to the Diet of Worms (April, 1509). Never before had the Estates been
so unanimous in refusing all support and loading him with complaints.
The cities were enraged at the practical supersession of the Council of
Regency, the Princes at his negotiating without their consent. After
mutual recriminations, they separated without effecting anything; and
their dispersal marks the end of all genuine attempts at Reform. Even
Maximilian's hereditary Estates voted far fewer men than he had
expected, and qualified even this grant by making the troops liable to
service only when he was personally in command. He thus found himself
involved in a serious war, without having sufficient resources to
execute his far-reaching designs, and was reduced to pledge tolls,
mines, and other sources of revenue in order to raise money.
The first great incident of the war was the Battle of Agnadello (May
14, 1509), in which the Venetians suffered defeat at the hands of the
French. The Papal troops occupied Ravenna and the rest of the Romagna,
while Ferdinand added the Apulian ports to his new dominions. For the
first and last time Venice made Maximilian a really advantageous offer:
all his lands should be restored, the Imperial suzerainty should be
recognized, and a handsome yearly subsidy paid down. But the envoys of
the Republic were not even allowed to approach him, and about midsummer
the Emperor opened the campaign in person with 15,000 men. The
Venetians had drawn off the mass of their troops to meet the French
advance, and he was virtually unopposed. By the middle of July he had
recovered all that he {60} had lost, and occupied in addition Verona,
Vicenza, Padua, Bassano and Feltre. He had already fetched some heavy
artillery over the Brenner to reduce Treviso, when the complexion of
affairs was suddenly and completely reversed. The inhabitants of the
invaded districts remained loyal to the Venetians, and so many of the
Imperial troops were required to check their harassing movements that
the towns were insufficiently garrisoned. The Pope and Ferdinand,
their own objects once attained, grew indifferent to the progress of
the League, and the Venetians bravely rallied and by a sudden movement
regained possession of Padua. The Emperor, leaving Treviso, laid siege
to Padua with some 22,000 men, and employed his heavy ordnance with
considerable effect. But the numbers of the garrison prevented him
from maintaining a complete blockade; and when two brilliant and
determined assaults had failed to reduce the town, he raised the siege
and returned to Tyrol (October). He himself explains his action by the
great number of troops and artillery inside, by the wonderful strength
of the defences, and by the lukewarm spirit of his own troops.[76] But
the main reasons are to be found in the short period for which the
troops were voted, and the entire lack of money to win them for further
services. Even in August the Emperor was pawning "deux couliers d'or
garniz de beaucop de bonnes et riches pierres," and a number of other
valuable jewels.[77] The Venetians quickly recovered all places of any
importance, with the solitary exception of Verona, which was defended
by a mixed garrison of Germans, French and {61} Spaniards. Maximilian,
at the end of his resources, threw himself unreservedly into the hands
of Louis XII. The Diet of Augsburg, which met in January, 1510, would
have acted wisely in strengthening his hands; for, now that there was a
danger of both Italy and the Papacy becoming dependent upon France, it
was more than ever to the interests of Germany to hold a strong
position south of the Alps. In spite of his rash onsets without
adequate preparation, Maximilian had a strong sense of the greatness of
the Empire, and was pre-eminently fitted to rouse the patriotism of
Germany in a struggle against the foreigner. The Diet did, it is true,
vote 1,800 horse and 6,000 foot for six months, but it had taken four
months to make up its mind to the sacrifice, and even then the troops
never arrived. Meanwhile the League had broken up. Julius II., once
in possession of the Romagnan cities, devoted himself to the problem of
"the expulsion of the barbarian." With this end in view, he removed
the ban from the Republic (February, 1510) and concluded a five years'
league with the Swiss, who were to send 6,000 mercenaries to his aid.
