should like to add that I wrote those things under entirely different
conditions. I do not wish to go into details, and I never expected that
that would ever become public. These were notes for myself to help me
form my judgment later on. I also want to ask especially that what I
said about Generaloberst Jodl should also be read into the record, or
where it belongs, that is, right after the statement about Field Marshal
Keitel. With regard to Field Marshal Keitel, I should like to emphasize
that I intended to convey that it was his manner towards the Führer
which made it possible for him to get along with him for a long time,
because if anybody else had been in that position, who had a quarrel
with the Führer every day or every other day, then the work of the whole
of the Armed Forces would have been impossible.
That is the reason and the explanation of what I wanted to express by
that statement.
COL. POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution has no further questions to ask
the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, have you got the whole document before you?
Was that the original document you had before you?
RAEDER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: In your writing?
RAEDER: No, it is typewritten. But it is signed by me.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the document can be handed to Dr. Siemers.
Dr. Siemers, do you want to re-examine beyond putting in that document?
Have you any questions you want to ask in addition to putting in that
document?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, on account of the cross-examination made by Sir David
Maxwell-Fyfe, I should like to re-examine, and I should like to ask for
permission to do that after I have read this document, so that I can
also cover the document tomorrow in this connection.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, the thought occurs to me with respect to this
document—do I understand that the Tribunal will order copies to be
distributed to all of the Defense Counsel? There are matters with
respect to the defendants on which the Counsel might want to examine.
They might be surprised.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought it was fair that Dr. Siemers should see the
document.
MR. DODD: Yes. I have no objection to that. But my point is, that in the
document there is reference to defendants other than the defendant
represented by Dr. Siemers. And at a later date, if this document is not
made known to the others by the reading of it or by the turning over to
them in translated form, they may claim surprise, and lack of
opportunity to examine on it.
THE PRESIDENT: I think some photostatic copies of the document should be
made so that all the defendants referred to therein may be acquainted
with the terms of the document.
MR. DODD: I just thought I would make that suggestion.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 21 May 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIFTH DAY
Tuesday, 21 May 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand._]
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with reference to your examination yesterday, I
have to put the following questions to you in re-examination. Sir David
was talking about the fact that before 1933 you had carried out
rearmament behind the backs of the law-making bodies. I think that
question, as such, has been clarified; but there is one supplementary
question. On whom did it depend just what was submitted to the
Reichstag?
RAEDER: On the Reichswehrminister.
DR. SIEMERS: And who was the Reichswehrminister at that time?
RAEDER: He was a member of the government and my direct superior. I had
to submit everything to him which I wished to get.
DR. SIEMERS: And his name was Gröner, wasn’t it?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: May I draw the Tribunal’s attention to the extract from the
Constitution which I have recently submitted as Exhibit Number Raeder-3,
according to which Article 50 lays down that the Reich President gives
all orders and decrees even where the Armed Forces are concerned. For
their validity decrees require to be countersigned by the Chancellor or
the Minister concerned. By the act of countersigning responsibility is
accepted. In this, our case, the Reichswehrminister was the competent
Reich Minister; and anything that was done afterwards with reference to
the law-making bodies was a matter for the government to decide.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Sir David has submitted to you Document
C-17. It is the index of a book written by Colonel Scherff, called _The
History of the German Navy from 1919 to 1939_. Was this book ever
written?
RAEDER: As far as I know, only the index was compiled. I assume that if
anything had been written, then it would have been submitted to me a
long time ago, but I never heard of that at all.
DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that the American Prosecution, at
the time when they submitted the document, pointed out that as far as
they knew the book was not written.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I believe that it is very difficult to
base accusations on an index, but I want you to tell me, Defendant, when
did you learn of this index?
RAEDER: It became known to me during my first interrogation by an
American prosecutor.
DR. SIEMERS: Furthermore, Document D-854, which is GB-460, was put to
you yesterday. May I come back to one question put by Sir David. On Page
1 Sir David had been reading as follows:
“But if—as was stated—in nearly all spheres of armament where
the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was violated in
the letter and all the more in the spirit—or at least its
violation was prepared—a long time before the 16th of March
1935....”
Then Sir David asked you: “Do you want to say that this is untrue?” You
answered but you did not quite finish your reply, at least it never
became quite clear what you said in the German or the English record. I
want you to tell me why you are of the opinion that Assmann was not
quite right in this respect?
RAEDER: It is an utter exaggeration. First of all, violations—as have
been proved here in detail—were mostly of a very minor nature; and only
the number of deviations may have given the impression that there were
many violations. Secondly, in its essential points, we never actually
filled the quotas allowed by the Versailles Treaty; in fact, we remained
below the figures granted. Besides, only defense measures are involved,
very primitive defense measures—Assmann’s representations are just a
great exaggeration.
DR. SIEMERS: What you are trying to say, therefore, is that Assmann’s
way of putting it “in practically every sphere of rearmament” is wrong?
RAEDER: Yes, probably Document C-32 will have led him to that conclusion
because there were so many points. However, on closer examination they
turn out to be very minor points.
DR. SIEMERS: With regard to the important points of rearmament, that is
to say construction of large ships, the Navy did not violate the Treaty,
did it?
RAEDER: No, no.
DR. SIEMERS: By repeating it three times, Sir David emphasized the fact
that you had a great deal of confidence in Assmann. I have nothing to
say against it, but beyond that I would like to put a supplementary
question to you: Did you have that much confidence in him, that in your
opinion Assmann could pass a proper legal judgment? Was he a lawyer?
RAEDER: No. Assmann was a naval officer who was not used at the front
any more. He was a very clever writer who had written a few volumes
about the first World War. He wrote very well, but even the volumes on
the naval warfare during the first World War were corrected a great deal
by the persons concerned; but against him and his ability to write
history nothing can be said.
DR. SIEMERS: I think you remember this document from yesterday. Is it a
final historical work? Is it a final and corrected edition?
RAEDER: No. So far as I know, he had not got that far. He was making
summaries and extracts from war diaries and records.
DR. SIEMERS: Assmann has written (Document D-854, GB-460):
“If, in this light, there were plans for ‘preparing the
construction’ in 1935 of twelve 275-ton submarines, six 550-ton
submarines, and four 900-ton submarines, then one will have to
consider the strategic points of view valid at that time.”
Added together 22 were planned, and for the following year 14
submarines—by no means built, just planned. Are these figures correct
in your opinion?
RAEDER: They are correct in my opinion. The only thing I am not sure
about is the 900-ton type; I cannot quite explain that. I cannot
remember that at that time we were building 900-ton boats. Apart from
the 250-ton type, our first types were 550-tons, and only then did the
740-ton boats come. Perhaps he is thinking of those when he says
900-tons. We did not actually build 900-ton boats.
DR. SIEMERS: On Page 158, Sir David has read to you the following
sentence, which I want to repeat because it needs clarification.
“It is probably in this very sphere of submarine construction
that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the
German-British Treaty. Considering the size of U-boats which had
already been ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided
for up to 1938. In reality, 118 were completed and constructed.”
I want to remind you that in the original there is the Note Number 6
referring to a letter of the Chief of the Naval Budget Department...
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: ...from the year 1942, presumably containing statistics on
the construction of submarines as the years went by. I believe that
these figures need to be clarified.
According to material at my disposal, it appears that these 55 U-boats
were in accordance with the London Agreement; that is to say, in
accordance with the 45 percent agreed on in 1935. You probably have not
got the exact figure in mind, but is that roughly correct?
RAEDER: Yes, that is probably right.
DR. SIEMERS: And now, the Figure 118. That, according to material at my
disposal, is also well-founded. That is the figure which corresponds to
the 100 percent equality in regard to the tonnage of submarines. If we
had 118 submarines, then our submarine equipment corresponded to that of
Britain at that time. Is that so?
RAEDER: Yes, it is correct; and it is also correct that we included
these later boats in the budget and had ordered them after we had seen
Admiral Cunningham and his staff in Berlin on 30 December and had
reached a friendly understanding in accordance with the agreement,
allowing us to build 100 percent. The remark read at the beginning,
saying that we had committed most violations in this sphere, is a
complete untruth. Until the beginning of the war we only built such
U-boats as we were allowed to build; that is to say, first 45 percent
and later 100 percent. It was a great mistake, of course, that we did
it.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have just said that it was a complete untruth.
I think that, even if Sir David used that word against you, one ought
not to pass such sharp judgment against Assmann. Do you not think,
Admiral, that there was possibly a legal error on his part when...
RAEDER: Yes, that may be.
DR. SIEMERS: ...he wrote these details and that he was not really
thinking of what you have just told us had happened; namely, that in
1938 there had been an agreement between England and Germany, according
to which Germany could now build 100 percent?
RAEDER: That is quite probable. When I said “untruth,” I meant
incorrectness.
DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that in the Naval Agreement of
1935, 100 percent was planned from the beginning and that Germany at
first renounced that but had the right at any time to increase to 100
percent, provided that Great Britain was notified. The notification is
presumably what you described, Witness; that is the negotiation with
Admiral Cunningham?
RAEDER: Yes, that was on 30 December 1938, or it may have been 31
December.
THE PRESIDENT: Is the defendant saying that there was a notification to
Admiral Cunningham on the 30th of December 1938? Is that what you said;
that there was notification to Admiral Cunningham on the 30th of
December 1938?
RAEDER: Admiral Cunningham came to Berlin, to this friendly negotiation
which had been provided for in the agreement. On that 30 December we
arranged with him that from now on, instead of 45 percent, 100 percent
would be built.
THE PRESIDENT: Was that an oral arrangement or a written one?
RAEDER: It was a conference between the Chief of Staff of the Naval
Operations Staff and Admiral Cunningham, and certain other individuals,
but I cannot remember the details. However, I am pretty certain that
minutes were taken.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, unfortunately, I have not been able to trace
any written evidence. I only know from Exhibit Number Raeder-11, that is
the agreement of 1935, that Germany could increase the tonnage, and the
agreement of ’37, that Germany had the duty to give notification.
Generally, notification is only in writing in diplomatic relations,
although, in my opinion, it was not necessarily a duty in this case.
Negotiations, as the witness said, did take place.
RAEDER: May I, perhaps, add that apart from the submarine problem, the
question of two heavy cruisers, which we had originally dropped, was
also settled. We only wanted to build three for the time being; and now
we were asking for assent to build the other two, to which we were
entitled. That was also agreed upon in accordance with the agreement.
DR. SIEMERS: Document C-140 was put before you yesterday; it is USA-51.
You will find it in the British Document Book 10a on Page 104. I want to
put one sentence from that document to you again, which has not been
quoted by the Prosecution, neither in November nor yesterday. It appears
under Figure 2-c. There is the following statement—I want to add that
this is the question of sanctions and the possible preparation of a
defense against sanctions in 1935. I quote from 2-c: “For the time being
I prohibit any practical preparations.”
Witness, I want to ask you...
THE PRESIDENT: That is not 10a, 104.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. Elwyn Jones has just been kind enough to point out to
me the English translation. It appears from it that—as I have also the
English translation before me—that there are two documents C-140; one
has one page and the other has two. One has not got a heading and is
dated, Berlin, 25 October 1933. In my opinion it is the document...
THE PRESIDENT: That is the one on Page 104?
DR. SIEMERS: No, on Page 104 there is, as I just heard from Major Elwyn
Jones, the other document, C-140, which has the heading, “Directive for
the Armed Forces in Case of Sanctions.”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and the date of it is 25 January 1933?
DR. SIEMERS: 25 October 1935, but that is a clerical error. It is 1933.
MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): There
appears to be another document which is not in the document book.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, perhaps I may point out that the Document
C-140, USA-51, presented by the Prosecution, must be the one I have
referred to, because it tallies with the record; I mean the record of
the session of 27 November. That is the document to which I have just
now referred.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it C-140 or C-141?
DR. SIEMERS: C-140, the same number, and that is the same as USA-51.
Mr. President, perhaps to simplify matters, I may later, after today’s
session or tomorrow submit the Document C-140 in the, here presented,
English and German text.
THE PRESIDENT: Read the document now and you can settle with Mr. Elwyn
Jones about the proper notation of the document, whether it should be
C-140 or whatever the exhibit number ought to be.
DR. SIEMERS: [_Turning to the defendant._] In the version submitted by
the Prosecution, preparation for the defense against sanctions is
mentioned. I shall now read a further sentence to you, and I quote, “For
the time being, I prohibit all practical preparations.” Would it be
right, therefore, that in 1933 nothing whatever was prepared by you in
the Navy?
RAEDER: No. Apart from the ordinary state of preparedness, nothing was
allowed to be done, in accordance with this order. This was merely a
precaution on the Führer’s part in order to take preparative measures in
case the opponent might do something.
DR. SIEMERS: You see, the reason why I am asking you this is that
yesterday in the cross-examination the preparations that you were
supposed to have made in this connection were held against you.
I now come to Document C-189, which is USA-44. I beg to apologize for
troubling the Tribunal in that I am asking them, if possible, to look at
the document again. It is contained in Document Book Raeder 10, Page 14;
and, incidentally, Sir David re-submitted it yesterday. Sir David
attached great importance to the two words “against England.” There
under Figure 2 it says:
“The Ob.d.M. expresses the opinion that later on the fleet must
anyhow be developed against England and that, therefore, from
1936 onward, the large ships must be armed with 35 centimeter
guns like those of the _King George_ class.”
Would this mean that you were using the plans of the English for
building ships of the _King George_ class?
The only reason, therefore, why you were pointing this out was that you
were considering the 35 centimeter guns used in the _King George_ class
by the British Admiralty?
RAEDER: Yes, it was the aim of every navy at that time to know as early
as possible which was the largest caliber of guns being used by other
navies. I said yesterday that, to start with, we had chosen as a model
the French _Dunkerque_ type, but later on we discovered that the British
used up to 35.6 centimeters. Ships have to be used, if war breaks out,
in their actual state; their gun caliber cannot be changed any more.
Therefore we always went as high as possible.
DR. SIEMERS: Would I be right, therefore—please excuse me—if I said
that the expression “against Britain” in this connection is not correct
grammatically, that according to German language usage it should have
said “with reference to England”?
RAEDER: Yes, it should have said “developing with regard to England.” I
said yesterday that it would have been quite senseless if I were to do
something against Great Britain before the conclusion of the pact.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that was fully gone into in
cross-examination, and the defendant stated his explanation of the words
used.
DR. SIEMERS: From Document C-190, which is the conversation on 2
November 1934 aboard the _Emden_ between you and Hitler, Sir David has
held up to you that Hitler, in a discussion with you and Göring, said
that he considered the expansion of the Navy in the planned manner an
absolutely vital necessity, since war could not be conducted unless the
Navy safeguarded the ore imports from Scandinavia. It was said that this
would have to be understood to mean that the Navy was planned in view of
a war and in view of safeguarding the ore imports, which really meant
aggressive intentions. Are you of the opinion that the British Navy was
not planned to safeguard imports to England or for the event of war and
was not equipped accordingly?
RAEDER: No, there is not the slightest doubt about that.
DR. SIEMERS: Six submarines are mentioned in this document. Considering
that figure, may I ask you to tell me the number of submarines that
Germany would have needed in order to conduct an aggressive war?
RAEDER: Well, at any rate, many more than we had in October 1939, a
multiple of that.
DR. SIEMERS: From a document, Mr. President, which was submitted
yesterday, D-806, I want to quote, in addition to the second paragraph
which has been quoted, the first paragraph and put it to the witness. It
is D-806, GB-462, submitted yesterday at noon.
[_Turning to the defendant._] There it says:
“1.) Reference: Submarine Construction Program. On 27 October
1936 I made decision regarding the full utilization of the still
available U-boat tonnage according to the Naval Agreement of
1935 and regarding the immediate ordering of the construction of
_U-41_ to _U-51_.”
Were these the rest of the submarines within the 45 percent limit to
which we were entitled according to the Naval Agreement of 1935?
RAEDER: Yes, that is right, judging from the figures.
DR. SIEMERS: And then, Admiral, you have been very thoroughly questioned
about Austria and Czechoslovakia. Since that subject has been gone into
in detail, I shall confine myself to just one question: Did you, at any
time, receive any tasks or orders of a foreign political nature from
Hitler? And did he ask you for your advice especially in foreign
political matters?
RAEDER: I was never asked for advice, and I had no foreign political
tasks, unless you consider the duties which I had to fulfill in Bulgaria
and Hungary after my resignation of a foreign political nature.
DR. SIEMERS: Regarding Czechoslovakia, that is, concerning the document
about the “Rest Tschechei,” you were asked whether Hitler had aggressive
intentions against Prague at that time. I think the question ought to
have been whether his intentions were for an aggressive war.
In connection with that, you have been asked about Göring’s threat to
bombard Prague, and you quite rightly admitted to Sir David that such a
bombing would be a threat. Sir David commented on it as being near to
aggressive war; but in order to be quite clear, I want you to tell the
Tribunal when you learned of this planned bombing.
RAEDER: Only after the whole matter had been settled, and only by way of
conversation. I heard no announcement and I knew nothing else of it
beforehand.
DR. SIEMERS: So you knew nothing of it before the occupation of Prague?
RAEDER: No, because military undertakings against Prague were altogether
unknown to me.
DR. SIEMERS: Then there is the Document C-100. Mr. President, it was
presented yesterday under the Number GB-464.
THE PRESIDENT: 463, I’ve got it.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon; 463.
[_Turning to the defendant._] From that document I want to quote to you
from Page 10. It is Page 3 of the attached document. I want to put the
following sentence to you. I quote:
“Führer asked Ob.d.M. whether there were any special wishes of
the Navy with reference to bases on Dutch-Belgian coast. Ob.d.M.
says no, since bases are within reach of the British coast and
are therefore useless as submarine bases.”
According to this, Witness, you were not in favor of an occupation of
Belgian and Dutch bases, nor did you in any way occupy yourself with
this question.
RAEDER: This was always my point of view, that from the experience of
the first World War Belgium and Holland, as far as the Navy was
concerned, could not offer any useful bases, since all forces were under
the control of the British Air Force. In the first World War serious
fighting occurred between the submarines leaving their ports and
destroyers stationed nearby. Therefore I declared myself not to be
interested in Belgium and Holland.
DR. SIEMERS: Skipping various documents, I now come to D-843, GB-466.
This is a document in which Dr. Breuer from the Oslo Embassy expresses
the view that the danger of a British occupation of Norway was not
really very great and that certain actions were only taken in order to
provoke Germany.
I have one more question on that. Did the Embassy in Oslo, that is to
say Breuer, know about the information that Admiral Canaris was
supplying to you?
RAEDER: I cannot tell you that, as far as I am concerned. I was never in
direct contact with Dr. Breuer, only with the naval attaché; but I must
add that Dr. Breuer had only been in Oslo for a comparatively short
period and that apparently he was not particularly well informed. The
statements made by Norwegian Ministers were certainly not properly
judged by him.
DR. SIEMERS: Was there not an order from Hitler that the Foreign Office
should not be informed about probable plans concerning Norway?
RAEDER: Yes, he expressly ordered that, and it is obvious that for that
reason the Reich Foreign Minister himself was informed very late.
DR. SIEMERS: In other words, as far as you can see, the ambassador could
not have had Canaris’ information through military sources.
RAEDER: No, hardly.
DR. SIEMERS: Then there were several documents, D-844 and D-845. It was
put to you from those that there was no danger in Scandinavia. Was the
information that you received at the time different?
RAEDER: Yes. I had continual information...
THE PRESIDENT: All this was gone into yesterday, and the witness gave
the same answer.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe that the following has never been mentioned
before. Did you know whether as early as 5 April mines had been laid in
the territorial waters off Norway?
RAEDER: The Allies had announced it on 7 April, but the actual
operations must have taken place a few days earlier.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, yesterday...
THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing_] Dr. Siemers, the only purpose of
re-examination is to bring out matters which are favorable to your
client which have not been raised in cross-examination, that is to say,
to explain anything which has not been given in cross-examination. When
he has given this account in cross-examination it is no good putting it
to him again in re-examination. We have heard it.
DR. SIEMERS: I think that on this particular point one explanation is
missing.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Yesterday you were asked, rather
unexpectedly, what had been the technical changes since 1936 and how the
legal situation regarding submarine warfare would have been influenced
thereby.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: It is a somewhat difficult question to answer in two
seconds. You have mentioned aircraft. Can you not supplement your
statement?
RAEDER: Yes, I forgot the most important point due to the fact that
there was a rather lively controversy. The important point is that the
spotting of vessels at sea by aircraft was something quite new and had
been developed very efficiently. That development continued very rapidly
during the war, until submarines could very quickly be located and
pursued.
DR. SIEMERS: Regarding D-841, which is the affidavit from Dietmann, may
I, with the Tribunal’s permission, make a formal application? In this
affidavit, there is the following sentence:
“It is my personal opinion that the higher authorities of the
Navy in Kiel and other places in Germany had knowledge of these
dreadful things.”
THE PRESIDENT: It isn’t “had knowledge” but “must have had knowledge.”
It seems to me it is in the translation “must have had knowledge.”
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I have not got the German and I do not know how the
original is worded. I only have the English translation. It is not quite
clear to me how the German version was worded. May I ask the Tribunal...
THE PRESIDENT: Is the document put in in the original German or is it
put in in the English? The deposition is in German presumably.
DR. SIEMERS: I presume that originally the statement was in German. The
copy I have states that this is a translation and that is English, but I
have not seen the German original.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, there must have been a German copy for
the witness yesterday. I don’t know whether or not it is the original. I
didn’t see it but I assume it was.
THE PRESIDENT: It isn’t the case that the deposition was made in German,
then translated into English, and then translated back into German, was
it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is why I assume it was the
original. I am sorry this was done. I haven’t got the original document
in front of me but I assume that was so. I will find out in a moment for
you.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What is the point, Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: I believe that this sentence should be struck from the
document. It does not record a fact.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean you are asking to have it struck out or...
DR. SIEMERS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you say, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the witness sets out fully the facts in
the preceding paragraphs of the affidavit and then it is true that he
introduces the sentence “By my personal opinion....” but the gist of the
statement is that from these facts which I have stated the higher
formations of the Navy in Kiel and in other places in Germany must have
had knowledge of these terrible conditions. A man who has been working
in that detachment of the German Navy and knows the communications
between that detachment and the headquarters is in a position to say
whether headquarters would have knowledge from the facts he has stated.
His inference has a greater probative value than the inference which the
Court can draw. The objection to the statement of a matter of opinion is
where the witness gives his opinion on a matter on which the Court is
equally capable of drawing an opinion from the same facts, but the
importance of that statement is that he is saying “working in the bow
and being familiar with the chain of command and communications.” I say
that anyone at Kiel must have been able to learn from these facts what
was going on at these places—so that is the narrow point, whether his
special knowledge entitles him to express a view which the Court,
without that special knowledge, would not be in a position to draw.
