schemes of active interference in Italy; and the Signoria, no longer
needing Maximilian's presence, now came to regard him as a positive
hindrance to their aggrandizing policy. But nothing could divert him
from his project. When the Venetians boggled over their promised
subsidy, he secured the necessary sum by loans from the Fuggers. The
remonstrances of his advisers were of none avail. At Augsburg and Linz
he divided his time between wild dreams of conquest with the Archduke
Philip, and the festive entertainments of the citizens. On St. John's
Eve he led the fairest maiden of the town to the dance, and gallantly
assisted her to kindle the bonfire, to the sound of drums and cornets
and the merry music of the dance.[55] In July he had an interview with
Ludovico at Munster,[56] receiving him in hunting dress, surrounded by
his companions of the chase; and in the last days of August entered
Italy {43} by the Valtelline. Even then his compact was not strictly
fulfilled. Instead of the stipulated 7,000 men, his army never
amounted to more than 4,000. His first scheme, of driving the French
from Asti and forcing Savoy to join the League, was sacrificed to the
jealousy of Venice, which opposed any increase of the power of Milan.
Nor were his own relations with Ludovico distinguished by their
cordiality. The latter declined to subsidize him unless the Pope and
Venice granted equal amounts, and sought to employ him in garrisoning
the Milanese against French attacks.[57] Finally, Maximilian decided
upon an attack on Florence, and as a preliminary laid siege to Livorno,
curtly informing Ludovico that if he would not provide money for his
troops he had better dismiss them to their homes.[58] But the numbers
of the besiegers were insufficient for the task, the Venetians held
aloof, and the French garrison never lost entire command of the sea.
The arrival of a fleet from Marseilles removed Maximilian's last hopes
of reducing the city; his resources were by now exhausted, and,
declaring that "against the will of God and men he would not wage this
war," he hurriedly retired northwards. He turned a deaf ear to the
entreaties of the Papal Legate,[59] and before Christmas was again in
Tyrol. According to the Italian wits, not even hunting invitations
could detain the disappointed monarch. In short his conduct presents a
favourable opportunity for introducing the cricitisms of Quirini, one
of the first {44} of that line of brilliant ambassadors, whose
diplomacy prolonged the existence of Venice till modern times. "He is
of excellent parts, and more fertile in expedients than any of his
advisers, yet he does not know how to avail himself of any single
remedy at the right moment; while he is as full of ideas and plans as
he is powerless to execute them. And though two or three methods lie
open to his intellect, and though he chooses one of them as the best,
yet he does not pursue this, because before its fulfilment another
design which he considers better has suddenly presented itself. And
thus he flits from better to better, till both time and opportunity for
execution are past"![60] Yet with all his indecision and want of
perseverance, he was resigned and cheerful in adversity, and it was
perhaps at this period that he consoled himself with the assurance
"Gott sorgt schon: es könnte noch schlimmer gehen."[61]
Maximilian's failure left the French influence all-powerful in Italy;
but Charles VIII. made no further movement, and his premature death in
April 1498 materially changed the situation. The first act of Louis
XII.--his infamous divorce from Jeanne of France, followed by his
marriage to Anne of Brittany--can hardly have been gratifying news to
Maximilian. Still, the latter hoped to obtain the restoration of
Burgundy from the new King, in return for acquiescence in the French
policy in Italy. But when his representations met with no response, he
sought aid {45} from the Diet for a war against France. In spite of
its refusal, and though he might have seen that the League had no
intention of pulling his chestnuts out of the fire, he threw an army
into Burgundy. But the Swiss mercenaries, who formed its strength,
either were bribed by Louis or mutinied for want of pay; while Philip
concluded a separate peace with France (July 2, 1499), actually
renouncing the claims which his father brought forward in his name, and
receiving from Louis XII. the investiture of Artois and Flanders. The
French King was led to conclude this treaty by his designs upon the
Duchy of Milan, which he claimed as the lawful heir of the Visconti
dynasty. His wise policy of treating the various members of the League
as though it were non-existent was crowned with success. Ere long all
were pacified but Maximilian, and he was rendered harmless by
systematic intriguing with the Swiss Confederates--a policy which had a
perceptible influence in producing the memorable Swiss war of 1499.
