THE SPANISH MARRIAGES[831]
At the close of the year 1845, when Peel had resigned office on
account of the dissensions in his Cabinet on the question of the
Corn Laws, Lord John Russell had in vain attempted to form a
government. His failure had been due to the objections urged by Lord
Grey to Palmerston's return to the Foreign Office.[832] Peel had,
in consequence, agreed to withdraw his resignation and to carry on
the government. But it was soon clear that the Protectionists, if
they could not prevent the passage of his Corn Bill, would certainly
encompass his downfall at the first opportunity. Palmerston, under
these circumstances, judged it advisable to take steps to remove the
impression that his nomination as Foreign Secretary would create alarm
in France and imperil "the cordial understanding." He, accordingly,
decided to visit Paris with the object of dispelling this idea. His
intimate knowledge of the French language and his considerable powers
of conversation, combined with the personal charm of Lady Palmerston,
soon achieved the desired result. In the previous month of December,
the prospect that "_ce terrible Lord Palmerston_" would be once again
at the Foreign Office had spread dismay in ministerial circles.
But, in the following spring, when he returned to England, after a
few weeks' stay in Paris, the amiable qualities and the friendly
dispositions of "_ce cher Lord Palmerston_" were the chief topic of
conversation in the political _salons_.[833]
Louis Philippe and his Foreign Minister had been most disagreeably
surprised by the disclosure of the proposal made by Christina to
the Duke of Saxe-Coburg. Lord Aberdeen's straightforward conduct
in the affair could not undo the fact that the Queen-Mother had
deliberately, and without the knowledge of the French ambassador,
opened a negotiation for the marriage of Isabella to a prince,
who was not a descendant of Philip V. In pursuance of this policy
the Duke of Sotomayor, the Spanish ambassador in London, had been
instructed to inquire officially in what light the British government
would regard the selection of a prince, who was not a Bourbon, as
the future husband of the Queen. To this question Lord Aberdeen had
replied that, "should it be found that no descendant of Philip V.
could safely be chosen, consistently with the happiness of the Queen
or with a due regard to the tranquillity of the country, it could be
no cause of displeasure to Great Britain were a prince from some other
family to be selected." He could not believe that in such a case "the
enlightened Court of the Tuileries" would interfere. "But, if contrary
to all reason and probability, an attempt were made to control the
wishes and feelings of the Queen and the clearly understood will of
her people, Spain would not only receive the warmest sympathy of Great
Britain but of all Europe."[834]
M. Guizot appears to have been even more annoyed than Louis Philippe
at Christina's proposal to the Coburgs. He is said, indeed, to
have attempted to persuade the King to counteract it, by demanding
the hand of Isabella for his son Montpensier. But neither Louis
Philippe nor the young Duke himself were prepared to resort to so
extreme a measure. The King, for the present, was content to address
acrimonious complaints to Christina,[835] and to instruct M. Bresson
to make a strong representation to the Spanish ministers.[836] At the
same time, both he and M. Guizot decided to take steps to effect a
reconciliation between the Queen-Mother and General Narvaez, whose
return to power they regarded as essential to the success of their
plans. Meanwhile, Jarnac spoke of Palmerston, with whom he had had his
first interview on July 14, as "fairly well intentioned and rather
timid." This description of his attitude, M. Guizot admitted, was
most satisfactory. "Nevertheless, between him and me," he pointed out
to his royal master, "there can be nothing more than a marriage of
reason." He purposed, therefore, so to arrange matters that he might
be enabled to communicate his views directly to Lord John Russell.
