THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
Lord Aberdeen, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Sir Robert Peel's
Cabinet, had held the same office in the government of the Duke of
Wellington. He had had to deal, as will be remembered, with the
question of the recognition of Louis Philippe and with the attitude
which England was to observe towards the revolution in Belgium. His
first experience of diplomacy had been gained in the days of the great
war. In 1813, as quite a young man, he had been sent upon a special
mission to Vienna, and had been concerned in the negotiations which
had resulted in the entry of Austria into the coalition. During the
campaign in Germany he had accompanied the headquarters of the allied
armies and had been profoundly impressed by the scenes of which he had
been a witness. Whether justified or not, the belief prevailed widely
that, should complications arise, the spectacle of Leipsic after
"the battle of the nations" would be ever present before the eyes of
England's Foreign Secretary.[713]
With regard to the more important questions which the Foreign Office
had in hand, or with which it had recently been called upon to deal,
Aberdeen was in substantial agreement with Palmerston. He approved
of his policy in the Egyptian affair and endorsed his views as to
the necessity of encouraging Spain to shake off the influence of
France. But he was at the same time intensely desirous of replacing
Franco-British relations upon their former intimate footing, and of
allaying the irritation which the Treaty of July had aroused. To
attain this end he was prepared to make far greater concessions than
any to which Palmerston would have consented. No one was so convinced
as he of the truth of the saying, ascribed to the Duke of Wellington,
that the peace of Europe would remain unbroken, so long as France
and England were united. It was not in their policies, but in their
personal characters, that lay the real difference between Aberdeen
and Palmerston. Aberdeen was by nature conciliatory. Palmerston was
instinctively combative, and would rarely deny himself the pleasure
of relentlessly exposing the fallacies of an opponent's arguments.
Aberdeen, although in some respects more of a Liberal than his
predecessor, had a scholar's abhorrence, which had been intensified by
his former relations with Metternich and other continental statesmen,
of all movements of a revolutionary character. Palmerston was a man of
coarser fibre, but of wider sympathies, than his grave and studious
successor.
Notwithstanding the earnest desire of both Lord Aberdeen and of
M. Guizot to bring matters to a successful conclusion, the first
important transaction between the new British government and the
French Foreign Office led to no satisfactory result. In 1831, and
again in 1833, France and England had contracted certain engagements
towards each other for the purpose of suppressing the slave trade.
They had agreed that their cruisers should stop and overhaul any
suspected vessel, whether flying the French or the British flag.
Palmerston, however, had not been content with an arrangement, which
limited the right of search to ships purporting to be of French or
English nationality. He, accordingly, in combination with France, made
representations on the subject to the other Powers and succeeded in
inducing them to agree to the principle which the French and English
governments had adopted. The new convention, to which all the chief
European Powers were to be parties, was ready for signature at the
time when it became evident that a change of government in England was
about to take place. Palmerston, who had always been keenly interested
in suppressing the slave trade, was particularly anxious that his
name should be affixed to an international agreement which, he hoped,
would prove the means of abolishing a traffic which he abhorred.
M. Guizot, however, saw fit purposely to delay matters in order to
deprive him of this satisfaction. Nor did he make any secret of his
reasons for acting in this manner. Palmerston's attitude towards him,
he complained to Henry Bulwer, had been unfriendly. In his dispatch
of November 2, 1840,[714] he had shown a total lack of consideration
for the difficulties of his position, and in a recent speech to his
constituents at Tiverton he had made some highly offensive remarks
about the manner in which the French military authorities in Algeria
were carrying on their war with the Arab tribes.[715]
But, once Lord Aberdeen was installed in Downing Street, M. Guizot's
objections to proceeding with the slave trade convention disappeared.
The necessary powers were sent to Sainte-Aulaire, the French
ambassador, and, on December 20, 1841, the treaty, regulating the
right of search, was signed in London. It was soon clear, however,
that M. Guizot had been mistaken in supposing that the Chamber
would agree to ratify the agreement into which he had entered. The
opposition to slavery had never been so pronounced in France as in
England, and the Treaty of July had greatly stimulated the old feeling
of jealousy of British maritime supremacy. By reason of England's
naval preponderance, the duty of stopping suspected vessels must
necessarily devolve chiefly upon her officers. Both in the French
Chambers and in the press it was hotly contended that the new treaty
was but a device, by means of which England purposed to arrogate to
herself the right of policing the sea. So keen was this feeling that
M. Guizot was forced to inform the British government that France
would be unable to ratify. Popular opposition, it was thought, would
diminish with time, and the protocol was accordingly kept open, in the
hope that France might still become a party to the treaty. But this
expectation was not fulfilled, and on November 9, 1842, the definite
withdrawal of France was officially communicated to Lord Aberdeen.
The affair caused no little resentment and disappointment in England.
Three years later, however, M. Guizot was enabled to re-open the
question. By that time the relations of the two countries were upon
a more friendly footing, and the Duc de Broglie and Dr. Lushington,
the commissioners of their respective governments, succeeded, in
consequence, in arriving at an agreement. The new treaty, signed on
May 29, 1845, fulfilled all the essential conditions of previous
conventions, but provided that, in future, the right of search
in African waters should be exercised by a joint Franco-British
squadron.[716]
Spanish affairs, however, were destined to be the question which was
to occupy the chief attention of the two governments. It has been
related how, in the autumn of 1840, Christina had been forced to
quit Spain, and how, in the spring of the following year, the Cortes
had elected Espartero sole Regent of the kingdom. This solution
of the difficulty was by no means acquiesced in as satisfactory
by all parties. The elevation of the popular general to the head
of the government was necessarily regarded as a victory for the
_Progressistas_ and, consequently, as a triumph for English diplomacy.
Indeed, since the abdication of the Queen-Mother, the _Moderados_, as
a parliamentary party, had almost ceased to exist. But their leaders
still continued to correspond with Christina, whose house in the Rue
de Courcelles in Paris soon became the centre of a vast conspiracy
against the new Regent.
