no connection. If Hitler had thought it necessary to remove the men in
high positions who opposed him in such matters, he would have had to
remove me long ago. But he never said anything about it to me, and I
have never noticed that he said anything like that because I
contradicted him. I have frequently pointed out, with regard to that
very question of England and France, that no war should be caused there;
and I never had the impression that he ever took it amiss.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just let us take it very shortly. Within 6
weeks of the disgrace of Blomberg and the removal of Von Fritsch, the
Anschluss with Austria took place.
Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not know that there were
pretended military preparations for the Anschluss with Austria, the ones
described by General Jodl in his diary and also described by Field
Marshal Keitel? Did you know that these threats of military action would
have been made?
RAEDER: I do not believe that I ever took part in a military discussion
concerning the Austrian Anschluss, because actually I had nothing to do
with it. But I should like to emphasize here, once and for all, that I
learned of such enterprises as, for instance, the annexation of Austria
through a directive issued by the Führer, and not before, because one
copy of these directives, regardless of whether or not they concerned
the Navy, was always sent to me as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. So,
of course, I must have received a directive in this case, too.
Unfortunately, I cannot tell you the date of it; but I confirm that a
directive came to my knowledge.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, the point that I am putting—and I do
not want to waste time on it—is this: That on the 5th of November
Hitler said that he was going to get Austria in 1943 to 1945 at the
latest, and earlier if an opportunity arises. Four months later, in
March 1938, he takes Austria after having got rid of the people who
threw cold water on his plans. But if you did not know about it, we
shall not waste time, but shall look at Czechoslovakia, because there
you did get the decree.
You will find that on Page 163 of Document Book 10a, Page 276 of the
German document book. That is the distribution of the directive for
operations against Czechoslovakia. It is bringing up to date the one of
the 24th of June, and you will see that its execution must be assured as
from the 1st of October 1938, at the latest, and Copy Number 2 goes to
you as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
Now, if you will turn over the page to the actual directive, 146 of the
English document book, 277 to 278, you see the first sentence of
Paragraph 1, “Political Prerequisites”:
“It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by
military action in the near future. It is the job of the
political leaders to await or bring about the politically or
militarily suitable moment.”
RAEDER: May I ask where it is? I do not seem able to find it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The first sentence in the directive, Paragraph
1, Political Prerequisites—Sentence 1: “It is my unalterable decision
to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future.”
RAEDER: The numbering is confused here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very sorry. Page 277, 278.
RAEDER: Yes. Now I have found it. What was the date?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 28th of May 1938, that is approximately six
months after the meeting which you had attended at which Hitler had said
he would attack Czechoslovakia at the earliest opportunity that he
could. Didn’t that make you think that Hitler’s speech in November was
not merely froth but was stating his plans?
RAEDER: No, because he kept on changing his decisions all the summer. He
made a fresh decision every month. That can be seen from Document
388-PS. And it was like this, I believe: on 10 September troops began to
assemble and on the same day negotiations were started. On 1 October the
peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland took place, after the other
powers had agreed to that at Munich. After the Munich negotiations...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We all know that. The point is perfectly
clear...
RAEDER: I should like to finish.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In May, here were the plans, and the Führer had
mentioned—in his speeches he had expressed this: that it was his
determination at the end of May to smash Czechoslovakia by military
action. Are you telling the Tribunal that you read that directive and
still took the view that Hitler had not got aggressive intentions? That
is the question.
RAEDER: Yes, at the end of May.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why, what more proof could you want than his own
determination to smash it? What clearer proof could you want?
RAEDER: He frequently said that he intended to smash something and then
did not do it. The question was peacefully solved then. I should like to
add that on 30 May—I believe that was the date—after mobilization had
just been carried out in Czechoslovakia, and that had led him to use
such stern words then, and from this—I think he was justified in doing
so, for this mobilization could only be directed against Germany, and as
I said, he changed his opinion at least three or four times in the
course of the summer, saying again and again that he would reserve his
decision and—or that he did not wish to use military force.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the Tribunal have gotten the whole of the
388-PS document in mind. I won’t argue it. You say that didn’t convince
you.
When Hitler went into Prague on the 15th of March 1939, did it then
occur to you that there might be something in what he said in the
interview on the 5th of November 1937 when he occupied the Slav part of
Bohemia and Moravia and broke his own rule about keeping Germany for the
Germans? Did it then occur to you that he might not then have been
joking or merely talking froth in November? Did it?
RAEDER: He had issued a directive saying that the aims for that year
were:
1) The defense of Germany against outside attack.
2) The settlement of the rest of Czechoslovakia in case she adopted a
line of policy hostile to Germany.
I heard nothing at all about his negotiations with Hacha and his
decision following them to occupy Czechoslovakia. I only knew that he
wanted to take action against Czechoslovakia according to his directive,
in case Czechoslovakia should adopt a line of policy hostile to Germany;
and according to the propaganda at that period, that actually did occur.
I had nothing at all to do with the occupation of Czechoslovakia; nor
with the occupation of the Sudeten area, because the only service which
we could have rendered in these operations was our small Danube Flotilla
which was subordinated to the Army for this purpose so that I had
nothing at all to do with it. There were no other military orders.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is your answer that even when Hitler went
into Prague on the 15th of March 1939, you still thought he had no
aggressive intentions? Is that what you want the Tribunal to believe
from you? Is that right?
RAEDER: Yes, I ask the Tribunal to do so because I believe that he did
not want to fight a war, to conduct a campaign against Czechoslovakia.
By means of his political measures with Hacha he succeeded so far that
war did not break out.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh yes, you heard the Defendant Göring give his
evidence that he told President Hacha that his armed forces would bomb
Prague if he didn’t agree. If that is not war, it is next door to it,
isn’t it?
RAEDER: It is very close to it. Yes, a threat.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let’s go further on for another 2 months.
If you didn’t see it, on March—on the 23rd of May—when you came to the
Reich Chancellery there were six high-ranking officers, of which you
were one. And Hitler said that he would give you an indoctrination on
the political situation. And his indoctrination was that, “We are left
with a decision to attack Poland at the first opportunity.” When you
heard him say that on the 25th of May, did you still think he had no
aggressive intentions?
RAEDER: I thought so for a long time after that. Just as Generaloberst
Jodl said, since he had solved the Czech problem by purely political
means, it was to be hoped that he would be able to solve the Polish
question also without bloodshed; and I believed that up to the last
moment, up to 22 August.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just take one glance—I shan’t keep you long—at
Document L-79, which you will find on Page 74, I think it is, of
Document Book 10. I am sorry. Page 298 of the German document book. I
beg your pardon. I am not going to ask you about the document because
the Tribunal has dealt with that. I want you to look at the people who
were there—298 in the German document book.
RAEDER: I know the people who were there.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s look: Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt; he was
afterwards General, Hitler’s principal adjutant, and killed on the 20th
of July, 1944, isn’t that right? Then the Defendant Göring,
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force; yourself as Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy; Colonel General Von Brauchitsch who was Commander-in-Chief of
the Army; General Keitel who was head of the OKW; General Milch who was
Göring’s Deputy; Halder who was Chief of Staff; Schniewind who was your
Chief of Staff; and Jeschonnek who was I think a Chief of Staff or a
high...
RAEDER: Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. And Colonel Warlimont, who was General
Jodl’s assistant.
Now, what do you think Hitler got these high-ranking generals for, and
told them, “We are left with a decision to attack Poland at the first
opportunity,” if he hadn’t any aggressive intentions? What were these
people there for if it wasn’t to develop a war?
RAEDER: I have already explained that the main purpose of that speech,
as may be seen from the last part of it, was to give a purely academic
lecture on the conduct of war, and on the basis of that lecture to
create a special study staff, a project which the chiefs of the Armed
Forces had so far strongly opposed. I also explained at the start that
his explanations were at first the most confused that I have ever heard
regarding the matter, and that he issued no directives in regard to them
but that the last lines read: “The branches of the Wehrmacht determine
what will be built. There will be no alteration in the shipbuilding
program. The armament programs are to be fixed for 1943 or 1944.” When
he said that, he could certainly not have intended to solve the Polish
question by a war in the near future.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that when he said,
“We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair; further successes
cannot be obtained without the shedding of blood,” you paid no attention
to it at all? You are seriously telling the Tribunal that you paid no
attention to that?
RAEDER: No, I certainly did not at all, because by this time I was
getting to know Hitler and was familiar with the exaggerations contained
in his speeches.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At this time you had already had the directives
for a surprise attack on Danzig, in November 1938. You had had the
directive on the 3rd of April for the Fall Weiss, and you know this
whole matter was _en train_. Are you seriously, Defendant, telling the
Tribunal that you had any doubt after the 23rd of May that Hitler
intended war against Poland and was quite prepared to fight England and
France, if they carried out their guarantee? I mean, seriously, I give
you this chance before we adjourn: Do you say that you had any doubt at
all?
RAEDER: Of course; I have surely explained that even in August I was
still doubtful. For instance, in estimating this speech, I must compare
it, as has already been done here, with the speech which Hitler had made
a few weeks earlier at the launching of the _Bismarck_, where he spoke
only of the peace of true justice. Those speeches were decisive for me.
I did not base my conclusions on this particular speech which is
reproduced in such an extremely confused manner; and that I proved by
the fact that during the whole of the summer I never said a word to the
Navy to suggest that war might break out in the autumn. Confirmation of
that was given here; and anybody can give further confirmation. I
thought very highly of Hitler’s political ability and even on 22 August,
when we were informed of the pact with Russia, I was still convinced
that we should again be able to find a peaceful solution of the problem.
That was my definite conviction. I may be accused of faulty judgment,
but I thought I had formed a correct estimate of Hitler.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I understand you to say that even on the
22nd of August you didn’t think that Hitler had any aggressive
intentions. Do you really mean that?
RAEDER: Yes, and there is a perfectly good reason for it, because there
was every prospect of our forming an alliance with Russia. He had given
all sorts of reasons why England and France would not intervene; and all
those who were assembled there drew from that the sincere hope that he
would again be successful in getting out of the affair without fighting.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will this be a convenient time to adjourn, My
Lord?
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am most anxious not to take up
unnecessary time. With regard to the meeting of the 22d of August, Your
Lordship may remember that Dr. Siemers raised a point as to the two
accounts of the meeting, one in Documents 1014-PS and 798-PS and the
other in the account by Admiral Böhm. I have had a comparison made out
in English and German showing the points which are similar to both, and
I thought it would be more convenient just to put that in. Let Dr.
Siemers see the German copy and make any suggestion at the appropriate
time rather than spend any time in cross-examining the witness as to any
differences in the accounts. My Lord, with the permission of the
Tribunal, I will put that in now and hand Dr. Siemers a copy so that he
can draw the Tribunal’s attention to any points at a convenient stage.
THE PRESIDENT: Did not Admiral Böhm make the accounts?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution’s account is in two
documents, 798-PS and 1014-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There was another document which was mentioned
by my friend, Mr. Alderman, but not put in. It was an account by a
journalist which was the first account the Prosecution had had, but when
they got the two accounts from the OKW files, they did not use their
first one; so I had only taken the two accounts from the OKW files and
Admiral Böhm’s account.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. But does not that make three documents in all, apart
from the one which has been left out?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, and I have taken each of the two
and compared it with Admiral Böhm’s.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So, on that I shall not pursue this interview. I
thought that it would save time.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I’d like you, therefore, Defendant, to look
at Document Number 789-PS, which is at Page 261 of Book 10a and Pages
438 to 440 of the German book—438 to 440. This is the note, Defendant,
of a conference on the 23d of November 1939 with Hitler, to which all
Supreme Commanders were ordered. Do you see that at the beginning, Pages
438 to 440? Do you see what it says, “to which all Supreme Commanders
are ordered”? Were you present?
