the Commander-in-Chief of the Army were made equal in rank to the Reich
Ministers. The Prosecution asserts that therefore you were a member of
the Cabinet and were permitted to and did participate in the meetings.
Is that correct?
RAEDER: No. I was not a Reich Minister but only equivalent in rank. The
reason for that was, I believe, that General Keitel was made equal in
rank with the Reich Ministers because, in administering the affairs of
the War Ministry, he was frequently in contact with them and had to be
on the same level in order to negotiate with them. And since Brauchitsch
and myself had seniority over General Keitel we also received the same
rank. I was not a member of the Cabinet at all, but the decree states
that on the order of the Führer I could participate in a Cabinet
meeting. It was probably intended that I was to come to the Cabinet when
technical matters had to be explained. However, that never occurred,
since after that time there were no Cabinet meetings.
DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that in Paragraph 2 of that decree by
Hitler it states: “The commanders-in-chief... on my orders shall
participate in the meetings of the Reich Cabinet.”
RAEDER: Yes. And as far as the Secret Cabinet Council is concerned I
need only confirm that, as Hitler told me himself the Secret Cabinet
Council had only been formed in order to honor the retiring Foreign
Minister, Von Neurath, in order to give the impression abroad and at
home that Von Neurath would still be consulted on foreign policy in the
future. However, that Secret Cabinet Council never met.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution has made the charge that on 12 March 1939,
on the day commemorating the heroes, you made a speech and that in that
speech you came forth with a ruthless challenge to fight against
Bolshevism and international Jewry.
May I state, if it please the Court, that unfortunately the speech was
entered in the document book by the Prosecution only from an excerpt
which was selected from a certain point of view; and I believe that it
would be well to know the context of the entire speech. Of course, I
shall not read it, but I should like to submit it as Exhibit Number
Raeder-46. The sentence is in my Document Book Number 3, Page 235, the
page from which the Prosecution took the quotation. Will you please
briefly express your opinion of that.
RAEDER: May I in doing so read a few short sentences which will
characterize the entire speech?
DR. SIEMERS: I have no doubt that the Tribunal will permit that. I only
ask you to use only a few significant sentences, just as the Prosecution
have done.
RAEDER: On Page 7, Line 6, it says...
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. That is on Page 235, the same page which
contains the quotation of the Prosecution.
RAEDER: Shortly before the quotation of the Prosecution we read on Line
6:
“He has given back self-confidence and confidence in their own
ability to the German people, and thereby enabled them to
retake, by their own strength, their sacred right refused to
them during the time of their weakness and, beyond that, to
approach the tremendous problems of the times with courage, and
to solve them. Thus the German people and the Führer have done
more for the peace of Europe and the world than some of our
neighbors are able to realize today.” (Document Number
Raeder-46)
Then we come to the sentence where I speak about the announcement of the
fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry which has been quoted
by the Prosecution. I should like to state briefly in connection with it
that after the experiences of the years 1917 to 1919, communism and
international Jewry had destroyed the resistance of the German people to
a considerable degree and had gained an excessively large and oppressive
influence in German affairs, in affairs of state as well as in economic
affairs, as for example also in the legal field. Therefore, in my
opinion, one could not be surprised that the National Socialist
Government tried to loosen and, as far as possible, remove this large
and oppressive influence. Although in pursuing this course the National
Socialist Government took rather severe steps which led to the Nuremberg
Laws—the exaggerations of which I regretted, of course—nevertheless,
in the course of the speech which I made in public at the orders of the
Reich Government, I could not find it compatible with my conscience to
express my personal opinions, which were basically different. It must
also be considered that such a speech had to fit into a general
framework. That, however, was only one short sentence, whereas other
points were considerably more in the foreground. In that connection I
ask for permission to read two more short sentences:
“And this is the reason for the demand for equal rights and
equal respect with all other nations which alone can guarantee
that the nations will live peacefully together on this earth.”
Then the last sentence, on Page 235:
“Within the bounds of German national community the Führer has
assigned us our tasks as soldiers to protect our homeland and
our peaceful national reconstruction and to train the young
manhood, fit for military service, which was entrusted to us and
which has to pass entirely through our hands.”
The next sentence was quoted by the Prosecution, because there I spoke
of the fact that we should not only train these young people technically
in the sense of the technical use of arms but also educate them in the
sense of National Socialist ideology and philosophy, and I stated that
we had to march shoulder to shoulder with the Party.
I have always taken the view that the Armed Forces should not be a
completely extraneous body in the State. It would be impossible to have
a republican armed force in a monarchist state or an armed force with
monarchist tendencies in a democratic state. Thus our Armed Forces would
have to be incorporated into the National Socialist State to the extent
necessary to create a real people’s community, and it would be the task
of the commanders of the Armed Forces to educate their branches of the
forces in such a way that they would recognize and live up to the good
national and socialist ideals of the National Socialist State. This
would be done in the same way as I did it as Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy. In this way it was possible to incorporate the Armed Forces in an
orderly manner, to keep them from all exaggeration and excesses, and at
the same time to form a people’s community within the State.
And then on the bottom of Page 236:
“This nation needed a new, a true peace, the peace of justice
and honor, peace without hatred. The world also needs peace.
Because a weak Germany could not obtain peace, a strong one has
won it for herself. It is the proud task of the German
Wehrmacht, to secure this peace for the German nation against
everybody.”
And quite at the end of the document, the 11th or 12th line from the
bottom of the page:
“But the soldier over there, whom we respect as the valiant
representative of his country, may accept a soldier’s word: What
Germany needs and wants is peace. These are not just words but
it has been proved by practical examples. The construction work
of Germany requires many years of quiet development.”
I think that this is sufficient...
DR. SIEMERS: I believe that is sufficient.
May I point out to the High Tribunal that in the English translation, on
Page 236, as far as I remember, one sentence was underlined. That is:
“The Wehrmacht and Party are one indivisible entity.” The Prosecution
has submitted that. Apart from that, nothing is underlined.
I wish to say in passing that in reality, in the original, many other
passages are underlined, particularly those sentences which Admiral
Raeder has just read which deal with peace.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, the Prosecution has accused you
with having connections with all the political activities of National
Socialism. Therefore I am compelled to ask you briefly concerning your
participation in actions in those countries where participation by the
Navy is certainly surprising.
In what way were you connected with the measures concerning the
annexation of Austria?
RAEDER: The Navy had nothing to do with the Anschluss of Austria at all
and did not take part in any way.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you make any preparations?
RAEDER: No. In the case of Austria, no preparations were needed. The
case of Austria was mentioned in Document C-175, but that dealt only
with the directive of 1 July 1937 for the unified preparation of the
Armed Forces for war.
DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that C-175 is USA-69, in the Document Book
of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 117.
[_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution considers this document
important and therefore I should like you to say a few words about it.
RAEDER: It deals with a statement, which, according to my knowledge, is
made in every state for every year and in which, according to the
political situation, such cases are mentioned which may arise in the
course of the year and for which, of course, certain preparations have
to be made. For the Navy, however, that document had no sequel as far as
Austria was concerned.
DR. SIEMERS: So it is a document which numerous...
THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that we have the reference to that right.
It came through, I thought, C-157, USA-69, 10a, and then I did not get
the page.
DR. SIEMERS: Page 117.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that C-157 or 175?
DR. SIEMERS: C-175.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Does this concern strategic preparations
for various eventualities?
RAEDER: Yes; various cases are mentioned here, for instance, the “Case
Red” and the special “Case Extension Red-Green.” All these had to be
dealt with but they did not necessarily lead to any consequences.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection I wanted to submit
various documents, Raeder exhibits, from which it can be seen that the
same type of preparations, since they are necessary for military and
strategic reasons, were also undertaken by the Allies—only to show
their necessity. At this moment I should like to forego that because I
cannot determine so quickly which of these documents are admitted and
which have been rejected. Perhaps I may therefore submit the connected
documents at the end in order that no misunderstanding may occur now by
my quoting the wrong figures.
[_Turning to the defendant._] In what way did you and the Navy
participate in measures concerning the Sudetenland?
RAEDER: In a directive...
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. May I ask you to look at the document of
the Prosecution 388-PS. It is USA-126—no, excuse me—USA-26. It is in
the Document Book of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 147. It is a
draft for the new directive “Grün” of 20 May 1938.
RAEDER: Yes, I have the directive here. It is of 20 May 1938 and says
with regard to the Navy:
“The Navy participates in the operations of the Army by
employing the Danube flotilla. That flotilla is put under the
command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. In regard to the
conduct of naval warfare, at first only those measures are to be
taken which appear to be necessary for the careful protection of
the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden intervention in
the conflict by other states. Those measures must be confined to
what is absolutely necessary, and must be carried out
inconspicuously.”
The entire course of action at the end of September and beginning of
October made the special measures unnecessary, so the Danube flotilla
which we had taken over from Austria was put under the command of the
Army.
DR. SIEMERS: What was the size of the Danube flotilla?
RAEDER: It consisted of some small river craft, one small gunboat and
minesweepers.
DR. SIEMERS: That is the total extent to which the Navy participated?
RAEDER: Yes, in which the Navy participated.
DR. SIEMERS: In what way did you and the Navy participate in the
preparations for the occupation of what the document calls the
“remainder of Czechoslovakia”?
This concerns Document C-136, USA-104 in the Document Book of the
British Delegation, 10a, Page 101. It is of 21 October 1938. The
Prosecution points out that according to that you had already been
informed in October that Czechoslovakia was to be occupied after some
time, that is in March, as actually happened. Will you please tell us
something about that?
RAEDER: That directive looks suspicious at first but the way in which it
is drafted shows that this again refers to possible cases. Point 1 deals
with the securing of the borders of the German Reich and protection
against surprise air attacks.
Points 2 and 3 are “Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia,”
“Occupation of the Memel Country.”
Number 2, “Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia”: The first
sentence reads, “It must be possible to shatter the remainder of
Czechoslovakia at any time if her policy should become hostile toward
Germany.”
That is the prerequisite in case of any action against Czechoslovakia;
that did not mean that it was certain that any action would be taken.
In the same manner, under Number 3, mention is made of the occupation of
the Memel country, where it says: “The political situation, particularly
warlike complications between Poland and Lithuania, may make it
necessary for the German Armed Forces to occupy the Memel country.”
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. May I point out that, according to my document,
the part which the witness has just read is missing in the English
translation—so that you will not look for it unnecessarily.
[_Turning to the defendant._] So here again this is a possible
eventuality?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: On 3 September 1939, at the beginning of the war, the
_Athenia_ was sunk. From the military point of view that case has
already been clarified by Herr Kranzbühler, but I should like you as
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to state your position and give an
explanation of the incident with special consideration of the fact that
the Prosecution, especially in this case, has raised a very severe and
insulting accusation. They have made the accusation that you, purposely
and in violation of the truth, held England and Churchill responsible
for the sinking of the _Athenia_, although you knew perfectly well that
the _Athenia_ had been sunk by a German U-boat. As proof, the
Prosecution has submitted the article of 23 October 1939 from the
_Völkischer Beobachter_.
Mr. President, that is Document Number 3260-PS, GB-218. Document Book 10
of the British Delegation on Page 97.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I would like you to explain that point.
RAEDER: The fact is that on 3 September at dusk the young submarine
commander of the submarine _U-30_ met an English passenger ship which
had its lights dimmed and torpedoed it because he assumed, by mistake,
that it was an auxiliary cruiser. In order to avoid misunderstanding I
should like to state here that the deliberations of Kapitänleutnant
Fresdorf, which have been mentioned here concerning the torpedoing of
dimmed ships in the Channel, did not yet play any part in the Naval
Operations Staff at that time and that this commanding officer could not
have known anything about these deliberations. He knew only that
auxiliary cruisers had their lights blacked out, and he assumed that
this was an auxiliary cruiser at the entrance of the northwest channel,
England-Scotland. He did not make a report since it was not necessary.
The information that a German U-boat had torpedoed the _Athenia_ was
broadcast by the British radio, and we probably received the news during
the night of the 3d to the 4th, and transmitted it to the various news
services.
In the morning of 4 September we received that news at the offices of
the Naval Operations Staff, and I requested information as to how far
our nearest submarine was from the place of the torpedoing. I was told,
75 nautical miles. At about the same time, State Secretary Von
Weizsäcker in the Foreign Office, who had been a naval officer in the
first World War, learned of this situation and made a telephone call to
the Naval Operations Staff, asking whether it was true. He did not call
me personally. He received the answer that, according to our
information, it could not be right. Thereupon he sent for the American
Chargé d’Affaires—I believe Mr. Kirk—in order to speak to him about
the matter because the radio broadcast had also mentioned that several
Americans had been killed in that accident. From his experiences in the
first World War it was clear to him how important it was that there
should be no incident involving America. Therefore, he told him what he
had heard from the Naval Operations Staff. I personally told the same
thing to the American Naval Attaché, Mr. Schrader, and that certainly in
good faith. I believed that I could tell him that in good faith because
we had no other information. State Secretary Von Weizsäcker then came to
see me personally, if I remember correctly. We were very close friends,
and he told me what he had told the American Chargé d’Affaires. He
apologized, I believe, for not having spoken to me personally and that
concluded the case for the time being.
