Book 1, Page 40, under II. In this affidavit Lohmann gives comparative

figures which show how much battleship tonnage Germany was allowed under

the naval agreement. Please take notice of it without my reading all the

figures. What is important is that, according to comparison with the

British figures, Germany was allowed to have 183,750 tons. At that time

she had three completed armored cruisers with 30,000 tons—which is

shown here—so that according to this affidavit 153,750 tons still

remained.

With reference to Document Raeder-127, I should like to submit a short

correction, because Grossadmiral Raeder, in looking through the

affidavit, observed that Vice Admiral Lohmann made a mistake in one

figure. The mistake is unimportant in terms of the whole, but in order

to be absolutely fair and correct I thought it necessary to point it out

to Vice Admiral Lohmann. Instead of 30,000 it should actually read about

34,000 tons, so that there is a difference, not of 153,750 tons but of

149,750. According to the naval agreement, we were allowed to build

146,000, the final figure, so that the result is not changed. Admiral

Lohmann’s mistake—as the Tribunal know—can be attributed to the fact

that we were very limited in our material resources.

RAEDER: May I add a remark to what I said before? The statement of these

displacements deviated from the terms of the treaty insofar as only the

original construction displacement or draught was reported and not the

draught and displacement which gradually resulted through these changes

in the course of the planning of the construction.

DR. SIEMERS: In addition, may I refer the honorable Court to the

following: The Naval Agreement of 1937 was changed by the London

Protocol of 30 June 1938. I refer to Exhibit Raeder-16. My secretary

just tells me it is not here at the moment; I will bring it up later. It

is the last document in Raeder Document Book 1, Page 97.

May I remind the Court that Document C-23 is of February 1938. By this

London Protocol, at the suggestion of the British Government, the

limitation on battleship tonnage to 35,000 tons was changed because the

British Government, as well as the German Government, realized that

35,000 tons was too low. As the protocol shows, effective 30 June 1938,

the battleship tonnage was raised to 45,000 tons. Thereby this

difference in the battleships, referred to in Document C-23, was settled

a few months later.

Now, I shall take up a new subject, the question of your participation

in the planning and conspiracy to wage wars of aggression. This is the

question of the so-called key documents which the Prosecution presented.

Since you, Admiral, were present during these speeches of Hitler’s to

the commanders-in-chief, I must ask you to comment on these documents.

The first document is Document 386-PS, the so-called Hossbach Document,

Exhibit USA-25, in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number

10, Page 81. It is Hitler’s speech of 5 November 1937.

Herr Grossadmiral, did you ever see this document of Hossbach before the

Trial began?

RAEDER: No, I saw no document and no protocol of any speeches which

Hitler made. No minutes were taken officially. Only in later years—I

believe since 1941—were stenographers present who wrote down every

word. These are really not minutes at all, since the document is written

in indirect discourse. It was written down by the author 5 days after

the speech itself, as we have heard.

DR. SIEMERS: Although it is a very important document, I have noted that

in contrast to other documents it has no distribution list; it was

written down 5 days after the speech and is not even marked “secret.”

Can you explain where these minutes were set down?

RAEDER: I cannot recollect in detail the conditions that prevailed. I

can only imagine that the adjutant in question kept the minutes in his

safe.

DR. SIEMERS: Then you have only an over-all impression of this speech,

after 8 or 9 years?

RAEDER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: The document was read in full here by the Prosecution and,

as cannot be denied at all, it contains serious references to a war of

aggression. It mentions, for instance, something bequeathed by will, the

problem of space, the hatred against England and France; it says that,

armament now being completed, the first goal is the overthrow of

Czechoslovakia and Austria.

Please explain to the Court what effect the speech had on you at that

time, and how it happened that you ascribed no such importance to the

speech as did Herr Von Neurath, for example, who was also present? And

in spite of the speech how did you retain your opinion that Hitler would

hold the old line and not seek a solution by force?

RAEDER: By way of introduction I may say that the assertion contained in

the trial brief, that an influential group of Nazis met in order to

examine the situation, does not give a correct picture of the situation

at all. Hitler called together the persons mentioned in the document to

explain to them the possibilities for political development and in order

to give them any instructions he might have.

And here I should like to say something in general—since there are

quite a number of Hitler’s speeches coming—about the nature of his

speeches. Hitler spoke at great length, going very far in retrospect.

Above all, in every speech he had a special purpose depending on the

audience. Just as he was a master of dialectics, so he was also a master

of bluff. He used strong expressions again according to the objective he

was pursuing. He afforded his imagination full play. He also

contradicted himself frequently in successive speeches. One never knew

what his final goals and intentions were. At the end of such a speech it

was very difficult to determine them. As a rule, his speeches made a

greater impression on people who heard him infrequently than on those

already acquainted with his whole manner of speaking on such occasions.

It was never a question of taking counsel but, as has been said, always

of giving undisputed orders.

The purpose of the speech on 5 November 1937 was, as Reich Marshal

Göring said at the beginning...

DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. That is at the beginning of this speech of 5

November?

RAEDER: Yes, at the beginning of the speech.

He told me he had spoken with the Führer beforehand. The Führer wanted

to spur on the Army to carry out its rearmament somewhat faster. It was

going too slowly for the Führer. The subject of the speech was Austria

and Czechoslovakia, which he said in one place he wanted to overthrow.

He said that the latest date would be 1943-1945, because after that our

situation would become worse. But the case could come up earlier due to

two conditions: In the first place, if internal unrest occurred in

France; in the second place, in the event of the outbreak of a

Mediterranean war in which England, France, Italy, and probably Spain,

would participate, which in my opinion was fantastic.

The assertion that the arming of the Army, Navy, and Air Force was as

good as completed in November 1937, I could not understand. The Navy

still had not a single battleship in service. The situation was similar

in the Air Force and Army. In no way were we armed for war, and a war

against England, for example, would have been sheer madness. For me, the

decisive sentences in his speech were that first, England and France—I

believe—had already written off Czechoslovakia, and secondly, that he

was convinced that France and England would not interfere. In the third

place was the fact that just a few months before, in July 1937, the

second naval agreement had been signed. These three facts seemed to me

to make it certain that Hitler would not seek a warlike solution to

these problems of Austria and Czechoslovakia. At that time it was a

question of the Sudetenland under any circumstances and it seemed he

would strive for a peaceful solution. For that reason the speech did not

impress me with the fact that Hitler at that time wanted to change his

policy—that he wanted to turn from a policy of peace to one of war. I

can imagine that Herr Von Neurath, not knowing the purpose of this

speech, received a different impression. But, as I now think back over

the matter, I can imagine that the exaggerated character of the speech

was specifically intended to force Von Neurath out of the Cabinet,

because I have learned that at that time the Führer was already inclined

to replace Von Neurath by Von Ribbentrop. That was only an assumption

which I made afterwards.

For me the conclusions to be drawn from the speech were none other than

these: The construction of the fleet in the ratio of one to three,

relative to England, was to be continued, and a friendly relationship

with England was still to be striven for. The ratio agreement which had

just been reached was to be observed.

DR. SIEMERS: And, it is obvious at the end of the document—namely in

the fourth paragraph from the end—that Field Marshal Von Blomberg and

Colonel General Von Fritsch, in giving their estimate of the situation,

repeatedly pointed out the necessity of England and France not playing

the role of our enemies. This is commented on further, and one sees that

Blomberg and Fritsch were disturbed and for once opposed Hitler.

After the speech you talked to Blomberg. Is it true that Blomberg, who

can unfortunately not be examined and Fritsch, who is also dead, saw

through this exaggeration of Hitler’s and therefore pointed out their

misgivings and in this way intended to intervene? About what did you

talk to Blomberg after this speech?

RAEDER: In the first place, Blomberg and Fritsch...

THE PRESIDENT: You must try not to put leading questions, Dr. Siemers.

You are putting into the witness’ mouth what you want him to answer. If

you want to...

DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry if I did so. It is a little difficult when the

two men who were there, Blomberg and Fritsch, are dead. I can only point

out that they are not alive now. My final question is...

THE PRESIDENT: That cannot be helped, the fact that they are dead. But,

if you want to get anything in about that, you must get it from the

witness, not from yourself.

DR. SIEMERS: What impression did Blomberg have after this speech? What

did he say to you afterwards?

RAEDER: I believe Blomberg himself in a questionnaire stated to Field

Marshal Keitel that when we military men left the room Blomberg, who was

with the Führer frequently, said that this again had not been meant so

earnestly and was not to be judged so seriously. He believed that the

Führer would settle these questions peacefully, too. And as Dr. Siemers

said, Blomberg and Fritsch had both already called the attention of the

Führer to the fact that under no circumstances should England and France

be allowed to intervene, since the German Wehrmacht would not be able to

cope with them.

I may add that in this case I intentionally did not make any such

objections because it was, after all, a daily occurrence that whenever I

met the Führer, I told him, “_Ceterum censeo_, we must stay on the

course in order to avoid entanglements with England.” And the Führer

repeatedly confirmed this intention of his. It is typical that as soon

as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Colonel General Von Fritsch, said

that after these remarks he would not be able to take the vacation in

Egypt in the winter of 1937-38 which he had planned for his health, the

Führer immediately retracted his statement and said that the affair was

not so urgent, that he could go ahead on his vacation undisturbed, which

he then did.

This shows that it was again a question of exerting pressure. That was

the speech of 5 November 1937. In fact he did not crush either Austria

or Czechoslovakia at that time; but in 1938 the question was settled

peacefully without bloodshed, and even with the agreement of the other

powers.

DR. SIEMERS: In this connection may I submit the document dating from

the following year, Exhibit Raeder-23, Raeder Document Book 2, Page 127.