Whilst it was thus a matter of common notoriety that the _Moderado_
chiefs, together with General Narvaez and other military rivals of
Espartero, were plotting in Paris[717] to overthrow the new order of
affairs in Spain, the question of the young Queen's marriage suddenly
sprang into prominence. Isabella was not yet twelve years of age,
but already the selection of her husband was the subject of grave
deliberations in Paris and in London. Christina had always considered
it to be vitally important that her daughter should marry a member of
one of the great reigning families. As far back as the year 1838, at
a most critical period of the civil war, when it was evident that no
assistance was to be expected from Louis Philippe, she had suggested
to the British minister that Isabella might be affianced to an English
prince. If the difficulties arising from the difference of religion
should prove insurmountable, she would be satisfied with the betrothal
of her daughter to a member of the House of Coburg, "on account
of the excellent education which the princes of that family had
received, and on account of their near connection with Her Britannic
Majesty."[718] Villiers was without instructions upon the point,
but he took upon himself to declare unhesitatingly that the English
match could never be effected. Christina, thereupon, announced her
intention of marrying her daughter to a son of the Archduke Charles of
Austria. It was a combination which, "she was now convinced, afforded
the best means of pacifying the country." The negotiations at Vienna,
she informed him, would be entrusted to M. de Cea Bermúdez and their
success would largely depend upon the amount of support given them by
the British government.[719]
Palmerston, upon receiving Villiers' despatch, immediately conveyed
to him "Her Majesty's gracious approbation of the course which he had
pursued."[720] At the same time, he informed him that the British
government could not possibly take part in M. de Cea's negotiations
at Vienna, "without in the first instance communicating thereupon
with the government of France and, as the King of the French would
be extremely averse to such a marriage, it was not probable that
such a communication would contribute much to the accomplishment of
the object." Nor was there any likelihood, he predicted, that the
Austrian Cabinet would entertain the offer. This view of the case
was soon borne out by the event. Metternich at once disclaimed any
intention of listening to Christina's proposals, whilst M. Molé, who,
notwithstanding the secrecy which had been observed, was aware of the
reasons of M. de Cea's presence at Vienna, declared to Lord Granville
that "the armed intervention of France would, undoubtedly, be the
consequence of any attempt to place an Austrian prince upon the throne
of Spain."[721]
The triumph of the constitutionalists and the termination of the civil
war necessarily invested Isabella with an importance which she had
not possessed, whilst the issue of the struggle was uncertain. Once
the stability of her throne seemed assured, she appeared to Louis
Philippe in the light of a most eligible daughter-in-law. In the
month of November, 1839, Christina's former minister, Count Toreno,
was understood to be engaged in negotiating a marriage between a son
of the King of the French and the young Queen of Spain. The scheme,
reported the British _chargé d'affaires_, had numerous supporters. But
the Queen Regent had informed him privately that "she was hostile to
the match and had other views for her daughter."[722] It is probable
that Christina was perfectly sincere in thus declaring her intentions
to Mr. Southern. Nor is there any reason to suppose that, after
her abdication, her objections to the French marriage diminished.
But, inasmuch as she was residing in Paris and hoped to obtain the
assistance of Louis Philippe to her schemes for overturning Espartero,
she was necessarily compelled to conceal her real sentiments. The
re-establishment of French ascendancy at the Court of Madrid occupied
a foremost place in the policy both of the King and of M. Guizot. So
long, however, as Espartero and the _Progressistas_ were in power
there was little prospect that they would be enabled to bring their
plans to a successful conclusion. Under the circumstances, therefore,
they were disposed to regard with a friendly eye the proceedings of
the military and _Moderado_ malcontents in Paris. Bulwer strongly
suspected that some kind of a compact existed, whereby Louis Philippe
promised indirectly to assist the conspirators, and Christina, in
return, undertook to employ her parental influence over Isabella
in favour of her marriage with the Prince de Joinville or the Duc
d'Aumale.[723]
The insurrection against Espartero broke out early in October, 1841.
The standard of rebellion was raised by O'Donnell at Pampeluna and by
the generals commanding the garrisons of Vittoria and Saragossa. But
their plans, which had been so carefully matured in Paris, miscarried,
and the loyal troops experienced little difficulty in dispersing their
followers and in restoring tranquillity. Madrid, in the meanwhile,
had been the scene of one of the most dramatic episodes in recent
history. On the night of October 7, Generals Concha and Diego Leon,
at the head of a band of military conspirators, penetrated into the
palace with the object of carrying off the young Queen. But when they
attempted to ascend the grand staircase they encountered a determined
party of halberdiers. A furious struggle then ensued. The crash of
musketry reverberated through the palace, and bullets struck the
walls of the room in which the terrified Isabella had sought refuge
with her attendants. But help was soon forthcoming. The resistance of
the halberdiers had enabled the national militia, which was animated
by strong Liberal and _Progressista_ sentiments, to assemble. At
the appearance of the citizen soldiers the conspirators either fled
or laid down their arms. Some of their leaders escaped to France,
but Leon was captured and, a few days later, paid the penalty of
his treason, his youth, his good looks and his former distinguished
services earning for him a sympathy which the circumstances of his
case in no way justified.
"With respect to the share of the French government in organizing
and promoting this enterprise," wrote Lord Aberdeen, "I do not think
it necessary to enter into an enquiry at present. We have received
the most positive assurances that they have been entirely strangers
to the undertaking. Whatever may be the value of these assurances,
the attempt having happily failed, there appears to be no advantage
in testifying suspicion and distrust."[724] He, accordingly,
directed Bulwer to do all in his power to persuade Olozaga, the
Spanish minister, to adopt as moderate a tone as possible in his
communications with M. Guizot. The Spanish government was naturally
deeply incensed at the encouragement which the conspirators had
received in Paris, and their representations on the subject included
a demand for the expulsion of Christina from France. This was
peremptorily refused and the relations of the two countries began to
assume a very disquieting appearance. In Bulwer's opinion, were Louis
Philippe to receive any encouragement from Austria or Prussia, he
might not improbably embark upon a war with Spain. "Should hostilities
break out," he warned Lord Aberdeen, "Barcelona would be the French
objective, on account of the effect which its capture would have on
those Courts which are fearful of the democratic opinions prevailing
there."[725]
Aberdeen's instructions to Mr. Aston, the British minister at Madrid,
were of the same nature as those transmitted to Bulwer in Paris. He
was to warn the Spanish ministers of the folly of provoking a rupture
with France. But, at the same time, he was to assure Espartero that
"the policy of Great Britain would continue to be directed towards the
maintenance of the real independence of Spain and to her protection
from whatever quarter she might be threatened."[726] Meanwhile, the
British government would make every effort to induce the Northern
Courts formally to acknowledge the sovereignty of Isabella.[727]
Whether designedly or not, however, the endeavours of Lord Aberdeen
in this direction were frustrated by France. Owing in a great measure
to his good offices, the Spanish government withdrew its demand for
Christina's expulsion.[728] Louis Philippe, thereupon, directed M.
