1942. Raeder writes:
“To my regret I have to send you enclosed, for your personal
information, a letter from Reich Minister Dr. Lammers to Prime
Minister Quisling.”
On Page 476 there is the letter from Lammers to Quisling which says—I
quote only one sentence:
“The Führer, therefore, desires that during the war there shall
be no conferences or discussions concerning a final or a
preliminary peace between the Greater German Reich and Norway,
or concerning other measures fixing or anticipating Norway’s
position to the Reich after the end of the war.”
This is the letter which the witness mentioned, which finally brought to
nought all his endeavors and those of Admiral Böhm.
Admiral, you had little to do with France, and therefore we can be very
brief. May I merely ask you, did you attempt at any time to influence
the political relations between Germany and France?
RAEDER: This influence, when there was any, was in the first place
directed as much as possible towards improving the defense of the
country. In the second place, there were above all humanitarian reasons.
I often visited naval and submarine bases in France. During these
journeys I got some knowledge of conditions in France. I saw that in
1940 and still in 1941 the population lived just as if it were at peace,
completely undisturbed. Consequently I believed, since the Führer had
shown so much moderation on the occasion of the Armistice, that a basis
could be found which would draw France—whose government was after all
collaborationist—closer to us.
I was informed that Laval was really sincere in his opinion that only
co-operation between France and Germany could guarantee a lasting peace
in Europe for the future. Therefore I suggested to him whether he
himself could not try to do something in that direction. He did not
intend to do this, and I referred to it again when I heard that Admiral
Darlan was trying to work more closely with our naval commander in
France, Admiral Schultze. That was first achieved in the field of
intelligence, where his services were very useful to us.
At the end of the year 1941 he mentioned that he would like to speak to
me. Admiral Schultze reported that to me and I told Hitler about it and
recommended such a conversation because I thought Lt would do some good.
DR. SIEMERS: It would do what?
RAEDER: That it might bring some advantage. The Führer approved this
meeting and instructed me as to his views. The meeting took place near
Paris on the occasion of an official trip which I made to the French
bases at the end of January or beginning of February 1942. I had the
impression that the meeting was very satisfactory, inasmuch as Darlan
was of the opinion that a peace would be of advantage to both nations
and he also appeared to be inclined to co-operate. He stressed, however,
that the whole political situation would have to be settled before peace
could be concluded. I also showed that I was prepared to meet him
concerning the negotiations with the Armistice Commission with respect
to heavy guns for big French ships. I reported to the Führer on the
results of the meeting. But in this case too the Führer was again
hesitant and did not want to make a decision. He said he had to see
first how the war went before he could decide upon his final attitude
toward France. Besides, that would be a precedent which might have an
effect on other nations. So that also was a failure. I did not obtain
the relief in the defense of France which I had hoped for and so, in the
case of France, this failure was the second reason which contributed
later to my asking for my release, because I could not carry my plans
through.
DR. SIEMERS: Now I come to the next subject where accusations are made
against you, and that is Russia. When did you hear for the first time
that Hitler intended to wage war against Russia, although he had
concluded a Nonaggression Pact with Russia?
RAEDER: May I first remind you that in the summer of 1940, that is to
say, July, August, and September, we in the Navy were very much occupied
with preparations for a landing in England; therefore it never entered
our heads that there could be any plans for action in another direction.
In August I heard from some Army office, possibly that of the
Commander-in-Chief, that considerable troop transports were going to the
East. I asked Hitler what that meant and he told me it was a grandiose
camouflage for his intentions to invade England. He knew that I would be
against it right away if he were to speak about an enterprise against
Russia. In September—I cannot recall the date exactly—he finally
admitted to me that he had certain intentions against Russia. In
September I reported to him at least twice, my more important report was
26 September, when I did everything I could to dissuade him from any
undertaking against Russia. In that report which I made in the presence
of Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel General Jodl I emphasized
particularly the strategic military side; first, because I could do that
in all clarity in the presence of other people, and then because I
assumed that such military reasons, that is, the possibility of failure
of an operation against Russia at a time when the struggle was on
against England, would impress him and dissuade him from that plan. On
26 September, after making this official report, I asked for a personal
conference alone with Hitler. Keitel and Jodl can testify that I always
did this when I wanted to discuss something particularly important with
the Führer, where I had to go beyond the conventional procedure and
which I could only do if nobody else was present. One could tell Hitler
a lot of things if one was alone with him, but one could not make any
such statements in a larger group. Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel
General Jodl know that very well, particularly well, because they were
the ones who in such cases always had to leave the room. On that
occasion I gave Hitler my views in detail; first, that it was not
possible to break the pact with Russia, that it would be morally wrong,
that it would serve no purpose because the pact gave us great advantages
and was a basis for a sound policy for Germany later on. Then I told him
that under no circumstances could he start a two-front war, as it was he
who had always emphasized that he would not repeat the stupidity of the
government of 1914 and that, in my opinion, it could never be justified.
Then I put to him again the difference of the forces on each side, the
absolute necessity for the Navy to concentrate on the war against
England and particularly at that moment when all resources were strained
to the utmost to carry out the invasion.
On that day I had the impression that Hitler was inclined to listen to
my argument because later, or the next day, the naval adjutant, Kapitän
Von Puttkamer, reported to me that Hitler had spoken in very much the
same vein as I had spoken, and had appreciated my argument.