RAEDER: Yes, it is the conference during the war on 23 November 1939.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Were you present?
RAEDER: I was present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who were the other commanders-in-chief who were
present?
RAEDER: The commanders-in-chief of the Army, the Air Force, and a
considerable number of generals of the Army.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The “Oberbefehlshaber”?
RAEDER: Yes, but in the Army...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, I want you to look at a passage. The
paragraph begins: “One year later, Austria came. This step also was
considered very hazardous.”
Do you see that? Do you see that paragraph?
RAEDER: Yes, I have got it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Much obliged. Now, I just want you to look at
the next few sentences.
“It brought about a considerable strengthening of the Reich. The
next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. But this step was
not to be accomplished in one move. First of all, the West Wall
had to be finished in the West. It was not possible to reach the
goal in one bound. It was clear to me from the first moment that
I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. It
was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia
was made. Then followed the establishment of the Protectorate
and with that the basis for the conquest of Poland was laid, but
I was not yet clear at that time whether I should start first
against the East and then against the West or vice-versa. Moltke
often had to ponder over the same things in his time. Of
necessity it came to a fight with Poland first. I shall be
accused of wanting to fight and fight again; in struggle I see
the fate of all beings. Nobody can avoid a struggle if he does
not want to go under. The increasing population requires a
larger living space. My goal was to create a logical relation
between the population and the living space.”
Whatever you had understood up to that time, you appreciated then, that
Hitler himself had had a consistent and clear aim of aggression
throughout these matters that I put to you this morning; did you not?
RAEDER: Yes, but now we were already in the middle of a war and he was
looking at these things retrospectively. Also, he wanted to make it
clear to the generals, with whom he had a conflict at that time, that he
had always been right in his political conceptions. That is the reason
why he quoted all these detailed points again.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, would you turn over to Pages 445-448,
which is Page 264 of the English document book, German document book
Pages 445-448. Have you got that?
RAEDER: Perhaps you would be good enough to read, I have here a...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is the paragraph that begins: “We have an
Achilles heel: The Ruhr.”
RAEDER: I have it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look about halfway down that
paragraph. You will see: “England cannot live without its imports. We
can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines off the English coasts
will bring England to her knees.”
Have you got that passage?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. Now, if you would just listen.
“However, this”—that is bringing England to her knees—“can
only occur when we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a
difficult decision for me. Nobody has ever achieved what I have
achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led
the German people to a great height, even if the world does hate
us now. I am setting this work at stake. I have to choose
between victory or destruction. I choose victory, the greatest
historical choice—to be compared with the decision of Frederick
the Great before the first Silesian War. Prussia owes its rise
to the heroism of one man.”
And there is some more about Frederick the Great and Bismarck:
“My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England
at the most favorable and quickest moment. Violation of the
neutrality of Belgium and Holland is unimportant. No one will
question that when we have won. We shall not give such idiotic
reasons for the violation of neutrality as were given in 1914.
If we do not violate the neutrality, then England and France
will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously.”
Now, do you remember, Defendant, that this was just 3 weeks after the
plans for “Fall Gelb,” that is plans for the attack on Holland and
Belgium, had been issued on 10 November? Do you remember that?
RAEDER: I know that this was discussed here. But we were already at war
with England, therefore at that stage it was no longer necessary to
discuss an attack against England and France and...
SIR. DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were not at war with Holland and Belgium,
were you?
RAEDER: Please, I would like to finish.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, I thought you had finished.
RAEDER: Here it says: “If the French Army marches into Belgium to attack
us, then it will be too late for us. We must be first.”
Hitler at that time stated that he had received definite news that
Belgium would not respect her neutrality and that he also had news
already that certain preparations for the reception of French and
British troops _et cetera_ had already been made. For that reason, he
wanted to forestall an attack from Belgium against us. Apart from that,
in his speech of 22 August 1939, he had made a statement entirely to the
opposite effect. He had said that Belgium and Holland would not break
their neutrality.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with what he said, that the
“Violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is unimportant. No
one will question that when we have won.” Did you agree with that view?
RAEDER: No, it is not exactly my opinion, but I had no cause on my part
to raise any objection against that statement of his at that moment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The view of the Naval War Command was put up to
him a month later with regard to U-boat warfare, was it not? Do you
remember that on 30th December you had a meeting with Hitler, at which
Colonel General Keitel and Fregattenkapitän Von Puttkamer were present?
RAEDER: Yes, I was with him on 30 December.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like you to look at the new document,
which is Document Number C-100, Exhibit Number GB-463.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, ought not this document be identified?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Lordship, of course, is right. I think we
had perhaps better give them two numbers, one for each of the original
PS documents. My Lord, the comparison...
THE PRESIDENT: 1014-PS has a number already, has it not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. That has a number.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought perhaps the comparative document ought to have
a number.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. Shall we call one comparison Exhibit
Number GB-464, the comparison of Document Number 798-PS; and the
comparison of Document Number 1014-PS, Exhibit Number GB-465?
THE PRESIDENT: I have only got one here, as far as I can see.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am going to get some more done. I am
afraid I have passed out only a limited number at the moment, but I will
have some more run off.
464, 798; GB-465 will be 1014-PS. It will be the comparison of Document
Number 798-PS with the Raeder Document, and Exhibit Number GB-465 will
be the comparison of Document Number 1014-PS in the Raeder document
book.
I am very much obliged to Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Now you are going to give us Document Number C-100?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: C-100, My Lord, yes.
Defendant, I will be grateful if you will turn over a few pages to where
it comes to a report, the date of 30 December 1939, and then after that
there is an enclosure to the report to the Führer of 30 December 1939.
Would you look at Paragraph IV, which says:
“With regard to the form and the moment for the commencement of
further intensification of the war at sea, the decision of the
supreme war command to begin the general intensification of the
war with an offensive in the West is of decisive importance.”
Have you got that, Paragraph IV?
RAEDER: Page?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am afraid the paging is different.
RAEDER: “With regard to the form”—yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “With regard to the form and the moment
for the commencement of further intensification of the war at
sea, the decision of the supreme war command to begin the
general intensification of the war with an offensive in the West
is of decisive importance.
“I. Possibility: The decision of the Führer is made in favor of
a Western offensive, beginning very shortly, within the
framework of the instructions issued for this to date, by
violating the neutrality of other states:
“In this case the intensified measures for the war at sea will
in their political effect only represent a small part of the
entire intensification of the war. The gradual change-over to
the intensified form of waging the war at sea within the
American restricted zone, with the ultimate aim of a ruthless
employment of all means of warfare to interrupt all commerce
with England, is therefore proposed with the start of the
offensive.
“Immediate anticipation of individual intensified measures for
the war at sea is not necessary and may be postponed until the
start of the general intensification of the war. The benevolent
neutrals Italy, Spain, Japan and Russia as well as America, are
to be spared as far as possible.”
Isn’t that right, that you contemplated that Hitler’s violation of the
neutrality of the Low Countries would cover, by being a more important
matter, your adopting the most ruthless methods of war at sea? Isn’t
that right?
RAEDER: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What does that mean if it does not mean that?
What does that mean if it does not mean what I have put to you?
RAEDER: With the beginning of the offensive in the West, Hitler also
wanted a certain more energetic pursuit of the war at sea. For that
reason, he asked me to introduce only at this point the intensified
measures which I considered already justified because of the attitude of
the British forces. These intensifications were very carefully
considered in that memorandum, and they followed step by step the
different steps taken by Britain.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will deal with the memorandum. You need not be
afraid that I will omit that, but what I am putting to you at the moment
is this: That so far from disapproving of the violation of the
neutrality of Holland and Belgium, you on behalf of the Navy were quite
prepared to accompany it by the intensification of submarine warfare;
isn’t that right?
RAEDER: That is twisting my words. I had nothing to do with this
violation of neutrality for we were not there when they marched into
these two countries. The only thing I was interested in was to intensify
the submarine war step by step, so as to meet the measures introduced by
the British, which also violated international law.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am going to come to submarine warfare, but at
the moment I want to try to keep in compartments. There are only two
more points on this aggressive war. I am now going to pass—you can
leave that document for the moment. I will come back to it, Defendant;
you need not be afraid, and I want you to help me on one or two points
in Norway.
With regard to Norway, you were quite content to leave Norway neutral,
not occupied, so long as you had a protected channel up the Norwegian
coast in neutral waters, is that right? That was an important point for
you, to have a channel in neutral waters so that not only your ships,
but also your submarines, could go up and start out from neutral waters,
is that right?
RAEDER: No, I have very clearly explained the origin of the Norwegian
campaign in documents. There was the danger that the British might
occupy Norway, and information of all sorts indicated that. Of course,
if we were forced to occupy the Norwegian coast, then, apart from all
the numerous disadvantages which I have explained, we had the advantage
that we would gain this or that base for our Atlantic submarines.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that the Navy
seriously thought that the British wanted to occupy Norway?
RAEDER: I most certainly thought that. We had so much information about
it that I could have no doubt whatever, and it was fully confirmed later
on.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just ask you, then, to look at just one or two
typical Navy reports. We won’t refer to the document again, but we will
start from there, just to get the time.
You remember, on the 13th of March 1940, General Jodl entered in his
diary that the Führer was still looking for justification; do you
remember that? You remember that, don’t you?
RAEDER: I have already explained once that the expression just used,
“justification,” is wrong, wrongly translated, Jodl wrote “Begründung,”
“reason.” But that is also wrong—please will you let me finish—even
that is incorrect, because the Führer had an abundance of reasons, which
he laid down in the instruction issued on the 1st of March, and it was
known to all of us. I have said that by the expression “Begründung,”
“reason,” he probably meant that he had not yet had a diplomatic note
compiled. He had not told the Foreign Minister anything about it at that
stage. I told you that recently under oath and I repeat it under oath
today.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. That is the meaning that you have given
to it. Well now, will you look at your own Raeder Exhibit Number 81, in
Raeder Document Book 5, Page 376.
RAEDER: May I have Document Book 5?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, you have not got it. I’m sorry. I will get
you one.
Now, that is dealing with the first point, encroachment by the English
into Norwegian territorial waters, and it says:
“An examination of the question as to whether a mass
encroachment by the English into the Norwegian territorial
waters was so immediately imminent that it might represent a
danger to present German shipping produces the opinion that this
is not to be expected at the present time. The ore transports
are to be continued, as no losses have yet occurred.”
Was that your information, that no mass encroachment of Norwegian
territorial waters was to be expected on the 22d of March?
RAEDER: That was not at all my conception. It was the view of Kapitän
zur See Fricke, who was at that time the Chief of the Operations
Department. He did not quite agree with me about the whole of this
question. He was of the opinion that the British should be allowed to
enter Norway first, and then we should throw them out through Sweden, a
completely distorted idea which I could not approve of in any way. I had
such clear information from Quisling and Hagelin, particularly at that
time, the second half of March, that there was no longer any doubt
whatever that within a reasonable time the British would intervene on a
big scale.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that that was Admiral Fricke’s view, and
you didn’t pay attention to it. Well, now, let me look...
RAEDER: I did not concern myself with it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know, Admiral Assmann, whom you have
described as a sound historian, kept a headline diary, and on the next
day he gives an account of a meeting between you and Hitler, and he says
this. This is the same day. You may have read it, because he turns down
your proposal to use U-boats off Halifax. It is the same day, the 23d of
February. Then, at that date, you are quoted as saying that to insure
the supply of ore from Narvik, it would be best to preserve the
neutrality of Norway.
