involved. He may also have mentioned details, concerning the distance of
the U-boats from the point where the ship went down, but I cannot today
tell you about this with any certainty.
DR. SIEMERS: During this conversation with Raeder, did you declare that
everything should be done to avoid war with the United States, referring
particularly to incidents like the sinking of the Lusitania in the
previous war?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I certainly and emphatically did, for at that time
the recollections of similar past incidents during the first World War
were still very vivid in my mind. I am sure I drew his attention to the
urgent necessity of avoiding all naval operations which might cause a
spreading of the war and—as I used to say in those days—decrease the
“neutral substance.”
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder share your opinion?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: To the best of my recollections—yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Are you convinced, Herr Von Weizsäcker, that Raeder gave
you truthful answers in this report about the _Athenia_?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Of course.
DR. SIEMERS: Now U-boat Number _30_ returned from her combat mission on
27 September 1939, that is—about three weeks after the sinking of the
_Athenia_, and her commander reported that he had inadvertently sunk the
_Athenia_. He had not noticed the fact at the time but was apprised of
the incident later by various wireless messages. Raeder heard about it
at the end of September, and discussed the matter with Hitler in order
to decide what attitude should be adopted. Hitler issued an order
enjoining silence. All this has already been discussed here. I would
like you to tell me if you were informed of the fact, subsequently
established, of the sinking by a German U-boat.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: No, certainly not.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you hear of Hitler’s order enjoining silence?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I naturally did not hear of that either.
DR. SIEMERS: I shall now have Document Number 3260-PS handed to you and
I must ask you to have a look at it. It is an article entitled
“Churchill Sinks the _Athenia_,” taken from the _Völkischer Beobachter_
of 23 October 1939. Do you remember this article?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. Perhaps I may look through it.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I inform you, in order to assist the
Tribunal, that this is GB-218 in the British Document Book Number 10a,
Page 97, to be correct—Page 99.
[_Turning to the witness._] Herr Von Weizsäcker, you have read this
article. May I ask you to tell me whether you recall having read this
article at the time of its appearance?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do recall that such an article did appear at that
time.
DR. SIEMERS: Then may I ask you further what your attitude was at the
time when you heard about this article?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I considered it a perverted fantasy.
DR. SIEMERS: Then you condemned this article?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Naturally.
DR. SIEMERS: Even though at the time you did not know yet that it was a
German U-Boat?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: The question of whether it was a German U-boat or not
could in no wise influence my opinion of the article.
DR. SIEMERS: Then you considered this article objectionable, even if it
had not been a German U-boat?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Of course.
DR. SIEMERS: Now the Prosecution asserts that Admiral Raeder had
instigated this article and is reproaching him very gravely on moral
grounds for this very reason, and the reproach is all the graver since,
as we have seen, Raeder at this time—unlike yourself—knew that it was
a German U-boat which had sunk the _Athenia_. Do you consider such an
action possible on Raeder’s part? That he could have instigated this
article?
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Dr. Siemers, you can only ask the witness
what he knew and what he did. You cannot ask him to speculate about what
Raeder has done.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I believed that,
according to this morning’s affidavit, it would be possible to voice an
opinion; but I shall, of course, retract my question.
THE PRESIDENT: What affidavit are you talking about?
DR. SIEMERS: The affidavit in which I suggested the expunging of any
expression of opinion, Dietmann’s affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: That is a perfectly different matter.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you at that time hear that Raeder
had instigated this article?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: No, I did not hear that; I would never have believed it
either. I consider it entirely out of the question that he could have
instigated an article of that sort or that he could have written it
himself.
DR. SIEMERS: To your knowledge, could this article be traced exclusively
to the Propaganda Ministry?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only answer this question in the negative; not to
Raeder and not to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, are you in a position to judge whether
grave points were involved in the historically-known violations
committed by the Navy against the Treaty of Versailles?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only answer that question indirectly. The details
are unknown to me. But I can scarcely consider it possible that grave or
important violations could have occurred, for it is precisely in naval
matters that the observance of contract agreements is particularly easy
to control. Ships cannot be built without being seen. I must therefore
assume that these infringements were of an insignificant nature.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in your opinion, did the Defendant
Raeder prepare a war of aggression or do you know of any case from which
Raeder’s attitude...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is the very charge against the
Defendant Raeder which the Tribunal has got to decide.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in February 1939, when you traveled by
train from Hamburg to Berlin with Admiral Raeder, did you converse with
him? And what was the occasion and what did you discuss?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. It is quite true that I met Admiral Raeder on the
train from Hamburg to Berlin, after the launching of a ship at Hamburg.
On this occasion the Admiral told me that he had just made a report to
Hitler in which he said he had made it quite clear that the size of the
Navy would preclude any war against England for years to come. I presume
that this is the reply to the question which you wished to receive from
me.
DR. SIEMERS: That was in February 1939?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was the launching of the _Bismarck_.
DR. SIEMERS: Then it is known to the Tribunal, for the launching of the
_Bismarck_ is entered in the records.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: It must have been in the spring—in February or March.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder’s declaration at that time have a calming
influence on you?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I heard Raeder’s declaration on the subject with very
great pleasure because there could be no other...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we do not care whether it had a calming influence
on him or not.
DR. SIEMERS: In your opinion, and to the best of your knowledge, did
Raeder—either as a politician or as a naval expert—exercise any
influence over Hitler?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the witness can tell us what Raeder said,
but he really cannot tell us in what capacity he was speaking, whether
as a politician or an admiral. If you want to know whether he had his
uniform on...
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you have any conversations with
Raeder or with any other high-ranking personages?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: About what?
DR. SIEMERS: About Raeder’s influence on Hitler.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was a well-known fact that political arguments
expressed by soldiers scarcely influenced Hitler at all, although
military arguments of a technical nature certainly did carry weight with
him, and in this sense Raeder may have exercised some influence over
Hitler.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in the winter of 1938 to 1939, the
usual large diplomatic dinner party took place in Berlin and you, as far
as I know, were present at this dinner. On this occasion Raeder spoke to
Sir Nevile Henderson about the probable return of Germany’s colonies...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, why do you not ask him instead of telling
him. You are telling him what happened.
DR. SIEMERS: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you are.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon; this was a conversation between Raeder
and Sir Nevile Henderson, not between Herr Von Weizsäcker and Henderson.
I am now asking you, Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you have a conversation to
this effect with Sir Nevile Henderson or with other British diplomats?
And do you know anything about their attitude?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I cannot recall having spoken personally with any
British diplomats about the question of the colonies. On the other hand,
I do know that between 1934 and 1939 the question of the colonies was
repeatedly handled by the British Government either officially,
unofficially or semiofficially, and their attitude was expressed in a
friendly and conciliatory manner. I believe I can remember reading a
report on the visit of two British ministers to Berlin and that on this
occasion the question of the colonies was also discussed in a
conciliatory manner.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, can you tell us anything about the
behavior or the reputation of the Navy during the Norwegian occupation?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: An occupational force always finds it difficult to be
popular anywhere. But with this one reservation I should like to state
that the Navy, as far as I heard, enjoyed a good, even a very good,
reputation in Norway. This was repeatedly confirmed to me during the war
by my Norwegian friends.
DR. SIEMERS: You made these Norwegian friendships at the time you were
Minister in Oslo? When was that?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I was Minister in Oslo from 1931 to 1933.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, one last question. A document, D-843, was submitted
yesterday, signed by Breuer who was with the Oslo Legation in March
1940. May I submit this document to you?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Am I to read the entire document?
DR. SIEMERS: I think it would suffice if you were just to glance through
it, especially over the middle part of the document.
[_Turning to the President._] Mr. President, it is GB-466 and the
document was submitted yesterday.
[_Turning to the witness._] According to this document Breuer stated
that the danger of a British landing in Norway was not so great as was
assumed by the other side, and he speaks of measures only by which
Germany might be provoked. What can you tell us about these statements
of Breuer’s? Are these statements correct?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Breuer was not with the Legation—he was the Minister
himself—and I take it for granted that he reported correctly on the
subject from an objective or rather, if I may say so, subjective point
of view. Whether this was really correct from an objective point of view
or not, is quite another question. To put it in plain German, whether
Breuer was correctly informed of the intentions of the enemy forces is
another question.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, according to the information you
subsequently received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, were
Raeder’s misgivings justified or was the picture, as painted by Breuer,
correct?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I must confess that my personal opinion tallied with the
opinion of Breuer, although both our opinions subsequently proved to be
incorrect and the conjectures of the Navy were justified, or—at
least—more justified than the opinion voiced by the Minister.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much indeed.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to ask any questions
of this witness?
DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Hess): Witness, on 23 August
1939, a nonaggression pact was concluded between Germany and the Soviet
Union. Were any other agreements concluded on that day by the two
governments, outside of this pact of nonaggression?
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the USSR): Mr. President,
the witness is called upon to answer certain definite questions which
are set forth in the application of counsel for the defendant, Dr.
Siemers. I consider that the question which is being put to him at this
moment by the defense counsel Seidl has no connection with the
examination of the case in hand and should be ruled out.
THE PRESIDENT: You may ask the question, Dr. Seidl, that you were going
to ask.
DR. SEIDL: I ask you again, Herr Von Weizsäcker, whether on 23 August
1939, other agreements had been reached between the two governments,
which were not contained in the nonaggression pact?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Where were these agreements contained?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: These agreements were contained in a secret protocol.
DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself read this secret protocol in your capacity
of State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: I have before me a text and Ambassador Gaus harbors no doubt
at all that the agreements in question are correctly set out in this
text. I shall have it put to you.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, what document are you putting to him?
DR. SEIDL: The secret addenda to the protocol of 23 August 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that not the document—what is this document that you
are presenting to the witness? There is a document which you have
already presented to the Tribunal and which has been ruled out. Is that
the same document?
DR. SEIDL: It is the document which I submitted to the Tribunal in my
documentary evidence and which was refused by the Tribunal, presumably
because I refused to divulge the origin and source of this document. But
the Tribunal granted me permission to produce a new sworn affidavit by
Ambassador Gaus on the subject in question.
THE PRESIDENT: You have not done it? You have not done it?
DR. SEIDL: No, but I should, Your Honor, like to read this text in order
to stimulate the memory of the witness, and to ask him whether in
connection therewith, as far as he can remember, the secret agreements
are correctly reproduced in this document.
GEN. RUDENKO: Your Honors! I would like to protest against these
questions for two reasons.
First of all, we are examining the matter of the crimes of the major
German war criminals. We are not investigating the foreign policies of
other states. Secondly, the document which defense counsel Seidl is
attempting to put to the witness has been rejected by the Tribunal,
since it is—in substance—a forged document and cannot have any
probative value whatsoever.
