[Cover Illustration]
TRIAL
OF
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL
_NUREMBERG_
14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946
[Illustration]
_PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY_
_1948_
This volume is published in accordance with the
direction of the International Military Tribunal by
the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction
of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.
VOLUME XIV
_OFFICIAL TEXT_
_IN THE_
ENGLISH LANGUAGE
_PROCEEDINGS_
16 May 1946—28 May 1946
CONTENTS
One Hundred and Thirty-first Day, Thursday, 16 May 1946,
Morning Session 1
Afternoon Session 32
One Hundred and Thirty-second Day, Friday, 17 May 1946,
Morning Session 63
Afternoon Session 82
One Hundred and Thirty-third Day, Saturday, 18 May 1946,
Morning Session 107
One Hundred and Thirty-fourth Day, Monday, 20 May 1946,
Morning Session 143
Afternoon Session 181
One Hundred and Thirty-fifth Day, Tuesday, 21 May 1946,
Morning Session 228
Afternoon Session 261
One Hundred and Thirty-sixth Day, Wednesday, 22 May 1946,
Morning Session 287
Afternoon Session 320
One Hundred and Thirty-seventh Day, Thursday, 23 May 1946,
Morning Session 357
Afternoon Session 386
One Hundred and Thirty-eighth Day, Friday, 24 May 1946,
Morning Session 418
Afternoon Session 450
One Hundred and Thirty-ninth Day, Monday, 27 May 1946,
Morning Session 494
Afternoon Session 533
One Hundred and Fortieth Day, Tuesday, 28 May 1946,
Morning Session 567
Afternoon Session 601
ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST DAY
Thursday, 16 May 1946
_Morning Session_
MARSHAL (Col. Charles W. Mays): If it please the Tribunal, the
Defendants Sauckel and Von Papen are absent.
[_The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand._]
DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Admiral, yesterday we
finished with the somewhat involved Document C-32, and we had got as far
as Point 11. We now come to Point 12, “Ammunition stocks in excess of
the armament permissible.” May I remind the Tribunal that this is
Document C-32, Exhibit USA-50, in Document Book 10 a, Page 8, Point 12,
which contains three columns.
Defendant, may I ask what you have to say to the accusation that you
exceeded the permissible amount of ammunition?
ERICH RAEDER (Defendant): Certain ammunition stocks were in excess of
the permissible amount and some were below it. I cannot tell you at this
date what the reason was in each particular case. I assume that this
depended to a considerable extent on the amounts left over from the last
World War.
In the case of the first two items, the 17- and 15-centimeter shells,
the actual stocks rather exceeded the quantity permitted, whereas the
third item, the 10.5-centimeter, falls very far short of it—instead of
134,000 there were 87,000. In the case of the 8.8-centimeter shells
there was an excess, then again a deficit, and the same thing applies to
the last item. But they are all very insignificant amounts.
DR. SIEMERS: In the copy before the Tribunal there appears to be a note
in the third column—on the next page in yours, Defendant—saying that
quantities of ammunition are partly manufactured and partly in course of
delivery, and that the total amount permissible will soon be exceeded.
I only wanted to ask you: The list was made out in September 1933. Then
are the figures stated correct for September 1933 or autumn 1933?
RAEDER: I did not quite understand you.
DR. SIEMERS: If it says in this document that measures to be taken later
will bring the totals above the quantities permissible, which—according
to this statement—they had not yet reached, then that is calculated as
from autumn 1933.
RAEDER: That may be assumed, yes. Because new ammunition as well as new
guns were being manufactured, and old ammunition then had to be
scrapped.
It also must be noted that ammunition for heavy artillery, which is not
listed here, was in every case short of the permissible amount. A
comparatively large amount of heavy artillery ammunition had been
granted us for heavy coastal guns, and we had by no means as much as we
were allowed to have.
DR. SIEMERS: For the assistance of the Tribunal, I may point out that
this last point is proved by the actual documents in the hands of the
Tribunal. In the Tribunal’s copy under the Figure 12, Column 2, just
beside the separate figures, there is a sentence which says, “... that
the whole quantity permitted for heavy artillery has not been reached.”
We now come to Number 13: “Exceeding the permissible stocks of machine
guns, rifles, pistols, and gas masks.”
RAEDER: Here, too, it must be admitted that in isolated cases stocks
were a little higher than permitted. There were, for instance, 43,000
gas masks instead of the 22,500 permitted. Large numbers of rifles and
machine guns were taken away even by individuals after the World War to
farms, _et cetera_. They were later collected, and for that reason there
was a comparatively large stock of them. But we are not dealing here
with any considerable quantities. Similarly ammunition, bayonets, hand
grenades, searchlights, fog equipment, _et cetera_, also exceeded the
prescribed limits but not to any great extent.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, Figure 14: “Obtaining 337 M.G. C/30’s without
scrapping equally serviceable weapons.” As I did not ...
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Surely, Dr. Siemers,
it would be possible to deal with all these various points in the
documents in one statement as to why there were these excesses. We have
a statement here which contains 30 different items, and you have only
got as far as 13, and you are dealing with each one.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, personally I agree entirely. I am sorry that
I caused the Tribunal so much trouble in connection with this document.
As I am not a naval expert, I had a great deal of trouble finding my way
through it; but I do not think that I was the cause of the trouble. The
Prosecution, you see, have made use of the single points in evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the question is—I am not blaming you, but
we want to get on. We are not blaming you. Can’t it be done in one
explanatory statement, one short statement?
DR. SIEMERS: I will try, Mr. President, and I will shorten it.
There is no need to say anything more about Numbers 15 to 17. I think
these were the most important points. The points planned for a later
date were not to be effective until the years ’33 and ’34. I may perhaps
just point out to the Tribunal that Number 17 refers to the intended
construction of reserve destroyers. The Versailles Treaty permitted the
construction of these.
I pass over Number 18 because we have already dealt with that. Number
19, again, refers only to intended construction. Number 20 I may
consider irrelevant; it concerns only the arming of fishing vessels.
Numbers 21 to 29 ...
THE PRESIDENT: I think, perhaps, you should ask the Defendant to explain
some of these observations in the third column. I mean in Number 18, for
instance: “Difficult to detect. If necessary can be denied.”
RAEDER: These were explanations given to our League of Nations
representative at the Disarmament Conference by the competent expert. It
does not refer to local conditions. Construction of submarine spare
parts, for instance, took place abroad or was to be prepared. It was
actually carried out in 1934 and ’35, and the first submarine was
launched at the end of June 1935.
DR. SIEMERS: I may take it, Defendant, that only the construction and
purchase of submarines was prohibited.
RAEDER: Yes, the construction in Germany.
DR. SIEMERS: I cannot prove until a later stage that no violation of the
Treaty was involved by the construction of these spare parts; but I
think you will have to give some indication of your reason for wishing
to conceal it, in view of the fact that spare parts were not forbidden.
I may remind you that this took place in September 1933 at a time when
negotiations had already been planned.
RAEDER: At that period, before the German-English Naval Agreement was
concluded on the basis of 35 to 100, Hitler was particularly eager to
avoid everything which might embarrass the negotiations in any way. The
construction and preparation of submarine parts came under this heading
as being a subject on which England was peculiarly sensitive.
DR. SIEMERS: Was there not an additional reason for this appendix and
other remarks in this second column—namely, the unfortunate experiences
which the Navy had caused in home politics, the fact that whenever the
slightest action was taken a quarrel immediately ensued on the home
political front?
RAEDER: Yes; and that went so far that the Reichswehrminister was
attacked on occasions by Prussian ministers who disagreed with the Reich
Government—for instance, Müller, Severing, Stresemann and later
Brüning, who alleged to the Reich Chancellor that he took steps which he
was not authorized to take. In reality, however, the Reich Government
itself had sanctioned these things already and had accepted the
responsibility for them.
DR. SIEMERS: So these things were kept secret for reasons of home
policy, so that they should not be apparent...
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: With the approval of the Reich Government?
RAEDER: With the approval of the Reich Government. As regards the firms,
a number of firms...
DR. SIEMERS: I would prefer now to refer back to Column 2, Number 20, as
I see from the record that the Prosecution have also expressly raised
this point in connection with the arming of fishing craft, emphasized
it, and made it the basis of a charge, “Warning shots, play it down.”