Then, on the 26th of March, Admiral Assmann in his report of the meeting
between you and Hitler records your answers as follows. It is quite
short: “British landing in Norway not considered imminent—Raeder
suggests action by us at the next new moon—to which Hitler agrees.”
That is Admiral Assmann’s report of the meeting between you and Hitler
on the 26th of March: “British landing in Norway not considered
imminent—Raeder suggests action by us at the next new moon, the 7th of
April—to which Hitler agrees.”
Do you remember that?
RAEDER: No. I mean, it is quite improbable that at that moment I should
not have been fully convinced of the imminent landing about which the
whole of Documents 004-PS and 007-PS gave me reliable information. I did
not see the documents, but the information contained in them was fully
available.
Admiral Assmann compiled his notes from all sorts of war diaries and
records. I most certainly never said that because at that time I
reported to Hitler again and again that our preparations which had
already been started a time ago would be complete at the end of January,
and that that would be the time when the landings had to be carried out
for the reasons I always put forward. It is completely wrong to assume
that at that time I had the slightest doubt. Later everything was proved
right...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now really we must...
RAEDER: And later on, it all turned out to be correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We must get down to this matter. You have told
us that Admiral Assmann was a trustworthy officer and good at naval
history.
RAEDER: He is not a deceiver, but he compiled the document from all
sorts of papers and I cannot imagine how he could have arrived at that
statement, I certainly never made it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, but the second part of it, the second
sentence, is right, isn’t it? “Raeder suggests action by us at the next
new moon, the 7th of April.”
That is right; that is when you did invade. That was when your armada
started off to arrive there on the 9th, wasn’t it?
RAEDER: But yes, of course. I was in favor of carrying out the landings
in Norway at the earliest possible time, after ice conditions had
improved, as we had previously decided and as had been ordered by
Hitler. For that I assume full responsibility. There was every reason
for that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well. Again I mustn’t argue with you, but the
point comes to this, that you are saying that Admiral Assmann, who is
right in his second sentence, is not only wrong but entirely wrong—I
mean, stating the opposite of the truth—when he says that the British
landing in Norway was not considered imminent.
Well now, we will just pursue that a little.
RAEDER: I only submitted to the Führer this matter of landing in Norway
on the supposition that this information was available and would
continue to be available.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, what was that document of the 26th of March
1940?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was an extract from the Assmann Diary which
I have used before, and I will have one made up and put in for
identification. I haven’t got it copied yet, My Lord, I am sorry. I
shall have it done.
RAEDER: I should be grateful if perhaps you could show me the document.
You have shown me all the others, but not this one, the one I contest.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I beg your pardon. It is such a short extract I
thought you would take it from me, but the last thing I want is not to
show you any documents.
You see the entry for the 26th of March:
“British landing in Norway not considered imminent. Raeder
suggests action by us at next new moon, 7th of April, to which
Hitler agrees. Further discussions about laying of mines at
Scapa before German invasion of Norway. Hitler agrees with
Raeder and will issue instructions accordingly.”
RAEDER: May I come back to it now. Here it says, the 26th of March 1940:
“Occupation of Norway by British was imminent when the Russian-Finnish
peace was concluded.”
That very Russian-Finnish affair was making it particularly urgent for
us to carry out a landing because the danger existed that the British,
under the pretext of supporting the Finns, would carry out a bloodless
occupation of Norway.
Then I go on to the question of the Führer, whether a landing by the
British in Norway might be imminent. One must consider that Assmann had
summarized all that from war diaries, and this question is explained by
the fact that the Führer wanted to know whether the situation had
changed in any way, because the peace had been signed. However, the
situation had not changed at all, because we knew in reality that the
landings by the British were not to be carried out to help the Finns,
but for other reasons. That question, therefore, whether at the time,
because of the peace treaty, the British landings might be particularly
imminent, was answered by me in the negative. Commander-in-Chief Navy
suggests action by us at next new moon, 7th April—Führer agrees.
Everything remained as before. Only the question whether because of this
peace treaty we ought to land at once, I answered “no.” That is
completely different from what you have been telling me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You read out the entry for the 26th of March.
What is the entry for the 26th of March? You read it out in German and
we can translate it.
RAEDER: “Occupation of Norway by the British was imminent when
the Russian-Finnish peace treaty was signed. Apparently, because
of the treaty, it was postponed. Question by the Führer, whether
at that moment a landing by the British in Norway was imminent,
was answered in the negative by the Commander-in-Chief Navy....”
Yes, that did not mean that because of that we had to renounce the idea.
“Commander-in-Chief Navy suggests action by us at next new moon.” The
reasons for our landing remained the same as before; only the Finnish
business could no longer be used by the British.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The peace treaty, the end of the war with
Finland, had taken place in the middle of March. That was off the map at
that time?
RAEDER: Of course, it was no longer important for us, but our reasons
remained as before.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, will you look at Document Number
D-843. This will be Exhibit Number GB-466. This is a report from your
diplomatic representative in Norway, dated the 29th of March, and at the
end of the first paragraph you will see:
“The British apparently did not want to take upon themselves the
responsibility for openly violating Norwegian territory and
Norwegian territorial waters without cause, and for carrying out
warlike operations in them.”
That is a quotation from the Norwegian Foreign Minister. Then your
diplomatic representative takes it up:
“The future will show whether Foreign Minister Koht sees things
quite right. It definitely appears, however, as I”—that’s the
German Foreign Minister’s representative—“have frequently
pointed out, that the British have no intentions of landing, but
that they want to disturb shipping in Norwegian territorial
waters perhaps, as Koht thinks, in order to provoke Germany. Of
course, it is also possible that the British behavior of last
week, which I have pointed out as well, will grow into more or
less regular and increasing interference in territorial waters
to attack our ore traffic off the Norwegian coast.”
And then Paragraph 3:
“The firm intention of Norway to maintain her neutrality and to
insure that Norway’s neutrality rules be respected can be
accepted as a fact.”
Were you told that your diplomatic representative in Oslo was reporting
that the British had no intentions of landing?
RAEDER: Yes. Dr. Breuer, the Minister to Norway, held a completely wrong
view. He believed Foreign Minister Koht’s assurances even though our
naval attaché kept reporting that Koht was completely on the side of the
British and his assurances were not to be believed. At the same time,
information had been received from Hagelin that the Norwegians were
giving assurances on paper but they themselves had said that they were
doing that only as subterfuge and that they would continue to co-operate
with the British. That is contained in the documents which we have
submitted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us look at another document. Look at
Document Number D-844. This is what your diplomatic representative in
Sweden was saying at the same time. That will be Exhibit Number GB-467,
that is from your representative in Sweden and you will notice that he
quotes Foreign Minister Guenther of Sweden, as first of all—about ten
lines down, just after the name of “Weizsäcker,” you will see:
“The Swedish Government had no reason at all to believe in an
impending action by the Western Powers against Scandinavia. On
the contrary, on the strength of all official reports and other
information, they considered the situation lately to be much
calmer.”
And then he says there is no prospect of a coup against Swedish ore.
Then he goes on to deal with Norway. Without being Anglophile, Guenther
did not believe in a British act of war against Norway either, but, of
course, he could not speak of this with as much certainty as with regard
to Sweden. At any rate, however, the Norwegian Government, with whom he
was in close contact, was of the same opinion. And if you look two
paragraphs farther on, it says:
“In conclusion, Guenther requested me to report his statements
to my government, and repeated that the Swedish Government
attached the greatest value to the German Government not
erroneously getting the impression of the existence of
circumstances which might evoke the possibility—he would not
use the word necessity at all—of special measures by Germany
with regard to Scandinavia.”
And then he says in the last paragraph that the Swedish Foreign Minister
had probably heard of the German preparations.
Now, would you look at Document Number D-845 which will be Exhibit
Number GB-468—that is the next day—from your diplomatic representative
in Stockholm:
“Serious anxiety exists in Swedish military and government
circles regarding possible German military preventive measures
in Scandinavia against the announced intensification of war
measures by the Western Powers. Swedish and Norwegian military
and government authorities consider it unlikely that military
measures will be taken against Scandinavia by the Western
Powers. Press reports on this subject by the Western Powers are
attempting to provoke Germany.”
That is from your military attaché in Stockholm. Were you told about
these reports from Stockholm, were you told of that?
RAEDER: I assume the Führer told me this. But we had no reason at all to
believe these assurances because obviously, quite obviously, Sweden had
considerable interest in our not going to Norway, because Sweden
believed that by so doing we would be able to exercise pressure on
Sweden also. That was what the British wanted, according to the
information we received later. Our minister was completely misinformed
and as a result was not informed by us because it was known that he
sided with Foreign Minister Koht. Our information was so clear, so
frequent and so unequivocal, that we could certainly carry out our
landing with a clear conscience and in fact this proved to be true.
Therefore, there is no point in discussing whether the order on the part
of the British to land in Norway—it was Trondheim, Stavanger and, I
believed, Kristiansand—whether this order was given on 5 April. On the
7th, during the night of the 7th to 8th, as the British reported in a
wireless message, the mine-laying in Norwegian waters was completed by
British ships and on the 7th, troops were shipped on cruisers, the names
of which I forget.
Therefore, this actually took place and my conception was correct and
not Herr Breuer’s who was dismissed immediately after this because he
was a failure. Thereupon, we carried out the landings on the strength of
quite positive information which we can prove in detail. Sweden’s action
is thoroughly understandable.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to argue with you although you
ought to know and I think you do know that there was no British order
for an invasion at all; there was an order for laying mines; but you
took this course as I suggested, you, knowing quite well that no British
invasion was imminent, contrary to your own Chief of Operations, Captain
Fricke, and contrary to all the information from your diplomatic
representatives in Norway. Now, I want to come to another point with
regard to Norway and then I am finished with that. You told the Tribunal
that in your view, using the enemy’s colors was a permissible _ruse de
guerre_ so long as you stopped before you went into action. Do you
remember saying that?
RAEDER: I did not understand.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember telling the Tribunal that
morning that using the enemy’s colors on a warship was a permissible
_ruse de guerre_ so long as you stopped before you went into action. Do
you remember saying that?
RAEDER: Yes; of course, that is the principle which is absolutely
recognized in naval warfare, that at the moment of firing you have to
raise your own flag.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that it is a
recognized procedure in naval warfare to use another country’s colors in
making an attack on a neutral country, an unannounced attack on a
neutral country? There was no war between you and Norway and there was
no reason for there to be any ruse. You were at peace with Norway. Are
you saying that?
RAEDER: It was all a question of pulling down the flag and raising the
German flag if we met the British. We did not want to fight with the
Norwegians at all. It says somewhere that we should first of all try to
effect a peaceful occupation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you give me a precedent even where the
German Navy, before this operation, had ever attacked a neutral country
with which it was at peace, using enemy colors? You tell me when you did
it before?
RAEDER: I do not know. I cannot tell you whether any other navy did it.
I have...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can assume any other navy—I even ask—have
you ever done it?
RAEDER: No, we have not done it and apart from that, we did not do it
because on 8 April, we gave the order by wireless—and you know from our
War Diary—that this should not be done, so it is quite useless to talk
here about what might have been done if it has not been done.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted to get clear on what your views on the
permissibility of naval warfare were. I want to come to one other point,
and then I am finished with this section of the case. With regard to the
attack on the Soviet Union, I am not going to ask you about all your own
views and what you said to Hitler, because you told us that at length;
but I would just like you to look at Document Book 10a, Page 252 of the
English book and Page 424 of the German book.
RAEDER: Which document is it, please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The big one.
RAEDER: I have not got that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Document Number 447-PS.
