshō Isan_ for June 23, 1903, pp. 34–35. Pood = 36.112 lbs.;
ruble = 51.5 cents.
Footnote 74:
Under this and other differential measures the commercial importance
of Vladivostok is said to be fast passing away. Local merchants made a
strong plea of their case before M. Witte when he traveled in the East
in 1902, but on his return he reported to the Czar that the interests
of the Empire demanded a large sacrifice at Vladivostok for the sake
of Dalny.
Footnote 75:
The effect of the new duties levied on tea at other places than Dalny
is seen in the following comparative table. The figures for 1902 are
taken from the U. S. _Monthly Summary_ for January, 1904, p. 2420, and
those for 1903 have been converted from data given in the British _D.
and C. Reports_, Annual Series No. 3280.
In 1902, the Russian Empire took 882,893 out of the 1,519,211 _piculs_
of tea exported from China, while in 1903 the corresponding amounts
were 1,010,580 out of 1,677,530. The distribution of the imported teas
to the Russian Empire, according to the routes, was as follows:—
1902 1903
_Via_ Odessa and Batum 206,699 _piculs_ 200,391 _piculs_
_Via_ Kiakhta 403,648 244,668
To Russian Manchuria 272,546 191,679
To Port Arthur and Dalny 373,842
We presume that most of the teas exported to Russian Manchuria went
through Niu-chwang. The table plainly shows an increased importation
at Dalny at the expense of all other points. It is not known how much
of the 373,842 _piculs_ imported at Dalny and Port Arthur was
reshipped to other ports not mentioned here. (_Picul_ = 133⅓ lbs. av.)
Footnote 76:
See the _Tsūshō Isan_, April 18 and August 3, 1903, and the U. S.
daily _Consular Reports_, January 21, 1904 (No. 1856). Reduction
apparently had not reached its minimum point. It was unknown whether
Dalny handled much of the Manchurian export trade.
Footnote 77:
The _Kokumin_, March 7, 1903. The ex-Japanese Consul at Niu-chwang,
Mr. K. Tanabe, doubts that Dalny will completely displace Niu-chwang
as an exporting centre. The latter is geographically the nature outlet
for the grain from the Liao Valley, and, in winter, the handling of
this product is apt to be done more at Mukden than at Dalny, the
latter becoming in that case a mere port of transit. Moreover,
mercantile customs differ so much at Niu-chwang and Dalny that it is
not possible that the conservative Chinese merchants should readily
transfer their business from the one place to the other. See Tanabe’s
conversation in the _Tōyō Keizai Zasshi_ (“Oriental Economist”), No.
244 (September 25, 1902), p. 16.
Footnote 78:
The central distributing station at Vladivostok has a capacity of
600,000 poods, and the one to be built at Dalny will hold 1,500,000
poods, to which a special tank steamer will bring oil from Batum.—The
_Tsūshō Isan_, May 3, 1903. Americans tried to build warehouses at
Dalny, but were opposed by Russians. The importation of American
kerosenes at Niu-chwang decreased from 3,172,000 gallons ($410,500) in
1901 to 603,000 gallons ($77,000) in 1902, and the decrease was in no
small measure due to the Russian competition at Dalny.
Footnote 79:
The _Tsūshō Isan_, October 23, 1903, pp. 1–21; the U. S. daily
_Consular Reports_, May 7, July 16, and August 28, 1903, and February
23, 1904.
Footnote 80:
See Mr. Miller’s reports in the U. S. daily _Consular Reports_ for
January 21 and 24, and February 5 and 6, 1904 (Nos. 1856 1858, 1859,
and 1870).
Mr. James J. Hill, in a recent speech at Minneapolis, said that his
great system of transportation, by taking advantage of all conditions,
and by carrying full loads both ways, had been able to make a freight
rate of forty cents a hundred pounds of flour to the Orient, or one
mill per ton-mile. According to him, the effect of the growing
exportation of wheat from the Pacific coast to the East seems to have
caused an advance in its price at Minneapolis of five to seven cents
per bushel. In view of these facts, the possible exclusion of American
flour from Manchuria would not be without serious effects, especially
if we consider Mr. Hill’s opinion that the success of Mr.
Chamberlain’s financial scheme would result in enabling Manitoba to
supply all the wheat needed in Great Britain, thus leaving in the
United States a large surplus of grain, for which other markets would
have to be developed. See the American _Review of Reviews_ for
February, 1904.
Footnote 81:
The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, February 15, 1904 (No. 877), p.
11.
Footnote 82:
The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, January 19, 1904 (No. 1854). Also
see _ibid._, April 4, 1903.
Footnote 83:
British Consul Hosie’s report, the _British Parliamentary Papers_
(“Blue Books”), _China, No. 1 (1900)_, p. 154.
Footnote 84:
See U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, February 15, 1904 (No. 1877), and
the _Tsūshō Isan_, October 8, 1903, pp. 42–43.
Footnote 85:
The _North American Review_ for May, 1904, pp. 683–684.
Footnote 86:
For the laborious process of obtaining permits to carry on business
only for short terms in these great sites for future cities, see the
_Tsūshō Isan_, September 18 (pp. 40–41) and November 23 (pp. 39–40),
1903.