"It will require nice handling to speak to one about foreign affairs
without offending the other. But, on occasions, we may have to do
so."[837]
Bresson appears to have expressed himself strongly in favour of
abandoning the Trapani marriage. In his opinion the matter resolved
itself simply into choosing one of the sons of Don Francisco. Jarnac
was, accordingly, instructed to propose to Lord Palmerston that these
two princes should be the objects of the joint support of France and
England. "London," wrote M. Guizot to Louis Philippe, "will certainly
favour Don Enrique, on account of his intimate connection with the
_Progressistas_. . . . Evidently Cadiz would be the best selection
for the Queen, Spain, and ourselves. Nevertheless, I do not think it
advisable to propose him directly."[838] Although Christina's overture
to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg at Lisbon had been made early in June, no
answer had yet been returned to it. The prudent Coburgs would seem to
have regarded it as inexpedient to incur the lasting enmity of Louis
Philippe, for the sake of seeing a member of their family raised to
the position of King-Consort of Spain. Upon his arrival in England,
at the end of June, the Duke was strongly advised in this sense both
by King Leopold and by Prince Albert. He, accordingly, resolved to
reject Christina's offer, on the ground of the injury which must
result to Spain from a marriage contracted in opposition to the wishes
of France.[839] This decision, however, would not appear to have been
communicated directly to Louis Philippe. Nevertheless, the private
letters, during the months of July and August, both of Bresson and
Guizot, show plainly that they were aware that the Coburgs had no
intention of entertaining the Queen-Mother's proposal.[840]
Palmerston, whilst in opposition, appears to have known nothing of
the details of the Spanish marriage question. Until informed of it
by Aberdeen, with whom he had a long conversation in the first days
of July, he was completely ignorant of Christina's proposal to the
Coburgs.[841] From 1834 to 1841, however, he had constantly been
engaged in combating the _Moderados_, and, upon his return to office
in 1846, he at once reverted to his former policy of favouring the
_Progressistas_. Under these circumstances, the candidature of Don
Enrique, whose connection with the extreme wing of the Liberal party
had been the cause of his exile and disgrace, would naturally enlist
his approval and support. Nevertheless, in his first communication to
Mr. Bulwer, he expressed no preference for any particular candidate.
Spanish affairs, he wrote in his famous despatch of July 19, appeared
to be divided into two questions--the marriage of the Queen and the
condition of the country. In respect to the first, he had nothing
to add to those instructions with which Bulwer had been supplied
by his predecessor in office. There were three candidates in the
field--Prince Leopold of Coburg and the two sons of Don Francisco de
Paula--and "Her Majesty's government could only hope that the choice
might fall upon the one most likely to secure the happiness of the
Queen and promote the welfare of the Spanish nation." The greater part
of the despatch, however, was concerned with the second question--the
political condition of the country. On that point, although Lord
Palmerston had no particular instructions to give, he had some very
severe criticisms to offer. "After a struggle of now thirty-four
years' duration for constitutional freedom, Spain," he declared,
"finds herself under a system of government almost as arbitrary in
practice, whatever it may be in theory, as any which has existed in
any former period of her history. She has indeed a Parliament, but
all freedom for discussion has been overborne by force. . . . There
is, indeed, by law liberty of the press, but that liberty has, by
the arbitrary acts of the government, been reduced to the liberty of
publishing what may be agreeable to the executive. . . . This system
of violence seems, in some degree, to have survived the fall of its
author[842] and not to have been as yet entirely abandoned by the
more moderate men who have succeeded him in the government. . . . It
was certainly not for the purpose of subjecting the Spanish nation
to a grinding tyranny that Great Britain entered into the Quadruple
Alliance and gave that active assistance, which contributed so
materially to the expulsion of Don Carlos from Spain. . . ."[843]
This despatch was not to be communicated to the Spanish Minister for
Foreign Affairs, but was intended to enable Mr. Bulwer to express,
"to those persons who might have the power of remedying the existing
evils," the opinions of his government upon the state of the country.
But, having sent it to Madrid, Palmerston, on July 20, confidentially
informed M. de Jarnac of its contents and allowed him to be supplied
with a copy of it. It is plain that he must have had some reason for
thus communicating to the French _chargé d'affaires_ a despatch,
replete with sentiments which could not but be otherwise than very
distasteful to his government. Without doubt, he must have known
that Bulwer's instructions would be at once passed on from Paris to
Madrid, and it can only, therefore, be supposed that he wished the
Spanish ministers to learn in this manner exactly what he thought
about them. Perhaps, also, he was not sorry that M. Guizot should
have an opportunity of realizing the very low estimation in which he
held his political friends, the _Moderados_. To the marriage question
he obviously attached little importance, and his remarks upon that
subject were, doubtless, drawn up far less carefully than those which
had reference to the actual condition of Spain.
Louis Philippe, at this time, was somewhat disturbed by a letter from
M. Bresson to M. Guizot, dated July 12, in which the ambassador gave a
lengthy account of his recent proceedings at Madrid. The Queen-Mother,
he reported, urged various objections to the Duke of Cadiz.