That went on for several months. I presented many such reports,
returning always with the same arguments. I believed again in November
that I had been successful. To my utter surprise, however, on 18
December, Directive Number 21 (Barbarossa) came out, which dealt with
the case of a war with the Soviet Union before the termination of the
war against England. It is true, of course, that it was a directive for
an eventuality. It is Document 446-PS, USA-31, of 18 December 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is in Document Book 10a, Page 247.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, the Prosecution asserted that the
Navy and you assisted in drawing up this directive. Is that correct?
RAEDER: That is in no way correct. Such directives were drafted in the
OKW after the Führer had taken his political decision, in the Armed
Forces Operations Staff; and in that Armed Forces Operations Staff there
was also one naval officer and one or more Air Force officers who, under
the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, dealt with matters
concerning the Navy and Air Force when such directives were being
drafted. The directive then went to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces and they were ordered, for their part, to work out and present
suggestions for the execution of the orders of the Führer. They had no
influence on the directive itself and did not see it at all beforehand.
May I add one more thing? I have been accused by the Prosecution that I
used my influence with the Führer not for moral and ethical reasons but
that I tried in a cynical way first to settle the account with England
and then to assail Russia. I have said before that I told all my reasons
to the Führer whenever I had the chance, but that I could not do that in
a public meeting or in the presence of other people, nor could I write
it down in my war diary, because the sharp words which fell there must
not become known to other people by means of the war diary. I want to
point to Document C-170, Exhibit USA-136, which dates from 23 August
1939 to 22 June 1941. It is a compilation of many excerpts from the War
Diary of the Naval Operations Staff—and from my minutes of conferences
with Hitler in which the Russian question was dealt with. This is not a
literal reproduction of my statements or word for word excerpts from the
War Diary, but it is a summary of excerpts by the naval archivist,
Admiral Assmann. I will not read details from these many entries, but I
should like to point out that precisely this document, C-170, shows in a
large number of entries contained therein that, since the beginning of
the war in 1939, I continuously used my influence with the Führer to
maintain good relations with Russia for the reasons which I have
previously mentioned. It would lead us too far if I were to start
quoting several entries here. But the document, I would like to
emphasize, is entirely convincing.
DR. SIEMERS: You had nothing to do with the Directive 21, which is
signed by Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl?
RAEDER: Absolutely nothing.
DR. SIEMERS: But following that, you made some preparations in
accordance with the directive? As they concerned the Navy they were in
any case not so important here.
RAEDER: Yes. We had the first conference in January, as can be seen from
one of these entries in C-170. I had reported to the Führer on 4
February about our intentions and in March the Navy began with certain
preparations. I have said already that the Navy throughout the first
period was hardly concerned with major operations, but only with the
cutting off of the Gulf of Finland by mines and light naval forces. I do
not know whether that is in Directive 21 or somewhere else but the
Führer, at my urgent request, had ordered that the center of gravity of
the naval warfare should still be in the direction of England.
Consequently, we could use only relatively small forces for the war
against Russia.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we had better break off now.
The Tribunal rather understood that you hoped to finish by midday today.
We realize that you had 2 hours of today taken up with your documents,
but when do you think you will be able to finish now?
DR. SIEMERS: I believe I will need only about three-quarters of an hour,
between half an hour and an hour.
THE PRESIDENT: Tomorrow at 10 o’clock we shall deal with the documents
of Seyss-Inquart, and we are told that will only last 30 minutes.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 18 May 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD DAY
Saturday, 18 May 1946
_Morning Session_
MR. DODD: Mr. President, with respect to the application for documents
of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, 87 documents altogether have been
submitted to the Prosecution, and we have gone over them in the German.
After numerous conferences with counsel for the Defendant Seyss-Inquart,
we find we are unable to agree now on 17 of these documents. As of
yesterday the number was 20, as I so stated, but we have now reduced it
to 17.
Document Number 5 in the defendant’s list is a copy of a resolution of
the German National Assembly on the 21st of February 1919, advocating
Anschluss between Austria and Germany. We have told counsel we object to
it as being really irrelevant here and immaterial. It is a resolution of
a German parliamentary body, and it doesn’t seem to us to make any
difference what they were thinking of Anschluss in 1919.
Document Number 10 is an extract from a newspaper article published in
October 1945 and written by a man named Walford Selby. It is a critical
article criticizing the Treaty of St. Germain for not avoiding the
obliteration of the Austro-Hungarian economic entity, and it discusses
what it describes as the mistakes of 1919, and so on. We understand that
it is intended to explain, with other documents, the economic background
of the Anschluss movement. Whatever may be said for that type of proof,
there are at least five other documents on the same basis and we made no
objection to them. But we did feel that somewhere this sort of thing,
even if relevant, certainly became cumulative. Documents 7, 12, 26, and
33 are all on the same subject, the economic background of Anschluss,
and this is a long one. Therefore, we feel that it certainly is not
necessary, doesn’t add very much, merely creates a lot of paper work,
and is cumulative.
Document Number 11 is a speech delivered by a Dr. Schober, giving the
area and population of the Republic of Austria. We haven’t any very
serious objection to this type of thing excepting that there probably
are better sources if the defendant wishes to establish the area and
population of Austria in 1921. Further, it seems to us that the Tribunal
could very well take judicial knowledge of the area and population of
Austria as of that date from reliable publications.