The matter was such that, if it had been reported in a normal way, we
would not have hesitated to admit and to explain the reason. We would
not have hesitated to apologize to the nations concerned. Disciplinary
measures would have been taken against the officer. I also reported the
incident to the Führer himself in his headquarters and told him that we
were convinced such was not the case, and the Führer ordered that it
should be denied. This was done by the Propaganda Ministry, which had
been informed of the order by my press department.
The submarine returned on 27 September...
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me if I interrupt. That date, Mr. President, is
identified by Document D-659, which was submitted by the Prosecution, it
is Exhibit GB-221 in Document Book 10 on Page 110.
RAEDER: The submarine commander returned on 27 September to
Wilhelmshaven. Admiral Dönitz has already described how he received him
and how he immediately sent him to me to Berlin by air.
The U-boat commander reported the entire incident to me and confirmed
that it was a sheer mistake, that it was only through all these messages
he had heard that he himself discovered that it was not an auxiliary
cruiser that was concerned but a passenger steamer.
I reported the facts to the Führer because they could have had severe
political consequences. He decided that, as it had been denied once, we
had to keep it utterly secret, not only abroad but also within official
circles and government circles. Consequently, I was not in a position to
tell State Secretary Von Weizsäcker or the Propaganda Ministry that the
facts were different. My order to the Commander of the U-boat fleet
reads:
“1. The affair is to be kept strictly secret upon orders of the
Führer.
“2. On my part, no court-martial will be ordered because the
commanding officer acted in good faith and it was a mistake.
“3. The further political handling of the matter is to be
attended to by the High Command of the Navy, as far as anything
has to be done.”
With that the commander returned to Wilhelmshaven and Admiral Dönitz has
already reported that he was punished by disciplinary procedure. To our
great surprise, about one month later that article appeared in the
_Völkischer Beobachter_ in which Churchill was accused of being the
author of that incident. I knew absolutely nothing about that article
beforehand. I would certainly have prevented its appearance because,
knowing that our submarine had torpedoed that ship, it was out of the
question to lay the blame on the enemy, on the First Lord of the
Admiralty of all people.
I found out later that the order to publish such an article was issued
by Hitler and reached the Propaganda Ministry through the Reich Press
Chief. As far as I remember I was told that the Propaganda Minister had
himself drafted that article. Later I could not prevent it. I did not
see the article nor did any of my officers of the High Command of the
Navy see it. They would certainly have come to me at once so that I
could have prevented its publication. We had no reason to expect such an
article 4 weeks after the torpedoing of the _Athenia_. That is the case
of the _Athenia_.
DR. SIEMERS: You just said that you had discovered that Hitler knew
about the article. When did you discover this?
RAEDER: Here, from my Codefendant, Hans Fritzsche.
DR. SIEMERS: Not at that time then?
RAEDER: No, by no means.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit again at a quarter past two.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. SIEMERS: In the meantime I have perused my documents and I am
therefore in a position to carry out the original plan, that is, of
submitting the documents during the examination.
In connection with the documents which we dealt with last, Document
C-126, “Strategic Preparations,” I should like to submit the following
documents which are contained in the _White Books_, documents which have
been granted me for my use and which also concern strategic preparations
on the part of the Allies. We are dealing with Exhibit Number Raeder-33.
It is the document dated 9 November 1939; and also Exhibit Number
Raeder-34, General Gamelin to General Lelong, 13 November 1939; and also
Exhibit Number Raeder-35, two extracts from the Diary of Jodl, 1809-PS,
which concern the measures taken by the Luftwaffe regarding the
Caucasus. It is not necessary for me to comment on this. I would just
like to call your attention to the questions which I put to the witness
Reich Marshal Göring on 18 March; he has already testified regarding the
plans of the Allies for the destruction of the Caucasian oil fields. And
finally in this connection, Exhibit Number Raeder-41, to be found in the
Document Book 3, Page 205, and the following pages, a report of the
Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin, dated 16 March
1940, it deals with the war plans for the year 1940 concerning the
tightening of the blockade, the plans regarding the Scandinavian
countries and, in addition, the plans for the destruction of the Russian
oil wells in the Caucasus.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, before I deal with the separate
campaigns of Greece, Norway, and so forth, I would like to ask you to
answer a question which relates to you personally. What decorations did
you receive from Hitler?
RAEDER: I received from Hitler in the autumn of 1939 in addition to the
Golden Emblem, which I have already mentioned, the Knight’s Order to the
Iron Cross. Furthermore, in the year 1941 on the occasion of my 65th
birthday I received a donation of 250,000 marks. This donation was given
to me by Hitler through an adjutant and in connection with that he sent
a document.
When I thanked him on the very first occasion, he told me that he was
giving me this donation as a means of decoration in the same manner as
the former rulers of Prussia had given their generals similar donations,
whether as sums of money or as a country estate; then he emphasized that
Field Marshals Von Hindenburg and Von Mackensen had received donations
from him as well.
DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall turn to the passage “Greece.” With regard to
Greece, the Prosecution has quoted Document C-12, which is GB-226. This
is to be found in Document Book Number 10, Page 1. This document deals
with the decision on the part of Hitler which was transmitted through
the OKW, dated 30 December 1939, signed by Jodl, and we read under
Number 1.:
“Greek merchant ships in the area around England, declared by
the United States to be a barred zone, are to be treated as
enemy vessels.”
This decision on the part of Hitler was made on the basis of a report by
the SKL. What caused you to make this report even though Greece was
neutral at the time?
RAEDER: At that time we had received a large number of intelligence
reports from our intelligence service that Greek shipping companies
apparently with the knowledge of the Greek Government were allowing
Greek ships to be chartered by England under favorable conditions.
Therefore, these Greek ships were in the service of England and thus
were to be treated in the same way as we were treating the English
merchantmen. These intelligence reports were confirmed later on to an
even greater degree than had been the case in the beginning.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I would like to submit to the High
Tribunal Exhibit Raeder-53, to be found in my Document Book 3, Page 258.
This document deals with the War Diary kept by the SKL in the month of
December 1939.
On Page 259, under the date of 19 December, the following entry is made:
“Greece has hired out about 20 vessels to ply between the United States,
Le Havre and Liverpool.”
This is confirmed by the reports just mentioned by the defendant. The
next entry, on the same page under the date 30 December:
“Justified by the sales and chartering of numerous Greek ships
to England it has been decreed, with the agreement of the
Führer, that Greek ships in the zone from 20 degrees West to 2
degrees East and from 44 degrees North to 62 degrees North shall
be considered as hostile craft by U-boats. Attacks to be made
invisibly as far as possible.”