RAEDER: The two fishing boats were quite small vessels and were normally
unarmed. They served to supervise the fishing boats in the North Sea
right up to Iceland, to help them in case of emergency, to take sick men
aboard and to afford protection against fishermen of other nations. We
thought it advisable to mount at least a 5-centimeter gun on these ships
since they were actually warships. “Warning shots” means that they fired
a salute when they wanted to draw the fishermen’s attention to
something; so it was quite an insignificant affair and had no need to be
artificially reduced to a bagatelle but was in fact a bagatelle.
DR. SIEMERS: We now come to Numbers 21 to 28. This is a list of various
firms, including industrial firms working on armament contracts. The
Versailles Treaty admitted certain firms for this type of work while it
excluded others. In actual fact, other firms had received contracts.
Perhaps you can make a general statement on this point.
RAEDER: This was at a time when we had strong hopes that progress would
be made at the Disarmament Conference. The Macdonald Plan, which brought
about a certain improvement, had already been accepted; and we might
have expected, in consequence, that the few factories still left to us
would have to increase their output during the next few years. I may
refer you to the shipping replacement scheme. Consequently, factories
producing specialized articles were better equipped and supplied. There
was, however, never any question of heavy guns or anything of that kind
but of automatic fuse-igniters, explosives—for instance, mine
containers, _et cetera_, small items but special items which could be
made only by certain firms. But, apart from the firms admitted, other
firms which had been excluded were also employed. Thus, for instance,
the Friedrich Krupp Grusenwerke A.G. at Magdeburg, Number 25, was
equipped to manufacture antiaircraft guns and antiaircraft barrels from
2-centimeters to 10.5-centimeters; similarly Number 26, a firm
manufacturing antiaircraft ammunition, explosives; Number 27...
DR. SIEMERS: I do not think we need the details.
RAEDER: No. And then engines for which there was also a great demand.
DR. SIEMERS: I have some questions which apply to all these figures. Is
this not offset to a certain extent by the fact that some of the firms
admitted had already dropped out for economic reasons?
RAEDER: Yes, you can certainly say that. These firms had comparatively
few deliveries which were not sufficient to keep them going.
DR. SIEMERS: Defendant, I think one not only can—I think one must—say
so. May I draw your attention to Point 22, Column 3, which reads, “The
list in any case is out of date, as some firms have dropped out.”
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: That leaves us with Numbers 29 and 30. Number 29,
“Preparations in the field of experiments with motorboats.” I think that
these were preparations in a very small field.
RAEDER: At the moment I cannot tell you exactly what this means.
DR. SIEMERS: I do not believe in any case that the Prosecution will
attach any importance to it.
Then I only want you to make a final statement on Number 30, “Probable
further concrete violations becoming necessary in the near future” up to
1934 inclusively. To all intents and purposes you have already answered
the question by your reference to the negotiations planned with the
British Government, some of which were already in progress.
RAEDER: Yes, that was the point.
DR. SIEMERS: These are matters, therefore, which were in any case due to
be discussed in the course of the negotiations with the British
Government, or rather the Admiralty.
RAEDER: You cannot say that of them all. For instance, Points 1 to 3
deal with mines. The number of mines was to be increased and modern
material was to replace the old. It goes on in the same way with the
transfer of guns from the North Sea to the Baltic “A” batteries, not
with the scrapping of guns.
DR. SIEMERS: To conclude the whole matter, may I ask you to say what
impression the whole thing made on a naval expert like yourself. All
things considered, would you say that these are minor violations, and
how far are these violations of an aggressive nature?
RAEDER: As I said yesterday, most of them are very inadequate
improvements in defense of an almost entirely defenseless position. The
separate items, as I explained yesterday, are so insignificant that it
is really impossible to spend very much time on them. I believe that the
Control Commission also had the impression that very little weight need
be attached to all these matters; for in 1925 when the Control
Commission left its station at Kiel where it had worked with the
organizations of the Naval Command, Commander Fenshow, Admiral
Charlton’s chief of staff and head of the Commission, whose main
interest was guns and who had worked with a Captain Raenkel, a gunner
and a specialist in these matters, said:
“We must leave now, and you are glad that we are going. You did
not have a pleasant task, and neither did we. I must tell you
one thing. You need not think that we believed what you have
said. You did not say a single word of truth, but you have given
your information so skillfully that we were able to accept it,
and for that I am grateful to you.”
DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Document C-29, which is Exhibit USA-46. Mr.
President, it is in Raeder’s Document Book 10, Page 8 of the
Prosecution’s document book.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean 10a?
DR. SIEMERS: Number 10, Page 8. This document, too, was submitted during
the general Indictment made by the Prosecution at the beginning of the
Trial on 27 November. It consists of a speech, a document signed by
Raeder, dated 31 January 1933, “General Directives for the Support of
the German Armaments Industry by the Navy.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution pointed this out; and they
have thought fit to conclude from it that on the day after Hitler’s
nomination as Chancellor of the Reich, you were already acting
positively in his support through this letter. Will you define your
attitude, please?
RAEDER: There is no connection whatsoever between this letter and
Hitler’s accession to power. You must admit that it would be impossible
to compile so long and complicated a document—which was, after all,
carefully prepared—between the evening of 30 and the morning of 31
January. This document results from the hope, which I mentioned before,
that already under the Papen and Von Schleicher Government the
stipulations of the Versailles Treaty and the Disarmament Conference
might be gradually relaxed, since the British Delegation had repeatedly
said that they favored the gradual restoration of equal rights. We had,
therefore, to get our industries into the best possible condition, as
far as the manufacture of armaments was concerned, by increasing their
output and enabling them to overcome competition.
As I say in Paragraph c of this letter, almost every country was at that
time making efforts in the same direction, even those which, unlike
Germany, had no restrictions imposed on them. Great Britain, France,
North America, Japan, and especially Italy made the most determined
efforts to gain markets for their armaments industry; and I wanted to
follow them in this particular sphere. In order to do this, there had to
be an understanding between the various departments of the Naval Command
Staff to the effect that industry must be given support in a way which
avoided the secrecy of technical matters and developments to too petty a
degree. That is why I explain in Paragraph c that secrecy in small
matters is less important than maintaining a high standard and keeping
the lead.
I state in the final sentence:
“To sum up, I attach particular importance to the continued
support of the industry in question by the Navy, even after the
expected relaxation of the present restrictions, so that the
industry would command confidence abroad and would find a
market.”
This has nothing at all to do with Hitler nor with any independent
rearmament on my own behalf.
DR. SIEMERS: Can you tell us when, approximately, you drafted these
directives?
RAEDER: During the month of January. I may say that we had a
conference—perhaps at the beginning of January—and after that I had it
put in writing.
DR. SIEMERS: That would be certainly 2 to 3 weeks before this letter was
written?
RAEDER: Yes, certainly.
DR. SIEMERS: I think it happens rarely that one receives a letter from a
government office one day after its being conceived by the head of that
office.
May I ask you now to tell me one thing more in connection with the
“relaxation of the present restrictions.” That means the relaxation of
the Versailles Treaty, I presume, through the Disarmament Conference.
You have mentioned that four times in this document, so that I assume
that was your basis.
RAEDER: Yes, it was. The whole atmosphere at that time, under both the
governments I mentioned, was such that one could expect an improvement.
DR. SIEMERS: And this was the basis for which, to quote a few names
only, Stresemann, Brüning, fought.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: As they felt it their duty to take certain advance
precautions?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: I think there is no need for me to go into further details.
I have read this document again and again, and have been unable to find
any point on which the Prosecution could base the conclusion that you
had National Socialist ideas.
I now come to Document C-140. It is Exhibit USA-51, and is in the
Document Book 10a, Page 104.
RAEDER: May I interrupt you, please? Would it not be appropriate that I
should say now what I wanted to say to supplement the statement in C-156
regarding aircraft?
DR. SIEMERS: I apologize. It might be practicable to finish with the
infringements of the Versailles Treaty before going on to another
subject. I had forgotten that.
