MAJOR JONES: You are not suggesting that you thought that the war

between Germany and Russia was a defensive war so far as Germany was

concerned, are you?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, we were of the opinion that the deployment of

troops on both sides had reached such an extreme point that it would not

take long for the storm to burst, and that from the military point of

view anyone who sees that a conflict is inevitable, naturally likes to

have the advantages which result from dealing the first blow.

MAJOR JONES: The invasion of Russia was a brutal aggression on the part

of Nazi Germany, you admit that now, do you not?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I do admit that.

MAJOR JONES: I want you to turn your mind for a moment, if you will, to

Document L-79, which is in the British Document Book 10, Page 74. Those

are the minutes of the Hitler conference on 23 May 1939 which you

discussed in your evidence-in-chief this morning. I take it that you

have read those minutes, Witness?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I look at them now? I have never seen these minutes

before. If I were to be asked about them, I would first have to read

them in toto.

MAJOR JONES: Well, you need not trouble to do that, Witness. You gave

evidence this morning as to Raeder’s discussion with you about this

conference. Did Raeder tell you that Hitler had said on 23 May 1939, for

instance:

“There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with

the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.

We cannot expect a repetition of the Czechoslovakian affair.

There will be war.”

Then further, Page 76 of the report:

“The Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with

England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict... England

is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a

life and death struggle.”

And then the next paragraph but one:

“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed

force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.”

Now, I am suggesting to you that those statements of Hitler’s

represented Hitler’s considered policy, and that that policy was in fact

carried out in the field of action. Is that not so?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, I must correct a mistake. I thought that

you had shown me a record on Russia and not the one on Poland. I saw it

in different writing, and I thought it was another record. If it is the

same record which I mentioned this morning, then I must state again that

Raeder did not agree with the belligerent wording of these minutes as

written down by Schmundt.

MAJOR JONES: Just one moment, Witness, if you please. I have read out

certain extracts from that document, which I take it that you heard

interpreted. Do you agree with me that those extracts represented

Hitler’s considered policy at the time and that that policy was in fact

carried out in the field of action?

If you keep your headphones on—I know it is difficult. Just move them

back if you wish to talk. Now, see if you can answer my question.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I should like to remark in this connection that Hitler

in his speeches pursued a certain purpose. In preparations for war he

saw a means of political pressure, and in the phrase “war of nerves”

(which was not used in Germany only, but went everywhere through the

ether far beyond Europe’s boundaries) he tried to find a means of

preventing war as well as a means of exerting pressure. This document

itself contains contradictions which lead to the conclusion that he

himself could not seriously have thought that a war would develop. I can

prove this by saying, for example, that he states that the General Staff

or the general staffs are not to concern themselves with this question;

but toward the end he says that all the branches of the Wehrmacht must

get together to study the problem. He says that a war with Poland must

in no event result in war with England; politics must see to that. But

in the next paragraph one reads: “But if a war actually does arise, I

shall deal short sharp blows for a quick decision.” In the next

paragraph it says again, “But I need 10 to 15 years to prepare,” and in

the concluding paragraph it says: “The construction program of the Navy

will in no wise be changed.”

If, therefore, Hitler at that time had really been serious in his

speech, that is, that an armed conflict with Poland would result

shortly, then he would not have exclaimed first that we would have time

until 1943 and, secondly, that there were to be no changes as far as the

Navy was concerned. Rather he would have said to Raeder, privately at

least: “In all haste prepare a strong U-boat program because I do not

know what course events will take.”

MAJOR JONES: But it is a fact that at about this time, the Fall Weiss

operation was being prepared to the very last detail, was it not? That

is the operation against Poland.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The operation was prepared to such a stage that when it

was canceled at the last minute we thought that we would not be able to

reach our forces at sea by wireless. We considered this an extreme

policy of exerting pressure in the form of a war of nerves. Since at the

last minute everything was canceled we believed without doubt that it

was only a means of pressure and not an entry into war. Not until we

heard the cannons were we convinced that the war was no longer to be

prevented. I personally believe...

MAJOR JONES: If you would shorten your answers as best you can, it would

be very convenient.

I want to go from Poland to Norway. The first conference of the

Defendant Raeder with regard to Norway took place on 10 October, you

have told us. I want you to hear the record of that conference, which is

found in Admiral Assmann’s headline diary. It is dated 10 October 1939:

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy states conquering the

Belgian coast no advantage for U-boat warfare; refers to value

of Norwegian bases.”

I suggest to you that the interests of the German Navy in Norway from

the point of view of requiring submarine bases was manifesting itself at

that time; is that not so?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I look at this document first? It is unknown to me.

MAJOR JONES: You shall see the original diary, if you want to reassure

yourself that I am reading it correctly.

[_The document was handed to the witness._]

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In this sentence, I do not see any belligerent

intentions. It says expressly that he attaches importance to the winning

of Norwegian bases.

MAJOR JONES: That is all I am putting to you at the moment. And do you

know that on 3 October the Defendant Raeder was sending out a

questionnaire upon the possibility of extending the operational base to

the north, and upon the bases that it would be desirable for German

power to acquire?

I am referring to Document C-122, My Lord. The document C-122 is in

Document Book 10a at Page 91.

If you will look at that document, Witness, you will see in the second

sentence:

“It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in

Norway with the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with

the aim of improving fundamentally our strategic and operational

position. The following questions are to be examined...”

And then there follow these questions:

“What places in Norway can be considered as bases?

“Can bases be gained by military force against Norway’s will, if

it is impossible to achieve this without fighting?

“What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?

“Will the harbors have to be developed completely as bases, or

do they possibly have decisive advantages simply as supply

centers? (The Commander of U-boats considers such harbors

extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for Atlantic

U-boats on temporary stops.)”

And then finally:

“What decisive advantages would there be for the conduct of the

war at sea in gaining a base in North Denmark, for instance,

Skagen?”

Now, I suggest to you that those documents are the clue to the German

invasion of Norway. Do you not agree with that?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I do not see any aggressive intentions in these

purely operational plans and considerations when thinking of what bases

might come into consideration for the conduct of the war. This morning I

said that, to the best of my knowledge, Generaladmiral Carls as early as

September sent a letter to this effect to Raeder in which he expressed

his concern and stated his strategical ideas and plans in case of an

Allied occupation of Norway.

MAJOR JONES: The source of the information which the Defendant Raeder

was receiving you discussed this morning, but one source that you did

not give wets the Norwegian traitor Quisling. The relations between the

Defendant Raeder and him were very close, were they not?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: There was no contact at all between Raeder and Quisling

until December 1939; then Raeder met Quisling for the first time in his

life and never saw him again.

MAJOR JONES: But after December Quisling’s agent Hagelin was a very

frequent visitor of the Defendant Raeder, was he not?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not believe that Hagelin ever went to Raeder

before Quisling’s visit, unless I am very mistaken. I think he visited

Raeder for the first time when he accompanied Quisling.

MAJOR JONES: Yes, but thereafter Raeder was in very close touch with the

Quisling movement, the Quisling treachery, was he not?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. Raeder had nothing at all to do with the Quisling

movement.

MAJOR JONES: Do you know a man, Erich Giese, Walter Georg Erich Giese,

who was an administrative employee of the adjutancy of the supreme

commander of the Navy in Berlin?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not quite catch the name.

MAJOR JONES: Giese, G-i-e-s-e. He was a—part of his duties were to

receive the visitors of the supreme commander. He was an assistant of

the supreme commander’s adjutant and he was dismissed from his post in

April 1942. And no doubt you recollect the man.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Will you please tell me the name again? Although it was

spelled to me I did not catch it. Is this a Norwegian?

MAJOR JONES: This is a German subject, an employee of the supreme

command of the Navy. Part of his duties were to receive all the supreme

commander’s visitors, to accept applications for interviews, and draw up

the list of callers for the supreme commander. Now you are looking at an

affidavit from this man, Document D-722, to be Exhibit GB-479.

THE PRESIDENT: Has the witness answered the question yet?

MAJOR JONES: Not yet, My Lord.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Now I have the name. The man of whom you are talking

was in the reception room of the adjutant’s office. It was not up to

this man, who was to be admitted to the Admiral; that was up to me. I

asked the callers for what reason they had come. Mr. Hagelin did not

visit Raeder before Quisling’s visit, that is, not before December 1939.

MAJOR JONES: I am not suggesting that but what I am suggesting is that

after December 1939 there was a very close link between Raeder and the

Quisling movement. I just read out to you this extract from the

affidavit of this man. From Page 3, My Lord, of the English text:

“I can state the following about the preparations which led up

to the action against Denmark and Norway: An appointment with

the Commander-in-Chief was frequently made for a Mr. Hagelin and

another gentleman, whose name I cannot recall at present, by a

party official of Rosenberg’s Foreign Political Office; as a

rule they were received immediately. I also had received

instructions that if a Mr. Hagelin should announce himself

personally, I should always take him to the Commander-in-Chief

at once. Shortly afterwards I learned from the minute book and

from conversations in my room that he was a Norwegian

confidential agent. The gentleman from the Foreign Political

Office who frequently accompanied him and whose name I do not

remember at the moment also conversed with me and confided in

me, so that I learned about the Raeder-Rosenberg discussions and

about the preparations for the Norway campaign. According to all

I heard I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated

from Raeder and met with Hitler’s heartiest approval. The whole

enterprise was disguised by the pretense of an enterprise

against Holland and England. One day Quisling, too, was

announced at the Commander-in-Chief’s by Hagelin and was

received immediately. Korvettenkapitän Schreiber of the Naval

Reserve, who was later naval attaché in Oslo and knew the

conditions in Norway very well, also played a role in all these

negotiations. He collaborated with the Quisling party and its

agents in Oslo.”

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It is not true that Mr. Hagelin was received by Admiral

Raeder. Herr Giese cannot possibly have any information about that

because he was stationed two rooms away. If he had perhaps noted down

that he was received by me, that would in a certain sense be correct.

The fact is that at the time, after the Quisling-Hagelin visit, I had

said that if he were to pass through Berlin again and he had any naval

political information in this connection, I should like him to make this

information available to me.

MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that Defendant Raeder never met Hagelin?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He did not meet him before Quisling’s visit in

December. Later he did not receive him any more.

MAJOR JONES: But he in fact received Hagelin and took him to Hitler on

14 December 1939, did he not?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He was accompanied by Quisling, that is correct. But he

did not have any special discussion with Raeder alone.

MAJOR JONES: You said—you spoke this morning as to a conference between

Quisling and Raeder on 12 December 1939 and suggested that politics were

not discussed at that conference.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: By the word “politics” I mean politics in the National

Socialistic sense, that is, National Socialistic politics on the

Norwegian side and on our side. The matters discussed were only naval

political questions.

MAJOR JONES: But I will not go into a discussion of the question of

politics with you. I will consider the familiar German definition that

politics is a continuation of war by other means. But if you look at the

Document C-64 you will see that political problems were discussed on 12

December. You see that is a report of Raeder to Hitler. It is found on

Page 31 of the Document Book 10a, in which Raeder writes in Paragraph 2:

“As a result of the Russo-Finnish conflict, anti-German feeling

in Norway is even stronger than hitherto. England’s influence is

very great, especially because of Hambro, the President of the

Storting (a Jew and a friend of Hore-Belisha) who is

all-powerful in Norway just now. Quisling is convinced that

there is an agreement between England and Norway for the

possible occupation of Norway, in which case Sweden would also

stand against Germany. Danger of Norway’s occupation by England

is very great—possibly very shortly. From 11 January 1940 on,

the Storting and thereby the Norwegian Government is

unconstitutional since the Storting, in defiance of the

constitution, has prolonged its term for a year.”

Politics was very much under discussion at that conference, was it not?

You have said that the Defendant Raeder was anxious for peace with

Norway. Was it for peace with a Norway ruled by the traitor Quisling?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In reply to your first question I should like to say

that in the minutes it says:

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy points out that in

connection with such offers we can never know to what extent the

persons involved want to further their own party aims, and to

what extent they are concerned about German interests. Hence

caution is required.”