At Dalny, however, Russia has welcomed the coöperation of all
nationalities in its development, and has been rather disappointed at
their comparative indifference. See Mr. F. Nakasawa’s conversation in
the _Tōyō Keizai Zasshi_ (“Oriental Economist”), No. 262 (March 15,
1903), p. 13. The reasons for this modification at Dalny of the
customary Russian policy are plain, for the port must be developed as
rapidly as possible before the Russians can absolutely control its
trade. Thus the importance of Dalny as a trading port brings to
conspicuous prominence the universal contradiction of the Russian
commercial policy in East Asia. Russia would exclude other trading
nations from her possessions in order to control the trade, but is at
the same time unable to develop it without either the coöperation of
other people or some unnatural devices.
Footnote 87:
See pp. 313 ff., below.
Footnote 88:
On March 27, 1904, Russia declared that Niu-chwang was under her
martial law. This eventuality had been fully expected by Japan. The
gravity of the situation, however, may be understood, when we remember
that the Russian law of neutrality considers food as among contraband
goods, so that the supply of millet, beans, and bean-cakes from
Manchuria to Japan was henceforth completely closed, until the
Russians evacuated Niu-chwang in July.
Footnote 89:
These concessions were acquired by the Russians in 1896 when the
Korean King was still living in the Russian Legation in Seul. About
May, 1903, after more than seven years’ inactivity, the Russians began
to cut timber on a large scale along the Yalu River, and subsequently
made extensive improvements at Yongampu at the mouth of the river. The
political features of this event do not concern us here. See pp. 263,
289 ff., 318 ff., below.
Footnote 90:
Kaiserling is a successor to the two other Russians who, one after the
other, had been engaged in the whale fishery on the Japan Sea for a
long period of time. It was Kaiserling, however, who extended the
work, made an agreement with the Korean Government, and was turning
the business into an apparently successful enterprise. In 1901, his
two vessels caught about eighty whales, which number was in 1902
increased to 300.—The _Tsūshō Isan_, September 28, 1903, p. 34.
Footnote 91:
Mr. J. Sloat Fassett’s article in the American _Review of Reviews_,
for February, 1904, p. 174.
In the winter of 1902–3, ice at Dalny was six inches thick.—Mr. F.
Nakasawa in the _Tōyō Keizai Zasshi_ (“Oriental Economist”), No. 262
(March 15, 1903), p. 13.
Footnote 92:
It is well known that at several times in history kingdoms have been
built which extended over both sides of the present boundaries between
Korea and Manchuria.
Footnote 93:
It is noticeable that the Russian diplomatic historian already
referred to gives as a reason for the desirability of placing Korea
under Russian protection the need of safe-guarding the frontiers of
Russian territories adjacent to Korea.—The _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No.
49, p. 8.
Footnote 94:
The Bay of Masampo, generally so-called, which lies between the Island
of Koji and the Korean coast, is said to be deep and broad enough to
hold the largest fleet, sheltered from winds from all directions.
Several islands with sufficiently wide passages between them form a
splendid gate to the bay, while the western extremity of the latter
may be walked across, when the tide is low, from the Koji to the
coast.
As to the Masampo reach or inlet, specifically, which is the head of
the gulf, “its entrance, five cables wide, named the Gate, is
perfectly free from dangers, and is available for all classes of
vessels. On either side are treeless hills, bare in winter, but in
summer covered with grass; these hills, near the entrance, slope
steeply to the water’s edge. The general depth over the reach is seven
fathoms, but it shallows gradually as the town of Masampo is neared,
until at one mile from the town the depth is four fathoms....
Anchorage may be had anywhere in Masampo reach, according to draught;
a depth of three fathoms being found at half a mile from the town, and
six to seven fathoms at two miles below it.”—The _Sailing Directions
for Japan, Korea, and Adjacent Seas_, published by the British
Admiralty, London, 1904, pp. 114–115. Masampo is the best but not the
only good naval harbor on the southern coast of Korea.
Footnote 95:
In 1861, when some Russian marines landed here and took virtual
possession of the islands, Awa Katsu, who was then one of the officers
appointed by the Yedo government to study the possibility of
organizing military forces after the Western model, succeeded in
setting the British Minister against the Russian Minister about the
Tsushima affair. Russia was obliged to abandon the islands. See the
_Katsu Kaishū_ (a life of Katsu), Tokio, 1899, iii. pp. 57–59.
Footnote 96:
It is interesting to hear that Russian school text-books enumerate
Korea and Manchuria among the Russian spheres of influence.—A letter
from Tōsuisei, dated St. Petersburg, February 13, 1900, in the
_Kokumin_, April 1, 1900.
