his diary we may conclude that the situation was correctly investigated.
The first part, which was submitted by the Prosecution, that is, the
first two sentences, I have already read. The rest of the entry is as
follows:
“Ambassador Ritter of the Foreign Office declares that an
aggravation of the conflict with Brazil is undesirable in view
of the attitude of Argentina and Chile and that, previous to
measures of war against Brazil, consultations must be held with
Italy and Japan. Acting on the report of the Chief of the Armed
Forces Operations Staff, the Führer has ordered on 30 May, that
the Naval Operations Staff is to ascertain, by inquiring in
Rome, whether the Brazilian reports about warlike actions
against Axis U-boats are correct. The inquiry by the Naval
Operations Staff shows that Italian U-boats were attacked on 22
and 26 May at the northeast corner of Brazil by airplanes which
beyond a doubt had started from a Brazilian air base. The Naval
Operations Staff transmit, moreover, the text of the official
communiqué of the Brazilian Air Ministry about the fighting and
propose to put into action near the main Brazilian harbors
during the period from 3-8 August 10 U-boats to sail from 22
June to 4 July from ports in western France, along with the
tanker _U-460_. The order for execution must be given to the
U-boats by 15 June at the latest. After the Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy had reported this to the Führer at the Berghof on
the afternoon of 15 June, the Führer declared himself in
agreement with the intentions of the Naval Operations Staff but
ordered, however, that before any final decision is made, the
political situation be examined once again by the Foreign
Office.”
I believe that this proves that we were careful enough; and I refer
further to Exhibit Number Raeder-116 which I should like to submit
herewith, in the same document book, Page 503, which is an extract from
the War Diary. Under date 6 June there is an entry which states that the
development has gone so far that:
“...a latent state of war is practically already in existence,
(Brazil entirely on the side of USA; most severe damage to all
German interests; individual Brazilian steamers not properly
illuminated sunk by U-boats; increasing agitation in Brazil;
Brazilians claim they have already sunk German U-boat while
patrolling the coast).”
And a further extract from the War Diary, Exhibit Raeder-117, which I
should like to submit herewith, to be found in the same document book,
Page 509. I ask the High Tribunal to take notice of this document and
its contents and I refer only to Figures 3 and 4 in detail. Under Figure
3 it reads:
“When Brazilian ships began to provide themselves with
camouflage paint and to arm, the order was given on 15 May 1942
to use arms at once against recognizable armed South Americans.”
And under Figure 4 it says:
“On the basis of the fact that Axis submarines were attacked by
vessels along the Brazilian coast and that the Brazilian Air
Ministry officially made known that attacks had been made by the
Brazilian Air Force, the Naval Operations Staff on 29 May 1942,
in Document 12938/42, Top Secret, asked the Armed Forces
Operations Staff for permission to use arms against Brazilian
military forces and merchant ships.”
I submit also Exhibit Number Raeder-118, Document Book 6, Page 510. I
ask the High Tribunal to take notice of this document. I do not wish to
quote it, since it repeats the facts we have already heard. I believe
that Figure 4 of Document 117 which I have just read clarifies the
matter completely and refutes every accusation against the Navy.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, do you have anything to add to
these extracts from the War Diary?
RAEDER: No, I have nothing to add. It is entirely clear.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, may I ask you now to describe to the High
Tribunal—and with this I am coming to the conclusion, of my
examination—how it came about that you resigned in January 1943?
Your Honors, shall we have a recess first?
THE PRESIDENT: It depends on whether you hope to finish in a few
minutes. If you hope to finish in a few minutes we will sit on so that
you may finish your examination.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe it will take perhaps 10 minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.
DR. SIEMERS: [_Turning to the defendant._] Please describe how it came
about that you resigned in January of 1943; but first I should like to
ask you one more question: Did you, even before this, have the idea of
resigning?
RAEDER: I should like to say briefly that on several occasions before
the war I asked the Führer to relieve me of my post, or I presented him
with an ultimatum. I should like briefly to cite two cases as examples.
In November 1938 in the presence of General Keitel I made a report to
the Führer about the type of ships and our plans as to how the ships
should be developed further. On this occasion the Führer, in a manner
defying explanation, began to attack everything that we had built and
were building, including the plans for the _Bismarck_, and to declare
them wrong. Later I found out that things like that happened whenever
some persons of his entourage, who knew very little about such things,
gave him their opinion, that he always followed it up, probably
wanting—as I told myself later—to check whether the things he had been
told were actually correct.
This case, however, was so extreme that I could not do anything else but
simply pick up my plans, put them in my brief case, and leave the room.
General Keitel was present. The Führer followed me to the door, asked me
to come in again, softened his accusations, and asked me not to resign
now under any circumstances.
The second case was a purely personal one, but it is rather typical. His
naval adjutant, who had just been appointed, wanted to marry a young
girl who had a very unsavory reputation at the University of Kiel. I
told him I would never consent to the marriage. The Führer had the girl
introduced to him and decided he had nothing against the marriage; I
left the Berghof and sent the Führer a letter via a staff officer in
which I told him that I would refuse my consent, that the officer would
not remain in the Navy should he marry, or else I would not remain. I
asked the officer who acted as my courier to bring back the answer since
I wanted to reach a decision at once. The Führer had the officer wait 2
days at the Berghof and then sent him back to me with a letter saying:
“Very well, the officer cannot marry and remain in the Navy and
he will not be used further as a naval adjutant; someone else
will be put in his place. He will become some sort of leader in
my National Socialist Motor Corps and will then serve as one of
my Party adjutants.”
It was also typical of the Führer that, to a certain degree, he wanted
to see his will carried through; but this man was out of the Navy, and I
could make my conviction felt in this case. Under these circumstances I
declared myself ready to continue in office. That was at the beginning
of 1939; in the course of the spring, however, I asked again whether I
could not be relieved of my position now, since I had served for many
years in the Navy and I did not believe I would be able to maintain the
dignity of the office much longer. I suggested to him that perhaps in
October 1939 I should leave my post. The Führer refused at the time, and
on 1 October we were at war, and in time of war I did not believe that I
could leave the Navy under any circumstances unless it was very urgent,
especially since I considered myself totally responsible for all
preparations and for the training of the Navy. In the course of the war
our co-operating which up until then, aside from such incidents, had
been quite congenial, since the Führer had always made an effort to show
me respect, our connection gradually became very strained during the
war. The Führer became more nervous when I made reports, flared up in
rage when there were divergences of opinion or if there had been any
incidents, as, for instance, a technical defect or poor performance by a
ship. It happened again and again that his entourage influenced him
before I could actually explain matters to him, and I was called in
subsequently to set him straight on these matters. In that way
unpleasant scenes ensued which wore me out.
One point about which the Führer was especially sensitive was the large
ships. He was always uneasy when our large ships were out on the high
seas and were carrying on raids against shipping. The loss of a ship,
such as the _Graf Spee_ or later the _Bismarck_, he considered a
tremendous loss of prestige; and matters like that, therefore, excited
him tremendously. That went on until the end of 1942. Then there
came—and this particularly impressed me—my defeat in the consultation
with the Führer on questions dealing with Norway, France, and above all,
Russia. In the final analysis he always listened more to the Party
people as, for example, Terboven, than to an old officer. That led to a
situation which could not be tolerated for any length of time. One of
the basic characteristics of the Führer was a tremendous suspicion
toward anyone and everyone, but especially directed against old officers
who had come from the old Wehrmacht and of whom he always
assumed—despite all well-intentioned treatment—that in their hearts
they did not share these feelings which he had to demand of them.
Especially the case of Russia had led me to so many conflicts with him
that our relations were strongly influenced thereby. Indeed, the man who
compiled all these war diaries and minutes, Admiral Assmann, summed it
up on one occasion at the conclusion of such a discussion with the
words: “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, therefore, is in complete
opposition to the Führer in this matter.”
At the end of 1942, just after I had had to put an end to the entire
Norwegian question, an incident occurred which led to the end. There was
to have been an attack on a convoy which was going to Murmansk or
Archangel from England. It was in December at a time when in those
northern regions there are just 1 or 2 hours of light and hence no
favorable weather for fighting by large ships when up against large
numbers of destroyers. The ships, together with the destroyers, had
started on their journey and had reached the convoy while it was still
light. But since daylight soon disappeared and darkness fell and since
the convoy was guarded by many destroyers, the admiral considered it
expedient to withdraw the big ships from the battle. That was the only
correct decision for he might have lost them all by torpedo attack. This
fact, and secondly the fact that unfortunately the radio connection
between this admiral and the Naval Operations Staff was made difficult
and at times completely broken off by static, caused the Führer to
become extremely excited in his headquarters where I reported to him
everything I found out myself. The whole day was spent with questions
back and forth, and even in the evening I could not give him a clear
picture. This excited him extremely. Through Admiral Krancke he had all
sorts of insults transmitted to me and demanded that I report to him
immediately; and I could see that very strong friction would result. I
arranged it so that I did not need to report to him until 6 days later
on 6 January so that the atmosphere could first cool off a little. On 6
January I could go to him with a complete report; and in the evening, at
a discussion at which Field Marshal Keitel was also present, he made a
speech of about an hour’s duration in which he made derogatory remarks
about everything that the Navy had done so far, in direct contrast to
every judgment passed on the Navy up until this time. From this I saw
that he was anxious to bring about a break.
I personally was firmly prepared to seize this opportunity to resign,
especially as it became ever clearer that the war was becoming a pure
U-boat war, and I could therefore feel that I could leave at this moment
with a clear conscience.
After the Führer had concluded his speech I asked to be permitted to
speak with him alone. Field Marshal Keitel and the stenographers left
and I told him that I was asking for my resignation as I could see from
his words that he was entirely dissatisfied with me and therefore this
was the proper moment for me to leave. As always, he tried at first to
dissuade me but I remained adamant and told him that a new
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy who would have complete responsibility
would definitely have to be appointed. He said that it would be a great
burden for him if I were to leave now since for one thing the situation
was very critical—Stalingrad was impending—and secondly, since he had
already been accused of dismissing so many generals. In the eyes of the
outside world it would incriminate him if I were to leave at this point.
I told him that I would do everything I could to prevent that happening.
If he wanted to give the appearance as far as the outside world was
concerned that I had not resigned because of a clash, then he could make
me a general inspector with some sort of nominal title, which would
create the impression that I was still with the Navy and that my name
was still connected with the Navy. This appealed to him at once and I
told him on 6 January that I wanted to be dismissed on 30 January. At
this point I had concluded 10 years of service as Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy under him. He agreed to this proposal and asked me to suggest
two successors so that he could make a choice.
On 30 January he then personally dismissed me by appointing me Admiral
Inspector of the Navy. He said that he would still on occasion ask me
for advice; but that never happened. I was merely sent out twice, once
to Bulgaria when the King of Bulgaria was buried and once to Hungary, to
the Hungarian Regent Horthy to bring him a gift from the Führer.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you otherwise performed no tasks as Admiral
Inspector?
RAEDER: I had no functions and received no orders.
DR. SIEMERS: Then my last question: Did you have the impression, on the
occasion of your conversation of 6 January 1943 with Hitler, that he in
a way was glad to get rid of you in view of the many differences of
opinion and the fact that you contradicted him frequently on technical
naval and political matters concerning Norway, France, Russia?
RAEDER: I do believe that he wanted to get rid of me at this time, for I
was in a certain way an inconvenience for him. This one case which I
described, where I had my way in the end, he had never forgotten.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much.