In July the Papal and Venetian armies assumed the offensive, and the
latter were able to reoccupy Friuli. But Julius met with disaster on
all sides; Maximilian and Louis won over the Swiss to inactivity, and
Henry VIII., on whose aid the Pope had reckoned, made peace with
France. Maximilian's attitude towards Venice was fiercer and more
hostile than ever, and led him to encourage the Pasha of Bosnia to
attack her Adriatic possessions. He himself declares that he hopes
soon "to carry out some fine exploit and execution against our enemy;
for it is not enough to put them to death by the {62} hundred: we must
dispose of them by the thousand."[78] Julius was driven to modify or
conceal his contemptuous opinion of the Emperor, whom he had treated to
the nick-name of "a naked baby."[79] For it was mainly through the
latter's influence that the Congress of Mantua was arranged, and
attended by the envoys of France, Spain, England and the Pope (March
1511), the primary object being the restoration of the League against
Venice. Earnest negotiations were also conducted at Bologna between
the Pope and Matthew Lang, who loyally resisted the bribes of a
cardinal's hat from Julius and of large subsidies from Venice. The
disproportion between the demands of the Emperor and the Republic was
too great to be overcome, and the Pope's hopes of winning Maximilian to
his League were frustrated. Still powerless by himself, Maximilian was
more than ever dependent on the French, and played a somewhat
subordinate part in the operations of Louis against the Venetians. A
despatch which he received from Trivulzio shows us in what scanty
consideration he was held by the French commander. Referring to the
capture of Mirandola by a German captain, he declares that "it has
thrown me into a worse humour than I have been in during my life," and
denounces the Imperialists in the most outspoken fashion.[80]
The sudden illness of Julius II. (August 1511), from which a fatal
issue was generally expected, led to an episode, which, though trivial
in itself and void of result, gives us a vivid impression of
Maximilian's {63} visionary nature. He actually entertained the
preposterous idea of himself succeeding Julius and uniting Empire and
Papacy in one person. Lang, Bishop of Gurk, was to proceed at once to
Rome, to persuade the Pope "to take us as coadjutor, so that on his
death we may be assured of having the Papacy, and of becoming a priest,
and afterwards a saint, so that after my death you will be constrained
to adore me, whence I shall gain much glory."[81] If necessary, Lang
was to spend 300,000 ducats in bribing the various Cardinals, and
Maximilian counted upon the assistance of Ferdinand and the people of
Rome. His confidential letter to Margaret bears the signature--"vostre
bon père Maximilian, futur pape."
But these extravagant dreams were dissipated by the unexpected recovery
of Julius II., who plunged more eagerly than ever into political life.
On October 5, 1511, the Holy League was openly published in Rome. Its
members--the Pope, Ferdinand and Venice--veiled their real design, the
expulsion of the French, under the sanctimonious pretence of
maintaining the integrity of the Papal States. Throughout the early
stages of the war Maximilian remained virtually inactive, but steadily
declined to desert his French allies. But none the less he permitted
Ferdinand and the Pope to conclude in his name a ten months' truce with
Venice. He was thus in the happy position of being in request with
both sides, while himself free from all immediate danger. When the
death of Gaston de Foix at Ravenna (April 11, {64} 1512) deprived the
French of their most capable leader, and the tide began to turn against
them, Maximilian inclined towards the side of the Pope. In allowing
18,000 Swiss to pass through Tyrol on their way to join the Venetians,
and in issuing strict orders that all Germans serving with Louis should
return home, he was certainly guilty of unfriendly conduct towards his
ally. In the actual expulsion of the French from the Milanese he took
no direct part, but from want of funds rather than disinclination,--the
Diet of Trier turning a deaf ear to his most urgent entreaties. At
length in November he took the decisive step. Though he had hoped to
see Milan under his grandson Charles rather than Massimiliano Sforza,
he consented to a league with Julius II., to whom the Imperial
recognition of the Lateran Council was of vital importance. In return
for this the Pope promised his support against Venice, with temporal as
well as spiritual arms.
