Less than a month after Sigismund's abdication, the death of Matthias

Corvinus diverted Maximilian's attention to those ancestral dominions

from which his father had been so ignominiously expelled, and justified

him in the hope of restoring the old Hapsburg influence over Hungary.

Frederick's claim to the latter kingdom was based on the agreement of

1463, ratified by Matthias and the leading Magyar nobles, by which

Frederick or his son was to succeed, if Matthias should die childless.

Though this condition was now fulfilled, the Hungarians were by no

means disposed to act upon it; and Uladislas, King of Bohemia, was a

dangerous rival to the Hapsburgs, both by reason of the nearness of his

dominions and the strength of his hereditary claims.[31] Several

causes {29} combined to handicap Maximilian. His father, with his

usual jealousy, refused to waive his rights in favour of Maximilian,

who alone was capable of carrying the enterprise to a successful issue.

Want of money, his curse throughout life, told heavily against him; nor

was any assistance to be obtained from the German Princes without

concessions on the Emperor's part, and these Frederick stubbornly

declined to make. Finally, Austria claimed first attention, and till

it had been recovered, Uladislas was left unassailed in Hungary.

Whatever might be the feeling in the latter country, there was no doubt

as to the popularity of Maximilian's cause in Austria. Great

enthusiasm prevailed, and his advance was as rapid and bloodless as it

was triumphant. Vienna University declared unanimously in his favour,

and, by the end of June, 12,000 men had enlisted in his service. In

July Maximilian entered Graz, and on August 19, made his triumphal

entry into Vienna, which had been hastily abandoned by the Hungarian

forces.[32] The oath of allegiance was taken to Maximilian only: the

citizens remembered Frederick too well to entrust themselves a second

time to his mismanagement. Meanwhile Uladislas had been proclaimed

King of Hungary on July 15, 1490,[33] and in September was crowned at

Stuhlweissenburg. Maximilian on this occasion displayed great

activity, and, aided by a liberal grant of money from the Tyrolese

Estates, invaded Hungary at the head of an army of about 17,000 men.

Crossing the Raab late in October, he met with but slight opposition;

Uladislas was unprepared, and by nature averse to energetic measures;

and the invader was joined by a number {30} of Hungarian magnates. But

this phenomenal success was fatal to the invaders; and by the time that

it reached Stuhlweissenburg, the army was virtually out of hand. In

spite of a firm resistance, the city was cannonaded (Maximilian

personally directing the artillery) and taken by storm; but a

disgraceful scene of plunder and slaughter ensued. Maximilian and his

captains were quite unable to restrain the soldiers, and on the next

day an open mutiny broke out. Their refusal to advance upon Buda, and

the consequent delay, proved fatal to the whole enterprise. When

summoned to surrender, the capital indignantly declined, and Uladislas

found time to bring up his Bohemians and to threaten Vienna. Frederick

III., true to his ultra-Fabian motto--"Mit der Zeit lohnt oder rächt

sich alles"[34]--sent no assistance, and Maximilian, seeing his base

endangered, and hampered by want of money and discipline, found it

necessary to withdraw westwards. His overtures to Poland met with no

response, and he was quite unable to continue the struggle alone. By

July 1491 Stuhlweissenburg fell into the hands of Uladislas, and all

Maximilian's recent conquests were lost. The urgent appeals of

Reichenburg to Maximilian for reinforcements and of Maximilian to his

father for money were all in vain. His position was absolutely

desperate from sheer want of funds,[35] while the turn which Breton

affairs were taking seemed to render peace necessary, at whatever

price. Frederick, who {31} throughout the war had thwarted his aims

and damped his ardour,[36] now offered his mediation, and negotiations

were opened in August. By the Treaty of Pressburg (November 7, 1491),

Uladislas was formally recognized as King of Hungary, but, failing his

lawful issue, the crown was to fall to Maximilian or his son. This

promise was to be solemnly ratified by the Hungarian Estates in

presence of the Imperial envoys. Moreover, Uladislas renounced all

claims upon Austria, and undertook to refund Maximilian for the

expenses of the war.[37]

The old Emperor's attitude during the late war had not improved his

relations with Maximilian; and the friction was rendered the more

acute, when Frederick refused to see his son, and shut off various

sources of income from him, thus seriously injuring his chances of

success against France. Moreover, Frederick's hostility to the

Bavarian Dukes formed a marked contrast to Maximilian's conciliatory

position, which was mainly due to the influence of his sister

Cunigunda, wife of Albert IV.[38] Duke Albert's high-handed conduct in

imposing a general tax on his subjects, in spite of the refusal of the

Estates, had led to the formation of a League of discontented nobles,

known as the Löwlerbund, which united with the Swabian League and was

openly encouraged by the Emperor. By the end of 1491 the movement had

ended in hostilities, and on January 23, 1492, Frederick {32} III.