The immediate causes of the outbreak were incidents of petty friction
on the Tyrolese border; but the real question at issue was the relation
of the Confederates to the Empire.
No sooner had the Swiss in earlier days attained their object of
holding directly from the Emperor, than they made it sufficiently
obvious that this dependence was for the future to be mainly nominal.
During the long reign of Frederick III. they had enjoyed just such a
state of internal peace and order as the perpetual Landfriede and the
Kammergericht aimed at securing for the rest of the Empire; and now,
when Maximilian demanded their submission to the decrees of the Diet of
Worms, by contributing men and money for his schemes of foreign policy,
war was practically {46} inevitable. Their close relations with
successive Kings of France had long shown the slight regard in which
they held their nominal ruler. Their connexion with the Empire brought
them no advantage, submission to the Common Penny (das Gemeine Pfennig)
naturally appeared a hardship to them, and the decisions of the
Kammergericht they regarded as assaults upon their treasured freedom.
Their refusal of Maximilian's demands was coupled with general steps
for union with the sister Leagues of the Graubünden and the Valais.
The war began with marauding and skirmishing, growing fiercer and
assuming larger proportions when the Swabian League armed itself at the
Imperial summons. But the Swiss everywhere held their own: their
superiority was admitted even by the Count of Fürstenberg, general of
the League, who branded his own troops as "ein flüchtig, schnöd und
ehrlos Volk." Maximilian himself had been engaged in unprofitable
operations against the Duke of Gueldres, and only arrived upon the
scene in July, to find matters going against him. Even his presence
did not turn the balance, and at Schwaderloch the Swiss, though
somewhat outnumbered, more than held their own. Only four days later
(July 24), the army of Henry of Fürstenberg, 15,000 to 16,000 strong,
suffered a severe defeat at Dornach at the hands of 6,000 Confederates.
The Austrian leader, with many distinguished nobles and about 4,000
men, perished on the field. This disaster dealt the final blow to
Maximilian's hopes. At first he shut himself up in the Castle of
Lindau, and refused to see any of his nobles.[62] But he soon
reconciled himself to the necessity of coming to terms. The {47}
Treaty of Basel (September 22, 1499), though less remarkable for its
provisions than for its omissions, is one of the landmarks of Swiss
history. By it mutual conquests were restored, and Maximilian
recovered the Prättigau, while various small disputes were referred to
arbitration. But, while Swiss independence was not formally recognized
by the Empire till a century and a half later, it was tacitly secured
by this treaty; and henceforward the Confederates enjoyed entire
immunity from Imperial jurisdiction and from Imperial taxation. Nor
was this the only result of the struggle. The Swiss had won for
themselves a position which inspired their neighbours with a genuine
admiration and a very wholesome fear. Respected and courted by the
outer world, they strengthened their position internally by a close
union of the Confederates and the Graubünden. The Empire was deprived
for ever of a number of its most valuable subjects,[63] and the House
of Hapsburg was finally excluded from the cradle of its greatness.
No one reaped fuller advantage from the Swiss war than Louis XII.
While all the energies of Maximilian were devoted to coping with the
Confederates, he found himself free to carry into execution his
projected invasion of the Milanese. Had the Emperor proved successful,
Ludovico might perhaps have saved himself (or at least prolonged the
struggle) by entering the Swabian League; but with the defeat of
Dornach the usurper's fate was sealed. Louis XII., who had already
allied himself with the Pope and Venice, winning the support of the
latter by the promise of Cremona, crossed the Alps at the end of July
with an army {48} of 22,000 men, and entered Milan almost unopposed.