THE PRESIDENT: But ought he not theoretically to state all the facts;
and if he does state all the facts, then the Tribunal will be in the
same position as he is to form a judgment; and it is for the Tribunal to
form the judgment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is exactly the point to which I
was addressing my argument, that there is the additional fact, that
because he was working there, was part of the chain of naval command and
he is speaking of the knowledge of the naval command from the point of
view of somebody who was working in it, and, therefore, he has on that
point his opinion as to the sources of knowledge; and the necessity of
constructive knowledge is an additional fact. My Lord, the state of a
man’s mind and the expression of his knowledge may be a fact in certain
circumstances, just as much a fact as that stated, as Lord Bowen once
put it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if the state of his knowledge is directly relevant
to an issue.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is the point here.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a form of expert evidence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, in a sense, it is not as Your Lordship
says, in a form, it is not in a usual form, but it is the evidence of
somebody who has special knowledge. My Lord, it is a well-known
distinction, for example, in the laws of libel between the persons who
have expert knowledge and the public at large; and, My Lord, the opinion
of someone with a special knowledge of the facts must have probative
value within Article 19 of the Charter. My Lord, if the provision that
this Tribunal is not bound by the technical rules of evidence is to mean
anything at all, I submit it should cover the expression of opinion on a
point such as this; that is the ability to have knowledge, which is
given by somebody who is in a special position to state such an opinion.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a very small point, Sir David, and we have got to
decide the matter and form our own opinion about it; and this man isn’t
here for the purpose of being cross-examined for anything of that sort.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is so, My Lord, but, of course that,
with respect, cuts both ways. I mean here he gives an affidavit and part
of it as the basis leads up to that conclusion. I should respectfully
submit that that conclusion is a statement of fact—but, if Your
Lordship says so, the time will come when we can ask Your Lordship to
draw that conclusion as a matter of argument ourselves; but, My Lord, on
the general position, the only reason that I have occupied even this
much of the Tribunal’s time is that Article 19 is an important matter in
the view of the Prosecution and, therefore, we have to argue against its
being whittled down. It is the only reason that I’ve taken up the
Tribunal’s time.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I just draw your attention to one point.
Sir David has just been mentioning the well-known legal difference. That
is just what I want to base my argument on, the difference between facts
and opinions. Here it is a question of opinion and please note the
following sentence does even go further; there, the witness is coming to
a legal opinion and he is stating who is responsible; therefore, he is
passing some sort of judgment. Furthermore, I beg you to consider that
this is quite a minor official who, after all, cannot possibly make
statements of such portent to the effect that higher formations in Kiel
and some other places in Germany—he is quite vague—had some sort of
knowledge.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, before the Tribunal adjourn, might I
make a correction and an apology? My Lord, I thought that a copy in
German had been put to the witness yesterday—of this affidavit; and
apparently it was a copy in English. The original affidavit was sent off
on the 6th of May; it was verified over the telephone by Colonel
Phillimore and it has not yet arrived. An English copy was sent and has
been processed and the original will be put in as soon as it arrives. My
Lord, I thought that we had got the original but apparently it has not
yet arrived, but it is an English document put to the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you let Dr. Siemers see the original as soon as it
arrives?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has carefully considered Dr. Siemers’
application and it has decided that the passage to which he objects and
which he asks the Tribunal to strike out in the affidavit of Walter Kurt
Dietmann shall not be struck out in view of Article 19 of the Charter.
The passage contains an opinion only, and the Tribunal will consider
that opinion in relation to the whole of the evidence when it is before
the Tribunal and will decide at that time the probative value of this
opinion as well as the probative value of the other evidence.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I just have...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, may I remind you that you told us that your
re-examination would take, you hoped, about half an hour?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Mr. President, I shall conclude very shortly.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, in connection with this Commando
decree which we discussed a good deal, Sir David yesterday put a case to
you regarding the attack on the ship _Tirpitz_. In this connection I
should like to ask you: Do you recall that in the testimony of Wagner
there was the question of a British sailor named Evans?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: And do you recall also that, according to the affidavit of
Flesch, Number D-864, GB-457, Flesch declared, “I am unaware of the fact
that Evans wore a uniform”?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I do not need to submit the document to you?
RAEDER: No, I recall it.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall further that it is said in Document UK-57,
submitted on the same day as Wagner’s testimony: “The British sailor
Evans was captured wearing civilian clothing”?
RAEDER: Yes. I have the document here.
DR. SIEMERS: And that was one case where the SD, obeying the Commando
order, committed a murder without the knowledge of the Navy?
RAEDER: Yes. This man had been apprehended by the SD or the Police, not
by the Navy. He had only been interrogated in the meantime by the
admiral.
DR. SIEMERS: The second case of which you are accused is the sabotage
attack on German ships near Bordeaux. I clarified this situation in
Wagner’s testimony the other day.
Do you recall that his document also states that these men tried to
escape to Spain in civilian clothes?
RAEDER: Yes, that is true.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, when using the small fighter craft mentioned
yesterday under the command of Vice Admiral Heye, did our soldiers ever
wear civilian clothing?
RAEDER: No, never.
DR. SIEMERS: Always in uniform?
RAEDER: Yes, always in uniform. These craft were a weapon just like
submarines, speed boats, _et cetera_.
DR. SIEMERS: As my last point, Mr. President, I should like to point out
that yesterday Colonel Pokrovsky submitted a document, USSR-460, which
deals with the Moscow notes.
COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, the point is that yesterday the Tribunal made a
decision about submitting to the attorneys for the Defense extracts from
USSR-460. Today the prosecutors have exchanged opinions among
themselves; and the Prosecution of the United States, represented by Mr.
Dodd; Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe for Great Britain; and myself for Russia,
have agreed that it is necessary for us to request you to permit us to
read into the record here today the three brief extracts referring to
Dönitz, to Keitel, and to Jodl so that they will be included in the
record. These are the excerpts which yesterday the Tribunal did not
allow to have read into the record as evidence. If we understood the
Tribunal rightly it was due to lack of time as the session was dragging
on.
Due to these circumstances these three extremely important
excerpts—important from our point of view—the accuracy of which was
confirmed yesterday by the Defendant Dönitz, have not been included in
the transcript of the session. For that reason I am requesting just
about 5 minutes time to read these excerpts into the record today, on
behalf of the Prosecution of the three countries.
THE PRESIDENT: What would be the most convenient course, Dr. Siemers?
Would you like to have them read now so that you can put any questions
upon them?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I make some remarks about this document?
The Soviet Delegation has been kind enough to put the original at my
disposal. I perused the original yesterday, and I looked at the
extracts. The Soviet Delegation desires to retain the original but has
also been kind enough to put instead a photostatic copy of the extracts
involved at the disposal of the High Tribunal. I am completely in
agreement with the suggestion, but I personally do not have the
intention of putting any questions on this document, which is clear to
me.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SIEMERS: And so I would like to ask that the resolution put forth by
the High Tribunal yesterday be upheld, that this should not be read,
just as other documents were not read out either.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the document was originally in German.
Presumably it has been translated into Russian; it has certainly been
translated into English. Unless the French members of the French
Prosecution want it read if it hasn’t been translated into French there
doesn’t seem to be any use in taking up the time of the Tribunal by
reading it into the record. We have got the document in English, and we
have all read it.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I think there is one reason. Even if it is read
into the record, it will at least be tomorrow before the transcript is
available for the defendants who are referred to, and this witness, or
this defendant, will be off the stand. If they want to cross-examine
about what he has said about them, then we will have, I suppose, to
bring this defendant back on the stand. I think we will lose far more
time by doing that, rather than now having Colonel Pokrovsky take 5
minutes to read it. They will all hear it, and then if they want to
examine about it, they can do so promptly.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, very well.
Dr. Siemers, if you don’t want to ask any questions about it, you can
conclude your re-examination now, and then Colonel Pokrovsky can read
the document. Then any of the other defendants can question the witness
if they want to, upon it.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that not be the best way, Colonel Pokrovsky?
COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, certainly.
DR. SIEMERS: I agree, Mr. President, but I do believe that this document
need not be read, because Mr. Dodd was somewhat mistaken when he said
that the defendants are not familiar with this document. They and their
counsel are thoroughly familiar with it. I believe everyone knows it,
and I do not think that it needs to be read. However, in the final
analysis, it really makes very little difference to me personally.
THE PRESIDENT: If the defendants’ counsel do not want it read then the
Tribunal does not want to have it read unless defendants’ counsel want
to ask questions upon it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I, as defense counsel for
Admiral Dönitz, am not interested in having the document read. I know
the document.
DR. SIEMERS: I have just been advised that the Defense Counsel know the
document and do not put any value on having it read nor do they wish to
put any questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, Mr. Dodd and Colonel Pokrovsky, it does not
seem that it serves any useful purpose to have it read.
MR. DODD: No, I am satisfied, Your Honor. I have not heard from Keitel’s
attorney; I assume he is satisfied. I am just concerned that at some
later date—a very interesting document to us, of course—and I am just
concerned some question may be raised and I am also sympathetic to the
desires of these defendants not to have it read publicly.
The Defendant Schacht’s counsel has not spoken either. I think it might
be well, Mr. President, if we had a careful statement from counsel for
each of these men that they do not want to question or, if so, that we
can be completely sure that it will not be raised again.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the defendants’ counsel are all here or all
the defendants are represented and they must clearly understand what I
am saying and I take it from their silence that they acquiesce in what
Dr. Siemers has said, that they do not wish the document to be read and
they do not wish to ask any questions.
COL. POKROVSKY: I have not understood your decision, My Lord. Are you
permitting me to read into the record these few excerpts or are you not?
THE PRESIDENT: No, Colonel Pokrovsky; I am saying that as the
defendants’ counsel do not wish the document to be read it need not be
read.
COL. POKROVSKY: We do give a great deal of importance and significance
to this document as it involves not only the interests of the Defense
but also the interests of the Prosecution. The document was accepted by
the Tribunal yesterday but for some reason only a very small part of the
characterization given therein by Admiral Raeder was included in the
stenographic record for the day. I do not see any reason why these
excerpts should not be read into the record now, and why the witness
Raeder, who intimately knew the Defendants Dönitz, Keitel, and Jodl,
should not hear the excerpts here and now.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky and Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal ruled
yesterday that it was unnecessary that the document should be read and
the Tribunal adheres to that decision in view of the fact that the
defendants’ counsel do not wish it to be read and have no questions to
put upon it.
Yes, Dr. Siemers.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I will now conclude my examination of
Admiral Raeder. I do not know whether other questions will be put to
Admiral Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any question which has arisen out of the
cross-examination which the defendants’ counsel want to put?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to put two questions, Mr.
President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, in cross-examination you were
confronted with orders and memoranda as to the U-boat warfare.
RAEDER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you consider yourself responsible for
these decrees dealing with the U-boat warfare which you issued during
your term as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?
RAEDER: I consider myself fully responsible for all decrees issued as to
the U-boat warfare which took place under my responsibility as well as
every naval operation which I ordered. In the Naval Operations Staff and
together with the officers of the Naval Operations Staff I worked out
these directives; I approved memoranda and in accordance therewith I
gave my orders. The Commander of the U-boat fleet was solely the
tactical commander of U-boats. He transmitted the orders and he carried
through the details of the operations.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, yesterday Sir David charged you
that he could not determine who actually gave the orders to change the
log book of the U-boat which sank the _Athenia_. Admiral Godt testified
in answer to my question that he had issued this order at the request of
Admiral Dönitz. Do you know of any facts which would show this testimony
of Admiral Godt to be incorrect?