[Illustration: ARMOUR OF MAXIMILIAN]
In February 1513, however, the situation was again changed by the death
of Julius II., and by the reconciliation of France and Venice. The new
Pope, Leo X., was vacillating and untrustworthy, though nominally
well-disposed to the Emperor; and the latter began to turn elsewhere
for an ally. On April 5, 1513, a treaty of alliance was concluded
between Maximilian and Henry VIII., mainly through the efforts of
Margaret, who had long urged on her father a break with France and a
close union with Spain and England. At first we find him complaining
that Henry "gives us only to understand what he wishes from us, while
of what he ought to do for us there is no mention."[82] But the
promise of 100,000 gold {65} crowns was magical in its effect; all his
opposition ceased, and he indulged in the usual sanguine anticipations.
Ferdinand, Henry and Maximilian would unite until France was completely
crushed, and by a joint invasion would win back all the territories
which had been wrested from their ancestors. The alliance was to be
cemented at the earliest possible date by the marriage of Charles to
Mary of England.
Notwithstanding such threatening signs, the French king pushed on his
preparations for a new invasion of Italy. The rapid success of the
expedition was suddenly effaced on the field of Novara (June 6, 1513),
where the French sustained a severe defeat at the hands of the Swiss
and were driven back across the Alps. Their return to France virtually
coincided with the expedition of Henry VIII. At the end of June the
English army landed at Calais, and marching in three divisions,
appeared before Thérouenne on August 1. Eleven days later he was
joined by Maximilian, who had already announced his intention of
serving as the English king's chief captain. "His experienced eye at
once detected a capital blunder in Henry's strategic position," but the
lethargy and exhaustion of the French had saved the latter from any
awkward consequences. The French armies had suffered terribly at
Novara, and Louis XII. himself was too broken in health to infuse
vigour into the operations. On August 16, Maximilian, at the head of
the allied forces, won a brilliant little victory at Guinegate, the
scene of his earlier triumph over the French in 1479. The enemy's
headlong retreat won for the engagement the familiar name of the Battle
of Spurs. This resulted in the surrender of Thérouenne, whose example
was followed on {66} September 24 by the important town of Tournai.
But, in spite of Maximilian's eager encouragement, Henry VIII. refused
to make full use of his advantage. The lateness of the season, the
difficulties of obtaining sufficient supplies, and still more the
position of affairs in Scotland, made him anxious to return to England;
and in November he re-embarked his army, leaving vague promises of a
renewal of the campaign in the following spring. Maximilian's
disappointment had been seriously augmented by the course of events on
the Burgundian frontier. Towards the end of August an army of 30,000
Swiss and Germans, led by Ulric of Würtemberg, had penetrated into
Burgundy, and on September 7 laid siege to Dijon. A determined assault
upon the town came within an ace of success, and made it clear to La
Trémouille, the commander of the garrison, that any prolonged
resistance was impossible. Substantial bribes to the Swiss leaders won
over the invaders to a treaty, by which Louis XII. was to make peace
with the Pope, to evacuate Milan, Cremona and Asti in favour of the
young Sforza, and to pay 400,000 crowns to the Swiss. On the strength
of this agreement Burgundy was evacuated; but no sooner was all danger
from that quarter at an end than Louis XII. repudiated the treaty, on
the ground that La Trémouille had greatly exceeded his powers.
In spite of the failure of Maximilian's hopes, he and Henry seem to
have parted on friendly terms. Indeed, the last event of the campaign
had been the treaty of Lille (October 17, 1513), between the two
sovereigns and Ferdinand, which stipulated for a triple attack on
France in the summer. Maximilian was to maintain 10,000 troops on the
French frontier in {67} return for a substantial subsidy from Henry
VIII., and Charles's betrothal to Mary of England was formally renewed.
But the unscrupulous Ferdinand only signed this treaty to infringe it.
