approved: Exhibit Raeder-91, Admiral Darlan to the French War Minister
Daladier on 12 April 1940; Exhibit Raeder-92, Page 412. This document
contains the English-French note to the Norwegian Government of 8 April
1940. I have submitted that document because this note expresses the
same legal points of view as expressed in the legal opinion of Dr.
Mosler.
Exhibit Number Raeder-97 and Exhibit Number Raeder-98: Number 97
concerns the _White Book_ and the planning of 7 February 1940,
concerning the Allied bases in Norway; and Number 98 is an excerpt from
the War Diary concerning the orders which, at the time of the occupation
of Norway, were found and from which it could be seen that an English
landing was imminent and the so-called plan under the camouflage name
“Stratford Plan,” which was prepared by the British Admiralty.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Concerning Norway, may I ask you the
following: During and after the occupation did you intervene to see that
the Norwegian population was treated decently, and what was your view of
the political question in Norway with regard to the attitude of Germany
to Norway?
RAEDER: From the very beginning I was for good treatment of the
Norwegian population. I knew that Hitler had given Gauleiter Terboven,
whom he had unfortunately appointed Reich Commissioner for Norway and to
whom he had entrusted the civil administration, instructions that he,
Terboven, should bring the Norwegian people to him; that is to say, make
them favorably disposed, and that he had the intention, finally, to
maintain Norway as a sovereign state in a North Germanic Empire.
Terboven was opposed to that. He treated the Norwegian population in a
very unfriendly manner, and by his treatment he actually sabotaged the
aims of Hitler. In close understanding with Admiral Böhm, who became the
naval commander in Norway and who had taken Kapitän Schreiber, the
former attaché, on his staff as liaison officer to the Norwegian
population, I tried to counteract these intentions of Terboven. On the
basis of the reports of Admiral Böhm I repeatedly approached the Führer
and told him that with Terboven he would never achieve his purpose. The
Führer designated Quisling chief of the Government. I cannot remember
exactly when he became Minister President, but Terboven also sabotaged
Quisling in his activities by making it extremely difficult for him, and
even discredited him among the population. Terboven’s chief reason was,
in my opinion, that he wanted to remain Gauleiter of Norway. All our
endeavors were unsuccessful, in spite of the fact that Admiral Böhm
tried very hard to achieve with the help of the Navy what Hitler had
expected, that is, to win over the Norwegian people.
I did not understand how on the one side one wanted to gain the sympathy
of the Norwegians and on the other hand one sabotaged Hitler’s
intentions.
That went on until 1942, at which time Böhm made a final report to me,
in which he explained that things could not go on like that, and that
Hitler’s intentions would never be realized. I submitted that report to
Hitler, but since it did not bring about any change—it was in the late
autumn of 1942—this failure of mine became one of the reasons which
finally led to my retirement.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you ask Hitler specifically to dismiss Terboven?
RAEDER: Several times. And I suggested that he should appoint General
Admiral Böhm as commander of the armed forces for Norway and give him
far-reaching powers so that he could carry out his—Hitler’s—aims. I
suggested that the Führer should as soon as possible conclude a peace
with Norway because only in that way could he bring about co-operation
between Norway and Germany and make the population turn to him. I told
him the attempts of sabotage by the Norwegian emigrants would lose their
meaning and cease and that possibly the Norwegian emigrants who were
leaning toward England at that time could be induced to return, because
they might be afraid that they might “miss the bus”; especially from the
point of view of economic advantages. The task of defending Norway would
be considerably easier if a state of peace could be brought about.
DR. SIEMERS: In conclusion, may I refer to Exhibit Raeder-107 which is
already known to the Tribunal. It is the affidavit by Schreiber under
Roman Numeral II. There Schreiber has mentioned in detail the utmost
endeavors of the Navy to prevent the regrettable terror regime of
Terboven and explained that Raeder, for the last time in 1942, used all
his efforts to get Hitler to conclude a peace between Norway and
Germany. I believe that the Navy had a good reputation in Norway, that I
can assume this is historically known without my having to prove it. To
be on the safe side I applied for a witness, but consent was not given.
May I also submit Exhibit Raeder-108 (Document Raeder-108), Document