DR. SEIDL: May I in this connection say the following, Mr. President.
This document is an essential component of the nonaggression pact,
submitted by the Prosecution in evidence as GB-145. If I now submit the
text to the witness...
THE PRESIDENT: The only question is whether it is the document which has
been rejected by the Tribunal. Is it the document which has been
rejected by the Tribunal?
DR. SEIDL: It was rebutted as documentary evidence _per se_.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then the answer is “yes.”
DR. SEIDL: But it seems to me that there is a difference as to whether
this document may be put to the witness during the hearing of his
testimony. I should like to answer this question in the affirmative
since the Prosecution when cross-examining can put the document in their
possession to the witness, and on the basis of his testimony we should
then see which is the correct text or whether these two texts harmonize
at all.
THE PRESIDENT: Where does the document which you are presenting come
from?
DR. SEIDL: I received this document a few weeks ago from a man on the
Allied side who appeared absolutely reliable. I received it only on
condition that I would not divulge its origin, a condition which seemed
to me perfectly reasonable.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you say that you received it a few moments ago?
DR. SEIDL: Weeks ago.
THE PRESIDENT: It is the same document that you say just now that you
presented to the Tribunal and the Tribunal rejected?
DR. SEIDL: Yes, but the Tribunal also decided that I might submit
another sworn affidavit from Ambassador Gaus on this subject, and this
decision only makes sense...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know, but you have not done so. We do not know
what affidavit Dr. Gaus has made.
DR. SEIDL: Ambassador Gaus’ sworn affidavit, the new one, is already in
my possession, but it has not yet been translated.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I certainly join General Rudenko in objecting
to the use of this document. We now know that it comes from some
anonymous source. We do not know the source at all, and anyway it is not
established that this witness does not remember himself what this
purported agreement amounted to. I do not know why he can not ask him,
if that is what he wants to do.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you may ask the witness what his recollection
is of the treaty without putting the document to him. Ask him what he
remembers of the treaty, or the protocol.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, please describe the contents of the agreement
insofar as you can remember them.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: It is about a very incisive, a very far-reaching secret
addendum to the nonaggression pact concluded at that time. The scope of
this document was very extensive since it concerned the partition of the
spheres of influence and drew a demarcation line between areas which,
under given conditions, belonged to the sphere of Soviet Russia and
those which would fall in the German sphere of interest. Finland,
Estonia, Latvia, Eastern Poland and, as far as I can remember, certain
areas of Romania were to be included in the sphere of the Soviet Union.
Anything west of this area fell into the German sphere of interest. It
is true that this secret agreement did not maintain its original form.
Later on, either in September or October of the same year, a certain
change, an amendment was made. As far as I can recall the essential
difference in the two documents consisted in the fact that Lithuania,
or—at least—the greater part of Lithuania, fell into the sphere of
interest of the Soviet Union, while in the Polish territory the line of
demarcation between the two spheres of interest was moved very
considerably westwards.
I believe that I have herewith given you the gist of the secret
agreement and of the subsequent addendum.
DR. SEIDL: Is it true that in case of a subsequent territorial
reorganization, a line of demarcation was agreed upon in the territory
of the Polish State?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I cannot tell you exactly whether the expression “line
of demarcation” was contained in this protocol or whether “line of
separation of spheres of interest” was the actual term.
DR. SEIDL: But a line was drawn.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Precisely the line which I have just mentioned, and I
believe I can recall that this line, once the agreement became
effective, was adhered to as a general rule with possible slight
fluctuations.
DR. SEIDL: Can you recall—this is my last question—if this secret
addendum of 23 August 1939 also contained an agreement on the future
destiny of Poland?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: This secret agreement included a complete redirection of
Poland’s destiny. It may very well have been that explicitly or
implicitly such a redirection had been provided for in the agreement. I
would not, however, like to commit myself as to the exact wording.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, did you see the original of the secret treaty?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I saw a photostat of the original, possibly the original
as well. In any case I had the photostatic copy in my possession, I had
a photostatic copy locked up in my personal safe.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you recognize a copy of it if it was shown to you?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Oh, yes, I definitely think so. The original signatures
were attached and they could be recognized immediately.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has been considering whether it ought to put
to the witness the document in the possession of Dr. Seidl, but in view
of the fact that the contents of the original have been stated by the
witness and by other witnesses and that it does not appear what is the
origin of the document which is in Dr. Seidl’s possession, the Tribunal
has decided not to put the document to the witness. The Tribunal will
now adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 22 May 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIXTH DAY
Wednesday, 22 May 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The witness Von Weizsäcker resumed the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think yesterday we got to the stage
whether any of the other defendants’ counsel wished to ask any
questions.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, indeed; I believe Dr. Von Lüdinghausen wishes to
examine the witness.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): Witness, I
should like to put a few questions to you about the activity of Herr Von
Neurath in his capacity as Foreign Minister. You were at that time
Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Office. What were
the dates?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe from late autumn of 1936, as a deputy, and
from the spring of 1937 until the spring of 1938 with full capacity.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But before then you had already had occasion to
work with Herr Von Neurath? In the autumn of 1932 were you not together
now and then at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What tendencies did Herr Von Neurath follow, and
what attitude did Von Neurath adopt at the Disarmament Conference?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: The attitude of Herr Von Neurath was dictated by the
provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations which provided for
disarmament. He followed those lines.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In that he followed the same policy which his
predecessors had followed at the Disarmament Conference?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was always the same.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, all the previous governments pursued a policy
aimed at peace and unity, or understanding; and Herr Von Neurath
continued this policy wholeheartedly, is that not correct?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I never noticed anything to the contrary.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you at that time—that is in 1932—notice in
any way that he had National Socialist tendencies or that he was at all
in sympathy with the National Socialists?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I had the impression that there was no common ground
between him and National Socialism.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Can you quite briefly summarize Herr Von Neurath’s
views with respect to foreign politics? Could he have been at that time
in favor of belligerent action, or was he the representative, the
acknowledged representative, of a policy of understanding and peace?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I should say that Herr Von Neurath pursued a policy of
peaceful revision, the same policy that had been carried on by his
predecessors. His aim was good neighborliness with all, without binding
himself politically in any special direction. I never noticed any
bellicose tendencies in his policies.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was there any change in Herr Von Neurath’s views
in the year 1936, when you became one of his closest collaborators, or
did they always remain the same?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: They were always the same.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: He was especially interested in bringing about an
understanding with England, but also with France; is that right?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I had the impression that Herr Von Neurath wanted to
bring about an understanding with all sides.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to put a few more questions to you
which more or less concern his relations with Hitler.
According to your knowledge of the circumstances, as his collaborator,
can it be said that he had the confidence of Adolf Hitler at all times
when he was Foreign Minister, and also that Hitler let himself be
advised and led by him altogether?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: As far as I am in a position to judge, he was the
adviser but not the confidant of Hitler.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But there was a certain contact between those
gentlemen; is that not right?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I was hardly ever a witness of such contacts.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you observe, when Von Neurath and Hitler met,
whether they frequently discussed the political situation, what had to
be done, and what should be done?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only say that we of the Foreign Office regretted
that the contact was not closer; all the more so as Hitler was
frequently absent from Berlin. We considered the contact too loose.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then, one cannot speak of close relations or of
very close collaboration with Hitler in the case of Von Neurath?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: In my opinion, no.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And, in your opinion and according to your
observation, how did the activity of Von Neurath affect foreign policy?
Was he the leading man, or was he not perhaps a retarding element, that
is a brake, so to speak, where matters contrary to his convictions were
concerned?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I have no actual proof that important foreign political
actions of this period were influenced by Von Neurath. But I can well
imagine that certain actions in the sphere of foreign politics were
prevented...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I do not think we can have the witness
imagine. We cannot have the witness telling us what he can imagine. I
think the question is too vague, and not a proper question to ask.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: During the time when Herr Von Neurath was Foreign
Minister, did any authority in the Party also have an influence on the
foreign policy which in effect was contrary to the tendencies of Von
Neurath or at least was not shared by him?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe there was not only one but many who acted in
that way and had connection and influence with Hitler of course. That
could not be verified, but it could be concluded from the results.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know why, for what reason, the
Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan in November 1935 was not signed by Von
Neurath but by the then Ambassador Von Ribbentrop in London?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Was not that in 1936?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: 1936; yes that is right.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I assume for the reason that Hitler always liked to put
several persons on to certain work, and he would then select from among
them the one he considered best suited to carry the work through.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was Von Neurath at all in agreement with this
Anti-Comintern Pact?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I do not know.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Von Neurath’s policy regarding personnel?
Did he try to keep old officials in office, or did he bring in National
Socialist officials?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Herr Von Neurath was very anxious to retain the old and
familiar Foreign Office staff, in the Foreign Office, as well as in
positions abroad.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But that changed the moment he resigned?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Not immediately, but later on to an increasing extent.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, just two more questions. What was the
attitude of Herr Von Neurath when he was no longer Foreign Minister and
the Sudeten questions became acute, in the autumn of 1938; and what part
did he play at the Munich Conference?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I recall a scene in the Reich Chancellery, a day before
the Munich Agreement, when Herr Von Neurath very strongly recommended
pursuing a policy of appeasement and following the suggestion of
Mussolini to hold a four-power conference.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that after Von Neurath had left the
Foreign Office that office was forbidden to give him any information
about foreign politics?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I think I remember that the successor of Herr Von
Neurath kept to himself information his predecessor received about
foreign political matters.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Herr Von Weizsäcker, you were German Ambassador to the
Holy See in Rome from the summer of 1943?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: At the same time the commander-in-chief in the Italian
theater of war was Field Marshal Kesselring?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes; that is, he was the commander-in-chief in that
theater from 25 September 1943. Before that time an Italian general held
the post.
DR. LATERNSER: Were you frequently called upon by Kesselring to settle
differences between the German Army on one hand and the civil
authorities on the other?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: There was constant communication between Field Marshal
Kesselring and my own office, not only in order to straighten out
differences, but above all to prevent differences.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you, through your frequent contacts with Field
Marshal Kesselring, gain a personal impression with regard to the
attitude of the military...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we are not trying Kesselring. What
relevance has this question got?
DR. LATERNSER: This question is relevant because in the
cross-examination of Field Marshal Kesselring the Prosecution produced
incriminating material to the effect that the military leadership in
Italy did not observe the usages of war and the laws of humanity. I
distinctly remember that you, Mr. President—and this may be seen on
Pages 5803 and 5805 (Volume IX, Pages 234, 235)—said in reply to an
objection by Dr. Stahmer that it was material incriminating the General
Staff. I should like to ask the witness now present a few questions
about this incriminating material.