Ludovico, deserted and betrayed by his people, sought refuge in Tyrol,
and was among the first to bring the tidings of his own misfortunes to
his Imperial nephew. But though received with the utmost sympathy and
respect by Maximilian, he soon perceived that the latter was as usual
at the end of his resources, and that no assistance need be looked for
from him. He purchased the services of 8,000 Swiss mercenaries and of
the celebrated Burgundian guard, and with their aid recovered his
capital and most of its territory. But the army which Louis XII.
despatched to the assistance of Bayard consisted largely of Swiss
troops; and Ludovico's mercenaries, refusing to fight against their
countrymen in the French service, renounced his cause and betrayed him
to the enemy. (April 10, 1500). In this undignified way one of the
chief disturbers of the peace of Italy bids a last farewell to the
field of politics; he remained in the most rigorous confinement at
Loches for the next five years, after which the earnest intercession of
Maximilian secured some relaxation in his treatment. He was allowed a
space of several leagues around his prison for hunting and other
amusements, and died in captivity in 1510.
On the very day when Ludovico fell into the hands of the French,
Maximilian opened the Imperial Diet at Augsburg. His main object was
to obtain aid against France; but the complete failure of his recent
military enterprises--alike in Burgundy, Gueldres, Switzerland and
Milan--compelled him to acquiesce in the formation of a Council of
Regency, (Reichsregiment), which was to discuss all military and
financial affairs, and even questions of foreign policy, which at that
period were considered the special department {49} of the Monarch.
This Council consisted of twenty-one members, of whom sixteen were
appointed by the Electors and Princes, two by the Imperial towns; while
Maximilian nominated two for Austria and Burgundy, and only one, the
President, in his capacity of Emperor. The promoters of the scheme
aimed at little short of his abdication; while he, on his part,
cheerfully assumed that they would defer to his wishes on matters of
foreign politics. The bait held out to him by Berthold was a permanent
war administration, possessing power both to levy troops and to impose
taxes; from this he promised himself an army of 30,000 men, and money
to maintain it. But the project remained upon paper, and Maximilian's
disgust was turned to fury when the first step of the new Council was
to conclude a truce with France, and virtually to commit him to
investing Louis XII. with Milan. Finding himself helpless in view of
the Diet's opposition, and determined not to submit to the ruling of
the Council, he began to make separate overtures to the French King.
In this he was readily encouraged by the Archduke Philip and by
Ferdinand, who was already hatching his iniquitous plot for the
partition of Naples, and who found Maximilian's hostile attitude to
France a drag upon Louis' action. In October 1501 the visit of
Cardinal d'Amboise, the trusted adviser of Louis XII., to the Court of
Innsbruck, brought matters to a final issue. A treaty, whose
friendliness was only rivalled by its hypocrisy, was concluded between
the two Monarchs. The infant Archduke Charles was betrothed to Louis'
daughter Claude; Louis himself was to receive the investiture of Milan,
in return for the sum of 80,000 crowns, and promised to assist the {50}
Emperor in his journey to Rome and in his projects against the Turks.
But the actual terms of the agreement were of little importance, as
they were obviously intended only for momentary ends. The conquest of
Naples, which was effected in the years 1501-1505, soon led to quarrels
between the two conquerors. Louis XII.'s continual intrigues with the
German Princes induced Maximilian to support the Spanish cause by the
despatch of 2,500 landsknechts; and by the end of 1504 the brilliant
tactics of the great Captain resulted in the final expulsion of the
French from the kingdom of Naples. At the same time the Emperor found
means to check Louis' intrigues, which the outbreak of the Bavarian war
had rendered dangerous. By the Treaty of Blois (September 22), Milan
was ensured to Louis XII., and, failing heirs-male, to Claude and her
youthful bridegroom Charles.[64] But this agreement, like its
predecessor, was not made to be observed. No sooner had d'Amboise
obtained Louis' formal investiture from the Emperor (April 1505), than
the betrothal of Claude to the Archduke was secretly annulled, and
Francis of Angoulême took his place as her prospective husband. The
death of Isabella the Catholic, and the struggle of Ferdinand and
Philip for the Castilian Regency, removed all danger of any united
effort between Spain and the Hapsburgs against France; and early in
1506 Louis' breach of faith was formally proclaimed and ratified by the
States-General of Tours.[65]
{51}
Notwithstanding this rebuff, Maximilian had gained a very distinct
advantage from peace with France. So long as the question of
investiture was pending, Louis could not interfere in the affairs of
the Empire, and Maximilian was free to profit by the turn of events.