Footnote 97:
It is remarkable how little the spirit of Japan’s policy, which the
writer has attempted to express in this sentence, is understood among
the people here. A vast majority of people, not excluding recognized
writers and speakers on the East, seem to ascribe to Japan certain
territorial designs, particularly in Korea. It is not remembered that
Japan was the first country to recognize the independence of Korea,
the cause of which also cost Japan a war with China. The present war
with Russia is waged largely on the same issue, for it is to Japan’s
vital interest to keep Korea independent. From this it hardly follows
that Japan should occupy Korea in order not to allow her to fall into
the hands of another Power. If Korea is really unable to stand on her
feet, the solution of the difficulty does not, in Japan’s view,
consist in possessing her, but in making her independence real by
developing her resources and reorganizing and strengthening her
national institutions. It is in this work that Japan’s assistance was
offered and accepted. It would be as difficult for any impartial
student not to see the need of such assistance as to confuse it with
annexation. It would, however, be entirely legitimate to regard the
task as extremely difficult and dangerously prone to abuse. Further,
see pp. 366 ff., below.
Footnote 98:
Russian exports for 1900–2 are classified as follows (1000 rubles as
unit):—
Food-stuffs Raw material Animals Manufactures Total
1900 381,174 269,806 17,902 19,553 688,435
1901 430,955 256,697 20,224 21,939 729,815
1902 526,189 258,267 21,558 19,263 825,277
It is seen that the exportation of food-stuffs was the largest in
value and increasing, while that of manufactured articles was the
smallest (2.5 per cent.) and, to say the least, stationary. Imports
were as follows:—
Food-stuffs Raw material Animals Manufactures Total
1900 79,844 307,402 1,136 183,682 572,064
1901 84,349 288,107 1,495 158,993 532,944
1902 81,409 295,483 1,403 148,800 527,095
The importation of manufactures decreased, but also that of raw
material did not increase, while, as shown above, the exportation of
manufactures was slight and stationary. Figures have been taken from
the _Tsūshō Isan_ for November 25, 1903, which drew them from Russian
official sources.
It is interesting to note the unfavorable conditions of the foreign
trade of Russia’s ally, France, in U. S. Consul Atwell’s report in the
daily _Consular Reports_ for February 24, 1904 (No. 1884), who quotes
from Georges Blondel.
Footnote 99:
See the Supplementary Note to this chapter on pages 61–64.
Footnote 100:
Documents of that time clearly indicate that the discovery of gold in
California and the westward expansion of the American nation, as well
as the growing prospects of the China trade and the increasing
application of steam in navigation, were the motives which prompted
the United States Government to open negotiations with Japan in 1853.
Footnote 101:
To-day there seem to be about 84,500 public schools in Russia, of
which 40,000 are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education
[compared with 30,157 public and private schools in Japan in 1902].
Toward the maintenance of the 40,000 schools, the ministry
appropriates only about $2,000,000, or a little over one eighth of the
annual cost. The teachers number 172,000 [in Japan, 126,703, in 1902],
and pupils and students, 4,568,763 [in Japan in 1902, 5,469,419].
7,250,000 children of school age are without any education [while in
Japan, in 1902, the ratio of attendance to the number of children of
school age was 95.80 per cent. for boys and 87.00 per cent. for girls,
or, on the average, 91.57 per cent.]. See the U. S. daily _Consular
Reports_ for February 8 and March 4, 1902 (Nos. 1871 and 1892), [and
the _Kwampō_, April 8, 1904].
Footnote 102:
As an evidence for this striking state of things the reader is
referred to Dr. E. J. Dillon’s article in the American _Review of
Reviews_ for October, 1904, pp. 449–454. The whole subject should be
more carefully studied than it seems to have been thus far.
Footnote 103:
“The whole northern part of _Asia Minor_, according to the treaty
between Russia and Turkey, is now placed under such conditions that
Russian capitalists have the area open to them, to the exclusion of
foreign enterprise. A situation analogous is found in _Persia_, where
the entire northern portion is acknowledged to be under the exclusive
economic influence of Russia.”—Consul Greener at Vladivostok, in the
U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, April 22, 1903 (No. 1627).
Footnote 104:
For example, the normal freight per ton from Russia to Eastern Siberia
would be about twenty-one rubles, while that from Japan or Shanghai is
three or four rubles. If Russian goods were sold to the artificial
exclusion of articles exported from nearer countries, the consumer’s
burden would be greatly increased.
Footnote 105:
Count Cassini, the present Russian Ambassador at Washington, wrote, in
the _North American Review_ for May, 1904: “... But let us suppose for
argument’s sake that Russia, triumphant in this war, finds herself
dominant in Manchuria. Japan, her enemy, could look for no favors; she
could not expect to find encouragement for the importation of her
manufactures” (p. 688).
Footnote 106:
Continuing, the Count stated: “But Manchuria would require many things
that Russia could not supply, or supply at figures reasonable enough
to create a market. In Russia, agriculture is, comparatively speaking,
more important than manufacturing, and those goods which are made in
my country are not such as Manchuria would need. Russia, too, would be
obliged to use the railway with its high freight tariffs....”—_Ibid._
Footnote 107:
One can seldom find a more outspoken confession of a diplomacy
consisting of a series of deliberate falsehoods than the chapters on
the Russian relations with China, Korea, and Japan, in a diplomatic
history by a Russian writer, as translated in the _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_,
Nos. 45, 46, 48, 49, and 50 (August, September, November, and
December, 1903, and January, 1904).