de Salvandy, who some weeks earlier had been appointed ambassador at
Madrid, to proceed to his post. But this measure, which seemed to
foreshadow the establishment of more harmonious relations between
the two countries, led to a most unfortunate complication. Salvandy,
upon his arrival at Madrid, insisted upon being allowed to place
his credentials in the hands of Isabella herself and absolutely
declined to present them to Espartero, the Regent. Both sides invoked
precedents in support of their attitude and pressed their arguments
with the greatest warmth. Finally, Salvandy withdrew from Madrid
taking with him all the members of his embassy, with the exception of
his second secretary, the Duc de Glücksberg, a son of Louis XVIII.'s
favourite minister, the Duc Décazes.
It is unnecessary to discuss the various questions of diplomatic
etiquette raised in this controversy. Whilst, upon the whole,
inclining to the French point of view, Lord Aberdeen was of opinion
that the dispute could have been amicably adjusted without great
difficulty. The attitude of Mr. Aston, he considered, had not been
altogether satisfactory, and he was disposed to impute blame to him
for not having discovered some basis for a compromise. Not content
with censuring him, he allowed M. Guizot to be furnished with a copy
of the letter in which his disapproval was expressed.[729] When
Salvandy was appointed to the Court of Madrid Bulwer had described
him as "a man of letters, but pompous and ridiculous in manner and
unlikely to acquire an influence over the young Queen of Spain."[730]
But, if it was the secret desire of Louis Philippe to provoke a
quarrel with Espartero, he was perhaps the most suitable person he
could have selected for the purpose. The dispute involving, as it
was supposed to have done, the monarchical principle had effectually
dispelled all hope that the absolute Powers would agree to renew
diplomatic relations with the Court of Madrid--a circumstance which
Louis Philippe, in conversation with the British ambassador, affected
"to deplore most deeply."[731] So far as France was concerned,
however, the Duc de Glücksberg was left at Madrid without official
title, in order merely to carry on the ordinary business between the
two countries.
But in all matters relating to Spanish affairs the question of
Isabella's marriage occupied the foremost place. Louis Philippe now
protested that he had never for a moment entertained the idea of
putting forward one of his sons as a candidate for her hand. But,
after making this assertion, he invariably added that he should object
to her marrying any prince who did not belong to either the Spanish
or Neapolitan branch of the House of Bourbon.[732] Accordingly, in
February, 1842, he sent M. Pageot, who had been for several years
first secretary of the French embassy at Madrid, to London, for the
purpose of obtaining the accession of the British government to the
principle that the husband of the Queen of Spain must be a descendant
of Philip V. After leaving London Pageot was to proceed to Vienna,
where he was to hold the same language to Prince Metternich.
Neither in London nor at Vienna, however, was M. Pageot able to
bring his mission to a successful conclusion. Lord Aberdeen declared
emphatically that England could not recognize the right of France
to dispose of the hand of Isabella. The British government looked
upon the matter "as an exclusively Spanish affair, which ought to be
regulated solely by considerations affecting the happiness of the
Queen and the welfare of her people." At these words M. Pageot, at
once, interposed with the remark that he presumed that he was now at
liberty to inform his government that England would not object to her
marriage with a French prince. But Aberdeen, with equal promptitude,
added an important amendment to his first statement. The marriage of
the Queen of Spain with a son of Louis Philippe would, he asserted,
upset the balance of power, and England would always oppose any
combination calculated to produce political consequences of that
nature.[733] Metternich was no less emphatic in protesting against the
pretensions of the King of the French to dictate on such a subject to
an independent State. Nor was he less decided in declaring that the
general interests of Europe would be endangered by Isabella's marriage
with a son of Louis Philippe. In his opinion the whole Spanish
question might be amicably settled by the betrothal of the Queen
to a son of Don Carlos, without any sacrifice of their respective
rights, as in the case of Ferdinand and Isabella in the fifteenth
century. This was a view of the case, however, with which the
British government was unable to concur. "Prince Metternich," wrote
Aberdeen,[734] "has been misled by a fancied historical analogy. The
solution, he suggests, might have been productive of good whilst the
civil war was in progress and whilst Don Carlos was in possession of
the northern provinces. But, now that he and his adherents have been
driven from Spain as fugitives, it would be regarded with the utmost
repugnance by the majority of Spaniards. A marriage of the Queen with
a son of Don Carlos, although it might reconcile the personal claims
of each, would inevitably bring into fierce and hostile contact the
passions and opinions of their adherents."
Pageot's mission, therefore, had done little to advance the question
of Isabella's marriage. Meanwhile, Count Toreno, Christina's
confidential adviser in Paris, had, on several occasions, sought
out Lord Cowley, the British ambassador, for the express purpose of
informing him that the Queen-Mother would prefer to see her daughter
married to a Coburg rather than to a Bourbon prince.[735] At the same
time Espartero was known to be engaged in attempting to negotiate her
marriage with the third son of the King of Bavaria. Louis Philippe,
for his part, was more than ever determined to restrict her choice
of a husband to the Bourbon candidates, and, in Lord Cowley's
opinion, had serious thoughts "of supporting his pretensions by an
armament."[736] It was, however, by more indirect methods that he
proposed to attain his ends. All through the spring and summer of
1842 the Spanish malcontents, both in Paris and upon the frontiers,
displayed renewed activity. The Carlists and the _Christinos_,
having concluded an alliance based upon the marriage of Isabella
with a son of the Pretender, openly prepared for united action
against their common enemy, the Regent Espartero.[737] This compact
was, doubtless, the reason of the seeming approval, given by Louis
Philippe, to Metternich's utterly impracticable plan for settling the
Spanish difficulty.[738] Neither the representations of the Spanish
government nor a strong protest from Lord Aberdeen[739] had any
effect in inducing the French authorities to place any check upon the
proceedings of the conspirators.