The death of George the Rich, Duke of Bavaria-Landshut (December 1,
1503), resulted in a disputed succession. In spite of a family
agreement (Erbvertrag) which expressly nominated as his heirs Duke
Albert IV. of Munich and his brother Wolfgang, the old Duke left his
lands to his daughter Elizabeth, wife of Rupert, a younger son of the
Elector Palatine. Both parties prepared to assert their rights, and
Rupert, careless of the consequences, threw himself into Landshut, thus
opening the war, and putting himself under the ban of the Empire.[66]
The Estates refused allegiance to Albert, and called in Maximilian as
mediator in the quarrel. The Emperor preferred to renounce his
position of _tertius gaudens_, and to throw the whole weight of his
support on Albert's side. Even had he not already, in 1497, recognized
Albert's title, both justice and his own interests urged him to the
Bavarian side. The Palatine House had ever been the foe of the
Hapsburgs, and Duke Albert, as the Emperor's brother-in-law, would
naturally seem the less dangerous of the two claimants. Maximilian at
first offered Rupert a third of George's possessions, in the hope of
averting hostilities; but, meeting with a curt refusal, he roused the
forces of the Swabian League, and, assisted by Würtemberg, Brunswick
and Hesse, took the field in person at the head of a considerable army.
The sudden death of {52} Rupert (August 20, 1504), closely followed by
that of his masculine wife Elizabeth, did not put an end to the war,
the Elector continuing the struggle in the name of his grandsons. A
fierce encounter took place near Regensburg between the Imperialists
and a large body of Bohemian mercenaries in the Elector's service.
Maximilian himself led the right wing to the charge, and drove the
enemy back to their laager, which, after the example of Zizka, they had
constructed from their baggage waggons. A desperate sally for the
moment broke the Imperialist ranks, and he was surrounded and dragged
from his horse by the long grappling hooks attached to the Bohemians'
lances. He owed his life to the distinguished gallantry of Eric of
Brunswick, who scattered his assailants when all hope seemed lost.
Rallying his troops, he led them on to victory, and defeated the enemy
with heavy loss. This affray was followed up by the siege of Kufstein,
in which the Emperor's artillery played an important part--especially
two heavy pieces, which he had christened "Purlepaus" and "Weckauf von
Oesterreich." The hesitation of the garrison, which at first made
promises of surrender, and then decided upon resistance, so deeply
incensed Maximilian, that when the inevitable capitulation came, he
refused to show any mercy. It was only when half the scanty garrison
had been executed that the intercession of the Princes prevailed to
secure pardon for such as remained (October 17, 1504). The capture of
Kufstein was the last serious incident of the war. A truce was
concluded in February, 1505, and in August, when Maximilian appeared at
the Diet of Köln, he was able to dictate his own terms to the
discomfited Elector. With the exception of Neuburg, {53} and some
territory north of the Danube, which were formed into an appanage for
Rupert's children, all the lands of George were made over to Bavaria.
But the Emperor had not conducted the war solely from the kindness of
his heart, and both claimed and secured a substantial reward for his
services. From the Palatinate he acquired Hagenau and the Ortenau;
from Bavaria, Kufstein, Rattenberg, and a number of petty
lordships,[67] and, most important of all, the Zillerthal, which gave
Tyrol a strong frontier to the north-east, and rounded off the
territories to which he had succeeded in 1500 on the death of Leonard
of Görz.