"Isabella," she declared, "had an insurmountable aversion to him and
she herself had grave doubts about his virility. This last statement,"
wrote M. Bresson, "took us upon very delicate ground. She adverted
to his voice, his hips, and his general bodily conformation, and I
replied by insisting that his rigid morality was to be ascribed solely
to his consuming passion for the Queen, her daughter. Furthermore, I
pointed out, that his desire to marry was inconsistent with the idea
that he was incapable of fulfilling the conditions of matrimony."
Christina's opinion upon that point was probably little influenced by
arguments such as these. But, when M. Bresson took upon himself to
assure her that, "in any Bourbon combination" the marriage of the Duc
de Montpensier with the Infanta could be announced simultaneously with
that of the Queen, she received the information with "every appearance
of sincere pleasure." Rianzarez also expressed to him his satisfaction
with this arrangement, which would remove the great political
objection to the Queen's marriage with Cadiz or, even, with Trapani.
Bresson, however, was of opinion that her union with the former could
be effected more easily and expeditiously than with the latter, and
he, accordingly, suggested that his regiment should be brought to
Madrid, in order that, "by constantly seeing him, Isabella might grow
accustomed to his voice and hips."[844]
The Queens, Louis Philippe declared at once, must be given to
understand clearly that Bresson had no right to promise that the
two marriages would be concluded simultaneously. He was not to be
moved from this decision by Guizot's insinuation that possibly the
ambassador had not gone quite so far as His Majesty imagined. On the
contrary, he replied, he had very little doubt that he had committed
himself even more deeply than he admitted. It was while he was in this
mood that Jarnac's copy of Palmerston's despatch of July 19 reached
Paris. A perusal of its contents caused the King a considerable amount
of annoyance,[845] yet it would not appear to have weakened his
determination to insist upon the disavowal of M. Bresson.[846] But the
question, as to how far the despatch of July 19 was responsible for
the final decision of Louis Philippe, will be discussed later on.
Although in his official instructions he had expressed no preference
for any particular candidate, Palmerston soon informed Bulwer,
privately, that Don Enrique was the British candidate.[847] The
selection of that prince called forth no objections from M. de
Jarnac. On the contrary, as late as August 16, he gave Palmerston
definitely to understand that, provided he would adhere to that
arrangement, France would join with him in pressing it upon the
Court of Madrid.[848] Bulwer, however, was filled with dismay on
learning that he was expected to support the suit of Don Enrique.
He had little fault to find with him personally. He considered him
manly, enterprising and ambitious, and described him as resembling
in many respects Prince Louis Napoleon.[849] There was one objection
to him, however, and that was an insuperable one--nothing short of a
successful revolution would induce Christina to accept him. "Let me
caution your Lordship again and again," he wrote on August 4, "against
appearing to listen to the counsels of the _Progressistas_ and Don
Enrique, if you wish to retain the confidence of the palace."[850]
No sooner was Palmerston installed at the Foreign Office, than Bulwer,
reverting to his former scheme, began to plead earnestly in favour
of the Coburg marriage. France, he maintained, in order to carry out
successfully her plans of aggrandisement in Algeria, Morocco, Tunis
and Egypt must exercise a paramount influence at Madrid. It followed,
therefore, that all her ambitious designs would be checkmated by the
Queen's marriage outside the Bourbon line. "The policy of maintaining
good relations with France," he was not disposed to dispute it, "was
a great and wise policy. But what would happen," he asked, "were
Louis Philippe to die? In that event would not the power of a great
military nation fall into the hands of three or four enterprising
young men, burning for glory in their several careers? The policy of
good relations with France depended," he much feared, "upon the life
of a man of seventy-four and upon the well or the ill-directed aim of
an assassin."[851] The Coburg marriage, Christina assured him, could
still be arranged. Let the management of the affair be entrusted to
him and he would undertake to bring it to a successful conclusion.
France would oppose it vigorously, and it must, therefore, be prepared
in secrecy. Indeed, he acknowledged that his plan must needs "wear
the aspect of an intrigue, in order to avoid the effects of an
intrigue."[852]
Palmerston, however, was not to be diverted from his intention by
these arguments. The Court, the government, and the Coburgs themselves
were alike agreed that Louis Philippe's hostility to it had rendered
the Spanish proposal unacceptable. On August 22, therefore, he
addressed a lengthy despatch to Bulwer, in which he laid it down as
the deliberate opinion of the British government that Don Enrique was
the most suitable candidate.[853] But, before this communication could
reach Madrid, the affair to which it referred had been definitely
settled. The French government had not failed to turn its knowledge
of Palmerston's dispatch of July 19 to account. M. Bresson, in
pursuance of M. Guizot's[854] instructions, had been busily engaged in
representing it as a declaration of hostility against the _Moderado_
government in Madrid. Nuñoz, the brother of the Duke of Rianzarez,
informed Mr. Bulwer that all hope of arranging the Coburg marriage
had been abandoned, that Palmerston "would listen to no other
alliance but that of Don Enrique, who is looked upon by the Court as
an open adversary and a disguised rebel," and that a _Progressista_
insurrection was being prepared in London.[855] Only a week after
he had transmitted this news, the British minister, on August 29,
reported that the Queen, the night before at 12 o'clock, had made
up her mind in favour of Don Francisco de Asis, Duke of Cadiz.