RAEDER: Actually I was never concerned with this case. I only decreed
the three points which have come up here several times.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Therefore, you consider Admiral Godt’s
testimony as being correct?
RAEDER: I assume that it is correct since everything else he said was
very reliable.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.
DR. SIEMERS: Then, with the permission of the High Tribunal I should
like to call my first witness, the former Reich Minister of the
Interior, Severing.
[_The witness Severing took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.
KARL SEVERING (Witness): Karl Severing. I am 70 years old and I live at
Bielefeld.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait one minute. Will you repeat this oath after me: I
swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
You may sit down.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, please tell the High Tribunal what role you
played in the Social Democratic Party up until the year 1933 and the
principal ministerial posts you held up until the year 1933.
SEVERING: At the age of 16½ I entered the labor union movement and when
I was 18 years old I entered the Social Democratic Party and as a result
of that fact I held honorary positions in the Party at a relatively
early age.
In the year 1905 I became councillor in the city of Bielefeld. I was
member of the Reichstag from 1907 until 1912; and I again became a
member of the Reichstag and at the same time a member of the Prussian
Diet in 1919. I was in the Reichstag and in the Prussian Diet until
1933. I was Minister in Prussia from 1920 until 1921; then again from
1921 to 1926, and from 1930 until 1933; from 1928 until 1930 I was Reich
Minister of the Interior.
DR. SIEMERS: When and why did you leave public life?
SEVERING: I retired from official public life in July 1932, and from
political life when the Social Democratic Party was prohibited.
DR. SIEMERS: Were you arrested when leaving public life in 1933, or
perhaps at a later date and, if so, at whose order?
SEVERING: I was arrested on the very same day on which the Enabling Act
was scheduled to be read and passed in the Reichstag. The order for my
arrest was signed by the then Minister of the Interior, Herr Göring, who
at that time was also President of the Reichstag and, if I may utter an
opinion, who would have had the obligation, as President of the
Reichstag, to protect the immunity of the members of the Reichstag.
Under breach of this immunity I was arrested the moment I entered the
Reichstag building.
DR. SIEMERS: But you participated in the vote on the Enabling Act?
SEVERING: The Chairman of the Social Democratic Reichstag faction had
complained to Göring against the treatment to which I was subjected with
the result that I was given leave to vote. But the voting had already
come to a close. However, Reichstag President Göring still permitted me
to give my “no” vote for the Enabling Act.
DR. SIEMERS: You were arrested thereafter but only for a very short
time?
SEVERING: On the next day I had to appear for further interrogations. I
was permitted to leave Berlin on the second day and was given the order
to hold myself ready at my home in Bielefeld for further interrogations.
DR. SIEMERS: Despite your well-known anti-Nazi attitude, you were not
arrested later and put in a concentration camp, if I am not mistaken.
SEVERING: I was never in a concentration camp, thanks to the
respect—and I say this with all modesty—which the old Prussian
officials, my previous subordinates, had for me. At the end of October
1933 I heard from the Police Chief in Bielefeld that trouble was brewing
for me. The police notified me that they would not be able to give me
any protection and advised me, therefore, to leave Bielefeld for several
months. I followed this advice and, from October 1933 until the end of
March 1934, I lived in Berlin using a false name. I first stayed with
friends, and then I went to a small Jewish sanatorium at Wannsee. I
feared another arrest in August 1944; according to someone whom I knew
in the police my name was on a list of people who were to be arrested
summarily—men and women who were suspected of having plotted against
Hitler in July 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say ’44 or ’34?
DR. SIEMERS: ’44. After the attempted assassination of Hitler of July
1944.
SEVERING: May I continue?
DR. SIEMERS: Please do.
SEVERING: After the attempted assassination of Hitler orders were given
to the police to arrest certain people. My name was on the Bielefeld
list. Then a police official whom I knew from the past pointed out that
I was close to my seventieth year and had lost my son in the war. Thus
he succeeded in having my name struck off the list.
DR. SIEMERS: Aside from what you have told us now, did you suffer any
further disadvantage at the hands of the National Socialists?
SEVERING: Well, I was considerably hindered in my movements. I was not
especially surprised that my mail was censored and my telephone tapped.
I considered that as a matter of course. But I could not even take a
trip without being followed and watched by the police.
If you do not mind, I should like to call your attention to the fact
that in addition to material damages there is also harm to one’s ideals
(ideelle Schädigungen), and in this respect I suffered a great deal at
the hands of the National Socialist Party after it assumed power. A
political measure, taken in connection with the polls of 1932, was used
against me, I might say, in a criminal way. They talked about me and my
friend Braun as the “thieves of millions,” and this epithet was also
applied to the members of my family.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, is this witness going to give any evidence
which has relevancy to the defendant’s case?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, bring him to it then as quick as possible.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well.
[_Turning to the witness._] Herr Minister, try to be as brief as
possible in this connection. It is of course true that with respect to
your ideals you suffered harm as well, but as the basis of my
examination and your testimony I would like to ascertain whether serious
harm was caused to you and I would like to have you tell us, but
briefly, whether National Socialism...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, what relevancy has this got to Raeder’s
case?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, my intention is to show that Minister
Severing, after a brief description of his life during Nazism can,
without bias, give entirely impartial answers in reference to Raeder.
Since he had no advantages but rather disadvantages at the hands of the
Nazis and on the other side...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have dealt sufficiently with the disadvantages
now. Go to the matter which relates to Raeder. He has given us, from
1933 to 1944, a fairly general account of his life and that ought to be
sufficient.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution accuses the Defendant Raeder, that in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he violated the Treaty of
Versailles, in the intention of carrying on aggressive wars, and that
behind the back of the Reich Government. In order to shorten the
testimony, I would like to point out to you that it is an undisputed
historical fact that Germany, in developing her Navy within the
framework of the Versailles Treaty, violated the stipulations of the
Versailles Treaty. All that is known to the Tribunal. Even before this
time, the government applied for the construction of armored cruiser A
within the compass of the Versailles Treaty. A great inner political
conflict arose over the construction of this cruiser and, in connection
with a debate before the Reichstag on this cruiser, the witness made a
speech. I have a brief excerpt from this speech which I should like to
submit to you and which I should like to read. Mr. President, this is
Exhibit Number Raeder-5, to be found in Document Book 1, Page 13. This
is an extract from a speech by the former Reichsminister Karl Severing
before the German Reichstag on 20 January 1928.
[_Turning to the witness._] Herr Minister, at this period of time you
were not a Minister; rather, you gave this speech as a deputy of the
Social Democratic Party?
SEVERING: Yes, that is correct.
DR. SIEMERS: The extract reads:
“Now the armored cruiser. The fact that a government, which
knows precisely what gigantic sums we must raise during the
coming year, should make such demands, is, to say the least,
quite surprising. It says, the Peace Treaty permits it—yes, but
the Peace Treaty also decrees the payment of reparations. The
9,300,000 marks demanded for this year will play their decisive
part only in the consequences entailed which would require the
raising of several hundred million marks, which during the next
few years seems to me absolutely impossible. Considering the
development of weapons for naval warfare, I am not convinced of
the military value of armored cruisers. It may be that armored
cruisers are the backbone of the defense at sea, as the
government says. But, to form an active fighting unit
(Gefechtskörper), the backbone must also be made up of other
elements, of U-boats and airplanes; and as long as we are not
allowed to build these, armored cruisers are of very little
value even for defense.”
Is that extract from the speech correct?
SEVERING: Yes, that, extract is reproduced correctly.
DR. SIEMERS: Is it right to conclude here that the Social Democratic
Party and you, personally, at that time, were of the opinion that the
Wehrmacht which was granted Germany by the Versailles Treaty might not
be sufficient for a defensive war?
SEVERING: That is correct.
DR. SIEMERS: Will you please comment on that a little more extensively.
SEVERING: That the 100,000-man army granted to Germany was not
sufficient even for a defensive war was and is known today possibly to
everyone in Germany concerned with politics. Germany got into a very bad
situation with regard to her eastern neighbors since the establishment
of the Corridor. The insular position of East Prussia forced Germany
even at that time to take measures which I reluctantly helped to carry
out; but the population of East Prussia had a right to be protected
against attacks which were threatening from the East. I am not speaking
about an aggressive war and I am not speaking of any plans of the Polish
Government; but I would like to refer you to the fact that in the years
1919, 1920, and 1921, there were aggressive groups in Poland who set
foot on German soil, possibly with the idea of establishing a _fait
accompli_...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, this evidence is all a matter of argument.
Not only is it a matter of argument, but we have had it over and over
again from nearly all the defendants and a good many of their witnesses;
and, surely, it is not assisting the Tribunal in the very least to know
what this witness said in 1928 or what view he took in 1928.
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, I believe this will become
clear in the following. Minister Severing was a member of the government
that held this cabinet meeting of 18 October 1928. I agree with the High
Tribunal that the matters have been heard frequently—these things only
once, however—but I should like to point out that Sir David even
yesterday in cross-examination accused the defendant, despite his
testimony, that, against the will of the Reich Government and against
the wish of the Parliament, he had violated the Treaty of Versailles.
If, therefore, after the testimony of Raeder, the Prosecution persists
in their opinion, I have no other possibility to prove the incorrectness
of the opinion of the Prosecution than by questioning a witness who...
THE PRESIDENT: The question whether the Treaty of Versailles was
violated is a question of fact and, of course, upon that you can give
evidence and you did give evidence through the Defendant Raeder; but
this witness is not talking about the question of fact. He is arguing
that Germany was entitled to defend herself in violation of the Treaty
of Versailles. That is what I understood his evidence to be and that is
a question of argument, not a question of fact.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, as far as I know juridically...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the class of evidence which has just been
given by this witness will not be listened to by the Tribunal. If you
want to prove facts by him, you can prove them, but you cannot prove
arguments or his views upon arguments.
DR. SIEMERS: Could Germany with her Wehrmacht protect herself against
the incursions in Silesia by Poland?
SEVERING: In the year 1920 the Wehrmacht would not have been able to
protect Germany in East Prussia; therefore, it was necessary to protect
the population of East Prussia, and this was achieved in that I,
personally, agreed that all weapons which were found in East Prussia
were to be given to the population. Under conditions which applied at
that time, it was, even for purposes of inspection, very hard to pass
through the Corridor by rail; so that in 1920, I had to make a tour of
inspection by way of water from Stolpmünde to Pillau. I am mentioning
this fact to show the difficulties of transportation through the
Corridor. In 1920 and ’21, it was not possible for the German Wehrmacht
to prevent attacks of Polish insurgents in Upper Silesia and, I am sorry
to say, and I emphasize “I am sorry” that a certain self-defense had to
be created in order to protect and defend German life and German
property.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, were the measures with regard to rearmament
as they were wanted and accounted for since January 1928 by
Reichswehrminister Gröner based on defensive or offensive ideas as far
as you know Gröner?
SEVERING: As far as I am acquainted with Gröner and his own personal way
of carrying on his office, everything that he conceived and carried out
was in view of defense.
DR. SIEMERS: Then this should also apply to the armored cruiser A. I
should like to know why the Social Democratic Party, which was
interested in the idea of defense, was against the building of this
armored cruiser.
SEVERING: In 1928 the Social Democratic Party was against the building
of the armored cruiser as the economic situation did not warrant
expenses which were not absolutely necessary. And the Social Democratic
Party wanted to prove and to show that they did everything within their
power in order to make the much-discussed disarmament a reality. They
did not believe that the building of an armored cruiser would be a
favorable gesture for the bringing about of appropriate negotiations.