This entry in the document which you have just presented to me

corroborates what I was trying to say, that is, that no party matters or

matters depending on agreement along ideological lines were to be

settled between Admiral Raeder and Quisling. For this reason I said that

Raeder did not discuss politics with him, but merely factual matters.

That Quisling, at the time of his introduction, should mention certain

things as a sort of preamble is self-evident. But he points out the

factor of caution and asks: “What does this man want? Does he want to

work with the Party or does he really want to remain aloof?”

MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder was preferring the

reports of Quisling to the reports of the German Ambassador in Oslo

which were entirely different from the reports of the traitor Quisling.

That is so, is it not?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe that Raeder never saw the reports from the

German Ambassador in Oslo. I at any rate do not know these reports.

MAJOR JONES: Now the Tribunal has the documents with regard to that

matter. I will not pursue it. I want to ask you next about the relations

with the United States of America. When did the German Admiralty first

know of Japan’s intention to attack the United States?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I can speak only for Raeder and myself. As far as I

know, it was not until the moment of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

MAJOR JONES: But you had received a communication from your German naval

attaché at Tokyo before the attack on Pearl Harbor, indicating that an

attack against the United States was pending, had you not?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Pearl Harbor? No.

MAJOR JONES: But against the United States forces. Just look at the

Document D-872, which will be Exhibit GB-480. You see that those are

extracts from the war diary of the German naval attaché in Tokyo. The

first entry is dated 3 December 1941:

“1800 hours. The naval attaché extended an invitation to several

officers of the Japanese Naval Ministry. It transpires from the

conversation that the negotiations in Washington must be

regarded as having broken down completely and that, quite

obviously, the beginning of actions to the south by the Japanese

Armed Forces is to be expected in the near future.”

And then on 6 December 1941:

“Conversation with Fregattenkapitän Shiba.”

The outcome of the conversation is reported to Berlin in the following

telegram:

“Naval Attaché, 1251. Military Secret:

“1. Last week America offered a nonaggression pact between the

United States, England, Russia and Japan. In view of the

Tripartite Pact and the high counterdemands, Japan rejected this

offer. Negotiations have therefore completely broken down.

“2. The Armed Forces foresaw this development and consented to

Kurusu’s being sent only to impress the people with the fact

that all means had been exhausted.

“3. The Armed Forces have already decided 3 weeks ago that war

is inevitable, even if the United States at the last minute

should make substantial concessions. Appropriate measures are

under way.”

And then—I will not read the whole document, and at the end it says:

“A state of war with Britain and America would certainly exist

by Christmas.”

Assuming that signal reached you before 8 December, you became familiar

with the plans of the perfidious Japanese attack upon the United States,

did you not?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not quite grasp it. I have already said that we

had no contact with the Japanese experts or attachés in Berlin. I

asserted that we first learned of the Pearl Harbor incident by radio,

and I cannot quite see what difference it makes whether on 6 December

the attaché in Tokyo told us his predictions, or whether he was drawing

conclusions about a future conflict from information sources which we

could not control. That has nothing to do with our having advised the

Japanese in Berlin to attack America.

MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you had no conversations in Berlin with

the Japanese attaché?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: To my knowledge there were no official conferences

between the two admiralty staffs, that is, official operational

conferences between the Naval Operations Staff and the Japanese

admiralty staff.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, before you part from that document, I

think you ought to read Paragraph 5.

MAJOR JONES: Paragraph 5, My Lord, reads:

“5. Addition—Naval Attaché.

“No exact details are available as to the zero hour for the

commencement of the southern offensive. All the evidence,

however, indicates that it may be expected to start within 3

weeks, with simultaneous attacks on Siam, the Philippines and

Borneo.

“6. The Ambassador has no knowledge of the transmission of the

telegram, but is acquainted with its contents.”

Now I want to...

THE PRESIDENT: With reference to what the witness has just said, I do

not know whether I understood him right before, but what I took down he

said was that the German Admiralty first knew of Japan’s intention to

attack, after Pearl Harbor, not that it first knew of Pearl Harbor by

radio. It was the first indication they had of an intention to attack.

MAJOR JONES: That is so, My Lord.

[_Turning to the witness._] I am suggesting to you, Witness, that you

knew perfectly well of the Japanese intention to attack the United

States before the incident of Pearl Harbor.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not know whether you are stressing Pearl Harbor,

or the fact that 2 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor we received a

telegram from Tokyo to the effect that a conflict was to be counted on.

I was asked whether we had known of the fact of the attack on Pearl

Harbor, and to that I said: “No.” I said that we had had no conferences

in Berlin between the Naval Operations Staff and the Japanese admiralty

staff. What you are presenting to me...

MAJOR JONES: I just want to deal with that, but I want to read out to

you what your Commander-in-Chief said about that, because it is not what

you are saying, you know. On the interrogation of Admiral Raeder on 10

November 1945 (Document D-880, GB-483) he was asked:

“Question: Would such matters be accomplished by Foreign Office

people alone, or would that be in collaboration with the High

Command of the Navy and OKW?”

And Defendant Raeder’s answer was:

“No, the negotiations were conducted by the Foreign Office and

on the part of the Japanese diplomats there was this delegate,

Oshima, who was an officer. He negotiated with the Foreign

Office in his capacity as delegate, but apart from that he was

enough of an expert to look at this thing from a military

standpoint as well. Military authorities had long before that

carried on negotiations with military and naval attachés about

the needs and other things that the Japanese needed... This was

all talked about and thrashed out with the military and naval

attachés.”

That is a very different version of the fact from the version you have

given, Witness, is it not? Now, there are two more matters which I want

to deal with.

I do not know whether it will be convenient, My Lord, to have a brief

adjournment.

[_A recess was taken._]

MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, with regard to the extract from

the interrogation of the Defendant Raeder which I read I wanted to be

clear that the defendant was then dealing with the relationship

generally between the German authorities in Berlin and the Japanese

representatives. I do not want to have given the Court the impression it

was a direct negotiation with regard to intervention against America

itself. I do not want to mislead the Court in any way with regard to

that matter.

[_Turning to the witness._] Did you know of the shooting in December

1942 by a naval unit belonging to the German naval officer in command at

Bordeaux of two British Royal Marines who took part in a raid on

shipping in the Gironde estuary?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I learned of that later.

MAJOR JONES: Did you see the entry with regard to that shooting in the

SKL War Diary?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, here in Nuremberg the defendant’s counsel showed me

an entry, but I do not know whether it was the War Diary of the Naval

Operations Staff.

MAJOR JONES: It has been suggested by both counsel for the Defendant

Dönitz and counsel for the Defendant Raeder that the entry in D-658

which contained the sentence: “The measure would be in accordance with

the Führer’s special order, but is nevertheless something new in

international law since these soldiers were in uniform,” that that entry

was not from the SKL War Diary. Now, you are familiar with the initial

of the Defendant Raeder, are you not?

I want you now to look at the original of D-658, so that it may be

established beyond peradventure that this matter was entered in the SKL

War Diary. I will put in a photostatic copy of the original if the

Tribunal will allow me, because the original is required for other

purposes. D-658 was GB-229, and it may be convenient to call the

photostats of the originals D-658(a) and GB-229(a). That is the War

Diary of the SKL, is it not?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I recognize it as such.

MAJOR JONES: And the SKL was perfectly familiar with that dreadful

murder of the men at Bordeaux, was it not?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From the War Diary I can see—such is my

impression—that afterward on 9 December they were informed about the

fact of the shooting.

MAJOR JONES: And their laconic comment was...

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In the Armed Forces communiqué it says: “According to

the Armed Forces communiqué, the two soldiers have been shot in the

meantime.” This can be seen in the War Diary of the SKL and I

acknowledged it.

MAJOR JONES: And the humane comment of the SKL is, “It is something new

in international law, since the soldiers were in uniform.”

There is one final matter which I wish to ask you about: Is it your

contention that the German Navy fought a clean war at sea?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I contend that the German Navy fought a very clean war

and that has nothing to do with the fact that it is said here in the

Diary of the SKL, as taken from the Armed Forces communiqué, that two

soldiers were shot and that this was in accordance with the special

order given by the Führer which has been cited but, as the Naval

Operations Staff adds, was something new in the history of naval

warfare. This too...

MAJOR JONES: I am turning to another matter, but you say generally...

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I just say in conclusion that this postscript has

been confirmed and that the Navy, in this case Raeder, had no influence

on these matters. If you ask me whether I approved that order or

something of the sort I would give you my personal opinion of the

matters which Raeder and I discussed.

MAJOR JONES: But you know Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and

who would have influence in Germany if the commanders-in-chief did not

have influence? Here was a matter directly reflecting on the honor of

German Armed Forces and despite that deliberate denial of the protection

of the Geneva Convention for those British marines he continued in

office, after they were deliberately murdered.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is a matter of opinion. I may take the following

stand: The fact is that in this war, for the first time, a form of

sabotage was applied, whether behind the lines by means of air landings

or otherwise.

MAJOR JONES: Just a moment. These were marines in uniform. Your own

report in the SKL War Diary says so.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have to comment on that order which was issued

earlier. The preamble of that order said that, since there was knowledge

of orders to the Allied soldiers or—I do not remember the exact wording

any more—since these soldiers were given orders not to bother taking

German prisoners but rather to shoot them while carrying out their work

in the so-called Commando raids, the following directives had to be

issued.

At that time I discussed this matter with Raeder, of course, and I can

merely state my personal opinion. I felt that I could believe this

preamble because I am of the opinion that if I resorted to, let us say,

sabotage behind the lines then of course I could not be bothered with

taking prisoners, because then the element of surprise would be

excluded. If, therefore, a troop of three to five men, a so-called

Commando undertaking, is sent behind the lines in order to destroy enemy

installations, then of course they cannot burden themselves with

prisoners without running the risk of being killed themselves or of

being recognized before they can carry out their undertaking. Therefore

I considered this preamble quite credible and I expressly said so at

that time.

MAJOR JONES: And you think that that shooting of those two marines was

therefore perfectly justified? That is your position on this matter, is

it not? Just say “yes” or “no” on that; I will not argue with you.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have not asserted that in any way. Rather I said,

here is a fact of which we were informed only by the Armed Forces

communiqué, and that Raeder and the High Command had not been heard on

this point. That is what I stated.

MAJOR JONES: Now, the final matter I wanted to ask you about, you have

indicated that in your opinion Germany fought a clean war at sea. I want

you to look at the new Document D-873 which will be GB-481, which is the

log book of U-boat _U-71_, under the date line 21 June 1941, when the

Defendant Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. You see the

entry reads:

“Sighted lifeboat of the Norwegian motor tanker _John P.

Pederson_ drifting under sail. Three survivors were lying

exhausted under a tarpaulin and only showed themselves as the

U-boat was moving away again. They stated that their ship had

been torpedoed 28 days before. I turned down their request to be

taken aboard, provisioned the boat with food and water and gave

them the course and distance to the Icelandic coast. Boat and

crew were in a state that, in view of the prevailing weather,

offered hardly any prospects of rescue.”—Signed:

“Flachsenberg.”

Is that your conception of a clean war at sea?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I observe that the commanding officer did what he

could, in view of the weather which he described when he said that in

view of the bad weather he could not rescue them. He threw provisions to

them in a sack and gave them the course to the coast. I do not know what

there is about that that is inhumane. If he had left without giving them

food and the course, then you might make that accusation.

MAJOR JONES: But he could have taken them aboard, you know. These were

three men who did...

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I believe you cannot judge that. Only the

commanding officer himself can judge that, the man in charge of the

U-boat. I would have to look at the weather, because it says here

“Medium swell.” That could also...

MAJOR JONES: But you see here the U-boat commander must have spoken to

these people and physically it must have been possible to take them

aboard, but he left them to their fate, you know, knowing quite well he

was leaving them to die.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all. Then he would not have needed to give

them any food and to give them the course to the coast. What makes you

think that they had to die? By the way...