I am so sorry, My Lord, this is entirely my fault. I beg the Tribunal’s
pardon. I have given the wrong reference. I really wanted him to look at
Page 59 in Document Book 10, Document Number C-170. I am very sorry, My
Lord.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, that is the extract from the Naval
War Diary, the one that I want you to look at is on Page 59, for the
15th of June. “On the proposal of the Naval Operations Staff (SKL) the
use of arms against Russian submarines south of the northern boundary of
Öland warning area...”
Have you got it?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “...is permitted immediately, and ruthless
destruction is to be aimed at.”
Now, would you mind, before I ask you a question, turning back to
Document Number C-38, which is on Page 11, which is Page 19 of your own
document book, German document book, Document Number C-38; Page 11 of
the British document book, and Page 19 of the German. That is an order
of the same date, signed by Defendant Keitel, to the Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy.
“Offensive action against submarines south of the line Memel to
the southern tip of Öland is authorized if the boats cannot be
definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by German
naval forces. The reason to be given up to ‘B’ Day”—that is
Barbarossa—“is that our naval forces are believed to be dealing
with penetrating British submarines.”
Why did you suggest that you should attack the Soviet submarines 6 days
before your own invasion when they wouldn’t be expecting any attack and
there was no question of any war?
RAEDER: As it has already been explained once here, it had happened just
before, that is before the 15th of June, that a submarine had penetrated
into the area of Bornholm, which is a long way to the west, and then had
given wrong recognition signals when the patrol boat near Bornholm
called it. If the wrong recognition signals are given, then it means
that it could not be a German submarine but it must be a foreign one. In
this case, the course of the ship and the location would bring us to the
conclusion that it must be a Russian boat. Apart from that, Russian
submarines at that time had repeatedly been located and reported off
German ports—Memel, for instance, and others. Consequently, we had the
impression that Russian submarines were already occupying positions
outside German ports, either to lay mines or to attack merchant or
warships. For that reason, as a precaution, I had to report this and I
had to propose that we should take action against non-German submarines
in these areas outside German ports. That suggestion was passed on the
same day and this additional statement was made, which, in my opinion,
was not necessary at all, but which prevented complications from
arising.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is still not an answer to my question. I
will put it this way. You considered it right to attack and urge the
ruthless destruction of Soviet submarines 6 days before you attacked the
Soviet Union? You consider that right? And then, to blame it on
penetrating British submarines—this is Keitel’s suggestion—is that
your view of proper warfare?
RAEDER: Well, I consider the first point right because it is always
important to get in before one’s opponent, and this was happening under
certain definite conditions. The second point was ordered by the Führer.
Neither of the two points was ever carried out, and therefore it is
useless, in my opinion, to discuss this matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is something for the Tribunal, and I will
decide what is useful to discuss.
Do I take it, then, that you entirely approve of attacking Soviet
submarines and ruthlessly destroying them 6 days before you start the
war? That is what the Tribunal is to understand, is it?
RAEDER: Yes, if they appeared in our waters to reconnoiter or to carry
out some other war action, then I considered it right. I considered that
better than that our ships should run into Russian mines.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, let us just come, for a short time, to
your views on U-boat warfare. Do you remember the document which I put
to the Defendant Dönitz about the memorandum of the Foreign Office,
Document Number D-851, which became Exhibit Number GB-451?
RAEDER: I have it before me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Right. Well, I will ask about that in a moment.
This is what you said about it when you were answering Dr. Kranzbühler,
I think on Saturday. You said:
“Since the war against England came as a complete surprise to
us, we had up until then dealt very little with detailed
questions of submarine warfare. Among other things, we had not
yet discussed the question of so-called unrestricted submarine
warfare which had played such a very important part in the
previous war. And from that fact it developed that on 3
September, that officer who was recently mentioned here was sent
to the Foreign Office with some points for discussion on the
question of unrestricted submarine warfare, so that we could
clarify with the Foreign Office the question as to how far we
could go.”
Now, do you think that is...
RAEDER: So far as I can recollect, that is the way it happened.
Unrestricted warfare had not been considered.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got the document in front of you?
RAEDER: You mean the one regarding the Foreign Office, Document Number
D-851?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dönitz 851, yes.
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t think this is in any copy, My Lord. Has
Your Lordship a copy?
THE PRESIDENT: No, I don’t think so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I did put it in when I was
cross-examining the Defendant Dönitz.
THE PRESIDENT: It is very likely with our Dönitz papers.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps Your Lordship will allow me to just read
it slowly, for the moment. The document says this:
“The question of an unrestricted U-boat warfare against England
is discussed in the enclosed data submitted by the High Command
of the Navy.
“The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage
to England which can be achieved with the forces available can
only be attained if the U-boats are permitted an unrestricted
use of arms without warning against enemy and neutral shipping
in the prohibited area indicated on the enclosed map. The Navy
does not fail to realize that:
“(a) Germany would thereby publicly disregard the agreement of
1936 regarding the conduct of economic war.
“(b) Conduct of the war on these lines could not be justified on
the basis of the hitherto generally accepted principles of
international law.”
Then, I ought to read this, or point it out. I have dealt with it
before, it is the second last paragraph:
“Points of view based on foreign politics would favor using the
method of unrestricted U-boat warfare only if England gives us a
justification by her method of waging war to order this form of
warfare as a reprisal.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I want you to take it by stages. You
see the paragraph that says:
“The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage
to England which can be achieved with the forces available can
only be attained if U-boats are permitted an unrestricted use of
arms without warning in the area...”
Is that your view? Was that your view on the 3d of September?
RAEDER: No, it is not my view; it is a conditional view. We had given
submarines the order to wage economic war according to the Prize
Ordinance, and we had provided in our War Diary that if the British were
to arm merchant ships or something like that, then certain
intensifications...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you please give me an answer to the
question I asked you? It is a perfectly easy question.
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, isn’t it your view?
RAEDER: In theory, of course, considering the small resources that we
had, the greatest possible damage to England could only be achieved
through—we had to discuss with the Foreign Office just how far we could
go with this intensification. For this reason, this officer was sent
there. The discussions with the Foreign Office resulted in the submarine
memorandum which shows, from beginning to end, that we were trying to
adhere to the existing law as far as possible. The whole memorandum is
nothing more than just that sort of discussion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you answer my question? When this
document says “the Navy has arrived at the conclusion,” is it true that
the Navy had arrived at that conclusion?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that true or not?
RAEDER: But of course, everybody would arrive at that conclusion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is much easier to say “yes” than to give a
long explanation.
Now, let us come to another point. Is it true that you had arrived at
that conclusion without consulting the Flag Officer, U-boats, as the
Defendant Dönitz said when he gave evidence?
RAEDER: Regarding these matters? We only agreed before the submarines
put to sea that they should wage war according to the Prize Ordinance. I
did not ask him whether he wanted to carry out unrestricted U-boat
warfare, because I did not want that. First of all I had to discuss it
with the Foreign Office to find out how far we could go. That was the
purpose of this affair, which was to give individual orders, such orders
which we were entitled to give, step by step, in accordance with the
behavior of the British. This was a question of international law, which
I had to discuss with the expert on international law in the Foreign
Office.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Isn’t it correct that you continued to press
this point of view, the conclusion of which you had arrived at, with the
Foreign Office for the next 3 months? Isn’t it correct that you
continued to press for an unrestricted U-boat warfare within the area
for the next 3 months?
RAEDER: I hardly think so; otherwise I would not have issued the
memorandum of 3 September. Maybe we did go to the Foreign Office and put
on pressure, but what we did is contained in the memorandum and our
measures were intensified step by step, following steps taken by the
British.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, the next step with the Foreign Office
was a conference with Baron Von Weizsäcker, on the 25th of September,
which you will see in Document Number D-852, Exhibit Number GB-469. You
see Paragraph 3 of that document:
“The High Command of the Navy will submit to the Foreign Office
a proposal, as a basis for a communication to the neutral
powers, in which those intensifications of naval warfare will be
communicated, the ordering of which has already taken place or
is impending in the near future. This includes, particularly, a
warning not to use wireless on being stopped, not to sail in
convoy, and not to black-out.”
That was your first step, was it not? That was put up to the Foreign
Office, with a number of other proposals?
RAEDER: Of course! The first measure was that armed merchant ships could
be attacked because as early as 6 or 8 September, a submarine had
stopped a merchant ship, the _Manar_, had fired a warning shot, and had
at once been fired on by the British steamer. Thereupon the submarine
started firing at the merchant ship. Such cases were known. And since
one cannot recognize in every case whether the ship is armed or not, we
assumed that it would lead to all ships being fired at. However, at that
time it was ordered that only armed British merchant ships should be
fired at. Secondly, that ships which sent a wireless message when
stopped could also be shot at, because this use of wireless which was
done by order of the Admiralty would immediately bring to the spot both
naval and air forces, especially the latter which would shoot at the
U-boat.
The first step, therefore, was firing on armed merchant ships—the
passenger steamers were still excepted—and secondly, firing on
blacked-out vessels and firing on those who made use of wireless.
Blacked-out vessels are...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now would you look at Document Number
D-853. I only want you to look at the next document, which will be
Exhibit Number GB-470. I want you to come as soon as possible to this
memorandum of which you talked.
D-853, if you will look at Section II, is a report by the Under
Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, dated the 27th of September,
which goes through these matters which you talked about just now, the
sinking at sight of French and British ships, under the assumption that
they are armed. In Paragraph II it is said:
“The Naval Operations Staff indicated anew that the Führer will
probably order ruthless U-boat warfare in the restricted area in
the very near future. The previous participation of the Foreign
Office remains guaranteed.”
Were you still pressing for absolutely unrestricted warfare within a
large area to the west of Britain and around Britain?
RAEDER: Yes. Insofar as we took intensification actions step by step on
the basis of our observations regarding the attitude of enemy forces,
and that is in those cases where intensification was perfectly justified
and was legally proved.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Baron Weizsäcker’s minutes of
the 14th of October which is Document Number D-857, which will be
Exhibit Number GB-471.
Now, you see, this is after these measures have been taken, which you
have just explained to the Tribunal. Baron von Weizsäcker reports to the
Defendant Von Ribbentrop:
“According to my information, the decision on unrestricted
U-boat warfare against England is imminent. This is at least as
much a political decision as it is a technicality of war.
“A short while ago I submitted my personal view in writing, that
unrestricted U-boat warfare would bring new enemies upon us at a
time when we still lack the necessary U-boats to defeat England.
On the other hand, the Navy’s attitude of insisting on the
opening of unrestricted U-boat warfare is backed by every
convincing reason.”
Then he says that it is necessary to ask for certain information. On
that you put in—on that point you put in your memorandum of the 15th of
October, which, My Lord, is Document Number C-157, and Exhibit Number
GB-224.
RAEDER: First of all, may I say something about the previous document?
This expression “unrestricted U-boat warfare...”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can do it later on, because we have got a
lot of ground to cover here.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal thinks he ought to be allowed to
say what he wants to say on that document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord, if Your Lordship pleases.
Please go on, Defendant, my fault.
RAEDER: Now the two documents are gone. What I wanted to say was that
the expression “unrestricted submarine warfare” on the part of the
Foreign Office originated from the previous World War. In reality, and
during the entire war, we did not wage unrestricted U-boat war in the
sense of the unrestricted submarine warfare of the first World War. Even
there, where he says “unrestricted submarine warfare might be
imminent”—are only ordered very restricted measures, which always were
based on the fact that the British had ordered something on their part.