Footnote 108:
The Russian diplomatic historian to whom frequent reference has been
made frankly says that the feebleness and internal disorder of China
are welcome conditions for the expansion of Russian influence in the
Far East, and that it would be the height of folly to displace the
weak China with a colonial possession of a European power.—The
_Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 48, p. 36.
Footnote 109:
See p. 55, note 1, above.
Footnote 110:
The _Shiberiya oyobi Manshū_, pp. 221–223.
Footnote 111:
The _Shiberiya oyobi Manshū_, pp. 223–225, 490–495.
Footnote 112:
The _Tsūshō Isan_, July 8, 1903, p. 4.
Footnote 113:
The New York _Evening Post_, January 20, 1903.
Footnote 114:
The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, April 22, 1903 (No. 1627).
Footnote 115:
The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, February 24, 1904 (No. 1884).
Footnote 116:
The _North American Review_, May, 1904, p. 688.
CHAPTER I
RETROCESSION OF THE LIAO-TUNG PENINSULA
The way in which the momentous _issues_ already discussed in the
introductory chapter have been at work and have steadily culminated in
the present conflict is with unusual clearness and in the most
instructive manner illustrated by the _historic events_ which led up to
the outbreak of the war. The study of these events also appears
essential for an intelligent understanding of the situation, for, in
this crisis, as in many another in history, the contestants do not seem
to be always conscious of even the more important issues at stake, while
the events, in their main outlines, are patent to every one. The former
may be found only by an analysis of facts, some of which are obscure,
but the latter are narrated dramatically, from time to time as they
occur or are published, in the press and in the diplomatic
correspondence, so that it is little wonder that the events are often
taken for the causes, even the significance, of the supreme fact to
which they seem to point. The student should investigate the issues if
he would know the meaning of the war, but, if he wishes to see something
of the conscious attitude which the belligerents take toward the
situation, perhaps no more profitable way can be found than in a study
of the events through which the issues have been writing history.
The conflict of Russia and Japan was foreshadowed already in the middle
of the past century, when the former began to claim some of the Kurile
Islands and the whole of Sakhalien, upon parts of which Japan had long
exercised vague sovereign rights.[117] Presently, in 1858, Muravieff
“Amurski” succeeded in creating a common proprietary right with China
over the vast territory lying between the Ussuri River and the sea.[118]
The same territory was, only two years later, definitively annexed[119]
to Russia through the skillful diplomacy of Ignatieff, Russian Minister
at Peking, who, taking advantage of China’s defeat at the hands of the
allied forces of England and France, had won the favor of the Chinese
Government by acting as mediator between it and the allies. The Eastern
naval headquarters of Russia, which had been transferred from
Peterpavlofsk in Kamchatka to Nicolaiefsk at the mouth of the Amur, was
now again moved further south to Vladivostok, founded in 1860, at the
southern end of the new territory. No sooner did the remote but certain
pressure from the expanding northern Power begin to be felt in Japan
than, in 1861, a Russian man-of-war took possession of the Japanese
islands of Tsushima in the Korean straits, from which it withdrew only
at the instance of the British Minister, Sir Rutherford Alcock.[120]
Half a dozen years after, the island of Sakhalien was placed under a
common possession between Russia and Japan, while, in 1875, the island
was surrendered to Russia, Japan receiving in return the chain of
sterile Chishima Islands (the Kuriles).[121] This brought the presence
of Russia still nearer home to Japan than before. On the other hand,
Russia seemed to have only begun her ambitious career in Eastern Asia,
for she could hardly be expected to be forever satisfied with her naval
headquarters at Vladivostok, a station which, situated as it was at the
southern extremity of her Oriental dominion, was so completely ice-bound
during a large part of each year that her fleet was obliged to winter in
Japanese harbors.
Then followed a comparatively long period of inactivity on the part of
Russia. When, however, in 1891, she finally resolved to build the
trans-Siberian Railway, the inadequacy of Vladivostok, not only as the
Pacific naval harbor of the Russian Empire, but also as the terminus of
the great railroad, became evident. To Russia a southern expansion
toward an ice-free outlet seemed now a necessity. For the realization of
this desire, an opportunity presented itself in a striking form, in
1895, at the end of the Chinese-Japanese war.
In order to obtain a clear understanding of this situation, it is
necessary to return to the outbreak of hostilities and thence trace the
evolution of Chinese diplomacy up to their close. At the unexpected
dispatch of large forces by Japan to Korea, in June, 1894, the Chinese
Government appealed to some foreign Ministers at Peking to bring
pressure to bear upon Japan to withdraw her troops from the Peninsula.
The Russian Minister is said to have observed that Russia would not be
prepared to organize an armed coercion until Japan endeavored to
exercise actual control over the Korean Kingdom, but might undertake to
tender friendly advice to Japan to withdraw. England was reluctant, but
as an appeal was again made to the Powers, she took the lead in
persuading others to join in a concert to stay Japan’s hand in Korea.
The plan was, however, frustrated by the emphatic refusal of Germany to
consider it. An ineffectual counsel was then made to Japan by a few of
the Powers individually, not to embark upon a war against China.[122] A
war, nevertheless, ensued, with a rare success on the part of Japan.