Maximilian's reputation in the Empire was now perhaps higher than it
had ever been before; the more so, that in the winter of 1504 death had
removed his old opponent, Berthold of Mainz, and that the new Elector
was a near relative of his own.[68] But when the future was all bright
with hope, and when his coronation at Rome and an union of Spain and
the Empire against the French and the Turks seemed at last on the point
of realization, his golden dreams met with a rude awakening. The
sudden and premature death of Philip, who had assumed in person the
government of Castile, and was successfully defending himself against
the spiteful intrigues of Ferdinand, put an end to the Emperor's
projects of Hapsburg combination (Sep. 25, 1506). The Catholic King
recovered the Regency, and was soon more powerful than ever in the
Spanish Peninsula. Maximilian at first met with no better success in
his attempt to {54} secure the government of the Low Countries. The
Estates of the seventeen Provinces refused to recognize his claims to
the Regency during the minority of his grandson Charles, and were
encouraged by Louis XII. in the formation of a Council of Regency. But
internal troubles, and the activity of Charles of Gueldres, pled his
cause more eloquently than any measures of his own. On their voluntary
submission to his rule, he appointed William de Croy, Lord of Chièvres,
and Adrian of Utrecht[69] as Charles' tutors, and entrusted the
administration to his daughter Margaret, the widowed Duchess of Savoy,
who made her public entry into Mechlin in July 1507, and who throughout
her rule justified his choice by her scrupulous integrity and brilliant
statesmanship.
In the same year, 1507, Maximilian made a fiery appeal to the Diet
assembled at Constance, for assistance in his schemes of a journey to
Rome and the expulsion of the French from Milan. After considerable
delay he obtained a grant of 3,000 horse and 9,000 foot for six months,
and received a further promise of 6,000 men from the Swiss envoys. But
his sanguine expectations were once more doomed to disappointment. The
majority of the promised troops never made their appearance; French
gold won over his Swiss allies;[70] and the Estates of his own
dominions outdid all previous occasions in their parsimony. Meanwhile
his ardent preparations had roused the distrust of Venice, which
refused him passage through {55} her dominions, unless he restricted
himself to a trifling escort. His army was too weak to force its way
either through Milanese or through Venetian territory; and hence he was
driven to an expedient which involved a break with the old mediaeval
traditions of the Empire. On February 4, 1508, he had himself
proclaimed with great pomp and solemnity, in the Cathedral of Trent, as
Holy Roman Emperor. It was declared that for the future in all
official documents he should be known by the title of "erwählte
römischer Kaiser," but that for convenience sake he should commonly be
called "Emperor." Julius II. raised no objection, partly because
Maximilian fully acknowledged the Papal right to crown him, and still
more because his arrival in Rome with an army would have been a most
unwelcome event. Maximilian's step was the first departure from the
immemorial custom of his predecessors; but with the exception of his
grandson, Charles V., not one of his successors in the Empire received
his crown at the hands of the Pope.
The refusal of Venice to grant a passage to the Imperial army
accentuated the ill-feeling which had long existed between Maximilian
and the Republic. Now that his ambitions could find no outlet to the
South, he turned his gaze Eastwards, and rashly embroiled himself with
his powerful neighbour. Within a month of his assumption of the
Imperial dignity, his troops were advancing into Venetian territory
from three different directions, threatening Vicenza, the valley of the
Adige, and Friuli. Maximilian gives expression to his rosy dreams of
victory in a letter to the Elector of Saxony: "The Venetians paint
their lion with two feet in the sea, the third on {56} the plains, the
fourth on the mountains. We have almost won the foot on the mountains,
only one claw is wanting, which with God's help we shall have in eight
days; then we mean to conquer the foot on the plains too."[71] But the
very day after this confident epistle was penned, Trautson, one of his
best captains, was routed and killed by the Venetians, with a total
loss of over 2,000. The Venetians now took the offensive in earnest,
and, superior both in numbers and discipline, completely turned the
tables on the Imperialists. Town after town fell before their advance,
and by the end of June, Görz, Pordenone, Adelsberg, Trieste were in
their hands; while the fleet seized Fiume and overawed the whole of
Istria. As soon as the tide began to turn, Maximilian had hastened
back to Germany, to rouse the Electors and the Swabian League, but from
neither could he obtain any real assistance. The whole brunt of the
defence fell upon the Tyrolese, who responded manfully to the call, and
checked the Venetian advance at Pietra, on the way to Trent. But any
prolonged resistance was hopeless; and Maximilian saw himself obliged
to conclude a three years' truce with the Republic, by which the latter
retained all her conquests except Adelsberg.