The Prosecution have submitted Document C-156. It is Captain Schüssler’s
book from the year 1937 and contains almost the same list of
infringements as Document C-32, so that that document can be disposed of
at the same time. In addition, it deals with the case of the designing
office for submarines in Holland, with which we have already dealt. But
there is still one point on which I should like to have your comments,
and that concerns certain preparations in connection with navy aircraft
which might be permitted later.
RAEDER: All sorts of preparations had been made in the field of aviation
long before I came into office. A number of aircraft had been purchased,
as I see from this book. They were stored with a firm called “Severa
G.m.b.H.,” which was known to the Reichswehrminister. The Versailles
Treaty had permitted us antiaircraft guns both on ships and on the
coast, as was mentioned yesterday; and for these antiaircraft, firing
practice had to be arranged. The Control Commission had allowed us a
certain number of aircraft to tow the necessary targets. These aircraft
were flown by ex-naval pilots employed by this company. The company, in
turn, was managed by an old naval pilot.
Since we were not allowed to train naval pilots or were not allowed to
have any naval air force, we gave a year’s training in the civil
aviation school to a number of prospective naval officers before they
joined the Navy, so that through this 1-year training they developed
into very good pilots. Then they joined the Navy and went through their
ordinary naval training. The aircraft purchased in this way was
temporarily in the possession of the “Severa,” which also had a good
deal to do with the Lohmann affairs and for that reason was dissolved by
Reichswehrminister Gröner in the summer of 1928. Reichswehrminister
Gröner established a new company with similar assignments in the autumn
of 1928, soon after I assumed office. But he had signed the agreement
himself in order to control the correct management of the whole affair.
In this company, in addition to their ordinary work, the Navy pilots
carried out experiments in connection with the development of aircraft
for a later Navy air force. We had the Government’s permission to
manufacture a model of every type likely to be of use, but we were not
allowed to accumulate aircraft. The Government had expressly forbidden
that. The result was that in the course of years the company developed a
number of aircraft types which would be useful at a later date when we
were once more allowed to have aircraft.
In the early period exercises in the Navy were carried out by the old
naval pilots—that is to say, it was demanded that exercises in
observation be taken and that the crews of ships learn how to act
against aircraft. When these young naval pilots were assigned to such
exercises, they were discharged from the Navy for that time. It was an
awkward affair, but it was always carried out punctiliously.
DR. SIEMERS: I may now turn to Document C-140, which is in Document Book
10a, Page 104. It is a letter from Reich Defense Minister Von Blomberg
dated 25 October 1933. It is addressed to the Chief of the Army, the
Chief of the Navy, and the Reich Minister for Aviation.
On this document the Prosecution based their accusations that you,
Witness, prepared military plans for an armed resistance which might
become necessary in consequence of Germany’s withdrawal from the
Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. Perhaps you can
briefly state your view.
RAEDER: I had no previous knowledge of our imminent withdrawal from the
League of Nations. This directive came out 11 days after we had left the
League of Nations, and it merely provides defensive measures in the
event of sanctions being applied against Germany by other powers in
consequence of her departure from the League of Nations. It says under
2c: “I prohibit any practical preparations in the meantime.” So, at
first, nothing was done in consequence of this directive, and the Reich
Defense Minister merely asked for a report from me as to what should be
done.
As far as I remember, no practical preparations of any kind were carried
out by the Navy at the time, because the situation remained absolutely
quiet and there was no reason to assume that there would be any need for
defense.
DR. SIEMERS: That is probably indicated by the words under Point 2a,
“Preparation for defense against sanctions.” It concerns the defense
only.
RAEDER: The defense only.
DR. SIEMERS: That the withdrawal from the League of Nations occurred 14
October 1933, 11 days before the document was written, is a well-known
fact and has been mentioned by the Prosecution on Page 257 of the record
(Volume II, Page 304).
Now we come to Document C-166. This is Exhibit USA-48. Mr. President,
this is in Document Book 10, on Page 36. It is a document dated 12 March
1934. It emanates from the Command Office of the Navy and refers to the
preparation of auxiliary cruisers for action. The Prosecution have
quoted only the first two paragraphs of this document and have pointed
out that it shows that auxiliary cruisers were to be built and describes
transport ships “O” for camouflage purposes.
The two paragraphs sound incriminating, but they can very easily be
explained. May I refer to Lohmann’s affidavit, Document Number Raeder-2,
my Document Book 1, Page 5. I refer to Paragraph II. I quote:
“The Document C-166, submitted to me, a communication from the
Office of the Naval Command of 12 March 1934, deals with the
‘availability of auxiliary cruisers’ which, as stated in the
document, were marked as ‘Transport Ships O.’ These ships were
not to be newly constructed but were to be selected from the
stock of the German merchant marine in accordance with the
demands enumerated in the document and were to be examined as to
their suitability for the tasks to be assigned them. Then plans
were made for reconstruction in case of necessity, but the boats
remained in the merchant marine.”
May I state at this point that in the English translation the word
“Umbau” has been translated by the word “reconstruction.” I have my
doubts as to whether this is quite correct. I presume that the
interpreter has now translated it as “Umbau” accordingly. As far as I
know, the German word “Umbau” only means much the same thing as the
English word “changes”—that is, “Veränderung.”
I continue to quote:
“The order to select such boats from German shipyards was
received, among others, by the Hamburg Office of the Naval
Command where I was serving at the time.”
Thus far Admiral Lohmann.
Witness, is Lohmann’s statement correct? Have you anything to add?
RAEDER: No. I can only emphasize again that there was no question of
immediate construction but only of selecting suitable ships and
examining them with a view to ascertaining the alterations necessary to
enable them to function as auxiliary cruisers in the case of a general
mobilization. The preparation of the plans and the plans themselves were
to be ready by 1 April 1935, as laid down in Number 12. They were to be
submitted to the naval administration so that in the case of
mobilization the ship concerned could be taken from the stock of the
merchant marine and converted.
All these proposals for mobilization were, of course, kept secret.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, that the whole
misunderstanding would not have arisen if the Prosecution had translated
two further sentences. The English version is very short and Point 11 is
missing. I quote the text of Point 11:
“‘B’ is requested in co-operation with ‘K,’ first of all, to
select suitable vessels and to ascertain how many 15-centimeter
guns have to be mounted to achieve the required broadside...”
The word “selected” is used here so that the intention is not—as the
Prosecution assert—the building of auxiliary cruisers but the making of
a selection from merchant vessels.
RAEDER: Yes; and the ships continued to sail in the service of the
merchant marine.
DR. SIEMERS: The second sentence, which I find has been unfortunately
omitted from the English translation of the Prosecution, reads as
follows:
“As long as only a restricted number of guns—at present 24—can
be placed at our disposal for this purpose, preparations are to
be made for only four transport ships (O). An increase of this
number, presumably to six, will be postponed to a date when more
guns are available. Until then we must await the results of the
preparations for the first auxiliary cruisers.”
The fact that only four, or at the most six, merchant navy vessels were
involved shows the insignificance of the whole matter.
I now come to Document C-189, USA-44. It is in Document Book Number 10
of the British Delegation, Page 66.
I should like your comments.—I beg your pardon. I should remind you
that this concerns the conversation between Grossadmiral Raeder and the
Führer aboard the _Karlsruhe_ in June 1934.
Grossadmiral, will you please state your views on the three points
mentioned in this brief document and which you discussed with Hitler in
June 1934.
First question: Why was Hitler unwilling to reveal the increase in
displacement of D and E—that is, the _Scharnhorst_ and the
_Gneisenau_—when, according to this document, these were defensive
weapons and every expert would notice the increased tonnage of these
ships and, as far as I know, did notice it?
RAEDER: At that time we were considering what we could do with the two
armored ships D and E, after the signing of the impending naval pact
with England—that is, the two ships which Hitler had granted me for the
Navy in the 1934 budget. We had definitely decided not to continue
building these armored ships as such, since we could make better use of
the material at our disposal.
DR. SIEMERS: But surely you realized that every expert in the British or
American or any other Admiralty would see on a voyage, as soon as he had
sighted the ship, that the 10,000 tons had now become 26,000?
RAEDER: Yes, of course.
DR. SIEMERS: So that there was merely the intention...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, when you are examining a witness directly,
you are not to ask leading questions which put into his mouth the very
answer that you desire. You are stating all sorts of things to this
witness and then asking him “isn’t that so?”