THE PRESIDENT: If you wish to ask him anything that he knows about
accusations which have been made by the Prosecution against Kesselring
as a member of the General Staff, then you may do that.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. I started and that was to be a
preparatory question.
Herr Von Weizsäcker, were the objects of art of Italy in the Italian
theater of war spared and put in safekeeping?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: The German Wehrmacht, under the leadership of Field
Marshal Kesselring, made the greatest efforts to spare and protect
edifices, property, and objects of art belonging to the Church. This was
a large chapter in the activities of the staff of Field Marshal
Kesselring, and success was not wanting.
DR. LATERNSER: Can you give us one or two especially significant
examples on this point?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes, there are a lot of examples. I would like to
mention that 6 months or a year ago an exhibition of manuscripts,
incunabula, and similar things, was held in the Vatican. The German
Wehrmacht is to be thanked for having saved a large part, if not the
greater part of these objects.
DR. LATERNSER: That is sufficient, Herr Von Weizsäcker. The high
military command in Italy is accused of having treated the Italian
population with especial harshness and cruelty. Can you tell us anything
about the fact that precisely on the part of the high military command
in Italy special measures were taken for the feeding of the population
at a period when the food problem was difficult?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Does this question refer especially to the food problem?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, the food problem in Rome.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Well, my field of observation was only Rome. But there I
can say that Field Marshal Kesselring told me one day that half his time
was taken up with the question of feeding Rome. And I knew one of the
higher military officials—I believe his name was Seifert or something
like that—who with great devotion concerned himself with this task and
carried it through with success.
DR. LATERNSER: Now my last question, Herr Von Weizsäcker: Through your
observations of the activities of the high military leaders in Italy you
must have gained a personal impression of these people. Did you get the
impression that there was a sincere effort on the part of these military
leaders to observe the laws of war and the laws of humanity?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: That is a matter of course, for otherwise certain
results could not have come about. Perhaps it is not known here that in
the autumn of 1943 the Holy See published a communiqué, an official
communiqué, which especially praised the behavior of the German soldiers
in Rome. Besides that, the sparing of the Eternal City could not have
been realized if the German Wehrmacht had not behaved as it did.
DR. LATERNSER: And that was a special merit of Field Marshal Kesselring
in particular?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I would say that when the history of this time comes to
be written first in the list of merit will be Pope Pius XII. Then praise
will be accorded, in the second place to the German Wehrmacht under the
leadership of Kesselring.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It has been asserted once that the Defendant Von Papen,
who in the summer of 1934 had been appointed ambassador to Vienna,
directed from that office a policy of aggressive expansion taking in the
entire southeast up to Turkey; and that he, among other things, had
offered neighboring states like Hungary and Poland territory to be
gained from the intended partitioning of Czechoslovakia. Did this policy
actually exist?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I am sorry. I did not quite understand your question.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy, which I just outlined, actually exist?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: My observation dates only from the late summer of 1936,
as before that time I was abroad. I did not notice later that Herr Von
Papen had carried on a southeastern policy for Vienna, or that he was
commissioned to do so. The Foreign Office could not entrust him with
such a mission, for he did not come under the Foreign Office.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: And this policy, as just outlined, did that exist at all
when you entered the Foreign Office?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Please repeat the question.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy of expansion on the part of Germany...
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Which policy?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The aggressive policy of expansion on the part of Germany
to the southeast as far as Turkey, the partitioning of Czechoslovakia,
and the cession of parts of Czechoslovakia to Poland and Hungary.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. In 1939, no doubt?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: 1936—in 1936.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution?
MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you one or two questions about the
_Athenia_ matter. You have told the Tribunal that you, yourself, saw the
American chargé d’affaires and informed him, about the middle of
September, that the _Athenia_ could not have been sunk by a German
U-boat. That is so, is it not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I did not see the American chargé d’affaires in the
middle of September, but on the day on which I heard of the sinking, and
that must have been, perhaps, 3, 4, or 5 of September.
MAJOR JONES: Were you already assuring the American representatives as
early as that that a U-boat could not have been responsible?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: That is correct.
MAJOR JONES: And did you recommend, or rather, did the German Foreign
Office recommend that the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy should
receive the American naval attaché and tell him the same thing, namely,
that a U-boat could not have sunk the _Athenia_?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I do not know. I only dealt with the chargé
d’affaires.
MAJOR JONES: I would like you to look at a new document, Document.
Number D-804, which will be Exhibit GB-477, which is an extract from the
SKL on the _Athenia_ case. You will see that that is a report from
Neubauer to the naval attaché and it reads as follows:
“The Foreign Office has had a report of the meeting between the
Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and the American naval
attaché, on 13 September 1939, passed on to it by telephone. It
is worded as follows:
“‘On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the
Commander-in-Chief of...’”
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I am sorry; I have not found the place as yet.
MAJOR JONES: Perhaps you would like to follow the English copy, Witness,
if you would like.
I read the second paragraph:
“‘On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy received the American naval
attaché on the advice of the Reich Foreign Minister and told him
more or less the following: He had intended for some days
already—as he knew—to write him that he should visit him in
order to tell him his opinion about the sinking of the
_Athenia_, in view of the continued agitation about it. However,
he had waited for the return of those of the submarines that had
been employed in waging war against merchant ships at the time
in question and which might possibly be concerned, in order to
receive reports about their activity personally. He repeated
most emphatically that the sinking of the _Athenia_ was not
caused by a German submarine. The ship nearest to the place of
the incident was at the time actually situated about 170 sea
miles away from the place of the sinking. Besides this, the
instructions as to how the commanders were to wage war against
merchant shipping, had after all been published. Up to date, in
no case had these instructions been even slightly disregarded.
On the contrary, an American captain reported a short time
before about the particularly courteous and chivalrous behavior
of the submarine commanders.’”
Well, now, it is clear from that, is it not, that the German Foreign
Office was most anxious to cover up this matter of the _Athenia_ as best
it could; was it not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: No; there was nothing to be covered up.
MAJOR JONES: When you discovered at the end of September that in fact it
was the _U-30_ that had sunk the _Athenia_, there was then a good deal
to be covered, was there not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that I stated already yesterday that I had
heard nothing to that effect.
MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you did not know at the end of
September, on the return of the _U-30_, that the _U-30_ had in fact sunk
the _Athenia_?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not remember that in any way at all.
MAJOR JONES: When did you first discover that the _U-30_ had sunk the
_Athenia_?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: As far as I remember, not at all during the war.
MAJOR JONES: But I understood you to say yesterday that you thought that
the publication in the _Völkischer Beobachter_, accusing Mr. Winston
Churchill of sinking the _Athenia_, was a piece of perverse imagination;
is that right?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Completely.
MAJOR JONES: Are you really saying to the Tribunal that—though you were
in a responsible job—are you saying to the Tribunal that you did not
discover the true facts about the _Athenia_ until the end of the war,
when you were directly concerned in the Foreign Office with this matter?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I told you already yesterday what I know about this. It
seems, does it not, that it was realized later by the Navy that the
sinking of the _Athenia_ was due to the action of a German submarine,
but I cannot at all remember that I or the Foreign Office were informed
of this fact.
MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder took no steps to correct
the information that had been passed to the American diplomatic
representatives, did he?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not recall at all that Admiral Raeder advised me or
the Foreign Office of the fact.
MAJOR JONES: Now, with regard to the Defendant Von Neurath.
If it please the Tribunal, I am not proposing to question the witness as
to the earlier diplomatic history, as this Tribunal has indicated that
it is desirable to reserve the matter for the defendants as they go into
the witness box later.
[_Turning to the witness._] But I want to ask you a general question.
What was the earliest date at which responsible officials of the Foreign
Office, like yourself, first realized that Hitler intended to wage
aggressive war?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: That the foreign policy of Hitler’s Government was a
dangerous one I realized clearly for the first time in May 1933; the
fact that an aggressive war was planned, perhaps, in the summer of 1938,
or at least that the course pursued in foreign policy might very easily
lead to war.
MAJOR JONES: Already in April 1938, the foreign political situation was
so tense that you sent a special memorandum to all German diplomatic
representatives dealing with the situation—the critical situation of
Germany.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: That may be. May I be permitted to read the document?
MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at Document Number 3572-PS, which is a
memorandum of the 25th of April 1938, signed by yourself, and a copy of
which was sent to all the German diplomatic representatives. It will be
Exhibit GB-478. That document reads:
“Since the work in the field of preparation for the mobilization
has made further progress within Germany in the Armed Forces and
in all civil administrations including the Foreign Office, it is
necessary now that in the case of government offices abroad
corresponding measures also be taken in their area of
jurisdiction without delay.”
And then there follows a series of instructions as to the actions that
are to be taken on the commencement of the period of crisis, or of
actual mobilization, and there is an insistence in the last paragraph
but one:
“I request the heads of offices, without waiting for further
instructions, to start considering now the measures to be taken
in their sphere of activity in the case of an emergency. In the
interest of absolute secrecy it must be observed strictly that
the number of people informed remains as restricted as
possible.”
That suggests, does it not, that as early as April 1938 you were
conscious of the imminent approach of actual mobilization; is that so?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: May I ask, is this document really dated the year 1938,
or is it 1939? I cannot quite distinguish the date.
MAJOR JONES: It is dated the 25th of April 1938.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Well, that may be.
MAJOR JONES: Now, you yourself were opposed to Hitler’s aggressive
foreign policy, were you not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I did not quite understand your question.
MAJOR JONES: You yourself were opposed to Hitler’s aggressive foreign
policy, were you not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I personally, completely.
MAJOR JONES: Did you endeavor to persuade the Defendant Von Neurath also
to oppose Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Herr Von Neurath was not Foreign Minister at that time.
MAJOR JONES: But he continued to be a very important functionary of the
Nazi State, did he not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that his influence in that period was even
smaller than before; but I kept in touch with him, and I think I agreed
with his opinion and he with mine.
MAJOR JONES: And yet he continued to serve the Nazi State, in
particular, in a territory which was acquired as a result of this policy
of aggression; is that not so?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I should be grateful if this question would be put to
Herr Von Neurath rather than to me.
MAJOR JONES: If you please. Now, you were in Italy and in Rome, were you
not, in March of 1944?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.
MAJOR JONES: You have given me some evidence as to the behavior of the
German forces in Italy. Were you in Rome at the time of the massacres in
the Hadrian Cave? You remember the incident, Witness, do you not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.