Furthermore, he had to inform Lord Palmerston that the marriage of
the Duc de Montpensier would take place at the same time. "I learn,"
he wrote in conclusion, "that directly the Queen had signified her
intention of marrying her cousin, Count Bresson formally asked the
hand of the Infanta for the Duke of Montpensier, stating that he had
powers to enter upon and conclude that affair."[856]
M. Guizot, on September 1, communicated this news to Lord Normanby,
the new British ambassador in Paris.[857] Palmerston, who was
yachting with Her Majesty on the south coast of England, received
the information of the conclusion of the double marriage in a letter
from the Comte de Jarnac. Louis Philippe eluded the disagreeable
task of apprising Queen Victoria that he had broken his compact, by
allowing his own Queen, Marie Amélie, to convey the intelligence
to her. The reply which she received was short and cold. "You will
remember," wrote Queen Victoria, "what passed between the King and
myself at Eu. . . . You will, doubtless, have heard that, in order
to be agreeable to your King, we declined to arrange the marriage
of our cousin, Prince Leopold, with the Queen of Spain. . . . You
will, therefore, easily understand that the sudden announcement of
this double marriage could only cause us surprise and the keenest
regret. . ."[858]
M. Guizot explained his conduct by referring to the _Memorandum of
February 27, 1846_, of the existence of which Palmerston was now for
the first time informed. In that document France had reserved to
herself the right of departing from the agreement at Eu, should at any
time a Coburg marriage appear "imminent or probable." Palmerston's
inclusion of Prince Leopold among the available candidates in his
despatch of July 19, combined with Christina's overture at Lisbon,
in the previous month of May, had created a situation, M. Guizot
insisted, which released France from all her engagements. But,
although he firmly maintained this contention and instructed M. de
Jarnac to hold the same language in London, his conduct was not that
of a man confident in the justice of his cause. Besides attempting
to induce Lord Aberdeen to declare that, under the circumstances, a
departure from the compact at Eu was permissible, he drew up a bitter
attack upon Lord Palmerston and sent it to Jarnac with instructions
to forward it to Lord John Russell. But in both cases he met with
disappointment. Aberdeen told him frankly that he could not adopt his
view of the case, and that he had no fault to find with the language
or the conduct of his successor in office.[859] John Russell showed
his letter to Palmerston, and informed M. de Jarnac that his colleague
had his hearty approval and support.[860] Louis Philippe, meanwhile,
had compiled a lengthy statement of his case and had sent it to
his daughter, the Queen of the Belgians, in order that it might be
placed before Queen Victoria. But neither his laboured attempts to
extenuate his own conduct nor his insinuations about Lord Palmerston
produced the desired effect. After a careful consideration of his
letter, replied the Queen on September 27, she had failed to discover
any reasons which could justify him in breaking his promise. She had
arrived at this conclusion, she begged him to believe, "by the help
of her own eyes," not, as he had suggested, by the aid of those of
Lord Palmerston.[861]
The protests of the Queen, however, were as ineffectual as the
official remonstrances of Bulwer at Madrid and of Normanby in Paris.