On 30 September 1938—I need not say anything further about Munich,

because the defendant was not directly participating—Hitler and

Chamberlain jointly declared that the agreement signed the previous

night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement were considered symbols of

the desires of both nations never again to wage war against each other.

The rest of the contents is well known.

Then I come to the second key document which the Prosecution

submitted—namely, Document L-79, the so-called “Little Schmundt.” It is

Exhibit USA-27, Number 10 in the document book of the British

Delegation, Page 24. The document in spite of its astonishing length was

also presented in full by the Prosecution, so that I shall not read from

it. May I remind the Court that it states that further successes could

not be achieved without bloodshed, and on 23 May 1939 with reference to

Poland it states that not Danzig but the readjustment of Lebensraum was

the issue at stake.

It speaks of the readjustment of Lebensraum and of the fact that the

Polish problem could not be separated from the conflict with the West.

Thereupon Hitler said that the only way out was to attack Poland at the

first suitable opportunity. Unfortunately, this is again a document

which is undated.

Do you know when Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt prepared this report?

RAEDER: No, unfortunately I cannot say that.

THE PRESIDENT: Why do you say it is undated?

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, there is no date stating when the document

was prepared. There is only the date referring to the minutes of the

conference of 23 May. In the case of the Hossbach Document the

conference was on 5 November, but it was written down by Hossbach 5 days

later from memory, on 10 November. In the case of Schmundt, we do not

know whether it was written down after 1 day, 5 days, or 4 weeks.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it in evidence that the document of 5 November was

written down 5 days later?

DR. SIEMERS: No. The document of 5 November shows that it was prepared 5

days later. The document is dated at the top, “Berlin, 10 November 1937;

Notes of the Conference in the Reich Chancellery on 5 November 1937....”

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is right, then there is evidence.

DR. SIEMERS: [_Turning to the defendant._] In the case of Schmundt,

there is no indication?

RAEDER: No.

DR. SIEMERS: You do not know when it was written down?

RAEDER: No, I never heard when.

DR. SIEMERS: Did you ever see this document before this Trial?

RAEDER: No.

DR. SIEMERS: Does this document contain a correct reproduction in all

points of Hitler’s speech, or does what you said about the Hossbach

Document apply here also?

RAEDER: It applies even more here. In my opinion it is the most abstruse

document concerning a Hitler speech in existence, for a large part of

the statements in my opinion makes no sense whatsoever, as I have tried

to show. The adjutant stated that he was only paraphrasing.

DR. SIEMERS: This is on the first page in the center where it is

written, “Reproduced in Substance.”

Please explain to the Court what impression this speech made on you at

the time and why you believed, in spite of this speech, that Hitler was

not planning any war of aggression.

RAEDER: I should like to point out again here that the trial brief makes

the comment that consultation took place regarding the scale on which

the plan should be executed. Particularly in this case this does not at

all represent the character of the speech correctly. The meaning of the

whole first part of the speech, as I said, is extremely vague. Whereas

in the 1937 speech he gave 1943 to 1945 as the latest deadline and the

possibility of an earlier date under certain improbable circumstances,

here Hitler speaks of a solution as being possible in 15 to 20 years. He

says that Poland is always on the side of the enemy, in spite of the

treaty of friendship, that her secret intention is to take advantage of

any opportunity to act against us, and that he, therefore, wants to

attack Poland at the first opportunity. The Polish problem cannot be

separated from the conflict in the West, but a conflict in the West must

not be permitted to arise simultaneously. If it is uncertain as to

whether a war with the West will or will not take place in the wake of

the German-Polish conflict, then a line of battle first against England

and France is perhaps of greater importance. Then again, he says that we

cannot allow ourselves to be drawn into a war with England on account of

Poland, a war on two fronts such as the incapable men of 1914 had

brought about.

Then again, England—and that is comparatively new here—is the driving

force against Germany. We must prepare for a long war in addition to a

surprise attack, obviously against England. It is astonishing that we

were to endeavor, at the beginning of such a war, to strike a

destructive blow against England. The goal is to force England to her

knees. Then follows quite a new part...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the defendant appears to be reading from a

document an argument about this document. That is not giving evidence.

If he can tell us anything about what happened at this meeting, it is

open to him to do so.

DR. SIEMERS: He is repeating, with the aid of this document, the

involved thoughts which Hitler expressed at that time, and he is

pointing out the contradictions contained in Hitler’s speech at that

time.

THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of argument, to point out that there are

conflicts between one part of the document and another. That is not the

subject of evidence. He has already told us that Hitler’s speeches

generally were—that one speech generally contradicted another, but we

can see for ourselves from the document if one part of it conflicts with

another.

DR. SIEMERS: Is it not of importance, Mr. President, that the abstruse

statements of Hitler at that time had such an effect on the witness that

he says so and so many points are false? Then the whole tendency which

we read out of it cannot be true. As I understand the witness, Hitler

must have had mental reservations back of such conflicting remarks to

commanders. But I believe we can shorten this.

Herr Grossadmiral, according to the wish of the Court, just explain what

the effect was on you and what in your opinion were the special designs

connected with this document.

RAEDER: By contrasting these sentences, I wanted only to show how

muddled the speech was. At the end there is a second part in which a

number of doctrinaire, academic opinions on warfare are expressed and a

conclusion to the effect that it was also a wish of Hitler to have

formed in the OKW a research staff to work out all these plans for war

preparation, evaluation of individual weapons, _et cetera_, without the

participation of the general staffs, with which he did not like to

collaborate. He wanted these things to be in his own hands. Thus it was

the formation of a research staff which motivated this speech.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemens, I have already told you that the Tribunal

thinks that argument is not evidence. This seems to be purely argument

upon this document. If there is anything in the shape of recollection as

to what passed at this meeting, that would be evidence; but merely to

argue upon the document is not in evidence.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may the witness not say what effect Hitler’s

processes of thought had on him? The Prosecution say that Hitler and

Raeder entered upon a conspiracy together.

THE PRESIDENT: He can say he did not understand it or did not think it

was sincere.

DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I should like to point out that the

witness referred to this point because this is the only passage from

this document which the Prosecution have not read. In this document the

sentences about the research staff, as I noticed immediately, were not

read. This research staff was what Hitler wanted to obtain.

Herr Grossadmiral, after this speech, was anything changed in your

department?

RAEDER: No. The conclusion drawn was: First, that the ship construction

program was to be continued in the same way as in the past—so Hitler

himself said—and in the second place, he said that the armament

programs were to be geared for the year 1943-1944. That was the positive

thing which I could conclude for myself.

At that time, moreover, I was strongly impressed by the speech which

Hitler himself made at the launching of the battleship _Bismarck_ in

Hamburg. There he said that the Wehrmacht, as the keenest instrument of

war, had to protect and help to preserve the peace founded on true

justice. That made the greatest impression on me at that time with

regard to Hitler’s intentions.

DR. SIEMERS: Was the fleet at that time in a position to do this?

RAEDER: No. It was completely incapable.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, if there are any passages in this document

which have not been read and to which you attach importance, you may

read them now; and for the rest, all that the Tribunal thinks you ought

to do is to ask the defendant, what his recollection was or what

happened at that meeting, and if he can supplement the document as to

what happened at the meeting, he is entitled to do so. The Tribunal does

not intend to prevent your reading anything from the document which has

not yet been read nor from getting from the witness anything which he

says happened at the meeting.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I understood the witness to mean that he

recalled the research staff which the Prosecution had not mentioned.

Thus it came about that the witness, since he too knows the document, at

the same time pointed out that the research staff was also mentioned in

the document. I believe that can explain the misunderstanding. The

situation is clear to me, and perhaps I may read this sentence in that

connection.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

DR. SIEMERS: Under Number 3, toward the end of the Document L-79, it

says:

“To study weak points of the enemy.

“These studies must not be left to the general staffs. Secrecy

would no longer be guaranteed. The Führer has, therefore,

decided to order the formation of a small research staff within

the OKW composed of representatives of the three branches of the

Wehrmacht and, as occasion arises, the three

commanders-in-chief—that is to say, general staff chiefs.

“The staff shall keep the Führer constantly informed.

“The research staff shall undertake the planning of operations

from the theoretical side and the preparations which of

necessity arise therefrom...”

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. A passage is left out in the English

translation. The copy I have before me says, “These studies must not be

left to the general staffs; secrecy would no longer be guaranteed.” And

then it goes on, “This staff shall keep the Führer informed and shall

report to him.” I do not think it is very important. Go on.

DR. SIEMERS: Apparently the paragraph about the research staff in the

Armed Forces High Command was left out in the English. Continuing the

document:

“The purpose of certain regulations concerns no one outside the

staff; however great the increase in armament of our adversaries

may be, they must at some time come to the end of their

resources and ours will be greater. The French have 120,000 men

in each class! We shall not be forced into a war, but we shall

not be able to avoid one.”

This research staff, in effect, eliminated the commanders-in-chief and

that was what Hitler wanted to achieve.

If I am correctly informed, the rest has been read by the

Prosecution—namely, the subsequent aim and the principle, to be

specific, the well-known order to keep everything secret and, at the

end, that which the witness remembered, that the shipbuilding program

should not be changed and the armament program should be fixed for

1943-1944.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Had Hitler at this time intended a war of

aggression, would he have had to speed up any particular part of the

Navy’s armament?

RAEDER: Yes, indeed. He would have had to speed up all naval

construction.

DR. SIEMERS: Would not the construction of submarines especially have

had to be speeded up?

RAEDER: Yes, of course, particularly because they could be built most

quickly.

DR. SIEMERS: How many submarines did you have at this time?

RAEDER: I cannot say exactly. I think about 26.