Document Number 14 is a statement by the former Chancellor of Austria in
1922 to the effect that Austria belongs to Germany. Our objection is
again based on the cumulative feature of this document, because there
are at least three other documents with almost identical statements by
Dr. Renner to which we have made no objection.
Document 19 is an extract from a book written by a man called
Kleinschmied, and the extract purports to show that a number of
politicians lived or prospered on the Anschluss movement in Austria.
That doesn’t seem to us to be very important here or likely to help the
Tribunal very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, what exactly does “lived from the propaganda”
mean? That they made their living by reason of propaganda, or what?
MR. DODD: Yes. It purports to show that they made it a vehicle for
carrying on political activities, and made an issue of it and sustained
themselves politically.
Number 21 is an extract from Kunschak’s book _Austria 1918-1934_, and it
gives the increase in the National Socialist votes in Austria between
1930 and 1932. That didn’t seem to us to be very material or very
helpful or likely to be helpful to the Tribunal. We objected to it on
the grounds that it was irrelevant and immaterial.
Document Number 22 is an extract from an article in the _New Free Press_
of August 1932, opposing the League of Nations loan. This again is
submitted to prove the flow or the continuity of the Anschluss movement.
There is at least one other document, Number 23, which purports to
establish the same principle on the same kind of proof.
Number 27 is an extract from an article written by Martin Fuchs, “Un
Pacte avec Hitler,” and it discusses the Yugoslav policy with respect to
Anschluss between Germany and Austria. Again that doesn’t seem to the
Prosecution to have any direct bearing or any helpful bearing upon the
issues here, whatever the Yugoslavs thought about it.
Number 31 is an extract from the _Neue Zeitung_ of the 11th of January
of this year wherein Gordon Walker states that the celebration in
Austria after the Anschluss was genuine. Well, that is Mr. Walker’s
opinion, and there is some other substantial opinion on the other side.
We doubt very much that his opinion is material here or competent.
THE PRESIDENT: Who is he?
MR. DODD: I understand he is a member of the Labor Party in Great
Britain, and a writer.
Number 39 is an extract from the _Archiv_ of 1938. This sets forth a
statement made by Senator Borah, of the United States, that the
Anschluss was a natural and inevitable affair and had nothing to do with
the United States. This was not a speech made by the late Senator Borah
in the Senate; it was his own opinion, and it does not seem to us that
it would be very helpful. Some later opinions of Senator Borah were not
so helpful, and this doesn’t seem to be very likely to be helpful to the
Tribunal with respect to this issue.
Number 47 is an extract from Zernatto’s book _The Truth about Austria_.
Zernatto was one of the State Under Secretaries of Austria, as the
Tribunal knows. He left the country after the Anschluss and went to the
United States and wrote this book. He makes a number of statements, I
might say, about the Defendant Seyss-Inquart. The Tribunal would be
interested in knowing that this Document 47, and Documents 48, 50, 54,
55, 60, and 61 are all extracts from the same book. Now, we felt that
wherever he reports a conversation with Seyss-Inquart, that would have
bearing and relevancy before the Court; but where he expresses his
opinion, we have more doubt about its relevancy. This one statement,
Number 47, seems to be his opinion. He doesn’t cite any conversation or
anything other than what appears to be his impression that Seyss-Inquart
disassociated himself from Leopold’s efforts.
Now, we do not object to 48, and to 50, or to 54, because although we
originally thought we would object, on reviewing them they appeared to
set out actual conversations between Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart, and it
might be helpful to the Tribunal. Therefore, we do not object to the
next three.
But 55, again, is a statement in Zernatto’s book that, in Zernatto’s
opinion, Seyss-Inquart was a figure on the chess board and was
double-crossed by the Nazi or new Party leadership. We object to that
for the reason that I have stated; it is the author’s opinion. He is
deceased, by the way, and is certainly not available. In any event, we
do not think his opinion can be very helpful.
Number 60 is also a statement from Zernatto’s book and it sets out a
conversation with an unnamed Austrian Nazi. We felt that was altogether
too vague and would not be of value or helpful. In Number 61, again, the
author Zernatto expresses his opinion that Seyss-Inquart was afraid of
shouldering responsibility. I don’t want to stress our objections too
heavily to these extracts. I don’t think they are very harmful,
certainly, but I rather object because we would like to cut down some of
this printing, and I do not think they will be very helpful to
Seyss-Inquart.
Number 68 is the first document on anti-Semitism, and it is an excerpt
from the publication entitled _The Elements of National Socialism_ by
Bishop Alois Hudal. It explains anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria;
and it goes on to discuss matters that the Tribunal has heard very much
about through other defendants, the disproportionate position of the
Jewish population in Germany, and so on. We object to it as not being
helpful and not material.
Again 69 is another extract from Zernatto’s book on the causes, as some
of these people see it, of anti-Semitism. It is his opinion and does not
to us seem to be helpful or material here. Number 71 is on the Slovak
question. I doubt that there has been any serious claim made anywhere in
this case that at various times the Slovaks have not claimed autonomy.
This extract from the _Archiv_ of 1938, insofar as we can discover,
seeks to establish that they did want autonomy. Well, we don’t think
that is very important here, and it will not be helpful to the Tribunal
or to Seyss-Inquart.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it a document of state?
MR. DODD: Well, it is a document from the _Archiv_, and in that sense it
is a public document.