MAJOR JONES: The last sentence is a clear indication that the U-boat

captain knew he was leaving them to die. I am suggesting to you that he

could have taken them aboard and should have done so if he had the

elements of humanity in him.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No; I do not know the condition of the U-boat, whether

the boat was in a position to take prisoners on board. I believe that

you have never seen conditions on a U-boat; otherwise you would not

judge it like that. Considering that the crew of a U-boat is under water

for weeks and uses every last bit of space and is exposed to the

greatest dangers day and night, one cannot simply say that it would have

been a humane act to take these additional men aboard. Besides, the

commander himself says there was hardly a chance of rescue in view of

the prevailing weather.

MAJOR JONES: I have no further questions, My Lord.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I have some questions concerning a few points

which Mr. Elwyn Jones put to you. An entry was shown to you from the

document by Assmann of 10 October 1939 with the assertion that from this

it can be seen that Raeder wanted to occupy Norway only in order to have

Norwegian bases. I should like to read to you the full entry and I

should like you then to take position to the entire document:

“The Führer agrees that full use of the only two battleships

which we have at the time should not be made for the time being.

Russia offered bases near Murmansk...

“Question of siege of England: Führer and Commander-in-Chief of

Navy agree that all objections by neutrals have to be rejected,

even in view of the danger of entry of U.S.A. into the war which

seems certain if the war keeps on.

“The more brutally the war is conducted the sooner the effect,

the shorter the war.

“Capacity for large U-boat production program. Führer rejects

suggestion to have submarines built by or bought from Russia for

political reasons. Commander-in-Chief of Navy states no

advantages to be won for the U-boat war by conquest of Belgian

coast; refers to the value of winning Norwegian

bases—Trondheim—with the help of Russian pressure. Führer will

consider the question.” (Document D-879, Exhibit GB-482)

Admiral, according to the entire contents, is this a complete

clarification of the Norwegian problem?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all.

DR. SIEMERS: Am I right in concluding that here a great number of

questions are treated and only one strategic question with reference to

Norway...

MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship pleases, the translation came through as,

“no advantage of occupation of Norwegian bases” and the translation

which is in the document is “Raeder stresses importance of obtaining

Norwegian bases.” Perhaps if there might be a careful—I am not saying

this in any critical sense—a very careful translation of the entry, it

might be important.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the—did you give that an exhibit number?

MAJOR JONES: No, My Lord. That is the entry from Assmann’s headline

diary.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is. But I want to know the exhibit number.

MAJOR JONES: I will have an extract made and the exhibit number given

this evening, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: It would be GB-482, would it not?

MAJOR JONES: Yes, My Lord, that is it; GB-482.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it is the same date; I beg your pardon if it

does not agree; but the document from which I read I received through

the courtesy of Mr. Elwyn Jones.

THE PRESIDENT: You had better go into the question of translation and

get that settled.

MAJOR JONES: Yes, Your Lordship.

DR. SIEMERS: At any rate, Admiral, both entries are 10 October, that is,

of the same conference. Am I right in saying that consequently there

were many strategic questions, not one of which can be said to have been

treated completely and conclusively?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I believe that this complex of questions has

nothing to do with the comprehensive discussion between Hitler and

Raeder concerning the occupation of Norway. The Norwegian question was

touched upon, the occupation of Norway, and then a few points brought up

for discussion which Raeder usually jotted down in his notebook. Apart

from the question whether an occupation of Norway was necessary or not,

the possibility of conquering bases outside German territory was

accidentally touched on the same day.

DR. SIEMERS: Therefore, Murmansk which had been offered by Russia was

discussed.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From Russia to Belgium—all along the coast, wherever

there were possibilities and advantages for our submarine strategy.

DR. SIEMERS: If in the War Diary a sentence in connection with a

conference between Raeder and Hitler is in quotation marks, does that

mean that these words were used by Hitler? Can one assume that?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If it says...

MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship please, the translation has now been

checked, and the original reading of “Raeder stresses the importance of

obtaining Norwegian bases” appears to be a perfectly correct

translation.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Siemers.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I understood, Dr. Siemers; shall I speak about that?

DR. SIEMERS: Yes, did you want to add something to that point?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I understand that the other gentleman just pointed

out that Raeder allegedly called Hitler’s attention to the necessity of

acquiring submarine bases and in that connection once spoke about

Russian assistance and also about the possibility of acquiring bases

from Norway. But that does not reveal any aggressive intentions.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in order to save time, I also asked Dr.

Kranzbühler to check the translation. The German text as I should like

to point out right now says: “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy points

out the value of winning Norwegian bases.” That is something different

from the English translation. But I should like to come back to this

later.

[_Turning to the witness._] Admiral, Mr. Elwyn Jones then submitted the

affidavit of Walter Giese. I should be grateful if you would look at it

again. It is D-722. The first line reads:

“I was born at Stettin on 24 November 1900, the son of a

bricklayer’s foreman, Ernst Giese.”

Then it says:

“I sat in the reception room of the Commander-in-Chief as

assistant to the adjutant.”

Then it says, in the same paragraph:

“I received the minute book from the adjutant at midday after

the conferences had ended and locked it up in the general safe.”

Then it says on the second page:

“I did not have much contact with the Commander-in-Chief

personally. This consisted merely in my submitting to him or

fetching from him top-secret correspondence.”

Admiral, am I right in assuming, therefore, that Giese was a sort of

messenger?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. In order to save officers we filled a large number

of unimportant positions with civilians, people who we thought were

worthy of our confidence. The care of a safe or guarding the key was

really the task of the second adjutant, who later had to be used

elsewhere.

Giese had been a sergeant in the Navy for many years and for 12 years

had been a clerk in the Navy, and therefore had had a certain amount of

practice in keeping files.

THE PRESIDENT: All this is stated in the document. If there is anything

inaccurate in the document, you can put it to him. But it all is set out

in the document, exactly as the Admiral said. You are wasting the time

of the Tribunal by repeating it.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe what Mr. Elwyn Jones presented was

also in the document. What matters is the question of interpretation and

the witness has been referred to very definite points. If I should be

mistaken, I beg your pardon. I believed that I also had the right in

re-examination to refer to certain points in the document.

THE PRESIDENT: If you want to, you can draw our attention to the

paragraphs.

SCHUJLTE-MÖNTING: I can be very brief.

Giese had no inside information about the facts, and even if he had,

without permission, looked into the minutes of the adjutant, which

were not a shorthand record but merely notes to aid the memory of

the adjutant, he could never have received the right impression

without having taken part in the conference. And it was not up to

him in the reception room to decide who should be admitted to the

Commander-in-Chief, but rather up to the adjutant or to me. He did not

even know who was to be admitted. And it is a bold statement or

assumption when he says that a man like Hagelin saw Raeder each time

instead of seeing me first. By the way, Hagelin came to me perhaps four

or five times.

DR. SIEMERS: Do you believe Giese was present when Raeder talked to

Hitler?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Giese? No, never. Giese sat in the reception room and

took care of Raeder’s telephone calls.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, nobody here suggests that he was. Mr. Elwyn

Jones was not putting it that this man Giese was present at talks

between Raeder and the Führer or Raeder and Hagelin.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, this is his affidavit, and in the affidavit,

it says, as I should like to point out now, on Page 5, “According to all

I heard, I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated from

Raeder and met with Hitler’s joyous agreement.”

How could he know that?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I might stress that even I as chief of staff was not

present at these private conferences, and Herr Giese had to stay with

the telephone and had no other way of gaining an insight than by giving

his imagination free rein.

DR. SIEMERS: That is enough, thank you. I come now to Document D-872.

That is the war diary of the naval attaché in Japan, in connection with

which you were told that you must have known that Japan would attack

America on 7 December. The telegram which is mentioned here is of 6

December. When could that telegram have arrived in your office?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean, when could I have received it personally?

DR. SIEMERS: Yes; or Raeder.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Not before the next morning.

DR. SIEMERS: That would be 7 December.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: At the earliest. In this case, the Chief of Staff of

the Naval Operations Staff would decide whether for operational reasons

that telegram should be presented at once, or not.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, do you remember that document?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Is Pearl Harbor mentioned in the document?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. I tried to explain that Pearl Harbor had no

connection with that telegram from Admiral Wennecker at all and that

Wennecker depended on sources of information and on his assumptions or

formulated his assumptions in a telegram on the basis of his information

without having any definite facts. Such telegrams were received

continuously. Sometimes these assumptions were correct; sometimes they

were incorrect.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the Prosecution has submitted it to prove that

military negotiations had taken place with Japan. Am I correct in saying

that that was only a message concerning possible developments?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, of course. I have tried before to explain that

there were no military negotiations between the admiralty staffs. Rather

the naval attaché was charged with examining and transmitting all

information of value which came to him.

DR. SIEMERS: Then a document was shown you which was not submitted, an

interrogation of Raeder of 10 November 1945. May I ask to look at the

bottom of Page 5 of this document which I am handing to you and the

passage which was read on Page 6?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, that ought to have a number, ought it

not?

MAJOR JONES: That will be GB-483, My Lord.

DR. SIEMERS: On that document, Page 5 at the bottom, is Document C-75

mentioned?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No.

DR. SIEMERS: I believe you are mistaken, Admiral, or else I have made a

mistake.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have an English copy—do you mean the English one?

DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the English copy because it does not exist in German.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean the last paragraph?

DR. SIEMERS: I believe the last line or the line before the last. The

page numbers are very hard to read. Maybe you have the wrong page.

This interrogation, Mr. President, concerns Document C-75. I believe the

witness will find it soon. Mention has been made of this document

recently and in accordance with the wish recently expressed by the

Tribunal, I am submitting C-75; that is Directive Number 24 about the

co-operation with Japan, and the full text is Document Number

Raeder-128. The Tribunal will recall that the British Delegation...

THE PRESIDENT: Has it already been put in, C-75, has it already been put

in?

DR. SIEMERS: I submit it now, C-75.

THE PRESIDENT: No, has it already been put in? Has it already been

offered in evidence?

DR. SIEMERS: You may recall that the Prosecution has submitted Document

C-75 as USA-151...

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is all I wanted to know. If it has already

been put in, it does not need a new number, is that not the position?

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I remind you that it needs a new number

because only the first part was submitted by the Prosecution.

MAJOR JONES: It has already been exhibited as USA-151, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think we are not giving fresh numbers, Dr.

Siemers, to parts of documents which had already been put in. If the

document has been put in, then where you want to use a fresh part of the

document it has the same number as the old number; that is all.

DR. SIEMERS: But, Mr. President, if the Prosecution in their document

put in only the first three paragraphs then I cannot...

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; I know that perfectly well, but you are

perfectly entitled to put in any part of the document. It is only a

question of what number is to be given to it and I think—I may be

wrong—that up to the present we have not given new numbers to documents

once that they have been put in, although fresh parts of the documents

are put in.

MAJOR JONES: My Lord, the position with regard to C-75 is that the whole

of the original has been put in as USA-151, but only an extract from the

original was included in the English document which was put before the

Court.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see. All I was concerned with was the number of

the thing. It has got the number USA-151 and I thought our practice had

been that it should continue to have that number. You can put in any

part of it you like, and if it is a question of translation, no doubt

the Prosecution will hand it to the translation department and have it

translated for you; but you are attempting to give it a new number, that

is all.

DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, once more, but I was asked recently to

submit the document anew and that is where the misunderstanding arose.

Under these circumstances, now that I hear that it has been submitted in

its entirety, I can withdraw it; I should be grateful if the Tribunal

were also to receive the complete translation of the document in English

and not only the first two paragraphs.

[_Turning to the witness._] Admiral, have you found it in the meantime?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it is on Page 7 as you thought and not on Page 5.

The document refers...

DR. SIEMERS: I apologize. It is right then that the interrogation refers

to Document C-75?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Document C-75, Admiral, is Directive Number 24 concerning

collaboration with Japan, and it says: “The following rules apply: Our

common war aim is to defeat England quickly and thereby keep the U.S.A.

out of the war.”