In November, 1842, a formidable insurrection broke out at Barcelona.
The rising assumed from the outset a republican character, and, in
their first conflicts with the troops, the insurgents were uniformly
successful. The arrival of reinforcements, however, soon altered the
aspect of affairs and enabled General Van Halen to re-establish the
authority of the Regent. Once more Louis Philippe and Christina were
loudly accused of having promoted the outbreak. The Queen-Mother,
reported Lord Cowley, undoubtedly supplied the revolutionists with
money, and General Atthalin, a close personal friend of the King and
an officer of his household, had been in secret communication with
the organizers of the movement. "The Spanish government," wrote Mr.
Aston, "considers that the insurrection at Barcelona has been promoted
by France with the twofold object of preventing the conclusion of
a commercial treaty with Great Britain and of causing the downfall
of the Regent.[740] The complaints, which the Spanish _chargé
d'affaires_ was instructed to make in Paris, bore especially upon the
proceedings of M. Ferdinand de Lesseps,[741] the French consul at
Barcelona, who was accused of having actively assisted the insurgents.
M. Guizot, however, who, according to Lord Cowley, had taken no part
in these intrigues, defended the conduct of Lesseps and directed the
Duc de Glücksberg to obtain a retractation of the charges brought
against him from the Cabinet of Madrid.[742] The situation thus
assumed a very dangerous appearance, and Lord Aberdeen intervened
once more in the interests of peace. Let the Spanish government, he
urged, institute a calm and dispassionate inquiry into all the facts
alleged against the French consul and let no reparation be demanded
of the French government, unless there be evidence of his culpability
sufficient to satisfy all impartial persons.[743] This advice was
accepted, and, after a thorough examination of all the circumstances
of the case, a disavowal of certain of the more serious charges was
inserted in the _Gazette_ at Madrid. Nevertheless, as Lord Aberdeen
pointed out, "few people could read with impartial attention the
various documents without coming to the conclusion that M. de Lesseps
did very considerably exceed the limits of his consular duties," and
he, therefore, ventured to express the hope that the French government
"would no longer retain him in the place where his undue activity had
been displayed.[744]
Under ordinary circumstances, Louis Philippe would not have hesitated
to dispense with the services of a consul, who had shown sympathy
with a republican insurrection. But it being his secret policy to
create every kind of embarrassment for Espartero he declined to
recall M. de Lesseps.[745] The refusal of the French government
aroused great indignation in Spain and materially contributed to
increase the difficulties which were threatening to overwhelm the
Regent.[746] The popular general, the idol of the nation, was now an
object of execration with all parties. His stern repression of anarchy
had gained for him the hatred of the extreme democrats, whilst his
ignorance of the principles of representative government had involved
him in innumerable disputes with the Cortes. The only remedy which he
could apply to the situation was to prorogue the Chambers and assume
the powers of a military dictator. But the army was no longer his
willing instrument. The senior officers, with few exceptions, held
_Moderado_ opinions, and, for the past two years, General Narvaez and
other agents of Christina had been busily engaged in undermining their
loyalty. In the month of June, 1843, Brigadier Prim raised the cry
of "Down with Espartero," to which his troops responded eagerly. The
revolution spread rapidly. Whilst regiment after regiment deserted
the cause of the Regent, Narvaez appeared before Madrid at the head
of a division. After a feeble resistance on the part of the national
militia the capital opened its gates. In the south meanwhile, on July
29, Espartero, having been abandoned by his troops, embarked at Cadiz
on a British ship, and sought refuge in England, where he was feasted
by the City of London and acclaimed by the populace.
For some weeks prior to these events the threatening aspect of
affairs had been a frequent subject of discussion between Louis
Philippe, M. Guizot, and Lord Cowley. Both the King and his minister
had but one remedy to suggest for the many ills from which Spain
was suffering. Espartero, they declared, would speedily find that
all his difficulties would disappear, were he to devote his whole
attention to effecting the marriage of Isabella with a Bourbon.
If England desired to see the dangers now threatening the Regent
averted, let her join with France in urging him to adopt this
policy.[747] Aberdeen, however, declined to entertain this request.
The matter, he maintained, was one in which no Foreign Power had a
right to interfere, whilst, "as to whether the proposed marriage
would be likely to answer the expectations of those who counselled
it, Her Majesty's government did not feel called upon to express
an opinion."[748] But as the situation in Spain daily increased in
gravity, Lord Cowley became persuaded that a fresh complication was to
be apprehended. Should Espartero be overthrown, he warned his chief,
it was greatly to be feared that the victorious party would demand the
marriage of Isabella with a son of Louis Philippe. If such an alliance
were to be proposed, the French nation would be flattered and might
not improbably insist upon the offer being accepted, "even at the risk
of war."[749]
The downfall of Espartero and the new danger to which Cowley had
drawn his attention caused Lord Aberdeen's resolution to waver. He
now proposed that France and England should unite their efforts for
the purpose of restoring order in Spain. Under the circumstances this
was practically an intimation that he was prepared to reconsider
his often-repeated declaration that the marriage of Isabella was an
exclusively Spanish affair. It was certainly interpreted in this sense
by Louis Philippe and M. Guizot, who accepted the offer with the
utmost alacrity. It was their policy to affect the greatest confidence
that, in their hour of triumph, Christina and her friends would
defer to the advice of France in all matters. But in their hearts
they had doubtless grave misgivings upon the subject, and they were,
consequently, only too delighted to obtain the support of England to
their schemes. Marshal Sébastiani was at once despatched to London to
confer upon the situation.[750] He was to assure Lord Aberdeen that
Louis Philippe would never allow one of his sons to marry the Queen
of Spain. Personally the King would prefer that she should marry a
son of Don Carlos, but he would not oppose her union with any member
of either the Spanish or Neapolitan branch of the House of Bourbon.