THE PRESIDENT: After Slovakia had been taken over by the Reich?
MR. DODD: No, not afterwards, it’s in 1938, and it preceded the taking
over.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.
MR. DODD: These are our objections, Mr. President. I do think we have
tried to be rather...
THE PRESIDENT: Of course, Mr. Dodd, we are only considering now the
question of objections to translation. We are not considering the
question of admissibility, nor are we binding you not to object to them
after they have been translated.
MR. DODD: Yes, I am aware of that, Mr. President. We tried to be, I
think, fairly generous about this list. The excerpts, or most of them,
are not too long. We did think we would have to call a halt somewhere,
and I do not think our 17 objections out of the 87 listed are very
strict or are pinching, really, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart.
DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Your
Lordship, High Tribunal, I know that you value my small country,
Austria, not only because of its ancient culture and its scenic beauty,
but also because it was the first country which lost its freedom through
Hitler. However, with all respect which you have for this country, I
cannot expect of you that, as representative of great powers, you know
the history of my country to the last detail. I do believe that it is of
the utmost importance for the defense of Seyss-Inquart that you
understand fully on the basis of what background and what motives this
man acted the way he did.
I myself can see three reasons which led to the Anschluss.
First of all, the desperate economic situation which runs like a red
thread from 1918 right up to—I am sorry to say—and through the year
1946.
The second reason, and I shall be very brief with regard to the
documents...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, will you come to the actual documents as
soon as possible, because you will remember we are only discussing the
question of whether they should be translated or not.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. The second reason was the disunity of the
democratic parties. The third reason was the attitude of the surrounding
powers. From these points of view I have assembled my documents.
The first document is a resolution of the Weimar National Assembly, and
I am of the point of view that it is important in respect to a final
judgment that the Anschluss was not only a wish of the Austrian
population, but an all-German postulate. It is very short and I request
that it be admitted.
The second document is by Selby, who for many years was the British
Ambassador in Vienna, a genuine friend of our country. In this article
he refers to the economic background and conditions in Austria, which
led to the Anschluss. That was the reason for my including this
document.
The next document is a speech delivered by Federal Chancellor Schober
who was held in great esteem by the world. In this speech he refers to
the fact that the burdens imposed on Austria are too great for her to
carry. He described the situation as a whole as a case of bankruptcy.
The next document is a statement by the present Federal Minister, Dr.
Karl Renner, in 1922. At that time Dr. Seipel went to Geneva and with
great difficulty put through a loan at the League of Nations which was
of great importance to us because at the same time it was demanded of
Austria that we should forego independence for 10 years’ duration. That
meant that we were not to take any steps to change the conditions for an
Anschluss. Renner opposed Seipel in Parliament at that time. This
document is in no way cumulative to Document 33, since in Document 33 I
want merely to describe the economic situation as it obtained in the
year 1938.
The next document is Point 2 of my evidence; namely, the strong
political propaganda for the Anschluss. In any event, I must dispute
most strongly the assertion that Document Number 21, which is very
short, is irrelevant. I consider it extremely important to prove that
this new, very young party, which grew in the fertile soil of a
desperate economic situation, increased tenfold, as far as the number of
votes was concerned, in the years 1930 to 1932; thus all the time there
existed a recognized political opposition to the government.
The next Document, Number 22, is an article which again illustrates the
economic situation in Austria at a very essential period of history,
namely, the moment when Federal Chancellor Dollfuss went to Lausanne in
order to negotiate another loan from the League of Nations, and we again
were forced to suppress thoughts of an Anschluss for another 10 years.
This Document, Number 22, as well as the next one, Number 23, is not
cumulative, since the one shows the political and the other the economic
position of the members of Parliament with respect to the League of
Nations’ loan of the year 1932.
The next document is only an extract from the views taken by the various
surrounding states to the Anschluss question. I selected only
Yugoslavia, for Yugoslavia was the country which most strongly supported
the idea of Anschluss in her foreign policy.
As far as Document 31 is concerned, I should like to remark,
supplementing the remarks made by the Prosecution, that Gordon Walker is
not only a member of the Labor Party, but—and this point is much more
important—during the entire war years he was head of the British Radio
Division Austria, and he was himself in Austria in the year 1938 and he
witnessed the Anschluss. His judgment therefore is of extraordinary
importance since it is the judgment of a prominent foreigner.
The same remark also applies to the following document, the statement by
Senator Borah who for 25 years was the Chairman of the American
Committee on Foreign Affairs. His opinion is surely deserving of notice.
The next documents concern statements made by Dr. Zernatto. I should
like to add that Dr. Zernatto was Federal Minister, General. Secretary
of the Fatherland Front and Schuschnigg’s right-hand man during the
period of the Anschluss. He was one of the spiritual fathers of the
Schuschnigg plebiscite. I am sorry to say that he died an emigrant in
1940, and I cannot produce him as a witness here; but his book is a
document and actually tells what this man experienced in those critical
days.
I urgently request that the remaining three documents, which are very
brief, be left in the book.
The next two documents, which concern anti-Semitism, I included very
unwillingly in order to avoid any accusation of anti-Semitic propaganda.
I included them because in the trial brief my client is accused of being
a member of an anti-Semitic organization. This accusation is
unjustifiable insofar as more importance is attached to this
organization than it actually deserves. If this matter is not further
emphasized by the Prosecution, I shall not attach any particular
importance to these two documents myself.