The chief action on the part of the British was that of militarizing the
entire merchant fleet to a certain extent. That is to say, the merchant
fleet was being armed, and they received the order to use these arms.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t see how that arises out of the last
document at all. Unless the Tribunal wants to go into it, I think we
might pass on.
Doesn’t Your Lordship think so?
RAEDER: Out of both documents. Not out of one only...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have put that point, I should think, at
least seven times this afternoon. I am going to suggest to you that your
real object of the submarine war was set out in the first paragraph of
the memorandum. Would you just look at it? You see “Berlin, 15
October...”
RAEDER: No, I must still say that there was not any unrestricted U-boat
warfare but merely an intensification of measures, step by step, as I
have repeatedly said, and these were always taken only after the British
took some measure. The British...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest that that is an entire untruth, and
that I will show you out of this document. Look at your own document,
this memorandum. In the first paragraph:
“The Führer’s proposal for the restoration...”
RAEDER: I am not telling untruths, I would not think of doing it. I do
not do that sort of thing.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is what I am suggesting to you, and I
will show it out of this document.
“The Führer’s proposal for the restoration of a just, honorable
peace and the new adjustment of the political order in Central
Europe had been turned down. The enemy powers want the war, with
the aim of destroying Germany. In this fight, in which Germany
is now forced to defend her existence and her rights, she must
use her weapons with the utmost ruthlessness, at the same time
fully respecting the laws of military ethics.”
Now, let’s see what you were suggesting.
“Germany’s principal enemy in this war is Britain. Her most
vulnerable spot is her maritime trade. The war at sea against
Britain must therefore be conducted as an economic war, with the
aim of destroying Britain’s fighting spirit within the shortest
possible time and forcing her to accept peace.”
Now, miss one paragraph and look at the next.
“The principal target of our naval strategy is the merchant
ship”—now, let’s look—“not only the enemy’s, but in general
every merchant ship sails the seas in order to supply the
enemy’s war industry, both by way of imports and exports. Side
by side with this the enemy warship also remains an objective.”
Now, wasn’t that the object which you in the Naval Command were putting
up to Hitler and to the Foreign Office, to use utmost ruthlessness to
destroy Britain’s fighting spirit, and to attack every merchant ship
coming in or going out of Britain? Wasn’t that your object?
RAEDER: Of course, but attacks on neutrals only insofar as they were
warned and advised not to enter certain zones. Throughout the centuries
in economic warfare the enemy merchant ship as well as the neutral
merchant ship has been the object of attack.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are not telling the Tribunal that you were
suggesting use of warnings. Are you seriously suggesting to the Tribunal
that what you meant by that paragraph was that neutral ships were only
to be attacked with warning?
RAEDER: Of course, and that happened. Afterwards we issued the warning
to neutral ships, after our blockade zone was established in accordance
with the American blockade zone. We warned them that they should not
enter this zone because they would run into most serious danger. That I
am saying, and I can prove it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest to you that that is untrue, and I will
show it out of the document. Now, just turn to page...
RAEDER: On 24 November that warning was issued.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you will turn to Section C of the document,
“Military requirements for the decisive struggle against Great Britain.”
“Our naval strategy will have to employ to the utmost advantage
every weapon at our disposal. Military success can be most
confidently expected if we attack British sea communications
where they are accessible to us with the greatest ruthlessness;
the final aim of such attacks is to cut off all imports into and
exports from Britain. We should try to consider the interest of
neutrals, insofar as this is possible without detriment to
military requirements. It is desirable to base all military
measures taken on existing international law; however, measures
which are considered necessary from a military point of view,
provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have
to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing
international law.”
Wasn’t that the view you were putting up to the Foreign Office and the
Führer, “Use international law as long as you can, but if international
law conflicts with what is necessary for military success, throw
international law overboard.” Wasn’t that your view?
RAEDER: No, that is quite incorrectly expressed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then explain these words. Explain these
words:
“We should try to consider the interest of neutrals insofar as
this is possible without detriment to military requirements.
However, measures which are considered necessary from a military
point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from
them, will have to be carried out even if they are not covered
by international law.”
What did you mean by that if you didn’t mean to throw international law
overboard?
RAEDER: It says “If the existing rules of land warfare cannot be applied
to them.” It is generally known that international law had not yet been
co-ordinated with submarine warfare, just as the use of aircraft at that
time. It says:
“In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is
effective in breaking enemy resistance should be based on some
legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new
code of naval warfare”—that is, a new code of naval warfare on
the basis of actual developments.
Throughout the war a new code of naval warfare was developing, starting
with the neutrals themselves. For instance, the Pan-American Security
Conference defined a safety zone 300 miles around the American coast,
thereby barring a tremendous sea area for overseas trade.
Likewise, the United States fixed a fighting zone around the British
Isles which was not at all to our liking, and on 4 November 1939, the
United States themselves maintained that it would be extremely dangerous
for neutral ships to enter it, and they prohibited their own ships and
their own citizens to enter this area.
We followed that up by asking the neutrals that they too should proceed
in the same way as the United States, and then they would not be harmed.
Then only those neutrals sailed to Great Britain which had contraband on
board and made a lot of money out of it, or which were forced by the
British through their ports of control to enter that area and
nevertheless submit themselves to those dangers. Of course, they were
quite free to discontinue doing that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now tell me, what changes had taken place in the
development of either airplanes or submarines from the time that Germany
signed the Submarine Protocol of 1936 to the beginning of the war? You
say that international law had to adapt itself to changes in weapons of
war. What changes had taken place between 1936 and 1939?
RAEDER: The following changes took place: The Submarine Protocol of 1936
was signed by us because we assumed that it concerned peaceful
actions...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not an answer to my question. My
question is quite clear. It is: What changes in weapons of war, either
in the air or in the submarines, had taken place between 1936 and 1939?
Now, there is a question. You are a naval officer of 50 years’
experience. Tell me, what were the changes?
RAEDER: It turned out that because of the airplane the submarine was no
longer in a position to surface and to investigate enemy ships or any
other merchant ships, particularly near the enemy coast where the
U-boats carried on their activities at first. There was no regulation at
all issued about airplanes.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is not an answer to the question. The
question you were asked was, what changes had taken place in the weapons
of war, either airplanes or submarines.
RAEDER: But Mr. President, the changes took place in the airplane. The
ever-increasing efficiency of the airplanes and the extension of their
activities also over the seas led to the situation where it became
impossible to examine any merchant vessel without aircraft being called
to threaten the submarine. That got worse and worse, so that later on
even rescuing had to be restricted because of enemy aircraft, and the
entire submarine warfare was completely turned upside down in that
manner.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that the only change that you can say in
order to justify your statement that international law was to be thrown
overboard where it didn’t fit in with military necessities? Is that the
only change, the increase in the power of aircraft between 1936 and
1939?
RAEDER: I have already said once it was not thrown overboard. It was to
be limited and changed and that was done by others too.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now would you just look at the next
paragraph. You talked about your consideration for neutrals. At the top
of Page 5 in the English text; it is the paragraph that follows the one
that I have just read. You say:
“In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is
effective in breaking enemy resistance should be based on some
legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new
code of naval warfare.
“The Supreme War Command, after considering the political,
military and economic consequences within the framework of the
general conduct of the war, will have to decide what measures of
a military nature are to be taken, and what our attitude to the
usage of war is to be. Once it has been decided to conduct
economic warfare in its most ruthless form, in fulfillment of
military requirements, this decision is definitely to be adhered
to under all circumstances. On no account may such a decision
for the most ruthless form of economic warfare, once it has been
made, be dropped or subsequently relaxed under political
pressure from neutral powers, as took place in the World War to
our own detriment. Every protest by neutral powers must be
turned down. Even threats from other countries, especially the
United States, to come into the war, which can be expected with
certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to a
relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon.
The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier will
it show results and the sooner will the war come to an end.”
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you now agree with that suggestion and that
point of view expressed in the paragraph which I have just read to you?
RAEDER: It has to be understood quite differently from the way you are
trying to present it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Quite differently from what it says...
RAEDER: No, not what it says. This is the point. We had the experience
during the first World War that, as soon as the order for
intensification had been given and communicated, as soon as the first
neutral had raised a finger to object, these measures were immediately
cancelled, particularly when the United States had a hand in it. And
here I am saying that under all circumstances it must be avoided that we
always withdraw our measures at once; and I give a warning to the effect
that we should consider our measures as carefully as possible. That is
the reason for the discussion with the Foreign Office and others,
namely, to avoid the situation where later on they might be withdrawn,
which would mean a considerable loss of prestige and the results would
not be achieved.
That is the reason. Numerous protests were received by Britain too, and
in most cases they were unanswered. I can quote from the Document Number
C-170, Exhibit Number USA-136, where there are a lot of figures, Number
14, where it says: “Sharp Russian note against the British blockade
warfare on 20 October 1939;” and Number 17, on 31 October, where it
states: “Political Speech of Molotov.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All that I ask is, was that a proper procedure?
RAEDER: I must give an explanation on that matter, and I was just about
to do that. Sharp attacks on the British blockade, in violation of
international law—these attacks were made by M. Molotov. Here too,
protests were made which were turned down. But I wanted to prevent
protests and the entire document shows that our deliberations always
aimed at taking measures in such a way that they could not be objected
to, but were always legally justified.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you tell me, Defendant, how it was
going to prevent protests if you suggest in this paragraph to use the
most ruthless measures and disregard every protest that neutrals made?
How is that going to prevent protests?
RAEDER: These measures were to be taken in such a way that no objection
was possible. If I tell the neutrals: “This is a dangerous area in every
way,” and nevertheless they go there because they want to make money or
because they are being forced by the British, then I need not accept any
protest. They are acting for egotistical reasons, and they must pay the
bill if they die. I must also add...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is true. They must pay the bill if they
die. That was what it came to, was it not?
RAEDER: They received large premiums for exposing themselves to that
risk, and it was their business to decide about it.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, we might break off now for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to be much longer, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought about half an hour, My Lord.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant, in this document the Naval
Command suggests that it calls for a siege of England, that is, the
sinking without warning of all ships that come into a big area around
England.
Didn’t you hear? Sorry. In this document the Naval Command suggests what
is called the siege of England, on Pages 10 to 13. And that is, the
sinking of all merchant ships, including neutrals and tankers, which
come into an area around England. Isn’t that so?
RAEDER: No, that is not true. The Navy Command does not suggest that,
but discusses the idea of a siege after the blockade had been discussed
and rejected. It likewise comes to a conclusion why the siege, which
until that time had not been accepted as a recognized idea by
international law, should not be undertaken; and it draws the inference
from all these discussions by setting out on the last page, the last
page but one, what shall now be considered the final conclusion. These
are only those measures which can be justified by the actions already
taken by the British. And during the entire discussion about blockading,
the consideration was always in the foreground as to whether the
neutrals would not suffer too much damage by that. And the whole idea of
a siege is based on the fact that Prime Minister Chamberlain had already
said—on 26 September—that there would not be any difference between a
blockade on the seas and a siege on land, and the commander of a land
siege would try to prevent with all means the entry of anything into the
fortress. Also, the French press had mentioned that Germany was in the
same situation as a fortress under siege.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am suggesting is that you come down in
favor of a siege, but you do not want any siege area declared. Will you
look at Paragraph 2 of the conclusions, and then I will leave the
document to the Tribunal. That is the point I suggest. In paragraph 2 of
the conclusions you say:
“For the future conduct of economic war, the basic military
requirements demand the utmost ruthlessness. The employment of
the siege by sea as the most intensified form of economic
warfare meets this demand. Even without the public announcement
of a state of siege, after it has been clearly defined as a
concept, a declaration which would have drawbacks militarily and
from the point of view of international law, and even without
the declaration of a prohibited zone, it seems perfectly
possible at the moment, as has been explained in this
memorandum, to take military measures to introduce the most
intensive form of economic warfare, and to achieve what are at
present the greatest possible results in the interruption of
enemy trade”—now the last words—“without the Naval Operations
Staff being tied in all cases, to special forms and areas.”