DR. SIEMERS: If I remember rightly, Admiral Dönitz has already answered

that there were 15 capable of sailing in the Atlantic—by the way, there

were altogether 26.

RAEDER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, in the winter of 1938-1939, did you have a talk

with Sir Nevile Henderson on relations between Germany and England?

RAEDER: Yes, a very short talk at an evening reception in the Führer’s

house, where I stood near Ambassador Henderson and Herr Von Neurath, and

wherein the question was discussed—it was brought up by me—as to

whether England had not welcomed Germany’s offer to set the proportion

of strength at 1 to 4 and would not draw certain conclusions from this

reciprocal relationship. Ambassador Henderson answered, without anyone

else having brought up this question, “Yes, that would be shown in the

future when the colonial question was settled.” I later reported this

answer to the Führer in order to use it to maintain a friendly policy

toward England.

DR. SIEMERS: We are now at the summer of 1939. Admiral, in the course of

the summer, after the speech of 23 May 1939, did you talk to Hitler in

view of the generally known danger of war, and what did he tell you?

RAEDER: Whenever I talked to the Führer, I always brought up the

question of England, whereby I annoyed him to a certain extent. I tried

to convince him that it would be possible to carry out the peace policy

with England which he himself had urged at the beginning of his regime.

Then he always reassured me that it remained his intention to steer a

policy of peace with England, always leaving me in the belief that there

was no danger of a clash with England—in any case, that at this time

there was no such danger.

DR. SIEMERS: Now I come to the third key document—namely, Hitler’s

speech before the commanders-in-chief on 22 August 1939, at

Obersalzberg. There are two documents: Document 1014-PS and Document

798-PS. Document 1014-PS is Exhibit USA-30, in Raeder Document Book 10a,

Page 269; and Document 798-PS is Exhibit USA-29, in Document Book 10a,

Page 266. In regard to this Document 1014-PS, which I have here in the

original in the form submitted by the Prosecution, I should like to make

a formal request. This Number 1014-PS was read into the record in the

afternoon session of 26 November 1945 (Volume II, Page 286). I object to

the use of this document. I request that this document be stricken from

the trial record for the following reason...

THE PRESIDENT: What document are you speaking about now, 1014-PS?

DR. SIEMERS: In Raeder Document Book 10a, Page 269, Exhibit USA-30.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, what are your reasons?

DR. SIEMERS: The deficiencies which were already mentioned in the other

transcripts are much greater here. This document is nothing but two

pieces of paper headed “Second Speech by the Führer, on 22 August 1939.”

The original has no heading, has no file number, no diary number, and no

notice that it is secret; no signature, no date, no...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to look at the original. Yes, Dr.

Siemers.

DR. SIEMERS: It has no date, no signature—in the original in the

folder, it has no indication of where the document comes from. It is

headed “Second Speech...” although it is certain that on this date

Hitler made only one speech, and it is hardly 1½ pages long, although...

THE PRESIDENT: When you say it has no date, it is part of the document

itself which says that it is the second speech of the Führer on the 22d

of August 1939.

DR. SIEMERS: I said, Mr. President, it has a heading but no date.

THE PRESIDENT: But you said it has no date.

DR. SIEMERS: It has no date as to when these notes were put in writing.

It has only the date of when the speech is supposed to have been made.

On all documents which the Prosecution submitted, also in the case of

minutes, you will find the date of the session and the date on which the

minutes were set up; also the place where the minutes were set up, the

name of the person who set it up, an indication that it is secret or

something like that. Furthermore, it is certain that Hitler spoke for 2½

hours. I believe it is generally known that Hitler spoke very fast. It

is quite out of the question that the minutes could be 1½ pages long if

they are to give the meaning and the content, at least to some extent,

of a speech which lasted 2½ hours. It is important—I may then refer to

still another point. I will submit the original of Document 798-PS

afterwards. I am no expert on handwriting or typewriters, but I notice

that this document, which is also not signed, whose origin we do not

know, is written on the same paper with the same typewriter.

THE PRESIDENT: You say we do not know where it has come from—it is a

captured document covered by the affidavit which was made with reference

to all other captured documents.

DR. SIEMERS: Well, but I would be grateful to the Prosecution if, in the

case of such an important document, the Prosecution would be kind enough

in order to determine the actual historical facts to indicate more

exactly where it originates. Because it is not signed by Schmundt or

Hossbach or anyone and has no number, it is only loose pages.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether the Prosecution can do that, but it

seems to me to be rather late in the day to ask for it.

MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): Mr.

President, I do not know what the exact origin of this document is

offhand, but I expect that we could probably get some information before

the Tribunal if the Tribunal wishes us to do so. But as the President

pointed out, it is a captured document and everything that counsel says

about it seems to go to its weight rather than to its admissibility.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know where the document was

found, if that is possible.

MR. DODD: I will make an effort to find that out.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, Mr. Dodd just pointed out that my objection

comes rather late. I believe I recall correctly that repeated objections

were raised...

THE PRESIDENT: I think it was I who pointed it out, not Mr. Dodd.

DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. I believe I recall correctly that the Defense on

several occasions raised objection during the Prosecution’s case, and it

was said that all statements could be made during the Defense’s case at

a later time—namely, when it is the defense counsel’s turn to speak.

THE PRESIDENT: I only meant that it might not be possible at this stage

to find out exactly where the document came from, whereas, if the

question had been asked very much earlier in the Trial, it might have

been very much easier. That is all I meant. Have you anything more to

add upon why, in your opinion, this document should be stricken from the

record?

DR. SIEMERS: I should like to point out, Mr. President, that I do not do

it for formal reasons but rather for a very substantial reason. Most

important words in this document have constantly been repeated by the

Prosecution during these 5 or 6 months—namely, the words “Destruction

of Poland, main objective... Aim: elimination of vital forces, not

arrival at a certain line.” These words were not spoken, and such a war

aim the German commanders-in-chief would not have agreed to. For that

reason it is important to ascertain whether this document is genuine.

In this connection, may I remind the Court that there is a third version

of this speech as mentioned in this courtroom—namely, Document L-3,

which is even worse than these and which was published by the press of

the whole world. Wherever one spoke to anyone, this grotesque and brutal

speech was brought up. For that reason it is in the interest of

historical truth to ascertain whether Hitler spoke in this shocking way

at this time. Actually, I admit he used many expressions which were

severe, but he did not use such words, and this is of tremendous

significance for the reputation of all the commanders who were present.

Let me point out the next words. They say expressly, “close your hearts

against pity, brutal measures.” Such words were not used. I will be in a

position to prove this by another witness, Generaladmiral Böhm.

I therefore request the Court to decide on my request for striking this

document from the record. I should like to point out that the document

is mentioned in the record at many points. Should the honorable Court so

wish, I would have to look for all the points. I have found only four or

five in the German record. If necessary, I would give all the points in

the English record. It was submitted on 26 November 1945, afternoon

session (Volume II, Page 286).

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you need bother to do that. You are now

only upon the question of whether the document should be stricken from

the record. If it were to be stricken from the record, we could find out

where it is. Is that all you wish to say?

DR. SIEMERS: One question to Admiral Raeder.

The words which I just read, “brutal measures, elimination of vital

forces”—were these words used in Hitler’s speech at that time?

RAEDER: In my opinion, no. I believe that the version submitted by

Admiral Böhm, which he wrote down on the afternoon of the same day on

the basis of his notes, is the version nearest to the truth.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in order to achieve clarity on this

question, I submit as Exhibit Raeder-27, in Raeder Document Book 2, Page

144, an orderly reproduction of this speech.

RAEDER: May I also have Document Book 2?

DR. SIEMERS: This is the speech according to the manuscript of

Generaladmiral Hermann Böhm. Generaladmiral Böhm was present at Hitler’s

speech on 22 August 1939 at Obersalzberg. He made the notes during the

speech. He transcribed them in the present form on the same

evening—that is, on 22 August 1939—in the Vier Jahreszeiten Hotel in

Munich. I have certified the correctness of the copy. The original is in

the handwriting of Generaladmiral Böhm. Böhm has been called by me as a

witness for various other questions. He will confirm that the speech was

made in this form as I have submitted here. A comparison of the two

documents shows that all terms, such as “brutal measures,” are not

contained in this speech. It shows further...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Surely this part of Dr. Siemers’ argument must

go to weight. He has said that a comparison of the two documents shows

such and such. I have just looked at the end of Admiral Böhm’s affidavit

and it contains, I should argue, every vital thought that is contained

in Document 1014-PS. But whether it does or not, that is a matter of

weight, surely. We cannot, in my respectful submission, go into

intrinsic comparisons to decide the admissibility of the document. As I

say, on that I should have a great deal to say by comparing the

documents in detail. That is not before the Tribunal now.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Tribunal was only wanting to hear whatever Dr.

Siemers has got to say upon the subject.

DR. SIEMERS: A comparison of the document with Document 798-PS, in the

longer and better version, as the Prosecution submitted...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, as Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe has just pointed

out, a mere comparison of the documents—of the two or three documents

does not help us as to its admissibility. We know the facts about the

document. It is a document in German, captured among German documents.

DR. SIEMERS: I understand. I made the statement only in order to show

that I am not raising objections for formal reasons, but because the

thing is actually of great importance. In proof of my...

THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, you will be able to urge that when you make

your speech in criticism of the document as to its weight. You will be

able to point out that it does not bear comparison with a fuller

document taken down by Admiral Böhm or with the other document.

DR. SIEMERS: Absolutely right. To explain my formal request, I refer to

my statement on the formal character of the document which I submitted.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

The application to strike out Document 1014-PS is denied.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Has Counsel for the Prosecution understood that the

Tribunal wishes to have information as to where that document was found?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord; we will do our best to get it.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and also the other, Document 798-PS.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, if Your Lordship pleases.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I submitted Document Raeder-27, which is the Böhm

version, to you. You have read the speech in this version. Is this

reproduction correct on the whole, in your recollection?