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. I shall make every effort to put my
questions differently.
RAEDER: My answer is different anyway.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes?
RAEDER: We are dealing here, in the first place, with plans: I asked
permission to revise the plans for these two armored ships; first, by
strengthening their defensive weapons—that is, the armor-plating and
underwater compartments—and then by increasing their offensive
armaments—namely, by adding a third 28-centimeter instead of
26-centimeter tower. The Führer was not yet willing to sanction, a new
28-centimeter tower because, as I said before, he did not in any
circumstances want to prejudice the negotiations going on with Great
Britain. To begin with, therefore, he sanctioned only a medium
displacement of 18,000 to 19,000 tons; and we knew that when matters
reached the stage where a third 28-centimeter tower could be mounted,
the displacement would be about 25,000 to 26,000 tons.
We saw no cause to announce it at this stage, however, because it is
customary in the Navy that new construction plans and especially new
types of ships should be announced at the latest possible moment. That
was the principal reason; and apart from that, Hitler did not want to
draw the attention of other countries to these constructions by giving
the figures mentioned or stating the very high speed. There was no other
reason for not announcing these things.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like your comments on Number 2 of the document.
That has been specially held against you by the Prosecution, because
there you state the view that the fleet must be developed to oppose
England later on.
RAEDER: At first—as I intended to explain later—we had taken the new
French ships as our model. The French Navy was developing at that time
the _Dunkerque_ class with eight 33-centimeter guns and a high speed,
and we took that for our model, especially since, in Hitler’s
opinion—as you will hear later—there was no question of arming against
England. We intended to reconstruct these two armored ships on this
pattern as battleships with nine 28-centimeter guns and capable of a
high speed. But then we heard that the _King George_ class was being
designed in England with 35.6-centimeter guns and, therefore, stronger
than the French type; and so I said that we would in any case have to
depart from the French type eventually and follow the English model
which is now being built with 35-centimeter guns.
There is an error in the translation—namely, “oppose England.” It says
in my text that developments should follow the lines of British
developments—in other words, that we should design vessels similar in
type to the English ships. But they were out of date, too, shortly
afterwards, because France was then building ships of the _Richelieu_
class with 38-centimeter guns. Therefore, we decided that we too would
build ships with 38-centimeter guns. That was how the _Bismarck_ came to
be built. The word “oppose” would have been quite senseless at a time
when we intended to come to an agreement with Britain on terms under
which we could in no way vie with her.
DR. SIEMERS: Now we come to Point 3 of this document, which the
Prosecution regard as equally important. I quote:
“The Führer demands complete secrecy with regard to the
construction of U-boats—in consideration, also, of the Saar
plebiscite.”
RAEDER: I have already referred to the Führer’s wish for secrecy in
connection with both the construction of submarines and the preparations
for that construction. This is one of the points on which he was most
sensitive, because in no circumstances did he wish to prejudice the
negotiations. He himself was generally extremely cautious during this
period and would not in any circumstances do anything which might
sabotage the naval pact which he was so eager to conclude.
DR. SIEMERS: I do not quite understand the reference to secrecy in
connection with the construction of submarines. These were as yet not
under construction, were they?
RAEDER: No. I said secrecy in connection with the preparations for the
construction of submarines; that is just a short way of expressing it.
DR. SIEMERS: We now come to Document C-190, Exhibit USA-45. It is in
Document Book Number 10 of the British Delegation, Page 67. This is a
conversation which took place between Hitler and Raeder on 2 November
1934 aboard the _Emden_. In the document before you Hitler informs you
that he considers it necessary to enlarge and improve the Navy by 1938
and that, if necessary, he would instruct Dr. Ley to place at the
disposal of the Navy 120 to 150 million marks from the Labor Front.
Did you have anything at all to do with raising funds for rearmament?
RAEDER: No, not actually with the raising of funds. I applied for funds
to the Reich Defense Minister, who allocated them to me for the purpose
of this rearmament. I presume that this statement was made because the
allocation sanctioned for the Navy appeared too small to me, and for
this reason the Führer said that if necessary he would get Ley to act.
This did not actually happen. I received my funds only through the Reich
Defense Minister.
DR. SIEMERS: Although the charge made by the Prosecution is not quite
clear to me, since it is based on Hitler’s views—which have nothing to
do with you—I want to come back to this sum once more. I may remind you
that an armored cruiser of the old 10,000-ton class, which after all was
small, cost 75 to 80 million. Could this figure of 120 to 150 million be
large enough to put the Navy in a position to carry out rearmament on a
large scale?
RAEDER: No, certainly not. Two battleships were also under construction,
apart from those two armored cruisers. You can imagine that the costs
continually increased.
DR. SIEMERS: So that this sum was not final?
RAEDER: No, it was not final.
DR. SIEMERS: Will you please go on, then, to Point 2. According to Point
2 of the document, you pointed out to Hitler during this conference that
it might be necessary to assemble six submarines during the first
quarter of 1935.
RAEDER: I said this because I knew that at the beginning of 1935 we were
going to aim at the re-establishment of the Armed Forces; and I thought
that this might create a critical situation in respect to sanctions,
which Hitler always expected, too. I assume that we were talking about
this and that is why I suggested that if the necessity for any special
preparations should arise out of the re-establishment of the Armed
Forces then six submarines should be assembled, at a date previous to
their proper date of assemblage, from those parts which were obtained
from abroad.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler actually give the order?
RAEDER: No, the order was not given.
THE PRESIDENT: We might break off now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Document C-159, Exhibit USA-54. This document
may be found in the British Delegation’s Document Book 10a, Page 110.
This document is a letter written by Von Blomberg on 2 March 1936,
dealing with the demilitarized zone. Did you, Witness, make lengthy
military preparations for the action which took place on 7 March 1936?
RAEDER: No, I made no lengthy preparations; I heard of the plan only
through this document of 2 March. I may refer you to Point 6 which says,
“To preserve the peaceful character of the operation, no military
security or advance measures are to be taken without my express orders.”
It was made clear, therefore, that the entire action was to have a
peaceful character.
DR. SIEMERS: You knew nothing at all about this entire action until the
beginning of March?
RAEDER: No, I believe that this action was kept especially secret.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I will turn to Document C-194, Exhibit USA-55, in the
British Delegation’s Document Book 10a, Page 128. This document is a
communication from the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy dating from 1936—the wording seems to
indicate 6 March 1936. It deals, therefore, with the same subject as the
last document. May I have your comments.
RAEDER: The Reich Defense Minister had sanctioned a certain air
reconnaissance to take place over the North Sea on 6 March—that is to
say, the day before the occupation of the Rhineland. He intended to
withhold his decision as to whether U-boats were also to be sent out on
reconnaissance assignments in the West as far as the Texel until the
next day. I thereupon issued an order on 6 March 1936 and gave special
instructions...
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon.
[_Turning to the Tribunal._] I would like to point out that Raeder’s
order of 6 March 1936 is appended to the same document and that the text
is therefore before the Tribunal.
[_Turning to the Defendant._] Please go on.
RAEDER: I prepared this decree of 6 March concerning the planning of the
U-boat line and the reconnaissance to take place in the German bay on 7
March. I pointed out especially that everything must be avoided which
might create a false impression of the Führer’s intentions and thus put
difficulties in the way of this peaceful action.
DR. SIEMERS: I would like to add to your statement that these words
taken from the decree of 6 March 1936 are to be found under Point 5.
They are in the last two lines.
RAEDER: Those were all precautionary measures in case of a hostile
counteraction.
DR. SIEMERS: Were there any preparations on a large scale?
RAEDER: No, no.
DR. SIEMERS: I come now to the two last documents dealing with the topic
of the Versailles Treaty and rearmament, Document C-135, Exhibit GB-213,
Document Book 10, Page 20—that is the British Delegation’s Document
Book 10—which is headed, “History of the War Organization”—that is,
the “War Organization and Mobilization Scheme.” This dates from 1938.
This document was read in its entirety by the Prosecution and a very
grave charge was based upon it, because the document contains a
statement to the effect that Hitler had demanded that in 5 years—that
is, by 1 April 1938—a Wehrmacht should be created which he could employ
as a political instrument of power and also because the document
mentions the Establishment Organization Plan 1938 and the Combat
Organization Plan.