This concludes my examination of Admiral Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit today until half past one. It will
adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask questions?
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): Admiral,
you recall the memorandum of the Naval Operations Staff of 15 October
concerning possibilities for an intensification of the economic war.
That is in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number 10, on
Pages 96 and 97 of the English text. Admiral Wagner has already
testified about it here. Can you add anything to that statement
concerning the purpose and the meaning of that memorandum?
RAEDER: Since the war against England came as a complete surprise to us,
we had up until then dealt very little with detailed questions of
submarine warfare. Among other things we had not yet discussed the
question of so-called unrestricted submarine warfare which had played
such a very important part in the previous war. And from that fact it
developed that on 3 September that officer who was recently mentioned
here was sent to the Foreign Office with some points for discussion on
the question of unrestricted submarine warfare, so that we could clarify
with the Foreign Office the question as to just how far we could go. And
that is the document which recently played a role here, D-851, GB-451,
of 3 November.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: 3 September, you mean.
RAEDER: Yes, 3 September. This touches upon all these questions. Then
discussions with the Foreign Office took place and this U-boat
memorandum mentioned by you was worked out in the High Command of the
Navy on the basis of these discussions and released on 15 October. I
believe that on 15 October I presented it to the Führer who in principle
agreed to the contents. But the very fact that a memorandum about
submarine warfare concerning possibilities for an intensification of
submarine warfare was issued only on 15 October shows how little we were
prepared for that eventuality.
That memorandum contains near the beginning that sentence which has been
quoted by the Prosecution concerning our position with respect to
international law, where reference is made to highest ethics of warfare,
adherence to international law, and the desire to base all military
measures on existing laws wherever possible. But if this is not possible
or when by deviation it is possible to achieve decisive military
results, and we could take the responsibility for this deviation, then
in case of necessity we must depart from existing international law.
That means that also a new international law may have to be developed.
However, this entire memorandum represents merely a constant search for
possibilities for conducting submarine warfare with the least damage to
neutrals and the greatest possible adherence to international law and in
such a way that it would become a decisive factor in the outcome of the
war.
Various cases are discussed as to how an intensification can be reached,
but it always was a question of finding countermeasures against enemy
measures. Such possibilities as blockade or the new concept to lay siege
to England by submarine warfare are examined in all directions; but the
draft always states the conclusion that in view of the number of
submarines and other misgivings it is not yet possible to conduct such
operations.
And the final result of that entire memorandum, as set down in that
document, can be found in the two last pages. Unfortunately I have only
the German copy in front of me where under the last Paragraph D the
final opinion, the following sentences which I should like to quote, are
worthy of notice...
THE PRESIDENT: Where is the extract?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On Pages 99 and 100 in the Document Book 10,
GB-224.
Mr. President, another excerpt from the same document has already been
mentioned and that is in the Document Book Dönitz 3, on Pages 199 to
203; but I do not believe that it is necessary to refer to it because
the witness will only read one or two sentences.
RAEDER: [_Continuing._] Now, the last paragraph “Conclusions” reads:
“1.) The manner in which economic warfare has been conducted
until now, in accordance with Prize Regulations, does not meet
with military demands for ruthless severity.
“A large part of enemy mercantile trade including all exports in
neutral ships is not covered.
“The requirements of naval law that neutral merchantmen be
stopped and searched can no longer be fulfilled, in view of the
strength of aerial reconnaissance and U-boat countermeasures in
the enemy’s coastal approaches. Economic warfare according to
Prize Regulations has therefore to be limited and in the North
Sea and the Baltic must be left to surface craft only. In the
Atlantic the U-boats in enemy coastal waters will limit their
activities to attacks without warning on convoys, troop
transports, and once it has been approved, armed and all enemy
merchantmen, and will conduct economic warfare according to the
law governing prizes only in exceptional cases. The use of the
Operational Air Force for economic warfare is not possible.
Economic warfare is conducted within the framework of
international law. A possibility of controversy with neutral
states is ruled out.”
Then one more sentence:
“If the Supreme War Command for political reasons should not be
able at present to decide to wage the economic war in the most
vigorous form possible by having recourse to a siege, it will be
possible to increase the effectiveness of the policy of stopping
enemy trade by a ruthless increase in the use of mines and by
air attacks on enemy port installations. One cannot, however,
expect a decisive result from the economic war in its present
form.” (Document C-157, Exhibit GB-224)
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The immediate result of that memorandum and
of your report to the Führer was the order of 17 October?
RAEDER: Yes, and that provided: Firstly, that all enemy merchantmen
could be torpedoed; and secondly, as a severer measure, that passenger
ships in convoys could be torpedoed a short time after an announcement
to that effect had been made. That was all done in connection with the
intensification, measure for measure, which we had brought about in
answer to individual acts of the enemy.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, that long passage that the defendant has
just read, if it has not been put in evidence yet, must be offered in
evidence by you. I understand it is not in evidence at present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I can help. I shall be using this
document and I shall put it in.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it been offered in evidence?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Only part of it, not the part that the defendant
has referred to. But, in view of that I shall refer to it later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, you mentioned that before 1935
certain preparations were made for the construction of a German
submarine weapon. Did Admiral Dönitz participate in any way in these
preparations?
RAEDER: In no way whatsoever. As was said before, he was abroad during
the last year; but even before that he had nothing to do with it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You have reported about your dismissal as
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Would you please tell me how it came
about that Admiral Dönitz became your successor?
RAEDER: The Führer had ordered that I propose two admirals as
successors. I suggested in writing first, as the elder...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, how does this arise? I mean, what
relevancy has it to anything we have to decide as to how Admiral Dönitz
became head of the Navy?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That has significance, Mr. President, in
view of the Prosecution’s assertion that Admiral Dönitz became the
successor of Admiral Raeder on the basis of political relations or
services rendered.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Please continue, Admiral.
RAEDER: I’ll be very brief. I suggested, first, Admiral Carls, who was
the senior and has vast knowledge of the entire conduct of naval policy.
In the event that the Führer should want to manifest that he now was
placing U-boat warfare in the foreground I suggested Admiral Dönitz, who
was the greatest authority in that field. Political considerations of
any kind were not mentioned at all; it was purely an official, technical
appointment.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no more questions.
DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, the
Tribunal, through its letter of 26 March, has consented that an
affidavit be submitted by the Codefendant Raeder for the Defendant
Keitel, provided the Prosecution has an opportunity to question Admiral
Raeder on his statements in cross-examination.
I have sent the affidavit to the Prosecution, and the Prosecution has
raised no objection. I ask to be permitted to submit this affidavit
which is concerned with the functions and position of the Defendant
Keitel as Chief of the OKW, as Exhibit Number Keitel-19, after Admiral
Raeder has confirmed that he signed this affidavit and that he agrees to
its being submitted.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, you are acquainted with the
questions which I put to you and which, after a conference with your
counsel, you answered and signed on 19 March?
RAEDER: That is about the position of Field Marshal Keitel in the OKW?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
RAEDER: I am quite familiar with that.
DR. NELTE: Then, may I submit this affidavit? The Prosecution has a copy
of it.
I have a few more questions for Admiral Raeder, the answers to which can
be greatly simplified with the permission of the Court. These are the
same questions which on 9 May, a week ago, I put to Admiral Dönitz and
which refer to the assertion made by the witness Dr. Gisevius about
Keitel’s tremendous influence and the circle of silence which Keitel is
said to have drawn around Hitler. I merely want to ask the witness
Admiral Raeder, with the permission of the Tribunal, whether he can
confirm as correct for the period before 1943 as well—that is, for the
period during which Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy—the
answers to my questions given by Admiral Dönitz in Raeder’s presence. I
ask for the decision of the Tribunal whether I may put this general
question in order to save time.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
DR. NELTE: You heard what I said, and I ask you, can you confirm the
answers given by Admiral Dönitz to my questions on 9 May for the period
before 1943 as well?
RAEDER: Yes, that I can do.
DR. NELTE: Now, I have one final question. During your testimony
Document L-79, the “Little Schmundt” file, was treated. You objected to
this document as inaccurate and not of probative value?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Dr. Siemers then quoted a part of that document which the
Prosecution, at the time when it submitted the document, had not read.
In that part of the document there is mention of a research staff in the
OKW.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. NELTE: I ask you now to tell me whether such a research staff in the
OKW was ever actually created.
RAEDER: Not to my knowledge. The work was done by the Armed Forces
Operations Staff in which there were officers representing all three
branches of the Armed Forces.
DR. NELTE: So there was no change in the scope of tasks and in the
division of jurisdiction?
RAEDER: No, definitely not.
DR. NELTE: That also concerns the question of working out strategic and
operational matters between the OKW and the Armed Forces Operations
Staff on one hand and the general staffs of the Armed Forces branches,
including the Naval Operations Staff, on the other?
RAEDER: As far as the Naval Operations Staff is concerned, yes, there
was no change.
DR. NELTE: And as far as the other branches of the Armed Forces are
concerned do you know of no change or...?
RAEDER: That I cannot say. I do not know about that.
DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch and Halder have testified about
that.
Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, is the affidavit that you referred to
contained in your document book?
DR. NELTE: No, not yet. It will be Number Keitel-19.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Will you have translations supplied to the Tribunal?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the
German Armed Forces): Admiral, you are the senior member of the group of
the General Staff of the OKW, and you belonged to this so-called group
for the longest time?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: In what manner did you become a member of this so-called
group?
RAEDER: I was appointed Chief of the Naval Command Staff by Reich
President Field Marshal Von Hindenburg. I did not join that group by
doing so; rather I became Chief of the Navy. One was not aware of any
group.
DR. LATERNSER: Joining and remaining in this group the Prosecution
maintains was voluntary. Was there any possibility at all for military
leaders to apply for any vacant posts?
RAEDER: No, there was nothing of the sort.
DR. LATERNSER: In other words, military accomplishments were the
decisive factor?
RAEDER: It was a military order. There was no question, of it being
voluntary.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you know the various members of the group at the time
when you belonged to it?
RAEDER: No, I certainly did not know all individuals from the other
branches. Of course, I knew a large number.
DR. LATERNSER: Within the purely military leadership was there ever a
conference about a plan which had as its purpose the launching of
aggressive wars?
RAEDER: No, there was never such a conference. Frequently it has been
mentioned here how the various enterprises came about—the political
decision of the Führer, a directive issued by him, and then the working
out of the final order.
DR. LATERNSER: Admiral, I do not mean now by this question the meetings
which took place under Hitler’s leadership. I mean meetings of purely
military officers.
RAEDER: Do you mean within the various branches of the Armed Forces?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, within the various branches.
RAEDER: Of course, within the Naval Operations Staff there were meetings
about various questions, but not about aggressive wars.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, my questions referred only to that. The Prosecution
asserts, furthermore, that this indicted group was first established by
the National Socialist Regime. Is that correct?
RAEDER: In no way whatsoever. There was no group at all, but the
organization was such as has frequently been described.
DR. LATERNSER: And such as has always existed in all armies of the
world?
RAEDER: Yes, as has always existed.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution has furthermore asserted that, after the
seizure of power by Hitler, the high military leaders had the choice
either of co-operating or of accepting the consequence that the new
regime would establish new armed forces, that is armed forces of their
own, and that on the basis of this situation the generals decided to
co-operate. Is that assertion by the Prosecution correct?