Besides that the document also mentions the fact I referred to recently,

that Singapore should be occupied by Japan.

Now Raeder, on 10 November ’45 stated his position in respect to this

and, according to the next page of the document, he said that which Mr.

Elwyn Jones has just put to you. May I ask you to look at it again? It

says there, on Page—I thought it was at the top of Page 6, maybe it is

at the top of Page 8...

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The top of Page 8. I do not know English as well as

German, but I would translate it: “If that which Japan needs...”

DR. SIEMERS: If I remember correctly, the word is “need.”

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he uses the word “need”—“and other things, things

that the Japanese need.”

DR. SIEMERS: That is to say, Japan’s needs and other things which Japan

requires. Therefore, the conversations mentioned by Raeder were not

concerned with strategic points?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, these are two entirely different things.

DR. SIEMERS: So that Raeder’s answer is concerned purely with questions

of supplies and material.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, purely questions of supplies and material...

DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: ...which we had with all the navies, not only with the

Japanese.

DR. SIEMERS: Then I come to the Commando Order about which you testified

already. I want to put to you the following: You have been shown

Document D-658, which says that according to the Armed Forces communiqué

the soldiers were executed, that the soldiers wore uniforms and that the

Führer’s Order was something new in international law. I believe that

the naval commander in western France reported this and that this was

contained in the Armed Forces communiqué. The man who compiled the War

Diary wrote: “A new thing in international law.” I am not a military

man, but I should like to ask you, would you consider such a reference a

criticism of the order?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe that I have to answer the question in the

following manner: Normally, the fact of an execution is not entered in a

war diary on operational matters.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that is really a matter which we can go

into, whether he thinks this is an entry which is a criticism of the

order.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe he wanted to establish that it was something

new.

DR. SIEMERS: Never mind, Admiral. A factual question. The Prosecution

asserts again that it concerns soldiers in uniform. The Wehrmacht

communiqué announced the execution on 9 December. The execution, as I

have already shown in another connection, did not take place until 11

December. I am presenting to you now Document UK-57, and ask you to look

at the second paragraph under Figure 4. The heading Figure 4 reads:

“Sabotage against German ships near Bordeaux”; then it says: “December

12, 1942”; and further on we read:

“From the submarine the participants went two by two in paddle

boats up the Gironde estuary. They wore special olive gray

uniforms. After carrying out the blastings they sank their boats

and tried, with the aid of French civilians, to escape to Spain

in civilian clothes.”

Did these soldiers behave correctly according to the provisions of

international law?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my opinion, no.

DR. SIEMERS: Then I have no more questions.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If they had had a clear conscience, they would not have

needed to wear civilian clothes.

DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me, just this final question:

Did you personally in the High Command receive an inquiry or any

information before this execution which was carried out at the direct

order of the Führer?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, neither an inquiry nor any information.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, the question as to whether a

document concerning Norway had been translated correctly was just

discussed. I shall find out what number it is. The English translation

which I have before me is not identical with the German original. It

deviates considerably. It is Document GB-482.

I shall read the German text which in my opinion differs from the

English translation.

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy states: Conquest of Belgian

coast provides no advantage for our submarine warfare; points

out value of winning Norwegian bases (Trondheim) with the help

of Russian pressure. The Führer will consider the question.”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, would it not save time, really, if we

have the sentence which is said to have been wrongly translated referred

to a committee of experts in the translating division?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President...

THE PRESIDENT: It really is not a matter which it is worth while wasting

time over.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, I did not know that it

was to be examined again.

THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better have it examined and then the

translation certified to.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I, myself,

have a question to put to the witness.

Admiral, Document D-873 has been put to you before. That was a war diary

of _U-71_ and concerned the supplying of three Norwegians in a lifeboat.

The entry was on 21 June. I have already submitted it to the Tribunal

under Dönitz Number 13, on Page 23 of my document book, a statement by

the above-mentioned commanding officer Flachsenberg. According to that

statement this submarine put to sea on 14 June. It was west of Norway.

Can you tell me if that U-boat, therefore, on 21 June, was putting out

for operations or returning from operations?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean from memory?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, considering the dates, put out to sea on

14 June, this entry on 21 June.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Putting out.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Putting out. As you know, this submarine was

a 500-ton vessel. Is a boat of that size in a position to carry out an

operation over several weeks with three additional people on board?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe not. I am not enough of an expert to be able

to judge definitely what the extra weight of additional persons on board

might mean as far as trimming experiments and such things are concerned;

but aside from that, I do not believe that such a small boat, which is

putting out to sea for an operation, can load itself on the way with

prisoners. I do not consider that possible.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

DR. SIEMERS: Then, with the permission of the Court, the witness may

retire.

[_Turning to the President._] Mr. President, in accordance with my

statement at the beginning of this case, I have already submitted the

majority of my documents during the examination. With the permission of

the Tribunal, may I proceed now to submit as quickly as possible the

remainder of the documents with a few accompanying statements.

I submit to the Tribunal Exhibit Number Raeder-18, an excerpt from the

Document Book 2, Page 105, an excerpt from a book which Churchill wrote

in 1935 called _Great Contemporaries_. I ask the Tribunal to take

official notice of the contents. Churchill points out that there are two

possibilities, that one cannot say whether Hitler will be the man who

will start another world war or whether he will be the man who will

restore honor and peace of mind to the great German nation and bring it

back serene, helpful and strong to a galaxy of the European family of

nations.

As Exhibit Number Raeder-20 I submit a short excerpt from Adolf Hitler’s

_Mein Kampf_ with reference to the fact that the Prosecution has said

that from that book one could see that Hitler intended to wage

aggressive wars. I shall show in my final pleadings how much one can see

from that book. I ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of the

short excerpt on Page 154: “For such a policy there was but one ally in

Europe, England.”

Exhibit Number Raeder-21, a speech made by Hitler to the German

Reichstag on 26 April 1942, is to show how rights were increasingly

limited in Germany and how the dictatorship became more and more

powerful.

Document Book 4, Exhibit Number Raeder-65, intended to facilitate my

arguments, is the Hague Agreement about the rights and duties of

neutrals in naval warfare. I need that for my final pleadings in

connection with Exhibit Number Raeder-66, the statement of opinion by

Dr. Mosler in Document Book 4, Page 289, the first document.

THE PRESIDENT: Can you give us the pages?

DR. SIEMERS: Page 289, Mr. President. It is the first page of the

Document Book 4.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Then I ask the Tribunal to be kind enough to take up

Document Book 5, since the remaining documents have already been

submitted. I submit as Exhibit Number Raeder-100, Document Book 5, Page

437, a document from the _White Book_ concerning the “top-secret”

meeting of the French War Commission on 9 April 1940, with Reynaud,

Daladier, Gamelin, General Georges, the Minister of the Navy, the

Minister of the Colonies and the Air Minister present. It concerns the

suggestion by Admiral Darlan of moving into Belgium. The suggestion was

supported by General Gamelin and also by the Minister for National

Defense and War. On Page 442 there is mention of the march into Holland

and finally of Luxembourg. Since the High Tribunal has knowledge of the

contents from the discussion of the documents, I do not want to read any

details. I simply ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. I

should also like to point out that on Page 443 of this very long

document mention is made of the occupation of the harbor of Narvik and

of the intention to get hold of the mines of Gallivare.

I now submit Exhibit Number Raeder 102, in the same document book, Page

449. This is an order of the 2d Belgian Infantry Regiment of 13 April

1940 concerning information about friendly troops and the building of a

fortified position. It can be seen from the document that the friendly

troops mentioned are the Allies.

Then I submit Exhibit Raeder-103, Page 452, which is a French document

of 16 April 1940 from headquarters concerning measures about the rail

transportation of French troops in Belgium.

I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of all these documents, which

I shall not read in detail.

The same applies to Exhibit Number Raeder-104, Document Book 5, Page

455, which is the order of 19 April 1940 of the 2d British Division

concerning security measures in Belgium. There we find a directive

similar to one in a document which has been submitted by the

Prosecution, a directive to establish contact with Belgian civilian

authorities.

Exhibit Number Raeder-105, Document Book 5, Page 459, is the statement

of a Luxembourg citizen which shows that 200 men, French soldiers in

uniform, entered Belgium in armored cars 7 days before the outbreak of

the German-Belgian hostilities.

May it please the Tribunal, I originally intended not to submit anything

in this Trial concerning the character of my client because I was of the

opinion that Admiral Raeder, both at home and abroad, enjoyed great

respect. The first trial brief against Raeder did not affect that

intention. Shortly before the presentation of that trial brief it was

changed, becoming considerably more severe and containing moral

accusations which seriously injure and insult Raeder’s honor. I have no

doubt that the High Tribunal will understand why under these

circumstances I ask to be permitted to submit some of the documents

granted me which concern Raeder’s character. I submit Exhibit

Raeder-119, Document Book 6, Page 514. That is a letter from Frau Von

Poser addressed to me. It is not an affidavit and quite purposely I have

submitted the original because in my opinion it will make a more

immediate and direct impression than an affidavit which I would first

have to ask for in my capacity as defendant’s counsel.

Similarly, there is a fairly long letter from Professor Dr. Seibt who

approached me on his own initiative. I submit Exhibit Number Raeder-120,

Document Book 6, Page 517. I would be grateful to the Tribunal if it

would take judicial notice of that letter. In order to save time I

refrain from reading it since it is six pages long.

Then I submit Exhibit Raeder-122, Document Book 6, Page 526, a letter

from Herr Erich Katz, which I submit with its appendices and I ask the

Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. This presents one of the cases

in which Raeder intervened personally, using his influence and

position—he used the official stationery of the Commander-in-Chief of

the Navy to intervene on behalf of Herr Katz who had been attacked as a

Jew—and actually succeeded in protecting him. Herr Katz has sent me

these documents on his own initiative in order to show his gratitude.

As Exhibit Raeder-123 I submit a letter from Günter Jacobsen that

concerns a similar case. Jacobsen also, without my asking it, approached

me in order to testify that Raeder rescued his father, who as a Jew had

been accused of race defilement, from the concentration camp

Fuhlsbüttel—I believe it was still a prison at that time—so that

Jacobsen could emigrate to England where he is living now.

I submit as Exhibit Number Raeder-124, an affidavit...

GENERAL RUDENKO: Mr. President, I must make the following statement. All

four exhibits mentioned just now by Dr. Siemers are personal letters

from various persons to Dr. Siemers. They are not sworn affidavits. They

are not interrogations. Therefore these documents have little probative

value, and I hold the view that they ought not to be admitted as

evidence. Many letters are received, and if they were all to be

submitted to the Tribunal, the Tribunal would have great difficulty in

establishing the truth and how far they are of probative value. In that

connection, I personally object to the fact that these documents should

be accepted as evidence in Raeder’s case.

DR. SIEMERS: My Lord, may I...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that the matter is of

sufficient importance to insist upon evidence being upon oath. The

documents are admitted.

DR. SIEMERS: As Exhibit Number Raeder-124 I submit an affidavit by

Konrad Lotter. The affidavit is very short and with the permission of

the Tribunal, I should like to read this one page:

“Grand Admiral Raeder has always appeared to me a man who

embodied the finest traditions of the old Imperial Navy. This

was true particularly in regard to his philosophy of life. As a

man and as an officer he was at all times the best model

imaginable.

“In 1941, when the anti-Christian policy of the Hitler regime

was in full force in Bavaria, when cloisters were closed and in

the education of the youth intolerance against every creed

became crassly manifest, I sent a memorandum of 12 pages to the

Admiral in which I presented to him my objections to this

policy. Admiral Raeder intervened at once. Through his

mediation, I was called to the Gauleiter and Minister of the

Interior, Wagner, in Munich. After a series of discussions

between the clerical, governmental, and Party authorities an

agreement was reached which had the following results: The

school prayer was retained, the crucifix was allowed to remain

in the schools, _et cetera_; furthermore, 59 clergymen who had

been fined 500 marks each were pardoned.