On October 10, 1846, the double marriage was duly solemnized at the
palace, in the hall called "_de Embajadores_." The British minister
was not present at the ceremony, which was witnessed by a great crowd
of persons. "One _viva_ only was heard, and that not very loud,
when the Infante Don Francisco descended from his carriage."[862]
Louis Philippe and M. Guizot had attained their object, but they had
sacrificed "the cordial understanding." In England, the authors of
the Spanish marriages stood condemned by the Court, by the Cabinet,
and by public opinion. There was no thought of an appeal to arms, but
it was felt that in the future the relations of the two governments
could no longer be carried on in the same spirit of close and friendly
intimacy. Palmerston, founding his case upon the renunciation made at
the Peace of Utrecht[863] by the Duc d'Orléans of that day, sought to
induce the Powers to declare that any children, which might be born
to the Duc de Montpensier and the Infanta, would be excluded from
succeeding to the Spanish throne. Throughout Europe, however, there
were ominous signs of a recrudescence of the revolutionary spirit,
and Metternich, in consequence, had strong reasons for desiring to
propitiate Louis Philippe and M. Guizot. He, therefore, refused to
pronounce himself and simply adopted an attitude of neutrality, taking
care to point out that the trouble could never have arisen, had the
legitimist principle been upheld and had Don Carlos been enthroned.
Russia and Prussia, which like Austria had never acknowledged the
sovereignty of Isabella, followed the example of the Court of Vienna
and declined to be drawn into the controversy.
Palmerston's conduct was, unquestionably, ill-advised in thus
attempting to apply to Spain, in the middle of the nineteenth century,
the stipulations of diplomatic instruments framed when the conditions
of Europe were very different. But, if his objections to the Infanta's
marriage, founded upon the Treaty of Utrecht, were unsuccessful, he
was afforded the satisfaction of completely refuting the pleas set up
by M. Guizot in justification of his actions. The argument which forms
the main contention of his despatches, both of October 31, 1846 and
of January 8, 1847, is unanswerable. The _Memorandum of February 27,
1846_, to which the French government attached so much importance was,
he pointed out, unofficial and verbal. No record of it was to be found
at the Foreign Office. M. de Jarnac had never mentioned it to him,
"until after the event had happened for which it was now quoted as a
justification." But, "even admitting for the sake of argument that Her
Majesty's present government were to be held bound by it, how could it
justify a departure from the engagement of Eu? The imminent danger,
specified in that _memorandum_, was the likelihood that either the
Queen or the Infanta should be about immediately to marry a foreign
Prince, not being a descendant of Philip V. But if that likelihood had
ever existed, it had at all events ceased to exist, when M. Bresson
demanded the hand of the Infanta for the Duc de Montpensier. Not only
had it then ceased to exist, but with respect to the Queen, whose
marriage was then the immediate and only subject of discussion, it
had been succeeded by an impossibility; because when Count Bresson
demanded the hand of the Infanta the marriage of the Queen to the
Infant Don Francisco had actually been resolved upon and settled."[864]
Both in the French Chambers and in the British Parliament the Spanish
marriages were the subject of debate, at the opening of the session of
1847. The publication of the English _blue-book_ created a profound
sensation in France.[865] After reading the correspondence, no one
could any longer maintain that England had encouraged the candidature
of Prince Leopold of Coburg, or that Louis Philippe had been justified
in breaking the agreement of Eu. Nevertheless, in spite of the light
which was thus thrown upon the proceedings which led up to the
marriages, the true history of the case was only imperfectly revealed.
Even to-day, the real motives which actuated some of the principal
actors in the affair are still largely a matter of conjecture.
Palmerston[866] himself believed, and his opinion has been adopted by
the majority of English writers, that a secret understanding existed
between Christina and Louis Philippe. The Queen-Mother's overture to
the Duke of Saxe-Coburg has been represented as a trap craftily laid
for the British government. England, it was calculated, would never
resist the temptation of actively supporting the candidature of Prince
Leopold, and Louis Philippe would, in consequence, be furnished with
a pretext for repudiating his promises.[867] But, plausible as this
explanation of Christina's conduct may sound, it cannot stand the test
of a close examination.
Had the Queen-Mother never manifested any anxiety to marry her
daughter to a Coburg, until she requested Bulwer to transmit her
proposal to Lisbon, her proceedings, it must be admitted, would be
open to grave suspicion. But the facts of the case are very different.
On at least three previous occasions, when she cannot possibly have
been acting in collusion with Louis Philippe, she had declared her
predilection for the Coburg match. In 1838, during the civil war,
she mentioned the matter to Lord Clarendon.[868] In 1841, after her
abdication, when she was living in Paris, she sent Count Toreno to
Lord Cowley to inform him that she regarded a Coburg Prince as the
most suitable husband for Isabella.[869] No sooner was she back at
Madrid, in 1844, than she expressed herself in the same spirit to Mr.