RAEDER: No. It is not true that thereupon any joining of forces took
place. I know that such tendencies existed. For instance, once in 1934 I
reported to the Führer that I had been informed that SA Gruppenführer
Killinger, who had formerly been in the Navy and had advanced to
prominence (in the SA), had the intention of becoming the Chief of Naval
Operations Staff. But I was not aware of any further efforts. But above
all, there was no coalition of the generals for defensive action against
such an intention.
DR. LATERNSER: So the assertion made by the Prosecution is not correct?
RAEDER: No, not correct. That was not in the least a method which would
have been in accordance with the sentiments of the soldier—that such a
coalition be formed to avert something.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution furthermore asserts that the group, above
all, the generals, let themselves be won over by the regime because of
the chance of conquest. Is that assertion correct?
RAEDER: That is an absolutely incorrect and farfetched assertion.
DR. LATERNSER: Was the effort of the Party to acquire for itself supreme
authority ever supported or promoted by the military?
RAEDER: I do not know that that ever happened. Do you mean the seizure
of power?
DR. LATERNSER: After the seizure of power was the Party supported by
military leaders, as far as you know, in its efforts to attain sole
domination in Germany?
RAEDER: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Yesterday, in reply to the question of your counsel, you
described how you came to swear your oath to Hitler. If such an
intention had existed in the mind of one of the commanders-in-chief,
would it have been possible for him to refuse the oath?
RAEDER: That I cannot say, but I believe that not one of us saw any
necessity for refusing that oath.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution has further asserted that the high
military chiefs agreed completely with the principles and aims of
National Socialism. Is that correct?
RAEDER: I explained here yesterday how far one could agree with the
principles of National Socialism and to what extent one trained one’s
soldiers according to these principles. Anything that went beyond that
was rejected and found no acceptance in the Navy. Here I can speak only
for the Navy.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the officers who were subordinate to you and who were
in the group ever have an insight into the political situation and
Hitler’s intention so that one could speak about participation or
membership in the plan?
RAEDER: No. There was an absolute prohibition on speaking to anyone
about speeches in which Hitler mentioned intentions and possible
developments. The officers below the rank of Armed Forces commander were
informed only when things had gone so far that the directive was to be
issued.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution further asserts...
RAEDER: I have to qualify that. That directive was first worked out by
the High Command of the Army and the Navy. Thus they received
information as soon as the directive of the individual branches of the
Armed Forces was issued and that always happened sometime later.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution also asserts that the high military
leaders were not military experts but that they knew Hitler’s intentions
of aggression and willingly co-operated. Can you name any military
leaders who, before they had received orders, took a positive attitude
toward any aggressive action?
RAEDER: I cannot answer that. I explained yesterday how Admiral Carls
pointed out to me the danger imminent in Norway; but he did not do
anything more than give me the information, point out the danger, and
elucidate the situation there.
DR. LATERNSER: The attitude of the former Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces, Von Fritsch, and of the Chief of the General Staff Beck to
the question of a war is known. I just wanted to ask you, did the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, have the
same attitude concerning the war?
RAEDER: I believe so, yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Concerning the conference on 5 November 1937, you have
already made detailed statements yesterday. I would like...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you have been putting this class of
question to every naval and military witness who has been called, and
what the Tribunal desires me to point out to you is that there has been
no cross-examination by any member of the Prosecution challenging any of
these points, so this evidence is entirely repetitive and cumulative and
is not bound to be put by you to every military and naval witness who
comes into the witness box, and it is simply a waste of time to the
Tribunal. When questions are answered by a witness and are not
cross-examined to by the other side, it is the practice to assume that
the answers are accepted.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, for me this is an extremely important
question which has just been touched upon, namely, the question of
whether a question is inadmissible because in the opinion of the Court
it is cumulative. I should like to make a few statements concerning
whether or not a question is cumulative.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Laternser, you can understand what the
Tribunal has said to you, that it is now desired, in view of the
directives of the Charter, that this Trial should be as expeditious as
it can reasonably be; and it does not desire to have the same evidence
adduced to it over and over again. Is that not clear?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I can assume that the Tribunal accepts
as true these proofs which I want to bring by means of my question, then
I can of course forego these questions. But I cannot determine whether
that is the case unless I know that I have succeeded in bringing
definite proof...
THE PRESIDENT: What I wanted to point out to you was that you asked the
same question of a great number of witnesses and that those questions
have not been cross-examined, and in such circumstances you can assume
that answers given by the witnesses are accepted.
DR. LATERNSER: If I am justified in drawing this conclusion, then of
course I shall dispense with such questions in the future. I have only a
few more questions, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] In support of the Indictment of the group
of the General Staff and the OKW two affidavits have been presented by
the Prosecution, one by Field Marshal Von Blomberg and one by
Generaloberst Blaskowitz. In these two affidavits both generals state
that as a whole, within the circle of generals before the war, the
opinion existed that the question of the Corridor would have to be
decided unconditionally and, if necessary, with force. Is that opinion
stated by the two generals correct? Was that the general attitude at
that time?
RAEDER: I never heard of such an opinion. In my presence General Von
Blomberg never made any statement of that kind. The Polish question was
discussed by us in the Navy only to the extent already mentioned here
during the last few days, namely that an attack on Poland by Germany
would have to be prevented under all circumstances. The political
treatment of this question...
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant says he has never heard of this suggestion.
DR. LATERNSER: That was the reason why I put the question to the
witness.
RAEDER: After 1933 political questions were handled and decided by
Hitler exclusively, and he said that he made all policies.
DR. LATERNSER: It is therefore correct that this opinion which Blomberg
and Blaskowitz have mentioned does not apply for the circle of generals?
RAEDER: Well, at any rate, I have never heard it expressed by the
generals. It did not exist in the Navy.
DR. LATERNSER: You were present at the conferences of 23 November 1939?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put one supplementary question
concerning those conferences. Admiral, do you remember that in the
course of these conferences Hitler reproached the generals because they
still had old-fashioned ideas of chivalry and that these ideas had to be
rejected?
RAEDER: That I cannot say with certainty. I believe that I can recall
having once heard it said that Hitler was of that opinion.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have one last question concerning the document
which your defense counsel already put to you in the course of your
examination. It is Document C-66 submitted by the British Prosecution
under GB-81. It is in Document Book 10, on Page 13, or 10a, Page 35. On
Page 5, in the last paragraph of that page, you said the following and I
quote:
“It can be seen from my statements and plans that the Führer
reckoned with a definite conclusion of the eastern campaign in
the fall of 1941, whereas the High Command of the Army (General
Staff) was very skeptical.”
Admiral, I wanted to ask you of what this skepticism consisted?
RAEDER: As far as I know, the High Command of the Army was of the
opinion that it was impossible to conclude such a tremendous campaign in
so short a time; and many others shared that opinion, whereas the Führer
believed that because of the new weapons and his strategy he could
conclude that campaign very quickly.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know anything about whether the High Command of
the Army had any fundamental objections before the beginning of the
Russian campaign?
RAEDER: As far as I know, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army was very
much against it; but that too, I cannot say definitely.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no more questions.
PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Representing Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, Counsel
for Defendant Von Neurath): Admiral, in the course of the proceedings it
has been testified, I believe by the Codefendant Göring, that Field
Marshal Von Hindenburg had expressly desired that Herr Von Neurath
become Foreign Minister. Do you know anything about that?
RAEDER: I learned at the time that Hindenburg had expressed that wish,
and it caught my attention because Field Marshal Von Hindenburg until
that time had always considered merely the appointment of the Minister
of Defense and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy as his privilege
in the Reich Government. This was the first time that he expressed such
a wish in the case of a Foreign Minister.
DR. KRAUS: So it was not the practice of the Field Marshal to make any
suggestions regarding the appointments of Ministers?
RAEDER: No. He had merely acted according to his own wish to appoint the
Defense Minister, even in the previous Social Democratic, Democratic,
and other cabinets.
DR. KRAUS: What may have been the reason for Field Marshal Von
Hindenburg’s making that exception in the case of Neurath?
RAEDER: He probably wanted to make sure under all circumstances that the
peaceful policies which had prevailed in Germany up to that time would
be continued. He was sure that Herr Von Neurath would continue these
policies in the same direction.
DR. KRAUS: So he had particular confidence in Herr Von Neurath’s
attitude up to that time?
RAEDER: Yes, beyond a doubt.
DR. KRAUS: You knew Von Neurath very well, and you were informed about
his political principles, weren’t you? What were the main lines of his
policies?
RAEDER: Herr Von Neurath wanted to see the gradual recovery of the
German people to normal conditions and he wanted to strive with peaceful
means for equal rights for the German Reich. Above all, he wanted to
have good relations with England, which was also in conformity with
Hindenburg’s intentions, and on this very point both of us agreed
completely.
DR. KRAUS: So one can say that you considered Von Neurath an exponent of
a policy of understanding with England and a peaceful policy of
compromise.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. KRAUS: Then I have a second question for you, Admiral. A Fritz
Wiedemann, who was Hitler’s adjutant from 1935 to 1939, has submitted an
affidavit. The Prosecution has submitted that affidavit under 3037-PS.
In this affidavit Herr Wiedemann states that on 28 May 1938 a conference
took place in the winter garden of the Reich Chancellery with all
important people of the Foreign Office, the Army, and the Operational
Staffs present, a meeting so large that one almost doubts whether all
these people could get into the winter garden.
And here, he says, in addition to Göring, General Beck, General Keitel,
and Von Brauchitsch, there were also present Von Neurath, Von
Ribbentrop, and yourself.
In this meeting Hitler spoke among other things about Czechoslovakia and
stated that it was his unshakeable intention that Czechoslovakia must
disappear from the map. Do you know anything about that meeting?
RAEDER: Although I can otherwise recall every large or more important
meeting, I do not have the slightest recollection of this meeting at
that time. The list of those present also seems very unlikely. I have
never seen Herr Von Neurath and Herr Von Ribbentrop together at the same
meeting. I should also doubt whether Herr Von Neurath at that time was
in Berlin at all. He was quite definitely not present at that meeting.
But I also do not remember any meeting at which Von Ribbentrop was
present as Foreign Minister when military matters were discussed. I
think this Herr Wiedemann is mistaken because I believe also that I have
never seen him at a meeting in which such matters are supposed to have
been discussed. The Führer always sent this personal adjutant of his out
of the room beforehand. I believe there is some mistake.
DR. KRAUS: Such an important statement by the Führer you would doubtless
have remembered.
RAEDER: Yes. During that summer the Führer’s opinions fluctuated
greatly. I believe that at the end of May a mobilization took place in
Czechoslovakia, or something of the sort—I do not remember exactly
what. But I attended no meeting, as far as I know, at which such a
statement was made.
DR. KRAUS: Thank you. I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any
questions?
[_There was no response._]
Sir David, it seems scarcely worthwhile starting the cross-examination.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, I entirely agree.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 20 May 1946, at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOURTH DAY
Monday, 20 May 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand._]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dr. Horn wishes to ask some questions.
DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): With the
permission of the Tribunal I should like to put a few more questions to
the witness.
Admiral, is it true that on 24 April 1941 the so-called neutrality
patrol of North American warships was extended past the 300-mile limit
to a distance of at least 1,000 miles?
RAEDER: I cannot remember the date, but such an extension did take place
at some time.