published the ban of the Empire against Duke Albert of Bavaria. The

Swabian League began to arm. The French were ready to invade the

Empire, if the League should attack Bavaria. An outbreak which would

involve the whole of South-West Germany seemed wellnigh inevitable, and

the entire credit of the preservation of peace, must rest with

Maximilian. At the last moment, when the armies were actually encamped

and facing each other in the field, his influence secured an adjustment

of the quarrel. He had appeased his father's anger by freeing the

Austrian dominions from the oath which they had taken to himself, and

by referring them to the Emperor as their ruler. Frederick was now

satisfied with the restoration of Regensburg to the Empire[39] and the

cancelling of Bavarian claims on Tyrol; while a full pardon was granted

by Albert to all members of the Löwlerbund. (May 1492.)

Maximilian, notwithstanding this triumph of his diplomacy, met with the

utmost difficulty in raising money for his operations against the

French; while a new enemy had arisen in the young Charles of Egmont,

who had recently recovered the Duchy of Gueldres, and who was destined

to be a thorn in Maximilian's side for the rest of the reign. Though

his position in West Germany was strengthened by a League with the

"Lower Union,"[40] the sole result of his efforts at the Diet of

Coblenz was a prospective grant of 94,000 gulden, of which only 16,000

actually came in. His campaign against the French has already been

sketched (p. 25). Scarcely were his {33} hands freed by the Peace of

Senlis, when an incursion of the Turks into Styria (August 1493) made a

fresh demand upon his attention. Then, as usual, the necessary aid

arrived too late, and the marauders returned home almost unchallenged.

In the midst of this danger Frederick III., whose health had been

failing for some time, and whose foot it had been found necessary to

amputate,[41] died at Linz, in the seventy-eighth year of his age

(August 19, 1493).

The old Emperor had lived to see his dreams of Hapsburg revival and

consolidation to a great extent realized; but his irritable nature had

led him to thwart the family aspirations on Hungary. In his dread lest

the acquisition of a throne should make his son more powerful than

himself, he afforded him no assistance, nay rather, threw every

hindrance in his way. Frederick's death was an undoubted gain to

Maximilian, for it left him Emperor elect and unquestioned ruler of the

Hapsburg dominions. Family divisions were no longer possible, since no

relative capable of resistance survived.[42]

But while his position was rendered more definite and imposing, there

seems to have been at this period a general cooling of Maximilian's

popularity, at least among the ruling classes. A powerful party in the

Empire, led by Berthold of Mainz, now claimed the fulfilment of those

promises of reform which he had made at the Diet of 1489,[43] and his

reluctance to devote {34} his time to its discussion produced a

distinctly bad impression among the Princes. Moreover, the part which

he now began to play in Italian politics, exposing, as it did, the

Imperial person to indignity and failure, roused all the old prejudices

of the caste of nobles, and acted as a damper to their enthusiasm.

Gladly as we should avoid threading the intricate maze of Italian

politics--a task which is after all more apposite to a general

history--some treatment of Maximilian's attitude during these momentous

years is inevitable, even in so slight a sketch as the present. A

general idea of Maximilian's ambitions in Italy will best be conveyed

by his own words. "Italy has for centuries experienced what it means

for the people, if no Emperor is there to restrain unruly passions, and

hence the friends of the people have ever looked with favour on the

Imperial power, and longed for the return of the Emperor."[44]

[Illustration: BIANCA MARIA SFORZA Painting by A. de Predis]

The fortunes of Milan were at this moment in the hands of Ludovico il

Moro, who, at first merely Regent for Gian Galeazzo, had retained the

whole powers of government in his own hands, even after his nephew had

come of age. The young Duke's wife, Isabella of Naples, deeply

resented her husband's sudordinate position, and Ludovico lived in

terror of intervention on the part of Ferrante and his Florentine

allies. Hoping to veil the injustice of his cause under Imperial

recognition, he turned to Maximilian, and offered, in return for his

own investiture as Duke of Milan, the hand of his niece, Bianca Maria

Sforza, and a substantial dowry of 300,000 ducats.[45] So much hard

cash seemed to promise to the needy Maximilian the fulfilment of many a

golden {35} dream; and the bride's want of pedigree was atoned for by

the practical possession of her uncle's money bags. The marriage was

duly celebrated on March 9, 1494, at Halle in Tyrol, when the heir of

all the Caesars linked himself with the granddaughter of a Romagnol

peasant.[46] Thus his first entry into Italian politics rightly

exposed him with justice to the nickname afterwards bestowed upon

him--Massimiliano Pochi Danari. "On the altar of politics the heart is

often the lamb of sacrifice." Maximilian's second marriage is not the

most creditable episode in his life. The luckless Bianca Maria never

filled the place of Mary in her husband's affections, and remained till

her death[47] a mere cipher, with next to no influence over him, and,

though never ill-treated, entirely neglected and overlooked. The

unpopularity of his marriage in Germany induced Maximilian to postpone

the investiture of Ludovico with the Milanese, and Gian Galeazzo dying

in the interval, the Emperor was able, with less offence to his

conscience, to fulfil his promise in May 1495.[48]