“The closing down of cloisters was also stopped at that time.

Gauleiter Wagner had to...”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, all these documents have been read by us

very recently.

DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Then I just ask the Tribunal to take judicial

notice of the remainder.

I submit also the two documents, Exhibit Number Raeder-125 and Exhibit

Number Raeder-126. Number 125 is an affidavit by the former Reich

Defense Minister, Dr. Otto Gessler, and Number Raeder-126 is an

affidavit by the Navy Chaplain Ronneberger. I ask you to take judicial

notice of this latter document.

I should like to be permitted to read the short affidavit by Dr. Gessler

since it contains not only something of a purely personal nature, but

also remarks concerning the accusations against Raeder.

“I, Gessler, have known the former Admiral Dr. Raeder personally

since about the middle of the 20’s when I was

Reichswehrminister. Raeder was then inspector of the educational

system in the Navy. I have always known Raeder as a man of

irreproachable, chivalrous character, as a man fully conscious

of his duty. As to the subject of the Indictment, I know very

little.

“Raeder visited me repeatedly after my release from imprisonment

by the Gestapo in March 1945 when I lay in the Hedwig Hospital

in Berlin and he also made arrangements for me to get home, as I

was ill and completely exhausted. I told him then about the

ill-treatment I had suffered, especially the torture. He was

obviously surprised and incensed about this. He said he would

report this to the Führer. I asked him at once to refrain from

that, for I had been told before the torture, and officially,

that all of this was taking place at the explicit order of

Hitler. Moreover, I knew definitely that I would immediately be

rearrested, since on my release I had signed the well-known

declaration and could not even obtain a confirmation of my

detention in order to get a ticket for my trip home.

“I heard nothing about secret rearmament in the Navy, neither

during my term of office nor later. During my term of office,

until January 1928, Admiral Raeder would not have been

responsible either, for at that time he was not Chief of the

Naval Command.

“At the time of the National Socialist regime I was ignored by

my former department and snubbed. One of the few exceptions was

Dr. Raeder. Before 1939 among other things he invited me three

times to visit on the cruiser _Nürnberg_ although I had refused

twice. During the visit in June 1939 he came to Kiel personally

to pay his respects to me. At that time we also discussed the

political situation. I expressed the apprehension that an attack

on Poland would mean a European war. Raeder declared positively

that he considered it out of the question that Hitler would

attack Poland. When this did happen later, I explained this to

myself on the grounds that Hitler liked to place even the

highest military leaders face to face with accomplished facts.”

Then there is the statement “under oath” and the signature of the

notary.

As to the last Exhibit Number Raeder-126, from the Navy Chief Chaplain

Ronneberger, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it since it

is too late to read it. It is a factual description and survey of church

questions and of religious matters in the Navy.

Mr. President, with that, with the exception of three points, I can

conclude my case. There are still two interrogatories missing which have

not yet been returned. I ask permission to submit these as soon as they

are received.

Then, there is the witness Generaladmiral Böhm, who has already been

approved, but who on account of illness has not yet been able to appear.

The British Delegation, through Sir David, has been kind enough to agree

that if necessary this witness can be interrogated at a later date. May

I be permitted to ask the Tribunal to keep this open, and if possible to

permit Admiral Böhm to be questioned at a later date. I want to point

out now that it will not be so large a complex of questions as in the

case of Admiral Schulte-Mönting, which the Tribunal knows from the

material I have submitted.

This concludes my case Raeder.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 23 May 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SEVENTH DAY

Thursday, 23 May 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the documents of the Defendant

Seyss-Inquart, the Tribunal admits the following documents which were

objected to: Number 11, Number 47, Number 48, Number 50, Number 54, and

Number 71.

The remainder of the documents which were objected to are rejected. I

will enumerate them: Number 5, Number 10, Number 14, Number 19b, Number

21, Number 22, Number 27, Number 31, Number 39, Number 55, Number 60,

Number 61, Number 68, Number 69.

That is all.

M. DUBOST: Mr. President, last night at the end of the session the

counsel for Admiral Raeder submitted a certain number of documents

including Document Raeder-105 of Document Book 5. This document is an

excerpt from the German _White Book_, Number 5. It is the testimony of

an old man of 72, a native of Luxembourg, who had lived in Belgium for

only 6 months, and who affirms that in April 1940 he saw 200 French

soldiers in Belgium. These soldiers, who he said were French, were in

armored cars.

I must ask the Tribunal to allow me to make objection to this Document

Number 7 of the _White Book_ Number 5, the original of which has never

been submitted and has not even been reproduced in the _White Book_, as

is the case with a certain number of documents in the German _White

Book_. It is necessary that in the name of France and of Belgium a

protest—a formal, categorical protest—be made against such an

assertion. At no time before the invasion of Belgium by the German

forces did any French troops set foot on Belgian soil. The reading of

this document, Number Raeder-105 of Document Book 5 of Admiral Raeder,

enables us to understand how there came to be the error in the testimony

by Grandjenet that is cited.

I have already told the Tribunal that this man is 72 years old and was

from Luxembourg. To the question put to him by the German authorities as

to how he recognized the soldiers he had seen as being of French

nationality, he answered:

“I was quite sure that they were French soldiers because I know

their uniform well. Moreover, I recognized the soldiers because

of the language they used when they spoke to me.”

Now, as far as the uniform is concerned, the Tribunal knows that at the

time when these events took place, the Belgian Army had a uniform of the

same color as the French Army and a helmet of the same shape. As for the

language, the Tribunal knows that a great part of the Belgian population

who live along the Luxembourg frontier speak French, and the Belgian

soldiers recruited in these districts speak French.

The Tribunal will certainly remember that this witness, who is a very

old man, had only been living for 6 months in Belgium and probably had

only a limited experience with things Belgian—and especially with the

Belgian Army.

At any rate, we assert in the name of France and in the name of Belgium

that before 10 May 1940 no French troops, no organized French troops,

penetrated Belgium, and that the isolated individuals who did go into

Belgium were interned there.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Siemers?

DR. SIEMERS: If it please the Tribunal, may I reply very briefly?

This matter concerns a document from the _White Book_, on which a

decision has already been handed down once and which was granted me. I

propose that the Prosecution be requested to submit the original if they

dispute the correctness of this document. In this I am in agreement with

a decision of the Tribunal according to which the application is to be

made for the presentation of the original if it is available, or

application should be made so that whoever has the original should

produce it. As far as I know the Prosecution have the original, since

all original documents were located in the Foreign Office in Berlin, or

in the alternative place of safekeeping, and all the originals of these

_White Books_ fell into the hands of the Allies.

THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by “original”? The original, I suppose,

is the original of the _White Book_. Is that what you mean?

DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I mean now, Mr. President, the original of this court

record.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, this comes from a _White Book_. That is a printed

document, I suppose, I do not suppose it contains the original of the

statement of this Luxembourg man.

DR. SIEMERS: The _White Book_ is a collection of numerous documents, and

the single original documents are in the possession of the Foreign

Office; in part they were from the files of the French General Staff,

and partly they were records of court proceedings. Regarding the

contents of this document...

THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, you are not proposing that we should strike

the document out, but the Tribunal will certainly take into account the

facts to which you have drawn our notice.

M. DUBOST: This is an application that the Tribunal shall refuse to

admit that document, Mr. President. At the same time this is a protest

against the assertion made by the Defense that French soldiers violated

Belgian neutrality in the course of the month of April. I hope the

Tribunal will allow me to add a few words of explanation. The _White

Book_, which we have here, comprises two parts. The first part

reproduces texts and the second part gives photostatic copies of these

texts. In the first part, which simply reproduces the texts, is found

the document which I ask the Tribunal to strike from the record. We have

searched in the second part which gives the photostatic copies of the

documents in the first part, and we do not find it. We state to the

Tribunal that the original of the document, which we ask the Tribunal to

strike out, has not been reproduced in the German _White Book_, since it

is not to be found in the second part.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe that M. Dubost’s entire

explanation refers to the question of the value of the document as

evidence and not to the question of the admissibility of the document.

That this document is in order appears to me to be quite clear, since it

is a record of court proceedings where a certain person, namely

Grandjenet, has been interrogated. Everything said by M. Dubost referred

more to the contents of the document than to the question of its value

as evidence. May I ask therefore that the document be admitted, as has

been done up to now, and ask that consideration be given to the fact

that the document has value in connection with the other documents which

have been granted to me and to Dr. Horn in his document book with

reference to Holland and Belgium.

If, in the second part of the document book there is no photostatic

copy...

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, and M. Dubost, the Tribunal will

consider the objection that has been made.

DR. SIEMERS: May I merely mention, Mr. President, that if the photostat

is not in the book, as M. Dubost states, then this is due to the fact

that this court record in its original text was German, and the

facsimiles are those prepared from the original text in French, that is

to say, of those documents which in their original version were in

French. If necessary I would appeal to Geheimrat Von Schnieden as a

witness regarding this record, since he at the time was informed about

all the records of this type and helped in the work of compiling the

book.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will consider the objection.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, with the permission of the

Tribunal I should like to say that the interrogatory put to the American

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Nimitz, is available. I received

it the day before yesterday and in the meantime it has gone in to the

interpreters for translation. With the permission of the Tribunal, I

should like to submit it now, in connection with the cases of Admiral

Dönitz and Admiral Raeder.

THE PRESIDENT: Have the Prosecution seen it?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you got copies for us?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I had been informed that the copies for the

Tribunal would be handed on by the General Secretary.

THE PRESIDENT: Unless we have copies, the document must not be read. It

must be put off until we have copies.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There are two copies in English and one in

French.

I present the document as Number Dönitz-100.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Soviet members of the Tribunal do

not have a copy of the document translated into their language, so you

will present it at a later date.

Will the counsel for the Defendant Von Schirach present his case?

DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for the Defendant Von Schirach): Gentlemen of

the Tribunal, I propose first of all to conduct the examination of the

Defendant Schirach himself, and in the course of this examination I will

bring to your attention the passage of the document book concerned, as

the individual points come up. Following the examination of the

defendant I shall then call my four witnesses, and at the end I intend

to submit the remaining documents, insofar as these documents have not

by that time been presented during the examination of the Defendant Von

Schirach. I presume, Mr. President, that you agree to this procedure.

I now call to the witness stand, first, Baldur von Schirach.

[_The Defendant Baldur von Schirach took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the following oath after me: I swear by

God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and

will withhold and add nothing.

[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, what is the date of your birth?

BALDUR VON SCHIRACH (Defendant): 9 May 1907.

DR. SAUTER: That means that a few days ago you were 39. You have been

married for 14 years; is that correct?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: And you have four children, whose ages are...

VON SCHIRACH: 4, 8, 11, and 13 years.

DR. SAUTER: In the Third Reich you were mainly active as Youth Leader?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: What offices did you fill in that connection, that is,

offices in the Party and in the Government—please state also how long

you held these various offices?

VON SCHIRACH: To start with, in 1929 I was the leader of the National

Socialist Students’ Union. In 1931 I became Reich Youth Leader of the

NSDAP, at first on the staff of the SA Supreme Command; in 1932, Reich

Leader for Youth Education of the NSDAP; in 1933, Youth Leader of the

German Reich, at first under the Minister of the Interior, Dr. Frick. In

1934, I held the same position under the Reich Minister of Education,

Rust. In 1936 the Reich Youth Leader became a leading Reich official,

and in that capacity I came directly under the Führer and Reich

Chancellor.

DR. SAUTER: Now, which of your offices were Party positions and which of

the ones you have mentioned were offices of the Reich?

VON SCHIRACH: Party positions were the office of Reich Youth Leader of

the NSDAP, and that of Reich Leader for Youth Education. Government

positions: The Youth Leader of the German Reich, at first subordinate to

the Minister of the Interior as I have described or under the Minister

for Education, and then in an independent position.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, you were removed from some of these offices in

1940. What positions in Youth Leadership did you lose in 1940, and what

positions did you still continue to fill to the end?