The last document which is being objected to, Number 71, contains the
Agreement of Pittsburgh which was concluded between Masaryk and Hlinka,
the Slovak leader, at which occasion Masaryk solemnly promised autonomy
to the Slovaks, a promise which was not kept according to the letter of
the agreement and which gave rise to a strong demand for autonomy in
Slovakia, which was supported by Hitler. For these reasons I ask that
this document also be approved.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal will consider the question
of these documents.
Now, Dr. Siemers.
[_The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand._]
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday in connection with
Norway I submitted on one occasion Documents 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, and 86.
I beg the Tribunal’s pardon, but I forgot to submit one document
pertinent to this matter, and I should like to remedy this omission.
The document, which has already been granted me, is Exhibit Number
Raeder-88, which likewise is an extract from the _White Book_ and is
printed in my Document Book Number 5, on Pages 392 and following. This
document shows the British order of 6 April 1940, regarding the plans
for the occupation of northern Swedish ore fields, proceeding from
Narvik.
Since the Tribunal is familiar with this document, it will not be
necessary for me to read from it.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, yesterday we had arrived at the
topic of Russia. You had answered my question regarding Directive Number
21, Document 446-PS, of 18 December 1940, to the effect that the Navy
had not worked on this directive. You further stated that the Navy
undertook preparations in January in accordance with the command.
RAEDER: May I make a brief remark on this directive to the effect that
yesterday I believe you made a mistake when you said that this directive
was signed by Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl. This was the copy of the
operational staff which Hitler had signed; but Keitel and Jodl only
countersigned. Thus there is no question of a signature of these two;
when such directives were issued they were signed only by Hitler, and
the others could merely countersign.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, and I thank you for the correction.
In this connection, I should like to ask the Tribunal to consider
Document C-35, USA-132. This document is found in the Document Book of
the British Delegation, Number 10a, on Page 16. It is an extract from
the War Diary with the date of 30 January 1941. It describes the
preparations by the Navy, in accordance with Hitler’s command of 18
December, where Hitler under Number IV of the directive commanded that
precautionary measures be taken in case Russia should alter her previous
attitude toward Germany, that is, only in case of this possibility.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, in connection with your
representation of the Russian situation, the Prosecution has submitted
Document C-66, which corresponds to GB-81. This is your report of 10
January 1944 to Admiral Assmann for the historical archives of the Navy.
The document will be found in the Document Book of the British
Delegation, Number 10, Page 13. There you will find the basic position
taken by Raeder with respect to “Fall Barbarossa.” This is set forth
under “a” of the document under Number 1...
I have just heard that this document is also to be found in the Document
Book 10a, on Page 35. There you wrote:
“At this time the Führer had made known his ‘unalterable
decision’ to conduct the eastern campaign in spite of all
remonstrances. Accordingly, further warnings, as long as
completely new situations had not arisen, were completely
without purpose, as one knew from experience. As Chief of the
Naval Operations Staff I was never convinced of the ‘compelling
necessity’ for Barbarossa.”
Do you have anything to add to these statements which you made at that
time?
RAEDER: I should like to say in this connection that despite the fact
that the directive had been issued on 18 December, I made a
comprehensive report at the end of December, as can be seen from
Document C-170, which I mentioned yesterday on several occasions, in
order to convince the Führer of the wrongness of this decision. This
shows that I have gone very far, for when the Führer had issued a
directive, even if it applied only to a hypothetical case, it was
generally impossible to approach him with basic considerations against
this directive. Everything else I mentioned already yesterday.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, yesterday, in connection with your
counterproposals made to Hitler with respect to Russia, you mentioned
that in the autumn the plan was still to carry through the action
“Seelöwe,” that is, to land in England.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: When, according to your strategic opinion, or the opinion
of the Navy, did this possibility cease to exist? When did you have to
dispense with this plan?
RAEDER: In the course of the month of September we still believed that
the landing could be carried through. As a necessary condition the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and I, too, always insisted—and he
realized this fully—that for a landing air superiority would have to be
on our side; and therefore we were waiting to see whether we could
actually produce this air superiority in time for the landing, which due
to weather conditions could not be carried out later than the beginning
of October. If it were not possible by then, it would have to be
postponed until May of the following year. It developed that air
superiority could not be produced to the necessary extent; consequently
it was said that the landing was to be postponed until the spring of the
following year. Further preparations were to be taken and they actually
were taken. But in the course of the winter the idea of a landing was
completely abandoned, and Hitler decreed that preparations in the
harbors along the Channel should be carried on only to such an extent as
would give the British the impression that this landing actually was to
take place. In September I had the impression that Hitler no longer had
any great interest in this landing and that in his own mind he was
completely committed to the Russian campaign in conjunction with which
he, of course, could not carry out the landing in England.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, I turn to the accusation raised against you by the
Prosecution that you demanded that war be waged against America. The
Prosecution has submitted in this connection Document C-152, or GB-122,
which is to be found in the Document Book of the British Delegation,
Number 10, Page 23. This is an extract from the War Diary of the Naval
Operations Staff dealing with a report of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy—that is, you—to the Führer on 18 March 1941. Under Figure 11 of
this document, it is stated, and I quote:
“Japan must proceed to take Singapore as soon as possible, since
the opportunity will never again be so favorable (preoccupation
of the entire British fleet elsewhere; the unreadiness of the
United States to carry on a war against Japan; the inferiority
of the United States fleet to the Japanese fleet). Japan is,
indeed, preparing for this action but will carry it out,
according to statements of Japanese officers, only at the moment
when Germany proceeds with the landing in England. All efforts
on Germany’s part must therefore aim to incite Japan to
immediate action. If Japan captures Singapore, then all other
Eastern Asiatic problems relating to the United States and
England will be solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, and Dutch
East Indies).