Bulwer.[870] To the very last she appears to have struggled against
the dictation of the King of the French. Finding that the Coburgs were
fearful of incurring the wrath of the Court of the Tuileries, she did
all in her power to persuade Louis Philippe not to insist upon her
daughter's marriage with a Bourbon, "who had none of the qualities
calculated to make her happy." As late as the middle of July, 1846,
she sent the Marquis of Miraflores to Paris to plead her cause with
him. But the "Citizen King" was inflexible. "Royal marriages," he
reminded her, "were not like of those of private individuals."[871]
Nevertheless, she still refused to yield, and when she at last gave
way and compelled the unfortunate Isabella to marry the Duke of Cadiz,
it was the ill-judged intervention of Lord Palmerston which was the
cause of her surrender, not the expostulations and threats of Louis
Philippe.
In Spain, in 1846, the victory of one party over another meant
something more than that a particular set of politicians had been
temporarily replaced in office by their opponents. Disgrace, exile
and even loss of liberty were the fate which generally awaited the
leaders of a defeated party. Christina herself, after the triumph
of the _Progressistas_ in 1836, had had to submit to the insolent
dictation of a band of mutinous sergeants and had seen her _Moderado_
ministers forced to fly from the country. Four years later the same
party, in its hour of victory, had humiliated her as a woman and as
a Queen and had driven her to resign the regency. She was not by
nature vindictive, but she, doubtless, regarded a _Progressista_
with feelings very similar to those which her father or her brother
entertained for a _Carbonaro_. It may be imagined, therefore, with
what dismay she read Palmerston's despatch of July 19. In every
line of it the intention of befriending her enemies was apparent.
Palmerston, it was clear to her, was declaring that Don Enrique was
the only suitable husband for Isabella, simply in order to promote the
fortunes of the _Progressistas_.
Once convinced that the _Moderado régime_ was endangered by the
hostility of Lord Palmerston, Christina determined to comply with
Louis Philippe's demands and thus obtain his protection. The Duke
of Cadiz was hastily summoned to Madrid and Isabella was compelled
to accept him for a husband. It is not absolutely certain whether
the Queen-Mother insisted upon the simultaneous announcement of
Montpensier's marriage with her second daughter, or whether the
proposal came from M. Bresson. It is highly probable, however, that
she made it an indispensable condition to her acceptation of Cadiz.
The fact that the Infanta was betrothed to a son of Louis Philippe
would conciliate the French party and would be looked upon by people,
generally, as some compensation for the extreme insignificance of the
King Consort. Moreover, from her point of view there was another, and
a far stronger reason, in favour of the simultaneous conclusion of the
two marriages. Once the elder brother was the husband of the Queen, it
would be very difficult to prevent the marriage of the younger, Don
Enrique, with the Infanta.[872] That danger could be averted only by
the announcement that she was betrothed to, and was shortly to marry,
Montpensier.
Notwithstanding that he owed his crown to a popular revolution, Louis
Philippe attached the highest importance to the natural alliances of
the Bourbons. The maintenance of relations with Spain on the footing
of consanguinity was, in consequence, the constant aim of his policy.
In the pursuit of this object he found a ready instrument in his
Foreign Minister. By upholding the principle that Isabella's husband
must be a descendant of Philip V., M. Guizot purposed to disprove
the reproach of his opponents that this foreign policy was weak and
subservient to England.[873] His motives are perfectly comprehensible.
But the reasons which induced the King to break the compact of Eu,
by consenting to allow his son's marriage to take place at the same
time as that of the Queen, have never been satisfactorily explained.
Louis Philippe was very angry upon learning, on July 20, 1846, that
M. Bresson, in order to overcome Christina's repugnance to the Duke
of Cadiz, had held out to her the inducement that Montpensier's
marriage with the Infanta might be concluded simultaneously. Turning
a deaf ear to the timid remonstrances of M. Guizot, he insisted upon
the necessity of acquainting the Queen-Mother that his ambassador
had greatly exceeded his instructions. His private correspondence,
discovered at the Tuileries after the Revolution of '48, makes his
sentiments upon that point absolutely clear.[874] Nevertheless, in
the course of the next three weeks all his scruples vanished, and he
allowed M. Bresson to be furnished with the powers necessary for the
conclusion of the double marriage.
According to the official French version of the affair, it was
the despatch of July 19 which caused the King to change his mind.