Considering the significance of this point, I asked Vice Admiral Lohmann
for his comments on this rather technical question. We are dealing with
Exhibit Number Raeder-2, in my Document Book 2, under part III, on Page
5. I think the Prosecution have misunderstood the meaning of certain
terms. The terms “Kriegsgliederung” (Combat Organization Plan) and
“Aufstellungsgliederung” (Establishment Organization Plan) have been
misunderstood.
I ask permission, therefore, to read this affidavit in conjunction with
the documents I have submitted in evidence. I quote:
“III. Referring to Documents C-135 and C-153, Armament Plan,
Mobilization Plan, Establishment Organization
Plan—Aufstellungsgliederung, A.G.—and Combat Organization
Plan—Kriegsgliederung, K.G....”
I would like to add that C-153 and C-135 are connected. I have taken
them together for the sake of simplicity. Therefore, I would like to
state for the record that 153 is Exhibit USA-43 and may be found in
British Document Book 10a, Page 107. It is headed, “Armament Plan (A.P.)
for the Third Armament Period.” It is a rather long document and is
dated 12 May 1934.
I quote Lohmann’s affidavit on these two documents:
“The above-named documents submitted to me deal with the
Establishment Organization Plan, the Combat Organization Plan,
the Mobilization Plan, and the Armament Plan. The first three
plans, or orders of distribution, deal with the same matters and
differ only in manner of composition. The Armament Plan differs
from the other plans inasmuch as it deals with new construction
and the required new materials and is hence less extensive.
“The German Navy, like the Armed Forces as a whole—and, no
doubt, the Armed Forces of every nation—made such plans in
order to be able, in the case of a conflict or of military
complications, to prepare in time and use efficiently the means
of combat available. Owing to changing conditions, military
developments, changes in personnel, and advances in technique,
such plans were revised every year. An essential part of these
preparations, self-evident in the case of any Armed Forces,
consisted of the establishment, mobilization, or combat
organization, which provided a survey of all naval installations
on land and sea, their local defenses, and tactical
subordination—as well as of all combat material on hand or to
be secured, increased, or reorganized by a specified date. All
operations envisaged by the military command were based on this
Combat Organization Plan, and it also served the political
leaders as an indication of the possibilities according to the
strength and number of the military resources available.
“The Combat Organization Plan always had to be prepared with
great foresight and was issued by the High Command of the Navy
generally 1½ years before it was to go into effect, in order to
enable the responsible offices to attend in time to such
necessary preliminaries, such as applying to the Navy Budget
Office for funds and materials—such as iron, steel, _et
cetera_—and for the preparation of accommodation insofar as all
this was not already covered by the peacetime development of the
Navy.
“In 1933, when Hitler in his Five Year Plan demanded that by 1
April 1938 an armed force should be created which he could throw
into the balance as an instrument of political power, the Combat
Organization Plan for 1938 was worked out independently of the
scheduled yearly Combat Organization Plan, and up to 1935 it
dealt mostly with the possibilities of the Treaty of Versailles
which had not yet been exhausted and with the question of
supplementing the naval strength with craft not subject to
limitation in type or number. After the Naval Pact of 1935, the
Combat Organization Plan 1938 was replaced by a “Combat
Organization Plan Ultimate Goal” (K.G. Endziel), which regulated
the number of warships of all types existing or to be built in
the proportion of 35:100 measured by the tonnage actually
existing in the English Fleet. In consideration of monetary and
material resources, the capacity of the shipyards, and the
length of time required to build large warships, this ultimate
goal was in the meanwhile fixed for the year 1944-45.
“There remained always the possibility of postponing it further,
in accordance with the building program of the English Fleet.
“The various terminologies have only a naval technical
significance and do not permit conclusions as to political
plans.”
I would like to indicate a slight error in translation in the English
text. The translation of the word “Terminierungen” by “terminology” is,
in my opinion, not correct. It should probably be “dates” or
“deadlines.”
Witness, are Vice Admiral Lohmann’s statements correct? Can you add
anything to this basic point of view?
RAEDER: These statements contain everything which can be said on this
matter. All these arrangements are, in my opinion, preparations which
must be made by every navy if it is to be systematically equipped and
made ready for operation.
* * * * *
Editor’s Note
In spite of the meticulous care given to this edition certain
inexactitudes may slip in, some originating with the speakers
themselves. In order to give a faithful rendering of the Record
we are avoiding alterations, but corrective notes will be
printed in the final volume.
The General Secretary’s Office would be grateful if the reader
would draw to his attention any errors or omissions, so that
they may also be included in the list of corrections.
_S. Paul A. Joosten_
Deputy General Secretary
Editor of the Record
Address:
Editor of the Record
International Military Tribunal
APO 696 A, United States Army
* * * * *
It says somewhere—in Document Number C-135, Page 1, under Point
2—that, “The growing tension between Germany and Poland forced us to
make practical instead of theoretical preparations for a purely
German-Polish conflict.” That was interpreted to mean that at some
time—I believe in 1930—we planned a war of aggression against Poland.
I testified yesterday that our main object was and had to be, nor could
it have gone any further than, to oppose with force any aggression
committed by Poland against East Prussia. That was the object of our
work—to protect Germany from an invasion by the Poles. At that time, it
would have been madness for German forces, which were still very
inadequately armed, to invade Poland or any other country.
Then too, since the dates 1938 and 1944-45 constantly recur, I would
like to point out again that the year 1938 first came into question as
the final date for the first phase of the Shipping Replacement Plan. The
last ship of this Shipping Replacement Plan was to be built from 1936 to
1938.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon.
[_Turning to the Tribunal._] I would like to call your attention to the
fact that this is Document Number Raeder-7.
RAEDER: [_Continuing._] Then Hitler decreed a Five Year Plan, which
happened also to cover the years 1933 to 1938 and in accordance with
which the Combat Organization Plan was to be fixed for the year 1938.
The Combat Organization Plan Ultimate Goal was fixed for 1944-45; and
the reason for fixing this date, as stated in the document which you
have just read, was the fact that in fixing our program we had to take
into consideration the funds and material at our disposal, the capacity
of our shipbuilding yards, and the length of time needed to build big
warships. A reasonably strong fighting force could not be created before
that date. Later on the Combat Organization Plan appears again in
several of my letters. But there was no date given which, on our part,
was intended as the appointed time of attack.
DR. SIEMERS: The statements in Document C-135 are in accordance with the
German-English Naval Agreement. Is that correct?
Perhaps I did not formulate my question clearly. The statement that a
new program was set up implies then that it was done in accordance with
the German-English Naval Agreement?
RAEDER: Yes, of course.
DR. SIEMERS: In any case, the reference to Document C-135, Point 8, is
probably to be interpreted in that way since it says, “...A modern
fleet, bound only by the clauses of the German-British Naval Agreement.”
RAEDER: Of course.
DR. SIEMERS: Now I turn to another topic and go back to the year 1933.
Grossadmiral, when did you meet Hitler, and did you have any connection
with National Socialism before 1933?
RAEDER: I met Hitler on 2 February 1933 when I saw him and talked to him
for the first time. It was at an evening party arranged by General Von
Blomberg at the home of General Von Hammerstein, the Chief of the Army
Command Staff, at which Reich Defense Minister Von Blomberg intended to
present to Hitler senior generals and admirals. I shall describe the
proceedings later.
Up to that time, I had had no connection whatsoever with National
Socialism. I knew Admiral Von Levetzow only from the first World War. He
was on the staff of Admiral Scheer whom I knew well and who had
obviously met Hitler at a comparatively early date. It was through him,
however, that I heard that Hitler took a very active interest in naval
matters and was surprisingly well-informed about them. On the other
hand, I believe that Von Levetzow had also spoken to Hitler about the
reputation of the Navy and his own opinion of the Navy at that time. But
I had no connections beyond that.
DR. SIEMERS: What were your reasons for remaining in office in 1933,
Grossadmiral, when you had no connection with National Socialism?