RAEDER: Yes. In my opinion, this version is that one which corresponds

most closely to reality. I remember especially that Hitler devoted a

large portion of his remarks to the point that England and France would

not intervene, giving reasons why they would not. He mentioned a number

of reasons, and I missed just that portion, in its elaboration, in the

other reproductions of the speech.

DR. SIEMERS: In the version of the speech Document 798-PS or Exhibit

USA-29 it says verbatim: “I am only afraid that at the last moment some

swine will offer me some plan of arbitration.” Were those words used in

the speech at that time?

RAEDER: In my recollection, certainly not. The Führer was not accustomed

to using expressions like that in speeches which he made to the

generals.

DR. SIEMERS: On the other hand, the version put forth by Böhm shows that

Hitler had, by this time, decided to attack Poland. I am asking you to

give us briefly the impression, which the speech made on you at the

time. Tell me also why, despite this speech which even in this version

is severe, you retained your office as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

RAEDER: Without doubt, I had the impression that the situation was

serious and tremendously tense. The fact, however, that Hitler in his

speech put too great a stress on proving that France and England would

not intervene, and the second fact that Herr Von Ribbentrop, the Reich

Foreign Minister, left for Moscow on the same day to sign a pact there,

as we were told—these things filled not only me but all listeners as

well with the strong hope that here again was a case of a clever move by

Hitler, which in the end he would successfully solve in a peaceful way.

Therefore I saw no reason to resign my office at that moment. I would

have considered that pure desertion.

DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I would

like, because of their chronological correspondence, to submit the two

documents Exhibits Raeder-28 and 29, and I ask that the Tribunal only

take judicial notice without my making further reference to them.

The Prosecution have cited Document C-155 and have accused you, through

this document...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, of the documents to which Dr. Siemers

has just referred—Documents Raeder-28 and 29—the first is a memorandum

of General Gamelin and the second is a letter from General Weygand to

General Gamelin of 9 September 1939.

Your Lordship will remember that the Prosecution objected to these

documents as being irrelevant, and, My Lord, the Prosecution maintain

that objection.

I do not wish to interrupt Dr. Siemers’ examination any more than is

necessary. If at the moment he is merely asking the Tribunal to take

judicial notice of the documents and does not intend to use them, it

would probably be convenient—in order not to interrupt the

examination-in-chief—that I merely indicate formally that we are

maintaining our objection to the document. Of course, I am at the

disposal of the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Is this the position, that they were allowed to be

translated and put in the document book but that no further order of the

Tribunal has been given?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No further order has been given and therefore,

My Lord, it is still open to us to object, as I understand the position.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps we had better deal with it now, then.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.

DR. SIEMERS: May I make a few remarks on this point? I believe...

THE PRESIDENT: But we had better hear the objection first, had we not?

And then we will hear you afterwards.

DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Mr. President, as you wish. This is a purely formal

point. I believe that Sir David erred slightly in referring to Document

Raeder-28. There was no objection to this document by the Prosecution,

but only against Document Raeder-29.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My friend is quite right; we did not object to

the translation of 28. However, My Lord, it falls into the same category

as 29, and I would still raise an objection. I apologize to Your

Lordship if I conveyed the impression that we had made an objection

before.

My Lord, the Number 28 is a letter from General Gamelin to M. Daladier

on the 1st of September 1939, in which General Gamelin gives his views

as to the problem of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg and

contrasts that view with the view of the French Government.

Now, My Lord, I submit that that expression of opinion on the part of

General Gamelin is in itself intrinsically too remote from the issues of

this Trial to be of any relevance or probative value.

Then, apart from its intrinsic nature, the position is that this was a

document which, as I understand from Dr. Siemers’ verification on Page

158, is taken from the _White Book of the German Foreign Office_, from

the secret files of the French General Staff, which could not have been

captured until sometime after June 1940. Therefore, as a secondary

reason, it can have no relevance to any opinion formed by the Defendant

Raeder in September of 1939.

My Lord, the second document is, as I said to the Tribunal, a

letter to General Gamelin from General Weygand, who was then the

Commander-in-Chief of the French Army in the Levant. It describes a plan

which General Weygand had in mind with regard to possible operations in

Greece. Nothing came of these operations before June 1940 when an

armistice was made by Marshal Pétain on behalf of part of the French

people—although not, of course, of the whole—and it can have no

relevance to October 1940 when Greece was invaded by Italy, or to the

position at the end of 1940 and the beginning of 1941 when the invasion

of Greece begins to be considered in the German directives and

operational orders which have been put in before the Tribunal.

That is the first point. And the same secondary point applies, that it

was also a captured document which could not have been captured before

June 1940; therefore, it can have no relevance to this defendant’s state

of mind in August or September of 1939.

My Lord, as a matter of convenience, I have just made a list of the

documents to which objections will be made and, My Lord, there are one

or two additions which my French and Soviet colleagues have asked me to

make, and I will deal with them when they arise.

My Lord, I would just like the Tribunal to have in mind that there are

four geographical groups of documents as opposed to the groups under

which they are arranged here, which the Tribunal will have to consider.

One is formed by documents relating to the Low Countries, the second,

which is Group G on the list which I have just put before the Tribunal,

deals with Norway; a third deals with Greece, of which Document

Raeder-29 is an example; and a fourth is Group E in the list which I

have just put in, dealing with tentative proposals and suggestions made

by various military figures with regard to the oil field in the Caucasus

or operations on the Danube.

My Lord, the same objections which I have made particularly with regard

to Documents Raeder-28 and 29 will apply generally to these groups, and

I thought that I ought to draw the Tribunal’s attention to that fact. In

addition, my friend Colonel Pokrovsky has intimated to me some special

objections which we will have to certain documents on which he can

assist the Tribunal himself when they arise.

But, My Lord, I do take these specific cases, 28 and 29, as

objectionable in themselves, and I draw the Tribunal’s attention to the

fact that they are also typically objectionable as belonging to certain

groups.

The decision of the Tribunal, Your Lordship, is given in the morning

session of 2 May 1946. Your Lordship said, “The question of their

admissibility will be decided after they have been translated.”

M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): May

it please the Tribunal, I would ask the Tribunal for an opportunity to

associate myself publicly with the declaration just made by Sir David

and to propose a few examples which will show the degree of importance

which should be attached to the documents in question.

The Defense is asking that the Tribunal take into account a document

published in the German _White Book_ Number 5, under Number 8. This

document reports a statement by a French prisoner of war who is supposed

to have said that he had been in Belgium since 15 April. However, the

German _White Book_ gives neither the name of this prisoner nor any

indication of his unit. We have none of the information which we need in

order to judge whether the statement is relevant. We are therefore faced

with a document which is not authentic and which has no value as

evidence.

The Defense is asking that Document Raeder-102 of the same document book

be admitted by the Tribunal. I ask the Tribunal to let me make a few

observations to show the one-sided manner in which these documents have

been assembled by the German authorities in the _White Book_.

I would say, first of all, that this Document Raeder-102 has not been

quoted at length. The French Delegation has referred to the text of the

German _White Book_. We have read it carefully. This document is only a

preparatory order in view of defensive preparations organized by the

Belgians on the French-Belgian frontier facing France. We have consulted

the Belgian military authorities. This order was a manifestation of the

Belgian Government’s determination to defend Belgium’s neutrality on all

its frontiers.

It is therefore contrary to the truth to try to prove by means of this

document the existence of staff contacts between Brussels, London, and

Paris, which, if they had existed, would have been contrary to the

policy of neutrality.

The commentary made by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs in the

introduction to the German _White Book_, Page 11 of the French text,

took the counsel by surprise and certainly did not mislead Admiral

Raeder, who is a serviceman. In fact, it is at the price of a lie that

the official commentator affirms, on the one hand, that the expression

“les forces amies” (friendly forces) used in this document means French

and British troops, whereas in reality it is a regular expression used

in the Belgian Army to describe Belgian units in the immediate vicinity

of those actually fighting. On the other hand, the German commentator

claims, and I quote, “The general line Tournai-Antoing, of the canal

from Mons to Condé, Saint Ghislain and Binche, is partly in Belgian and

partly in French territory.” It is sufficient to look at a map to see

that all those localities are in Belgian territory and they are all at

least some dozens of kilometers distant from the French-Belgian

frontier, and in places, 60 kilometers from the French frontier.

I ask the Tribunal to excuse this interruption. I thought it was

advisable to enlighten them by giving a convincing example of the value

of the evidence furnished by the German _White Book_.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks the most convenient

course would be to hear your argument now upon these documents, not only

upon 28 to 29, but upon the other documents specified in Sir David

Maxwell-Fyfe’s list, and then the Tribunal would consider these

documents after the adjournment and would give its decision tomorrow

morning.

DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I should be very grateful if it

would be possible to proceed in a somewhat different manner. I should

like to call attention to the fact that a rather lengthy debate

regarding documents has already taken place, and the decision of the

Court followed. I believe that if I comment upon all the documents at

this point a great deal of time will be lost, since the coherence of the

documents will emerge of itself later during my presentation of

evidence. If I now deal with the list submitted by Sir David, I would,

in order to show my reasons, have to set forth all that which will

appear again in the regular course of testimony later on. I thought that

the decision of the Tribunal first to present the documents in the

document book was specifically to save time, and then objections could

be made one by one as individual documents are presented.

THE PRESIDENT: I know; but there are a very great number of documents.

The Tribunal will have to hear an argument upon each document if we do

what you suggest, reading the list of Sir David. There are 30 or 40

documents, I suppose.