MAJOR JONES: When 325 Italians were murdered and 57 Jews were thrown in
as a bit of makeweight. You were there when that happened, were you not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe it was 320 prisoners who were murdered in this
cave which you just mentioned.
MAJOR JONES: Yes. Were you consulted about that matter?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: No.
MAJOR JONES: That was an action by German forces, was it not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe by the German Police, and not by the German
Armed Forces.
MAJOR JONES: And you know, Witness, that there were many murders of that
kind carried out by the SS during the period of German activity in
Italy, do you not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not know about many murders having taken place, but
I believe that the German Police were quite capable of such things.
MAJOR JONES: You know that they left a record of terror and brutality
wherever they left their mark upon Italy; is that not so?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: The German Police, yes.
MAJOR JONES: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine?
DR. SIEMERS: I have no more questions, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I now call the witness Vice Admiral
Schulte-Mönting.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go ahead.
[_The witness Schulte-Mönting took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
ERICH SCHULTE-MÖNTING (Witness): Erich Schulte-Mönting.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, please tell us briefly what positions you held
from 1925 to 1945, particularly in what positions you served immediately
under Admiral Raeder.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From 1925 to 1928 I was naval adjutant to
Reichspräsident Hindenburg and, as such, simultaneously second adjutant
to the Chief of the Naval Command Staff. Consequently my first
collaboration with Raeder dates back to 1928.
From 1929 until 1933 I had several front commands. From 1933 to 1937 I
was first adjutant to Raeder. From 1937 to 1939 I had several front
commands. From 1939 to 1943 I was Admiral Raeder’s Chief of Staff; and
up to 1944 I remained Admiral Dönitz’ Chief of Staff. In January 1944 I
was naval commander in southern France until the invasion; subsequently
commanding general in North Trondheim. After the collapse I was employed
for some months with the British Navy in winding up activities. Then in
the autumn I was interned in a camp for generals in England.
DR. SIEMERS: Please tell me, if you can remember, in which month of 1939
you started to work with Raeder.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The first of January 1939.
DR. SIEMERS: Can you tell us briefly anything about Raeder’s prestige as
a navy expert, especially abroad? I mean only with regard to technical
naval questions.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I believe that through the many years of service I
had with Raeder, and the many conversations I had with foreigners, I
have been able to form some idea. After all, Raeder was head of the Navy
for 15 years. He was known, or rather had a name, as a naval officer and
as Chief of Staff of the last Commander-in-Chief of the German Imperial
Navy, Admiral Hipper, the opponent of the famous British Admiral Beatty
in the Skagerrak battle. He was known...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you kindly observe that light. When the
yellow light goes on, you are talking too fast. When the red light goes
on, you must stop.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He was known through his literary activity at the time
of the “Tirpitz Era,” when he edited the _Nautikus_, and later, after
the first World War, through his two works on cruiser warfare in the
last World War, for which he received an honorary doctor’s degree and
which, I should say, gained him a reputation among experts.
DR. SIEMERS: The defendant is accused of building up the Navy with the
intention of carrying on an aggressive war, and this even after the
Treaty of Versailles was already in force.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is not correct. Never in all my conversations
which I had with Raeder was the thought—much less the word—of an
aggressive war mentioned. I believe that all his actions and his
directives contradict this.
DR. SIEMERS: Were there possibly any ideas of a strategic nature under
consideration, while the Versailles Treaty was in force, with a view to
an aggressive war?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Never.
DR. SIEMERS: What was the basic reason for the maneuvers held by the
Navy from the years 1932 until 1939?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: They were held exclusively with a view to the security,
protection, and defense of the coastal waters and the coast itself.
DR. SIEMERS: Was a war with England taken as a basis for any of these
maneuvers between 1932 and 1939?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that was never made a basis, and I believe that
would have appeared impossible and unreasonable to every naval officer.
I remember that even at the beginning of the year 1939 Raeder issued a
directive to the front commanders to hold maneuvers, in which he
excluded a maneuver directed against England as an impossibility. It was
forbidden to carry out that maneuver at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, it is now confirmed, as you know, that the Navy in
the twenties, with the knowledge of the then parliamentary government,
violated the Treaty of Versailles. These questions have been discussed a
great deal here, therefore, we can be brief.
I should like to ask you generally: Is it possible from these
violations, which are known to you, to deduce aggressive intentions?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I consider that is completely out of the question.
The violations were so insignificant and were based so exclusively on
protection and defense that I think it is impossible to construe them as
aggressive intentions.
DR. SIEMERS: Can you give us briefly a few instances or name a few cases
where violations took place?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, they were limited to the installation of
coastal batteries, antiaircraft batteries, the procuring of mines and
similar things, all of which were exclusively for the purpose of defense
or protection.
DR. SIEMERS: Did these violations of the Treaty of Versailles—or, shall
we say, the slight deviations—become known to the Inter-Allied
Commission in whole or in part, and did that commission partly overlook
these things because they were really trifles?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I would say it was an open secret.
DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you, Admiral, to pause between question and
answer so that the interpreters can keep up. Just pause a moment after
my questions before you reply. May I ask you to repeat the answer to my
question with regard to the commission?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I would say that it was an open secret. It was just
passed by.
DR. SIEMERS: As proof that these violations of the treaty were made with
the intention of waging aggressive war the Prosecution has several times
presented the book by Post Captain Schüssler entitled _The Navy’s Fight
against Versailles_. It is Document C-156. I will have this document
submitted to you in the original. In order to save time and not to
burden the Tribunal again with details—I do not want to go into
details—I shall just ask you: What do you know about this book, and
what caused it to be written at all? When was it written and what is
your general opinion about it?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I know this book. It came about as a result of the
attacks of the National Socialist regime in the years 1934 and 1935,
which blamed the preceding government and the Navy for not having done
enough in the past to arm the nation and for not even having exhausted
the possibilities of the Treaty of Versailles. Consequently, the idea
arose at that time of publishing a sort of justification. This brochure
is to be considered in that light; a sort of justification for, I might
say, sins of omission.
This booklet was later never actually published, or rather it was
withdrawn from circulation because it was, I might say, a rather poor
attempt, for, after all, it contains no challenging points which might
be classified as rearmament.
DR. SIEMERS: Was this booklet distributed within the Navy later on?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. As I said, it was withdrawn from the circles which
had already had it and it was also severely criticized.
DR. SIEMERS: Was the book withdrawn on Raeder’s orders?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe so, yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Through this book and another document, by Assmann, a
charge has been brought concerning the known endeavors made with a
construction firm in Holland. And it was also said yesterday that, by
order of Admiral Raeder, U-boats were built for Germany in Finland and
in Spain. Is that correct?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is not correct. The U-boats which were designed by
the Dutch firm, and which were built abroad, were not built for the
German Navy, but for foreign countries.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know for whom they were built? Who received the boat
which was built in Finland?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe Turkey received one, and one went to Finland.
DR. SIEMERS: Then the ships were constructed for foreign orders and for
a foreign country?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: What advantages at all did the Navy have from their
collaboration in the construction?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We were only interested in keeping alive the
experiences gained in U-boat warfare during the last World War.
Consequently the Navy was interested in seeing that constructors of
U-boats continued along those lines.
DR. SIEMERS: In your opinion, was that prohibited according to the
Treaty of Versailles?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I know of no paragraph which prohibits our activity
in foreign countries along those lines.
DR. SIEMERS: In the beginning of February 1933 Admiral Raeder made his
first naval report to Hitler. Do you know what Hitler, on that occasion,
gave Raeder as the basis for rebuilding the Navy?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I remember it exactly, because it was the first
report which the then Chief of the Naval Command Staff, Admiral Raeder,
made to the Reich Chancellor Hitler.
Hitler said to Raeder that the basis of his future policy was to live in
peace with England and that he intended to demonstrate that by trying to
conclude a naval agreement with England. In this he wanted the German
Navy to be kept relatively small. He wished to recognize Britain’s naval
superiority because of her position as a world power. He would
accordingly suggest an appropriate ratio of strength. He wanted an
understanding with regard to the construction of our Navy; and we should
take these, his political points of view, into consideration. Raeder was
impressed with the statements, for they were completely in accordance
with his own basic attitude.
DR. SIEMERS: Within the framework of this policy the German-British
Naval Agreement was then concluded in 1935. Was the Navy as a whole and
Raeder in particular pleased with this agreement, or did they see
certain disadvantages in it?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder and the Navy were very pleased with this
agreement, although we had to impose voluntarily upon ourselves severe
limitations for a certain length of time. By this agreement, in
comparison with the Washington conference, I should say we ranged among
the smallest sea powers. In spite of that, this agreement was generally
welcomed, because friendly relations with the British Navy were desired,
and it was believed that if we followed a wise and moderate policy,
England in return would show her appreciation.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know whether at that time Hitler as well approved of
the agreement in that form and was pleased about it?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I can affirm that. Raeder and I happened to be
together with Hitler in Hamburg the day this agreement was concluded,
and Hitler said to Raeder when this fact was reported to him:
“This is the happiest day of my life. This morning I received
word from my doctor that my throat trouble is insignificant, and
now this afternoon I receive this very gratifying political
news.”
DR. SIEMERS: You have already stated, Admiral, that the naval agreement
was welcomed by the Navy. You will recall that in the year 1937 a
modified naval agreement was concluded with England. Was the attitude of
the Navy to that question still the same at that time?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, absolutely. The Naval Agreement of 1937 brought
merely one, I might say, additional clause. This was for an exchange of
information; and we had also reached an agreement with the British Navy
with regard to a fixed U-boat tonnage. We had no reason...
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, referring to the U-boat tonnage, I remember the
1935 agreement: 100 percent of the British U-boat tonnage; Germany
limited herself to 45 percent, but reserved the right to increase the
tonnage up to possibly 100 percent, in which case she must, however,
notify England and discuss it with the British Admiralty.
Was this notification about the increase to 100 percent given, and if
so, when and in what way?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: After we had reached 100 percent, Admiral Cunningham
was in Berlin and on that occasion the fact was discussed once more.
Whether a written confirmation was made in addition I no longer recall.
I take it for granted because that was the purpose of the agreement of
1937. On the occasion of his visit in December 1938, Admiral Cunningham
explicitly gave Britain’s agreement to the final 100 percent equality in
U-boats. That is the way I, or rather all of us, interpreted his visit.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember whether there was a special conversation,
or a conversation between Admiral Cunningham and Raeder, on the occasion
of this visit, in which Admiral Cunningham discussed generally the
relations between the German and the British Navy, and between Germany
and England?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I had the personal impression that Cunningham and
Raeder parted on very friendly terms. At Cunningham’s departure there
was a breakfast for a rather limited circle, and on that occasion
Cunningham expressed his pleasure at the conclusion of the naval
agreement, concluding his speech with a toast to the effect that now all
these questions had been settled at last, and it was to be hoped that in
the future there would be no war between our navies.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this incident?