That is your final conclusion, that you should have as effective a siege
as possible without proclaiming any area. Isn’t that so?
RAEDER: No, that is not the conclusion. The conclusion is that we cannot
carry out a siege, and that it would be a matter for the political
leadership of the State to decide. The political leadership of the State
has never suggested to decree a siege, and it can be seen here quite
clearly what, on the basis of the memorandum, is suggested for the time
being, and then how the intensification gradually took place.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We must not take time arguing about it, I want
you to make clear...
RAEDER: But...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me finish. My suggestion to you is—and
there I leave it—that you rejected a formal siege, but you claimed the
right to sink at sight, without warning, all neutral vessels in an area
which the High Command may choose.
Now, I want to pass on to another subject, because I am afraid time is
getting on.
RAEDER: That is no siege, however. That was a directive issued after
neutral ships did not heed our warning and continued to enter the sea
around Britain in order to support Britain in the economic warfare which
she, with the greatest ruthlessness and severity, was conducting against
us. It was a measure of self-defense.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it that the document speaks for itself,
now that the attention of the Tribunal has been drawn to it. I want to
come to another point. You have mentioned certain matters, in answer to
Dr. Horn this morning, with regard to the treatment of American ships in
the summer of 1941. In April 1941 you were pressing for German naval
forces to operate freely up to three miles of the American coast instead
of the 300-mile safety limit which the Americans were suggesting, were
you not? Well to save time I will give the witness Document Number
D-849, Exhibit Number GB-472.
[_The document was handed to the defendant._]
That says you couldn’t get in touch with the Defendant Von Ribbentrop
and therefore you asked Baron Von Weizsäcker to get a decision on these
points:
“1) Authorization for the German naval forces in the western
part of the Atlantic Ocean to operate freely as far as the
international customary 3-mile boundary.
“2) The cancellation of the preferential treatment which
American merchant vessels have been enjoying so far in our
warfare at sea.”
Now, I hand you Document Number 850, that will be Exhibit Number GB-473.
Your suggestion, which had been made in April, was turned down by Hitler
in June. It is a memorandum from Ritter in the Foreign Office and it
reads:
“General Jodl informs me that at the recent report of
Grossadmiral Raeder to the Führer, the more far-reaching orders
to the naval forces, as they were discussed in connection with
the Raeder interview, have been postponed until further notice.
“In the same way, permission to attack United States’ merchant
vessels within the framework of the prize law has not been
granted.”
Your suggestion was to abandon the policy then existing and attack up to
the 3-mile limit. Now, I want you to come to another point...
RAEDER: No, please may I make a statement concerning that? I should like
to say something, even if you do not put a question to me. It is not
right.
At that time, in March 1941, and on the 1st of April and the following
dates in 1941, a whole number of intensifications were introduced by the
United States, which I mentioned this morning, from the document which I
had before me. Therefore, it was clear that I, on behalf of the Naval
Operations Staff, which was supposed to conduct the most effective naval
war, urged that also with respect to the United States those steps
should be taken which were permissible according to international law,
and that we should start slowly. Those steps included:
First: that we should no longer respect that 300-mile limit, but go as
far as the 3-mile limit, where according to existing international law,
it was possible to attack. That is to say, not against international
law, but it was just discontinuing certain favorable conditions which we
had granted the United States. And Point 2: The cancellation of the
preferential treatment...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That’s exactly what I suggest to you. There is
no dispute between us. I was just establishing that point.
RAEDER: Yes—no...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I want you to come...
RAEDER: I only wanted to say that during the hearing of Grossadmiral
Dönitz the Prosecution demanded of us that we should not treat certain
neutrals better than others, but we should treat them all alike; that is
to say in plain language, we must sink them all, no matter whether we
wanted to do so or not, and of course we were not bound to do that. The
second thing: it was a matter of course that a thoroughly justified
suggestion on my part from the point of view of the Naval Operations
Staff had been rejected by the Führer if, with regard to the political
situation, he decided that at that time he did not desire to adopt a
more severe attitude towards the United States.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to come to quite a different
point. Do you say that you did not know anything about the extermination
of Jews in the Eastern Territories?
[_There was no response._]
Do you say that you did not know about the extermination of Jews in the
Eastern Territories?
RAEDER: I say clearly under oath that I had not the slightest inkling
about it. I might add in explanation that on no account would Hitler
have spoken about such things to a man like myself, whose opinion he
knew, especially because he was afraid that on my part there would be
very serious objections. I explained the other day why I used the word
“Jews” in my memorial speech. In my opinion, I was obliged to do so. But
that had nothing at all to do with an extermination of Jews. About the
Jewish matter I have only learned...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well...
RAEDER: Excuse me, please, one moment. I only learned something about
the Jewish matter when Jews who were known to me, mostly friends of my
old parents, approached me and told me that they were about to be
evacuated from Berlin. And then I intervened for them. That was the only
thing I knew. On occasions I was told in answer to my questions that
they were to be evacuated to cities where ghettos had been established.
I always understood that a ghetto was a district in a city where all the
Jews lived together, so that they would not have to mingle with the rest
of the population.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you know, my question was only: Did you
know or did you not, and you could have answered that yes or no. I want
you now to answer about that point...
RAEDER: Yes, but I must—so many questions have been asked about this
very point and as every man in my position who held the same views says
the same, that he does not know anything about it, I should like to
explain once for all that one did not hear about these things, because
civilians certainly did not talk to us about that, because they were
always afraid that they would get into difficulties. The Führer did not
speak about it. I had no connection with Himmler nor with other agents
of the Gestapo. I did not know anything about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want you just to tell the Tribunal
your chain of command for the Baltic coast. Is this right that you had
the naval chief command, and then the Flag Officer of the East Baltic
coast Tallinn and, under him, you had a command at Libau; is that right?
Was that your chain of command?
RAEDER: I did not understand that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was your chain of command for the East Baltic
coast, Kiel, Flag Officer Tallinn, and a detachment under him at Libau?
You had...
RAEDER: I assume, so—that depends on various things. If they were
operational matters, then it had to do with the Naval Group Commander
East or North; and as far as matters of organization were concerned,
then it might have gone through the Station Chief of the Baltic Sea.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, at any rate, you had got in 1941 a
naval command at Libau, had you not?
RAEDER: Yes, of course.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I would like you just to look at
Document Number D-841, which is a deposition on oath by one of the naval
employees at Libau.
My Lord, that will be Exhibit Number GB-474.
This witness says: “Deposition on oath of Walter Kurt Dittmann.”
And then it says:
“I was Naval Administration Inspector and officer in charge of
the Naval Clothing Depot at Libau in Latvia.
“I held this position from the beginning of August 1941 to the
end of March 1942.
“The Jewish population of Libau at that time was supposed to be
about 7,000 people.
“Up to the end of March 1942 many thousands of them had already
been ‘evacuated’ by the Gestapo and the Latvian Police.
“‘Evacuated’ was the local expression for the annihilation of
these people.
“All Jews were registered. When a new lot was to be evacuated it
happened in the following way:
“The Latvian Police fetched the Jews out of their houses, put
them on lorries and drove them to the Naval Port about six to
seven kilometers outside the town. Later on these people had to
march and were not taken there in lorries.
“In the Naval Port these people were then shot with machine
guns. This was done by the Gestapo and the Latvian Police. The
police, of course, got their orders from the German Gestapo.
“I personally did not witness these incidents, but comrades told
me all about them.
“Some of the Jews before they were shot worked for the Navy.
“About 80-100 people worked in the Clothing Depot every day.
“About 100-150 people worked in the Garrison Administration
every day.
“About 50 people worked in the Garrison Building Office (Navy)
every day.
“Through these contacts and through personal visits to the
houses of Jews I heard a lot regarding the terrible happenings
in Libau during these months.
“I personally went to my superior, Festungs-Intendant Dr.
Lancelle, and before that I also went to another superior, the
officer in charge of the Hospital Administration, named Müller,
both were Naval Administration Officials. I pointed out to them
these abuses which have already been described. The answer I got
was that they could not do anything and that things like that
were best overlooked.
“The Marineverwaltungsassistent Kurt Traunecker accompanied a
consignment of clothing from Kiel to Libau. He stayed a few
weeks in Libau and he expressed his displeasure at the
conditions there regarding the annihilation of the Jews.
“He then went back to Kiel to the local clothing office. There
again he expressed his displeasure and was ordered to appear at
the Naval Administration Headquarters (Marine-Intendantur). Whom
he saw there, I do not know, but it was made clear to him that
these occurrences were not true, and therefore he should not
talk about them any more, otherwise he would get into most
serious trouble.
“My personal opinion is that the higher offices of the Navy in
Kiel and in other places in Germany must have had knowledge of
these terrible conditions.”
Are you saying, Defendant, that with your naval detachments on the East
coast of the Baltic and with these things happening, that nobody
reported to you that the Jews were being slaughtered by the thousands in
the Eastern Territories, you are still saying it?
RAEDER: Yes, I knew nothing about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was your staff doing, if they were not
telling you about this? Had you an efficient staff? Do you say you had
an efficient staff?
RAEDER: That is a question which is not relevant here. Of course I had
only efficient officers around me. But here we are dealing with things
which were not done at all by the Navy. It says here in all places that
it was the police and so on. I even was in Libau once and I was
told—and this is the only thing in connection with this matter—that
the peculiar thing was that the Jews in Libau, contrary to their custom,
were craftsmen and therefore they were doing useful work there. That was
the only thing I heard about it. As regards any extermination...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When were you in Libau?
RAEDER: I cannot say that now. It was after it was occupied, probably
immediately afterwards.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Were you there in 1941 or 1942?
RAEDER: I said just now that I do not know exactly when; I have to look
it up somewhere. It does not say here that anything was reported, only
that it was apparently discussed in the Navy Headquarters and with the
Navy Quartermaster (Marine-Intendantur), who does not report to me. Of
course I would have intervened if I had heard about such happenings.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You think you would? Well, I’ll leave that. Now,
tell me about the Commando Order of the 18th of October 1942. You
received Hitler’s Commando Order and passed it on to your various
divisions of the Navy, did you not?
RAEDER: Yes, I passed it on through the Naval Operations Staff.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you approve of it?
RAEDER: I did not recommend it, but I passed it on. I have to make a
statement if you want to know what I thought about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that’s not what I’m asking you. I’m asking
you—first answer my question—did you approve of an order to shoot
Commandos or to hand them over to the SD to be shot, did you?
RAEDER: I did not recommend the order, but I received it as drafted by
the Führer, and as it came into my hands, I passed it on as ordered with
the same remark as to how far it has to be passed on and how it has to
be returned. It was all ordered by Hitler in detail. It was decisive for
me that in one of the first paragraphs the reason for this order was
given, and the reasons why Hitler considered a deviation from
international law justified. Moreover, a short time before I had been in
Dieppe in France, and there I was informed that on the occasion of the
Commando action of the British in France, the prisoners, I believe they
were from the Labor Service, who were working along the coast, had been
shackled with a noose around their neck and the other end of the noose
around the bent-back lower leg, so that when the leg weakened, the noose
tightened and the man choked.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, will you answer my question: Did you
approve of the order or not? You haven’t answered it yet. Did you
approve of the order?