Scarcely, however, had the marshal arrived in England than it was
announced that Queen Victoria purposed to pay the king of the French
a visit at the Château d'Eu, near le Tréport. Her Majesty was to
be accompanied by her Foreign Secretary, who would thus be enabled
personally to discuss matters with M. Guizot.
The Queen duly arrived at Eu, on September 2, and prolonged her stay
until the 7th, as the guest of the King. In every respect the visit
proved an immense success.[751] Her Majesty's affectionate regard for
Louis Philippe was destined, before long, to diminish greatly, but she
appears always to have looked back with pleasure upon the days spent
in company with his family at Eu.[752] Although social amenities
were the feature of the visit, Lord Aberdeen and M. Guizot were
enabled to discuss grave matters of State. Both appear to have been
equally satisfied with the result of their informal conferences,[753]
and their agreement upon Spanish affairs was afterwards confirmed
by Aberdeen in an official despatch. "All that can at present be
done," he wrote, "is that both governments should act cordially and
unreservedly together, taking for the principle of their conduct
the real good of Spain, without reference to the supposed separate
interests of either. . . . Her Majesty's government are still of
opinion that to the Queen and the nation should be left the selection
of the Royal Consort. But they will not be found unwilling to offer
such friendly counsel to the Spanish government as may aid them in
coming to a sound decision. With this view, although Her Majesty's
government cannot admit that the preferable claims of any prince
or family are such as to control the free choice of the Spanish
government, they would be fully disposed to concur in the proposition
of the Cabinet of the Tuileries and to recommend that the selection
of the Queen's Consort should be made from the descendants of Philip
V. . . ."[754]
Shortly after the conclusion of the Queen's visit to Eu, M. de
Jarnac,[755] the French _chargé d'affaires_ in London, was the guest
of Lord Aberdeen at Haddo. On one occasion his host placed in his
hands a letter in which he referred to the "cordial understanding,"
which he now believed had been established between France and
England.[756] This designation struck M. Guizot as singularly happy,
and both he and Louis Philippe henceforward constantly employed it to
describe the complete accord existing between the French and British
governments.
An occasion quickly arose which enabled England to show that "the
cordial understanding" was, so far as she was concerned, no diplomatic
fiction. The Duc de Bordeaux, more commonly known by the title of
Comte de Chambord which he shortly afterwards assumed, arrived in
London, towards the end of November. The prince was the posthumous
son of the Duc de Berri and the sole surviving male representative
of the elder branch of the Bourbons. No sooner was he installed in
the house, which had been taken for him in Belgrave Square, than
hundreds of French legitimists flocked to London. They were for the
most part members of the old noble families, but among the pilgrims
was M. Berryer, the distinguished advocate and parliamentary orator.
Even old Chateaubriand, who since the Revolution of July had taken no
part in politics, journeyed to London to testify his devotion to the
prince, whom he and his party acclaimed as _Henri V. King of France
and Navarre_.[757] These proceedings aroused considerable excitement
in France and caused Louis Philippe and his ministers some uneasiness.
The French ambassador had already been instructed to urge that Queen
Victoria should refuse to receive the young prince, on the ground that
it was the evident intention of his adherents to give to his visit the
character of a political demonstration against the House of Orleans.
The Queen[758] had promptly signified her readiness to comply with
this demand. It was not possible, however, to accede to a further
request, made after the arrival of the Duc de Bordeaux in London,
that the proceedings in Belgrave Square should be forcibly put a
stop to, seeing that they in no way infringed the law of England. An
intimation was, nevertheless, conveyed to His Royal Highness that
Her Majesty greatly disliked these demonstrations and would, in
consequence, be pleased to hear that he had decided to curtail his
stay in London. This message produced the required effect. The Duc de
Bordeaux, a few days later, departed from Belgrave Square, and, during
the remainder of the time which he spent in England, his conduct was
irreproachable.[759]
The promptitude with which the Queen and her government had responded
to his wishes was very gratifying to Louis Philippe. In their Speeches
from the Throne, both Sovereigns, at the opening of their respective
Parliaments, alluded to "the cordial understanding" which had been
established between their governments. Nevertheless, before the close
of the session of 1844, the two countries were once more upon the
brink of war. In the year 1839, a company had been formed at Nantes
for the purpose of founding a French colony in New Zealand. The
undertaking was supported by the government, which proposed annexing
both islands. But, before the arrival of the French expedition,
Captain Hobson proclaimed the sovereignty of Her Britannic Majesty
over New Zealand, and its acquisition was duly notified in the
_London Gazette_ of October 2, 1840. The French government bowed
before the accomplished fact, but prepared to seek another outlet in
the Pacific. The following year, accordingly, a squadron, under the
command of Admiral Dupetit-Thouars, was dispatched to take possession
of the Marquesas Islands, where it was proposed to establish a penal
colony. Not content, however, with carrying out his instructions the
admiral, upon his own responsibility, proceeded to declare a French
protectorate over Tahiti, the most important of the islands of the
Society group. More than fifty years before, Tahiti had been visited
by the first English missionaries. Owing to their unremitting efforts,
the islanders had gradually been converted to the Protestant religion
and had acquired civilized habits. On two occasions the Sovereign,
Queen Pomare, had offered to place herself under the protection of the
British flag, but both Canning and Palmerston had declined to accede
to her proposal. In August, 1842, Admiral Dupetit-Thouars anchored off
the island. He came to exact reparation for the alleged ill-treatment
of two French priests. He demanded a large indemnity and threatened
a bombardment, unless payment were made within twenty-four hours. It
was altogether out of the power of Queen Pomare to comply with these
conditions. Resistance was, however, out of the question. By the
advice of the French consul, M. Meerenhout, she begged to be allowed
to place herself under the protection of France. It was M. Meerenhout
who was supposed to have counselled the French admiral to make his
descent upon the island.[760]
The admiral's report of his proceedings at Tahiti afforded little
satisfaction either to the King or to M. Guizot.[761] But to have
disavowed him would have exposed them to the charge of truckling
to England--an accusation which would probably have proved fatal
to the existence of the government. The establishment of a French
protectorate over the islands was, accordingly, published in the
_Moniteur_ of March 20, 1843. The announcement was much resented
in England. It was not possible, however, for England to object to
France assuming a responsibility which she herself had twice declined
to undertake. Lord Aberdeen's communications with M. Guizot on the
subject were, consequently, confined to the expression of a hope that
the British missionaries would not be interfered with, and that the
sovereign rights of Queen Pomare would be respected. With both these
requests the French government readily promised to comply.[762] But,
in the meantime, affairs at Tahiti had not been progressing smoothly.