DR. HORN: Is it true that at the beginning of June 1941 a law was passed
in the United States confiscating foreign ships immobilized in North
American harbors as a result of the war and including 26 Italian and 2
German ships?
RAEDER: Here again I cannot tell you the date for certain. It happened
in the summer of 1941. The ships were mostly Italian, with a few German
ships. I cannot swear to the exact figures.
DR. HORN: In June 1941 the United States publicly declared its
willingness to give the Soviet Union every possible aid. Did you discuss
this with Hitler, and what was his attitude towards it?
RAEDER: Yes, that is correct. There were some questions of a loan
without interest, or some such thing. Very probably I did speak to
Hitler about it, but I cannot tell you what his attitude was. I can say
only that all these measures at that time in no way deterred us from the
course we had pursued until then. In June I had the conversation with
Hitler at which I explained to him that up to that time we had allowed
American warships to go completely unmolested, and that we would
continue to do so in spite of the considerable disadvantages entailed
which I mentioned recently.
DR. HORN: In 1941 the American Secretary of War Mr. Stimson and the
Secretary of the Navy Mr. Knox, as well as Secretary of State Mr. Hull,
repeatedly advocated in public the use of the United States fleet to
safeguard English transports of war material to Great Britain. On 12
July 1941, Secretary of the Navy Knox informed the representatives of
the press of Roosevelt’s order to shoot at German ships. How did Hitler
and you react to these actions, which were contrary to neutrality?
RAEDER: Your facts are correct. They will go down in the annals of
history. Hitler did subsequently issue an express order that we were in
no circumstances to open fire of our own accord, but only in
self-defense. This situation actually did arise later in the case of the
two destroyers _Greer_ and _Kearny_.
DR. HORN: Thank you. I have no further questions.
MARSHAL: Your Honor, the report is made that Defendant Göring is absent
this morning.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you had read at the time of its
publication the book by Captain Schüssler, _The Fight of the Navy
against Versailles_, had you not?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at it on Page 26 of Document Book
10, Page 123 of the German document book? Captain Schüssler had told you
that he was going to write such a work, had he not?
RAEDER: Yes. And I might add that this book was written because we in
the Navy had been accused by National Socialist circles of not having
done enough to strengthen the Navy in the period previous to 1933. That
is why all these things were mentioned in that book.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the book was circulated among senior
officers in the Navy, was it not?
RAEDER: Yes; at any rate, any of the senior officers who wanted it could
have it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you just turn to Page 127, or to Page
27 of the English book, which gives the preface? You will see at the end
of the first paragraph it says that it is to give a reliable picture of
the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace
Treaty of Versailles.
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And in the third paragraph:
“This memorandum is also meant to distinguish more clearly the
services of those men who, without being known to wide circles,
were ready to accept extraordinary responsibility in the service
of the fight against the peace treaty.”
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree, Defendant, that that preface
represents generally but accurately the feeling of the Navy with regard
to invading the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles?
RAEDER: Yes, as regarding circumventing the Versailles Treaty as far as
necessary to improve our defenseless position, for reasons which I
explained recently here. To do this was a matter of honor for every man.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just turn over—it is Page 28, My Lord, and
it is Page 126 of your copy.
[_Turning to the defendant._] It gives a summary of contents. You see,
it is in four sections. The first section deals with the first defensive
actions against the execution of the Treaty of Versailles, and then
enumerates what they were. Don’t trouble about that. The second is
independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government
and legislative bodies.
RAEDER: In both cases it says: From the end of the war until taking over
the Ruhr in 1923; from 1923 until the Lohmann case in 1927. I had
nothing to do with either case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us see. From 1922 to 1924 you were
inspector of naval training at Kiel, were you not?
RAEDER: Inspector of the training system; the schools, the further
training of officer candidates, the complete training of assistants of
the Chief of Staff, that is, chief-of-staff assistants, a sort of
general staff officer, and similar matters. I had nothing to do with
affairs of the front.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what you were asked. You were asked whether you
were inspector of training. The answer was “yes,” was it not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As inspector of training, are you telling the
Tribunal that you did not have a very complete knowledge of the weapons
available for your service?
RAEDER: No, no. It was not a question of weapons visible for all to see.
As I explained to you recently, that was a matter of setting up gun
platforms and transferring guns from the North Sea to the Baltic. This
was done by a special command, which worked under the direct order of
the Chief of Navy; among others, there was this Kapitänleutnant Raenkel,
for instance, who was the specialist dealing with all gunnery questions
at the time. I myself was in Kiel, and there were no guns or anything of
the kind in Kiel and its neighborhood.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Take the next period from 1923 to 1927. From
1925 to 1928 you were Chef der Marine Station der Ostsee, were you not?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not
know about the independent armament measures taken behind the back of
the Reich Government?
RAEDER: No; I had nothing at all to do with these affairs. I have
already said that was done by the Chief of the Naval Command Staff. I
knew in a general way...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you whether you ever had to do
with them, I am asking you whether you are saying that you did not know
about them. You knew all about them, did you not?
RAEDER: I knew it in a general way, that such measures were being taken.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, take the next, Number III: “Planned
armament works tolerated by the Reichskabinet, but behind the back of
the legislative bodies.” The legislative bodies would be the Reichstag
and the Reichsrat, would they not?
RAEDER: Yes. But I already said recently that it was not the military
commander-in-chief’s business to negotiate these matters with the
Reichstag. This was a matter for the Government. Herr Severing will also
testify to that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will hear Herr Severing when he comes. At the
moment I want you to tell the Tribunal this...
RAEDER: [_Interposing._] I say the same...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just wait a minute; you have not heard my
question yet. What did you say to Captain Schüssler? Did you tell him
you are giving an entirely false picture in suggesting that the Navy had
anything to do with going behind the back of the Reichstag? Did you make
any effort to correct what Captain Schüssler was saying?
RAEDER: No; I did not correct his book. I had no time for that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just before we come to Number IV, if you
just look, it’s page—
My Lord, it is Page 32 of the English book, and Page 186 of your book.
This is part of Captain Schüssler’s description of Section II dealing
with economic rearmament; it comes under the heading, “Difficult Working
Conditions.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you see that? It begins: “There were
often difficult working conditions.” Do you see that? The heading is
“Difficult Working Conditions.”
RAEDER: Yes I see, “Difficult Working Conditions.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to look at the last part of it.
Now, I want it quite clear, Defendant. This is dealing with the period
from 1923 to 1927, before you were head of the Navy; so I want to ask
you about it.
“There were often many external difficulties besides these for
the Tebeg—the camouflaging of the task and the work, the
distance separating them, the impossibility of settling any
questions even of minor importance by telephone, and the
necessity of avoiding if possible any written correspondence,
and of carrying it out in any case as private correspondence
with false names and disguised expressions.”
Did you not know that that was the method by which it was being carried
on?
RAEDER: No; I really knew very little about the Tebeg—the Tebeg, the
Navis—any of these things. But I think it was quite right for these
people to work like that, because at that time the attitude of a large
percentage of the German people was unreliable, and there was great
danger if these things leaked out. In any case, the Tebeg had been
dissolved when I arrived.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you kindly turn back to Page 126, in
Book 4, Page 28 of the English book, and just look at Captain
Schüssler’s description of the fourth period: “Armament under the
direction of the Reich Government in camouflaged form (from 1933 to 1935
when we were free to recruit on an unrestricted basis.)”
Do you agree that Captain Schüssler was giving an accurate description
of your methods from 1933 to 1935?
RAEDER: How does he describe it? Where is that passage?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Number 4.
RAEDER: “Armament under the leadership of the Reich Government in
camouflaged form”?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree that it is a correct description of
your activities from 1933 to 1935?
RAEDER: Of course. I did that on orders from the head of the State; and
before all the head of the State was very anxious to see that no
exaggerated measures should be taken, so that it would not interfere in
any way with his plans for making an agreement with Great Britain. He
allowed very little to be done with regard to the Navy. He could at once
have built eight armored ships, so many destroyers, and so many torpedo
boats, none of which had yet been built, but he did none of these things
because he said, “We do not want to create the impression that we are
arming on a large scale.” He approved only two...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have explained that; so note, Defendant, the
point is this—the “camouflaged form” when you were negotiating the
naval agreement. You did not want anyone to know what steps you had
taken contrary to the treaty and how far you had gone. That is the plain
fact of it—you wanted to get the naval agreement without disclosing
what you had done, isn’t that so?
RAEDER: No, that distorts the sense of what I said. We did not want the
announcement of these measures to cause strained relations between
Germany and Britain. The measures as such were completely justifiable
and were extremely minor ones.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will come to that in a moment. I only do want,
before we leave these naval works, to ask you one question about another
book. You know that Oberst Scherff projected a history of the German
Navy. I don’t want any misunderstanding about it. As I understand the
position, you permitted Oberst Scherff to have recourse to the archives
of the Navy but beyond that you hadn’t seen anything of his work, isn’t
that right?
RAEDER: I did not see his book at all. I saw the table of contents here
the first time I was interrogated. I did not give him the order, either;
he received it from the Führer; and for that reason I allowed the Chief
of the Navy Archives to assist him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is exactly what I put to you. I want
you to turn to Book 10a. It starts at Page 1 in the English version and
also Page 1 in the German. And if you would look at Page 3 you will find
the proposed table of contents of Oberst Scherff’s book, Page 3 in the
English version. I think it must be about Page 3 in the German version,
too. Now would you look at the heading of Section 2. It is:
“Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State.” And then he
describes, “(a) National Socialism in the Navy before 1933”...
RAEDER: Where is that? I have not found it yet.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Section 2 of the table of contents.
RAEDER: No, that must be something quite different. I have not got it
here...
I have got it now.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Section 2, which is:
“Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State.” And you can
see the proposed headings which were to cover some 30 pages: “National
Socialism in the Navy before 1933.” Then: “The oath of the Navy to the
Führer; the taking over of the National Insignia; the first alteration
of the flag and the New War flag.” Do you agree with Oberst Scherff’s
description? You agree that this is a correct description, that the
proceedings could be described as the incorporation of the Navy in the
National Socialist State?
RAEDER: Of course—I explained that here recently—the Navy—the Armed
Forces—had to have some connection with the National Socialist State. A
democratic Navy in a monarchy is impossible. The basic principles must
agree. But I myself decided the extent to which these principles were
adopted—that is to the degree where the Navy maintained its internal
independence and yet occupied its appropriate position with regard to
the National Socialist State.
Apart from that, I do not see any text here; I can only see the
headings.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that doesn’t offend you as a
description. That is all I wanted to get clear. I do not want to spend a
great deal of time.
RAEDER: But the headings mean nothing.
For instance, it might say in the actual text that the Navy did not fit
into the National Socialist State properly. I do not know. The same
holds good of the fleet. Of course...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to waste time on it. There were
three matters which you dealt with in your examination-in-chief, and I
am not going to deal with them in detail; but I just want to remind you
of them and put one general question. You can put that document away; I
am not going to pursue it further. Would you mind putting that document
away and giving me your attention for the next question?
You were asked about the E-boats, your survey list, that long document,
in September 1933, and the question of disguised auxiliary cruisers as
transport ships O. Is this a fair summary of your answer: That you
admitted that these breaches of the Treaty took place, but said in each
case that the breach was only a little one. Is that a fair summary of
your answer? Is it?