“Japan wants to avoid a war against the United States of
America, if at all possible, and can do so if she takes
Singapore promptly.”
The Prosecution has construed this statement of yours to mean that you
wanted to lead Japan into a war against America. Is that correct?
RAEDER: It is one of the most incorrect assertions contained in the
Indictment against me. It is entirely clear that, since I was involved
in a naval war with England with my small German Navy, I did not want,
under any circumstances, to have America on my neck as well; and it has
been discussed here repeatedly that my most urgent effort during the
entire first few years of the war was to avoid, under all circumstances,
being involved with the United States. Admiral Wagner described here in
detail the limitations which I had imposed on the German Navy in order
to prevent any clashes with the United States. I imposed limitations
which actually I could hardly justify when I carried on U-boat warfare
with such relatively small means. On the other hand, the United States
from the end of 1940 on, at the latest, and during the entire year of
1941, exerted pressure on us in our naval warfare wherever possible and
committed actions which could be interpreted as definitely not neutral.
I remind you merely of the repairing of British warships in the United
States, something which up until that time was completely impossible and
unheard of; and Roosevelt’s orders to shoot given in July and in
September 1941; attacks by the American destroyers _Greer_ and _Kearney_
in the Atlantic on our U-boats. In two cases U-boats were pursued with
depth charges for 2 hours until finally they surfaced and fired, in one
case damaging one destroyer. Despite all this, in June 1941 I reported
to Hitler that we were continuing not to disturb the merchantmen of the
United States in any way—with the result that United States merchantmen
were crossing the Atlantic completely unmolested on sea lanes of their
own choosing, were in a position to give reports about our U-boats and
our sea warfare without our preventing them from doing so; because of
this the British were in a position to camouflage their ships as
American ships. That they did. The first time our pocket battleship
_Admiral Scheer_, while crossing the Atlantic, searched a ship flying
the American flag it turned out to be the British ship _Canadian
Cruiser_. Despite all this I recommended to the Führer, and he fully
approved my suggestion, that we should take no measures against American
ships. That we did not go to Halifax to lay mines Admiral Wagner has
already mentioned. I need not mention that any further.
DR. SIEMERS: Was this proposal that Japan capture Singapore only for the
purpose of having assistance and an ally against England, with whom we
were already at war?
RAEDER: That is actually the case, and I should like to picture very
briefly the development which led to this proposal. This was not
anything that I did on my own initiative, but rather at the beginning of
the year 1941 political negotiations were carried on with Japan partly
by the Führer and partly by the Foreign Minister. I was not even called
into these negotiations, and I must say regrettably so, for at these
negotiations many things were discussed which were not correct. However
on the other hand this shows again that there can be no talk about a
conspiracy. Contact was made, and then the visit of the Foreign Minister
Matsuoka took place, I believe, in March.
On the basis of this entire development the Führer, on 5 March 1941,
issued Directive Number 24. That is Document C-75, USA-151, of 5 March.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to call the attention of the High Tribunal to
Document C-75, which is the same as USA-151, to be found in the Document
Book of the British Delegation, Number 10a, Page 58. In this Directive,
Number 24, it says under Figure 3a:
“As the joint object in the war it is important to defeat
England quickly and in that way keep the United States out of
the war.”
And three paragraphs farther down, under “d,” it says:
“The capture of Singapore...”
THE PRESIDENT: That on Page 58 is Instruction Number 54, concerning
collaboration with Japan.
DR. SIEMERS: I have just been advised—to my surprise—that only a part
of this directive is to be found in the English translation. I ask that
the Tribunal grant me permission, under these circumstances, to submit
the complete directive later as a Raeder document.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it in your Raeder book, Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: No, not up until now; for I did not know that only a part
had been translated. I am asking for permission to submit this whole
document later as a Raeder document.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you. This may be found under Figure 3a, and the next
quotation will be found under Figure 3d, and it says:
“The capture of Singapore, which is the key position of England
in the Far East, would be a decisive achievement in the war
effort of the three powers. Beyond that, attacks on other bases
of British and American sea power, if the entry of the United
States into the war cannot be prevented, will serve to shatter
the might of the enemy in that zone....”
I ask the Tribunal to note the fact that already on 5 March, which is
the date of this directive, Hitler decreed the capture of Singapore.
Consequently, the suggestion made by Admiral Raeder in Document C-152,
dated 18 March, cannot be considered decisive, since a Hitler decree was
already in existence.
RAEDER: May I make a brief remark about that? The same thing seems to
apply to all the cases which are being mentioned here: First of all, the
political decision by Hitler, the head of the State; then the directive
of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces to the Armed Forces; then
the conclusions drawn by the commanders-in-chief of the separate
branches of the Wehrmacht. So, after I received the directive of 5
March, I had to contemplate how Japan, after entering the war, could
strategically be used with the best results. And that depended on how we
could most effectively wound our main opponent, England, on the sea. In
this connection I had to insist most urgently that Japan move against
Singapore since there were also circles who were of the opinion that
Japan should attack Vladivostok, which would have been a grave mistake.