DR. SIEMERS: On 28 June 1928 a new Reich Government was formed. Müller
was Reich Chancellor; Stresemann was Foreign Minister, and you were
Minister of the Interior. What position did your government take to the
then pending problem of universal disarmament stipulated in Versailles,
or to the then pending problem of rearmament by Germany?
SEVERING: I have just made a reference to this problem. We were of the
opinion in the Social Democratic Party, even after entering the Müller
government, that we would have to use all our efforts in order to solve
just this problem. In September of 1928 the then Reich Chancellor
Müller, replacing the Foreign Minister Stresemann who was ill, went to
Geneva in order to bring this problem up before the League of Nations.
Müller made a very resolute speech which, if I remember correctly, was
received very coolly by Allied statesmen; so that any practical
suggestions for the realization of disarmament could not be hoped for in
the near future.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, in July 1928 you spoke with
Reichswehrminister Gröner about the budget and specifically about the
fact that secret budgets of the Wehrmacht, on the armored cruiser and so
forth, had become known. What attitude did you take in this connection
and what were the results following your agreement with Gröner?
SEVERING: In order to answer this question I would like to touch again
on the extract from my speech, which you just submitted to the High
Tribunal. In the same Reichstag session in which I gave this speech, the
Reichswehrminister Gröner appeared for the first time as successor of
Gessler. I had said a few farewell words in honor of Gessler who was
leaving. I greeted the new Minister with the remark that my political
friends would show him respect, but that he would have to earn our
confidence first. It was probably while thinking of this remark that
Gröner came up to me in the first session of the Müller Government and
said that he was looking forward to a sincere collaboration with me. I
quoted a passage from _Iphigenie_ on that occasion, “May there be truth
between us.” Only complete sincerity would make possible fruitful
co-operation, I said.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks that this is an absolute
waste of time and this speech of the witness is entirely irrelevant. Why
do you not ask him some questions which have some bearings on the case
of Raeder?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I remind you that the Prosecution has
made the accusation that the rebuilding was undertaken by means of a
secret budget and that a secret rearmament was carried on with the idea
of starting wars of aggression. It is not quite clear to me how I can
cross-examine the witness in any other way than by asking him how these
secret budgets, which to a certain extent are practically identical with
violations of the Versailles Treaty, were dealt with in his government.
That is exactly what I just questioned the witness on.
THE PRESIDENT: This speech that you have drawn our attention to is
simply a speech in which he said that he did not think that armored
cruisers were of any use. That is the only meaning of the speech, except
insofar as it refers to the fact that reparations had not been paid. For
the rest it simply says that armored cruisers, in his opinion, are of no
use.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I may not and do not wish to make a plea
here. In the speech which I read something else is said. It says there
that the Social Democratic Party was against the building of this
armored cruiser, because of economic reasons and not because of
strategic reasons, and that if an armored...
THE PRESIDENT: What has that got to do with a charge of making an
aggressive war in 1939?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I did not raise the accusation of an
aggressive war; the Prosecution did that, but I have to protect my
client against the accusation that in 1928 he had intentions of carrying
on an aggressive war; I assert that he had no intention of that sort,
that the Reich Government knew about the violations of the Treaty, that
the Reich Government took the responsibility for them, and the testimony
of the Minister will show that these are actual facts which were
challenged only yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: Ask him some direct questions on issues of fact. Then the
Tribunal will listen to them if they are relevant, but the Tribunal
considers that the evidence of his speech that you have been dealing
with is an utter waste of time.
DR. SIEMERS: I shall try to be brief. As a result I shall put questions
to the witness which he will answer one by one.
[_Turning to the witness._] You just said that you demanded of Gröner
confidence and absolute truthfulness. Did you ask him in this connection
for enlightenment on the secret budgets and the violations of the Treaty
of Versailles which had taken place up to that time?
SEVERING: I specifically asked him for enlightenment since, in January
of 1928, the then Reich Chancellor Marx had frankly admitted that under
Kapitän Lohmann in the Navy Department there had been misrepresentations
in the budget which could not be in accordance with good bookkeeping and
political honesty.
DR. SIEMERS: What did Gröner reply?
SEVERING: Gröner then told me that he had the intention of discussing
these matters at a cabinet meeting and of clarifying all these matters.
DR. SIEMERS: Were the commanders-in-chief of the two branches of the
Wehrmacht to be present at this meeting?
SEVERING: On 18 October they were to appear and did appear.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, when did you meet Admiral Raeder for the
first time?
SEVERING: The first official contact, according to my recollection, was
made the beginning of October 1928, probably on the day when he paid me
an official visit on my assuming office.
DR. SIEMERS: As Exhibit Number Raeder-6, I submitted to the High
Tribunal, as the High Tribunal will probably recall, a speech by Raeder
dated 23 January 1928. There was a covering letter with this document.
This letter will now be submitted to the witness.
[_Turning to the witness._] According to this document, did your meeting
with Raeder take place on 5 October 1928, 5 days after the appointment
of Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?
SEVERING: This discussion probably took place on that day. May I
mention...
DR. SIEMERS: Just a moment, Herr Minister. I think it will be safer if
you look at the letter. There it says: “Following our discussion of 5
October...” May I ask you to confirm to the High Tribunal that this
report made by Raeder was saved by you and that it is a true and
authentic copy?
SEVERING: The letter which I put at your disposal is the original of the
letter by Raeder. It is in accordance with the incidents which you just
mentioned.
DR. SIEMERS: Then, on 5 October this conversation with Raeder did take
place. Were the conversations between you and Raeder basically in
accordance with the ideas expressed in this speech?
SEVERING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall that in this speech Raeder declared
emphatically that a war of aggression was a crime?
SEVERING: Yes, I remember that.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you on the occasion of this conversation tell Raeder
that you had agreed with Gröner that the actual violations of the Treaty
of Versailles would have to be discussed and clarified and that a
cabinet meeting would have to be held?
SEVERING: I do not recall this detail, but it was quite probable.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you demand of Raeder that between yourself and him
there should be absolute sincerity and truthfulness?
SEVERING: Of Raeder, too, but especially of the chiefs of the Army.
DR. SIEMERS: As a result of this discussion with Raeder, did you have
the impression that you could work with Raeder in a satisfactory manner
and that he would tell you the truth?
SEVERING: Yes, I had that impression.
DR. SIEMERS: On 18 October 1928 the cabinet meeting which we have
already mentioned took place. May I ask you to describe briefly that
cabinet meeting, provided it is agreeable to the High Tribunal to have
the witness picture this session. I believe that a description of this
session would save time, rather than to have me ask single questions.
Therefore, Herr Minister, be brief in telling us what happened.
SEVERING: At this session, members of the cabinet were familiarized with
the details of what might be considered a concealment of the budget or
violations of the Versailles Treaty. Both gentlemen, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy,
spoke, if I remember rightly.
DR. SIEMERS: Did the entire cabinet attend?
SEVERING: Yes, perhaps with the exception of one or two members who were
ill, but it was a session which in general might be called a plenary
session.
DR. SIEMERS: The principal members were present?
SEVERING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Were Müller, Stresemann present?
SEVERING: I cannot tell you whether Stresemann was present. He was still
ill in September and whether he had recovered by 18 October, I cannot
say. But I might add, that if Herr Stresemann was not present, certainly
someone else was present as an authorized deputy from the Foreign
Office.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Admiral Raeder and General Heye at this meeting
expressly give the assurance to the cabinet—as I remember, in form of
an affidavit—that only those violations had occurred which were
mentioned by them?
SEVERING: Whether that was proclaimed in a solemn manner by affidavit or
by word of honor, I cannot say; but, in any event, at the request of the
Reich Chancellor and especially at my own request, they said that no
further violations would take place.
DR. SIEMERS: They assured you specifically that there would be no
further violations without the knowledge of the Reich Government?
SEVERING: Yes, exactly that.
DR. SIEMERS: And over and above that, they stated that now the Cabinet
knew about everything?
SEVERING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: A declaration to that effect was made?
SEVERING: Yes, such a declaration was made.
DR. SIEMERS: Were important matters connected with these secret budgets
or violations of the Treaty of Versailles?
SEVERING: I may state here and have to admit even that since I was used
to violations of the Versailles Treaty, I was especially interested in
the extent of the violations with regard to the sum. I wanted to know
what I could do in my new capacity against secret arms-bearers and
against illegal organizations; and I asked what was the total sum
involved. I was thereupon told—and I believe that this was set down and
confirmed in writing later—that perhaps 5½ to 6 million marks was the
amount involved in these secret budgets.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, you remember the budget figures of those
days better than I do. What can we gather from these figures? Must we
conclude that they were grave violations involving aggressive intentions
or may we gather that in the final analysis they were just trifles?
SEVERING: I do not have the figures as they apply to the budget plans of
the Navy and the Army. I cannot quote the figures from memory. But the
impression I gained from the reports of the two Wehrmacht leaders was
that only trifles were involved. It was this impression which caused me
to assume a certain political responsibility for these things, and
especially in view of the fact that we were assured that further
concealment of budget items or other violations were not to occur in
future.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember that Gröner at this session declared that
the small infringements of the Treaty dealt purely with defense
measures, with antiaircraft guns, coastal fortifications, _et cetera_?
SEVERING: I cannot give you the details today, but I might remind you
that all the speeches which Gröner made at the time when he was Defense
Minister were along these general lines. In all of his speeches in the
Reichstag, Herr Gröner expressly declared that he was an advocate of
sound pacifism. In answer to your question I reply that Gröner’s
statements, and also my own, were based on defense and defensive
measures.
DR. SIEMERS: In other words at the end of this session, the Reich
Government expressly accepted the responsibility for these infringements
and the small secret budget items?
SEVERING: To the extent that we have mentioned.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder in the future adhere to the clear directives of
the Reich Government?
SEVERING: I cannot answer that in a positive manner, but I can say that
I did not observe any violations on the part of the Navy in respect to
the agreements during my term of office as Minister of the Interior.
DR. SIEMERS: Are you personally of the opinion, since you know Raeder
sufficiently well, that he kept the promise he made to you not to resort
to secret violations?
SEVERING: Raeder gave me the impression that he was an honest man and I
believed that he would keep his word.
DR. SIEMERS: Just one more question, Herr Minister. Of course, you
cannot remember the details, but do you perhaps recall that on the
occasion of the cabinet meeting of 18 October there was discussion about
a Dutch firm which was designing U-boats?
SEVERING: No, I cannot give you details of the discussion; but I do know
that at that period of time, there was much talk—either in another
cabinet meeting or by a subcommittee of the Reichstag or by a different
parliamentarian body—of experimental workshops which had been
established for the Army and the Navy in Russia, Sweden, and Holland.
DR. SIEMERS: Purely experimental workshops?
SEVERING: I can say only that there was talk to this effect. Whether
these experimental workshops had been established I cannot tell you from
my own experience.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, could Germany, by reason of governmental
discussions going on at the time, hope that some day, despite the
Versailles Treaty, she would be permitted to build U-boats?
SEVERING: The leading statesmen...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, how can he answer that there was a hope that
they would be allowed to build U-boats? That is what your question was,
was it not; was there a hope?