I also submit the following document, Number Raeder-54. This document is
taken from the _White Books_. It is dated 23 January 1940, and it is a
report from the German Embassy at the Hague to the Foreign Office. The
heading is: “The Contemplated Chartering of 50 to 60 Greek Ships to the
British Government.” It is not necessary for me to read it. I should
like merely to quote the beginning of the first sentence:
“After the British press brought reports at the end of November last
year”—that is, 1939—“about the alleged charterings of Greek vessels to
British companies”—and so forth—then follows the statement that these
50 to 60 ships are now chartered by British companies.
Even though it is not quite accurate historically, I would now like
first of all to conclude the question of Greece. In historical sequence
Norway should follow now first, but for the sake of coherence I should
like to deal with Greece and the occupation of Greece first.
In the Document C-152, identical with C-167 or Exhibit GB-122, in the
Document Book of the British Delegation Number 10, Page 23, the
Prosecution has charged you with the Figure 9 of this lengthy document,
specifically Figure 9.)B.)f.). It says there:
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy requests confirmation of the
fact that the whole of Greece is to be occupied even in the case
of a peaceful solution. The Führer: Complete occupation is a
stipulation for any settlement.”
This document concerns your report to Hitler of 18 March 1941. What were
the reasons for your making this proposal?
RAEDER: In the beginning I had but little knowledge of the political
intentions of the Führer as far as Greece was concerned, but I did know
of his Directive Number 20, dated 13 December 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, I would like to mention for the
assistance of the Court that we are dealing with Document 1541-PS, that
is GB-117, Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 270. This
directive is dated 13 December 1940.
RAEDER: In this directive the Führer, for the reasons given in Paragraph
1, said that his intention was, as set forth in Paragraph 2:
“b.) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in
March, to employ this group of forces to occupy the north coast
of the Aegean by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the
entire Greek mainland (‘Operation Marita’). The support of
Bulgaria is to be expected.”
The next time I heard about these things again was when I heard that the
British had landed in southern Greece on 3 March. We learned that on
about 5 or 6 March. For this reason I asked the Führer that he occupy
all of Greece in order to prevent the British from attacking us from the
rear, by air, and from erecting air bases, all of which would hamper the
conduct of our war not only in Greece but also in the eastern
Mediterranean.
The fact was that when a political decision had been made by Hitler of
his own accord and without having consulted anyone, I, as Chief of the
Naval Operations Staff, always had to draw my strategic conclusions from
this political decision and then had to make to him my proposals on
naval and on other warfare as far as they concerned me.
Since in December he had already considered the possibility that all of
Greece would have to be occupied, the case had now actually arisen for
me to make this proposal to him for the reason I have already mentioned.
When I said “all of Greece,” that implied to me and the Naval Command
the entire Greek coast, where the British forces might land.
DR. SIEMERS: Your proposal was made about 2 weeks after British troops
had landed in Greece?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: In this same connection I would like to submit Exhibit
Raeder-58, in my Document Book 3, Page 271. This is a document contained
in the _White Book_, according to which on 4 January—I beg the
Tribunal’s pardon. Sir David is right. Document 58 has been rejected and
I withdraw it.
In this connection I would like to submit Exhibit Number Raeder-59. It
is to be found in Document Book 3, Page 273 and is an extract from the
_White Book_: It is the minutes of the French War Committee of 26 April
1940. This document deals with the decision of the War Committee
regarding Norway, the Caucasus, Romania, and Greece.
I also submit Exhibit Number Raeder-63, in Document Book 3, Page 285,
which is an address by the British Secretary of State for India, Amery,
dated 1 December 1940. This document also shows plans regarding Greece,
a year and a quarter before the time just mentioned by the witness.
Now I shall turn to the topic of Norway.
[_Turning to the defendant._] The British prosecutor, Major Elwyn Jones,
considers the attack against Norway a special case in the series of
aggressive wars waged by the Nazi conspirators. In this connection he
pointed out that, in this case, Hitler did not think of this himself but
rather was persuaded by you. Since his point is very important, I should
like to ask you to describe this event exactly, and therefore I ask you
first of all: When was the first conversation about this matter between
you and Hitler?
RAEDER: The first conversation between Hitler and myself concerning the
question of Norway was on 10 October 1939, and that was at my request.
The reason for this was that we had received reports at various times
during the last week of September through our intelligence service of
the offices of Admiral Canaris that the British intended to occupy bases
in Norway.
I recall that after reports to this effect had reached me several times
Admiral Canaris visited me himself on one occasion—something he did in
very important cases only. And, in the presence of my chief of staff, he
gave me a coherent explanation concerning the intelligence reports which
had been received. In this connection air bases were constantly
mentioned, as well as bases in the south of Norway. Stavanger was
mentioned constantly with the airport Sola, and Trondheim was usually
mentioned and occasionally Christiansand.
During the last days of September I had a telephone conversation with
Admiral Carls who was the commander of Navy Group North and was
therefore in charge of operations in the Skagerrak, the Kattegat and in
the North Sea. This man had obviously received similar reports. He
informed me that he had composed a private letter addressed to me, in
which he dealt with the question of the danger of Norway’s being
occupied by British forces and in which he was in a general way dealing
with the question as to what disadvantages such a step would have for
us, and whether we should have to forestall such an attempt, and also
what advantages or disadvantages the occupation of Norway—that is, of
the Norwegian coast and the Norwegian bases—by our forces would have.
Up until that point I had not concerned myself with the Norwegian
question at all, except for the fact I had received these reports. The
arrival of this letter at the end of September or the beginning of
October, it must have been about then, impelled me to show it to the
Chief of Staff of the SKL and to instruct him to deal with all dispatch
with the question of the occupation of Norwegian bases by England, and
the other questions which Admiral Carls had dealt with, and to have the
questions discussed in the SKL. The advantages and disadvantages of an
expansion of the war towards the North had to be considered, not only of
an expansion on our part but, above all, an expansion on the part of
England; what value, what advantage would accrue to us if we acted
first; what disadvantages would result if we had to defend the Norwegian
coast?
The result of this was the questionnaire mentioned in C-122, GB-82,
where the questions were asked: What places were to be used as bases;
what the possibility of defense by us would be; whether these ports
would have to be developed further; and also, what advantages would
result so far as our U-boats were concerned?