When the Queen was induced to invoke the protection of France, Mr.
Pritchard, the British consul, was absent from the island on a visit
to Australia. Pritchard had, for a long time past, been engaged in
missionary work and in trading in the South Seas. According to his
own statement, however, upon his appointment to the post of consul at
Tahiti, he had severed his connection with the Methodist missionary
society of which he had been a member.[763] Meerenhout, the French
consul, on the other hand, was an ardent Roman Catholic, but, like
his British colleague, he too combined the business of trading with
his official duties.[764] Racial prejudice, sectarian zeal and trade
rivalry account sufficiently for the bitter enmity which existed
between the two men. The news of Admiral Dupetit-Thouars' proceedings
reached Pritchard at Sidney, and his own correspondence shows that he
started upon his return journey with the intention of doing everything
in his power to induce the British government "to interfere" and with
the expectation of finding "many difficulties to encounter."[765]
His first act upon his arrival at Tahiti was to instigate Queen
Pomare, over whom he appears to have had great influence, to write
to Her Britannic Majesty. In this curious document Queen Pomare,
after inviting her "sister friend" to commiserate with her in the
difficulties in which she was involved with the French, begged her
"to send a large ship of war" to her assistance. The circumstances
under which the demand for French protection had been extorted from
her were narrated, much space being devoted to the part played in the
transaction by M. Meerenhout, "a very bad and troublesome man."[766]
It was evident to Lord Aberdeen that the attitude adopted by Mr.
Pritchard might at any moment produce some disagreeable incident, the
danger of a chance collision being enhanced by the ill-feeling which
prevailed between the French and British naval officers. He decided,
therefore, to appoint Major-General Miller, upon whose prudence and
judgment he could depend, consul-general of the Pacific Islands,
and to place under his orders all the British consuls in the South
Seas. At the same time, he sent off instructions to Mr. Pritchard
enjoining him to recommend a prudent line of conduct to Queen Pomare
and carefully "to avoid any expression calculated to encourage her
or her chiefs to expect assistance from England." Her Majesty's
government, whilst strongly disapproving the action of the French
authorities at Tahiti and deploring the humiliations inflicted upon
the Queen, "was precluded from interfering authoritatively on her
behalf."[767] But, before this despatch could reach its destination,
Admiral Dupetit-Thouars reappeared at Tahiti. On this occasion he had
returned to complain of some incident connected with the hoisting
of a flag. After a few days spent in investigating the matter, he
pronounced the islanders to be animated by a thoroughly bad spirit.
On November 6, 1843, Queen Pomare was declared deposed, and Tahiti
a French possession. Having issued this proclamation the admiral
proceeded to land troops and to occupy the island. In his despatch to
his government, explaining the reasons which had induced him to take
this step, he imputed the chief blame for the unrest of the natives to
Mr. Pritchard.[768]
The news of these events reached Europe in the month of February,
1844, and evoked a great outburst of indignation in England. Louis
Philippe and M. Guizot were again placed in a most embarrassing
situation. Should they refuse to uphold the action of the admiral,
their conduct would be assailed on all sides as a cowardly betrayal
of French interests at the bidding of England. On the other hand, the
ratification of his act, if it should not entail war, must certainly
put an end to "the cordial understanding," the maintenance of which,
for the present, was essential to the successful execution of their
Spanish policy. Of these two alternatives, the second unquestionably
presented the greatest disadvantages. At a Cabinet Council, on
February 25, it was decided to adhere to the protectorate, but to
disavow the last proceedings of Admiral Thouars and to reinstate
Queen Pomare in the sovereignty of which she had been deprived.[769]
A few weeks later, on April 10, Lord Aberdeen informed Mr. Pritchard
that he would be transferred to the Navigator Islands. In deciding to
remove him from Tahiti, the government in no way desired to express
disapprobation of his past conduct, but, for the sake both of his own
comfort and of the maintenance of good relations with France, it was
felt to be advisable to replace him by some person who had not been
connected with the transactions of the past two years.[770] This
measure of precaution was, however, of no avail. A month before the
despatch of these instructions Mr. Pritchard had departed from Tahiti,
but under very different circumstances from those contemplated by Lord
Aberdeen. The disavowal of Admiral Thouars was made the subject of a
fierce attack in the Chamber upon the Soult-Guizot Cabinet. In the
course of the debates, certain deputies displayed great hostility to
England and indulged in much intemperate language. This ebullition
of temper was not treated very seriously in England. But it was a
different matter when the Prince de Joinville, who was a strong
supporter of Admiral Thouars, saw fit to publish a pamphlet, in which
the question of a war with Great Britain was discussed in all its
bearings. Only the year before His Royal Highness had been the guest
of Queen Victoria at Windsor, and the appearance of his work, entitled
_Note sur l'état des forces navales de la France_, created a most
disagreeable impression at Court, upon the government and upon all
classes of the people. Louis Philippe, who had never authorized the
publication of his son's imprudent pamphlet, was genuinely distressed
and did all in his power to suppress it.[771]
Public attention, however, was speedily diverted from the Prince
de Joinville to the Tsar. Suddenly, on May 31, 1844, the Court was
informed that Nicholas would arrive on a visit to England within the
next twenty-four hours. At Ascot races and at the various festivities
which were hastily arranged in his honour, his appearance excited
universal curiosity. On every occasion it was plainly his intention
to impress, not only the Court and high society, but all classes of
the people with the sincerity of his desire to establish the most
friendly relations between his empire and Great Britain.[772] To
Peel, Aberdeen and Wellington, with whom he had some confidential
conversations, he was at pains to contrast his respect and affection
for England with the dislike and the contempt with which he regarded
Louis Philippe, M. Guizot, and the French nation generally. Sir Robert
Peel, however, appears to have told him plainly that he and his
colleagues were most desirous that, at the death of Louis Philippe,
his crown should pass to his next heir in the Orleans line without
disturbance or opposition. But having given emphatic expression to his
hatred of the July Monarchy, Nicholas put forward a distinct proposal.