RAEDER: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let’s take it in bits, then. Are you
disputing that any of these matters with regard to the E-boats, the
matters on the survey lists or the transport ships O—are you disputing
that any of these matters took place? I understood, you admitted they
all did take place...
RAEDER: No, they took place in the way I described. For instance, these
auxiliary cruisers were not built. We were not allowed to do that. But
we were allowed to make plans and we were allowed to select those ships
which, in the event of war—if a war had broken out in which Germany was
attacked by another state—could have been used as auxiliary cruisers.
That was not a violation. If it were I would admit it. The U-boat
designing office in Holland was not a violation of the Versailles Treaty
either. The wording was quite different; I do not remember the third
case which you mentioned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember there was a long list in a
document, from yourself.
RAEDER: Yes, of course.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And I understood, maybe wrongly, that you
admitted these things took place, but you said “it is only a little
one.”
RAEDER: Yes, of course. Those were small things, but they were urgently
necessary in Germany’s defense interests.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want to ask you about an officer of
yours, Vice Admiral Assmann. Was he an officer in whom you had
confidence?
RAEDER: He was a very able historian.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you answer my question? Was he an officer
in whom you had confidence?
RAEDER: I had confidence that he would write history correctly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all I wanted. Now, would you have a look
at a new document, which is Document Number D-854, which, My Lord, will
be Exhibit Number GB-460. Now, that is an extract from one of a series
of essays on the operational and tactical considerations of the German
Navy and consequent measures taken for its expansion between 1919 and
1939, contained among the files of Vice Admirals Assmann and Gladisch,
who were in the historical section of the German Admiralty.
Now, would you mind not looking at it for a moment, Defendant? I want to
ask you some questions and then you can look at it with pleasure
afterwards. Do you agree that in nearly all spheres of armament where
the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was violated in the
letter and all the more in the spirit? Do you agree with that?
RAEDER: No, by no means in every sphere. In the most important sphere we
were far behind the Versailles Treaty, as I explained to you very
clearly. Possibly we infringed on it the other way round, by not doing
as much as we could have done.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you just look at this document. At the
beginning of the first quotation your officers say:
“But if—as was stated—in nearly all spheres of armament where
the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was violated in
the letter and all the more in the spirit—or at least its
violation was prepared—a long time before the 16th of March
1935...”
Are your admirals wrong in stating that? Is that what you are telling
the Tribunal?
RAEDER: May I please see which page this is on? I have not seen it yet.
Yes, he says, “in nearly all spheres of naval armament...”
That is not the case, for in the sphere of...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That’s what I put to you; is that right?
RAEDER: No, it is not right. We had not even built as many ships as we
could have built, but—as I have explained repeatedly, the violations
were concerned with...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You’ve explained that.
RAEDER: ...violations were...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, we do know the position of your
shipbuilding yards. You’ve given that explanation and it’s a matter of
discussion whether it’s of any value. I am not going to argue with you.
I am asking you this question: Are you saying that the admirals of your
historical section are wrong in that sentence that I read out to you?
RAEDER: Yes, I am stating that. It is wrong as it stands.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now let’s pass on—the Tribunal
will judge that—to the statement of Admiral Assmann. It goes on:
“This probably took place in no other sphere, on the one hand so
early, and on the other hand under such difficult circumstances,
as in the construction of a new submarine arm. The Treaty of
Versailles had only been in force a few months (since 10 January
1920) when it was already violated in this point.”
Do you agree with Admiral Assmann on that?
RAEDER: No, he is wrong. It was not violated at all in this point, and
the reason it started so early was because all the ex-U-boat commanders
and U-boat officers and technicians were out of a job and offered their
services to maintain technical developments in U-boats abroad; that is
why it was so early. But that has nothing to do with me because I had no
say in these matters then. At that time I was working on the Navy
Archives.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, how are you able to be so confident today
that Admiral Assmann is wrong? I thought you said that he was a good
historian. He had not to go back very far. He only goes back 20 years.
RAEDER: A good historian can make mistakes too if his information is
wrong. I merely said I had confidence in him...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say quite in detail—the first paragraph is
about Japan.
RAEDER: Yes; what he says about the building of U-boats is wrong.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let’s just see how far he was wrong. We
needn’t go into the first paragraph which deals with shipbuilding for
Japan, but take the second one: “In 1922...” Do you see the paragraph
which begins:
“As early as 1922, three German shipbuilding yards established a
German U-boat designing office in Holland under a Dutch cover
name with about 30 engineers and designers. In 1925 a Dutch
shipbuilding yard built two 500-ton U-boats for Turkey according
to the plans of this bureau, which enjoyed the financial and
personal support of the Naval Command. In the solution of this
question, too, Kapitän zur See Lohmann was concerned
decisively.”
Is that right?
RAEDER: We have admitted that. That was in no way a violation of the
Versailles Treaty.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We’ll not argue that, but it’s right anyway.
Admiral Assmann’s right about that. Then he deals with Finland and with
Spain. And, if you look at the end of the paragraph after dealing with
Spain, he says:
“Already in the autumn of 1927 the Naval Designing Department
was commissioned to carry out construction in Spain by the Chief
of the Naval Command Staff, Admiral Zenker, who accepted the
responsibility despite all the difficulties in the field of home
politics. The working out of the project and the drawing up of
the construction plans took place in the Dutch Bureau. After
completion in 1931, the ship carried out trial runs and diving
exercises from Cadiz to Cartagena, under German direction and
with German personnel, consisting of officers, engineers, naval
construction students and foremen.”
That’s all. That’s quite right, isn’t it?
RAEDER: Yes, but the shipbuilding designer from our designing office, in
particular, as well as the above-named other persons employed on U-boat
construction, were discharged from the Navy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And just look at the last sentence: “This boat
which is now the Turkish submarine _Gür_ became the prototype for the
_U-25_ and _U-26_.”
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the 250-ton submarines which were made in
Finland. And, if you look at the last sentence of the next paragraph:
“The Finnish U-boat was the first U-boat plan to be worked out
in Germany and successfully carried out; the Dutch bureau was
called upon only to work out the details.
“The Finnish 250-ton vessel became the prototype for _U-1_ to
_U-24._”
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And now the next paragraph:
“The building and the thorough trial of the prototype vessel
made it possible to obtain the parts for _U-1_ to _U-24_ in 1933
to 1935, long before the order for the assembly of the vessels;
and the latter was prepared beforehand as far as was possible
without endangering secrecy.”
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you turn on to Page 156. You see
where the next quotation is from:
“At the beginning of 1935”—that is 6 months before the
Anglo-German Treaty—“there were probably six 250-ton boats
ready for assembly, six 275-ton and two 750-ton boats on which
preparatory work was being done. About 4 months were needed for
assembling the small ships and about 10 months for the big ones,
dating from 1 February 1935, but everything else was still quite
uncertain.”
Now, look at the next words:
“It is probably in this very sphere of submarine construction
that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the
German-British Treaty.
“Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been
ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up to
1938. In reality 118 were completed and under construction.
“The preparations for the new U-boat arm were made so early, so
thoroughly and so carefully, that already 11 days after the
conclusion of the German-British Naval Treaty, which permitted
the construction of U-boats, the first German U-boat could be
put into commission on 29 June 1935.”
Now, take that sentence, which is written by Admiral Assmann, and we’ve
seen what your connections with Assmann were through about 100
documents. He said: “It is probably in this very sphere of submarine
construction that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the
German-British Treaty.”
Now, you’ve told this Tribunal for about several hours of your evidence
that that was a freely negotiated treaty of which you were very proud
and which you were ready to support. Are you telling the Tribunal that
your admirals are wrong in saying that in submarine construction Germany
adhered the least to the restrictions of that freely negotiated treaty?
RAEDER: That is a completely false judgment. I have stated here that, as
long as no negotiations with Great Britain had taken place with regard
to the pending agreement, all the preparations which we did make were
exclusively attended to abroad—that in the proportion which probably...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you can make your explanation...
RAEDER: Will you please stop interrupting me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We’ll take it in this order, and don’t get cross
about it. You answer my question, and then you make your explanation.
Now answer my question first. Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is
wrong in saying in that first sentence that it was just in the “sphere
of submarine construction that Germany adhered least to the restrictions
of the German-British Treaty.” Is Admiral Assmann wrong when he says
that, is that what you’re telling the Tribunal? Well, that is my
question.
RAEDER: He is wrong. I said so; I have already said so.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe these are not questions relating
to facts. They are questions for legal decisions. It is a legal argument
as to just how Article 191 of the Versailles Treaty is to be
interpreted.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the question is quite proper. In
his explanation, of course, he can explain that in his view it was not a
breach of the Treaty and he has already explained that. He can give us
his opinion about it. He was the head of the German Navy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, will you take the second sentence...
RAEDER: But I should like to finish if I may. I can give an explanation
of that.
All these things were only preparations made outside Germany. The point
under discussion is whether the Finnish U-boats were constructed with
the help of German designers. That is true. German designers were not
forbidden to help Finnish designers to draft designs for U-boats. It is
also true that this U-boat later...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I’m awfully sorry to interrupt you, but you know
this isn’t dealing—this sentence isn’t dealing with this early period.
This is dealing with the period after the Anglo-German Treaty in 1935
and that’s what I want you to answer me about. This Finnish matter was
long before that.
RAEDER: I am still speaking of the period preceding the agreement, for I
was accused of manufacturing U-boat parts abroad. And the fact is
that...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I know, but don’t you see that...
RAEDER: I have not given my answer yet. No...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you about that. I like you to
answer the right question. I’m not asking you about the question of
Versailles any longer. I’m asking you about Admiral Assmann’s assertion
that you did not adhere to the restrictions of the German-British Treaty
in 1935, and what you did in Finland in the 20’s has nothing to do with
that. Now, that’s all. You can give your explanation.
RAEDER: That is entirely wrong. We particularly restricted ourselves
with regard to the construction of U-boats; and in 1938 we had still not
built the 45 percent which we were entitled to build, so we made an
application for permission to build up to 100 percent; and this was
agreed on, and came into effect, as appears from the text of the English
treaty, after a friendly discussion with the British Admiralty at the
end of 1938. At the beginning of the war we still did not have 100
percent. We were always behind with the construction of submarines.
Admiral Assmann, who probably had no up-to-date knowledge of these
matters, is quite wrong. I can swear to that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the next sentences. This is
dealing...
RAEDER: What page are you speaking of?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 156. I will read it very slowly again:
“Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been
ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up to
1938. In reality 118 were completed and under construction.”
Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong when he states that?
RAEDER: I am awfully sorry; I still have not got the passage from which
you are reading, that is quite—which line...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got the sentence, Defendant?
RAEDER: Yes, I have found it now.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, you see what Admiral Assmann says,
that:
“Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been
ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up to
1938.” That is before there was any mention of going from 45 to
100. “In reality 118 were completed and under construction.”
Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong in giving these figures?
RAEDER: Certainly. In 1939 we entered the war with 40 submarines—I do
not know the exact number. This is either a misprint or quite an
incredible figure. As you know, we started the war with—I think—26
U-boats capable of sailing the Atlantic, and in addition a number of
smaller boats. I cannot tell you for certain now what was under
construction at the beginning of the war but there was no intention of
this kind. That was precisely the accusation made against me—that I did
not have sufficient U-boats built in good time. I dispute the whole of
that sentence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree then, Defendant, that Admiral
Assmann’s figures are quite incompatible with what you have told the
Tribunal about the number of U-boats with which you started the war?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: I should be grateful to Sir David if he would read the
entire sentence; that is, if he would also read Note 6, which appears
after the Number 118 and after the word “ordered.” Note 6 which, as I
have just observed, is not included in the English translation is worded
as follows: “Chief of the Naval Budget Department, B. Number E 311/42,
Top Secret, of 19 November 1942.”