RAEDER: The Reich President, Field Marshal Von Hindenburg, at the same
time Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, had appointed the leader of the
largest party as Chancellor of the Reich. I think that, if I had gone to
him and told him I wanted to resign—or intended to resign—because he
had appointed a new Chancellor, he would quite certainly have taken it
as an insult and would then really have dismissed me. I had not the
slightest reason to ask my Supreme Commander to release me from my
military post because he, in his capacity of Reich President, had
appointed a new Reich Chancellor of whom I, perhaps, might not approve.
DR. SIEMERS: When and where did you first hear Hitler state his basic
political principles?
RAEDER: I heard him for the first time on the afore-mentioned 2
February, after the dinner at General Von Hammerstein’s home. I was
introduced to him before dinner, and after dinner he made a speech. He
was accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Herr Von Neurath.
There were no other members of the Party present.
In his speech, he first of all spoke of his career and of his social and
national aims. He said that he wanted to regain equal rights for the
German Reich and that he would try to rid the country of the shackles of
the Versailles Treaty and restore to Germany her internal sovereignty;
and he also discussed his social aims: the establishment of true
community among the people, the raising of the workers’ standard of
living, assistance to be given to the farmers, and the promotion of
agriculture, the establishment of a labor service, and the elimination
of unemployment. He specially emphasized—and this was really the main
point—that both domestic and foreign policy were to be left entirely in
his hands, that the Wehrmacht was to have nothing at all to do with
this, that the Wehrmacht was not to be used even to deal with unrest at
home, and that he had other forces to deal with these affairs. He wanted
to insure an undisturbed period of development for the Wehrmacht so that
it could become the factor necessary to prevent the Reich from becoming
the sport of other nations; and for that reason it would be necessary in
the next few years for the Wehrmacht to devote its entire attention to
the preparation of its main objective, training for the defense of the
fatherland in the case of aggression. The Wehrmacht would be the sole
bearer of arms, and its structure would remain unaltered. He spoke of no
details.
There was a comparatively large party assembled. As far as schemes for
war were concerned—none was mentioned, and all those present were
uncommonly pleased with this speech. He spoke with particular respect of
Reich President Von Hindenburg, the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht,
and we had the impression that he would respect this much-revered
personality.
This speech was the only account of his basic principles which he gave
me as Chief of the Naval Command Staff, as well as to the Chief of the
Army Command Staff and others.
DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, when did you report to Hitler for the first
time on the Navy; and what was Hitler’s general attitude on this
occasion—toward the Navy in particular?
RAEDER: The first naval report I gave was a few days later in the
presence of General Von Blomberg, who in his capacity of Reich Defense
Minister was my superior. I cannot give the exact date, but it was
shortly afterwards.
On this occasion, Hitler gave me a further account of the principles on
which I was to command the Navy. I reported to Hitler first of all on
the state of the Navy; on the rather slight degree to which the
provisions of the Versailles Treaty had been carried out by the Navy,
its inferior strength, the Shipping Replacement Plan, and incidents
concerned with naval policy, such as the Treaty of Washington, the
Treaty of London, 1930, the position of the Disarmament Conference. He
had already been fully informed on all these matters.
He said he wanted to make clear to me the principles on which his policy
was based and that this policy was to serve as the basis of long-term
naval policy. I still remember these words quite clearly, as well as
those which followed.
He did not under any circumstances wish to have complications with
England, Japan, or Italy—above all not with England. And he wanted to
prove this by fixing an agreement with England as to the strength to be
allotted to the German Fleet in comparison with that of the English
Navy. By so doing, he wanted to show that he was prepared to
acknowledge, once and for all, England’s right to maintain a navy
commensurate with the vastness of her interests all over the world. The
German Navy required expansion only to the extent demanded by a
continental European policy. I took this as the second main principle on
which to base my leadership of the Navy. The actual ratio of strength
between the two navies was not discussed at the time; it was discussed
later on.
This decision of Hitler’s afforded extreme satisfaction both to myself
and to the whole of the Navy, for it meant that we no longer had to
compete senselessly with the first sea power; and I saw the possibility
of gradually building up our Navy on a solid foundation. I believe that
this decision was hailed by the whole Navy with joy and that they
understood its significance. The Russian Pact was later greeted with the
same appreciation, since the combination of the Russian Pact and the
naval agreement would have been a guarantee of wonderful development.
There were people—but not in the Navy—who believed that this amounted
to yielding ground, but this limitation was accepted by the majority of
Germans with considerable understanding.
DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, what were your personal relations with
Hitler? How did you judge him in the course of the years, and what was
Hitler’s attitude toward you?
RAEDER: I welcomed this vigorous personality who was obviously most
intelligent, had tremendous will power, was a master in handling people,
and—as I myself observed in the early years—a great and very skillful
politician whose national and social aims were already well known and
accepted in their entirety by the Armed Forces and the German people...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think this might be taken more shortly. We
have heard it from so many of the others.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. Is the defendant not to describe his relations with
Hitler? Do the Tribunal consider them irrelevant?
THE PRESIDENT: He might do it shortly.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. Good. Grossadmiral, please do it shortly.
RAEDER: I would just like to say what I thought of Hitler in order to
make clear my reasons for not at any time leaving him, which fact the
Prosecution have raised very strongly against me. His first steps in
both domestic and foreign policy undoubtedly called forth admiration for
his political ability and awakened the hope that, since he had taken
these first steps without bloodshed or political complications, he would
be able to solve in the same way any problems, which might arise later.
THE PRESIDENT: We have heard this as I have pointed out—this quality or
power of Hitler’s ability from nearly every one of the defendants and it
is very cumulative, and if this defendant wishes to say he was greatly
impressed by Hitler’s qualities, that is quite sufficient. All of the
rest is cumulative.
RAEDER: Very well. Then I shall only say that during the early years I
had no reason to wonder whether I should remain in my position or not.
DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, we shall automatically come to the later
complications at a later stage of the hearing.
I come now to the German-British Naval Agreement and would like to ask
you briefly how this Naval Agreement of 1935 came about. I am referring
to Document Number Raeder-11, Document Book 1, Page 59, which contains
the Naval Agreement in the form of a communication from the German
Foreign Minister to the British Government. The actual content was fixed
by the British, as the first few words show:
“Your Excellency, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt
of your Excellency’s note of to-day’s date, in which you were so
good as to communicate to me on behalf of His Majesty’s
Government in the United Kingdom the following”:
Then come the following statements by the British:
“1. During the last few days the representatives of the German
Government and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom
have been engaged in conversations, the primary purpose of which
has been to prepare the way for the holding of a general
conference on the subject of the limitation of naval armaments.
It now gives me great pleasure to notify your Excellency of the
formal acceptance by His Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom of the proposal of the German Government discussed at
those conversations, that the future strength of the German Navy
in relation to the aggregate naval strength of the Members of
the British Commonwealth of Nations should be in the proportion
of 35:100. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom regard
this proposal as a contribution of the greatest importance to
the cause of future naval limitation. They further believe that
the agreement which they have now reached with the German
Government and which they regard as a permanent and definite
agreement as from to-day between the two Governments...”
THE PRESIDENT: This is a well-known document, and the Tribunal will take
judicial notice of it, of course. It is not necessary to read it all.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well. I should nevertheless like to point out that,
according to Point 2f of this document, the British Government
recognized that, as far as submarines were concerned, Germany should be
allowed the same number as Britain. At that time that amounted to about
52,000 tons, or rather more than 100 U-boats. The Government of the
German Reich, however, voluntarily undertook to restrict itself to 45
percent of the total submarine tonnage of the British Empire.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you and the Navy regard such
considerable restrictions as the basis for Germany’s peaceful
development, and was it received favorably by the Navy in general?
RAEDER: Yes, as I have already said, it was received with greatest
satisfaction.
DR. SIEMERS: Since a judgment formed some years ago carries more weight
than a declaration made now in the course of the Trial, I wish to submit
Document Number Raeder-12, Document Book 1, Page 64. This document deals
with a communication made by Grossadmiral Raeder for the information of
the Officers’ Corps. It is dated 15 July 1935, a month after the signing
of the naval agreement. Raeder says—and I quote the second paragraph:
“The agreement resulted from the Führer’s decision to fix the
ratio of the fleets of Germany and the British Empire at 35:100.
This decision, which was based on considerations of European
politics, formed the starting point of the London conferences.
In spite of initial opposition from England, we held inflexibly
to our decision; and our demands were granted in their entirety.