Turkey was sick, very sick, upon the point of death. It would be a
critical moment when the Ottoman empire should break up completely.
Nevertheless, he apprehended danger only from the ambitious and
aggressive spirit of the French. Let, therefore, England, Austria and
Russia agree to act in concert, without reference to France, and all
would be well.[773] The British ministers would not appear altogether
to have rejected this proposition. But it is difficult to believe
the story[774] that distinct pledges on the subject were given, and
that Nicholas, in consequence, was tempted to embark upon those
measures which were to result in the Crimean war. It is unnecessary,
however, to discuss here whether the conferences of 1844 were in any
degree responsible for the war ten years later. The Tsar's visit had
no immediate effect upon the European situation in general, or upon
Franco-British relations in particular. Nothing that he had said or
done during his nine days' stay in England had in any way impaired
"the cordial understanding." He had probably a shrewd idea, however,
that complications in more than one direction would, before long,
greatly endanger its existence. An instinctive perception of coming
trouble may have been the secret of his sudden determination to visit
England.
On June 6, three days before the departure of the Tsar, Aberdeen was
informed officially that French troops might not improbably be ordered
to enter the territory of the Emperor of Morocco.[775] The famous Arab
chieftain, Abd-el-Kader, with whom the French had been at war for a
long time past, had recently sought refuge within the frontiers of
the Moorish empire. On former occasions, when hard pressed, he had
eluded capture in this manner. Representations had frequently been
made at Fez, on the subject of the facilities which were alleged to
have been afforded him for renewing the struggle. These complaints,
however, had hitherto produced little or no effect, and Marshal
Bugeaud, the governor of Algiers, consequently urged the adoption of
stronger measures. Neither Louis Philippe nor his ministers desired
to begin hostilities, but, on May 30, 1844, a French force, under
General de Lamoricière, was attacked by a body of Moroccan cavalry
upon the Algerian side of the frontier. The situation at once assumed
a very grave character. The French consul at Tangier was instructed to
proceed to Fez to demand the punishment of the Moorish commander, the
expulsion of Abd-el-Kader, and the withdrawal of the troops assembled
close to the French frontier. At the same time, a squadron under
the Prince de Joinville was despatched to Moroccan waters[776] and
preparations were made for reinforcing Marshal Bugeaud.
The news that hostilities were impending caused great dissatisfaction
in England. Ministers were questioned upon the subject in both
Houses and the press commented upon the affair with much acrimony.
Under pretext of obtaining redress for some more or less imaginary
grievance, Morocco, it was predicted, would be invaded and, without
doubt, permanently occupied. The fate which had befallen the Dey
of Algiers was assuredly reserved for the Emperor of Morocco. This
general feeling of uneasiness and suspicion was increased by the
selection of the Prince de Joinville, the author of the recent
pamphlet, for the command of the squadron sent to cruise off
Tangier.[777] The two governments, nevertheless, maintained their
friendly communications. M. Guizot gave the most positive assurances
that every effort would be made to settle the affair peacefully, and
undertook that, should hostilities break out, Tangier[778] would
not be bombarded nor would any portion of Morocco be appropriated.
Aberdeen was not prepared to deny that the French government had grave
cause for complaint. Although it had been considered necessary for
the protection of British interests that a squadron should be sent to
the Moroccan coast, the British fleet in those waters, he promised
the French ambassador, would be numerically inferior to that of the
Prince de Joinville.[779] Had he regarded it as in the smallest degree
probable that his proposal would be accepted, he would, doubtless,
have suggested that England should act as mediator in the quarrel.
But, in spite of the fact that "the cordial understanding" had
been loudly proclaimed, the idea of allowing England to interfere
would have been so unpopular in France that no government could
have ventured to entertain it. Under these circumstances Aberdeen
could only direct Mr. Drummond Hay, the British consul at Tangier,
to proceed to Fez and to endeavour to prevail upon the Emperor to
acquiesce in the French demands. Notwithstanding that the Moors had
a second time attacked the column of General de Lamoricière, strong
hopes were entertained, at the end of July, that actual war might
still be averted.
On July 30, 1844, _The Times_ announced the startling news that Mr.
Pritchard, the British consul at Tahiti, had arrived in England,
after having been arrested, cast into a dungeon and finally expelled
from the island by the French military authorities. In answer to a
question put to him, the following night, by Sir Charles Napier in
the House of Commons, Sir Robert Peel declared that, if the reports
which the government had received were true, "a gross outrage" had
undoubtedly been perpetrated. But, when the next day M. de Jarnac
spoke to Lord Aberdeen on the subject, he was authorized to inform
M. Guizot that the Prime Minister could not admit that his words had
been correctly reported in the morning papers.[780] The first accounts
of Mr. Pritchard's case would seem to have been somewhat inaccurate.