England’s power center in East Asia had to be attacked. But the very
fact that I believed that the capture of Singapore would cause the
United States of America to shy away from the war occasioned this
proposal of mine, and not the opposite.
DR. SIEMERS: In this same connection, I refer to Document 1877-PS which
was submitted in the special Indictment against you. It is USA-152 and
may be found in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number 10,
Page 320. It is a conversation between the Japanese Foreign Minister,
Matsuoka—I am just told now that 320 is incorrect. It should be 319.
THE PRESIDENT: And it should be 10a, I think.
DR. SIEMERS: 10a, I beg your pardon.
It is a conversation between Matsuoka and Von Ribbentrop on 29 March
1941. We have already discussed this matter. On Page 8 of this document,
the following is said:
“The Reich Foreign Minister again referred to the problem of
Singapore. Because of the fear expressed by Japan that there
might be U-boat attacks from the Philippines and that the
British Mediterranean Fleet and Home Fleet would join the attack
he had discussed the situation once more with Admiral Raeder.
The latter told him that the British fleet would be so
completely occupied in the home waters and in the Mediterranean
this year that she would not be able to dispatch even a single
ship to the Far East.
“The American U-boats were described by Admiral Raeder as being
so inferior that Japan would not have to concern herself about
them at all.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] Herr Von Ribbentrop, in reply to my
question on 1 April 1946, declared that he had been mistaken, that the
statement was probably made by Hitler. Will you please clarify this
statement once and for all?
RAEDER: I can only confirm that I never discussed such questions with
Herr Von Ribbentrop, for unfortunately there was no connection between
the Foreign Office and the High Command of the Navy especially since the
Führer had forbidden that any information be given by the Foreign Office
to the military authorities. I would never have made such statements
since they were in direct opposition to my own opinion, and especially
since in this case I had no basis for any such statements.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, were not, on the other hand, questions frequently
dealt with in the Naval Operations Staff as to the industrial and
military strength of the United States, and that for these reasons any
entrance of the United States was to be feared?
RAEDER: This was fully clear to us, even to the last detail.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you at any time during the war see this Document
1877-PS, which is before you?
RAEDER: No, no.
DR. SIEMERS: Were you advised about these discussions between Herr Von
Ribbentrop and the Foreign Minister Matsuoka or the discussion with
Oshima?
RAEDER: No; I was merely told by the Führer, and that is shown in the
Document C-170, dealing with the results of this discussion with
Matsuoka. But I had no discussions with Herr Von Ribbentrop.
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, I have just been asked to
correct a word which I have just used; in order to be fair, I should
like to do so. I said that Hitler, in his directive of 5 March 1941,
“decreed” that Singapore be taken. The expression is not correct. He
naturally could not give any orders to Japan. The mistake arises because
the directive starts with the words: “The Führer has commanded the
following for our co-operation.” And under Figure 3 it says: “The
following directives apply in this case.” And among these directives the
taking of Singapore is mentioned.
Admiral, in any conversation did you suggest to anyone at any time that
Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
RAEDER: No, we never talked about that at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you hear anything about this plan before Japan attacked
Pearl Harbor?
RAEDER: Never. It was a complete surprise for me and the Naval
Operations Staff that this attack took place; and it is a complete
mistake in judging the mentality of the Japanese to assume that they
would have spoken of such a plan to anyone, even inside Japan, who was
not directly connected with it. In 1904 they likewise attacked Russian
ships “out of the blue” without anyone suspecting anything at all.
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I should
like to submit three documents which have been granted me, first Exhibit
Number Raeder-19, to be found in Document Book 2, Page 108. This
document deals with the report by the American General Marshall which
has been placed at my disposal through the help of the Court.
In this report, dated 1 September 1945, General Marshall stated the
following; and I refer to Page 116:
“In order to establish for the historical record where and how
Germany and Japan failed I asked General Eisenhower to have his
Intelligence officers promptly interrogate the ranking members
of the German High Command who are now our prisoners of war. The
results of these interviews are of remarkable interest. They
give a picture of dissension among the enemy nations and lack of
long-range planning that may well have been decisive factors of
this world struggle at its most critical moments.”
And two paragraphs further:
“No evidence has yet been found that the German High Command had
any over-all strategic plan. Although the High Command approved
Hitler’s policies in principle, his impetuous strategy outran
German military capabilities and ultimately led to Germany’s
defeat. The history of the German High Command from 1938 on is
one of constant conflict of personalities in which military
judgment was increasingly subordinated to Hitler’s personal
dictates. The first clash occurred in 1938 and resulted in the
removal of Blomberg, Von Fritsch, and Beck and of the last
effective conservative influence on German foreign policy.
“The campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, and the Low Countries
developed serious diversions between Hitler and the General
Staff as to the details of execution of strategic plans. In each
case the General Staff favored the orthodox offensive, Hitler an
unorthodox attack with objectives deep in enemy territory. In
each case Hitler’s views prevailed and the astounding success of
each succeeding campaign raised Hitler’s military prestige to
the point where his opinions were no longer challenged. His
military self-confidence became unassailable after the victory
in France, and he began to disparage substantially the ideas of
his generals, even in the presence of junior officers. Thus no
General Staff objection was expressed when Hitler made the fatal
decision to invade Soviet Russia.”