The figure, Mr. President, refers to a much later period, not 1938 at
all.
I should be extremely grateful if, after the experience we have just
had, I could in future have not only the German document but also the
English translation from Sir David. I should be very grateful to Sir
David if he could have this done.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you not have the passage you want translated from
the German into English by the time you want to re-examine? As I
understand it, you are referring to some note which is an addition to
what has been translated into English. Will you read it again, would you
read the passage again?
DR. SIEMERS: Sir David has been reading the following: “In reality 118
were completed and under construction.”
That is as far as Sir David has read. After the word “ordered” there is
the figure 6. This refers to Note 6. Note 6 is worded as follows: “Chief
of the Naval Budget Department, B. Number E 311/42, Top Secret, of 19
November 1942. (Page 19).”
In other words, this shows that the Number 118 must have been mentioned
on Page 19 of this document of the Naval Budget Department in 1942. The
figure therefore does not refer to the year 1938 but to a later date.
RAEDER: I can add another explanation to that which is quite possible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I will look into that, but the text
says—and there is no difference in the German text—exactly what I
read—that “about 55 could have been provided up to 1938 and that in
reality 118 were ready and ordered.” That is Admiral Assmann’s text.
DR. SIEMERS: But not 1938.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, My Lord, my friend, Dr. Siemers, will
have ample opportunity—if there is any point, I shall consider it, but
there is the text, and the text includes that. What the footnote says,
Dr. Siemers, can be put in re-examination.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Sir David, will you look at the note and see
if the report was made in 1942, rather than the construction? I suggest
that you ask him whether or not the note doesn’t show that the report
was made in 1942.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, my translation of this note is “Chief of
the Naval Budget Department.” Then it gives the reference to his note,
dated 19 November 1942. It seems entirely to bear out the suggestion of
the learned American Judge, that this is the reference to the report,
nothing more. It is only suggesting that the date of construction was
1942, and I think it really would be a matter of convenience that,
unless Dr. Siemers has got something to say on the text that I am
putting, if he reserved these argumentative points to re-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you can raise it all in re-examination. You
can have a translation of this note laid before us by that time.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I am perfectly agreeable. I have merely
requested that one copy of the English translation of the newly
submitted documents should be given to me.
Mr. President, you will admit that it is a considerable handicap to me
to ascertain during the cross-examination what passages are missing from
the translation and translate them myself when the British Delegation
have an English translation on hand. I think it might be easier if Sir
David would be good enough to let me have an English translation for my
own use.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you will be able to let him have an English
translation of any new document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. The Tribunal has ordered that. That
is prepared. Surely you got the English translation? Certainly, My Lord.
As I put each document, a translation will be given to Dr. Siemers.
THE PRESIDENT: There may have been some mistake.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will certainly get it.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, we will pass to another gentleman on
your staff. You told us a good deal about the naval budgets. Do you
remember a Flottenintendant in your department, Secretary
Flottenintendant Thiele, of the OKM Department E, the Budget Department
of the German Admiralty? Do you remember?
RAEDER: Yes. Mr. Prosecutor, may I just say one more thing about the
question of 118? I have just remembered something in connection with
this Number 6, Chief of the Naval Budget Department. It is perfectly
possible that in this case Admiral Assmann has taken two things
together. All U-boats and ships were, of course, included in the budget
and in this way sanctioned. This budget was drafted at the end of the
year and published before the year to which it applied. As this large
figure suddenly appears in this document, it is perfectly possible that
here the Figure 118 originates on the basis of the agreement with
England made on 30 or 31 December. It is perfectly natural that we
should include in the budget all the other U-boats which we were allowed
to build to complete the 100 percent. This does not necessarily mean
that we started to build the U-boats in 1938. Incidentally I think we
might have perhaps begun, because one can only build so and so many
U-boats in any one year.
I think that this explanation, which occurred to me when I saw the words
“Naval Budget Department,” is a perfectly correct one.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Tribunal has the wording; that is, “up to
1938,” and I am not going to argue the point with you. The words speak
for themselves.
I would like you to look at Document Number D-855, which becomes Exhibit
Number GB-461, and it is an extract from a lecture by the gentleman I
have just mentioned, Herr Thiele, which was given at the German Naval
Training Center for Administrative Officers in Prague on 12 July 1944.
The extract I want to put to you is on Page 22, and it is headed “Ship
Construction Plan.” Have you got that—Page 22, and the heading is “Ship
Construction Plan”? You see the paragraph beginning:
“The era of the very large development of the Navy had therefore
come at the moment of the seizure of power. Already in the first
year after this, in March 1935, the construction of battle
cruisers with a displacement of 27,000 tons was undertaken. Such
a vessel was ordered to be constructed. Thus one of the clauses
of the Treaty of Versailles which was the most important for us
was at once violated in the naval sphere in a manner which in a
short time could no longer be camouflaged.”
Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right when he says that in his lecture?
RAEDER: Of course it was a violation, but I have explained here at
length that there was no question of building new battle cruisers but of
utilizing the two armored ships which had already been granted us; and I
said that in 1934 Hitler had only given me permission to enlarge
somewhat the plans for these ships, so that the armor might be heavier.
I see from this that it was not until March 1935, when it was certain
that the treaty would be concluded and also that England would allow us
to build such ships through this treaty in a few months’ time that the
Führer sanctioned the plans projected for the 26,500 ton ships which
were to be the first of the battleships in the new program; and they
were then begun. So that the three 28 cm turrets—that is, the offensive
weapons which he had not yet approved in 1934—were thrown in.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This gentleman seems to agree with you more than
the other. Just look at what he says about U-boats two sentences further
on. He says:
“The U-boats were completed in separate parts, as their
construction was under no circumstances to be apparent to the
outside world. These parts were stored in sheds for the time
being and needed only to be assembled after the declaration of
freedom to rearm.”
Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right on that point?
RAEDER: Yes, he is right. We have admitted that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us look at his next point.
RAEDER: Perhaps I can complete my explanation? We...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do try to keep it as short as you can. I don’t
want to cut you out, but keep it as short as you can.
RAEDER: Of course, but I must complete my defense.
We had U-boat parts manufactured abroad and only at the beginning of
1935 did we bring them in and assemble them, when the naval treaty was
certain.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. You say you were anticipating the treaty;
well now, just look at what he says after that:
“The third also of those clauses of the Treaty of Versailles
that was most disadvantageous for us, the limitation of
personnel to 15,000 men, was immediately ignored after the
seizure of power. The total personnel of the Navy was already
25,000 in 1934, and in 1935, the year of the London Naval
Agreement, 34,000 men.”
Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right on that? Is that right?
RAEDER: Yes, that is admitted. It was clear that we had to train
personnel in good time so that crews might be available for our
increased naval forces.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now I just want you to look for a moment
at the document which is on Page 3 of Document Book 10, which you did
refer to in your examination-in-chief. That is Document C-23, about the
displacement of the _Scharnhorst_ and the _Gneisenau_ and the _Tirpitz_
and the _Bismarck_ and the other ships.
Now, you are familiar with that document; we have discussed it.
RAEDER: Yes. I know the documents.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, that is dated the 18th of February,
1938. Germany didn’t denounce the Anglo-German Naval Treaty until after
the British guarantee to Poland in April 1939, which is 14 months later.
Why didn’t you simply send a notification to Great Britain that the
displacements had come out 20 percent bigger because of defensive
matters in construction? Why didn’t you do it?
RAEDER: I cannot tell you that today. We explained recently how the
displacements gradually increased through quite insignificant changes to
our own detriment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Really, Defendant, I have got that well in
mind. We have got the reason why the displacements came out bigger, and
I don’t think you are prejudicing yourself if you don’t repeat it, but
just look at the bottom of that page, because I think you will find the
reason which you can’t remember there; won’t you?
“In the opinion of A IV, it would be quite wrong to report a
larger tonnage than that which will probably be published
shortly, for instance, by England, Russia, or Japan, so as not
to bring upon ourselves the odium of an armament race.”
Isn’t that the reason?
RAEDER: Yes, that was intended for a future date. We wished in no
circumstance to create the impression that we were increasing the
offensive power of our ships.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I am going to pass to another
subject, and I want to put quite shortly and bluntly, as you will
appreciate, the point the Prosecution puts to you, that for 20 years,
from 1918 to 1938, you and the German Navy had been involved in a course
of complete, cold and deliberate deception of your treaty obligations.
That is what I am putting to you. Do you understand? After these
documents, do you deny that that is so?
RAEDER: Of course. It was not a cold-blooded affair. All our evasions of
the Versailles Treaty were due to our desire to be able to defend our
country more efficiently than we had been allowed to. I have proved here
that in the Versailles regulations the only points restricted were those
unfavorable to the defense of our country and favoring aggression from
without. As regards the ships, I may add that we could never complete
any very great number of ships, and consequently we were interested in
increasing as far as possible the power of resistance, that is, their
seagoing security, _et cetera_. At no time did we increase the offensive
power above the strength which was permitted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I want you to understand what my next
series of questions is directed to. I don’t want there to be any
misapprehension. I am now going to suggest to you that these breaches of
treaty and your naval plans were directed toward the possibility, and
then the probability of war. I would just like you to take the same
document that I have been dealing with, C-23. We will use that to pass
from one to the other.
Would you turn to Page 5 of Document Book 10, and there you will see
that there is a memorandum, I think of the Planning Committee to the
Flottenchef, Admiral Carls. We have heard your view of Admiral Carls,
that you thought he was a very good officer, and in fact he was your
first choice for your successor.
Now, that is in September 1938, and it is a top secret opinion on the
strategic study of naval warfare against England, and you see “A” says:
“There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.”
Now, look at Paragraph 1:
“If, according to the Führer’s decision, Germany is to acquire a
position as a world power, she needs not only sufficient
colonial possessions, but also secure naval communications and
secure access to the oceans.”
Do you agree with that, Defendant?
RAEDER: Yes, that is correct. I know the whole document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, look at 2:
“Both these requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to
Anglo-French interests, and would limit their position as world
powers. It is unlikely that this can be achieved by peaceful
means. The decision to make Germany a world power, therefore,
forces upon us the necessity of making corresponding
preparations for war.”
Do you agree with that?
RAEDER: Yes, that is all quite correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let’s take 3:
“War against England means at the same time war against the
Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well, and a
large number of countries overseas—in fact, against half to
two-thirds of the whole world.”
I needn’t ask you about that, because the facts have shown it.
Now, look at the next: “It can only be justified....”
RAEDER: Yes, but I must be allowed to comment on that document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh certainly, I’m sorry. We got on so quickly I
thought we were not going to have any explanation.