Seeing that Palmerston had placed Coburg at the head of the list
of candidates, he, rightly or wrongly, conceived that the danger,
specified in the _Memorandum of February 27, 1846_, had become
"probable and imminent," and that he was, in consequence, released
from all his engagements to England. But his secret correspondence
with M. Guizot completely disproves this assertion. In forwarding, on
July 24, the despatch to the King, Guizot himself made no suggestion
of that nature. On the contrary, he expressed the extremely judicious
opinion that Palmerston was very indifferent about Coburg and was
rather trying to regain his influence over the _Progressistas_. Louis
Philippe took the same view of the case. He was greatly annoyed at
the strictures passed upon his friends, the _Moderados_, predicted
that Palmerston's proceedings would lead to the _bouleversement_ of
Spain, but "all that," he wrote, "makes it the more necessary that our
disavowal of the simultaneous marriage plan should reach Christina
at once. The more we suspect bad faith in others the more must we be
careful to keep our own hands clean."[875] The letters published in
the _Revue retrospective_ show that he adhered to these admirable
sentiments for some ten days longer. There is no document, however,
or trustworthy evidence to explain why, probably about August 13 or
14, he suddenly decided to adopt a totally different view of the
matter. Under these circumstances it is only possible to suggest the
following explanation.
Louis Philippe in the question of the Spanish marriages had a twofold
object in view. To his Bourbon policy was subjoined the _bourgeois_
policy of the _père de famille_, who was desirous of obtaining for
his son the large fortune which was supposed to be the portion
of the Infanta. Palmerston, however, was determined to prevent
the accomplishment of this plan. To the well-known instructions
transmitted to Bulwer, on August 22, was appended a despatch, marked
_separate and confidential_, in which he laid down the principle that
Montpensier's marriage with the Infanta "would be as objectionable,
and in some respects more so, than his marriage with the Queen."[876]
It is true that the contents of this despatch were unknown to Louis
Philippe and his agents, and moreover, that before it reached Bulwer's
hands the affair had been concluded. But Guizot was, undoubtedly,
aware of Palmerston's opinions on the subject. Indeed, in a letter to
the King, on August 8, he expressed the fear that, although Coburg
might be abandoned so far as Isabella was concerned, Palmerston
would probably attempt to marry him to the Infanta. "After our first
battle," he wrote, "we shall have to fight another, and a very sharp
one."[877] Louis Philippe himself, a few days later, appears to
have been disturbed by a letter which his Queen had received from
Christina. The tone of it he considered unpleasant, "and it contained
no mention of Montpensier's marriage." . . . "Our situation,"
he informed Guizot, "has, in consequence, much changed for the
worse."[878]
It is evident, therefore, that on August 12, Louis Philippe was
aware that danger threatened his project of marrying his son to the
Infanta from two quarters. Palmerston was resolved to oppose it, and
the Queen-Mother, if not actually hostile to it, was showing some
reluctance to support it. But in the course of the next day or two,
news would probably be received from Madrid of the effect which the
despatch of July 19 had had upon Christina and her ministers. Under
these circumstances, a great effort was, doubtless, made to persuade
the King to give Bresson a free hand. Guizot, Madame Adelaïde,[879]
and other members of his family assuredly represented to him that
the present opportunity must not be allowed to escape. Christina was
thoroughly frightened, and would be prepared to accept both Cadiz and
Montpensier, provided only that the two marriages could take place
simultaneously. Should there be either hesitation or delay, however,
Palmerston would have time to mature his plans, and the Infanta and
her fortune would be lost to them.
If the theory, here put forward, be correct, that it was Palmerston's
hostility to Montpensier's projected marriage which caused Louis
Philippe to break his promise to England, the question arises,
whether, under the circumstances, he was not justified in regarding
himself as released from his engagements. M. Thureau-Dangin[880]
contends that the King, having undertaken at Eu to postpone his son's
marriage with the Infanta until the Queen should have children,
had a right to expect that, in the interval, England should do
nothing to facilitate her marriage with any other prince. Aberdeen,
unquestionably, did not regard the matter in that light. He simply
looked upon Montpensier's marriage with the Infanta as delayed for
several years, until, by the birth of heirs to Isabella, it should
have lost its political significance. Even then, when it should be
less objectionable, he did not consider that England was bound to
consent to it, and, in the meantime, as he pointed out to Peel,
"many things might happen."[881] Palmerston most certainly would
have repudiated the notion that the compact of Eu debarred him from
recommending the alliance of the Infanta with Leopold of Coburg. "We
can admit of no parity of position," he told Jarnac, "between a son
of the King of the French and the third son of a German nobleman as
closely related to the French, as to the British, Royal Family."[882]
M. Guizot, in the _Memorandum of February 27_, undoubtedly declared
that the Bourbon principle applied equally to the Queen and the
Infanta, but he clearly had not much faith in his ability to make good
that contention. He was perfectly aware of Palmerston's sentiments
with respect to Montpensier's marriage, but he never attempted to
argue that, because of them, the King was released from his promise.