During the course of hostilities, China seems to have more than
once[123] avowed her impotence and requested the Powers to intervene,
until her repeated reverses on land and the well-nigh complete
annihilation of her northern squadron brought her to such straits that
the friendly Powers could no longer remain inactive. Japan also
intimated her willingness to negotiate for peace. After the envoys whom
China had sent with insufficient powers had been twice refused by Japan,
Li Hung-chang, later to be joined by his son-in-law, Li Ching-fang,
arrived with plenary powers at Shimonoseki, on March 19, 1895, where he
was received by the Japanese Plenipotentiaries, Count Itō, Premier, and
Viscount Mutsu, Foreign Minister. It appears, however, that China had
already signified to certain Powers her suspicion that Japan desired the
cession of a territory on the Chinese mainland. Before, therefore, Li
Hung-chang left the Chinese shores, the German Minister at Tokio was
instructed by his government to warn the Japanese Foreign Office that
certain Powers had been contemplating assent to China’s appeal to
interfere, and that the demand for a cession of territory on the
continent would be particularly calculated to provoke such an
intervention.[124]
It was under these circumstances that negotiations were opened between
the Chinese and Japanese Plenipotentiaries on March 20. It is
unnecessary here to recount the story of an abortive attempt made on
Li’s life by a fanatic, and of the consequent armistice for twenty days.
At Li’s recovery, the Japanese terms for peace were proposed on April 1,
which with amendments became the basis of the final Treaty[125] signed
at Shimonoseki on April 17. It provided, among other things, for the
absolute independence of Korea, the cession to Japan of the Liao-tung
Peninsula, Formosa, and the Pescadores, and an indemnity of two hundred
million _taels_. Of the ceded territories, the Liao-tung being situated,
as it were, in a position to hold a key at once to Peking, Manchuria,
and Korea, its cession to Japan was probably calculated, from the
latter’s point of view, first, to render any renewed attempt of China to
dominate Korea impossible, and, secondly, to establish an effective
barrier against the southern expansion of Russia.[126]
Naturally, the progress of the peace negotiations had been watched with
keen interest by the European Powers. Particularly alert was Russia,
whose press deprecated so early as March 31 the alleged intention of
Japan to secure territory on the mainland, and which, as soon as Li
Hung-chang communicated to her early in April the terms proposed by
Japan and appealed to her to interfere, discerned in those terms a great
turning-point of her own career in the East. She must at once have
realized the grave danger to the entire future of her Eastern policy
from Japan’s occupation of the Liao-tung Peninsula, as well as the
immense advantages which her own possession of the same territory would
confer upon herself. Nor did the Korean independence, which the new
treaty secured, fail to be interpreted by the Russian press as an
exclusive protectorate to be exercised by Japan over the Kingdom.
“Russia,” wrote the _Novoe Vremya_ about April 20, “cannot permit the
protectorate over Korea which Japan has secured for herself by the
conditions of the treaty. If the single port of Port Arthur remain in
possession of Japan, Russia will severely suffer in the material
interest and in the prestige of a Great Power.”[127] It was just the
time to intervene. China had shown herself impotent, and had appealed
for intervention, and Japan was an exhausted victor. By one clever
stroke Russia might coerce the latter and ingratiate herself with the
former. She would, however, perhaps have thought twice before she acted,
had it not been for the active assistance rendered to her by France and
Germany. At a council, it is said, Russian naval and military
authorities concluded that Russia alone could not successfully combat
Japan, which, however, might be coerced if Russia coöperated with
France. An active communication of views now ensued between the Foreign
Offices of St. Petersburg, Berlin, Paris, and London. The diplomatic
correspondence of the day is still withheld from the public view, but it
is well-known that France readily acceded to the Russian desire for a
joint intervention, and Germany suddenly changed her former attitude
toward Japan and allied herself with the two intervening Powers; while
Great Britain, which had more than once acted in favor of China, altered
her course to the opposite direction by declining to admit that Japan’s
terms of peace were prejudicial to her own interests. The reasons avowed
by Germany and France for their assistance to Russia would seem to be
rather unconvincing, unless one takes for granted the existence of
certain unexpressed motives for the act. Germany claimed to have found
in the terms of peace a future menace to the political and economical
interests of Europe, for those terms “would constitute a political
preponderance of Japan over China,” to use the language of “an evidently
inspired article” of the _Cologne Gazette_, “and would exercise a
determining influence on the development of China’s economic condition,
and of the sway of Japan in that country. From this it is concluded that
Japan is endeavoring to post herself as a sentry, as it were, before all
the chief important routes of China. As Japan commands, by Port Arthur
and Wei-hai-Wei, the approach to the Yellow Sea, and, by Formosa and the
Pescadores, the chief commercial route to China, it is taken to be
desirous of encircling her with a firm girdle, in order, if necessary,
to seclude her completely from the world. The European Powers,
therefore, wish to ward off in time any steps prejudicial to their
interests.”[128] Nor did the reasons brought forward by France seem to
be more germane to her own interests than those of Germany were to hers.