RAEDER: In 1938, as has been stated here quite often, the Führer’s
attitude towards Great Britain became more difficult in spite of all the
efforts of General Von Blomberg and myself to tell him that it was not
so on England’s side, and that it was possible to live in peace with
England. In spite of that the Führer ordered us to prepare for possible
opposition by England to his plans. He for his part never contemplated a
war of aggression against Great Britain; and we in the Navy still much
less; in fact, I have proved that I did nothing but try to dissuade him
from that. In 1938 he ordered us to make a study similar to those we had
already made in the case of other possibilities of war—which it was the
duty of the Wehrmacht Command to do—but dealing with the course which a
war against England might take and what we would require for it. This
study was prepared, and I reported to the Führer that we could never
increase our fighting forces to such an extent that we could undertake a
war against England with any prospect of success—it would have been
madness for me to say such a thing. I told him—that has repeatedly been
mentioned—that by 1944 or 1945 we might build up a small naval force
with which we could start an economic war against England or seize her
commercial shipping routes, but that we would never really be in a
position to defeat England with that force. I sent this study, which was
compiled under my guidance in the Naval Operations Staff, to
Generaladmiral Carls who was very clear-sighted in all such questions.
He thought it his duty to explain in this introduction of his reply,
which agreed with our opinion, the consequences which such a war against
Great Britain would have for ourselves, namely, that it would bring
about a new world war, which neither he nor we in the Navy nor anyone in
the Armed Forces wanted—in my opinion, not even Hitler himself, as I
proved the other day—hence this statement. He said that if we must have
war with England, it was essential that we should first of all have
access to the ocean and, secondly, that we should attack English trade
on the sea route of the Atlantic. Not that he proposed that we, on our
part, should embark on such a venture. He was only thinking of the case
of such a war breaking out very much against our will. It was our duty
to go thoroughly into the matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He says that, “The war against it”—that is the
war against England—“can only be justified and have a chance of success
if it is prepared economically as well as politically and militarily.”
Then you go on to say “waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an
outlet to the ocean.”
Now, I just want to see how you prepared.
RAEDER: Yes, that is quite clear and quite correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s just look how you had begun to prepare
economically. Let’s take that first, as you put it first.
Would you look at Document C-29, which is Page 8.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, hadn’t we better break off now before going
into this?
[_A recess was taken._]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I told you, Defendant, that I was next going to
ask you a question about Document C-29, which is on Page 8 of the
English Document Book 10 and on Pages 13 and 14 of the German document
book. You will remember, this document gives general directions for
export given by the German Navy to the German armament industry...
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...and you told us when you were dealing with
the document that you wanted your service not to be small-minded about
matters of a not very high secrecy but, in addition to that, your
general policy was that the German armament firms should develop a
foreign trade so that they would have the capacity to deal with the
increased demands of the German Navy as soon as possible. Is that right,
is that a fair summary, or shall I repeat it?
RAEDER: Yes, but it must be added that I said in two places that we
hoped at that time that the Treaty of Versailles would be relaxed,
because it was a comparatively favorable period for negotiations for
disarmament and we already had the governments headed by Von Papen and
Von Schleicher, both of whom showed great understanding for the needs of
the Armed Forces and therefore fought hard for that at the disarmament
conference. So a definitely legal development might be hoped for in this
direction; and on the other hand, our entire industry was unable to cope
with armaments production except on an insignificant scale and had
therefore to be increased. I again stress the fact that it had nothing
to do with the Hitler regime. That decree just happened to come out on
31 January.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t think you are really disagreeing with me
that your policy, your broad economic policy for the German armament
industry, was to develop its export trade so as to be able to deal with
increased home requirements in future years; that is what you advocated,
isn’t it, that the German armament industry should at once increase its
export trade so as to be able to deal with increased home requirements
when these requirements arose? Isn’t that right?
RAEDER: Yes, that is correct but I do not quite understand that
expression. Did you say “Eigenhandel” or “Eisenhandel”—internal trade
or iron trade? I did not quite hear the expression—“Eigenhandel” or
“Eisenhandel”?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “Aussenhandel” (Foreign Trade).
RAEDER: “Aussenhandel”—yes, undoubtedly we wanted to be able to compete
industrially with other nations, so that our industry would be in
favorable position, and would gain strength.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I will ask you to turn to Document Number
C-135, which is Page 21 of the—sorry My Lord, Page 20 of the English
document book and Page 73 of the German document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Book 10.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Book 10, My Lord, yes.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, you remember that document, you dealt
with it? You said...
RAEDER: Yes, it was dealt with in the Lohmann affidavit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it is a document of the—I think, in April
1933, judging by the dates which I put to you a moment ago, and you said
to the Tribunal in giving your evidence that it was mere chance that the
year 1938 was mentioned; that that was the same period as has been dealt
with.
RAEDER: It has already been stated several times that the year 1938 was
mentioned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Has it been mentioned in some Weimar Republic
document? Will you just look at the second last paragraph; that will be
on your Page 74, Page 21 of the English document. It is in the middle
paragraph of Paragraph 3:
“Now Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler had made the clear political
request to build up for him in 5 years, that is, by the first of
April 1938, armed forces which he could place in the balance as
an instrument of political power.”
Is that sure, that Hitler had made a clear political request?
RAEDER: Yes, as far as I remember, he demanded a sort of five year plan
in 1933 the last year of which, 1938, happened to coincide with the 1938
mentioned in our substitute plan for subsurface construction, and that
directive had obviously been given for the whole of the Armed Forces;
since the naval agreement, which gave us the right to arm only in the
proportion of 1:3 and not in accordance with any special plans, had
become the basis for the Navy as early as 1935.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The point that I want to deal with is this: Did
Hitler tell you that he wanted these forces to place in the balance as
an instrument of political power, did he tell you that?
RAEDER: I can no longer tell you that; but I believe that it is a
perfectly ordinary expression to say that one uses one’s armed forces as
an instrument which could also be thrown into the scales at political
negotiations, so that we need no longer be kicked around by the
different nations, as had so far been the case. In my opinion, no
suspicion attaches to the expression.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To put it bluntly, Hitler was telling you, “by
1938 I want armed forces that I can use in war, if war should become
necessary.” That is what it means, isn’t it? That is what you understood
it to mean, isn’t that right?
RAEDER: No. There was no word about a war, only about the fact that we
had to keep our position among the other nations so that we could no
longer be tossed aside, as had hitherto been the case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If anyone tried to push you over, you could
fight; that is it, wasn’t it?
RAEDER: That is obvious. That would be the case, of course, if we were
attacked. We wanted to be in a position to defend ourselves if we were
attacked. Up till that point we were unable to do this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just let us take the first example, when
you contemplated fighting. If you look at Document Book 10a, Document
Number C-140, Page 104 of the English translation and Page 157 of the
German version, you remember that is the directive of Field Marshal Von
Blomberg on Germany leaving the disarmament conference and League of
Nations. And there, there is a pretty full general directive as to what
military measures you would take if the members of the League of Nations
applied sanctions against you; in other words you were quite prepared...
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...for a war happening on that peace policy;
that is so, isn’t it, and that is what it says, it gives all
preparations ready for fighting?
RAEDER: These preparations were made, if I remember correctly, 11 days
after we had left the League of Nations, and it was quite natural that,
if the Führer believed that in consequence of our leaving the League of
Nations, which was quite a peaceful action in itself, warlike measures
or sanctions would be applied against us, we would have to defend
ourselves; and if such an attack was probable we had to take these
preparatory steps.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you realized, Defendant, that as early as
October 1933 the course of Hitler’s foreign policy might have brought
about an immediate war, did you not?
RAEDER: No, I did not expect at all that such a measure as the secession
from the League of Nations, where we had always been treated unjustly
because we had no power behind us, would result in a war with any other
power. Nevertheless, it was right to take such eventualities into
consideration.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. That is good enough for me.
Now, just let us look at the same document book, Document Number C-153,
on Page 107 of the English version and Page 164 to 167 of the German
version. That is, you will remember, your armament plan for the third
armament phase, and I would just like you first of all to look at
Paragraph 3.
In (a) and (b) of Paragraph 3 you give the general basis for your
arrangements:
“(a) For the military leaders a sound basis for their strategic
considerations, and
“(b) For the political leaders a clear picture of what may be
achieved with the military means available at a given time.”
RAEDER: Yes, it is quite obvious that such a plan would have this
purpose.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that your political leaders were to make
their plans on what armed forces you had available for war, if
necessary. That was what you were contemplating then, was it not?
RAEDER: Yes, that is a matter of course; I reported to the Führer that I
could put a certain military strength at his disposal during that year.
The Chief of State must know that in order to know what he can count on.
But that has nothing to do with plans for war. That is the case in every
state. On the other hand, I cannot influence the political leader as to
what he wants. I can only report what I could have. Therefore, I had
nothing to do with political matters. I only did what is necessary and
what is done in every state.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And just look at Paragraph 7.
I am not going to argue with you as to whether states base their foreign
politics on things other than war as a matter of argument, but look at
Paragraph 7: “All theoretical and practical R-preparations (armament)
are to be drawn up with a primary view to readiness for a sudden war.”
That is that you, as far as the Navy was concerned, you had to be ready
then for an immediate war footing, have the Navy on an immediate war
footing, isn’t that right?
RAEDER: No, no. This concerns the sequence of the things to be taken for
granted. The armament plan listed the most important immediate
requirements of the Navy and at that point I say here that this applied
to weapons to be used in a war where there was no time to prepare and
that is, in plain language, the mobile fleet, which must be in a state
of constant readiness. It had to be kept ready for action at a moment’s
notice and it had to receive priority. All other matters, such as
quarters, and things that had nothing to do with direct combat, were
attended to afterwards.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought that is what I put to you, that the
fleet had to be ready and ready for war. However, you have given your
account of it.
Just turn over, if you will be so good, to Page 66 of Document Book 10,
Page 285 of the German document book; Document Number C-189, My Lord.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I want to raise just this one point
on which you made a point in your examination and which I must
challenge. You say in Paragraph 2:
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy expresses the opinion that
later on”—and I ask you to note the words “later on”—“the
fleet must anyhow be developed against England and that
therefore from 1936 onwards the large ships must be armed with
35 centimeter guns.”
Now, are you telling the Tribunal, that “gegen England” does not mean
“against” in the sense of in antagonism to, directed against, in
opposition to—that it merely means in comparison to? Are you seriously
saying that, are you?
RAEDER: I explained the other day that we are dealing here with the
question of keeping up with other navies. Up to that time we were
keeping up with the French Navy which had 33 cm guns. Then England went
beyond that in mounting 35.6 cm guns on her ships and then, as I said
before, France went beyond England in using 38 cm guns. Thus I said to
the Führer that our 28 cm guns which we believed we could use against
the French _Dunkerque_ class would not be heavy enough, and that we
would have to take the next bigger caliber, that is 35.6 like those of
the English ships. That was never done because the French began to use
38 cm guns and our _Bismarck_ class followed the French lines.
That comparison of calibers and classes of vessels was at that time
quite customary and was also...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told us all that before and my question is a
perfectly simple one; that this document in the original German, when
you say “gegen England” is exactly the same as in your song _Wir fahren
gegen England_. It means against, in antagonism and directed against,
and not in comparison. That is what I am putting to you and it is a
perfectly short point.
Are you telling this Tribunal that “gegen England” means in comparison
with England?
RAEDER: That is what I want to say; because it says “develop gegen
England” and at that time we had not even signed the Naval Agreement. It
is hardly likely that I would consider following an anti-British policy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Look to the next page, Document Number C-190,
Page 67 of the English document book, Page 284 of the German document
book. That is your conversation with Hitler, on the 2nd November 1934,
when you are discussing bigger naval estimates and the availability of
more money. I want you to look at the end of the first paragraph which
gives Hitler’s reasons.