These questions, as I have already stated, were put to Admiral Dönitz as
well, but his answers arrived only after I had made the report on 10
October. I would like to say, by way of introduction, that it was
entirely clear to me that if we undertook to occupy these bases we would
violate neutrality. But I also knew of the agreement which existed
between the German and Norwegian Governments of 2 September regarding
neutrality, and I knew the concluding sentence, in this _aide memoire_,
which is Document TC-31, GB-79, dated 2 September 1939.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, but I should like to point out, Mr.
President, that this document is found in the Document Book of the
British Delegation 10a, at Page 330.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You have that document before you?
RAEDER: Yes, I have it before me, and I would like to quote the
concluding sentence.
DR. SIEMERS: It is the last document in the book, Your Honor, at Page
329.
RAEDER: [_Continuing._] The last sentence:
“Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government change so
that any such breach of neutrality by a third party recurs, the
Reich Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard
the interests of the Reich in such a way as would be forced upon
the Reich Cabinet by the resulting situation.”
Then, within the next few days, I asked the Chief of Staff of the SKL to
submit to me the data which the SKL had prepared during the preceding
days and I reported to Hitler on 10 October, because I considered this
problem particularly important. It was entirely clear to me that the
best possible solution for us would be that Norway should maintain a
steadfast neutrality, and I expressed my opinion, as may be seen in
Document C-21, GB-194.
This is an extract from the War Diary of the SKL.
DR. SIEMERS: It is in the Document Book of the British Delegation 10a,
Page 6.
RAEDER: It says here, on Page 3 of the German version, the next but last
paragraph, under the date of 13 January: “Situation discussion with the
Chief of the SKL.”
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. C-21 was not entirely
translated by the Prosecution. This document may be found in my document
book under Exhibit Number Raeder-69, and I should like to submit it
herewith. It is in Document Book 3, Page 62.
THE PRESIDENT: Document Book 3 only goes to 64, is that not right? It
must be Document Book 4.
DR. SIEMERS: There must be a mistake in the document book then. At
first, due to an oversight, the table of contents was only completed as
far as 64 by the Translation Section, but since that time it has been
corrected and supplemented. It is in Document Book 4, Page 317.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Page 317, at the top.
DR. SIEMERS: [_Turning to the defendant._] Please comment on this
document.
RAEDER: In the next but last paragraph, it says:
“In complete agreement with this point of view, the Chief of the
Naval Operations Staff is therefore also of the opinion that the
most favorable solution would doubtless be the maintenance of
the present situation which, if strictest neutrality is
exercised by Norway, will permit the safe use of Norwegian
territorial waters for the shipping vital to Germany’s war
effort without the attempt being made on the part of England to
seriously endanger this sea lane.” (Document Number Raeder-69)
I maintained this point of view when reporting to Hitler. In that report
I first mentioned the intelligence reports which we had at hand. Then I
described the dangers which might result to us from a British occupation
of bases on the Norwegian coast and might affect our entire warfare,
dangers which I considered tremendous. I had the feeling that such an
occupation would gravely prejudice and imperil the whole conduct of our
war.
If the British occupied bases in Norway, especially in the South of
Norway, they would be able to dominate the entrance to the Baltic Sea
from those points, and also flank our naval operations from the
Helgoland Bight and from the Elbe, Jade and Weser. The second outlet
which we had was also gravely imperiled, affecting the operations of
battleships as well as the courses of our merchantmen.
In addition to that, from their air bases in Norway, they might endanger
our air operations, the operations of our pilots for reconnaissance in
the North Sea or for attacks against England.
Furthermore, from Norway they could exert strong pressure on Sweden, and
that pressure would have been felt in this respect, that the supplies of
ore from Sweden would have been hindered or stopped by purely political
pressure. Finally, the export of ore from Narvik to Germany could have
been stopped entirely, and it is known how much Germany depended on
supplies of ore from Sweden and Norway. They might even have gone so
far—and we learned about this subsequently that such plans were
discussed—as to attack and destroy the ore deposits at Lulea, or to
seize them.
All of these dangers might become decisive factors in the outcome of the
war. Aside from the fact that I told Hitler that the best thing for us
would be to have strict neutrality on the part of Norway, I also called
his attention to the dangers which would result to us from an occupation
of the Norwegian coast and Norwegian bases, for there would have been
lively naval operations near the Norwegian coast in which the British,
even after our occupation of bases, would try to hamper our ore traffic
from Narvik. A struggle might ensue which we, with our inadequate supply
of surface vessels, would be unable to cope with in the long run.
Therefore, at that time I did not make any proposal that we should
occupy Norway or that we should obtain bases in Norway. I only did my
duty in telling the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht about this grave
danger which was threatening us, and against which we might have to use
emergency measures for our defense. I also pointed out to him that
possible operations for the occupation of Norwegian bases might be very
expensive for us. In the course of later discussions I told him that we
might even lose our entire fleet. I would consider it a favorable case
if we were to lose only one-third, something which actually did happen
later on.
There was, therefore, no reason for me to expect that I would gain
prestige by such an enterprise—I have been accused of this ambition by
the Prosecution. As a matter of fact, the exact opposite might easily
result.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the
fact that these things may be seen in documents which date from the time
of the war, one of which is Exhibit Number Raeder-69, of 13 January
1940, which has just been handed over. This document is a study, and it
is claimed that this study is based on the consideration that if England
were to have the bases in Norway, the situation would be impossible for
the conduct of the war by Germany and such a situation could be
prevented only if we forestalled England by occupying Norway ourselves.
What the witness has just said is stated in exactly the same way in the
War Diary.
In the same connection, I should like to refer to the document of the
Prosecution, Document C-66, GB-81, which may be found in British
Document Book 10a, Page 35. This document is dated 10 January 1944. May
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the fact that there, under
the code name “Weserübung” (Weser Maneuver)—that was the name covering
this action—the substance of the statements the witness has just made
is to be found. I do not wish to read all of them since we would lose
valuable time thereby.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean C-66? That is about the Plan Barbarossa. Is that
the one you mean?
DR. SIEMERS: The last page, under the heading “Weserübung,” Page 39 of
the English document book. Mention is made there of the letter by
Admiral Carls, spoken of by the witness, and of his thoughts in
connection with this matter. In the German original there is the
heading, “Appendix 2.”
A clearer version is found in Document Raeder-69, since that dates from
January 1940, 3 months later, and in the meantime new reports had come
in. This, on the other hand, is a description dating from October 1939.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, I must once more refer to
Document C-122, which you have already mentioned.
The Prosecution, in that document, accuses you of saying:
“The Chief of SKL deems it necessary to tell the Führer as soon
as possible of the ideas of the SKL on the possibility of
expanding the sphere of operations in the North.”
They think they may conclude therefrom that your primary thought was to
expand the operational sphere of the Navy.