DR. SIEMERS: Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe has already stated that he will be

guided according to different geographical groups. Therefore, there will

not be objections with regard to each document but rather with regard to

each group of documents and each group of questions—for instance, an

objection in the Norway case against all Norwegian documents or in the

Greek case against all Greek documents. It would be easier to deal with

matters that way, since in my testimony I shall be dealing with Greece

and Norway anyway, whereas if I do so now I shall have to say everything

twice. But I shall of course be guided by the decision of the honorable

Tribunal. I only fear that an unnecessary amount of time will be lost

that way.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I only want to say one word on

procedure. I did hope that Dr. Siemers and I had already occupied

sufficient of the Tribunal’s time in arguing this point because, of

course, the arguments as to relevancy must be the same. Whether they are

so obviously irrelevant as not to be translatable, or whether they are

inadmissible, at any rate my arguments were the same, and I did not

intend to repeat the argument which I had made before the Tribunal.

Dr. Siemers already assisted the Tribunal for an hour and a half on this

point, which we discussed before, and I hoped that if I stated as I did

state that I have maintained the points which I put before the Tribunal

in my previous argument, that Dr. Siemers might be able on this occasion

to shorten matters and to say that he relied on the—if I may say

so—very full argument which the Tribunal had on the other occasion.

That is why I thought it might be convenient if we dealt with them now

and put this problem out of the need for further consideration.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks that you must argue

these questions now, and it hopes that you will argue them shortly, as

your arguments have already been heard in favor of them. But we think

that you must argue them now and not argue each individual document as

it comes up, and it will consider the matter. It already has these

documents, but it will consider the matter again and decide the matter

tonight.

COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): My

Lord, inasmuch as the Tribunal decided to have Dr. Siemers argue the

point which was expressed by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe and other

prosecutors, I think it is my duty to name three documents to which our

Prosecution object.

The Soviet Prosecution would like to object altogether to five

documents. Two of them—I have in mind Documents Raeder-70 and 88—have

already been included by my friend Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe in the list

which has been given to the Tribunal. So all I have to do now is to name

the three remaining numbers, so that Dr. Siemers would have it easier in

answering all together. I name Documents Raeder-13, 27, and 83.

Document Raeder-13 is a record of a report of Captain Lohmann. There is

an idea expressed in this report which I cannot call other than a mad

and propagandist idea of a typical Nazi. The idea is that the aim of the

Red Army is world revolution, and that the Red Army is really trying to

incite world revolution. I consider that it would not be proper if such

nightmares and politically harmful ideas were reflected in the documents

which are to be admitted by the Tribunal.

My second objection is in connection with the Document Raeder-27. This

is a record which was made by a voluntary reporter, Böhm, of an address

of Hitler’s at Obersalzberg. The Tribunal already rejected Dr. Siemers’

application to include two documents pertaining to the same questions

and emphasized the fact that the Tribunal does not wish to compare the

authenticity of different documents pertaining to or dealing with the

same question.

I consider that inasmuch as the Tribunal already has at its disposal

among documents which were admitted two records dealing with Hitler’s

address at Obersalzberg, therefore, there is no necessity to admit the

third record of his speech, especially since in this third version there

are altogether shameless, slanderous, and calumnious remarks against the

Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and the leaders of the Soviet

Government. Neither the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union nor we as

representatives of the Soviet State would ever agree to have such

remarks included in the record.

The third document is Document Raeder-83. Document 83 is an excerpt from

the German _White Book_. Since the authenticity of this _White Book_ has

already been questioned by Dr. Dubost, I consider it material which

cannot be relied upon, and in particular with regard to the Document

Raeder-83. There are several remarks, harmful to the Soviet Union, which

have absolutely no political basis—that is, the passage pertaining to

the relations between the Soviet Union and Finland. So on the grounds of

such general political motives, I would ask the High Tribunal to exclude

as evidence Document Raeder-83 from the list of documents which were

presented to the Tribunal by Defense Counsel Siemers. Furthermore,

strictly speaking, it is absolutely clear that this document is

irrelevant. That is all I want to say.

DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I note to my regret that we are

back at the beginning again in our debate about documents; for we are

disputing about documents now which were not mentioned at all in the

original debate concerning documents, which took place on 1 May. I had

believed, however, that I could rely on this one principle, that at

least those documents which at that time were not objected to would be

considered granted. Now, however, I find that those documents which were

not discussed at that time at all are under dispute. It is extremely

difficult...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks you are entirely in

error in that, because it is obvious that a document which has not been

translated cannot be finally passed on by the Prosecution or by the

Tribunal, and the fact that the Prosecution does not object to it at

that stage does not prevent it from objecting at a later stage when it

has been translated.

DR. SIEMERS: There were some documents to which I was told that the

Prosecution did not object, and with regard to them I believed at any

rate that that was final, just as with reference to some documents...

THE PRESIDENT: I thought I had made myself clear. What I said was this:

The Prosecution in objecting or not objecting to a document before it is

translated does not in any way bind them not to object to it after it is

translated. Is that clear?

DR. SIEMERS: Then I shall take these documents one by one. First of all,

I would like to start with those documents which Colonel Pokrovsky...

THE PRESIDENT: No, no, Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal will not listen to

these documents taken one by one. If they can be treated in groups they

must be treated in groups. They have been treated in groups by Sir

David, and I am not saying you must adhere exactly to the same groups,

that the Tribunal is not proposing to hear each document one by one.

DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. Then it is a misunderstanding. I wanted

to discuss those documents at the beginning, because there are some

things which are not clear and which were objected to by Colonel

Pokrovsky. I did not realize that Colonel Pokrovsky mentioned the

documents in groups. I believe he mentioned five documents—three of

them individually—and I believe that, though I have not understood

everything, I can deal with these individually mentioned documents one

by one. However, I shall be glad to start with the group laid down by

Sir David if that is to be dealt with first. Shall I first...

THE PRESIDENT: When you said you were going to deal with the documents

one by one, you meant all the documents one by one? I am not suggesting

that you...

DR. SIEMERS: No, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: You can deal with Colonel Pokrovsky first if you like.

DR. SIEMERS: Colonel Pokrovsky has as his first objection Document

Raeder-13. This deals with a document dated 1935. Certainly Colonel

Pokrovsky can offer some objection to the contents of this document, but

how a document can be classed as irrelevant just because a certain

sentence allegedly contains propaganda is not quite clear to me. I

believe I could find sentences in other documents which have been

submitted during these past 6 months which might be interpreted in some

way as propaganda. I cannot quite imagine that that is an objection, and

I would like to remind the Tribunal that right at the beginning of the

proceedings, when we were dealing with Austria, the Tribunal rejected an

objection made by the Defense regarding a letter. The Defense objected

because the author of the letter was available as a witness. Thereupon,

the Tribunal, and justly so, decided that the letter was evidence. The

only matter for debate is the probative value. The Tribunal admitted

this document. And in connection with this I should like to mention that

a lecture at a university which is set down in writing is a document.

The lecture deals with the naval agreement, and I believe that therewith

the relevancy...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, have you not made your point on Number 13?

You said the majority of the thing is clearly relevant, though there is

one sentence which may be alleged to be propaganda, and, therefore, the

document ought not be struck out. Is that not your point?

DR. SIEMERS: No, I am saying that it is a document which has a bearing

on the evidence used in this Trial, and the Soviet Prosecution cannot

dispute it because it was a lecture given in 1935. I cannot at all

understand the use of the word “propaganda” by Colonel Pokrovsky in

connection with this document.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I do not understand what you say in the least. I

thought I put the point you had made. I thought you made it clear that

the document in itself was relevant and could not be rejected because it

contained one sentence which was alleged propaganda. That is your point,

and I shall want it stated in one or two sentences, and the Tribunal

will consider it. I do not see why the time of the Tribunal should be

taken up with a long argument about something else.

DR. SIEMERS: Colonel Pokrovsky secondly, if I understood the

interpreter, objected to Document Number Raeder-27. In this instance we

are concerned with the speech of Hitler at Obersalzberg on 22 August

1932. It is Exhibit Raeder-27. It is very hard for me to comment on this

document since I do not understand the objections of Colonel Pokrovsky.

It deals...

THE PRESIDENT: The objection was that there was no necessity for a third

record of the speech. There were two records which you objected to, and

he said there was no necessity for a third.

DR. SIEMERS: I would like to add to that then, Your Honor, that the

Soviet Delegation does not agree with the Delegation of the United

States. In the record at that time the representative of the American

Delegation said that if any one had a better version of that speech, he

should present it. Therefore, I agree with the opinion of the American

Prosecution and I believe, aside from that, that not a word about the

relevancy of a speech which was made shortly before the outbreak of the

war is necessary.

Document Raeder-83 is the third document objected to by Colonel

Pokrovsky. This contains the sixth session of the Supreme Council on 28

March 1940, the drafting of a resolution with the heading “Strictly

Secret.” In this document the Supreme Council—that is, the constituents

of the Allied leadership—agreed that the French and British Governments

on Monday, 1 April, would tender a note to the Norwegian and Swedish

Governments. The contents of this note is then given, and there is a

reference to the point of view of vital interests, and it says there

then the position of the neutrals would be considered by the Allies as

one contrary to their vital interests, and that it would evoke an

appropriate reaction.

Under Figure 1c of this document, it says:

“Any attempt by the Soviet Union which aimed at obtaining from

Norway a position on the Atlantic Coast would be contrary to the

vital interests of the Allies and would provoke the appropriate

reaction.”