And on Page 118, there is an extract dealing with Germany and Japan. I
quote:
“Nor is there evidence of close strategic co-ordination between
Germany and Japan. The German General Staff recognized that
Japan was bound by the neutrality pact with Russia but hoped
that the Japanese would tie down strong British and American
land, sea, and air forces in the Far East.
“In the absence of any evidence so far to the contrary, it is
believed that Japan also acted unilaterally and not in
accordance with a unified strategic plan.”
And further, in the documents which were also granted me, Exhibit
Raeder-113 and 114, in the Document Book 6, Page 491 and Page 497...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think you should ask the witness whether
he agrees with General Marshall’s appreciation.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, do you agree with the opinions of the American
General Marshall?
RAEDER: I have not completely absorbed these statements. In general they
are the lines of thought which we also had pursued, but I cannot vouch
for each single point. In order to speak with certainty I would have to
look at them or they would have to be read to me again.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe the general confirmation is sufficient. In
Document Raeder-113 I should like to refer to the heading:
“Army Foresaw Japan’s Move, Marshall Says:
“Washington, December 11 (AP)—General George C. Marshall,
formerly Army Chief of Staff, acknowledged last night that the
Army knew more than 10 days before December 7, 1941, that a
Japanese move toward Pearl Harbor might take them past the
deadline where the American chiefs believed the U.S. should
fight.”
In order to save time I shall not read the particulars; but it can be
gathered from the report by Marshall that the American Army knew about
it and later the date of November 25 and 26 is mentioned. In addition
Marshall testifies that preparations had been worked out in the United
States before the war for the construction of landing strips for
American bombers in Rabaul, Port Moresby, and Singapore.
In Exhibit Number Raeder-114, which I am also submitting, Henry L.
Stimson, the former United States Secretary of War, made a statement
under date of 21 March.
“Henry L. Stimson, former U.S. Secretary of War, disclosed that
the late President Roosevelt’s War Cabinet had discussed and
rejected—9 days before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor—an
American attack on the Japanese forces without further
warning...
“Stimson related that he had received on November 28, 1941
information of Japanese movements along the Asiatic coast. On
the same day, he said, the Cabinet met and discussed the
possible meaning of the Japanese move.”
He further said that:
“...if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British
would fight, and that if the British fought we would have to
fight.”
According to this, Admiral, did the United States know about these
Japanese plans before you did?
RAEDER: Apparently, yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I shall turn to the last accusation by the
Prosecution, and that concerns Brazil. In this connection, the
Prosecution has submitted Document 1807-PS, GB-227, to be found in the
Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 288. This is Jodl’s
diary, the entry of 16 June 1942. I have to beg your pardon, I am told
it is Page 287, not 288. This entry reads:
“The Naval Operations Staff applied on 29 May for permission to
attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. It considers that a
sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant ships is
expedient at this moment when defensive measures are still
incomplete and there is the possibility of surprise, since
Brazil is to all intents and purposes waging naval warfare
against Germany.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution is accusing you of
violating neutrality and violating international law because you made
that proposal at a time when Brazil was neutral. I call your attention
to the fact that the war with Brazil broke out 2 months later on 22
August 1942. Please tell me briefly from memory just how you came to
make this proposal.
RAEDER: The relations between Brazil and Germany at this time could not
have been worse. The Germans were very much persecuted and treated very
badly. Germany’s economic interests were heavily impaired. The
Brazilians were already completely on the side of the United States.
They had allowed United States air bases to be established along the
Brazilian coast, and also intelligence stations. They themselves
confirmed that they had destroyed a German U-boat; and, on the other
side, the German U-boats had also attacked Brazilian ships, for the
Brazilian ships were not illuminated according to regulations and
consequently could not be recognized as Brazilian ships. Germany had
previously asked all of the South American countries to illuminate their
ships in such a way that their nationality could be distinguished at
night. Then there were air attacks on U-boats of the Axis Powers, and
they could have been carried out only from Brazilian bases. At this
request of the Naval Operations Staff to the Führer, the Führer decreed
that once again we should ask the Italians what intelligence reports
they had received; and Italy in turn confirmed that some weeks before
Italian U-boats, which had been operating together with ours, had been
attacked near the Brazilian coast. Likewise the Brazilian Air Ministry
had made known the fact that Brazilian aircraft or United States
aircraft coming from Brazilian air bases had attacked Axis U-boats.
On the basis of that confirmation the Führer permitted the use of
weapons against Brazilian ships along the Brazilian coast. A plan was
worked out, according to which a certain wave of U-boats, which left the
French coast in June to proceed into the Atlantic, was to go to the
Brazilian coast. The Führer had ordered in particular that this was not
to be mere pin-pricks but rather a serious enterprise. This operation
was later stopped and not carried through. I am sorry that I am not able
to say for what reason. But it can be seen from our document which gives
the statements made in the War Diary.
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I believe that the entire
accusation of the Prosecution regarding this planning would not have
been raised if Document 1807-PS, Jodl’s diary entry of 16 June, had been
submitted _in toto_. Only the first part was submitted. Therefore, I
submit this entry as Exhibit Number Raeder-115, to be found in Document