RAEDER: I have already said that by the possibility of expansion of the
operational zone to the North I meant an expansion of British operations
and its consequences, and also the possibility of our forestalling this,
thus gaining bases which would be of certain importance to us.
DR. SIEMERS: What did Hitler reply at this discussion on 10 October
1939?
RAEDER: Hitler had not yet concerned himself with this question. The
question was very far from his mind, for he knew very little about
matters of naval warfare. He always remarked that he did not have an
over-all picture of these things, and therefore felt somewhat uncertain.
He said that he would deal with this question and that I should leave
the notes with him, which I had worked out on the basis of statements
made by the SKL, so that he might use them as a basis for his
deliberations on this problem.
It was typical and really speaks very much against the character of the
conspiracy, that on this occasion Hitler, when confronted with the
problem of Norway, did not say a single word about the fact that
previously, the last time evidently in the summer of that year, he had
already dealt with Norwegian questions prompted by Rosenberg. I gather
from a document which I saw for the first time here that on 20 June
1939, Rosenberg had submitted to the Führer a comprehensive report about
his connections with Norwegian political circles, but I heard of these
connections for the first time on 11 December.
It would have been a matter of course for me if the Führer, who was
dealing with Norwegian strategical matters, had told me on this
occasion: “I have such and such information about Norwegian matters.”
But he did not do that—there was always a considerable lack of
collaboration. The Führer told me that we should await the arrival of
further reports and that he would deal with these questions.
DR. SIEMERS: In the subsequent period of October and November, up until
11 December, did you discuss this question with Hitler again?
RAEDER: No, the question was not discussed at all during those months,
but in September Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, who had first been
appointed assistant attaché in Oslo and later, naval attaché, gave me
further reports at that time about conditions in Norway, and so did the
intelligence service. He told me of reports which were circulating there
about a possible British landing. Later on Kapitän Schreiber was
actually my chief collaborator in these Norwegian problems, and he
showed a particular understanding of the whole situation.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I should like to submit to the Tribunal
Exhibit Raeder-107, an affidavit of the naval attaché who has just been
mentioned, Richard Schreiber. This may be found in my Document Book 5,
Page 464.
According to that document, Schreiber was drafted on 7 September 1939 as
a reserve officer and was sent to Oslo as a naval attaché. He states
that he held that post there since the autumn of 1939.
With the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to read a portion of
this, under I, on Page 465, at the bottom.
THE PRESIDENT: We told you that we had read all these documents which
were objected to. We let in this document, so it is not necessary for
you to read it again.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Then in this connection, may I refer to the
first part of this affidavit, Part I?
Mr. President, I should like to point out a small but misleading error
in translation on Page 466. In the second paragraph, second line, the
word “deutsch,” (German) is missing: “...there were clear directives of
the German Foreign Office that Norwegian neutrality should be
particularly respected by the Germans...” In the English text it says:
“of the Foreign Office.” It should read “of the German Foreign Office.”
I should be very grateful if this mistake would be rectified.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, you know the affidavit given by
Schreiber?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Different reports are contained therein. You have already
referred to them in part. Did any additional special reports come in
during those 2 months? Was Narvik mentioned in addition to the other
ports already mentioned?
RAEDER: As far as I remember it was Kapitän Schreiber who expressly
mentioned Narvik for the first time. Kapitän Schreiber had very quickly
made himself acquainted with conditions there. He had established good
connections in Norwegian circles. A confirmation of all that I had known
up to that point came on 11 December.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, would you please describe your meeting with Quisling
on 11 December 1939?
RAEDER: May I first ask whether the Documents 004-PS and 007-PS, which I
believe were submitted by the Prosecution, may be used in this
connection? For example, the minutes of the conference of 11 and 12
December, an accompanying letter by Rosenberg referring to these
minutes, and similar matters?
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I believe that you will be permitted to use these
documents. But since they are known you only need to mention the points
that you remember.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: On this occasion I should merely like to ask whether you
did not know the documents by Rosenberg, 004-PS and 007-PS?
RAEDER: No, I did not know those documents.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you see them for the first time here?
RAEDER: I saw them for the first time here. But the reports contained in
these documents were already known to us at that time as is proved by
the dates of the documents.
DR. SIEMERS: Please tell us only what you heard at that time from
Quisling.
RAEDER: Up until 11 December I had neither connections with Herr
Rosenberg—except for the fact that I had seen him on occasion—nor,
above all, did I have any connections with Quisling about whom I had
heard nothing up to that time.
On 11 December my Chief of Staff, Schulte-Mönting, reported to me that
Major Quisling, a former Norwegian Minister of War, had arrived from
Oslo. He was asking for an interview with me through a Herr Hagelin,
because he wished to tell me about Norwegian conditions.
Herr Hagelin had been sent to my chief of staff by Herr Rosenberg.
Rosenberg had already known Hagelin for some time as I have mentioned
before. Since reports from such a source on Norwegian conditions seemed
to be of great value to me, I declared myself ready to receive Herr
Quisling.
He arrived on the same morning and reported to me at length about the
conditions in Norway, with special reference to the relations of the
Norwegian Government to England and the reports on the intention of
England to land in Norway, and he characterized the whole situation as
especially critical for, according to his reports, the danger seemed to
be imminent. He tried to fix a date. He thought it should occur before
10 January, because then a favorable political situation would arise.
I told him that I was not really concerned with the political situation,
but I would try to arrange to have him give his information to the
Führer. I would be concerned only with the military and strategic
situation, and in that connection I could tell him right away that it
would not be possible to take any measures from 11 December until 10
January, first because the time was too short and secondly because it
was winter.
I considered his expositions to be of such importance that I told him I
would try to arrange for him to report to the Führer personally, so that
these reports would reach and influence him directly.
Then on the 12th—that is on the next day—I went to Hitler and informed
him of the conversation between Quisling and me, and I asked him to
receive Quisling personally so that he might have a personal impression
of Quisling. On this occasion I told him—and this is written down in
one of the documents—that in cases of this kind one would have to be
especially cautious, since one could not know to what degree such a
party leader would try to further the interest of his party. Therefore
our investigations would have to be especially careful. And I again
called the attention of the Führer to the fact that an attempt to occupy
Norway would bring with it greatest risks as well as certain
disadvantages for the future situation. In other words, I carefully
presented both sides of the picture in a neutral manner.
Hitler then decided to receive Quisling together with Hagelin on one of
the following days. The two gentlemen then were obviously in touch with
Rosenberg. I believe they stayed with him, and Rosenberg sent me, by
letter, a record of a meeting which had apparently been drawn up by
Quisling and Hagelin and also a description of Quisling’s personality.