The _Débats_ wrote, on April 31, that all the clauses on the occupation
of continental territory were impossible for Europe to recognize.
Moreover, Port Arthur, with a strip of territory round it in the hands
of the Japanese, would be a menace for the independence of Korea, as
much as for the security of Peking. The _Temps_ also said that Japan’s
predominance over China, which would be the ultimate result of the
arrangement, was “a constant menace for the interests of Europe. It was
a serious blow dealt at the rights of the immediate adjacent Powers....
A European concert was now a duty toward civilization.” Perhaps it is
safe to say that, so far as France was concerned, her desire to oblige
her political ally was a more real ground for her coöperation with the
latter than any other presented in her press. As for Germany, her
Foreign Minister then remarked, it is said, that Japan had never
requited the favors Germany had done her during the war, but had, on the
contrary, deliberately concluded with China a treaty containing
provisions not only excessively favorable to Japan, but also prejudicial
to the political and economic interests of Europe. This remark, again,
hardly explains the suddenly changed attitude of Germany. Perhaps it is
well to surmise that there existed deeper and more complex diplomatic
reasons, upon which it would be idle here to speculate. The declination
of Great Britain to join in the concert may more easily be accounted
for. China, which she had at first favored, had not only been inclining
toward Russia, but had shown herself by her incompetency less worthy of
trust than the ambitious Japan. The latter had also secured in the
treaty certain commercial and industrial privileges in South China which
would be even more advantageous to Great Britain than to Japan, while,
on the other hand, the former had little reason to suppose that Japan’s
retention of the Liao-tung was designed to imperil China and Korea. On
the contrary, the presence of Japan at the strategic position on the
mainland might prove an effective check upon Russia, whose cause Great
Britain was the least inclined to advocate. She therefore stood aloof
from the joint intervention, and her conduct provoked a bitter
resentment in the Russian and French press.[129]
The plan of intervention seems to have matured between Russia, France,
and Germany by April 20, and, on April 23, their representatives at
Tokio separately presented brief notes at the Foreign Office. These
notes, accompanied as they were by the verbal profession of each of the
Governments, particularly the German, of its friendly motive in the act,
intimated that Japan’s retention of the territory was considered by them
as not only imperiling the Chinese Capital, but also making the Korean
independence illusory, and, consequently, prejudicial to the permanent
peace of the Far East.[130] The treaty of Shimonoseki had been signed on
April 17, and the exchange of its ratifications fixed for May 8. The
Japanese Government had to answer the three Powers within the fifteen
days between April 23 and May 8, for, whatever its decision regarding
the Liao-tung, it would be unwise to postpone the ratification of the
treaty with China.[131] In the mean time, the Eastern fleets of the
three Powers were augmented and concentrated, and made ready, if need
be, for an immediate and concerted action, Russia going even so far as
to prepare the army contingents in the Amur region for quick
mobilization. Unknown as it was how thoroughly the Powers were
determined, in case Japan should refuse to consider their counsel, to
appeal to force of arms, none the less real was their idea of coercion,
as well as the exhaustion of Japan’s resources. On the other hand, the
common interests of Japan, Great Britain, and the United States had not
developed to such an extent as to justify their united resistance
against the intervening Powers. Japan seems to have complied with the
Powers’ wishes so far as to agree to retrocede the Liao-tung save the
small peninsula of Kin-chow containing Port Arthur, but the Powers
declined for evident reasons to accede to the proposed compromise. The
British Foreign Minister also urged Japan to make to the
susceptibilities of Europe all concessions compatible with her dignity
and her permanent interests.[132] The Japanese Government, after holding
repeated conference before the Throne and with military councilors,[133]
definitely resolved, on May 4, to relinquish, for an additional monetary
consideration from China,[134] all of the Liao-tung. Evidently time was
too limited and the occasion too inopportune for Japan successfully to
induce China to pledge not to alienate in the future any part of the
retroceded territory to another Power. On May 10, the entire nation of
Japan beheld with deep emotions the simultaneous publication of the
treaty of Shimonoseki, which had been ratified in its original form, and
of a special Imperial decree countersigned by all the Ministers of the
Cabinet, announcing that a desire to insure a permanent repose of the
Orient had compelled Japan to go to war, and that the same desire had
now prompted the three Powers to tender to Japan their present friendly
counsel, which the Emperor, for the sake of peace, had accepted.[135]
The historical significance of this memorable incident deserves special
emphasis. It is not too much to say that with it Eastern Asiatic history
radically changed its character, for it marks the beginning of a new
era, in which the struggle is waged no longer among the Oriental nations
themselves, but between sets of interests and principles which
characterize human progress at its present stage, and which are
represented by the greatest Powers of the world. China’s position as a
dominant exclusive force was no sooner overthrown in Korea than it was
replaced by that of another power of a like policy and with aggressive
tendencies. Moreover, the area opened to the advance of Russia covered
not only Korea, but also Northern China and beyond, and the new
aggressor was the very power which had thirty years before created a
restless feeling among the Japanese, by extending toward them through
Primorsk and Sakhalien its already enormous contiguous dominion. The
influence of Russia was now brought face to face with that of Japan,
each with a promise to extend against, and perhaps to clash with, the
other. With the movement of Russia there traveled from Europe to East
Asia her sympathetic relations with France, while against this practical
alliance stood the increasing common interests and sympathies of Japan,
Great Britain, and the United States; Germany remaining as a free lance
between the two groups of Powers. This remarkable accession, in both
area and agents, of the new activity in the East was heralded in, to all
appearance, not gradually, but with a sudden sweep. And gravely ominous
was its opening scene, representing at once a pretended good-will toward
a feeble empire and an armed coercion of a proud nation whom coercion
would only stimulate to greater ambition.