RAEDER: I always said—yes, I did—no, I do not want to say—I said that
twice already. I passed it on because it was an order from my
Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, in one of the last paragraphs it said that
that order should not be applied for the treatment of prisoners taken
after a naval action or after large scale landing operations and I, as
well as many others in the Navy, concentrated our attention on this
point because that was our main activity. But I saw no reason to raise
objections to the Führer on account of this order which I thought
justified in this way. And I would like to state very clearly that I, as
a soldier, was not in a position to go to my Supreme Commander and Chief
of State to tell him, “Show me your reasons for this order,” that would
have been mutiny and could not have been done under any circumstances.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, do you remember that one example which we
have discussed a great deal in this Trial, which you must have listened
to, was the case of naval men coming in with a two-man torpedo, trying
to sink the _Tirpitz_. Do you remember that case? Surely you can answer
that “yes” or “no,” because either you remember or you do not. We have
discussed it about six times.
RAEDER: Yes, I remember. If I remember I will say “yes.” The contrary
does not have to be assumed at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that during the time that you were
Inspector General, or Admiral Inspector of the German Navy, that there
was started a “Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände,” under Vice Admiral
Helmut Heye, which included in its command one-man torpedoes, one-man
U-boats, explosive motor boats, and had personnel, starting at about
5,000 and rising, I think, as far as 16,000? Did you know that there was
that Kommando in the Navy, “Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände”? Did you
know that?
RAEDER: Yes, I knew that of course and that it operated quite openly on
the French coast and later on, I believe, also on the North coast.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you have approved if the Allies had shot
any one of your thousands of personnel in that Kommando that was dealing
with one-man and two-man torpedoes and explosive motor boats? Would you
have approved if we had shot them out of hand?
RAEDER: First, I cannot give any information about what I would have
done in a particular case with which I had nothing to do any more.
Secondly, here it is...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, if you don’t want to answer, it is
good enough for me. I will point it out in due course to the Tribunal
with...
RAEDER: But you interrupted me again. I should like to make a second
point after what I said first. Secondly, these units fought quite
openly, just below the coast, and had no civilians on board and also no
murderous instruments or instruments for sabotage with them, so they
were fighters just like the fighters in a submarine. I know...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is exactly the point that I have put with
our Commandos, so I will not argue.
I want to pass to one other point. Was it under your orders that the log
on the _Athenia_ was falsified? Was it by your direct order?
RAEDER: No, not at all. I have explained the other day here that my
order was, “First: absolute secrecy upon the order of the Führer.
Secondly: politically it will be dealt with by the High Command of the
Navy. Thirdly”—there was a third point—I will find it in a second—“I
do not intend to punish the commander because he acted in good faith and
committed an error.” That is what I ordered. I did not order anything
further concerning that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, do you know under whose orders the log was
falsified? I am very anxious to know. The log was falsified. I have
asked the Defendant Dönitz. He cannot tell me. He has put in an
affidavit that the matter was to be left to you, and now I am asking you
whether you can tell me. I think the commander is dead, as far as I
remember, so he cannot tell me. Do you say that you cannot tell me under
whose orders the log of the Submarine _U-30_, that sank the _Athenia_,
was falsified?
RAEDER: I have already said that I had nothing to do with it, because in
fact I did not have anything to do with such details. I did not order
such details. The other day—I do not know whether Admiral Wagner said
it—it was discussed who did it. I assumed that it was within the
flotilla.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me just this about the _Athenia_. You told
us the other day that you gave these orders, and then washed your hands
of the matter. Nearly a month later...
RAEDER: I have already said I had nothing further to do with it, for you
know...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had nothing to do with it. Nearly a month
later the Propaganda Ministry put out this suggestion, I think you said
on Hitler’s orders—that the _Athenia_ had been sunk by Churchill. Did
you not feel that it was your duty as Grand Admiral and head of the
German Navy to make any protests against this disgraceful, lying
suggestion, that the First Lord of the British Admiralty had
deliberately sent to their deaths a lot of British and American
subjects? Did you not think it was your duty to do that?
RAEDER: I spoke to Hitler about it—but it had happened without our
having any idea about it. I was extremely embarrassed about it when the
First Lord of the Admiralty was attacked in that, one can say, boorish
manner but I could not change anything subsequently and Hitler did not
admit that he...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you did not bother about that, as I
understand it, you didn’t bother at all...
RAEDER: Yes, I had misgivings about it, and I was very indignant about
it. Please do not keep twisting what I say...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you translate your indignation into actions?
That is what I am asking.
RAEDER: Into what kind of action?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Any action.
RAEDER: Yes, that Hitler should get Goebbels to contradict that article?
That Hitler would not do if he himself had been the author of the
article.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want to get it clear. You did
nothing when you knew that Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch, who were old
friends and comrades of yours, had been framed up by sections of these
Nazi plotters; you did nothing about that? You did nothing to protest
against the treatment meted out to Von Blomberg or Von Fritsch? You did
nothing, did you?
RAEDER: No, but at that time I did not know anything about the
background, as you yourself said this morning. I knew nothing about the
background. Later when I became acquainted with the details I gradually
put the whole picture together. At that time I was not in a position to
assume that such methods would be at all possible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I put to you your own statement that you
made a year ago. I just want to get it quite clear that the first time
in your life that you were moved to protest was, I think, in March 1945,
when you saw the actual marks of torture on the hands of your friend,
Herr Gessler, and at that time the Soviet troops were over the Oder and
the Allies were over the Rhine, and that was the first time that you
made any protest when you took off your Party Golden Emblem, wasn’t it?
That was the first protest you ever made in your naval, military,
political career; is that right?
RAEDER: Not a bit of it. I did not really know what was going on.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well then—I put it again. In March 1945 you
took off the Party Golden Emblem when you saw the marks of torture on
your friend Gessler’s hands. Isn’t that right?
RAEDER: When Dr. Gessler, who in spite of my objections had been kept
for several months in a concentration camp, returned from the
concentration camp and informed me that he was in extremely pitiful
condition, and that in spite of my request in August, when he was sent
to the concentration camp and when I had asked the Führer through
Admiral Wagner for Dr. Gessler to be questioned quickly because he was
certainly innocent in connection with the assassination attempt, so that
he could be released as soon as possible, then...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, my question is, was it then that you took
off the Party Emblem. You can answer that. You can give your explanation
later.
RAEDER: Yes, but wait a moment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But up to then you did not make any protest
against anything that Hitler did, except the purely military one on the
invasion of the Soviet Union?
RAEDER: I always made serious protests, and that I have proved here, and
the adjutant, General Schmundt, told me, “You will be most successful if
you try to influence the Führer personally when you are alone with him
and tell him quite openly what you think.” This is important enough to
mention and I must say it.
Well, Dr. Gessler came back from the concentration camp and told me that
during his first interrogation—at that time I had not yet had a chance
to intervene—he had been tortured. That was the first time that I heard
that anywhere in Germany anybody was tortured. There is a letter from
Dr. Gessler about that—that I told him immediately, “I am going to the
Führer at once to tell him about this because I cannot imagine that he
knows about that.” Gessler begged me—when he confirmed that letter—for
goodness sake not to go to the Führer then, because that would endanger
his, Gessler’s, life. I said I would answer for it that nothing would
happen to him, and that I would still try to approach the Führer.
During the whole of the ensuing period I attempted to approach the
Führer, who was not at headquarters. When I was informed in April that
he was in Berlin, which was already under heavy attack, I tried to
approach the Führer day after day by calling Admiral Voss over the
telephone. That was no longer possible, and after I received that
information the first thing I did was that I went, together with my
wife, to the lake which was behind our house and tore off my Party
Emblem and threw it into the lake. I told that to Admiral Voss but
unfortunately I could not tell it to the Führer any more. That can be
seen from the letter which Dr. Gessler wrote, and we would have liked to
have him as a witness, but his state of health did not permit it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was your first protest.
RAEDER: It was not my first protest. That is twisting my words.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other cross-examination?
COL. POKROVSKY: On 18 May 1946, during the morning session of the
Tribunal you testified that during your service as Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy you twice made application to resign. The first time you tried
to resign was in November 1938 when you were dealing with the building
up of the Navy, and Hitler was not pleased with your plans, and the
second time was when Hitler, without your knowledge, permitted his
adjutant who was a naval officer to marry a certain young girl. Is that
not so?
RAEDER: Yes, but I put in further applications for resignation which
were not so sensational, once in 1937, and I believe even in 1935, when
I was not in good health. But these were two typical examples which show
how such things came about.
COL. POKROVSKY: I understood that in the first of these two cases Hitler
finally persuaded you not to resign.
RAEDER: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: And in the second case, he complied with your wish but
he never forgot it.
RAEDER: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: In fact, you resigned only in January 1943, is that not
so?
RAEDER: In actual fact, yes. But I must add that during the war I felt I
could not leave the Navy, which was already in such a difficult
situation, and I believed I enjoyed its confidence to a certain extent
so that I could be useful.
COL. POKROVSKY: On the morning of 18 May you said here in the Court in
regard to your resignation, that it seemed to you then that Hitler, at
that particular moment, wanted to get rid of you. Is that so?
RAEDER: At that moment I had the impression, when he made such serious
accusations and when he considerably contradicted his previous
judgments, that maybe he wanted to get rid of me, and I therefore
considered that that was a particularly favorable moment to leave.
COL. POKROVSKY: The question of successors was solved by your naming a
few people to Hitler.
RAEDER: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: And among them was the Defendant Dönitz. Did you mention
his name?
RAEDER: Yes. I mentioned his name. I informed the Führer of that in
writing, first Carls, second, in case he wanted to concentrate on
submarine warfare, Grossadmiral Dönitz, who was the highest authority in
that field.
COL. POKROVSKY: And does it not seem to you, after your answer to my
questions, that the answer which you gave to Dr. Laternser on 18 May,
when you mentioned the absolute impossibility of resigning from the
general staff, was not a proper answer? It was possible to resign, was
it not?
RAEDER: Yes, but in this case, of course, there were two prerequisites.
The first was that Hitler himself did not like me any more and I knew
it, so that it would not be insubordination if I threw up my post for
some reason or other.
Secondly, because it was possible, as I pointed out in that
conversation, for the change to take place under peaceful conditions so
that the Navy would not suffer by it. If I had left because of a
quarrel, then that would have had a very bad effect on the Navy because
it might have meant a certain split between the Navy and Hitler, and I
had particularly to preserve unity, at that critical moment of the war.
COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to understand my question correctly.
RAEDER: Yes, I understand...
COL. POKROVSKY: I am not asking you about the prerequisites which might
have been required for granting an application for resignation. I am
asking you a question in principle:
Was it possible or was it not possible to resign? After all, you did
resign. You resigned from your post as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
RAEDER: Yes, but I had been in the service for 15 years, and I could
tell him, “If that is the way you yourself judge me, then there is no
sense in your continuing to work with me.” That was a favorable
opportunity which made it permissible for me to ask him to release me.
But what one could not do was to throw up the job and give the
impression of being insubordinate. That had to be avoided at all costs,
I would never have done that. I was too much of a soldier for that.
COL. POKROVSKY: I have already heard what I wanted to hear from you in
reply to my question.
Now, I will pass on to the next question. You maintain that all the time
you were striving towards normalizing relations with the Soviet Union,
is that correct?
RAEDER: I am sorry; I could not understand what you said.
COL. POKROVSKY: You maintain that during your service you always strove
to make the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union quite normal,
is that not so?
RAEDER: I was always in favor of the Bismarck policy, that we should
have a common policy with Russia.
COL. POKROVSKY: If I understood your testimony correctly the day before
yesterday and on Friday, in 1940, already, you had knowledge of the fact
that Hitler intended to attack the Soviet Union.