DR. SIEMERS: I know, Mr. President, these questions were already dealt
with by the governments which obtained through the years 1928 to 1932;
and I believe that Stresemann carried on these discussions. Since
Stresemann is no longer alive, I would like to ask Herr Severing on this
point.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to the Tribunal that it is mere political
gossip.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, on whom did it depend what was brought up in
the Reichstag? Raeder is accused of acting behind the back of the
Reichstag. Who submitted this to the Reichstag? Did Raeder do that?
SEVERING: I do not quite follow you. Who submitted the budget, you mean?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes.
SEVERING: The budget went through the hands of the experts of the
various Ministries and the entire Cabinet, and the budget was submitted
to the Reichstag by the Cabinet.
DR. SIEMERS: The matter of dealing with the budget before the Reichstag
was a matter for the Reich Government and not for the Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy, is that right?
SEVERING: Inasmuch as a budget item was submitted to the Reichstag, the
competent Reich Minister took care of it in the main committee and the
plenary session of the Reichstag, but the political responsibility was
assumed by the entire Reich Cabinet.
THE PRESIDENT: It was never alleged as to the Defendant Raeder that he
had submitted the budget to the Reichstag; it was never put to him.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, yesterday it was asserted...
THE PRESIDENT: Don’t argue! Go on with any other questions.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall whether at the end of 1929 you talked with a
member of the government with regard to the various leading
personalities in the Wehrmacht, and that you made a comment which
subsequently became known concerning certain personalities?
SEVERING: Yes, it is correct that on one occasion I had been asked to
give a personal estimate of certain military personalities. I named
Gröner and Raeder in this connection.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, how many concentration camps do you know of?
SEVERING: How many do I know of now?
DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry; not now. How many did you know of before the
collapse of Germany?
SEVERING: Perhaps 6 to 8.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, did you know before the collapse of Germany
or rather did you know in 1944 already about the mass murders which have
been dealt with so frequently in this proceeding?
SEVERING: I gained knowledge of concentration camps when murder, if I
may say so, became professional and when I heard of a few cases which
affected me personally very deeply. First of all, I was told that the
Police President of Altona, a member of the Reichstag and a Social
Democrat of the right wing of the Party, had been murdered in the
concentration camp at Papenburg. Another friend of mine, the chairman of
the Miners Union, Fritz Husemann, is said to have been murdered shortly
after his being committed to the same concentration camp. Another friend
of mine, Ernst Heimann, was beaten to death in the Oranienburg Camp
according to the reports received by his family.
Dachau was known even in the north of Germany as a concentration camp.
Some Jewish inmates returned from Buchenwald in the spring of 1939, and
in that way I learned of this camp. Columbia House at Berlin I figured
to be a concentration camp also.
That was my only knowledge of camps and their horrors up until the time
when the London radio started to report about concentration camps. I
perhaps might mention another case. In 1944 a friend of mine, a member
of the Reichstag, Stefan Meier, who had served 3 years in the
penitentiary, was put into a concentration camp in or near Linz. After a
brief stay there he was murdered, according to reports received by his
family.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, you just heard of these and similar
individual cases?
SEVERING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: You were not familiar with the fact that thousands were
murdered every day in gas chambers or otherwise in the East?
SEVERING: I believed I should tell the High Tribunal only of those cases
which were, so to say, authentically reported to me. Everything I
learned of later through indirect reports, from my friend Seger or from
the book of the now Generalintendant Langhoff, had been told me but I
had no possibility of checking up on their accuracy.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, did you and your Party friends have the
possibility...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, are you going to finish this examination, or
are you going on? Do you see the clock?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I should like to leave the decision to the High
Tribunal as to whether we shall have a recess now. I understand there
will be a cross-interrogation so that...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but presumably you know what questions you are going
to ask; I don’t.
DR. SIEMERS: I cannot say exactly what answer the witness is going to
give. It might take perhaps another 10 minutes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will adjourn now till a quarter past 2
o’clock.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit on Saturday morning.
Now, Mr. Dodd, could you tell us what the position is with reference to
the documents of the Defendants Von Schirach, Sauckel, and Jodl?
MR. DODD: As far as Von Schirach is concerned, we are waiting for a
ruling on those documents concerning which we were heard on Saturday.
I’m sorry, that was on Seyss-Inquart. I wasn’t sure the documents were
ready.
These documents are all ready; they are all translated and in book form.
THE PRESIDENT: Will it be necessary to have any further discussion of
them?
MR. DODD: I believe not, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then, we can take it that we needn’t have
another argument about those documents.
MR. DODD: No, Sir, I comprehend no need for any further argument on Von
Schirach’s documents.
With reference to Sauckel, I have asked our French colleagues what the
situation is, since they have the primary responsibility. And so far as
the Prosecution is concerned, I am told that Mr. Herzog of the French
Prosecution staff is on his way here and he will be able to report more
accurately.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we can mention that at a later stage then. Schirach
at any rate then is ready to go on?
MR. DODD: He is ready to go on.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: Sir David has the information about the Defendant Jodl.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Mr. Roberts.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the position with regard to Jodl’s documents is
that Dr. Jahrreiss produced for me a draft book, just before Easter,
which had a certain number of documents, all except four of which had
already been exhibited, and therefore no objection could be taken to
them.
My Lord, the other four were all short. Two, I thought, were
objectionable on the ground that they referred to alleged war crimes by
one of the Allies. But, My Lord, they were so short that I thought the
best course would be for them to be translated—they were only a page or
so, each of them—so that when the books had been translated any
objection could be taken, and then the Tribunal could shortly decide the
matter.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, as there are only four of them and only two which
might be objected to, that can be dealt with when we come to hear the
case.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, there are only two.
THE PRESIDENT: We needn’t have any special hearing for it.
MR. ROBERTS: No, My Lord, certainly not. It could be disposed of in a
very few minutes.
PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Mr. President, I
should like to say one more word about these Jodl documents. We are
having difficulties over one document. It is the affidavit of Lohmann,
which we submitted in German, but which was not translated into English
for us on the grounds that only such documents could be translated which
the Prosecution had already accepted; and the Prosecution had adopted
the standpoint that it cannot express any opinion on that document as it
has not been translated into English.
I have mentioned this in a brief petition to the Tribunal, and I hope
that the Tribunal will settle the matter.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, Lohmann’s affidavit which is very short—it goes
principally to character—and it is really not objectionable, but I had
to point out that it hadn’t actually been allowed by the Tribunal in
their order. The Tribunal ordered it in regard to...
THE PRESIDENT: If it is accepted in the translation, that is all that is
necessary.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I entirely agree, and it is all on one page.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. Let it be translated.
MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, it may be convenient for me to
indicate to the Tribunal at this stage of Raeder’s case that with regard
to the witness Lohmann, the Prosecution does not now desire to
cross-examine that witness in view of the documents which are before the
Court, and the fact that the matters his affidavit dealt with were dealt
with yesterday by my learned friend Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, in his
cross-examination of Raeder, and finally, in view of the passages of
time.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the Prosecution want to
cross-examine Lohmann?
MAJOR JONES: No, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any
questions of Lohmann?
Very well, then I understand that the witness Lohmann is being kept here
and perhaps a message could be given to the Marshal that he needn’t
remain.
M. JACQUES B. HERZOG (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): Mr.
President, in the name of the French Prosecution I should like to say a
word about the documents presented by Sauckel’s defense. I have no
objection to the presentation of these documents with the reservation,
of course, that a ruling on them be made after they are presented. We
have no objection to the documents being translated or presented.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it is necessary or desirable for there to be
a special hearing with reference to the admissibility, or can that be
done in the course of the Defendant Sauckel’s case? At the moment I
apprehend that the documents have been looked at for the purpose of
translation. They have now been translated. If you think it necessary
that there should be any special hearing before the case begins, as to
admissibility, we should like to know. Otherwise they would be dealt
with in the course of the case, in the course of Sauckel’s case.
M. HERZOG: I think, Mr. President, it will be sufficient if the Tribunal
deals with these documents during the course of the defendant’s case. I
do not think we need a special hearing as far as these documents are
concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, as far as I have been able to ascertain,
you have inadvertently not yet answered one of my questions clearly.
With reference to the concentration camps you said that you had heard of
certain individual cases, and you named the individual cases. In order
to avoid any misunderstanding, I just want to ask you in conclusion: did
you hear of the mass murders which have been mentioned in this Trial,
whereby at Auschwitz, for instance, an average of about 2,000 persons a
day were exterminated in the gas chambers? Were you in possession of
this knowledge before the collapse, or did you not know anything about
that either?
SEVERING: I knew nothing whatsoever about these mass murders, which only
became known in Germany after the collapse of the Hitler regime, partly
through announcements in the press and partly through trials.
DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, what could you and your friends in the
Party do during the National Socialist regime, against the National
Socialist terror which you have partly mentioned, and did anyone abroad
support you in any way in this respect?
SEVERING: If you will limit the question to asking what I and my
political friends could do and did do after 30 January to combat the
Hitler regime, then I can only say—but little. If there was any
question of resistance against the Hitler regime, then that resistance
was not a centrally organized one. It was restricted to the extent that
in various cities the opponents of the Nazis met to consider how one
might, at least by propaganda, overcome the mental terror. No open
resistance was possible.
But perhaps I should here draw your attention to the following: On 30
January I personally made a decisive attempt—or rather an attempt
which, in my opinion, might have proved decisive—to oppose the Hitler
regime. In the autumn of 1931 I had an interview with the Chief of the
Army Command, Von Hammerstein, during which Von Hammerstein explained to
me that the Reichswehr would not allow Hitler to usurp the seat of the
President of the State. I remembered that conference, and on 30 January
1933 I inquired whether Von Hammerstein would be prepared to grant me an
interview. I wanted to ask him, during that interview, whether he was
still of the opinion that the Reichswehr would not only declare itself
to be against the Hitler regime, but would oppose such a regime by force
of arms.
Herr Von Hammerstein replied to the effect that, in principle, he would
be prepared to have such an interview with me, but that the moment was
not a propitious one. The interview never took place.
If you were to ask me whether in their efforts to fight the Hitler
regime, at least by propaganda, my political friends had received any
support from foreign personalities whom one might have called
anti-Fascists, then I must say—unfortunately no. On the contrary, we
quite often noticed, with much sorrow, that members of the English Labor
Party, not officials but private individuals, were Hitler’s guests and
that they returned to England to praise the then Chancellor Hitler as a
friend of peace. I mention Philipp Snowden in that connection and the
_doyen_ of the Labor Party, Lansbury. In this connection I would like to
draw your attention to the following facts: In the year...
THE PRESIDENT: The attitude of political parties in other countries has
nothing to do with any question we have to decide, absolutely nothing.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe that this is sufficient. I have no further
questions to ask, Herr Minister, and I thank you.
DR. LATERNSER: Minister Severing, during your term of office was the
figure of 100,000 men, conceded by the Peace Treaty of Versailles for a
normal army, ever exceeded?
SEVERING: I have no official knowledge of that. I would assume, however,
that that was not the case.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know at all whether, at the end of 1932, the
League of Nations made a promise or held out prospects that this Army of
100,000 could be increased to 300,000 men?
SEVERING: Here too I am unable to give you any official information. I
can, however, give the following explanation: In 1932 I received a
letter from a party friend of mine, Dr. Rudolf Breitscheid, who was a
member of the League of Nations Delegation and in which he mentioned
rumors of that kind; but he also added other information...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we don’t think that rumors are relevant in
the Trial. He says he can’t give us any official information. He then
begins to give us rumors. Well, we don’t want to hear rumors.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, what the witness is now saying is rather
more than a rumor and I think you will probably be able to judge for
yourself when he has entirely answered the question.