VON SCHIRACH: In 1940 I left the position as the leader of Youth, that

is, I left the office of the Reich Youth Leadership of the NSDAP, but I

retained the office of Reichsleiter for Youth Education and with that

the entire responsibility for German youth. I received as an additional

new post that of Gauleiter of Vienna, which was combined with the

governmental post of Reichsstatthalter of Vienna and also that of Reich

Defense Commissioner for Wehrkreis XVII.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, we want now to come back to your activity as Youth

Leader. There is an affidavit by you here dated 4 December 1945,

3302-PS. In this affidavit you stated to the Prosecution in December

that you acknowledge yourself to be responsible for all youth education

in the Third Reich.

VON SCHIRACH: That is correct.

DR. SAUTER: Were you, when you gave the statement of guilt, under the

impression that your successor, the late Reich Youth Leader Axmann, was

dead?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: You thought that he died in the last battles of the war?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I was convinced that he had died in Berlin.

DR. SAUTER: In the meantime, Witness, you have learned from newspaper

reports that your successor as Reich Youth Leader, this man Axmann, is

still alive. Is that correct?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: Do you want then, today, to support your affidavit regarding

your personal responsibility as Youth Leader without reservation; or do

you want to limit it in any respect today?

VON SCHIRACH: I do not want to limit this affidavit in any way. Although

during the last years of his life Hitler gave orders to the Youth of

which I do not know and also my successor, Axmann, particularly in 1944,

gave orders with which I am not acquainted since the relationship

between us had been broken off due to the events of the war, I stand by

the statement that I have made in the expectation that the Tribunal will

consider me the only person responsible in Youth Leadership and that no

other Youth Leader will be summoned before a court for actions for which

I have assumed responsibility.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, I would now be interested in knowing whether

possibly principles and directives which you received from Hitler or

from any Party office or from any governmental quarter were the formula

for your youth education; or whether, for your youth education, the

principles were derived from the experiences which you had during your

own youth and among the youth leaders of that time.

VON SCHIRACH: The latter is correct. Of course, the education of the

Hitler Youth was an education on the basis of the National Socialist

idea. But the specifically educational ideas did not originate with

Hitler, they also did not originate with other leaders in the Party;

they had their origin in youth itself, they originated with me, and they

originated with my assistants.

DR. SAUTER: Perhaps you will be good enough now to explain to the

Tribunal somewhat more in detail how you, yourself, arrived at those

principles and that type of youth education, based on your own

education, your personal development, and so forth?

VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the simplest way for me to do this would be

for me here, very briefly, to sketch the story of my youth and describe

also in that connection the youth organizations with which I came in

contact. I can in that way save much time for my further statements.

My father was a professional officer in the Garde-Kürassier Regiment of

the Kaiser. I was born in Berlin and one year later my father retired

and moved to Weimar, where he took over the management of the Court

Theater there, which later became the Weimar National Theater. Thus I

grew up in Weimar, and that town, which in a certain sense is the native

city of all Germans, I regard as my native city. My father was well off;

our home offered a great deal of intellectual and artistic stimulation,

above all in the literary and musical field, but apart from and beyond

the educational opportunities of our home, it was the atmosphere of the

town itself, that atmosphere of the classic and also the postclassic

Weimar which influenced my development. It was most of all the genius

loci, which early captured my imagination. It is directly due to those

experiences of my youth that later on I led the youth back again, year

after year, to Weimar and to Goethe.

And the first document which is important in this connection for my

case, which is Document Schirach-80, will prove just that. There is a

brief reference in that document to one of the many speeches which I

made in the course of my activity as Youth Leader to the leaders of the

young generation, and in which I directed the youth to Goethe...

DR. SAUTER: May I interrupt you for a moment, Herr Von Schirach?

In this Document Number Schirach-80, Mr. President, there is—on Page

133 of Schirach’s document book—a brief report on a Reich Cultural

Convention (Reichskulturtagung) of the Hitler Youth in Weimar. This

happens to be a report from 1937, but the defendant has already told you

that such cultural conventions of the Hitler Youth took place every year

in Weimar, the city of Schiller and Goethe. In this report, Document 80

of document book Schirach, there is, for instance, discussion of a

speech of the defendant on the importance of Goethe for the National

Socialist education of youth. It is said, in this connection, that at

that time Schirach stated, and I quote...

THE PRESIDENT: You need not read it to us, Dr. Sauter. It refers to

Goethe, that is all.

DR. SAUTER: In that case, Herr Von Schirach, will you continue?

VON SCHIRACH: It was not only the annual cultural convention but the

annual meeting of the leaders of the Hitler Youth which took place in

Weimar. Apart from that there were also what we called the “Weimar

Festivals of German Youth.”

What is important in this connection is that in this speech I quoted a

sentence of Goethe which, to a certain extent, became the leitmotiv of

all my educational work: “Youth fashions itself afresh from youth.”

Even my worst enemy cannot deny the fact that I was to the young

generation of the German people at all times not only the propagandist

of National Socialism but also the propagandist of Goethe. A certain

Herr Ziemer has submitted a lengthy affidavit against me in which he

quarrels with the youth education for which I am responsible. I believe

that Herr Ziemer did his work a little too superficially. In his

description of German national education he should at least have taken

into consideration my educational efforts designed to guide youth toward

the life work of Goethe.

I joined my first youth organization when I was 10 years old. I was then

just the age of the boys and girls who later on entered the Jungvolk.

That youth organization which I joined was the so-called “Young German

League,” (Jungdeutschland Bund), which Count von der Goltz had founded,

a Boy Scout organization. Count von der Goltz and Haeseler, impressed by

the British Boy Scout movement, had formed Pathfinder units in Germany,

and one of these Pathfinder organizations was the Jungdeutschland Bund

just mentioned. It played an important part in the education of German

youth until about 1918 or 1919.

Much more significant in my development, however, was the time which I

spent in a country boarding school (Waldpädagogium). This was an

educational institution directed by an associate of the well-known

educator, Hermann Lietz. There I was educated in the way which I later,

on an entirely different basis...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, do you think the education of the defendant

himself is in any way material for the Tribunal to hear? It is the

education which he imparted which is the matter that is material. What

he imparted, not what he himself took in.

DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the defendant would nevertheless ask you to

allow him these statements, particularly, from the point of view that

with them he wants to show you that the principles according to which he

led youth education came to him not from Hitler and not from any Party

source, but that they resulted from his own experiences in his own

youth. It is, indeed, of some importance for the Tribunal to examine the

question: According to what principles did the defendant direct youth

education and how did he arrive at these principles? The defendant is

asking permission to explain that.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Sauter, the defendant has already taken some

considerable time in telling us about his early youth and his education,

and the Tribunal thinks that it ought to be cut short, and that not much

more time ought to be taken up in dealing with the education of the

defendant. As I have pointed out to you, what is material for us is the

education he imparted to German youth and not the education which he

received himself.

DR. SAUTER: We shall, of course, comply with your wish, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Herr Von Schirach, will you please make

your statements as brief as possible?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I can be very brief.

DR. SAUTER: Please, go on.

VON SCHIRACH: Lietz’ idea was to give youth an education in which they

have in the school an image of the state. The school community was a

miniature state and in this school community was developed a

self-administration of youth. I only want to point out in passing that

he, too, was applying ideas which long before him had been developed by

Pestalozzi and the great Jean Jacques. All modern education, of course,

goes back somehow to Rousseau, be it a question of Hermann Lietz or the

Boy Scouts, the Pathfinder movement or the German Wandervogel movement.

At any rate, that idea of self-administration of youth in a school

community gave me my idea of the self-leadership of youth.

My thought was to attract the younger generation in school to ideas that

Fröbel had originated 80 years before. Lietz wanted to win over youth

from early school days onward.

I may perhaps mention very briefly that when in 1898 Lietz began his

educational work, the British Major Baden-Powell was being surrounded by

rebels in a South African town, and was training youngsters to scout in

the woods and with this laid the groundwork for his own Boy Scout

movement, and that in that same year, in 1898, Karl Fischer from

Berlin-Steglitz founded the Wandervogel movement.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, I think that this chapter, which is merely the

historic background, might perhaps, in accordance with the wish of the

President, be terminated now. If I understand you rightly then, you mean

that those principles which you applied later on as Reich Youth Leader

had become familiar to you in your own youth and in the youth movement

of the time. Is that right?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes; basically, yes. The basic principles of my later work

originate there.

DR. SAUTER: There is one more point I want to know in this connection.

Did this education at that time have any political or anti-Semitic

tendencies and how did you happen to get into politics?

VON SCHIRACH: No, that educational work had no political and most

certainly no anti-Semitic tendencies, because Lietz came from the

circles around the Democrat Naumann, from the Damaschke circle.

DR. SAUTER: But how did you get into politics?

VON SCHIRACH: In the meantime the revolution had broken out. My

father...

DR. SAUTER: The revolution of 1918-1919?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes, the revolution of 1918-1919. My father had been

thrown out of his position by the Reds. The National Assembly in Weimar

had convened. The Weimar Republic had been founded. We had a

parliamentary system, we had a democracy, or what we in Germany thought

was a democracy—I doubt that it was one. It was about 1923. I was at

home at the time. It was a period of general insecurity, want, and

dissatisfaction; many respectable families had become beggars through

the inflation, and the worker and the citizen had lost their savings.

The name “Hitler” made its appearance in connection with the events of 9

November 1923. I was not able at the time to gain any exact information

about him. This Trial has informed me and people of my generation for

the first time what Hitler actually wanted. At that time I was not a

National Socialist. Together with some boys of my age I joined a youth

organization which had the name “Knappenschaft.” It was in some way

connected with the people’s movement, but it was not bound to any party.

The principles of that organization were simply comradeship, patriotism,

and self-control. There were about 100 boys from my city in it at the

time who, in this youth organization, fought against the shallow

tendencies of youth in the postwar period and against the dissipation

indulged in by growing youngsters.

In that circle, as a 16-year-old, I first came in contact with

socialism, for here I found youths from every level, working boys,

craftsmen, young office employees, sons of farmers. But there were some

older ones among us too, who were already settled in life, and some also

who had been in the World War. From discussions with these comrades I

came to grasp for the first time the consequences of the Versailles

Treaty in their full import. The situation of the youth at the time was

this: The school boy had the prospect of struggling through somehow or

other as a working student, and then he would in all probability become

a member of the academic proletariat for the possibility of an academic

career practically did not exist for him at all. The young worker had no

prospect of finding an apprenticeship. For him there was nothing other

than the grim misery of unemployment. It was a generation nobody would

help unless it helped itself.

DR. SAUTER: And that circle to which you belonged as a 16-year-old boy,

then, gradually drifted into the currents of National Socialism?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes, and in quite a natural way.

DR. SAUTER: How did it happen?

VON SCHIRACH: In central Germany there were disturbances. I need only

mention the name of the Communist bandit leader, Max Hölz, to indicate

what conditions obtained at the time. And even after outward calm had

come, conditions still prevailed that made it impossible to hold

patriotic meetings because they were usually broken up by Communists.

There came an appeal to us young people to furnish protection for these

patriotic meetings, and we did. Some of us were wounded in doing this.

One of us, a certain Garschar, was killed by Communists. In that manner

a large number of national meetings took place which otherwise could not

have been held in the Weimar Republic, National Socialist meetings, too;

and to an increasing degree it was exactly such meetings that we had to

protect because the Communist terror was directed against them

particularly.

Through this protective activity I met leading National Socialists—at

first as speakers, naturally, not personally. I heard Count Reventlow

speak; I think I heard Rosenberg then too; I heard Streicher speak and

heard the first oratorical efforts of Sauckel, who soon after became

Gauleiter of the National Socialist Party in Thuringia. In this way...

THE PRESIDENT: What date is he speaking of?

DR. SAUTER: This is the period around 1924, that is, a year after the

Hitler Putsch.

In that way, Witness, the circle of which you were then a member came

under National Socialist influences. Was this also supported with

reading, reading of National Socialist literature?