The Führer’s decision was based on the desire to exclude the
possibility of antagonism between Germany and England in the
future and so to exclude forever the possibility of naval
rivalry between the two countries.”
A sentence on Page 66 is also important. I wish to ask the High Tribunal
to take judicial notice of the rest of it:
“By this agreement, the building-up of the German Navy to the
extent fixed by the Führer was formally approved by England.”
This is followed by individual statements as to tonnage.
Then I should like to call attention to the final sentence, which is
indicative of Raeder’s attitude at the time:
“This agreement represents a signal success in the political
sphere since it is the first step towards a practical
understanding and signifies the first relaxation of the
inflexible front so far maintained against Germany by our former
opponents and implacably demonstrated again at Stresa.”
DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, were the lines of peaceful development laid
down by you at that time followed in the next years?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I should like to submit Document
Raeder-13. This is a document which enables me—in order to save
time—to dispense with the testimony here in Court of Vice Admiral
Lohmann. This document will be found in Document Book 1, Page 68, and is
entitled, “The New Plan for the Development of the German Navy,” and is
a standard work. It is a speech made by Vice Admiral Lohmann in the
summer of 1935 at the Hanseatic University in Hamburg. I ask the High
Tribunal to take judicial notice of the essential points of this
document; and as this is an authoritative work done at the request of
the High Command, I may perhaps just quote the following. Admiral
Lohmann sets forth first of all that since we now had the liberty to
recruit and arm troops, the Navy was then free of restrictions, but that
that was not Hitler’s view. I now quote:
“The Führer, however, chose another way. He preferred to
negotiate on German naval armament direct with Britain which, as
our former adversary”—I beg your pardon; I am quoting from Page
70—“has tried for years to show understanding for our difficult
position.”
And on Page 71 Lohmann speaks about misleading reports published in the
press, _et cetera_, and continues literally:
“All the more surprising, then, was the ratification of the
treaty which expressed the full agreement of both governments
and did not, like some armament treaties of former time, leave
more embitterment than understanding in its wake. The sense of
fairness which British statesmen have retained, despite the
frequently dirty ways of higher politics, came through when
confronted with the unreserved sincerity of the German
declarations, the dignified firmness of the German
representatives, and the passionate desire for peace inspiring
the speeches and acts of our Führer. Unlike former times, the
speeches of the British leaders expressed respect and
recognition. We have acknowledged this as a sign of honest
willingness to understand. The voices from the circles of
British war veterans are hardly less valuable than the attitude
of the official leaders. In November 1918, for instance, when
the German Fleet was taken by British squadrons to be interned
in Scapa Flow, the British Commander-in-Chief, Lord Beatty, the
great foe of our Admiral Hipper, sent the famous signal, ‘Do not
forget that the enemy is a contemptible beast.’ This Grand
Admiral expressed his dislike for Germany on many occasions, but
on 26 June this same Lord Beatty stated in the House of Lords,
‘I am of the opinion that we should be grateful to the Germans.
They came to us with hands outstretched, announcing that they
agreed to the ratio of 35:100.’ If they had submitted other
proposals, we could not have prevented them. We may be truly
grateful for the fact that there is at least one country in the
world whose competition in regard to armament we do not need to
fear.”
Then I should like to refer to Page 73, which limits battleships to
35,000 tons. This limitation plays a part in the Prosecution Document
C-23. The fact that in this document next to the words “Panama Canal”
are placed the words “battleships 35,000 tons” has a certain
significance. The limitation to 35,000 tons is not so decisive and
important as the Prosecution would like us to believe. This is the
origin: The United States of America at that time wanted to limit the
tonnage to 35,000 tons on account of the width and depth of the Panama
Canal, for the Panama Canal would have had to be enlarged in order to
admit ships of greater tonnage. I shall return to this point later since
this limit of 35,000 tons was not maintained.
Then as evidence of the basis for comparison with German U-boats, I
should like to point to Page 76 where the figure mentioned is 52,700
tons. It is a historical fact—which is set down here—that France took
no part in this limitation and at that time was the strongest U-boat
power with her 96,000 tons, 96 ready and 15 under construction. It is
also a historical fact that Germany—and this is shown on the same
page—had agreed to abolish submarines, having had to destroy 315 after
the first World War.
Grossadmiral, did this accord with the British Fleet apparent in these
documents show itself on another, or on any particular occasion?
RAEDER: I tried to maintain this good understanding and to express these
sentiments to the British Navy as, for instance, when I was informed of
the death of Admiral Jellicoe through a phone call from an English news
agency. He stood against us as the head of the English Fleet in the
first World War, and we always considered him a very chivalrous
opponent. Through this agency I gave a message to the English Fleet.
THE PRESIDENT: I doubt if this really has any effect on the issues we
have to consider.
RAEDER: In any event, I tried to bring about a good understanding with
the British Navy for the future and to maintain this good understanding.
DR. SIEMERS: On 17 July 1937 a further German-English Naval Agreement
was signed. I am submitting this document as Document Raeder-14,
Document Book 1, Page 81. This is a rather lengthy document only part of
which has been translated and printed in the document book; and in order
to understand the violation with which the Prosecution charge us, I must
refer to several of the points contained in this document.
The agreement concerns the limitation of naval armaments and
particularly the exchange of information on naval construction. In
Article 4 we find the limitation of battleships to 35,000 tons, which
has already been mentioned; and in Articles 11 and 12—which I will not
read because of their technical nature but would ask the Tribunal to
take note of—both governments are bound to report annually the naval
construction program. This must be done during the first 4 months of
each calendar year, and details about certain ships—big ships in
particular—4 months before they are laid down. For a better
understanding of the whole matter, which has been made the basis of a
charge against the defendants in connection with the naval agreement, I
may refer to Articles 24 to 26. The three articles show...
THE PRESIDENT: Can you summarize these articles?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I did not intend to read them, Your Honor. I just want
to quote a point or two from them.
These articles enumerate the conditions under which either partner to
the agreement could deviate from it. From the start, therefore, it was
considered permissible under certain conditions to deviate from the
agreement, if, for instance, (Article 24) one of the partners became
involved in war, or (Article 25) if another power, such as the United
States or France or Japan, were to build or purchase a vessel larger
than those provided for in the agreement. In this article express
reference is made to Article 4—that is, to battleships of 35,000
tons—in the case of deviation, the only obligation was to notify one’s
partner. Article 26 states a very general basis for deviation from the
agreement—namely, in cases where the security of the nation demands it
such deviation is held to be justified. No further details are necessary
at this point.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom):
My Lord, the deviation is subject to notification of the other party
under Subarticle 2. It was just relevant in Article 26—any deviation is
subject to notification to the other party of the deviation to be
embarked on.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it, Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, of course. I believe...
THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution say that this agreement was broken?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. With reference to the remarks just made by Sir David,
I would like to say that I pointed out that such deviation was permitted
under these conditions, but that there was an obligation to notify the
other partners. Perhaps that did not come through before.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Was this agreement concluded, Admiral, in
1937, from the same point of view which you have already stated? Are
there any other noteworthy facts which led to the agreement?
RAEDER: In 1936, as well as I remember, the treaties so far made by
England with other powers expired, and England was therefore eager to
renew these treaties in the course of 1936. The fact that we were
invited in 1937 to join in a new agreement by all powers meant that
Germany would henceforth be completely included in these treaties.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have accused you of violating this
German-English Naval Agreement, and this charge is based on Document
C-23, Exhibit USA-49, in the British Delegation’s Document Book 10, Page
3. This document is dated 18 February 1938. It has been mentioned
repeatedly in these proceedings and begins as follows, “The actual
displacement of the battleships _Scharnhorst_, _Gneisenau_ and _F/G_ is
in both cases 20 percent greater than the displacement stated to the
British.” Then we find a list which shows that the displacement of the
_Scharnhorst_ was given as 26,000 tons but was actually 31,300 tons, and
that the draught stated one meter less than was actually the case. And
the “F” class, that is, the _Bismarck_ and _Tirpitz_, were listed as
35,000 tons but had an actual displacement of 41,700 and a difference of
80 centimeters in draught. Therefore, according to what we have seen,
there is an evident infringement of the treaty. Grossadmiral, I am
assuming that you do not dispute this violation of the treaty?