Ere six weeks had elapsed, he had formed a close alliance with Louis
XII., which was to be cemented by the marriage of the Princess Renée to
one of Ferdinand's grandsons. Milan and Genoa were to form her dowry,
and were to be jointly occupied by the two sovereigns until the
marriage was actually accomplished. Although the execution of this
treaty could not but thwart one at least of Maximilian's projects--the
marriage of Charles and Mary, and that of young Ferdinand and Anne of
Bohemia---the Emperor was none the less won over by the wiles of the
Catholic king to listen to French proposals of peace. The earnest
dissuasions and sagacious advice of Margaret fell upon deaf ears. "It
seems to me," she wrote, "that this is done only to amuse you ... in
order to gain time, just as happened last year by reason of the
truce.... Small wonder if Ferdinand is the most readily disposed of
you three towards peace; for he has what he wants."[83] And again,
"you know the great inveterate hatred which the French bear towards our
House,"[84] and, "it is clear that now is the hour or never, when you
will be able, with the aid of your allies, to get the mastery over our
common enemies." Even her warnings that peace means that the Duchy of
Burgundy will remain French[85] and that Henry VIII., "if he sees
himself deserted by you, will win for himself better terms than you
will know how to secure," seem to have been entirely {68} disregarded
by the obstinate Maximilian. On March 13, 1514, the Emperor signed the
treaty of Orleans with France, and so confident was he of Ferdinand's
influence with his son-in-law Henry VIII., that he actually guaranteed
the English king's adhesion. The natural result of such presumption
was that Henry and Maximilian fell apart, and early in August the
former made his own terms with Louis XII., fully justifying Margaret's
prophecy that the French King would set more value upon a settlement
with England than upon the less solid advantages to be gained from her
father's goodwill.
Peace was followed in October by the marriage of the enfeebled Louis
XII. and the vivacious Mary of England, the rupture of whose betrothal
to Charles completed the estrangement of Henry and Maximilian. But the
gaieties and entertainments which heralded the new Queen's arrival
proved fatal to the bridegroom. The death of Louis XII. on New Year's
Day 1515, and the accession of his cousin, the young and fiery Francis
of Angoulême, produced a complete change in the political situation.
The typical product of his age, the new sovereign personified only too
well the France of the Renaissance and of the later Valois kings,
combining all their exaggerated license and treachery with those
debased ideals of chivalry which had replaced the ancient code of
honour. His mind was fired by wild dreams of foreign conquest, and his
accession was promptly followed by preparations for a fresh invasion of
Italy. The treaties with England and Venice were renewed, and by the
end of March the young Archduke Charles, who had assumed the Government
in January, signed, at the instance of his tutor Chièvres, a treaty of
peace and amity {69} with France. But the French monarch was not to
remain unopposed. A new league was speedily formed against him between
the Pope, the Emperor, Ferdinand, Milan and the Swiss, the latter
resolutely rejecting all Francis's overtures for peace. Undeterred by
the threatening attitude of the League, Francis led a magnificent army
of 60,000 men across the Alps, and in the desperate battle of Marignano
(September 13 and 14, 1515) drove back the Swiss army by sheer hard
fighting. Full 20,000 men were left dead upon the field, and the
Swiss, exhausted by so crushing a defeat, were compelled to abandon the
Milanese to yet another conqueror. Leo X. promptly sued for peace, and
the Spanish and Papal forces in North Italy were practically disbanded.
The strange inactivity and want of interest, which Maximilian would at
first sight seem to have displayed, while such grave issues were at
stake, must be attributed to an event of great importance in the
history of his own dominions. This was no less than his reception, at
Vienna, of the Kings of Hungary and Poland, which set a seal to the
negotiations and labours of many years by a final understanding between
the two dynasties.[86] Under the terms of the Treaty of Vienna (July
22), Prince Louis of Hungary was definitely betrothed to Mary of
Austria, while his sister Anne was delivered over to the Emperor to be
educated, in view of her marriage with the young Archduke Ferdinand.