In this letter, which is here as a document but which was not read by
the Prosecution, it says specifically that Rosenberg knew what the
political conditions were but that, of course, he would have to leave
the military side entirely to me since I was the competent authority on
that.
DR. SIEMERS: If it please the High Tribunal, in this connection I would
like to submit Exhibit Raeder-67, to be found in my Document Book 4,
Page 309. That is the letter from Rosenberg to Raeder dated 13 December
1939, which was not mentioned by the Prosecution. The Prosecution merely
mentioned the appendix mentioned in the letter—that is, a note by
Rosenberg, under Number C-65, the same as GB-85. According to its
contents C-65 belongs to Exhibit Raeder-67.
THE PRESIDENT: You say there was another besides Raeder-67 which you
were referring to?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes; I am referring to Raeder-67.
THE PRESIDENT: I got that. But you said some other document as well.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the document submitted by the Prosecution, C-65, and
that is an appendix to this letter; the two belong together. The latter
document, C-65, is to be found in the Document Book of the British
Delegation 10a, Page 33. If these two documents are taken together, it
can be seen that the political side is not mentioned in either document;
and this explains what the witness meant when he said that he was not
concerned with the political side of the question but only with the
military side. It is for that reason that Rosenberg had sent it to him.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it would be a good time to break off.
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. DODD: Mr. President, with respect to the case of the Defendant
Seyss-Inquart, counsel and representatives of the Prosecution have been
conferring with respect to his application for documents. We have agreed
on a great number, but there are 20 upon which we are unable to agree.
THE PRESIDENT: 20?
MR. DODD: 20. I think we could do it in 30 minutes if the Tribunal will
set some time aside; it might take a little more. Sir David has reminded
me that the translators are waiting on us to go ahead with their
translation work.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I think the best thing would be to take it
tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock.
MR. DODD: Very well, Mr. President. It has been suggested also that the
case of Seyss-Inquart precede that of Defendant Von Papen. I understand
that is the wish of the counsel, and it is very satisfactory to us as
well.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SIEMERS: We have to refer briefly to Document 1809-PS, the Diary of
Generaloberst Jodl. It is GB-88 in the Document Book of the British
Delegation 10a, Page 289.
May I first ask when were the plans for the occupation of Norway
drafted?
RAEDER: I may say that on the basis of the conference which Quisling had
with the Führer in my presence on 14 December the Führer ordered the OKW
to deal with the matter and study it. The Führer had two more
conferences with Quisling on 16 and 18 December at which I was not
present. The matter was then handled by the OKW according to the
directives and an initial plan known as “North” was drafted. Document
C-21, which I have mentioned before, shows that this Plan North was
received by SKL on 13 January and then, in the course of January, the
date 27 January was mentioned, the draft of a directive for the Plan
North was made. That draft was made in the OKW in the usual way. Kapitän
zur See Krancke as expert for the Navy took part in it. The directive
was completed on 1 March 1940, and was issued to the three branches of
the Armed Forces. In the meantime, a large number of reports had been
received, and it was possible to use these as a basis for the drafting
of the directive. These reports besides coming from Kapitän Schreiber
now also came direct from Quisling, who sent them to the Führer. They
mentioned the preparatory work carried out by the English and the
French—special mention was made of the Navy Attaché Kermarrec—in
Norwegian ports for finding out the possibilities of landing,
measurements of quays, and the height of the bridges between Narvik and
the Swedish border and similar things.
These reports which reached us showed clearly that within a reasonable
time a landing was intended. Also political reports reached us which
Hagelin received through his connections in Norwegian circles, reports
which in part came directly from members of the Storting—and from
members of the Government and their entourage.
All of these reports confirmed that the pretext of aid for Finland in
the dispute between Finland and Russia played a certain role. The danger
was discussed that England under pretext of aid for Finland would
proceed to a bloodless occupation of Norway. The directive for the case
Norway, therefore, was issued on 1 March. In the further course of the
month of March more reports were received. In the meantime, the
_Altmark_ incident had occurred, and it was observed by Hagelin too that
the behavior of the Norwegian commander was a pretense, and it was clear
that in the case of any encroachment on the part of Great Britain, the
Norwegian Government would protest only on paper.
DR. SIEMERS: You said just now the directive is dated 1 March. This is
correct. The Prosecution submitted a quotation of 5 March from Document
1809-PS. That is an entry in Jodl’s Diary: “1500 hours big conference
with the three commanders-in-chief regarding Weserübung. Field Marshal,
having no knowledge about plans, is furious.” How is it possible,
Admiral, that Reich Marshal Göring had not been consulted at a time when
the directive was already issued?
RAEDER: I cannot explain that at all. I had no authority to speak about
it and I cannot say why he was not consulted.
DR. SIEMERS: It is in the nature of conspiracy that the second man in
the Reich would be informed about it from the beginning. Has he not ever
spoken to you about that matter?
RAEDER: No, not that I remember, but that shows how little, especially
in the Führer’s entourage, one can speak of a conspiracy. The Foreign
Minister, Von Ribbentrop, also was not present during any of the
Quisling conferences or receptions and I had no authority, to speak to
him about these matters.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I should like to know your position regarding Jodl’s
entry of 13 March, in which he stated: “Führer does not give the order
for ‘W’ (Weserübung). He is still trying to find a justification.”
I ask you to explain these words to us as you understand them.
RAEDER: Yes. The English translation as far as I can remember says
“Looking for an excuse.” But he needed neither justification nor excuse,
because in the first paragraph of the directive of 1 March—that is to
say, 2 weeks before that—he had stated what circumstances made it
necessary to occupy Norway and Denmark with certain forces of the
Wehrmacht. British encroachments in Scandinavia and the Baltic were to
be prevented thereby, our ore deposits in Sweden safeguarded, and the
bases against England for the Navy and the Air Force were to be
expanded.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that is the Document C-174;
that is, GB-89, Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 113.
That is the directive for case “Weserübung” of 1 March 1940, which as
the witness has mentioned, already contains the justification for it.
May it please the Tribunal, to prove that the information received by
the witness through the intelligence service of Admiral Canaris, through
Kapitän Schreiber and so on, is objective and in agreement with facts,
may I be permitted to submit several documents—and that Exhibit Number
Raeder-75 from the _White Book_ dated 17 February 1940, which mentions
the landing of British troops in Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik, and
several appendices to it, which show the trends of thoughts at that time
in regard to the Swedish ore; Document Exhibit Raeder-77...
THE PRESIDENT: This is 75, Pages 43 and 44?
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. Not page, but Exhibit Raeder-75. It is
Page 340. Document Book 4.