DR. SIEMERS: December 1938. I believe that is correct, Admiral?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As far as I remember, December 1938.
DR. SIEMERS: I remember the date from the testimony given by Admiral
Raeder. I myself knew only that it took place in 1938.
THE PRESIDENT: What Admiral Cunningham is it?
DR. SIEMERS: I do not know, I am not a naval expert. Perhaps Admiral
Schulte-Mönting can tell us.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not understand the question, Doctor.
DR. SIEMERS: Which Admiral Cunningham is that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The present Lord Cunningham. The elder of the two.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that it must have been on 30
or 31 December 1938, as far as we, or rather as far as Raeder recalls.
[_Turning to the witness._] From 1933 until 1939 was Raeder confident
that Hitler would not start a war?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. Raeder was completely confident of that. As proof
of this I may say that actually nothing was changed in our building
program within that period. That would have been necessary if one had
had to prepare oneself, at least mentally, for an armed conflict.
DR. SIEMERS: In what respect would the building program have had to be
changed if one had wanted to wage an aggressive war?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It would have been necessary to give priority at least
to the U-boat building program.
DR. SIEMERS: Was it clear to you and to the leading naval officers that
a real aggressive war started by Germany would perforce result in a war
with England?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. The knowledge of this fact is proof in my opinion
that a war of aggression was not planned.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, now in 1938 and 1939 incidents took place which
perhaps justified a certain amount of skepticism. I should like to
remind you of the crisis in the autumn of 1938 concerning the
Sudetenland which almost led to war, which was then prevented only at
the last moment through the Munich Agreement. I should like to call your
attention specifically to the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia
in March of 1939, which was contradictory to the Munich Agreement.
Now, what was the attitude of Raeder to this incident, which you must
know as you spoke to him practically every day.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As Hitler had stated expressly at Munich that he was
interested only in the German areas of Czechoslovakia; and, even though
perhaps he seemed exceedingly determined to the outside world, was
actually willing to negotiate, Raeder and the leading circles in the
Navy believed that these things would be adjusted politically.
With the occupation of Czechoslovakia a great disquiet certainly did
arise among us. But we were firmly convinced that Hitler would not make
any exaggerated demands, and that he would be prepared to settle these
matters politically, because we could not imagine that he would expose
the German people to the danger of a second world war.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you know that before the agreement with Hacha was made,
under rather strange circumstances, a bombardment of Prague had
allegedly been threatened; or did Raeder know anything about that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not believe that Raeder knew anything about this.
I am hearing about it for the first time now.
DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall turn to the Document L-79. This is a speech
delivered by Hitler on 23 May 1939; that is the so-called “Little
Schmundt File.”
Mr. President, this is Exhibit USA-27, and is to be found in Document
Book Number 10, Page 74, of the British Delegation. I am submitting this
document to the witness.
[_Turning to the witness._] This speech delivered by Hitler on 23 May
1939 was recorded by the adjutant on duty, Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt.
As far as I know, Raeder, on the same day, discussed this speech with
you in detail. At that time you had been Chief of Staff for a period of
about 6 months. From your later activity are you familiar with the type
of recording which was customary for military speeches?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: This record can really not be considered a true
account. I have from this record...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, in the first place, your question was very
much leading. You did not ask him a question. You put into his mouth
what had happened. That is altogether wrong. You ought to have asked
him, if you wanted to prove a conversation he had with Raeder, whether
he did have a conversation with Raeder. You have told him that he had a
conversation with Raeder. The purpose of examination is to ask
questions, and then he could tell us if he had a conversation with
Raeder. He cannot tell us whether this is a true account or a true form
of the account when he was not at the meeting himself.
DR. SIEMERS: I wish to thank the High Tribunal, and I shall try to put
the questions properly. The witness...
THE PRESIDENT: Not only that, but the Tribunal cannot listen to this
witness’ account, or his opinion as to whether this is a true account of
a meeting at which he was not present.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, the witness, as Chief of Staff, has always
seen the exact minutes on important meetings. They were delivered to him
in accordance with the distribution list. Therefore, as this document is
of a decisive nature, I should like to determine whether
Schulte-Mönting, as Chief of Staff, received the minutes or whether he
just received knowledge of the contents through Admiral Raeder’s
immediate reporting. That was the purpose of my question.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, you mean you want to ask him whether
he ever saw this document. Yes, you may certainly ask him that. Ask him
if he saw the document.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Your Honor, but I believe the answer of
the witness was lost in the interpretation, and if I am correct...
THE PRESIDENT: Never mind about his answer; the question is what
question you are to put to him, and he can answer whether he ever saw
the document.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I shall put that question.
Admiral, did you get to see this document at the time?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I am just seeing it now for the first time, here in
Nuremberg.
DR. SIEMERS: How did you hear about the contents of the speech of 23
May?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder informed me fully, as a matter of principle,
after every speech or conference, confidential or otherwise. Immediately
after the speech, Raeder gave me his impressions which are in
contradiction to these so-called minutes. Raeder did not have this, I
might say, exaggerated bellicose impression which is apparent in this
document. But, on the other hand...
THE PRESIDENT: The witness must tell us what Raeder said to him. That is
what I told you before. He may tell us what Raeder said to him.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I should like you to tell us just what Raeder said
to you.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder told me that Hitler in his speech said there was
a prospect of a future conflict with Poland, and that this was in
contradiction to those things which he had discussed with him alone.
That the speech in itself was contradictory, was the impression he
expressed to me at that time. He also told me that after the speech he
had had a conversation with Hitler alone during which he called his
attention to the contradictions contained in the speech. At the same
time he reminded Hitler of what he had told him previously, namely that
he would settle the Polish case under all circumstances in a peaceful
way; and now he was considering a warlike solution possible. Hitler, he
said, had reassured him and had told him that politically he had things
firmly in hand. Then when Raeder asked him, or rather called his
attention to this contradiction and asked him just what he really
intended to do, Hitler had answered, Raeder told me, the following:
“I, Hitler, have three ways of keeping secrets. The first, when
we two speak alone; the second, when I, Hitler, keep them to
myself; the third, for problems of the future, which I do not
think out to an end.”
Raeder called his attention to the impossibility of a warlike conflict.
To that, according to Raeder, Hitler replied:
“It is as if you and I had agreed on a settlement of one mark.
Now, I, Hitler, have already paid you 99 pfennig. Do you think
that because of this last 1 pfennig you would take me to court?”
And Raeder said “No.”
“You see”—Hitler said to Raeder—“I have got what I want by
political means, and I do not believe that because of this last
political question”—the solution of the Polish Corridor, as we
called it—“we will have to anticipate a war with England.”
DR. SIEMERS: And that was in a conversation between Hitler and Raeder
after this speech had been made?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That took place after this speech.
THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with regard to the minutes which I have shown you,
I have one final question: Did you personally, as Chief of Staff, also
receive and read all minutes which were sent to Raeder?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, as a rule I saw all minutes and reports before
they were given to Raeder.
DR. SIEMERS: Was Admiral Reader of the opinion—excuse me, I should like
to put the question differently.
What was Raeder’s point of view concerning the Navy and politics?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder’s opinion was that we, the Navy, had nothing to
do with politics. He adopted that attitude as an order and a trust
received from the old Reich President, Von Hindenburg, who, when
appointing Raeder to be head of the Navy, imposed that as a duty upon
him.
DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Norway. What were the reasons which induced
Raeder, in September and October 1939, to consider a possible occupation
of Norway?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The reasons were the reports which came from various
sources about alleged intentions of an occupation of Norway by the
Allies. These reports came from the following sources: First, Admiral
Canaris, who was the chief of our intelligence service. He reported to
Raeder, in my presence, once a week, the information that had come in.
Secondly, the reports that came from the naval attaché in Oslo,
Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, which indicated that rumors were increasing
that the Allies intended to drag Scandinavia into the war in order to
prevent, if possible, the iron ore exports from Sweden to Germany. We
did not consider these reports altogether impossible, because, as
documentary evidence from the last World War proves, Churchill had
seriously considered the occupation of Norway.
DR. SIEMERS: Was there a further source for reports of that kind?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Admiral Carls, the Commander-in-Chief of Group North,
had received similar reports which he passed on orally and in writing.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember any details from these reports which you
could give us quite briefly?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. There were reports concerning the presence of
British air crews in Oslo, allegedly posing as civilians. There were
reports about Allied officers making surveys of Norwegian bridges,
viaducts, and tunnels all the way to the Swedish border, which was taken
as an indication that the transportation of heavy material and equipment
was planned. And last but not least there were reports about a secret
mobilization of Swedish troops because of the alleged danger to the ore
areas.
DR. SIEMERS: What danger arose for Germany on account of that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If Norway were to have been actually occupied, the
conduct of the war in the North Sea would have become almost impossible,
and it would have been very difficult in the Baltic Sea. The ore imports
most probably would have been stopped. The danger from the air would
have become terrible for north Germany and the eastern territories. In
the long run the North Sea and the Baltic would have been blocked
completely, which eventually would have led to the total loss of the
war.
DR. SIEMERS: What did Admiral Raeder do on the basis of these
considerations?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He reported to Hitler about his misgivings and called
his attention to the dangers.
DR. SIEMERS: When was that report made?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If I remember correctly, in the autumn of ’39.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, until the adjournment, will you go very
slowly because, owing to the power of the electrical recording being
off, what is happening here in Court is impossible to take and therefore
we have to rely solely upon the shorthand notes which cannot be checked
back against the electrical recording. Do you understand? Therefore I
want you to go rather more slowly than usual.
DR. SIEMERS: When was the conference between Hitler and Raeder in which
Raeder for the first time pointed out these dangers?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In October 1939.
DR. SIEMERS: According to the War Diary that conference took place,
which of course you cannot remember offhand, on 10 October. At any rate
you probably mean that conference.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler then, as a result of that conference, make a
final decision?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, in no way at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Did discussions about that subject then take place
continually between Hitler and Raeder?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. No further discussions along that line took place
then until perhaps the end of the year. Only when the reports which I
mentioned before were received in increasing numbers was that subject
taken up again.
DR. SIEMERS: Is it known to you that in December 1939 Quisling came to
Berlin and also talked with Raeder?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that is known to me, and I took part in that
meeting.