THE PRESIDENT: You do not need to read the document, do you? I mean you

can tell us what the substance of it is. It appears to be an objection

to any further attack upon Finland, which would be considered by the

Allies to be contrary to their vital interests. That is all.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, just this expression “vital interests” is

the decisive one. I do not wish, as the Prosecution always seem to

think, to bring up some sort of objection from the point of view of _tu

quoque_. I want to show only what the situation was according to

international law, and that at the same time when Admiral Raeder was

entertaining certain thoughts regarding Norway, Greece, and so forth,

the Allied agencies had the same thoughts and were basing these thoughts

on the same concept of international law which, as I recently said, was

upheld by Kellogg—namely that the right of self-preservation still

exists. Now I can prove my point through these documents.

THE PRESIDENT: The point made against you by Sir David was that the

document could not have come into the hands of the German authorities

until after the fall of France.

DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall deal with the groupings designated by Sir

David.

Sir David made certain fundamental statements. Regarding Document

Numbers Raeder-28 and 29, he pointed out specifically that in one case

they were the thoughts of General Gamelin and in the other case those of

General Weygand, and that these ideas were not known to the Germans at

that time since these documents were not yet in our hands. The latter

point is correct. The concept and the plan of occupying Greece, of

destroying Romanian oil wells, those thoughts were known to the

Germans—namely, through their intelligence service. The Prosecution did

not present the data of the German High Command which show these

reports. Since I do not have these documents, I believe it would be just

if I am given the possibility of presenting the actual facts which were

known to Germany and in this way prove them. I have no other proofs.

That it is agreeable to the Prosecution to deprive me of the documents

which I need for the defense, I can understand; but the Prosecution must

also understand the fact that I consider it important that those

documents which are definite proof of certain plans remain at my

disposal.

The charge has been made against Admiral Raeder that it was an

aggressive war—a criminal war of aggression—to formulate plans for the

occupation of Greece. Document Raeder-29 shows that General Weygand and

General Gamelin on 9 September 1939 concern themselves with planning the

occupation of neutral Salonika. So if this is the case, I cannot

understand how one can point an accusing finger at Admiral Raeder, on

the German side, for having concerned himself with such plans a year and

half later. I believe, therefore, that these and similar documents must

be granted me, for only from them can the military planning and the

value of the military planning, or the objectionable side—that is the

criminal side of the planning, be understood. The strategic thinking of

the defendant can be understood only if one knows approximately what

strategic thinking prevailed at the same time with the enemy. The

strategic reasoning of Admiral Raeder was shut up in an airtight

compartment but depended on the reports received about the strategic

planning of the opposition. It is a reciprocal activity. This reciprocal

activity is necessary for an understanding. Therefore, in view of this

very essential point, I ask to be granted this kind of document since,

as I have recently stated, I do not know how I can carry on my defense

at all in the face of these grave accusations regarding Greece and

Norway if all of my documents are stricken. I believe that I am

understood correctly when I do not assert that we were cognizant of

these documents. But Germany knew the contents of these documents, and I

believe that is sufficient.

May it please the Tribunal, we are once again at Document Raeder-66 in

Group A. This Document Raeder-66 is the opinion of Dr. Mosler, an expert

in international law, about the Norwegian operation as judged from the

standpoint of international law.

Since we are always talking about saving time in this courtroom, I would

have my doubts about rejecting this article, for a refusal would force

me to set forth the trend of thought point by point in detail, and I

believe that it is much easier for the Tribunal, for the Prosecution and

for me, if I submit general legal arguments in this connection.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, this is a document which is a matter of

legal argument. If the Tribunal thinks it would be of any assistance to

have the argument in documentary form, I willingly withdraw my objection

to that. That is on quite a different project than the other one, and I

want to help in any way I can.

While I am before the microphone: I did mention that there were two

other documents that fall into the same group. Document Raeder-34 falls

into Group B, and Document Raeder-48 into the Group E.

My Lord, I did mention 28 when I was addressing the Tribunal.

DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I do not wish to dispute

Document Raeder-66, I have really done this just to ease the situation

for everyone. The additional documents in this group are Raeder-101 to

107. I cannot say that this is a homogeneous group. One document deals

with Norway, another deals with Belgium, a third deals with the Danube.

The unity of this group escapes me. Basically these documents have this

point in common: that, as I have already stated, a plan existed in the

Allied General Staff, as well as in the German, and all were based on

the tenet of international law regarding the right of self-preservation

and vital interests.

In order to be brief at this point I should like to refer to Document

Raeder-66 particularly, and to save time I ask that the quotations from

this document be considered the basis for my remarks today on the right

of self-preservation. I am referring to the quotations on Page 3 and

Page 4 of this expert opinion. The legal situation is made very clear

therein, and it is set forth very clearly in this expert opinion that,

with regard to the question of the occupation of Norway, we are not

concerned with whether the Allies had actually landed in Norway but only

whether such a plan existed, that we are not concerned with the fact

whether Norway agreed or did not agree. The danger of a change of

neutrality according to international law gives one the right to use

some compensating measure or to attack on one’s own accord; and this

basic tenet has been maintained in the entire literature which is quoted

in this document, and to which I shall refer later in my defense speech.

Out of group 101 to 107, I have to mention Document Raeder-107

especially. Document Raeder-107 is not concerned at all with the _White

Books_ as the other documents are. 107 is an affidavit by Schreiber.

Schreiber was naval attaché at Oslo from October 1939 onward. From the

beginning I have said that I needed Schreiber as a witness. In the

meantime, I dispensed with Schreiber because even though we tried for

weeks, we could not find him. I discussed this matter with Sir David and

with Colonel Phillimore. I was advised that there would be no objection

on this formal point since Schreiber suddenly and of his own accord

reappeared again.

If, as the Prosecution wish, this piece of evidence is taken from

me—namely, the affidavit of Schreiber about the reports which Admiral

Raeder received from Oslo and, in addition to that, the documents from

which the authenticity of these reports may be shown—then I have no

evidence for this entire question at all. Besides, Schreiber was in Oslo

during the occupation and he has commented in his affidavit with regard

to the behavior of the Navy and the efforts of Admiral Raeder in

connection with the regrettable civil administration of Terboven.

Therefore, I am asking the High Tribunal to grant this affidavit to me

or to grant Schreiber as a witness so that he can testify personally.

This latter course, however, would take up more time. I have limited my

evidence through witnesses to such a degree that I believe that, in view

of the entire span of 15 years with which we are dealing, in the case of

the Defendant Raeder at least, such an affidavit should be granted me.

With regard to Group B, I should like to refer to the remarks which I

have already made. As far as I can see, the group seems to be thoroughly

heterogeneous, but I believe they are all documents taken from the

_White Book_. The same ideas should be applied which I have recently

expressed to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: I think Sir David recognized that there was a certain

degree of lack of identity in these groups, but he suggested that they

all fall into geographical groups: one group, the Low Countries; one

group, Norway; one group, Greece; and one group, the Caucasus and the

Danube—which agrees with “E.” That is what he said. Could you not deal

with them in those geographical groups?

DR. SIEMERS: Very well.

I have already talked about Norway and in that connection I therefore

refer to the remarks I have already made. I have already briefly

mentioned Greece. I would like to say that there was a double accusation

made: One, that neutral ships were sunk—namely, neutral Greek ships,

and secondly, the accusation of an aggressive war against Greece—that

is, the occupation of all Greece.

With regard to the last point, I have already made a few statements.

Dealing with the Greek merchantmen I would like to say only that in this

case the action and attitude of the defendant appears justified in that

he received reports which coincided with the documents which were found

a month later in France. The same reports were received by Raeder when

he expressed his views to Hitler. I would like to prove that these

reports which came to him through the intelligence service were not

invented by the intelligence service but were actual facts. The same

applies to the oil regions. Plans existed to destroy the Romanian oil

wells and furthermore there was a plan to destroy the Caucasian oil

wells; both had the object of hurting the enemy; in the one case Germany

alone—as far as Romania was concerned—and in the second case Germany

and Russia, because at that time Russia was on friendly terms with

Germany.

These plans are—and this is shown by the documents—in the same form as

all other documents presented by the Prosecution. These documents as

well, in their entirety, are “top secret,” “personal,” “confidential.”

Just as the Prosecution have always said, “Why did you do everything

secretly? That is suspicious.” These documents contain ideas based on

strategic planning just as do the documents presented by the

Prosecution. That is something which arises from the nature of war and

which is not meant to be an accusation on my part, nor should it be

construed as an accusation against Admiral Raeder by the Prosecution.

Then the group of Ribbentrop documents follows. I can say only what I

said recently. And as I glance at it cursorily now, the documents in the

Ribbentrop document book are not as complete as they are here.

Therefore, I believe it is important to take the documents and to

investigate their complete content from the point of view of Raeder

rather than the point of view of Ribbentrop. That perhaps may have taken

place, as the High Tribunal suggested the other day. Then I believe,

however, it is not an objection which can be used by the Prosecution to

say that in the case of Ribbentrop they were partially admitted and

partially rejected. For some documents which were granted Ribbentrop

were refused me.

Then we turn to Group “E,” and that is _tu quoque_. I believe I have

already spoken sufficiently on that point just recently. I dispute it

again and I cannot understand why the Prosecution will not agree with me

on that. I do not wish to object. I am not saying _tu quoque_; I am only

saying that there is strategic planning which is carried on in every

army and there are tenets in international law which applied to the

Allies exactly in the same way as to us, and I beg to be granted these

possibilities of comparison in foreign politics.

I believe herewith that I have dealt with all points so far as it is

possible for me to define my position in such a brief period of time

with regard to about 50 documents, and I am asking the High Tribunal not

to make my work more difficult by refusing these documents to me.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will carefully consider these documents and

your arguments.