The flattery and congratulations which surrounded these proceedings
included the adoption of Louis by Maximilian as his successor in the
Empire. But this was merely a formal move in the diplomatic game,
calculated to {70} win the support of the young Prince. The Emperor
well knew that the Electors cared little for any wishes which he might
express; otherwise we may be sure that Charles, not Louis, would have
been designated.[87]
The completeness of Francis's success, and his efforts to rouse the
Scots against England drove Henry VIII. into the arms of Ferdinand.
(October 19.) English gold was liberally expended among the
Confederates; and in February, 1516, 17,000 Swiss mercenaries moved on
Verona, to join the Imperialists. Maximilian, whose forces were
further swelled by levies of Tyrol and the Swabian League, was thus
enabled to take the offensive in North Italy, with better prospects of
success than on any previous occasion. In March he led a
well-appointed army of 30,000 men across the Mincio, and forced the
French and Venetians to raise the siege of Brescia and fall back upon
their respective bases. Maximilian continued to advance rapidly beyond
the Oglio and the Adda, until he was within nine miles of Milan itself.
But now, when Bourbon was well-nigh incapable of any prolonged
resistance, and when fortune, after so many rebuffs, seemed at length
about to crown the Imperial arms with victory, Maximilian, for some
inexplicable reason, hesitated to strike home, and withdrew his army
once more behind the Adda. His motives for so extraordinary a step
have never been discovered; and today we are as completely in the dark
as were his own allies at the time. Pace, who, as English envoy in
Maximilian's camp, had peculiar opportunities for clearing up the
mystery, writes in {71} his report to Wolsey, "that no man could, ne
can, conject what thing moved him to be so slack at that time, when
every man did see the victory in his hands, and the expulsion of the
Frenchmen out of Italy."[88] Maximilian's own version--that the
difficulties of foraging, the enemy's superiority in cavalry, and the
stoppage of English money necessitated a retreat--is, in the face of
incontestable facts, most improbable; and the only plausible
suggestion--that the Emperor's change of policy was produced by a
liberal outlay of French gold--is pure conjecture, unsupported by
proofs. If we may believe the testimony of Pace in a matter which
concerned his own person (and there is no reason to suspect his
honesty), the Emperor, in his straits for money, actually profited by
the English envoy's helpless condition, to extort a large sum of money
from him, declaring that in case of a refusal he would make terms with
France and would inform Henry that Pace had been responsible for his
defection.[89]
The universal indignation which Maximilian's withdrawal aroused among
the troops is shown by the nicknames of "Strohkönig" and "Apfelkönig"
which were levelled at him.[90] The army rapidly melted away, and,
after struggling through the Val Camonica in deep snow, he reached
Innsbruck with but a few hundred Tyrolese troops. On May 26 Brescia
surrendered to the French and Venetians, and of all the Emperor's
conquests Verona alone continued its resistance.
The sorry outcome of Maximilian's last Italian expedition seriously
impaired his credit, alike within the {72} Empire and abroad. He now
found it advisable to give heed to the counsellors of his grandson
Charles, whose position had been materially altered by recent events.
On January 23, 1516, the arch-intriguer Ferdinand had passed from the
scene of his questionable triumphs; and the young Archduke was left
master of the entire Spanish dominions, with all their boundless
possibilities. In spite of Francis' intrigues in Gueldres and Navarre,
and his scarcely veiled designs upon the throne of Naples, Charles
persisted in a policy of friendship towards France. On August 13 he
concluded the Treaty of Noyon, by which Francis was unquestionably the
greater gainer. Charles' betrothal to the French king's infant
daughter not only put in question his rights to Naples, but also
condemned him to remain a bachelor for many years, until the bride
should attain a marriageable age. He further undertook to win
Maximilian's consent to the restoration of Verona to the Republic, for
a sum of 200,000 ducats.