THE PRESIDENT: He is speaking of rumors. If you have any fresh question
to ask him, you can ask him.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the increase of the Army from 100,000 to 300,000 men
ever assume any palpable shape in the sense that the question was
discussed elsewhere, too?
SEVERING: I have just told you that Dr. Breitscheid was a member of the
League of Nations Delegation and that his information to me was not a
fabric of his own invention. That information stated that an extension
of the Army had been envisioned but that this extension would probably
be made at the expense of the police. Dr. Breitscheid informed me
accordingly.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much, I have no further questions to ask.
DR. HAENSEL: You have just told us that you had no knowledge of the
Jewish mass murders in Auschwitz before the collapse. Did you have any
knowledge of other measures or deeds perpetrated against Jews which you
could define as criminal?
SEVERING: I experienced one such case personally. In 1944 a friend of
mine in Bielefeld, Karl Henkel, was arrested and transferred to a labor
camp near Emden, and he was shot on the third day.
DR. HAENSEL: Do you know who arrested him, what authority?
SEVERING: He was arrested by the Bielefeld Gestapo.
DR. HAENSEL: Did that occur in connection with some large scale action
or was it an individual case?
SEVERING: It appeared to me to be an individual case.
DR. HAENSEL: Did you hear of a number of such individual cases at that
time, that is in 1944?
SEVERING: In 1944 I did not hear of any individual cases of murder, but
I did hear of deportations from Westphalian towns to unknown
destinations.
DR. HAENSEL: What authorities dealt with these deportations?
SEVERING: I cannot say for certain, but I assume that it was the
Gestapo.
DR. HAENSEL: Are you of the opinion that considerable sections of the
population knew of these occurrences?
SEVERING: You mean, of the deportations?
DR. HAENSEL: Yes.
SEVERING: They usually took place quite publicly.
DR. HAENSEL: Are you of the opinion that the people were generally just
as well acquainted with these events as the members of the organizations
as, for instance, the ordinary SS man, or would you say that the
ordinary SS man knew more than other people?
SEVERING: Oh yes. He was informed of the places of destination of these
transports.
DR. HAENSEL: But I understood you to say, that the convoys were not
escorted by the SS; you said it was the Gestapo.
SEVERING: Yes, I have just stated that I assumed that the Gestapo had
conducted the arrests and the lootings, but I did not receive any
assurances that this was exclusively the work of the Gestapo.
DR. HAENSEL: And as to the other measures—apart from such
deportations—which might be called a kind of local pogrom, have I
understood you to say that you did not hear of them often?
SEVERING: Local pogroms occurred in November 1938.
DR. HAENSEL: Did you, during the execution of such measures, of which we
have frequently heard, make your own observations or did you remain at
home?
SEVERING: I remained at home. I only saw the results of these pogroms
afterwards in the shape of destroyed Jewish firms, and in the remains of
the synagogues.
DR. HAENSEL: And to which organizations or groups do you attribute these
events of November 1938?
SEVERING: My own judgment would not have any decisive value, but I tell
you quite frankly, it was the SA or the SS.
DR. HAENSEL: And what makes you think that it was precisely these two
groups?
SEVERING: Because the members of these groups, in my home town of
Bielefeld, were called the instigators of the synagogue fires.
DR. HAENSEL: By whom?
SEVERING: They were indicated by name by the population in general.
DR. HAENSEL: You knew about the concentration camps. Can you still
remember when you heard about them for the first time? It is important
at least to determine the year.
SEVERING: No. I cannot tell you that at the present moment. I can only
reply to your question by referring to individual dates. The first
murder in a concentration camp became known to me when I heard that, in
the Papenburg Concentration Camp, the former member of the German
Reichstag and Police President of Altona had been shot. That could have
been either in 1935 or 1936, I am no longer sure when.
DR. HAENSEL: And later, did you hear of many other such cases, or did
you have personal knowledge of them?
SEVERING: From personal knowledge which is so certain that I could give
it with a clear conscience to the Tribunal only in the cases I mentioned
this morning.
DR. HAENSEL: Were you told that concentration camps were places in which
the political opponents of the regime were to be interned without
anything worse happening to them than loss of liberty?
SEVERING: Whether I was told that?
DR. HAENSEL: Whether you were told that, whether you heard that?
SEVERING: No. On the contrary, I heard that concentration camps meant to
the population the very incarnation of all that is terrible.
DR. HAENSEL: What do you mean by “population”? Do you also mean those
sections of the population who had some official connection with the
Party: small Party members, small SA men and small members of the SS?
SEVERING: I cannot say anything about that since I conversed nearly
exclusively with opponents of the system.
DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that these opponents with whom you conversed
presented a united front against anyone who wore a party emblem or a
badge of some organization?
SEVERING: No. This question upon which you are dwelling affects wide
sections of the population, their general humanitarian feeling, and
their feeling of indignation about conditions in the camps, as and when
the facts became known.
DR. HAENSEL: I asked my question with the intention of hearing whether
this feeling of indignation was noticeable even in people who actually
wore the emblem of the Party.
SEVERING: I assume so, but I cannot offer it to the Tribunal as a fact.
DR. HAENSEL: But were even these people exposed to the considerable
pressure which you have alluded to?
SEVERING: They probably felt that their Party membership rendered them,
in a certain sense, immune.
DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that many people became members in order to
benefit by this immunization?
SEVERING: Yes, I believe so.
DR. HAENSEL: I heard that you yourself were a member of the NSV; is that
true?
SEVERING: No.
DR. HAENSEL: Is it true that you were arrested after 20 July 1944?
SEVERING: I have already answered that question this morning. I was not
arrested.
DR. HAENSEL: You were never arrested at all?
SEVERING: No, with the exception of the one case which I also mentioned
this morning.
DR. HAENSEL: Did you at any time express the opinion that what had been
achieved in Germany in the social sphere after 1933 did, to a
considerable extent, represent the ideal of previous governments?
SEVERING: Yes, I expressed this as follows: “What was new was not good,
and what was good was not new.”
DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that any German, be he a Party member, a
member of the SS or not, must have had any knowledge of events at
Auschwitz of which you yourself knew nothing at all?
SEVERING: No. He would not necessarily have to possess this knowledge. I
would not go so far as to say that. But he might, perhaps, have known
about it.
DR. HAENSEL: And what exactly do you mean by “He might, perhaps, have
known about it”?
SEVERING: Through guards escorting the transport echelons. They did not
always remain in the area of the concentration camps; they usually
returned.
DR. HAENSEL: And if they were sworn to the strictest secrecy?
SEVERING: Then they could not tell anything.
DR. HAENSEL: Do you know of cases where people were condemned for
speaking of such matters?
SEVERING: No.
DR. HAENSEL: Did you ever hear anything about the activities of the
“special courts”?
SEVERING: No, in any case I heard nothing in connection with these
particular activities of the “special courts.”
DR. HAENSEL: But the sentences pronounced against people who listened to
foreign broadcasts (Schwarzhörer) and to people accused of spreading
so-called false rumors, were published very often in the papers. Did you
never read them?
SEVERING: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I have only one question to ask you. You told
us this morning that in 1919 you were a member of the Weimar National
Assembly. May I ask what the attitude of the National Assembly
was—particularly of the faction of the Social Democrats of whom you too
were a leader—towards the problem of the Austrian “Anschluss”?
SEVERING: During the time of the sessions of the Weimar National
Assembly I was Reich and State Commissioner for the Rhineland and
Westphalia, and was seldom able to participate in the debates of the
Weimar National Assembly. I therefore have no detailed knowledge as to
how these matters were formulated or expressed. But one thing I do know
and that is, that it was practically the unanimous wish of the Assembly
to include a paragraph, or an article in the Constitution, ratifying the
“Anschluss” of Austria to Germany.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
MAJOR JONES: Herr Minister, you have told the Tribunal that in 1928 the
Defendant Raeder assured you solemnly that there would be no further
violations of the Treaty of Versailles without the knowledge of the
Reich Cabinet. Did Raeder fulfill that assurance?
SEVERING: I have already stated this morning that I cannot answer that
in any positive sense. I can only state that violations of the agreement
of 18 October 1928 by the Naval Command did not come to my knowledge.
MAJOR JONES: Did you know, for instance, of the construction in Cadiz,
in Spain, of a 750-ton U-boat under German direction between the years
1927 and 1931?
SEVERING: No, no.
MAJOR JONES: My Lord, the authority for that statement of fact is the
Document D-854.
And, Herr Minister, did you know that after its completion in 1931 that
U-boat carried out trial runs under German direction and with German
personnel?
SEVERING: No, I did not know anything about that either.
THE PRESIDENT: I think he said he didn’t know of any violations.
MAJOR JONES: I am putting to you certain matters, and I suggest to you,
Herr Minister, that it may well be that you were being deceived during
this time. Do you agree with me about that?
SEVERING: I would not deny the possibility of deception, but I must very
definitely declare that I did not know anything of the construction of a
submarine.
MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at the Document C-156. This is a new
extract from Captain Schüssler’s _Fight of the Navy against Versailles_.
You will see that the following entry appears on Pages 43 and 44.
“In 1930 Bartenbach succeeded, in Finland also, in making
preparations for the construction of a U-boat answering to the
military demands of the German Navy. The Naval Chief of Staff,
Admiral Dr.h.c. Raeder, decided, as a result of the reports of
the Chief of the General Naval Office, Konteradmiral Heusinger
Von Waldegg, and of Captain Bartenbach, to supply the means
required for the construction of the vessel in Finland. A
250-ton plan was chosen for this U-boat, so that the amount of
1½ million Reichsmark was sufficient for carrying out the
project.
“The fundamental intention was to create a type of U-boat which
would permit the inconspicuous preparation of the largest
possible number of units which could be assembled at shortest
possible notice.”
Herr Minister, did you know that 1½ million Reichsmark were spent in
1930 in connection with this U-boat construction?
SEVERING: I have stated this morning that I was Minister in the Reich
Ministry of the Interior from 1928 to 1930. I consider it necessary to
determine these dates a bit more precisely. I resigned on 30 March 1930.
If the year 1930 is mentioned in a general way, then it is not
impossible that everything mentioned here was carried out after 30 March
1930.
MAJOR JONES: You have said that the rearmament that went on when you
were connected with the Government of Germany was purely defensive. When
did you realize that the Nazi Government’s rearmament was not defensive
but aggressive? At what date did you come to that conclusion?
SEVERING: From 30 January 1933 on. That both the choice and the
appointment of Hitler as Chancellor of the Reich meant war, was not in
the least doubted by me and my political friends.
MAJOR JONES: So that you realized from the first day of Nazi power that
the Nazi Government intended to use force or the threat of force to
achieve its political aims; is that right?
SEVERING: I do not know if knowledge and conviction are identical. I was
convinced of it, and so were my political friends.
MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you one or two questions about the Defendant
Von Papen. Did Papen use force in carrying out the Putsch which brought
him to power in July 1932?
SEVERING: Von Papen did not personally exercise such force, but he did
order it. When, on the morning of 20 July 1932, I refused to surrender
voluntarily the office of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior to the
man who had been appointed by Von Papen as my successor, I explained to
him that I had no intention of doing so and in order to make my protest
more emphatic, I pointed out that I would only give way to force. And
then force was used in the evening of 20 July in my office. The newly
appointed police president of Berlin appeared in my office, accompanied
by two police officers. I asked these gentlemen whether they were
authorized by the President of the Reich or by the Reich Chancellor to
carry out this mission. When they answered “yes,” I stated that I would
leave my office rather than cause the shedding of blood.