“He considers it vital that the Navy be increased as planned”—now
look—“as no war could be carried on if the Navy were not able to
safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia.”
Are you still telling the Tribunal you were not from 1934 onwards
contemplating war? Well, if so, why does Hitler say that? That is one of
the most vital points of German naval strategy.
“No war could be carried on if the Navy were not able to safeguard the
ore imports from Sweden.”
Were you not contemplating war in November? Were you not?
RAEDER: Hitler said that a navy is built so that, if war becomes
necessary, the navy can use its weapons to defend the country. A navy is
established for no other purpose, and that was definitely one of the
general reasons for the existence of a German Navy. There were many
people who thought a navy was unnecessary.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, what I am putting to you is this. You
have told the Tribunal that the Navy was purely defensive, all your
preparations were purely defensive. I am suggesting to you that Hitler
there is contemplating a war and contemplating the task of a navy during
a war, a few months before he intended to denounce the military clauses
of Versailles.
You were all set for a war if it should become necessary, and you knew
that. Was that not the position?
RAEDER: That is a complete misrepresentation of the facts, Mr.
Prosecutor. Of course it is necessary during peacetime to contemplate
the circumstances which might arise to make it necessary to call on the
Armed Forces for defense. At that time nobody thought of a war of
aggression, and the individual tasks must be understood. One of the
Navy’s tasks was undoubtedly to secure the Swedish and Norwegian ore
exports in case of war; and it had to be developed with a view to that
end.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you just look at the next sentence in
Paragraph-2: “When I pointed out that in the critical political
situation in the first quarter of 1935, it would be desirable to have
six U-boats already assembled....”
You were preparing for the critical political situation.
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s look at what you were doing in 1936. Would
you give the defendant and Dr. Siemers Document Number D-806.
That is a report of yours dated the 11th of November 1936, dealing with
the U-boat construction program, and after the first paragraph you say
this in the second paragraph:
“The military and political situation urgently demands that the
extension of our U-boat fleet should be taken in hand
immediately and completed with the greatest energy and dispatch,
as it is a particularly valuable part of our armament at sea and
possesses special striking power.”
Are you saying that what you were urging there was purely defensive and
that you had no idea of the special striking powers that would be needed
in a war?
RAEDER: The entire political situation, or so I seem to remember, made
me consider it necessary to put the construction of submarines in the
foreground. But I never expected that we would start a war on our own
account. Hitler himself had told me that again and again, but he had
made his political moves which could undoubtedly lead us into war if the
other powers intervened against such a political move. The charge made
against me was that I did not push the construction of U-boats
sufficiently far ahead.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are stressing it sufficiently there, aren’t
you? “On the military and political situation”—you were kept fully
informed of the political situation and were adjusting your naval
armament accordingly; isn’t that so?
RAEDER: At that time I not only knew nothing about what was going to
happen, but I knew that we had occupied the Rhineland during that year,
and that in consequence of the clouds which appeared on the horizon as a
result of the occupation of the Rhineland Hitler maintained an attitude
of greatest caution and said that we must be prepared for further
complications. For that reason a special directive was issued in 1936,
and I took precautions along the lines suggested by these
considerations. My main duty was to watch; and on the basis of my
observations and the conclusions which I drew from them, I had to
strengthen myself as much as possible. This document, about which you
did not question me, had the same connotation.
I asked whether—should political tension develop at the beginning of
1935, before the signing of the Naval Agreement, and that would not be
done till June—we should perhaps assemble six U-boats. That was also in
the case of tension arising; and I knew at that time that the
declaration of freedom of territorial defense was intended to be made in
1935.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, you have told us what you knew in
1936. Now, just let’s pass on to 1937. I want to know exactly what you
say. That of course, as you remember, turns on the Hossbach Document,
386-PS, which is at Page 81 of Document Book 10, Page 314 of the German
document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, did you give the number of that last document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very grateful, My Lord. It is Exhibit
GB-462.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I want you just—have you got that,
Page 314 of the German document book?
RAEDER: Can you tell me the paragraph? I have...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, the first thing I want to ask you about is
the third paragraph, the last sentence, where Hitler is reported as
saying: “The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the
solution of the need for living space.”
And then I wanted you, if you would be so good, to turn over two pages
to 316. My Lord, it is Page 83 of the English document book. That is
repeated. My Lord, it is about seven lines down. Where Hitler says: “The
only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of
greater living space.” And then he says that: “The history of all times
has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking
resistance.” And then in a separate paragraph he says: “The question for
Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at the
lowest cost.”
Do you see that, on Page 316?
RAEDER: May I begin with the last one? It is wrongly translated.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that’s what I’m really going to ask you. I
want you to just tell us, did you hear Hitler say that that was the
general problem, “the greatest possible conquest to be made at the
lowest cost.”
RAEDER: No. The English document has the word “conquest” (Eroberung),
but that is not in the German document. The German text reads: “the
highest possible gain (Gewinn) with the smallest risk.” That is a phrase
borrowed from sport. There is no mention of conquest.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I’m quite prepared to accept that it comes after
the passage which I have referred to you in quite some detail, because I
don’t want to select anything out of the context. Did you appreciate
that Hitler there was saying, “The only possibility for Germany is to
get extra living space,” and that had to be got at the expense of other
nations? He said that, didn’t he?
RAEDER: He did say that; and I explained recently how that is to be
understood. He was speaking of Austria and Czechoslovakia, of the
Sudetenland. We were of the opinion that no change was intended in that
policy; nor did one take place later. War was not waged against Austria
or Czechoslovakia.
We were all convinced that he would solve that question peacefully, like
all other political questions. I explained that in great detail.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, that is what I was going to ask you
about. You have taken my second point yourself. The rest of the document
deals with action against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Would you look at
Page 86?
I think you will agree with me that Field Marshal Von Blomberg and
General Von Fritsch rather poured cold water on Hitler’s ideas. Isn’t
that a fair way of putting it?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They rather thus showed a certain antipathy?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that was in November 1937.
RAEDER: We all of us told him constantly that in no circumstances might
he start a war with England and France, and he always agreed. But I
explained that this entire speech had a definite purpose; and that for
this purpose he exaggerated a great deal and at once withdrew that
exaggeration when a hint was given to him about the danger of a war with
France and England.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was what I was going to ask you. That was
in November. By January, Field Marshal Von Blomberg had made his
unfortunate marriage, hadn’t he?
RAEDER: I believe it was in January. I do not know exactly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you took the view, didn’t you, that he had
been encouraged to do that by the Defendant Göring?
RAEDER: I never said that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, didn’t you?
RAEDER: No, not that I know of. I never thought that at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember making a statement in Moscow on
this point? Let me read it to you.
RAEDER: To whom, please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In Moscow to the Russians.
“At the beginning of the year 1938 I had experiences of a
personal nature, which although they did not concern the Navy
directly caused me to lose confidence, not only in Göring but
also in the sincerity of the Führer. The situation in which
Field Marshal Von Blomberg found himself as a result of his
unfortunate marriage made his position as a Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces impossible. I came to the belated conclusion
that Göring was making every effort to obtain the post of
Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht in place of Blomberg.
“He favored the marriage because it made Blomberg ineligible for
this post, while Blomberg believed—and even stated
repeatedly—that such a marriage was possible under the present
system. Göring had already had him shadowed in the past, as I
learned from later remarks.”
Didn’t you say that?
RAEDER: In Moscow, immediately after the collapse, I made a note of the
causes of the collapse as seen in the light of my own experience. I
wrote this document under the conditions there—where I was treated very
chivalrously—and I had no hesitation in informing the highest general
of the Commissariat of the Interior of this when I was asked what I was
doing there.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All I want to know is, is that true, what you
said?
RAEDER: Yes. I wrote these notes, and it is also true that it occurred
to me afterwards that Göring might have favored the marriage. I believe
that he himself told me that here. He had assisted Blomberg in such a
way that, I think, he did not know what the true state of affairs was or
how serious the matter was.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you see, your view at that time was that
Göring was encouraging the marriage because he knew that it would put
Blomberg off the map as Commander-in-Chief because he, Göring, wanted
the position. Was that the view that you held last summer?
RAEDER: I believed that last summer, yes. And it is also true that
Göring certainly wanted to become Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, but the Führer himself thwarted him in that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that was Von Blomberg. We know what
happened to him. Your second choice, after Von Blomberg, was Von
Fritsch, was it not? You thought that Von Fritsch would have been the
best Commander-in-Chief if Von Blomberg went, did you not?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mentioned that to Hitler? And...
RAEDER: He asked me, and I said that if I were consulted, I would
suggest Baron von Fritsch. But the Führer said that that was out of the
question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. But there were some of them bringing a
charge of homosexuality against Von Fritsch; isn’t that right? That was
why it could not be done?
RAEDER: Yes. He said, in general terms, that some kind of moral crime
existed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were one of the court who inquired into that
charge, were you not? Göring, as president, you and General Von
Brauchitsch?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you came to the conclusion that the charge
of homosexuality against Von Fritsch was a frame-up by the Gestapo, did
you not? Do you know what I mean? I am afraid “frame-up” is rather
difficult to translate.
RAEDER: The whole thing gave me that impression. Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is because the denunciation had been by
some shady character who you thought was a “hang-around” of the Gestapo;
and at the trial, the co-operation of the Gestapo with the accuser was
brought to light; that is right, is it not?
You were satisfied, from sitting at the trial?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you agree that there had been—not a
confusion—but that the guilty party was a cavalry captain, Rittmeister
Von Fritsch, and not this general at all; isn’t that right?
RAEDER: I agree absolutely. We acquitted Baron von Fritsch because his
innocence was proved. There was no suspicion of any kind remaining
against him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You acquitted him, but his reinstatement did not
follow? His reinstatement in command did not follow?
RAEDER: No. I went to him, as I knew him very well, and asked him if
he would agree to my going to Hitler and suggesting that he, Baron
von Fritsch, be reinstated. But Fritsch replied that he considered
that quite impossible. He thought that his authority was so much
impaired that he would no longer care to resume his position as
Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
After that, unfortunately, I could do no more about it. I reported
this to the Führer, but there were no further developments. All that
happened was that the Führer confirmed the absolute innocence of
Baron von Fritsch in a large assembly of generals and admirals.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you say this with regard to the Von
Fritsch incident:
“I was convinced that Göring had a hand in this well-prepared
situation, since in order to attain his goal it was necessary to
eliminate every possible successor to Von Blomberg”?
Do you remember saying that?
RAEDER: I do not remember that now; but I believe that I held that
opinion. To be quite just, I must say that Baron von Fritsch’s acquittal
was due principally to the way in which Göring conducted the
proceedings. The witness who was brought up told so many lies and made
so many contradictory statements every few minutes, that only Göring
could cope with him. After seeing that, I was very thankful that I had
not been appointed president, as suggested by the Minister of Justice. I
could not have coped with those people. It was entirely due to Göring’s
intervention that he was acquitted without any difficulties.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But of course, I think you have said, Witness,
that whether he was acquitted or not, the authority of Von Fritsch in
the German Army was in his own view destroyed by the fact that this
charge had been brought against him. That was the result of it, was it
not?
RAEDER: Herr Von Fritsch thought so. I would have insisted on being
reinstated after I had been acquitted in that manner.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did it not strike you as curious that the two
people who on the 5th of November had tried to head Hitler off from a
course that might have meant war were both disgraced in 2 months? Didn’t
it strike you as curious?