The Tribunal will now adjourn.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 17 May 1946, at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SECOND DAY

Friday, 17 May 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have given careful and prolonged attention

to the consideration of the documents offered by Dr. Siemers on behalf

of the Defendant Raeder; and they, therefore, do not wish the documents

which they propose to admit to be read because they have already read

them all.

I will now deal with the documents individually.

Document 66 is admitted for the purposes of argument, and not as

evidence; Document 101 is denied; Documents 102 to 105 are admitted;

Document 106 is denied; Document 107 is admitted; Document 39 is denied;

Document 63 is admitted; Document 64 is denied; Document 99 is denied;

Document 100 is admitted; Documents 102 to 107 are admitted; Document 38

is denied; Document 50 is denied; Document 55 is denied; Document 58 is

denied; Documents 29, 56, 57, 60, and 62 are denied. I should have

included in that group Document 28, which is also denied. Documents 31,

32, 36, 37, and 39 are denied; Document 41 is admitted; Document 99 has

already been denied, and Document 101 has already been denied; Document

59 is admitted; Document 68 is denied; Document 70 is denied; Document

72 is denied; Document 74 is denied; Document 75 is admitted; Document

77 is admitted; Document 79 is admitted; Document 80 is admitted;

Document 84 is admitted; Document 85, which is on Page 82 of Volume V,

is admitted; Document 87 is denied; Document 88 is admitted; Document 91

is admitted; Document 13 is admitted; Document 27 is admitted.

The Prosecution may, if they wish it, apply to cross-examine the witness

who made that document.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): That is

Admiral Böhm.

THE PRESIDENT: Admiral Böhm, yes.

Document 83 is admitted; Document 34 is admitted; Document 48 is denied.

Have I gone too quickly for you, Dr. Siemers? You have the last few?

DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I heard everything.

MR. DODD: Mr. President, yesterday afternoon the Tribunal asked that we

ascertain the origins, if possible, of Document 1014-PS. Some question

was raised about it by Dr. Siemers. It is Exhibit USA-30.

I have had a search made, and I have some information that we are

prepared to submit concerning this document. I should like to point out

that 1014-PS and 798-PS and L-3 are documents all concerning this same

speech made at Obersalzberg on 22 August 1939. They were offered in

evidence by Mr. Alderman of the American staff on the 26th day of

November 1945.

I should like to point out that L-3, to which Dr. Siemers made reference

yesterday, was offered only for identification, as the record shows for

the proceedings of that day on the 26th of November, and has received

the mark Exhibit Number USA-28 for identification only. Mr. Alderman

pointed out, as appears in the record, that he was not offering it in

evidence, that it was a paper which came into our hands originally

through the services of a newspaperman, and that later on the Documents

798-PS and 1014-PS were found among captured documents. They referred to

the same speech in Obersalzberg. Mr. Alderman offered these two at that

time.

Now Document 798-PS, Exhibit Number USA-29, and Document 1014-PS,

Exhibit Number USA-30, were both found by the forces of the United

States in this fashion:

They had been taken from the OKW headquarters in Berlin, and in the

course of various journeys in those days they finally arrived at one

place and were stored, it now appears, at various places by the OKW

under the control of a General Winter of the German forces; and they

were transported in three railway trains to Saalfelden in the Austrian

Tyrol. Subsequently, General Winter ordered that all documents in his

possession be turned over to the Allied forces and they were. These

particular documents, together with some other papers, were turned over

by General Winter and members of his staff at that time; and on the 21st

day of May 1945, they were removed from Saalfelden where they were under

the control of General Winter and taken to the Third U.S. Army Document

Center at Munich. While at Munich they were sorted and cataloged by

Department G-2 Supreme Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Force

with the assistance of clerks from the OKW and OKH. On the 16th of June

1945 these documents, together with others, were removed on six trucks

from the headquarters of the Third Army at Munich and were taken to the

U.S. Group Control Council Number 32 at Seckenheim, Germany, which was

located in the former offices of the I.G. Farben Company, and were

placed on shelves on the third floor of the building and kept under

guard. Between the 16th of June 1945 and the 30th of August 1945, the

task of collecting, sorting, assembling and cataloging these documents

was carried out under the supervision of the British Colonel Austin,

with personnel of the Supreme Headquarters and the G-2 Document Center

of the G-2 Operational Intelligence Section, 6889 Berlin Document

Section, and the British Enemy Document Unit, and the British Military

Intelligence Research Section. Beginning on the 5th day of July 1945,

and continuing until the 30th of August 1945, these documents were

screened at that place by members of the staff of the United States

Chief Counsel. Lieutenant Margolies, who is here in the courtroom and a

member of our staff, personally picked these documents out of your file

798-PS and 1014-PS from the OKW captured files, brought them to

Nuremberg, and lodged them in the document room where they have been

kept under strict security ever since.

Now, that is the history of these two documents about which Dr. Siemers

raised some question yesterday—a considerable question I might say—and

inferred there was something strange about their contents. I think the

story which I have given in the form of a statement over the signature

of Lieutenant Commander Hopper clearly establishes the source and where

they have been ever since; and I think it is only fair to say that,

since Dr. Siemers saw fit to point out that this language sounded

extremely harsh and was attributed to Hitler, these documents were

offered to show these people were actually talking about aggressive war.

The reading of the three documents by the Tribunal will clearly show

they are all in agreement in substance; of course, there are differences

in phraseology, but the important thing and purpose for which they were

offered was to show that these people were talking aggressive war. I

might say I am not surprised to find my friend is sensitive about the

remark, but I think the unanswered proof in the case thus far shows that

not only were these things said but they were done.

M. DUBOST: May it please the Court. No doubt it is a mistake in

translation. We understood 106 had been rejected the first time and

admitted the second time in the Group 102 to 107.

THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid it was my mistake. I did say that the Group

102 to 107 were admitted; but I have also said 106 was rejected, and it

is rejected. It is entirely my mistake. 106 is rejected.

M. DUBOST: 106 is thrown out and 102 to 107 are also rejected, are they?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I will state the exact numbers: 102, 103, 104, 105,

and 107 are admitted.

M. DUBOST: Very good. Mr. President, we want to offer further

explanations on 102 to 107 during the course of the proceedings.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I say a few words concerning the

statement made by Mr. Dodd?

I had no doubts, and I certainly have no doubt now, that since these

documents were found they have been handled very correctly and Mr. Dodd

spoke only about that. I believe it is important to establish: Whether

one can determine the connection these documents had with other

documents, because in that way one can see whether these were documents

belonging to a certain adjutant. For instance, were they together with

the Hossbach papers or together with the Schmundt file? If, for

instance, the documents were with the Schmundt documents it is probable

that they belonged to the adjutant.

THE PRESIDENT: That all goes to the weight of the document, does it not?

No doubt, a document which is signed has more weight than a document

which is not signed. All those matters the Tribunal will take into

account when considering the documents, but the admissibility of the

document depends upon its being a German document found and captured.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I wanted to say this only because it is

unpleasant to have the American Delegation misunderstand my motion

concerning the document. I make no charges concerning the manner in

which the document was found, I merely say that it is undecided among

which papers it was found. It came to my attention that Mr. Dodd treated

the three documents concerned in quite the same way, whereas Mr.

Alderman on Page 188 of the record (Volume II, Page 286), states that

one of these three documents, L-3, was evidently not in order because of

its doubtful origin. And therefore he withdrew the document.

May I then, if it please the Court, continue with the examination of the

Defendant Raeder?

[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, we have a few final questions

concerning the conspiracy. I believe it will not take much time. I ask

you to look at the Document C-155. That is Exhibit GB-214, in Document

Book 10, Page 24—Document Book 10 of the British Delegation, Page 24.

It is your letter of 11 June 1940, which was sent to 74 Navy offices and

which the Prosecution has called a letter of justification. The

Prosecution wants to deduce from this that you knew that a war was to be

expected as early as the summer of 1939. I should like you to answer

this charge very briefly.

RAEDER: There is manifold proof to show that I was not expecting a war

in the fall at all, and in view of the small extent of rearmament of the

German Navy this was quite natural. I have stated quite clearly in my

speech before the U-boat officers in Swinemünde that we could not count

on it.

DR. SIEMERS: And what was the reason for that letter, C-155?

RAEDER: The reason was that a number of torpedo boats had misfired and

this could be traced to the fact that torpedoes had not yet been as

perfectly developed as they should have been at the beginning of a war.

An additional reason was that, now that the war had so suddenly broken

out, many officers believed that it would have been better to have

developed the submarine weapon as much as possible first, so that at

least this weapon would be ready in large numbers in the event of a war.

I objected to that opinion precisely because such a war was not to be

expected. And on Page 6, 8th paragraph, I emphasize again—in the second

line—that the Führer hoped until the end to postpone the imminent

dispute with England until 1944 or 1945. I am speaking here of an

imminent dispute. An imminent dispute is not exactly something to strive

for, it is rather to be feared.

DR. SIEMERS: There is another key document, that is, Document 789-PS,

Exhibit USA-23, the very long speech made by Hitler on 23 November 1939

before the commanders-in-chief.

The document, Mr. President, is in Document Book 10a on Page 261. This

is again a Hitler speech where there is no indication of who recorded

it. Signature and date are missing.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Since this is similar to the other

documents I do not have to question you on that point. I would merely

like to know, Admiral, did that speech also betray a definite

background, a certain mental reservation on the part of Hitler?

RAEDER: Yes. There was at that time a rather severe conflict between

Hitler and the commanders-in-chief of the Army, and also a difference of

opinion with the leading generals concerning the offensive in the West.

The Führer assembled all the leaders in order to give them his opinion

about this whole matter. He stated—and I was present myself—that up to

that time he had always been right in his decisions and that he would

also be right in the opinion that the western offensive had to be

undertaken in the fall if possible. Toward the end he used very harsh

words; in the third from the last paragraph of the document he states:

“I shall not be afraid of anything and I shall destroy everyone who is

against me.” That was directed against the generals. Actually the

western offensive did not take place until the spring because the

weather conditions delayed them.