DR. SIEMERS: What did Quisling tell Raeder?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Quisling came on a recommendation from Rosenberg and
said he had important news of a military and political nature. He
confirmed, more or less, the things which we knew already.
DR. SIEMERS: Were only the military dangers discussed in this
conference?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Only these things were discussed; the conference was
very short.
DR. SIEMERS: No political questions were discussed?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Raeder met Quisling for the first time?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: On the occasion of that visit.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have at that time any close connections with
Rosenberg?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, he knew him casually, having just seen him a few
times.
DR. SIEMERS: Had Rosenberg informed Raeder before about the relations
between Rosenberg and Quisling?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not to my knowledge.
DR. SIEMERS: What did Raeder do when Quisling confirmed the reports
received from Canaris and other sources?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As the things we suspected were confirmed from Norway,
Raeder considered this so serious that he went immediately to Hitler.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you also know what he suggested to Hitler?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Hitler wanted to talk to Quisling himself.
DR. SIEMERS: And that took place?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it did.
DR. SIEMERS: Was a final decision made then concerning Norway, in
December 1939?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Hitler directed that as a countermeasure,
theoretical preparations should be made for a German landing in Norway.
The order, the final order, as far as I know was not given until March.
DR. SIEMERS: Was the landing in Norway an undertaking which you and
Raeder considered a risky one or was it considered absolutely safe to do
so?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Raeder and the gentlemen from the Naval Operations
Staff and also the front commanders considered that undertaking very
risky. I remember Churchill’s speech in Parliament when he said, after
he had been questioned about that matter, that he did not believe the
German Navy would undertake that risk in face of the British Navy.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Churchill made that statement,
approximately?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe it was between 7 and 9 April.
DR. SIEMERS: 1940?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: What was your estimate at the Naval Operations Staff of the
risks of losses?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder had told Hitler that he would have to reckon on
the possible complete loss of the fleet, and that if the operations were
carried out successfully he would have to be prepared for the loss of
about 30 percent of the forces used.
DR. SIEMERS: And how much was lost?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: About 30 percent.
DR. SIEMERS: In view of the risk of losing the entire fleet, was Raeder
at first in favor of that operation?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. He considered a neutral attitude on the part of
Norway as much better than having to take this risk.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have asserted that Raeder and the Naval
Operations Staff recommended the occupation of Norway out of the desire
for fame and conquest. What do you say about that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The desire for fame was not in Raeder’s character. The
plans for operations which came from his desk bore the mark of bold
daring, but also of thorough planning. One does not work out plans to
the minutest detail covering the distance from German ports up to
Narvik, which is about that from Nuremberg to Madrid, and one does not
use the Navy against a superior British fleet for the sake of fame.
Raeder had told the Naval Operations Staff and the front commanders that
he had to carry out that operation against all the rules of warfare
because there was a compelling necessity to do so.
DR. SIEMERS: When did the actual drafting of the military operation take
place at the Naval Operations Staff?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: February 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: During the period from December 1939 until March 1940 did
you continue to receive reports from the sources you have mentioned?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Did these later reports contain a clearer indication as to
the place of the landings, or did you not see the details about that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, they covered the areas between Narvik via Bergen
to Trondheim, from Bergen to Oslo.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder—excuse me, I want to put the question
differently: What was the basis which Raeder suggested to Hitler for the
relations between Germany and Norway?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: To that I would like to...
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me, I mean in the period after the operation was
carried out and Germany had occupied Norway.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder in speaking to Hitler advocated a policy of
peace. He suggested repeatedly that attempts should be made for peace
with Norway. He was in agreement in that respect with the German
Commander-in-Chief in Norway, Generaladmiral Böhm, while Terboven, who
was directing political matters, was of a somewhat different opinion.
DR. SIEMERS: Did serious conflicts arise in that respect between
Terboven and his civil administration on the one side, and Raeder and
Böhm and his colleague, Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, on the other?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, there were serious differences and quarrels all
the way up the line to Hitler. Hitler at that time told Raeder that he
could not make peace with Norway because of France.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said, “because of France.” Was it not possible
to make peace with France also, and what was Raeder’s attitude in that
regard?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder advocated the same thing concerning France.
DR. SIEMERS: And what did he say?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He tried to arrange a conference with Admiral Darlan in
an effort to forward these matters. He had pointed out to Hitler, when
the Atlantic Coast was fortified, that it would be better and more
practical to make peace with France than to make great though inadequate
sacrifices for defense. Hitler replied that he fully agreed but out of
consideration for Italy he could not conclude a peace treaty with
France.
DR. SIEMERS: Did the conversations between Raeder and Darlan take place?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, near Paris.
DR. SIEMERS: Were you present?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Admiral Schultze, the Commanding Admiral in France.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder tell you whether the results of the conversation
were favorable?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he told me about the very favorable results.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder report on that to Hitler?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: And in spite of that, Hitler refused?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Out of consideration for Mussolini.
DR. SIEMERS: According to your knowledge, did the Party or the
leadership of the SS through Heydrich attempt to fight Raeder?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Heydrich repeatedly attempted to bring Raeder and the
Navy into discredit with Hitler through defamatory remarks and by
spying, either by posting spies in the officers corps or the casinos, or
by misrepresenting or distorting news. Against these attacks, Raeder
defended himself tenaciously and successfully.
DR. SIEMERS: Why was the Party against Raeder?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is a question which is very difficult to answer. I
believe mainly because, first of all, there were differences in the
religious field. Many commanders before they put to sea for combat
turned to Raeder for help so that during their absence their relatives
would not have their religious freedom curtailed.
DR. SIEMERS: When did the first differences occur between Raeder and
Hitler, and during what period did Raeder ask for his dismissal?
THE PRESIDENT: We have had that from that defendant himself, have we
not? Raeder told us when he asked for it. No cross-examination about it.
DR. SIEMERS: Then may I ask you for what reasons Raeder remained?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First, because Hitler himself had asked him to stay,
and gave him assurances for the integrity of the Navy. Furthermore, at
that time, there were discussions about combining the Navy and the
merchant marine into one ministry and putting Party people into that
ministry. In that event we did not see a strengthening but a weakening
of our fighting force. Besides, during that period there occurred a gap
in the line of successors, due to illness and losses.
And last but not least, Raeder remained in the war out of a sense of
responsibility and patriotism.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you yourself ask Raeder to remain in office?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I had to ask Raeder frequently and very seriously.
I myself was once ordered by Hitler to come to the Reich Chancellery.
DR. SIEMERS: When was that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In the beginning of 1939, when he explained his
standpoint to me in a long conversation and asked me to convince Raeder
that he had to stay. Moreover, he enjoyed the confidence of the Navy.
The senior officers and officials of the Navy had asked me orally and in
writing to try to persuade Raeder not to leave his office prematurely.
Since 1928 he had led the Navy with a firm hand through all political
vicissitudes.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, may I return again to your conversation with
Hitler in the beginning of 1939? Did you speak with Hitler alone?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that was a private conversation of about an hour
and a half.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler tell you anything about his political plans on
that occasion?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No; not about political plans in the sense of what is
called politics, but he tried once more to bridge political differences
with Raeder. He told me one should not weigh each individual word of
his. His visitors were right, but only after they had left; he would put
forward records and witnesses; all he wanted was to appeal to the
emotions of his listeners and to stir them up to do their utmost, but
not to commit himself with words. In the future he promised he would try
to give the Navy independence in all technical questions.
DR. SIEMERS: You just said “not to weigh each individual word.” Admiral,
were the speeches of Hitler ever taken down accurately, that is, by
stenographers?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, but as far as I know only in the later part of the
war. Hitler was against having his words put on record, because everyone
who listened to him returned home with his own opinion. He himself did
not stick to his text; he thought out loud and wanted to carry his
listeners away, but he did not want his individual words to be taken
literally. I spoke about that to Raeder very frequently. We always knew
what was expected of us, but we never knew what Hitler himself thought
or wanted.
DR. SIEMERS: If Hitler did not want to be taken at his word, how did it
come about that he agreed in the war to have his speeches taken down by
stenographers?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I told you before that too many misunderstandings had
occurred, and that Hitler as well as those who reported to him believed
that everyone had convinced the other of his opinion. Thereupon they
started keeping minutes. The minutes kept up to then were personal
impressions of those who were not instructed to keep them but who did so
on their initiative.
THE PRESIDENT: What time is the witness speaking of? He said up to then
the minutes had been kept on the personal initiative of the person who
took them. What time is he speaking of?
DR. SIEMERS: From what time, according to your recollection, were these
minutes taken by the stenographers?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From 1942, I believe.
DR. SIEMERS: From 1942?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It might also be 1941. During the war, at any rate.
DR. SIEMERS: But your conversation with Hitler was in January 1939?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, January 1939.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what did the stenographic minutes look like later
on? Did you ever see them?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We repeatedly asked for excerpts from the minutes and
tried to compare them with the prepared text and they too contained
contradictions.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, I come to the period when Hitler prepared for war
against Russia, and I am going to show you the Directive Number 21, of
18 December 1940, concerning the Case Barbarossa.
Mr. President, that is Document Number 446-PS, Exhibit USA-31, in the
Document Book of the British Prosecution Number 10a, Page 247.
[_Turning to the witness._] The Prosecution have asserted that Raeder or
the Naval Operations Staff had taken part in the drafting of that
directive; is that correct?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. The Navy had nothing to do
with the drafting of that directive.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have any previous knowledge of Hitler’s plan to
attack Russia, before he received that directive?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, by an oral communication from Hitler to Raeder,
about the middle of August 1940—or October 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: October 1940. Did Raeder inform you about his conferences
with Hitler concerning Russia, and what attitude did he adopt in these
conferences?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder informed me fully, because the prospect of war
with Russia was much too serious to be taken lightly. Raeder opposed
most energetically any plan for a war against Russia; and, I should like
to say, for moral reasons because Raeder was of the opinion that the
pact with Russia should not be broken as long as the other side gave no
cause for it. That, as far as Raeder knew, was not the case in October.
That economic treaty—as we called it at that time—to our knowledge was
about 90 percent at the expense of the Navy. We gave Russia one heavy
cruiser, heavy artillery for battleships, artillery installations,
submarine engines, submarine installations, and valuable optical
instruments for use on submarines. Besides, Raeder was of the opinion
that the theater of operations should not be allowed to be carried into
the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea was our drill field, I might say. All our
recruits were trained there; all our submarine training took place in
the Baltic Sea.