MAJOR JONES: Did the Defendant Papen, when he secured power, purge the
police and the government of anti-Nazis?
SEVERING: Yes. There are numerous indications that the intention existed
to purge the police of all republican elements and to replace them with
men who were first devoted to Von Papen and then to the National
Socialists.
MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you one or two questions about the Defendant
Göring.
The Defendant Göring has stated, and the entry is on Page 5837 of the
transcript of the proceedings (Volume IX, Page 258), that the
institution of protective custody existed in Germany before the Nazis
came into power. Is that true?
SEVERING: I would say that the institution of protective custody did
exist, theoretically, and it was last formulated in the Prussian Police
Administrative Law, in Paragraph 15. During my term of office protective
custody was never applied in normal civilian life. The regulations in
Paragraph 15 of the Police Administrative Law stipulated quite
definitely that if anybody was taken into protective custody the police
administration was obliged to bring him before the courts within 24
hours. This procedure is in no way identical with that protective
custody, the threat of which for decades remained suspended over the
peaceful citizens of the State.
MAJOR JONES: And, of course, there were no concentration camps in
pre-Nazi Germany, I take it?
SEVERING: Never.
MAJOR JONES: How many of your political associates and colleagues of the
Social Democratic Party were murdered in concentration camps while
Göring was still Chief of the Gestapo?
SEVERING: It is very difficult to make an estimate. You might say 500,
you might also say 2,000. Reliable information is now being collected.
My estimate is that at least 1,500 Social Democrats, or trade-union
officials, or editors were murdered.
MAJOR JONES: And how many Communist leaders do you think were murdered
during Göring’s period of power over the Gestapo?
SEVERING: I would assume that if you include among the Communist leaders
also such trade union officials, who considered themselves members of
the Communist Party, then approximately the same figure would be
reached.
MAJOR JONES: Did Göring personally have any knowledge of these murders?
SEVERING: That I cannot say. If I were to answer that question, then I
should have to ask myself what I would have done in case it had been one
of my functions to administer camps in which the fate of tens of
thousands was being decided.
I am not sure whether it is of any interest to the Tribunal if I were to
give you one or two examples from my own experience.
In 1925 I had to create a camp for refugees from Poland.
MAJOR JONES: You need not trouble to go into that, Herr Minister.
SEVERING: No? At any rate I would have considered it my first and
foremost task to inquire whether, in the camps which I had installed,
the principles of humanitarianism were being adhered to. I was under the
impression that this was not being done. I always reminded my police
officials that they were servants of the people and that everyone in
those camps should be humanely treated. I told them that never again
should the call resound in Germany, “Protect us from the police.”
(“Schutz vor Schutzleuten”). I myself demanded punishment for police or
other officials when I was under the impression that defenseless
prisoners were being ill-treated by members of the police.
MAJOR JONES: As Minister of the Interior, did you become familiar with
the organized terror of the SA against the non-Nazi population of
Germany in the years after 1921?
SEVERING: Oh yes. Keeping an eye on the so-called armed organizations
was one of my most important tasks during my term of office in Prussia.
The roughest of all the armed organizations proved to be the SA. They
sang songs such as: “Clear the streets for the Brown Battalions” and
with the same arrogance with which they sang these songs, they forcibly
became masters of the streets, wherever they encountered no adversary
worth mentioning. Another rowdy song of theirs seemingly illustrated
their program: “Hang the Jews and shoot the bigwigs.” Wherever the SA
could exercise terror unhindered, they raged and blustered in such
style. They waged beer-hall battles with people of different opinion.
These were not the customary skirmishes between political opponents
during election fights. No, this was organized terror. During the first
Jewish boycott in 1933, they stood on guard to frighten those customers
from buying in department stores who were accustomed to buy in these
stores. As the Tribunal already know, they organized the terror actions
of 8 November 1938. In 1930 they also damaged numerous Jewish shops in
Berlin, possibly as a worthy prelude to the convening of the Reichstag
into which 107 National Socialists entered at the time, as we know.
MAJOR JONES: Finally, I want to ask you one or two questions about the
Defendant Schacht.
When did you first hear of Schacht’s relations with the Nazi leaders?
SEVERING: In 1931 I received information from the police administration
in Berlin, that interviews had been taking place between Mr. Schacht and
the leaders of the National Socialist German Workers Party.
MAJOR JONES: Did you have any connections with Schacht in 1944?
SEVERING: If the matter is of any interest here to anybody, I actually
refused these connections. Schacht—although I held him in high esteem
as an economic expert—was known to me as a rather unreliable person in
political matters. By joining the Harzburg Front, Schacht betrayed the
cause of democracy. This was not only an act of ingratitude, for it was
only through the Democrats that he ever reached the post of President of
the Reichsbank, but it was also a great mistake since he and others of
the same social standing by joining the Harzburg Front first made the
National Socialists—so to speak—socially acceptable.
I could not, for this very reason, agree to any co-operation with
Schacht on 20 July 1944, and when in March 1943 I was asked to join a
government which was to overthrow Hitler, I categorically refused to do
so, giving Schacht’s machinations and sundry other circumstances as my
excuse.
MAJOR JONES: What was your reason for that?
SEVERING: I have just indicated these reasons. My friend Leuschner, who
was hanged, together with other young Social Democrats—Von Harnack,
Weber, Maas—my friend Leuschner and I discussed the composition of such
a government. Leuschner informed me that a general would probably be the
President of the Reich, and another general would be the Minister for
War. I pointed out that Schacht in all probability would become
financial or economic dictator, since Schacht was suitable for such a
post through his actual or alleged connections with American business
circles. But these connections between Schacht and—in National
Socialist parlance—between plutocracy and militarism, this connection,
I say, appeared to me so compromising to the cause of democracy,
especially to the cause of Social Democracy, that I was under no
circumstances prepared to become a member of any cabinet in which
Schacht would be the financial dictator.
MAJOR JONES: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine?
DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, the Prosecutor has just talked about the
construction of a U-boat in Finland and of a U-boat in Cadiz. With
regard to the construction of the U-boat in Cadiz, he has referred to
D-854. I presume that this document is unknown to you.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, the witness said he knew nothing about
either of those instances.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.
[_Turning to the witness._] Do you not remember that during that
discussion Admiral Raeder and Reichswehrminister Gröner mentioned the
Finland U-boat?
SEVERING: I do not remember.
DR. SIEMERS: You do not know about it? And now—a leading question: Is
it true that the agreement made on 18 October 1928 stipulated that the
Chief of the Naval Command Staff was obligated to keep the
Reichswehrminister informed and the Minister of the Reichswehr, in his
turn, would inform the other Ministers of the Cabinet?
SEVERING: As far as I can remember, the agreement or the promise of the
two Chiefs of the Command Staffs was that the Cabinet should, generally
speaking, be kept informed about all questions. That was technically
possible only in the manner in which you have just indicated, that is to
say, that the Reichswehrminister would be the first to be informed and
that he, in turn, would pass this information on to the Cabinet.
DR. SIEMERS: So that there was no obligation, on Raeder’s part,
currently to report to you or to appear before the Cabinet?
SEVERING: That would have been quite an unusual measure, just as the
meeting of 18 October was in itself unusual; the members of the Cabinet
consisted either of the Ministers or of their official representatives.
DR. SIEMERS: So that the further management of the matter would
technically be handled by the Reichswehrminister?
SEVERING: Technically by the Reichswehrminister and politically by the
Cabinet.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. I have no further questions to put to
the witness.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): On what legal
regulation was your exemption from the duties of Minister of the
Interior in Prussia, on 20 July 1932, based?
SEVERING: The release from my duties?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. The release from your duties.
SEVERING: It was based on Article 48.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Who, on the strength of Article 48, issued emergency
decrees?
SEVERING: This emergency decree was issued by the Reich President, who
alone was entitled to do so.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was the fact that you were removed from office on 20
July, under the circumstances which you have just described, based on
the fact that Von Papen and Hindenburg, who issued the decree, were of
the opinion that the emergency decree was legal, whereas it was your
point of view that the legal basis for the emergency decree did not
exist and in consequence you remained in your office?
SEVERING: I was of the opinion, and it was later confirmed by the
Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) that the President of the Reich was
authorized on the strength of Article 48 to issue directives for the
maintenance of peace and order; and if he did not see in the Prussian
Ministers, and particularly in myself as Minister of Police, sufficient
guarantee that this peace and order would be insured in Prussia, he had
the right to relieve us of our police functions, and especially to
exclude us from all other executive measures. But he did not have the
right to discharge us as ministers.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it known to you that the highest court in Germany, the
State Court of Justice, on 25 October 1932 issued a statement to the
effect that the decree of the Reich President of 20 July 1932 was
compatible with the Constitution insofar as it had appointed the Reich
Chancellor as Reich Commissioner for Prussia and authorized him
temporarily to deprive Prussian Ministers of their official functions
and to assume these functions personally.
SEVERING: I have just explained the meaning of that decision of the High
Court of Justice.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: One more question: Did Von Papen, then Reich
Commissioner, in carrying out certain changes in personnel, bring
National Socialists into the police force?
SEVERING: I cannot say. The political character of the police officials
was not outwardly recognizable. That might be the case with
Oberpräsidenten, Regierungspräsidenten and police presidents, but not
with every simple police official.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it true that Von Papen gave the key position of police
president in Berlin to the former police president of Essen, Melcher,
who in your time was already police president of a large city?
SEVERING: That is correct.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Now then, the witness can retire and the Tribunal will
now adjourn.
How many more witnesses have you got?
DR. SIEMERS: I now have the witnesses, Freiherr Von Weizsäcker and Vice
Admiral Schulte-Mönting, the Chief of Staff. The examination of
Schulte-Mönting will take up some time, whereas I shall be through with
Freiherr Von Weizsäcker in a short while.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. SIEMERS: If it please Your Honors, may the Witness Freiherr Von
Weizsäcker, be called?
[_The witness Von Weizsäcker took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
ERNST VON WEIZSÄCKER (Witness): Ernst von Weizsäcker.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SIEMERS: Baron Von Weizsäcker, at the beginning of the war you were
State Secretary in the Foreign Office, is that correct?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: You will recollect that on 3 September 1939, that is on the
first day of the war between Germany and England—the English passenger
ship _Athenia_ was torpedoed northwest of Scotland. There were American
passengers on board. The sinking of the ship naturally caused a great
sensation. Please tell the Tribunal how this matter was treated
politically, that is, by you.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I remember this incident, but I am not certain whether
it was a British or an American ship. In any case, the incident alarmed
me very greatly at the time. I inquired of the Naval Operations Staff
whether a German naval unit could have sunk the ship. After this was
denied, I begged the American Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Alexander Kirk, to
call on me and told him that no German naval unit could have
participated in the sinking of the _Athenia_. I asked the Chargé
d’Affaires to take cognizance of this fact and to cable this information
to Washington without delay, adding that it was most important in the
interests of our two nations—Germany and America.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, you had contacted the Navy before
taking these steps?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you, at this first conversation, talk to Admiral Raeder
personally or did you speak with some other officer?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I could not say that now, but I did get definite
information. I am sorry I cannot give you the full details. But I did
receive a definite answer that no German naval unit was involved. That
satisfied me.
DR. SIEMERS: In connection with this subject did you, on the same day or
shortly after, visit Admiral Raeder and discuss this matter further with
him?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that is true. I can recall. Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder tell you on this occasion that it could not have
been a German U-boat, since reports coming in from the U-boats said that
the distance from the nearest U-boat was too great, that is—about 75
nautical miles?