It now remains for us to interpret the effects wrought upon Japan by the
intervention of the three Powers, for the sentiment of the nation seems
to be so universally and persistently misunderstood as to have caused
even some of the natives to misconstrue their own feelings. It is
generally supposed that the conduct of the Powers in depriving Japan of
her prize of victory excited in her breast a deep feeling of revenge,
but this view seems to evince too slight an understanding of the
characteristics of the nation. Also, the prevailing sense of pity
manifested by friendly foreigners toward Japan for her alleged
misfortune appears entirely misplaced, for, on the contrary, she has
derived an inestimable benefit from the experience. Let us explain. The
most obvious lesson drawn by the best minds of Japan, and unconsciously
but deeply shared by the entire nation, was neither that the Powers were
acting upon a principle altogether different from their professed
motive, for that was too plain to every one; nor that she must some day
humiliate the very Powers which had brought coercion upon her, because
it was well known that their self-interest had demanded it, as hers
would, were she in their place. Japan suddenly awoke to an absorbing
desire which left little room for the question of national revenge. It
became to her as clear as daylight that the new position she had
acquired in the Orient by her victory over China could be maintained,
and even her independence must be guarded, only by an armament powerful
enough to give her a voice among the first Powers of the world. If she
would not retire into herself, and finally cease to exist, she must
compete with the greatest nations, not only in the arts of peace,[136]
but also in those of war. Moreover, a far vaster conflict than she had
ever known in her history, excepting the Mongol invasion of the
thirteenth century, was seen to be awaiting her. It is perhaps
characteristic of modern Japan that she scarcely has time to breathe.
The only course to save her seemed to be, now as at any other recent
crisis of her life, to go forward and become equal to the new, expanding
situation. As soon as her supremacy in the East was assured, Japan thus
found herself confronted with a task hitherto almost unpremeditated, and
henceforth began an enormous extension of her military forces,[137] as
well as a redoubled activity in all other lines of national
progress.[138]
What is less obvious, but still more important, is—it is questionable if
there is in the entire range of Japan’s national life another point less
understood abroad but more essential for an insight into the present and
future of the Extreme Orient than this—the increased enthusiasm of Japan
in her ardent effort to strengthen her position in the world by basing
her international conduct upon the fairest and best-tried principles of
human progress. The effort is not free from occasional errors, but the
large issue grows ever clearer in Japan’s mind. A study of her past
would seem to convince one with overwhelming evidence that her historic
training has produced in Japan moral and material characteristics
eminently fit for the pursuit of such a policy. However that may be, the
subsequent evolution of her interests at home and abroad seems, by a
fortunate combination of circumstances, to have irrevocably committed
her to this course; for not only does a common policy along these lines
draw her and the Anglo-Saxon nations closer together, but it is therein
also that the vital promise of her future seems to lie.[139] And it may
be added, the consciousness of this powerful unity of moral and material
life seems to have infused a thrilling new force into that historic love
of country of the Japanese nation.[139] It is to the intervention of
1895 and the situation that ensued that Japan owes the hastening of all
these results.
-----
Footnote 117:
See the negotiations of 1852, 1859, and 1862, and the treaties of 1855
and 1867, between Russia and Japan, regarding the Kuriles and
Sakhalien. The _Tō-A Kwankei Tokushu Jōyaku Isan_ (a collection of
special treaties relating to Eastern Asia, compiled by the Tō-A
Dōbun-kivai, Tokio, 1904. Cloth, 4^o, xiv + xii + 812 + 70; hereafter
abbreviated as _Tokushu Jōyaku_), pp. 1–8. This work, which is in
Japanese and Chinese, is by far the most complete collection of the
treaties and conventions concluded between Japan, China, and Korea,
and other Powers. It also contains historical notes explaining the
origin and nature of many important agreements.
Footnote 118:
Treaty of Aigun, May 16, 1858, Article I.—_Ibid._, pp. 200–202
(Chinese); W. F. Mayers’s _Treaties between the Empire of China and
Foreign Powers_, 3d edition, Shanghai, 1901, p. 100 (French).
Footnote 119:
Treaty of Peking, November 14, 1860, Article I.—_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp.
202–203 (Japanese); Mayers, p. 105 (French).
Footnote 120:
See p. 51, note 1, above.
Footnote 121:
See _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 5–14. See a Russian view of these affairs in
the _Dōbun-kwai_, No. 50 (January, 1904), pp. 25–30. See also Z.
Nakamura, _Chishima Karafuto Shinryaku-shi_ (history of Russian
aggression in the Kuriles and Sakhalien), Tokio, 1904.