We had already partly stripped the Baltic coast of batteries and
personnel for the purpose of protecting the Norwegian and the French
coasts. We had very small oil reserves at our disposal, the synthetic
oil production was not yet in full swing. The Navy had to turn over some
of its reserves to industry and agriculture. Consequently, Raeder was
strongly opposed to waging war against Russia.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the Prosecution believe that Raeder was only
opposed to the date set for the war against Russia and concludes this
from the War Diary in which actually the entries refer to the date. Is
that correct?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. After the receipt of Directive
21, called Barbarossa, Raeder approached Hitler again with reference to
the war against Russia, and also put down his thoughts in a memorandum.
He tried to convince Hitler of the following: Poland had been crushed,
France had been occupied, and, for military reasons, an invasion of
England was out of the question. He said clearly that now the time had
arrived when the further conduct of the war could not be decisive on the
Continent, but in the Atlantic. Therefore, he told him that he had to
concentrate all forces at his disposal on one objective: To hit the
strategic points of the Empire, especially the supply lines to the
British Isles in order to compel England to sue for negotiations or, if
possible, to make peace. He suggested, as has been mentioned before,
that the policy of peace with Norway should be pursued, peace with
France, and closer co-operation with the Russian Navy, such as was
provided for in the economic treaty, and the repurchase of submarine
equipment or submarines. He said that the decision or the date for a
decision no longer rested with us because we did not have the necessary
sea power and that in case of a long duration of the war the danger of
the participation of the United States had also to be considered; that
therefore the war could not be decided on the European continent and
least of all in the vastnesses of the Russian steppes. That point of
view he continued to present to Hitler as long as he was in office.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said at first that Raeder had protested, in
principle as you have expressed it, for moral reasons, that is, for
reasons of international law.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Why was not that entered into the War Diary when the other
reasons that you have mentioned can be found in the War Diary? At least
they are alluded to.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That I can answer, or at least give you an explanation.
Raeder, as a matter of principle, never criticized the political
leadership in the presence of the gentlemen of the Naval Operations
Staff or the front commanders. Therefore, he did not speak to me and the
others about the private conversations which he had with Hitler, except
when it was necessary for military reasons.
DR. SIEMERS: When were the preparations by the Navy, on the basis of
Directive 21 that you have in front of you, made? Do you remember that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe about 3 months later.
DR. SIEMERS: At any rate, certainly after the directive?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, after the directive.
DR. SIEMERS: Were they made on the basis of that directive?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: On the basis of that, yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Was that directive already a final order or was it just a
precautionary strategic measure?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my estimation it should not be considered as an
order, and that can be seen from Points IV and V.
DR. SIEMERS: In what way?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Point V says that Hitler was still waiting for reports
from commanders-in-chief. And Raeder still reported to Hitler after he
had received the directive.
DR. SIEMERS: Is Point IV, if you will look at it once more, also in
accordance with your opinion?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, absolutely. The words “precautionary measures” are
underlined.
DR. SIEMERS: Precautionary measures for what?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In case of war against Russia.
DR. SIEMERS: Well, I think, Admiral, since you have mentioned it
yourself, you should read the sentence which follows the words
“precautionary measures.”
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: “In case Russia should change her attitude, she is...”
THE PRESIDENT: You cannot argue with your own witness about the meaning
of the words. He has given his answer.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well.
[_Turning to the witness._] Was Raeder of the opinion, at any time, that
he had succeeded in dissuading Hitler from the unfortunate plans against
Russia?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. After he had made his report at that time, he
returned and said, “I believe I have talked him out of his plan.” And at
first we did have that impression because in the following months there
were no more conferences about it, to my knowledge, not even with the
General Staff.
DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you quite briefly then about Greece. According to
Document C-152, which I will have shown to you, Raeder made a report to
Hitler on 18 March 1941, in which he asked that the whole of Greece
should be occupied. What were the reasons that caused the High Command,
that is, Raeder and you, to make that suggestion?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: When Raeder asked for authorization, as it says here in
the War Diary, for the occupation of the whole of Greece, even in the
event of a peaceful settlement, we, according to my recollection, had
already been for 3 months in possession of the directive which was
concerned with the occupation of Greece, and when...
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. Was that Directive Number 20? I will have it
shown to you. Is that the one you mean?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, “Marita,” that is the one.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is Document Number 1541-PS, Exhibit
GB-13, in the Document Book of the British Prosecution 10a, Page 270.
That is Directive Number 20, Case Marita of 13 December 1940.
[_Turning to the witness._] Admiral, what caused Raeder, apart from that
point which Hitler had already explained, to ask that specific question
again in the month of March, that is to say, on 18 March?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: A British landing had already occurred in the south of
Greece a few days before.
DR. SIEMERS: Did this landing make it necessary to occupy the whole of
Greece?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, for strategic reasons, absolutely. The menace of
an occupation from the sea or from the air, or the formation of a Balkan
front against Germany, or the menace from the air to the oil fields, had
to be eliminated under all circumstances. May I only remind you of the
Salonika operation in the first World War. I believe that was a similar
situation.
DR. SIEMERS: Here again the Prosecution say this was governed by the
desire for conquest and fame. Is that correct?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I should like to answer that fame requires
achievements, and I do not know what the Navy could have conquered in
the Mediterranean. We did not have a single man or a single ship down
there; but Raeder, of course, for the strategic reasons I have
mentioned, had to advise Hitler in that direction.
DR. SIEMERS: Were breaches of neutrality on the part of Greece known to
you before this time, before we occupied Greece?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We had been informed that in 1939, certain Greek
political and military circles had been in the closest connection with
the Allied General Staff. We knew that Greek merchantmen were in British
service. Therefore we were compelled to consider the Greek merchantmen
which sailed through the prohibited zone to England as enemy ships. And,
I believe, in the beginning of 1940, or the middle of 1940, we received
information that the Allies intended to land in Greece or to establish a
Balkan front against Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, as the last point in my questions dealing with
Russia, I should like to show you the document submitted by the Soviet
Prosecution, Document USSR-113. This document is a communication from
the Naval Operations Staff of 29 September 1941 to Group North, that is,
Generaladmiral Carls. Under II it states as to the result of a
conversation between Admiral Fricke and Hitler: “The Führer is
determined to make the city of St. Petersburg disappear from the face of
the earth.” Raeder has been accused of not having done anything to
oppose such a monstrous intention and has been accused because the Naval
Operations Staff passed on this communication. I ask you, Admiral, did
you know of this communication in 1941?
[_Turning to the President._] I beg your pardon, Mr. President, I should
like to remark that at this moment, I am sorry to say, I have no
photostatic copy of this document. I tried to procure it. I have this
very moment received it, and I should like to submit the photostatic
copy at this point, instead of the written copy.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: This seems to be the original which I have before me?
DR. SIEMERS: No, Admiral, it is a copy, an exact copy of the photostatic
copy with all paragraphs and names, made for my own special use.
Were you acquainted with this piece of writing in 1941?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not know it in 1941, it is submitted to me at
this moment for the first time.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you believe that Admiral Raeder saw this communication
before it was sent off, even though you yourself had not seen it?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That would have been a miracle. Communications which
were submitted to Admiral Raeder all went through my hands. They always
had the notation, either “the Commander-in-Chief has taken due note,”
and were initialed by me personally in order to certify this notation,
or “this order or this directive is to be submitted to the
Commander-in-Chief,” and in this case too my initials were affixed. This
order and this copy which you have just shown to me I have never seen
before; I am not acquainted with it; and I consider it impossible that
Admiral Raeder should have seen it, because on 29 September 1941 I was
in good health and exercising my duties in Berlin.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what do you know about this question of Leningrad
and the Navy?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I recall that at the so-called daily discussions
regarding the general situation one of the officers of the Naval
Operations Staff reported on the intentions of the Army regarding the
future of Leningrad—not Petersburg. Whereupon Raeder expressed the
desire that it be kept in mind during the operations that Leningrad
should, under all circumstances, fall intact into our hands, for he
needed shipyards and adjoining territory for naval construction; and he
wished that the Army be informed of the urgency of this desire, because
in view of the ever-increasing danger of air attacks, we intended to
shift part of our shipyard facilities to the East.
At that time we had already begun, if I remember correctly, to move
installations from Emden to the East and wanted, furthermore, as Raeder
wished, to evacuate Wilhelmshaven subsequently and move the
installations there as far to the East as possible. He emphasized
expressly that the city should also be left as undamaged as possible
because otherwise there would be no place for the workers to live. This
is all I can truthfully tell you about the case of Leningrad.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know that this wish of Raeder’s was rejected by
Hitler because he said it was not possible?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I do not recall that this case was taken up again.
For the operations in the North soon came to a standstill, I believe.
DR. SIEMERS: Did other high officers tell you anything at all about this
document?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I never heard anything about this document, nor did
I see any reason to discuss it with anyone.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, if it is agreeable to the Tribunal, I should
like to submit a document which was granted me, Exhibit Raeder-111,
because of its connection with this problem. It is to be found in my
Document Book 6, Page 435. It is an affidavit by Rear Admiral Hans
Bütow, dated 21 March 1946. I should like to read this document since it
is very brief.
THE PRESIDENT: What page is this?
DR. SIEMERS: Page 435 in Document Book 6, Exhibit Number Raeder-111. It
reads as follows:
“During the period from 20 June 1941 to 20 October 1941, namely,
the period to which Document USSR-113, (1), UK-45, refers, I was
stationed in Finland as Naval Commander. I was under
Generaladmiral Carls, the Commander-in-Chief of Group North. I
declare that the document in question, USSR-113, (1), UK-45, a
communication of 29 September 1941 sent by the Naval Operations
Staff to Group North, and its contents have never come to my
knowledge, as it doubtless would have if Generaladmiral Carls
had passed on the letter to the offices subordinate to him. As
far as I know, no one else in my command received this
communication.
“I myself first obtained knowledge of this order of Hitler’s in
November 1945 on the occasion of a conversation with Dr.
Siemers, the defense counsel for Admiral Raeder.
“Other officers, especially other naval commanders, have never
spoken to me about this order. It is thus clear that the other
commanders likewise had no knowledge of this order.”
Then there is the certification and the signature of the senior naval
judge before whom this affidavit was made.
Admiral, then I should like to turn to a new topic, the alleged war of
aggression which Raeder is supposed to have planned against America. Did
Raeder at any time try to instigate Japan to a war against America?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, never. We never had any military discussions with
Japan at all before her entry into the war. Quite on the contrary, he
warned Hitler against war with America in view of England’s naval
superiority and her co-operation with America.
DR. SIEMERS: For what reasons did you, Raeder, and the High Command
especially, warn Hitler?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, for the reasons which I outlined before,
reasons of over-all strategy which motivated Raeder during the entire
course of the war. Raeder considered the enemy on the sea primarily, and
not on land. If the largest sea power in the world were added to
England, which was already superior, then the war would have taken on
unbearable proportions for us.