VON SCHIRACH: Of course, I do not know what my comrades read, with the

exception of one book which I shall give you directly. I know only what

I read myself; I was interested at that time in the writings of the

Bayreuth thinker, Chamberlain, in _The Foundations of the Nineteenth

Century_, in the writings of Adolf Bartels, in his _Introduction to

World Literature_ and _History of German National Literature_. There

were works...

THE PRESIDENT: I have already told you that we do not want to know the

full story of the defendant’s education. He is now giving us a series of

the books which he has read, but we are not interested.

DR. SAUTER: Very well, Mr. President.

VON SCHIRACH: I shall only say in one sentence that these were works

which had no definite anti-Semitic tendencies, but through which

anti-Semitism was drawn like a red thread. The decisive anti-Semitic

book which I read at that time and the book which influenced my

comrades...

DR. SAUTER: Please...

VON SCHIRACH: ...was Henry Ford’s book, _The International Jew_; I read

it and became anti-Semitic. In those days this book made such a deep

impression on my friends and myself because we saw in Henry Ford the

representative of success, also the exponent of a progressive social

policy. In the poverty-stricken and wretched Germany of the time, youth

looked toward America, and apart from the great benefactor, Herbert

Hoover, it was Henry Ford who to us represented America.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks, as I have said twice

now, that the educational influences of the defendant are quite

irrelevant to us. I do not want to say it again and, unless you can

control the defendant and keep him to the point, I shall have to stop

his evidence.

DR. SAUTER: But, Mr. President, is it not of interest to the Tribunal

when judging this defendant and his personality that they know how the

defendant became a National Socialist and how the defendant became

anti-Semitic? I had thought...

THE PRESIDENT: No, it is not of interest to the Tribunal.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, how did you then meet Hitler and how did you happen

to join the Party?

VON SCHIRACH: I must say that I did not become a National Socialist

because of anti-Semitism but because of Socialism. I met Hitler as early

as 1925. He had just left Landsberg on the Lech, his imprisonment was

ended, and he came to Weimar and spoke there. It was on that occasion

that I was introduced to him. The program for the national community

which he developed appealed to me so enormously because in it I found on

a large scale something I had experienced in a small way in the

camaraderie of my youth organization. He appeared to me to be the man

who would pave the way into the future for our generation. I believed

that through him there could be offered to this younger generation the

prospect of work, of happiness. And in him I saw the man who would

liberate us from the shackles of Versailles. I am convinced that without

Versailles the rise to power of Hitler would never have happened. That

dictate led to dictatorship.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, when did you then become a member of the Party?

VON SCHIRACH: I became a member of the Party in 1925. I joined the SA at

the same time, with all my comrades.

DR. SAUTER: You were 18 at the time?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: Why did you join the SA?

VON SCHIRACH: The SA furnished the protection for the meetings, and we

simply continued in the SA, as part of the Party, the activities which

we had carried out before in our youth organization.

DR. SAUTER: In 1926, Witness, that is when you were 19 years old, there

was a Party rally in Weimar?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: As far as I know, you talked to Hitler personally on that

occasion; is that correct?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I was to have talked personally to Hitler one year

earlier. On this occasion there was another meeting. He was making

speeches at various mass meetings in Weimar, and he came back to Weimar

again during the same year to speak before a smaller circle. Together

with Rudolf Hess he paid a visit to the home of my parents and on that

occasion he suggested that I should study in Munich.

DR. SAUTER: Why?

VON SCHIRACH: He thought I ought to know the Party at its very core and

thought I would become acquainted with the Party work in that way. But I

want to say here that at that time I did not have any intention at all

of becoming a politician. Nevertheless, I was very much interested, of

course, in getting acquainted with the Movement at the place where it

had been founded.

DR. SAUTER: You went, then, to Munich, and studied there?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I then went to Munich. At first I did not concern

myself with the Party. I was occupied with Germanic studies, history,

and the history of art; I wrote and I came into contact with many people

in Munich who were not actually National Socialists but who belonged, I

should say, to the periphery of the National Socialist movement. At that

time I lived in the house of my friend, the publisher Bruckmann...

DR. SAUTER: Then in 1929 you became the head of the Movement within the

universities. I think you were elected, not nominated, to that post?

VON SCHIRACH: The situation at the beginning was this: I attended Party

meetings in Munich; in Bruckmann’s salon I met Hitler and Rosenberg and

many other men who later played an important role in Germany. And at the

university I joined the university group of the National Socialist

German Students League.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.

DR. SAUTER: Go on, Herr Von Schirach, you have just told us that you

joined this university group in Munich. Will you please continue?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes, and I also started to take an active part in this

group. I spoke there before my comrades, at first about my own work in

the literary field, and then I began to give lectures to the students

also about the National Socialist movement. I organized Hitler student

meetings among the students in Munich, and then I was elected a member

of the General Students Committee, the ASTA, and through this activity

among the students I came more and more into contact with the Party

leadership. In 1929, the man who was the then so-called Reich Leader of

the National Socialist Students Union retired, and the question arose of

who should be given the leadership of all the university groups. At that

time Rudolf Hess, on behalf of the Führer, questioned all university

groups of the National Socialist University Movement and the majority of

all these groups cast their vote for me to head the National Socialist

Students Union. This accounts for the curious fact that I am the only

Party leader who was elected into the Party leadership. That is

something which has otherwise never occurred in the history of the

Party.

DR. SAUTER: You mean to say by that, that all the others were nominated,

and you alone were elected?

VON SCHIRACH: I was elected, and then I was confirmed in office.

DR. SAUTER: And if I am right, you were elected at the students’ meeting

at Graz in 1931.

VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. That is wrong. I am now talking only

of the National Socialist University Movement; I will come back to this

point later.

Now I was leader of the National Socialist University Movement, and I

reorganized this movement. I began my work as a speaker. In 1931 I

was...

THE PRESIDENT: Surely it is sufficient that he became the leader. It

really does not matter very much to us whether he was elected or not.

DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I am making every effort all the time to

abbreviate this speech. But perhaps I may ask just one more question

with reference to this subject.

Witness, then in 1931 you were, as far as I know, elected to the

presidency of the General Congress of Austrian and German Students,

comprising all parties, and elected, I think, unanimously. Is that

correct?

VON SCHIRACH: It is not correct.

DR. SAUTER: Then explain briefly, Herr Von Schirach.

VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. At the meeting of the General German

Students Congress in 1931, at which all German students and all Austrian

students and Sudeten-German students were represented, one of my

collaborators whom I had suggested as leader was unanimously elected

head of the entire student group. This was a very important affair for

the youth and for the Party. Two years before the seizure of power the

entire academic youth had unanimously given their vote to a National

Socialist. After this students’ rally at Graz, I had with Hitler a...

THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a convenient time to adjourn.

DR. SAUTER: Very well.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. SAUTER: Witness, before the recess we stopped at the fact that in

1929 you had been elected the leader of the academic youth. Two years

later, Hitler made you Reich Youth Leader. How did that appointment come

about?

VON SCHIRACH: After the student meeting at Graz in 1931, the success of

which was very surprising to Hitler, I had a conference with him. In the

course of that meeting, Hitler mentioned a conversation we had had

previously. At that time he had asked me how it came about that the

National Socialist University Movement was developing so quickly,

whereas the other National Socialist organizations lagged behind in

their development.

I told him at that time that one cannot lead youth organizations as an

appendix of a political party; youth has to be led by youth, and I

developed for him the idea of a youth state, that idea which had come to

me from experiencing the school community, the school state. And

thereupon in 1931 Hitler asked me whether I would like to assume the

leadership of the National Socialist Youth Organization. This included

youth cells, then the Hitler Youth and the National Socialist Students

Organization, which also was in existence at that time. Several men had

already tried their hand at the leadership of these organizations: the

former Oberstführer SA Leader Pfeffer, the Reichsleiter Buch, actually

without much result.

I agreed and became then Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP, temporarily a

member of the staff of the Oberst SA Leader Röhm. In that position, as

Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP in the staff of Röhm, I had the rank of

an SA Gruppenführer and kept that rank also when, half a year later, I

became independent in my position. That explains also the fact that I am

an SA Obergruppenführer. I got that rank many years later, _honoris

causa_. However, I did not possess an SA uniform—even after 1933.

DR. SAUTER: Then in 1931 you became Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: That, of course, was a Party office?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: Then in 1932 you became Reichsleiter? At that time you were

25 years old. How did that come about?

VON SCHIRACH: I have already said that I had expressed the opinion to

Hitler that youth could not be the appendix of another organization, but

youth had to be independent; it had to lead itself; it had to become

independent; and it was in fulfillment of a promise which Hitler had

already given me that, half a year later, I became an independent

Reichsleiter.

DR. SAUTER: Independent Reichsleiter, so that you were subordinate

directly to the Party leader Hitler?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: With what material means was that youth organization created

at that time?

VON SCHIRACH: With the means furnished by the young people themselves.

DR. SAUTER: And how were those funds raised? By collections?

VON SCHIRACH: The boys and girls paid membership fees. A part of these

membership fees was kept at the so-called district leadership offices,

which corresponded to the Gauleitung in the Party or to the SA

Gruppenführung in the SA. Another part went to the Reich Youth Leader.

The Hitler Youth financed its organization with its own means.

DR. SAUTER: Then, I am interested in the following: Did the Hitler

Youth, which you created and which was given Hitler’s name, get its

importance only after the seizure of power and by the seizure of power

only, or what was the previous size of this youth organization which you

created?

VON SCHIRACH: Before the seizure of power, in 1932 the Hitler Youth was

already the largest youth movement of Germany. I should like to add here

that the individual National Socialist youth organizations which I found

when I took over my office as Reich Youth Leader were merged by me into

one large unified youth movement. This youth movement was the strongest

youth movement of Germany, long before we came to power.

On 2 October 1932, the Hitler Youth held a meeting at Potsdam. At that

meeting more than 100,000 youth from all over the Reich met without the

Party’s providing a single pfennig. The means were contributed by the

young people themselves. Solely from the number of the participants, it

can be seen that that was the largest youth movement.

DR. SAUTER: That was, therefore, several months before the seizure of

power, and at that time already more than 100,000 participants were at

that rally at Potsdam?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: The Prosecution has made the accusation, Witness, that

later, after the seizure of power—I believe in February 1933—you took

over the Reich Committee of German Youth Organizations. Is that correct,

and against whom was that action directed?

VON SCHIRACH: That is correct. The Reich Committee of Youth

Organizations was practically no more than a statistical office which

was subordinate to the Reich Minister of the Interior. That office was

managed by a retired general, General Vogt, who later became one of my

ablest assistants. The taking over of that Reich Committee was a

revolutionary act, a measure which youth carried out for youth, for from

that day on dates the realization of the idea of the Youth State within

the State. I cannot say any more about that.

DR. SAUTER: The Prosecution further accuses you, Witness, of having

dissolved the so-called “Grossdeutscher Bund” in 1933, that is, after

the seizure of power. What was the Grossdeutscher Bund, and why did you

dissolve it?

VON SCHIRACH: The Grossdeutscher Bund was a youth organization, or

rather a union of youth organizations, with pan-German tendencies.

I am surprised, therefore, that the Prosecution has made the dissolution

of that organization an accusation at all.

DR. SAUTER: Many members of this Grossdeutscher Bund were National

Socialists. There was no very essential difference between some of the

youth groups associated in that organization and the Hitler Youth. Is

that correct?

VON SCHIRACH: I wanted youth to be united, and the Grossdeutscher Bund

wanted to continue a certain separate existence. I objected to that, and

there was agitated public controversy between Admiral Von Trotha, the

leader of the Grossdeutscher Bund and me, and in the end the

Grossdeutscher Bund was incorporated into our youth organization. I do

not recall exactly whether I banned the organization formally; I know

only that the members came to me, and that between Admiral Von Trotha

and me a discussion took place, a reconciliation. Admiral Von Trotha

until his death was one of the warmest sponsors of my work.

DR. SAUTER: How did the suppression of the Marxist youth organization

come about?

VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the suppression of the Marxist youth

organizations, if I remember correctly, came about in connection with

the suppression of trade unions. I have no exact documents any more

regarding that. But at any rate, from the legal point of view, I was not

authorized in 1933 to order a suppression of that kind. The Minister of

the Interior would have had to do that. I had the right to ban youth

organizations, _de jure_, only after 1 December 1936. That the Marxist

youth organizations had to disappear was a foregone conclusion for me,

and in speaking about this suppression order as such, I can only say

that the German working youth found the realization of its socialistic

ideas, not under the Marxist governments of the Weimar Republic, but in

the community of the Hitler Youth.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, at first you were Reich Führer of the NSDAP; that

was a Party office. And after the seizure of power, you became Youth

Leader of the German Reich; that was a State office. On the basis of

this State or national office, did you also have jurisdiction over and

responsibility for the school system, for the elementary schools, for

instance?

VON SCHIRACH: For the school system in Germany the Reich Minister for

Science, Education, and Culture was the only authority. My field was

education outside the schools, along with the home and the school, as it

says in the law of 1 December 1936. However, I had some schools of my

own, the so-called Adolf Hitler Schools, which were not under national

supervision. They were creations of a later period. And during the war,

through the Child Evacuation Program that is, the organization by which

we took care of evacuating the young people from the big cities

endangered by bombing—I was in charge of education within the camps

where these children were housed. But on the whole I have to answer the

question about competence for the school system in Germany in the

negative.

DR. SAUTER: This youth which you had to educate outside of the schools

was called the Hitler Youth, the HJ.

Was membership in the Hitler Youth compulsory or voluntary?

VON SCHIRACH: The membership in the Hitler Youth was voluntary until

1936. In 1936 the law already mentioned concerning the HJ was issued

which made all the German youth members of the HJ. The stipulations for

the carrying out of that law, however, were issued only in March 1939,

and only during the war, in May 1940, was the thought of carrying out a

German youth draft considered within the Reich Youth Leadership and

discussed publicly. May I point out that my Deputy Lauterbacher, at the

time when I was at the front, stated in a public meeting—I believe at

Frankfurt in 1940—that now, after 97 percent of the youngest age group

of youth had volunteered for the Hitler Youth, it would be necessary to

draft the remaining 3 percent by a youth draft.

DR. SAUTER: In this connection, Mr. President, may I refer to two

documents of the document book Schirach. That is Number Schirach-51.

THE PRESIDENT: I did not quite understand what the defendant said. He

said that the membership was voluntary until 1936, that the HJ Law was

then passed, and something to the effect that the execution of the law

was not published until 1939. Was that what he said?

DR. SAUTER: Yes, that is correct. Until 1936—if I may explain that, Mr.

President—membership in the Hitler Youth was absolutely voluntary. Then

in 1936 the HJ Law was issued, which provided that boys and girls had to

belong to the Hitler Youth. But the stipulations for its execution were

issued by the defendant only in 1939 so that, in practice, until 1939

the membership was nevertheless on a voluntary basis.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that right, Defendant?

VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is right.

DR. SAUTER: And these facts which I have just presented, Mr. President,

can also be seen from two documents of the document book Schirach,

Number Schirach-51, on Page 91, and Number Schirach-52 on Page 92. In

the latter document...

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Sauter, I accept it from you and from the

defendant. I only wanted to understand it. You can go on.

DR. SAUTER: And in the second document mention is also made of the 97

percent which the defendant has said had voluntarily joined the HJ, so

that now there were only 3 percent missing. May I continue:

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, what was the attitude of the

parents of the children on the question of whether the children should

join the HJ or not? What did the parents say?

VON SCHIRACH: There were, of course, parents who did not like to have

their children join the HJ. Whenever I made one of my radio speeches to

the parents or to the youth, many hundreds of parents sent me letters.

Among these letters, there were many in which the parents voiced their

objections to the HJ, or expressed their dislike for it. I always

considered that a special proof of the confidence which the parents had

in me. I should like to say here that never, when parents restrained

their children from joining, have I exerted any compulsion or put them

under pressure of any kind. In doing that I would have lost all the

confidence placed in me by the parents of Germany. That confidence was

the basis of my entire educational work.

I believe that on this occasion I have to say also that the concept that

any youth organization can be established and carried on, and

successfully carried on, by coercing youth, is absolutely false.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, did youngsters who did not join the Hitler Youth

suffer any disadvantage for that reason?

VON SCHIRACH: Youngsters who did not join the Hitler Youth were at a

disadvantage in that they could not take part in our camping, in our

trips, in our sporting meets. They were in a certain sense outsiders of

the youth life, and there was a danger that they might become

hypochondriacs.

DR. SAUTER: But were there not certain professions in which membership

in the HJ was a prerequisite for working in those professions?

VON SCHIRACH: Of course.

DR. SAUTER: What were the professions?

VON SCHIRACH: For instance, the profession of teacher. It is quite clear

that a teacher cannot educate youth unless he himself knows the life of

that youth, and so we demanded that the young teachers, that is those in

training to teach, had to go through the HJ. The junior teacher had to

be familiar with the ways of life of the pupils who were under his

supervision.

DR. SAUTER: But there were only a few such professions, whereas for

other professions membership in the HJ was not a prerequisite for

admission. Or what was the situation?

VON SCHIRACH: I cannot answer that in detail. I believe that a

discussion about that is not even possible, because the entire youth was

in the Hitler Youth.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, you know that the Prosecution has also accused the

defendants of having advocated the Führer Principle. Therefore, I ask

you:

Was the Führer Principle also valid in the HJ, and in what form was it

carried out in the HJ? I should like to remind you that I mean that kind

of Führer Principle of which we have heard in the testimony.

VON SCHIRACH: Of course, the HJ was built up on the Führer Principle;

only the entire form of leadership of youth differed basically from that

of other National Socialist organizations. For instance, we had the

custom in youth leadership of discussing frankly all questions of

interest to us. There were lively debates at our district leader

meetings. I myself educated my assistants even in a spirit of

contradiction. Of course, once we had debated a measure and I had then

given an order or a directive, that ended the debate. The youth

leaders—that is the young boy and girl leaders—through years of

working together and in serving the common purpose, had become a unity

of many thousands. They had become friends. It is evident that in a

group of that kind the carrying out of orders and directives takes place

in ways entirely different from those in a military organization or in

any other political organization.

DR. SAUTER: Witness...

VON SCHIRACH: May I add something?

Leadership based on natural authority such as we had in the youth

organization is something which is not alien to youth at all. Such

leadership in the youth organization never degenerated into

dictatorship.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, you have been accused of training the youth in a

military way, and in that connection, the fact has been pointed out that

your HJ wore a uniform. Is that correct, and why did the HJ wear a

uniform?

VON SCHIRACH: I have stated my opinion about that in many instances. I

believe there are also documents to illustrate it. I have always

described the uniform of the HJ as the dress of comradeship. The uniform

was the symbol of a community without class distinctions. The worker’s

boy wore the same garb as the son of the university professor. The girl

from the wealthy family wore the same garb as the child of the day

laborer. Hence the uniform. This uniform did not have any military

significance whatsoever.

DR. SAUTER: In that connection, Mr. President, may I ask you to take

judicial notice of Document Number Schirach-55 of the document book

Schirach, then of Numbers Schirach-55a and 117, where the Defendant Von

Schirach, many years ago, expressed in writing and repeatedly the same

trends of thought which he is expressing today.

I should only like to ask, Mr. President, for permission to correct an

error in Document 55, on Page 98. Rather far down, under the heading

“Page 77,” is a quotation from a book by Schirach. There it says:

“Even the son of the millionaire has no other power...”

I do not know whether you have found the passage. It is on Page 77 of

the book quoted, and Page 98 of the document book, Number Schirach-55.

There is a quotation near the bottom of the page:

“Even the son of the millionaire has no other power...” It should read

“dress,” not “power.” The German word “Macht”, is an error, and should

be the word “Tracht.”

So I ask now to have the word “Macht” (power), changed to the word

“Tracht” (dress).

Witness, I shall then continue with the interrogation. You have been

accused of having prepared youth for the war, psychologically and

pedagogically. You are alleged to have participated in a conspiracy for

that purpose, a conspiracy by which the National Socialist movement

acquired total power in Germany, and finally planned and carried out

aggressive wars. What can you say about that?

VON SCHIRACH: I did not participate in any conspiracy. I cannot consider

it participation in a conspiracy if I joined the National Socialist

Party. The program of that party had been approved; it had been

published. The Party was authorized to take part in elections. Hitler

had not said—neither he nor any of his collaborators—“I want to assume

power by a _coup d’état_.” Again and again he stated in public, not only

once but a hundred times: “I want to overcome this parliamentary system

by legal means, because it is leading us, year by year, deeper into

misery.” And I myself as the youngest deputy of the Reichstag of the

Republic told my 60,000 constituents similar things in electoral

campaigns.

There was nothing there which could prove the fact of a conspiracy,

nothing which was discussed behind closed doors. What we wanted we

acknowledged frankly before the nation, and so far as printed paper is

read around the globe, everyone abroad could have been informed also

about our aims and purposes.

As far as preparation for war is concerned, I must state that I did not

take part in any conferences or issuing of orders which would indicate

preparation for an aggressive war. I believe that can be seen from the

proceedings in this Court up to now.

I can state only that I did not participate in a conspiracy. I do not

believe either that there was a conspiracy; the thought of conspiracy is

in contradiction to the idea of dictatorship. A dictatorship does not

conspire; a dictatorship commands.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, what did the leadership of the Hitler Youth do to

prepare the youth for war and to train it for warlike purposes?

VON SCHIRACH: Before I answer that question, I believe I will have to

explain briefly the difference between military and premilitary

training.

Military training, in my opinion, is all training with weapons of

war, and all training which is conducted by military personnel,

that is, by officers, with and without weapons of war. Premilitary

education—premilitary training is, in the widest sense, all training

which comes before the time of military service; in particular cases it

is a special preparation for military service. We, in the Hitler Youth,

were opponents of any military drills for youth. We disliked such drills

as not youthful. I am not giving my personal opinion here, but the

opinion of thousands of my co-workers.

It is a fact that I rejected the Wehrjugend (the Youth Defense Groups),

which had formerly existed in Germany, and did not allow any

continuation of Wehrjugend work within the HJ. I had always been

strongly opposed to any soldier-playing in a youth organization. With

all my high esteem for the profession of an officer, I still do not

consider an officer capable of leading youth because in some way or

other, he will always apply the tone of the drill field and the forms of

military leadership to youth.

That is the reason why I did not have any officers as my assistants in

the Hitler Youth. Just on account of my refusal to use officers as youth

leaders, I was severely criticized by the Wehrmacht on occasion. I

should like to stress that that did not come from the OKW; Field Martial

Keitel, especially, had a great deal of understanding for my ideas.

However, in the Wehrmacht, now and again, criticism was heard on account

of the general attitude of opposition of the Youth Leadership corps

toward having officers used as leaders of a youth organization. The

principle of “youth leading youth” was never broken in Germany.

If I am now to answer definitively the question of whether the youth was

prepared for the war and whether it was trained in a military sense, I

shall have to say, in conclusion, that the main efforts of all youth

work in Germany culminated in trade competition, in the trade schools,

in camping, and competition in sports. Physical training, which perhaps

in some way could be considered a preparation for military service, took

only a very small part of our time.

I should like to give as an example here: A Gebiet, or district, of the

Hitler Youth, for instance the Gebiet of Hessen-Nassau which is about

the same as a Gau in the Party, contributed from its funds in 1939 as

follows: For hikes and camping, 9/20; for cultural work, 3/20; for

sports and physical training, 3/20; for the Land Service (Landdienst),

and other tasks and for the offices, 5/20.

The same area spent, in 1944—that is, 1 year before the end of the

war—for cultural work, 4/20; for sports and defense training, 5/20; for

Landdienst and other tasks, 6/20; and for the evacuation of children to

the country, 5/20.