RAEDER: No, in no way.
DR. SIEMERS: Certainly, at the time of this document there were only
four battleships in question: _Scharnhorst_, _Gneisenau_, _Bismarck_,
and _Tirpitz_...
THE PRESIDENT: It seems you are again stating these things to the
Tribunal, making statements instead of asking questions of the witness.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe, Mr. President, that I was incorporating my
documentary evidence in order to show the connection, so as to make
clear what we are dealing with. I was about to put the question: Were
the four battleships mentioned actually in commission when this document
was drawn up?
RAEDER: No, they had not yet been commissioned.
DR. SIEMERS: None of these four battleships?
RAEDER: No.
DR. SIEMERS: If I am permitted to do so, I may say that the exact dates
on which these ships were commissioned—dates which the defendant can
hardly repeat from memory—can be seen from Point IV of Lohmann’s
affidavit, Document Number Raeder-2.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you must prove them. You cannot state them
without proving them.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, certainly, Your Honor.
I am referring to Document Number Raeder-2, which has been submitted to
the Tribunal already. This is the affidavit by Lohmann, on Page 5. I
quote from Document Book 1, Page 8:
“Within the limits defined by the German-English Naval
Agreement, the German Navy commissioned four battleships. I
append the dates of laying down the keel, launching, and
commissioning, as far as I can still determine them.
_Scharnhorst_: laid down keel, exact date cannot be determined;
launched, 3 October 1936; commissioned, 7 January 1939.
_Gneisenau_: laid down keel, date cannot be determined;
launched, 8 December 1936; commissioned, 31 May 1938.
_Bismarck_: laid down keel, 1936; launched, 14 February 1939;
commissioned, 2 August 1940. _Tirpitz_: laid down keel, 1936;
launched, 1 April 1939; commissioned, 1941.”
Admiral Lohmann was unable to ascertain the exact date. The “H”—I may
add that the other ships mentioned under Document C-23 were planned but
were broken up later. They had already been broken up in the summer of
1939, and this applies only to the first “H.” So far there is no
question of final preparation or construction. Since an obvious
violation of the treaty exists, we now have to consider in what light
this violation should be regarded. The Prosecution have said that this
violation of the treaty is criminal since it implies intended
aggression. In order to save time, especially since technical problems
are involved, I should like, before questioning the defendant further,
to submit Document Number Raeder-15, within the scope of the documentary
evidence which I have submitted with the Tribunal’s permission. In my
opinion, this document proves that there was no intention of aggression.
Document Number Raeder-15 is an affidavit—I beg your pardon—it is in
Document Book 1, Page 94. This document deals with an affidavit deposed
before a notary at Hamburg by Dr. Ing. h.c. Wilhelm Süchting and is
important for the refutation of Document C-23, and for that purpose I
should like to quote:
“I am the former Director of the shipbuilding yard of Blohm &
Voss in Hamburg. I was with this firm from 1937 to 1945”—pardon
me—“from 1907 to 1945 and I am conversant with all questions
concerning the construction of warships and merchant ships. In
particular, as an engineer I had detailed information about the
building of battleships for the German Navy. Dr. Walter Siemers,
attorney at law of Hamburg, presented to me the Document C-23,
dated 18 February 1938, and asked me to comment on it. This
document shows that the Navy, contrary to the previous
agreement, informed the British that the battleships
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_—as well as other intended
constructions—had a displacement and draught of about 20
percent less than was actually the case.
“I can give some details to explain why this information was
given. I assume that the information given to the
British—information which according to naval agreement 4 had to
be supplied 4 months before the keel was laid down—was based on
the fact that the battleships _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ were
originally intended to have a displacement of 26,000 tons and a
draught of 7.50 meters and the battleship “F” (_Bismarck_) a
displacement of 35,000 tons and a draught of 7.90 meters, as
stated.
“If these battleships were afterwards built with a greater
displacement and a greater draught, the changes were the result
of orders given or requests made by the Navy while the plans
were being drafted and which the construction office had to
carry out. The changes were based upon the viewpoint repeatedly
expressed by the Navy—namely, to build the battleships in such
a way that they would be as nearly unsinkable as possible. The
increase of the tonnage was not meant to increase the offensive
power of the ship”—I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I shall be
finished in a moment—“The increase of the tonnage was not meant
to increase the offensive power of the ship but was done for
defensive and protective purposes.”
I may perhaps point out that in the English text there is a mistake in
translation. In this text the word “not” is missing. It should read,
“was not meant,” and not “meant.”
“As time went on, the Navy attached more and more importance to
dividing the hull of the battleship into a greater number of
compartments in order to make the ship as unsinkable as possible
and to afford the maximum protection in case of leakage. The new
battleships were therefore built broad in the beam with many
bulkheads, only about ten meters apart, and many longitudinal
and latitudinal bulkheads outside the torpedo bulkhead. At the
same time, both the vertical and the horizontal armor-plating
were, as far as my information goes, heavier and composed of
larger plates than those used by other navies. In order...”
THE PRESIDENT: In other words, his explanation is that they were altered
in the course of construction for technical reasons. It does not matter
what the technical reasons are.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, but I do believe that
when we are dealing with a clearly-established violation of a treaty,
the manner of this violation is of some importance. I do not believe
that each and every violation of a treaty can be described as a war
crime. The point is whether this violation of the treaty was a war crime
in the sense of the Charter—in other words, whether it was motivated by
the intention of waging a war of aggression. An insignificant violation
of a kind which, after all, is found in every commercial lawsuit cannot
be a crime.
THE PRESIDENT: The affidavit is before us. We shall read it. In fact,
you have already read the material parts of it.
Now, I think we had better adjourn. How long do you expect to be?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it is very difficult for me to judge that
accurately, but I imagine I shall be able to conclude sometime tomorrow.
I hope, Mr. President, that I shall be able to conclude at noon; but I
am asking Your Honor to take into consideration the fact that I am
incorporating my documentary proof in the interrogation and that this
documentary proof, which in many other cases has taken hours to present,
is thus dealt with simultaneously.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hope that you will make your presentation as
short as you possibly can. We have already been so long a time over this
defendant.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I must first make a formal request, namely,
that in addition to my own secretary I may have another here in Court.
She was here this morning but has just been told that she may not come
into the courtroom, and she is now standing outside the door.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
[_The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand._]
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Grossadmiral, you just saw the affidavit of Dr.
Süchting. I ask you: Is it true, or rather—not to confuse you I will
ask—on what did the Navy base its ideas about enlarging the battleships
by about 20 percent?
RAEDER: Originally there was no intention to enlarge the ships by 20
percent. But at the time when we resumed battleship construction, when
we could see that we would have a very small number of battleships in
any case, it occurred to us that the resistance to sinking of ships
should be increased as much as possible to render the few we had as
impregnable as possible. It had nothing to do with stronger armament or
anything like that, but merely with increasing the resistance to sinking
and to enemy guns. For this reason a new system was worked out at that
time in order to increase and strengthen the subdivision of the space
within the ship. This meant that a great deal of new iron had to be
built into the ships. Thereby the draught and the displacement were
enlarged. This was unfortunate from my point of view, for we had
designed the ships with a comparatively shallow draught. The mouths of
our rivers, the Elbe, Weser, Jade, are so shallow that ships with a deep
draught cannot navigate all stages of the rivers. Therefore, we had
these ships built broad, intending to give them a shallow draught; but
by building in these many new latitudinal and longitudinal bulkheads, we
increased the draught and also the displacement.
DR. SIEMERS: Were these disadvantageous changes, which took place during
construction, due in part to a comparatively limited experience in
battleship construction?
RAEDER: Yes. Since the designers in the High Command of the Navy and the
designers and engineers in the big shipyards had not built any heavy
warships for a very long time, they lacked experience. As a result, the
High Command of the Navy had to issue supplementary orders to the
shipyards. This in itself was a drawback which I tried hard to overcome.
DR. SIEMERS: Did the construction of these four battleships surpass the
total tonnage accorded by the naval agreement?
RAEDER: No, the total tonnage was not overstepped until the beginning of
the war.
DR. SIEMERS: Your Honors, in this connection I should like to refer to
Document Raeder-8, which has already been submitted in Raeder Document