Footnote 122:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 78–79, 719.
Footnote 123:
See, for instance, the London _Times_, November 7, 1894, p. 5.
Footnote 124:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 79–80.
Footnote 125:
For the text of this treaty, see the _Treaties and Conventions between
the Empire of Japan and Other Powers_, compiled by the Foreign Office,
Tokio, 1899, pp. 377 ff.; Mayers, pp. 181–184; U. S. 54th Congress,
1st Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp. 200–203; etc.
Footnote 126:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 43–45, 80.
Footnote 127:
The London _Times_, April 22, 1895, p. 5.
Footnote 128:
The London _Times_, April 22, 1895, p. 5.
Footnote 129:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 81–82.
Footnote 130:
The German note, which was accompanied by a Romanized translation into
Japanese, is said to have contained a statement to the effect that
Japan was weak, Germany was powerful, and Japan would surely be
defeated in case she should go to war with Germany. This peculiar
sentence was, at the protest of the Japanese Foreign Office, expunged
from the note.—_Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 86
Footnote 131:
To the last moment Russia, it is said, persisted in advising China to
postpone the ratification.
Footnote 132:
The London _Times_, May 3, 1895, p. 5; M. de Blowitz’s correspondence,
dated Paris, May 2.
Footnote 133:
The declaration made in November, 1903, by a person intimately
associated with Marquis Itō, who was the Premier during the war.—The
_Kokumin Shimbun_, November 10, 1903.
Footnote 134:
Germany is said to have undertaken, when her note was presented, to
guarantee a monetary consideration from China. By the treaty between
Japan and China, concluded on September 22, the sum was fixed at
30,000,000 _taels_.
Footnote 135:
_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 81–87. As has been said, the diplomatic
correspondence of the day has not been published by any of the Powers
concerned. The information briefly given in the text has been culled
from, besides _Tokushu Jōyaku_, the leading articles of the _Tokio
Nichi-Nichi Shimbun_ (Tokio Daily News), a semi-official organ of the
Japanese Government at the time, as quoted in the _Nisshin Sen Shi_
(history of the Japan-China war, Tokio, 1894–5, 8 vols.), vol. viii.
pp. 141–171. These articles give a minute and careful account of the
diplomacy of the day, and may largely be relied upon as authentic.
Footnote 136:
It will be remembered that Japan had in 1894 revised her treaties with
the Powers, and thereby freed herself from the yoke of consular
jurisdiction and placed the foreign residents within her domain under
the jurisdiction of her own law, and also largely restored her tariff
autonomy.
Footnote 137:
The position which the military and naval expenditures have occupied
in the finance of the Japanese Government since the war of 1894–5 may
be gathered from the following table (unit, 1000 _yen_; _yen_ = 49.8
cents):—
Total revenue Total Army and navy Ratio of the
of the expenditures expenditures last two
Government of the
Government
1894–5[139] 98,170 78,128 20,662 26.4%
1895–6[139] 118,432 85,317 23,536 27.6%
1896–7[139] 187,019 168,856 73,248 43.4%
1897–8[139] 226,390 223,678 110,542 49.3%
1898–9[139] 220,054 219,757 112,427 51.1%
1899–1900[139] 254,254 254,165 114,212 44.9%
1900–1[140] 295,854 292,750 133,113 45.4%
1901–2[141] 274,359 266,856 102,360 38.3%
1902–3[141] 297,341 289,226 85,768 29.7%
1903–4[142] 251,681 244,752 71,368 31.7%
1904–5[143] 229,855 223,181 69,433 31.1%
Footnote 138:
To take only a few tangible instances, Japan’s national budget grew
more than three-fold during the ten years before 1903, her foreign
trade in 1903 was 263% as large as it was in 1894, her private
companies increased from less than 3000 in 1894 to 8600 in 1902, with
a corresponding growth of their authorized capital from less than 200
million to 1,226.7 million _yen_, and her population itself has
increased perhaps by 12%. A decisive development has also taken place
in both the internal politics and the international relations of
Japan.
Footnote 139:
An attempt has been universally made during the present war to explain
the apparent contempt of death of the Japanese soldier as due to his
low estimate of human life, or else to his fatalistic view of the
world. It may be seriously doubted whether these explanations are
tenable. At least it may be said that in no other case would the sons
of Japan so fearlessly and cheerfully face death. It is impossible to
discover in them a less fear of death than in other nations. Life is
dear, but it is sacrificed to a cause which is considered higher than
life. It was the primary lesson in the education of the _samurai_ to
choose death when it saved honor and when life was selfish. This view
of life has now been transferred from the narrow sphere of the
individual person or fief to the large field of the entire nation,
whose cause, it is believed, represents the best postulates of human
progress. It would, perhaps, be legitimate to criticise the incidental
abuse of this feeling, or to question whether the same loyalty might
not be transferred to a still higher region than the state, but the
subject must first be understood by the critic.
Footnote 140:
See our Introduction.
Footnote 141:
Actual account on October 31, 1903.
Footnote 142:
Settled accounts.
Footnote 143:
Estimates in the budget. All based on the Fourth Annual.