Then Exhibit Number Raeder-77, also from the _White Book_: “The French
Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs Daladier to the French
Ambassador in London, Corbin.”
In Document Book 4, Page 352. I have seen that there is a mistake in the
English document book. On Page 353 the heading is missing or rather on
Page 354. I may point out that this document bears the date 21 February
1940. That is contained in the original document under the heading
“Intervention in Scandinavia.” It concerns the occupation of the most
important Norwegian ports, _et cetera_, and mentions again the question
of the Swedish ore.
Then I come to the Document Exhibit Raeder-78; Document Book 4, Page
357, an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff of 4
March in which in connection with the case of the _Altmark_ it is
explained that a defense by Norway against British military action is
not possible.
Then Exhibit Raeder-79, Document Book 4, Page 359, note by the
Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin. Here also there
is a mistake in the translation. The heading of the document was omitted
on Page 360. I would be grateful if the Tribunal would note that the
original document bears the date 10 March 1940. It is top secret and is
based on the fact that the general plan for armed intervention in
Finland existed since 16 January and therefore as a precautionary
measure the ports and airfields on the Norwegian coast should be
occupied. I refer to the remaining contents of document.
Then may I submit Exhibit Number Raeder-80, a report about negotiations
of the Scandinavian Commission of the Inter-Allied Military Study
Commission of 11 March 1940, top secret, concerning landing at Narvik.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Then, Admiral, we are finished with
Norway. I believe you said already that the reports increased
considerably in the month of March. When did Hitler give the final order
for the occupation?
RAEDER: At the end of March or beginning of April. I cannot recall the
exact date.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe that is sufficient.
RAEDER: May I also mention a particularly important report which I
remember now. Quisling reported in February that Lord Halifax had told
the Norwegian Ambassador in London that an operation on the part of the
British for the acquisition of bases in Norway was planned for the near
future. That report also reached us at that time. I should like to add,
as I emphasized before, that being fully conscious of my responsibility
I always tried to show the Führer both sides of the picture and that the
Führer would have to be guided by my documentary proof when deciding, to
take or refrain from taking that tremendous step. But that does not mean
to say that because I pointed out to my Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces that particular danger, I in any way decline to accept
responsibility. Of course, I am in some measure responsible for the
whole thing. Moreover, I have been accused because in a letter submitted
here under C-155 I had told my officers’ corps that I was proud of the
way in which this extraordinarily dangerous enterprise had been
executed. I should like to confirm this, because I believe I was
entitled to be proud that the Navy had carried out that operation with
such limited means and in the face of the entire British fleet; I still
stick to that.
DR. SIEMERS: Did reports reach the SKL in March about violations of the
neutrality of Norway? That is incidents in territorial waters?
RAEDER: Yes. In the second half of March repeated attacks were made by
British planes and naval forces against our merchant ships bringing the
Swedish ore down from Narvik.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection may I submit some more
documents? Exhibit Raeder-81, Document Book 5, Page 372, War Diary of
the Naval Operations Staff which contains several entries showing that
towards the end these incidents became more and more frequent and that
the Norwegian neutrality was violated by British air and naval forces.
As that document is known there is no need to read anything from it.
Then Exhibit Raeder-82 in Document Book 5, Page 377, also War Diary of
27 March, also concerning violations of neutrality. Furthermore, Exhibit
Raeder-83, Page 379, a draft resolution of the sixth session of the
Supreme Council, dated 28 March 1940, which was already mentioned
yesterday. It deals with vital interests from the standpoint of
international law and with the laying of mines in territorial waters on
5 April.
Then Exhibit Raeder-84, Page 384, and Exhibit Raeder-85, Page 386, both
of which are documents from the _White Book_. May I only point out that
it mentions that the first transport is to leave on J.1. day, that is
actually on 5 April; in other words, 4 days before the occupation by
Germany.
Exhibit Raeder-86 is an excerpt from the War Diary, of which I ask you
to take official notice and which concerns the chartering by England of
90 percent of the Norwegian tankers.
To conclude Norway, may I ask you to look at two Documents, C-151 and
C-115. Those are Exhibits GB-91 and GB-90, respectively, Document Book
of the British Delegation 10a, on Pages 106 and 62. The dates are 30
March 1940 and 4 April 1940. The documents show that the ships which
were to carry out the landing should carry the British flag for
camouflage reasons. The Prosecution uses that document also to support
its accusation.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What do you say about it?
RAEDER: That is quite a regular ruse of war, that warships carry a
foreign flag. A requisite for the legality of that act, however, is that
at the moment of an enemy action, the moment fire is opened, their own
flag must be hoisted in time. That has always been done in the German
Navy, especially in the case of our auxiliary cruisers, which frequently
sailed under a foreign flag in order to avoid being reported by merchant
ships, but which always lowered that flag in time. That is a matter of
honor. It must be added that in this case, as the War Diary shows...
DR. SIEMERS: 8 April.
RAEDER: ...that on 8 April, on account of certain considerations, we
rescinded that order, because we had the report that an English action
was under way, and we feared that complications would arise from that.
So this order was not carried out in the long run. I believe the
document can be found which contains that.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I submit, in this connection, Exhibit Number
Raeder-89 (Document Raeder-89), Document Book 5, Page 400, where we find
under 8 April: “The previous order is rescinded, the British flag is not
to be used.”
RAEDER: You also asked about Document C-115, which says that the
blockade runners camouflaged as merchant ships with dimmed lights should
enter Oslo Fjord unobtrusively. This too is quite a regular ruse of war
against which, from the legal point of view, no objection can be made.
Likewise there is nothing to be said against English names given in
answer to signals of identity.
I did not finish answering one question because I was interrupted. That
was the question concerning the expression “justification” or “excuse”
in the War Diary of Generaloberst Jodl. As I have shown, it was not a
question of the justification, which had been expressed a long time
before by Hitler, but I believe that I am right in saying that the
question was that the diplomatic note which, at the moment of the
execution of the enterprise, had to be presented to the Norwegian and
Danish governments, giving the reason for his action, had not yet been
drafted, especially as he had not yet spoken to the Foreign Minister at
that time at all. The Foreign Minister received the information, as he
has said himself, only on 3 April.
DR. SIEMERS: With this I should like to conclude the question of the
occupation of Norway. May I still submit the approved document, Exhibit
Raeder-66, which was approved for the purpose of argument? It is an
opinion expressed by Dr. Mosler, and it can be found in Document Book 4,
Page 291; and in this connection, concerning the use of flags, may I
draw special attention to Figure 7, Page 304, from which we may see the
legal reasoning. Furthermore, may I submit Exhibit Raeder-90, Document