Throughout the controversy he confined himself to asserting, what
he knew to be untrue, that Palmerston's proceedings had rendered
"probable and imminent" the alliance of a Coburg prince with Queen
Isabella.
In most English accounts it is taken for granted that Louis Philippe
selected the Duke of Cadiz as a husband for Isabella, in order to
make certain that the succession to the Spanish throne should pass
to the descendants of Montpensier. But the circumstances do not
warrant this assumption. Count Trapani, whose physical fitness was
never called into question, was always his favourite candidate. It
was only in the last resort, when, owing to the unpopularity of the
Neapolitan connection, he was forced to bring forward another Bourbon,
that he fell back upon Cadiz. The suspicions which existed about the
virility of this young prince did not deter the King from seeking to
impose him upon Isabella. He cannot, however, be fairly charged with
having expressly chosen him, because he believed him to be impotent.
Don Enrique and the sons of Don Carlos being for different political
reasons out of the question, he had no option but to renounce his
Bourbon principle, or to insist upon the Queen's marriage with the
Duke of Cadiz.
The experience of England during the eighteenth century had taught
her to look with dread upon the prospect of having to struggle
single-handed against the two Bourbon Powers. The lesson of 1783 was
never forgotten by her statesmen. Under the Restoration, when the
absolute rule of Ferdinand VII. was re-established by French bayonets,
Mr. Canning, to avert the dangers of a close alliance between the
Courts of Madrid and of the Tuileries, acknowledged the revolted
Spanish colonies and "called in the new world to redress the balance
of the old." Palmerston was confronted by a different situation. Spain
was weaker, but France had acquired Algiers and was upon terms of
suspicious friendliness with Mehemet Ali. In alliance with the Pasha
of Egypt in the east and with Spain in the west, she might, it was to
be feared, obtain a complete control of the Mediterranean. It was,
therefore, Palmerston conceived, a matter of the first importance that
her influence over the Cabinet of Madrid should be destroyed. This
object, in his opinion, could never be successfully attained until
Spain should be endowed with Liberal institutions, and should adopt a
national, not a dynastic, policy. It was with this end in view that he
entered into the Quadruple Treaty, by which England engaged to assist
the _Christinos_ to expel Don Carlos from the Peninsula. Without
doubt, the idea upon which his policy was based was statesmanlike;
nevertheless, the methods by which he hoped to accomplish his purpose
were deplorably unsound. The treaty of 1834 involved interference in
the domestic affairs of Spain, and that in combination with the very
Power the ascendancy of which over the Spanish government it was his
secret object to diminish.
Any military advantages which the _Christinos_ may have derived from
the Quadruple Treaty were more than counterbalanced by the harm, which
the jealous interference of France and Great Britain in her internal
affairs, inflicted upon Spain. Long after the Pretender had fled and
outward peace had been restored, the political settlement of the
country was retarded by the rivalry and intrigues of the ambassadors
and ministers of the two Powers. The marriages of 1846, and all the
evils which they brought in their train, were an outcome of the policy
which Palmerston had inaugurated twelve years before. But he had not
been in power during the whole of this period, and, when he returned
to the Foreign Office, the marriage question was already far advanced.
Aberdeen was not responsible for the Quadruple Treaty, and he was
sincerely desirous of putting an end to the practice of meddling with
internal politics, which both the French and British agents at Madrid
had adopted. Nevertheless, his weakness and irresolution in dealing
with M. Guizot were the cause of much mischief. Had he adhered to
his first pronouncement that England would object to any alliance
which threatened to disturb the balance of power, but that, with that
exception, she looked upon the Royal marriages as an exclusively
Spanish affair, none of the subsequent complications could have
arisen. Unfortunately, however, after the downfall of Espartero, he
undertook to observe a kind of benevolent neutrality towards the
principle of the French government--that Isabella's husband must
be a Bourbon. The compact of Eu and the different interpretations
which were placed upon it, the pretensions set up in the _Memorandum
of February 27_, 1846, were the consequences of the modifications
introduced into his original declaration.