RAEDER: In September 1940 for the first time I heard certain statements
from Hitler himself that he was thinking of a war with Russia, given
certain circumstances. Even in the directive he mentioned one of these
prerequisites, one of these circumstances. He did not say to me at that
time that in any circumstances he wanted to wage war, but that we had to
be prepared, as it says in Paragraph 1, that before crushing England we
might have to fight against Russia. And from September on I began to
make objections to him.
COL. POKROVSKY: Was there not a case of an incident when you maintained
that the explanations which had been given by official governmental
organs or agencies for an attack on the Soviet Union gave you and the
others the impression that it was a deliberate propaganda, and in fact
they were quite repulsive in their effect? Do you remember that?
RAEDER: The propaganda made by Hitler made an impression? I did not
quite get it...
COL. POKROVSKY: I believe that you once expressed in writing the view
that the OKW and the Foreign Ministry explained to the German people the
reasons for attacking the Soviet Union in such a way as to give the
impression that it was deliberate propaganda, and the total effect was
repulsive. Do you not remember it?
RAEDER: Oh, you mean the broadcasts emanating from the Foreign Office
when the war started? Yes, that was Hitler’s propaganda to make the
German people understand the reason for this war. That is right. As
regards breaking the Pact...
COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to take a look at one document. This is
a document written by you, and I would like you to tell us whether this
document contains the precise subject matter of my question.
RAEDER: Where is it?
COL. POKROVSKY: “The propagandistic...”
RAEDER: “The propagandistic”—shall I read it?
“The propagandistic, political and military announcements given
out at the beginning of the war by the Foreign Office and the
High Command of the Armed Forces, which were to justify the
breaking of the Pact because of breaches by the Soviet Union,
found very little credence among the people as well as among the
Armed Forces. They showed too clearly that they were propaganda
for a certain purpose and had a repulsive effect.” (USSR-460.)
I know that at that time Hitler himself drafted these documents,
together with Goebbels.
COL. POKROVSKY: In connection with this question I have another question
for you. Am I to understand you in this way; that your divergence of
opinion with Hitler over foreign policy, and in particular in regard to
aggressive wars, was less strongly defined than your difference of
opinion about the question of the marriage of a naval officer with a
certain girl? Did you understand me?
RAEDER: No, they were two quite different things. Those were military
questions where the political decisions remained with the Führer. I was
very insistent about the moral issues also, where they concerned the
Pact, but I did not send him any written ultimatum because in this
matter it would have been unsoldierly. I did not have the final
decision, he had it; whereas in the case of Albrecht, it was up to me to
decide—to say yes or no—and not to sign that which I was supposed to
sign.
COL. POKROVSKY: You are saying now that this is a question of morals.
Does it not seem to you that an unprovoked attack on a country with
which Germany had a nonaggression treaty—do you not think that such a
question is always connected with the question of morals?
RAEDER: Of course; that is what I said myself, that in this case too I
laid special stress on the moral issue. But in spite of that, as the
highest man of the Navy, I was not in a position to hold out the threat
of resignation at that moment. I was too much of a soldier to be able to
do that, to be able to leave the Navy at a moment like that.
COL. POKROVSKY: In answer to questions put to you by your counsel here
in this courtroom you testified that your speech, which was delivered by
you on 12 March 1939—that is Page 169 of the Russian text in the Raeder
document book, My Lord—the speech where you praised Hitler and Hitler’s
policies—you mentioned that this speech was not in accord with your
true opinion. Is it so or is it not?
RAEDER: No, that is not correct. I said that we had had the experience
that the Communists and Jews, from 1917 to 1920, had strongly undermined
our power of resistance, and that for this reason it could be
understood, if a National Socialist government took certain measures
against both of them in order to stem their influence, which was
excessive. That was the sense of my statements and I made absolutely no
mention of any further steps which might come into question.
COL. POKROVSKY: In short, you are saying now that when you delivered
that speech on 12 March 1939, that this speech was fully in accord with
your ideas and your views. Is that correct?
RAEDER: Yes, it was, or I would not have made it. It was in accord
insofar as I had to recognize that the National Socialist Government had
in some way to stem that influence which was generally recognized to be
excessive, and as I said yesterday, the National Socialist Government
had issued the Nuremberg Laws, which I did not entirely approve of where
they went to extremes. But if the Government was so disposed, it was not
possible for me in an official public speech, which I gave on the orders
of that Government, to express my personal views which were different.
That had to be considered within this address to the nation.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you be able to finish in a very few moments? It is
now five minutes past five.
COL. POKROVSKY: I think, My Lord, that only about 10 minutes will be
sufficient for me. I have only about three or four more questions left.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
COL. POKROVSKY: [_Turning to the defendant._] In order to save time I am
not going to argue with you in regard to the motives which made you
deliver the speech. It was important for me that you should confirm what
you said, and that is, that this speech was in accord with your views
and ideas. Now I will pass on to the next question.
On 29 September 1941, your Chief of Staff, Admiral Fricke—do I
pronounce his name correctly? Is it Fricke or Fricker?
RAEDER: Fricke, yes, Chief of the Staff of the Naval Operations Staff.
COL. POKROVSKY: Admiral Fricke published a directive in regard to the
future fate of Leningrad. Do you know what document I mean, or must this
document be shown to you?
RAEDER: No. I know that document very well.
COL. POKROVSKY: This directive was published with your consent?
RAEDER: I did not give a specific order for it because there was no
necessity for passing it on. May I just explain briefly how it was. I
had...
COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, and I would like you to be brief.
RAEDER: Quite briefly, yes. I had requested Hitler when I heard that he
intended in the course of the war to bombard Leningrad, that he should
spare the port and dock installations because they would be useful for
us later, as we had to keep moving our bases back to the East on account
of the British air attacks in the Baltic. Shortly before the date which
you have mentioned Admiral Fricke had been at the Führer’s
headquarters—I do not know for what reason—and had there spoken with
the Führer in my absence, and the Führer had explained to him that plan
to bombard Leningrad, especially with aircraft, and he used those very
exaggerated words which were then written down in the document. The Navy
had absolutely nothing to do with the shelling of Leningrad. We received
no orders for that. We were only interested in that one thing which I
mentioned before, that the shipyards and port installations should be
spared. The Führer had informed Fricke that unfortunately he was not in
a position to do that because the attack, especially if made with
aircraft, could not be directed quite so precisely. All we could do was
to inform Generaladmiral Carls that Leningrad, in case it should be
taken, could not be used as a base, and Generaladmiral Carls had to stop
the preparations which he had already begun by allocating German workers
and probably also machinery which was intended to be used in Leningrad
later on. Carls had to know of that and, as the document says, the
so-called Quartermaster Department of the Navy had to know about it, and
that was why Admiral Fricke passed on that paper. Unfortunately he
included in this paper the expressions used by Hitler, which had nothing
to do with the whole affair as far as we were concerned, because we had
nothing to do with the shelling. By so doing he did not assume in any
way the responsibility, in the sense that he approved it. He only
believed that he had to pass on Hitler’s wording of the order.
The Navy had nothing to do with the matter. It would not have been
necessary to pass it on, and unfortunately and very clumsily that
expression used by Hitler was entered in that document. However, nothing
happened and that document was not passed on from Generaladmiral Carls
to our Finland Commander. That is the whole story.
COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me the question is becoming more
complicated. I asked you a simple question. Your Chief of Staff, Chief
of Operations, published a directive. Did you know about the directive?
RAEDER: No. That is not a directive—that can be seen also from the
photostat—because the letter had not been submitted to me for passing
on, and that shows that it was not considered to be very important. It
was not a directive to undertake any operation or anything important. It
was just a directive to stop anything that might have been done with
regard to bases; so that really nothing happened. Thus, when that
document was passed on by Admiral Fricke, nothing happened at all. It
was quite superfluous.
COL. POKROVSKY: You are talking about the destruction of one of the
biggest cities of the Soviet Union. You are talking in this document
about razing the city to the ground, and you maintain now that it is a
more or less trifling question, that this question was not important
enough to be reported to you, as Fricke’s Chief? Do you want us to
believe that?
RAEDER: Of course. It is not a question of the shelling of Leningrad,
with which we had nothing to do at all. It was the minor question which
concerned us, the question as to whether we would later be able to
establish a naval base there, and whether we could bring workers and
machines and such things to Leningrad. That was a minor issue. The
shelling of Leningrad was a major issue.
COL. POKROVSKY: I think that the Tribunal will be able to understand you
correctly and to draw the necessary conclusions, both from this document
and from your testimony.
Now, I have one last question for you. On 28 August 1945, in Moscow, did
you not write an affidavit as to the reasons for Germany’s defeat?
RAEDER: Yes, I took special pains with that after the collapse.
COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, we submit this document to the Tribunal in the
form of excerpts, Document Number USSR-460. In order to save time I
would like you to hear several excerpts from this affidavit.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You will be shown where they can be found
on the original, and you can say whether it was correctly read into the
record and whether you acknowledge and confirm it.
“My Attitude Towards Adolf Hitler and the Party. Disastrous
influence on the fate of the German State...”
Did you find this place?
RAEDER: Yes, I have it.
COL. POKROVSKY: “Unimaginable vanity and immeasurable...”
DR. SIEMERS: Would you be kind enough to give me a copy so that I can
follow?
COL. POKROVSKY: “Unimaginable vanity and immeasurable ambition
were his main peculiarities; running after popularity and
showing off, untruthfulness, vagueness, and selfishness, which
were not restrained for the sake of State or People. He was
outstanding in his greed, wastefulness, and effeminate
unsoldierly manner.”
Then, a little further on:
“It is my conviction that Hitler very soon realized his
character, but made use of him where it suited his purpose, and
burdened him perpetually with new tasks in order to avoid his
becoming dangerous to himself.”
On Page 24 of your document you give another characteristic:
“The Führer continued to attach importance to the fact that from
the outside his relations to me seemed normal and good. He knew
I was well thought of in all the really respectable circles of
the German people, and that in general everybody had great faith
in me. This cannot be said of Göring, Von Ribbentrop, Dr.
Goebbels, Himmler and Dr. Ley.”
Now I will ask you to find Page 27.
RAEDER: But there is something missing. “In the same way, as for
instance, Baron Von Neurath, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, Schacht,
Dorpmüller and others,” who were on the other side.
COL. POKROVSKY: Evidently it was not correctly translated to you. I will
read this passage into the record. Now, on Page 27, this place is
underlined in red pencil: “Dönitz’ strong political inclination to the
Party...”
THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] I think the Tribunal could read this
themselves if the defendant says that it is true that he wrote it.
Probably Dr. Siemers could check it over and see that there are no
inaccuracies.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, My Lord. Then I shall have the opportunity to
put a very brief question.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I will ask you to take a look at a place
on Page 29, which is marked with pencil, where the paragraph deals with
Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl.
Will you confirm that?
RAEDER: What am I supposed to do? Yes, well...
COL. POKROVSKY: I am asking you with regard to everything that I read
into the record and what you say just now in this paragraph. I would
like to have an answer from you. Do you confirm all that?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I quite agree with the suggestion by the
Tribunal. However, I should like to ask that the entire document be
submitted. I have only short excerpts before me, and I would be grateful
if I could see the entire document. I assume that Colonel Pokrovsky
agrees to that.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, Dr. Siemers, one part of the document having
been put in evidence, you can refer to the remainder of the document.
You can put the remainder of the document in, if you want to.
RAEDER: I said that at the time I tried to find an explanation for the
cause of our collapse.
COL. POKROVSKY: First, I ask you to give the answer, yes or no.