The Emperor's humiliation at the hands of Venice only served to augment
the suspicion and dislike with which she was regarded by her other
neighbours. The Pope felt an especial grudge against her, as the
possessor of Ravenna and Rimini, which lawfully belonged to the Holy
See. Already in the summer of 1507 he had been feeling his way towards
a coalition, by an attempt to restore friendly relations between {57}
Louis and Maximilian; but the latter was then still too full of schemes
for the recovery of Milan to entertain the proposal. When however he
engaged in war with Venice, he sent agents of his own accord to Louis
XII. The latter at first refused all accommodation unless Venice were
included; but when the Republic neglected to include Gueldres in the
truce, he availed himself of this flimsy excuse to negotiate with the
Emperor. An active exchange of views followed between Margaret and her
father, both as to an agreement with France, with regard to which he
trusted largely to her judgment,[72] and the proposed marriage of
Charles with Mary of England, to which he would only consent in return
for a substantial loan.[73] Maximilian himself arrived in the
Netherlands in August, but does not seem to have visited his daughter.
When the crisis of the negotiations was reached he still remained in
the background, and deputed Margaret and his councillor, Matthew
Lang,[74] to receive the French envoys at Cambrai. D'Amboise raised so
many difficulties that at length Margaret threatened to return home,
declaring that they were merely wasting time.[75] This firm attitude
brought the French envoys to reason, and on December 10, 1508, the
memorable League of Cambrai was duly ratified. Ostensibly it was a
renewal of the treaties of 1501 and 1504, with the exception of the
betrothal of Claude and Charles. But its genuine aim was the complete
partition of the Venetian land-Empire between the four {58}
arch-conspirators. The Pope was to receive the towns of the Romagna,
Ferdinand the Apulian seaports. Maximilian was to recover all his lost
territories and to supplement them by Verona, Padua, Vicenza, Treviso
and Friuli; while Louis XII. should occupy Brescia, Bergamo and
Cremona. The Imperial conscience, which felt some scruples at so
prompt an infringement of the truce, was salved by the commands of
Julius II., who bade him, as protector of the Church, take part in the
recovery of her lands. Further, to veil the iniquity of the agreement,
the Pope excommunicated Venice and all its subject lands.
Though Maximilian thus isolated Venice, and made it possible to recover
his lost territory, yet his adhesion to the League was an undoubted
political error. Not only did his action assist the destruction of the
only power in North Italy capable of resisting the foreigner, and thus
directly lead to the establishment of French predominance in Lombardy;
but it also implanted in the minds of the Signoria that irremovable
distrust of his intentions which was responsible for many of his later
misfortunes, and which the pursuance of a straightforward policy might
have averted. Had he exercised but a moderate amount of foresight, he
would have realized that Louis, with his vast superiority in power and
resources, would sooner or later discard his needy ally and reserve the
lion's share for himself. It is probable that the false glamour and
vanity of the Imperial tradition obscured his eyes to the fact of his
own weakness; and what from one point of view is his strength--his
unquenchable hopefulness and buoyancy of spirit--here proved his
weakness and egged him on to defeat and humiliation.
{59}