DR. SIEMERS: We have heard details of that during previous proceedings,

and I believe we do not have to go into that now. In this connection we

come to the last document, that is C-126, which you also have in front

of you, GB-45. It is in Document Book 10a on Page 92.

With regard to the preparation of the war against Poland, the

Prosecution has submitted this document of the High Command of the Armed

Forces dated 22 June 1939 and signed by Keitel, because that document

contained a timetable for “Case White”; that is, the case of Poland. Did

that document or that directive indicate to you a definite aggressive

intention?

RAEDER: No. Not a definite intention of aggression at all. In all cases

certain long-range questions had to be cleared up, such as, for

instance, whether our training ships which used to put to sea in summer

should leave, or whether they should wait. This decision, however, was

only to be made in the beginning of August. In connection with that

order I issued the order of 2 August also pertaining to that document,

to the individual higher Naval offices, namely, an operational directive

for the use of Atlantic submarines in the Case White. May I be permitted

to read the first lines, because the wording is important:

“Attached is an operational directive for the employment of

U-boats which are to be sent out into the Atlantic by the way of

precaution in the event that the intention to carry out Case

White should remain unchanged. F.d.U. (Commander of the U-boat

fleet) is to hand in his operation orders to SKL by 12 August.

The decision regarding the sailing of U-boats for the Atlantic

will probably be made before the middle of August.

“If the operations are not carried out, this directive must be

destroyed by 1 October 1939 at the latest.” (Document C-126,

Exhibit GB-45)

Thus it was not definite that such operations would take place. It was

rather a precautionary measure which had to be taken under all

circumstances in connection with the Case White.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have said that Hitler assured you repeatedly,

particularly when you spoke to him personally, that there would not be a

war?

RAEDER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Particularly there would be no war against England?

RAEDER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Now, then, on 3 September 1939 war did start with England.

In connection with this did you speak to Hitler about that question—and

if so, when?

RAEDER: On the 3 September in the morning, I believe between 10 and 11

o’clock—I cannot remember the exact hour—I was called into the Reich

Chancellery. The SKL had already informed me that the ultimatum had been

received from England and France. I came into the study of the Führer

where a number of persons were assembled. I only remember that Deputy of

the Führer Hess was present. I could not say who else was there. I

noticed that Hitler was particularly embarrassed when he told me that

despite all his hopes, war with England was imminent, and that the

ultimatum had been received. It was an expression of embarrassment such

as I had never noticed on Hitler.

DR. SIEMERS: I come now to the charge made by the Prosecution that you,

Admiral, agreed with National Socialism and strongly supported it.

May I be permitted to ask the Tribunal to look at Document D-481, which

is GB-215 in Document Book 10a, Page 101. This deals with the oath of

civil servants and the oath of soldiers.

[_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution, with reference to this

document, has stated that on 2 August 1934, in a special ceremony, you

took an oath to Adolf Hitler, and not to the fatherland. In the

transcript, of 15 January 1946, Page 2719 (Volume V, Page 262), we read,

“The Tribunal will see that Raeder”—in his oath—“put Führer in the

place of fatherland.”

I do not understand this and I will ask you to explain, whether it is

correct that you had any part in changing the oath from “fatherland” to

“Hitler.”

RAEDER: No. I cannot understand that accusation at all. The entire

matter was not particularly a ceremony. I do not know who is supposed to

have observed it so that he could make such a statement. The

Commander-in-Chief, Von Blomberg, and the three commanders-in-chief of

the Armed Forces were called to Hitler on the morning of 2 August. We

were in his study and Hitler asked us to come to his desk without

ceremony or staging. There we took the oath which he, as Chief of State

and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, read to us. We repeated that

oath. None of us participated in the writing of that oath and no one had

asked us to do so. That would have been quite unusual. The oath referred

to the person of Hitler. No previous oath had ever been rendered to the

fatherland as far as the words were concerned. Once I took an oath to

the Kaiser as Supreme War Lord, once to the Weimar Constitution, and the

third oath to the person of the Chief of State and Supreme Commander of

the Armed Forces—Hitler. In all three cases I took the oath to my

people, my fatherland. That is a matter of course.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, when you were ordered to that meeting on 2 August,

did you know before what it was to deal with?

RAEDER: Well, I would assume that his adjutant informed my adjutant that

I was to come in connection with the taking of the oath. I could not

speak with certainty now, but I assume so.

DR. SIEMERS: It was the morning after the death of Hindenburg?

RAEDER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: On the day after the death of Hindenburg?

RAEDER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Did you know about the wording of the oath?

RAEDER: No, but the oath was written on a piece of paper and I assume

that we were informed of the wording before, at the desk, there.

DR. SIEMERS: May I say at this time, Mr. President, that the wording is

contained in the document that I have mentioned and represents a Reich

law.

[_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution asserts that on 30 January

1937 you became a Party member by virtue of the fact that you received

the Golden Party Badge. Will you answer briefly to this point, which has

been discussed previously in other cases?

RAEDER: When the Führer gave me the Golden Party Badge he said,

specifically, that this was the highest decoration which he could give

at the time. I could not become a Party member at all because it had

been stated that soldiers could not be members of the Party. That was

generally known, and for this reason that assertion likewise is

incomprehensible.

DR. SIEMERS: The membership of soldiers was prohibited by the

Constitution?

RAEDER: Yes, prohibited. May I say one more thing to prevent any

misunderstanding? It was prohibited both by the Weimar Constitution and

the decrees which Hitler had issued.

DR. SIEMERS: Were you in opposition to the Party because of your staunch

Christian and Church attitude, which was generally known? Briefly, how

did it work out? Did you have any difficulties with the Party because of

it?

RAEDER: In general I had no great difficulties with the Party, which I

think is best explained by the fact that the Navy had considerable

prestige in the Party, as it did in all Germany. I always had the higher

officers, at least the chiefs of bases and fleet commanders, settle any

friction which occurred in the lower echelons, through the proper

authorities. If they were more important they were brought to my

attention and I took care of them; if they dealt with matters of

principle I passed them on to the OKW. Since I never let anything slip

through, in case of incitement by the Party, the entire relations soon

became very smooth and I could prevent all sorts of friction, so that

before long they rarely occurred. In that respect we had the advantage

in the Navy because there were no territorial matters to administer. We

were concerned with the sea and only worked in the coastal cities where

actually everything concerned the Navy. I did have difficulties because

of Heydrich, whom I had removed from the Navy in 1928 or 1929 after a

court of honor had sentenced him for unscrupulous treatment of a young

girl. He was very resentful toward me for a long time and he tried on

various occasions to denounce me to the leadership of the Party or to

Bormann and even to the Führer. However, I was always able to counteract

these attacks so that they had no effect on my situation in general.

This attitude of Heydrich communicated itself in some way to Himmler, so

that here also, from time to time, I had to write a strongly worded

letter; but it was precisely the strong wording of those letters which

was of help in most cases.

I should not like to waste any time by mentioning various instances,

such as the one with the SD; however, there were no direct attacks

because of my position in regard to the Church. There was only the

statement made by Goebbels, which I learned of through my Codefendant,

Hans Fritzsche, that I was in disfavor with the Party on account of my

attitude toward the Church; but, as I have said, I was not made to feel

it in a disagreeable way.

DR. SIEMERS: I believe I do not need to ask you to waste any time in

explaining the importance which you placed on religious matters in the

Navy. I will submit an affidavit to this effect without reading it. It

was made by Chief Navy Chaplain Ronneberger, whom you have known for

many years and who described the situation and thus clarified

everything. In that connection, however, may I put one question: Did you

emphasize repeatedly to Hitler that a religious attitude was necessary

for the soldiers and the Navy?

RAEDER: Yes, that happened frequently, and I kept to this course in the

Navy until the end without hesitation.

DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, Mr. President, I might submit Exhibit

Number Raeder-121 (Document Raeder-121). It is in my Document Book

Raeder Number 6, Page 523. I should not like to take the time of the

Tribunal by asking questions about the contrasting views between the

Party and the Navy in matters of the Church. I believe that this

document makes it sufficiently clear that a bond between Church and

National Socialism was not possible. In this field Bormann is the most

outstanding figure, and I should like to read only the first paragraph

of the exposé which I have submitted:

“National Socialistic and Christian concepts are incompatible.

Christian churches are built on the ignorance of man and are at

pains to sustain the ignorance of as large a part of the

population as possible, for only in this way can the Christian

churches maintain their power. In contrast to this, National

Socialism rests on scientific foundations.”

In the second paragraph, the last sentence:

“If therefore in the future our young people do not learn

anything more about Christianity, the teachings of which are far

inferior to our own, then Christianity will disappear of

itself.”

And, on the second page at the end:

“Just as the harmful influence of astrologers, soothsayers, and

other swindlers are eliminated and suppressed by the State, so

the possibilities for the Church to exert its influence must

also be entirely removed. Only when this has happened will the

State leadership have full influence over the individual

citizen. Only then will the existence of the people and the

Reich be guaranteed for all time.”

Since the religious and Christian attitude of the defendant is generally

known, I believe this is enough to show the contrast between the Party

and the defendant in these matters.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Concerning the conspiracy, the Prosecution

has also accused you of being a member of the Secret Cabinet Council and

the Defense Council. Will you please answer quite briefly, because these

questions have been discussed so often that I assume that no one in this

Court wishes to hear anything further about these things. Were you a

member of the Reich Government?

RAEDER: No.

DR. SIEMERS: According to Document 2098-PS, which is GB-206, Document