Maximilian's first intention was to employ his wife's dowry in a

Crusade against the Turks; and he plunged eagerly into projects of

forming active alliances abroad and of raising permanent forces at home

to stem the tide of infidel invasion.[49] But disturbing {36} rumours

of the doings of Charles VIII. diverted his attention to the Italian

Peninsula.

By the death of Lorenzo de' Medici in 1492, the balance of power, which

his skill had so long preserved in Italy, was seriously endangered.

The incapable Piero inclined towards Naples, whose attitude was now

little short of openly hostile to the Milanese usurper. Ludovico, in

dire need of some influential ally, made advances to the new Pope and

to Venice. But his alliance with these powers was shortlived: Spanish

diplomacy effected a reconciliation between Naples and Alexander VI.,

and Ludovico found himself more isolated than ever. The death of the

old King of Naples, in January 1494, hastened events. The universal

hatred with which his successor, Alfonso II., was regarded, while it

drove the exiled Barons to extreme measures, was favourable to the

cause of Ludovico. He turned naturally to Charles VIII., who had

recently acquired the Angevin claims to the throne of Naples, and whose

feeble mind was filled with all the clap-trap of mediaeval chivalry.

The appeal met with an enthusiastic response: every other trend of

policy was sacrificed that this might succeed. By the end of August

1494, all was prepared for the invasion of Italy, and, with a

magnificently appointed army of 60,000 men, Charles crossed the Alps

and was welcomed by the traitor Ludovico. Florence opened her gates to

the deliverer: the Pope abandoned Rome at his approach, and looked on

in sullen anxiety from Sant' Angelo; and Naples itself was occupied

amid general rejoicings, almost before a single blow had been struck.

Dazzled by such unprecedented success, Charles VIII. lost all restraint

and began to indulge in the {37} wildest dreams. He was to recover

Jerusalem, to eject the infidel from Europe, and to restore in his own

person the fallen Empire of Constantinople. Rightly or wrongly, he was

credited with the intention of forcing the Pope to crown him Emperor of

the West, or of driving him from the Papal throne and instituting a

thorough reform of the Church. Such rumours could not but fill

Maximilian with an uneasiness which Borgia's letters did not fail to

augment.[50] It was only owing to the skilful diplomacy of Charles'

envoys and his own strained relations with Venice, that he preserved

neutrality for so long as he did.[51] Had not others taken alarm at

the turn of affairs, he might have prevaricated till the time for

action had passed. Ludovico, who was before all others responsible for

the French expedition, was the first to be disillusioned. Alarmed at

the open designs of the Duke of Orleans on Milan, he soon became as

anxious for Charles' ruin as he had been eager for his success, and

looked for assistance to his more powerful neighbours. But it was

Ferdinand of Spain who really brought about Maximilian's change of

policy, by holding out the tempting bait of a double marriage alliance

with his House. The Emperor's[52] suspicions of Venice were overcome,

and the Signoria became {38} the centre of opposition to France. The

various intrigues were conducted with such skill and secrecy, that even

Comines, who then held the post of French Ambassador in Venice, was

completely outwitted. But their details do not leave us with a

favourable impression of the confederates' straightforwardness. The

itch of the Republic's patriotic palm was allayed by a promise of the

Apulian ports; while the Pope displayed to the full his talent for

shifty intrigue and prevarication, and Maximilian kept up a stream of

friendly assurances which effectively duped his young and incapable

rival.

Thus the proclamation of the Holy League, between the Pope, Maximilian,

Ferdinand, Ludovico and the Venetians, (March 31, 1495) came upon the

French as a bolt from the blue. Its ostensible objects were to defend

the Papacy, and to secure peace in Italy and mutual protection against

the attacks of other Princes. But from the very first its members made

little attempt to conceal their genuine aim--the expulsion of the

French from the Peninsula. The massing of troops by each of the allies

removed all doubts upon the subject; and Charles VIII. saw himself

compelled to abandon Naples. On July 6, 1495, ne encountered the

forces of the League at the battle of Fornovo, and after a running

engagement made good his retreat westwards. Even then the German and

Venetian troops might have inflicted serious losses on his armies ere

they recrossed the Alps; but the treachery of Ludovico, who concluded a

treaty with Charles without consulting any of his allies, forced them

to retire and leave the French unmolested.