Besides, through the reports of our naval attaché in Washington, Vice
Admiral Witthöft, Raeder was very well informed about the tremendous
potential at the disposal of the United States.
I might also say with reference to the conversion of the normal economy
into a war economy, that the tremendous outlay of shipyards and
installations, as Witthöft stated a few months before the war, permitted
the construction of a million tons of shipping each month. These figures
were very eloquent and were naturally at the same time a terrible
warning to us not to underestimate the armament potential of the United
States.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution believes it must draw a contrary conclusion
from the fact that Raeder on 18 March 1941, according to the War Diary,
proposed that Japan should attack Singapore.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my opinion, that was an absolutely correct measure
and a correct proposal, which was in line with Raeder’s reasoning. He
was interested in dealing blows to England’s important strategic
centers. That he tried to ease our situation is understandable and
self-evident. But at no time did he propose that Japan should enter into
a war against America, but rather against England.
DR. SIEMERS: Were there any discussions about these strategic questions
at that time between you and Raeder on the one hand and Japanese
military authorities on the other?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I have already stated that before Japan’s entry
into the war no military discussions with Japan had ever taken place.
The Japanese attitude was very reserved.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder ever discuss the fact that Japan should attack
Pearl Harbor?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. We heard about this for the first time over the
radio.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, during the time of your activity in the High
Command of the Navy or during your activity as a commanding admiral at
Trondheim did you have any knowledge about the treatment of Allied
prisoners of war by the German Navy?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I might reply that I know of no case in which Allied
prisoners of war, as long as they were under the control of the Navy,
were treated other than properly and chivalrously. I could refer to the
testimony given by the English commander of the midget U-boat, which
attacked the _Tirpitz_ in the Alta Fjord, who after his return to
England from imprisonment, gave a press interview on the occasion of his
being awarded the Victoria Cross. In this interview he mentioned the
particularly chivalrous and correct treatment he had received at the
hands of the commander of the _Tirpitz_.
From my own command in Norway I could mention a case in which members of
the Norwegian resistance movement dressed in civilian clothing were
treated just as chivalrously and correctly. I had to investigate these
cases in the presence of British authorities, and the correctness of the
treatment became evident.
DR. SIEMERS: When did you have to investigate this at the order of the
British Military Government?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: After the capitulation.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, not the Military Government, but the
British Navy.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The British Navy at Trondheim, while I was a commanding
admiral.
DR. SIEMERS: And the cases which were investigated there, first by you
and then by the competent British admiral, were not contested?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Were not contested. The naval officer handed them over
to me for safekeeping, and I had to present the findings of the courts
of inquiry in writing.
DR. SIEMERS: And the result...
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The result was good, proper, and occasioned no
protests.
DR. SIEMERS: And the result was presented to the competent British
officer?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it was on his very order that I had to do it.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the case of the _Athenia_ has been dealt with here
in detail and is known to the Tribunal. Therefore, in order to save
time, I should like merely to touch this case in passing. I should like
you to tell me: Did the High Command know, did you and Raeder know, at
the beginning of September 1939 that the _Athenia_ had been sunk by a
German U-boat?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. The Commander of U-boats reported on the 3d that
the _Athenia_ could not have been sunk by a German U-boat since, if I
remember correctly, the nearest boat was about 70 nautical miles away.
DR. SIEMERS: When did you learn that a German U-boat had sunk the
_Athenia_?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe 2 or 3 weeks afterwards, after this U-boat
returned.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I should like to refer to a document,
according to which the date was 27 September.
[_Turning to the witness._] Do you know that a declaration had been made
by State Secretary Von Weizsäcker on 3, 4, or 5 September to the effect
that it was not a German U-boat? When it was established that it
actually had been a German U-boat, what did Raeder do about it?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The assumption that it had not been a German U-boat was
at first justified and State Secretary Von Weizsäcker therefore acted in
the best of faith, as did we. After this regrettable mistake became
known, Raeder reported this fact to Hitler. Hitler then gave the order
that he did not want the statement which had been made by the Foreign
Office denied. He ordered that the participants, that is those who knew,
should give their oath to remain silent until, I believe, the end of the
war.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you give your oath of silence?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I personally did not give my oath of silence, and
neither did Admiral Raeder. In the High Command we were the only ones, I
believe, with the exception of Admiral Fricke who had knowledge of that,
and we should probably have taken the oath.
DR. SIEMERS: At Hitler’s order you were obliged to administer an oath to
the others who knew about this?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I am of the opinion that it was the crew of the
U-boat, insofar as they knew about this mistake.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution accuses Admiral Raeder of not having gone
to Freiherr Von Weizsäcker to tell him that it actually was a German
U-boat and of not having said to the American naval attaché, “I am
sorry; it was a German U-boat after all.”
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Such thoughts occurred to us as well, but we thought
that any discrepancies which might arise and lead to political ill-humor
in America were to be avoided as much as possible. Stirring up this case
once more would have greatly aroused public feeling. I remember, for
instance, the _Lusitania_ case during the first World War. To have
stirred up this case again after a few weeks and to arouse public
opinion, and then to force entry into the war would have had little
sense.
DR. SIEMERS: And that was the train of thought which caused Hitler to
issue this decree?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It was the train of thought which we also shared.
DR. SIEMERS: You said it was not to be stirred up again but regrettably,
as you know, this case was stirred up again. On 23 October 1939 in the
_Völkischer Beobachter_ a very unfortunate article appeared with the
heading “Churchill Sinks the Athenia.” Do you remember that article?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, of course. That article was published without
Raeder’s knowledge and without the knowledge or complicity of the Navy.
Even today I do not know yet who the author of the article was. It
originated in the Propaganda Ministry, and Raeder and the rest of us in
the High Command of the Navy were most indignant, not so much because
this topic was being stirred up again, but rather because of the tenor
of the article for whether deliberately or unintentionally—we did not
know which it was—there was a misrepresentation.
We were obliged to keep silence. To what extent the Propaganda Ministry
had been informed about this matter by Hitler, we did not know. We also
had no opportunity to speak with the Propaganda Ministry about this case
and we were completely surprised when this article appeared several
weeks later in the _Völkischer Beobachter_. We were therefore deeply
indignant, especially Raeder, because it was fundamentally against his
principles that leading foreign statesmen be attacked in a caustic
manner; and, in addition, the facts were completely distorted. And
besides—this may also be important—this involved Raeder’s opponent
whom Raeder did not in the least wish to disparage before the German
public, for Raeder took him only too seriously; and this was, I believe,
no other than Churchill.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, one last question: Did the Propaganda Ministry call
you or Raeder up before this article appeared?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, no.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I should like to turn to the last question of my
examination. This is the last point.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is about the sixth final question you
have asked.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, the translation must have
been wrong. The previous question was the final question on the
_Athenia_ problem. Now, this is actually the final question which I wish
to put.
[_Turning to the witness._] The Prosecution accuses Admiral Raeder of
not supporting Generaloberst Freiherr Von Fritsch after the latter had
been exonerated and acquitted in court and accuses Raeder of not having
used his influence to reinstate Fritsch in office and restore his
dignity. Is that correct?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. Raeder gave me all the files
of the legal proceedings against Generaloberst Von Fritsch sometime in
the beginning of 1939 to be kept in the safe. At that time he told me
how the course of the proceedings had impressed him and also of the fact
that he had made Generaloberst Von Fritsch the offer of a complete
reinstatement, going so far as to have him reinstated in his previous
office. Von Fritsch thanked him for that and told him personally that he
would never assume his former office again, that he would not even
consider returning after what had happened, for which reason he was
requesting Raeder not to make any efforts in this direction.
Besides, Fritsch and Raeder were on good personal terms—to say that
they were friends is going perhaps too far, but I have often seen
Fritsch at Raeder’s house even after his dismissal.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel want to
ask any questions?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Schulte-Mönting, you just spoke
about the correct treatment of prisoners in connection with a U-boat
attack on the _Tirpitz_. Do you mean by that the attack in November 1943
in the Alta Fjord?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that is the one I mean.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it a two-man U-boat?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Whether it was a two-man or three-man U-boat, I do not
know, but it was a midget U-boat. Several U-boats attacked
simultaneously. Some of them were sunk, and the commander who
successfully, I believe, placed his magnetic mine was taken prisoner.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And this commander was treated according to
the Geneva convention?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Absolutely.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you first about the _Athenia_
episode. I take it you agree that the article in the _Völkischer
Beobachter_ was thoroughly dishonorable, lying, and discreditable.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I heard nothing at all in German.
MAJOR JONES: I will repeat my question. With regard to the _Athenia_—do
you hear me now?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.
MAJOR JONES: With regard to the _Völkischer Beobachter_ article on the
_Athenia_, do you agree that it was a thoroughly dishonorable
publication?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I agree that it was a dishonorable publication,
untrue and dishonorable.
MAJOR JONES: Perhaps if you keep your headphones on—I have a number of
questions to ask you, I am afraid—it might be more convenient for the
work we have to do.
And you say that the Defendant Raeder thought it was dishonorable?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he did as well.
MAJOR JONES: What action did he take to manifest his displeasure?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In this case he valued the interests of the State more
than a newspaper article. The interests of the State required that in
any event all complications with the United States were to be avoided.
MAJOR JONES: That appears to be a characteristic on the part of Raeder
that runs throughout the history from 1928 to 1943, that throughout he
put what he thought were the interests of the Nazi State before
conditions of morality, honor, and public decency, is that not so?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That I do not believe. I believe that in this he acted
consistently as a good patriot would act.
MAJOR JONES: You see, with regard to the invasion of Russia, for
example, you said to the Tribunal that on both moral and strategic
grounds, Raeder was against the invasion of Russia. Why did he not
resign?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: By way of reply I must mention first Hitler’s answer to
Raeder’s statements against a war with Russia. This answer was to the
effect that he saw no possibility of avoiding a conflict for the
following reasons:
First, because of the personal impression which he, Hitler, had received
from Molotov’s visit, which had taken place in the meantime. By “in the
meantime” I mean between the directive and the carrying through of the
directive.
Secondly, the fact that allegedly the economic negotiations had not only
been dragged out by the Russians but, as Hitler expressed it, had been
conducted with blackmail methods.
Thirdly, as he had been informed by the German General Staff. Russian
troop deployment had taken on such threatening proportions that he,
Hitler, could not wait for the first blow from the other side because of
the air threat to Brandenburg and the capital and to the Silesian
industry. Raeder then, of course, had to realize that he could not
refute these arguments or prove the opposite.