Meanwhile Maximilian was engaged at the famous {39} Diet of Worms (26

March-August, 1495). Burning to strike a blow which might tend to the

humiliation of his rival, he found himself once more, so to speak, the

prisoner of his pocket. The Electors and the other Estates were

determined that redress should precede supply, and stubbornly refused

to grant a single florin, until the question of reform had been placed

on a satisfactory basis. Nor can they be accused of any want of

patriotism; for the interests of the Empire were by no means coincident

with those of Austria. Indeed, had not Maximilian's territorial

instincts triumphed so completely over his feelings as Emperor, he

might have been the first to recognize the deep and sterling patriotism

which inspired the Elector Berthold. As it was, his first intention

had been to remain fourteen days at Worms, and, after obtaining the

Diet's sanction for the Imperial levies, to conduct a vigorous campaign

against the French. But here he was met by the practical impossibility

of inducing a body mainly constituted for peace, to undertake a long

and tedious war at a distance. The feudal system had fallen into

decay, and the old military power of the Empire was no more. New

circumstances demanded new measures; and the triumph achieved by a

standing army in France pointed the direction which military reform

should take. The proposal, then, which Maximilian laid before the

Diet, was for a continuous money aid for ten or twelve years; with this

he might form an army of landsknechts. But the Diet was wholly

unsympathetic, and rigidly confined itself to schemes of reform.

Meetings were sometimes held without any reference to the Emperor, and,

as he indignantly exclaimed, he found himself treated with {40} less

consideration than some petty burgomaster. The struggle of parties

lasted throughout the summer, Maximilian adopting a highly undignified

attitude of sulking. On three occasions he was particularly pressing,

especially in August, when Novara was threatened by the Swiss, and a

mutiny of the lands-knechts might be expected, if their pay was not

forthcoming. At last nothing was left for Maximilian but submission,

and he accepted the Elector Berthold's proposals for reform. But

Charles VIII. had already recrossed the Alps, and the time for action

was past.

Yet, notwithstanding his enforced inactivity, Maximilian's presence at

Worms had not been in vain. The brilliancy of the Court and the

gallant ceremonies of the lists hid from the casual observer the true

meaning of this great assembly of princes and nobles. Yet the two

important results of Maximilian's policy form a striking contrast to

his humiliation at the hands of the Electors. In return for the

services of Count Eberhard, he erected Würtemberg into a Duchy, at the

same time limiting the succession to heirs-male. Since the hopes of

the new ducal family rested upon one delicate youth,[53] this

arrangement held out to Maximilian or his successors the prospect of

acquiring the fair valley of the upper Neckar. But the other

achievement of his policy was destined to have far more momentous

consequences. This was the fulfilment of his agreement with Ferdinand

the Catholic, in accordance with which the Prince of Asturias was

betrothed to Margaret of Austria, and the Archduke Philip to Joanna of

Spain. By an extraordinary fatality, the latter marriage, which at the

time had {41} seemed the less important of the two, came to exercise a

vast influence on the history of Europe. The Spanish heir died within

a year of his marriage (1497), and Margaret's child lived but a few

days. Isabella Queen of Portugal was now heiress of Castile and

Arragon; but the fates fought against the unity of the Peninsula. In

1498 Isabella died, and in 1500 her only child, Prince Miguel, followed

her to the grave. Philip's wife, Joanna, became heiress of Spain and

all its splendid dependencies in the New World.

Though Maximilian had been thwarted in the hope of meeting his rival on

the open field, the next year brought a prospect of intervention in

Italian affairs. Charles VIII., on his return to France, had set on

foot preparations for a fresh invasion. The success of his overtures

to the Swiss Cantons, and the servile attitude of Florence, filled the

Venetians and Ludovico with alarm; and the two powers invited

Maximilian to make an expedition to Italy in person. His eagerness to

restore Imperial influence in that country, coupled with his knightly

thirst for renown, led him, with curious inconsistency, to submit to

the indignity of becoming the pensioner of States whose feudal superior

he claimed to be. Each promised 30,000 ducats for three months towards

the payment of his troops and engaged a number of Swiss mercenaries in

addition. The Emperor's sanguine nature already saw the French party

in Italy crushed, and frontier provinces wrested from the grasp of

Charles. But the Estates of the Empire, which had been summoned to

meet at Lindau, proved more unmanageable than ever. Even had his

condottiere-contract not filled them with disgust, they were wholly

disinclined to {42} repay his grudging and half-cancelled concessions

by grants of money for an object which the Empire viewed with

indifference. His penury may be judged by a letter which he received

from his councillors at Worms, containing an urgent request for more

money, as the maintenance of the courtiers has been stopped, and the

Queen and her ladies will be provided for "only three or four days

more; and if within that time no money comes, even their food-supplies

will come to an end."[54]

[Illustration: LUDOVICO SFORZA (Duke of Milan)]

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