When all the circumstances were brought to light, it was evident that
the British government had just cause to complain of the treatment
which he had experienced, but it was, at the same time, no less clear
that his own conduct had been most injudicious. Immediately upon the
proclamation of French sovereignty over Tahiti, Mr. Pritchard struck
his flag and sent a protest to Admiral Thouars. From this moment he
assumed so anomalous a position that it is not surprising that the
French governor, Admiral Bruat, should have refused to recognize
it. According to Pritchard's own statement, he "continued to perform
his functions as consul, except in corresponding with the French
authorities, and continued to act as the accredited agent of Great
Britain to Queen Pomare." Furthermore, he appears to have invited the
deposed Queen to take up her abode in his house, where she stayed
until, "considering it not safe to remain on shore," she decided
to go on board H.M.S. _Dublin_, which was lying in the harbour of
Papeite.[781]
The natives meanwhile were growing restless and evincing a
determination to resist the imposition of foreign rule. Their
hostility, in the opinion of the French officers, was to be ascribed
mainly to the pernicious example set them by Mr. Pritchard. No event
of importance, however, occurred until March 2, 1844, on which date,
during the absence of the governor from Papeite, a French sentry was
alleged to have been assaulted by a native. M. d'Aubigny, the senior
officer on the spot, thereupon proclaimed martial law throughout the
island and decreed the arrest of Mr. Pritchard, who was forthwith
imprisoned in an underground chamber beneath the guard room of a
block house. After he had been in captivity for four days and had
endured much discomfort, Admiral Bruat returned to Papeite. The
governor, perceiving at once that his subordinate had acted with undue
precipitation, ordered the release of Mr. Pritchard and his removal
to a British vessel, _The Cormorant_, which, on March 13, quitted the
island and carried him to Valparaiso.[782]
"Never since I have been in this country," wrote M. de Jarnac, "have I
seen anything to equal the excitement which the news from Tahiti has
aroused. The religious party took up the case at once. Meetings of the
'_Saints_' have been convened, violent speeches have been delivered
all over the country, and pictures representing certain of the
events connected with the affair have been exhibited. The papers are
very violent. Lord Aberdeen appears to be growing more apprehensive
daily. He is convinced that some form of satisfaction must be given.
He wishes, however, to leave the initiative of proposing it to
Your Excellency: but I happen to know that the plan of sending Mr.
Pritchard straight back to Tahiti has been under discussion by the
Cabinet."[783] In France the excitement was scarcely less intense.
The newspapers, with one accord, called loudly upon the government
to stand by its officers, and to deny Great Britain any kind of
reparation, even at the risk of war. The production of _Charles_ IV.
at the Opera House evoked a furious manifestation of hostility to
England. Fortunately, however, the session was brought to a close on
August 5, and, in the meantime, M. Guizot resolutely refused to make
any statement about the affair in the Chambers.[784]
But although the prorogation afforded him some relief, M. Guizot
was, nevertheless, in a position of extreme difficulty. His friends
unceasingly warned him that he must resist the demands of England,
or be prepared to succumb to the outburst of popular indignation
which any concessions would provoke.[785] Under these circumstances
he decided that complete inaction was, for the present, the safest
course to adopt. "The greater the excitement," he instructed Jarnac,
"the more necessary it becomes to allow it time to cool down. For
the moment we must abstain from all discussion of the subject."
Nevertheless, when interviewing Aberdeen, he would do well to
bring forward those arguments which he himself was employing in
his conversations with Lord Cowley. Stress should be laid upon
the fact that Pritchard had ceased to act as consul. As a private
individual whose presence was regarded as prejudicial to good order,
the colonial authorities had a universally acknowledged right to
expel him. At the same time, however, it could not be denied that
"some of the proceedings which had attended his removal had been
irregular. . . ."[786]
Hitherto Lord Aberdeen had studiously refrained from formulating any
precise demand. But, on August 13, after a meeting of the Cabinet,
he directed Cowley to give M. Guizot clearly to understand that,
unless satisfaction in some shape were voluntarily offered, he must
transmit "a formal and detailed statement of the grounds upon which
Her Majesty's government founded its expectations of redress."[787]
In England anger at the continued silence of the French government
was rising to a dangerous pitch. On August 14, at a meeting at Exeter
Hall, at which Mr. Pritchard himself was present, men, who in most
international disputes would have advocated peace at any price,
gave utterance to the most warlike sentiments. Two days later came
the news that the answer of the Emperor of Morocco to the French
_ultimatum_ having been considered unsatisfactory, Tangier had been
bombarded. "War," wrote M. de Jarnac, "is now generally regarded as
inevitable."[788] Lord Cowley was instructed to represent that "the
attack upon Tangier, after the repeated assurance of M. Guizot that it
would be respected under all circumstances, had greatly surprised the
British government . . . any occupation of the coast of Morocco could
not fail to be viewed in a very serious light by Great Britain, and
must lead to evils of great magnitude.[789]"
M. Guizot, however, adhered resolutely to his plan "of allowing time
for the excitement to cool down" in England, and he still forbore
to offer any satisfaction for the treatment to which Mr. Pritchard
had been subjected. Both he and the King appear to have strangely
underestimated the intensity of the resentment to which the Tahiti
affair had given rise. "The two governments," he informed Jarnac,
"were not yet agreed in their appreciation of the facts imputed to Mr.
Pritchard," and it was, consequently, impossible for the present to
discuss the nature of the reparation which might be due to him. Again,
a few days later, he directed him to inform Lord Aberdeen that his
despatch of the 13th would have to be deliberated upon by the Council,
"many of the members of which were absent from Paris."[790] Meanwhile,
the press of both countries was busily engaged in embittering the
quarrel. Some highly offensive attacks upon the private life of Mr.
Pritchard appeared in the French papers, whilst _The Times_ published
letters, purporting to have been written by naval officers who had
witnessed the bombardment of Tangier, in which the most insulting
doubts were cast upon the seamanship of the Prince de Joinville and
upon the fighting qualities of the French sailors.[791] M. Guizot,
however, continued to display a lofty indifference to the popular
excitement on both sides of the Channel. He was content to enjoin M.
de Jarnac to impress upon Lord Aberdeen that it "would be a disgrace,
were the peace of the world to be disturbed on account of Pritchard,
Pomare and d'Aubigny."[792]
But the young diplomatist in charge of the French embassy in London
was, fortunately, alive to the dangers of the situation. Ever since
the first arrival of the news from Tahiti, M. de Jarnac had sought
to convince his government that the affair was highly serious. Nor
was it only to M. Guizot that he addressed his warnings. Having been
charged to deliver a letter from the King to Prince Albert, he took
the opportunity, thus afforded him, of communicating his fears to
Louis Philippe himself. He begged him to believe that at a recent
Cabinet Council Lord Aberdeen had been the only minister to oppose a
large increase of the navy. "Were it not for the confidence reposed
in the wisdom of Your Majesty, the situation would resemble in many
unfortunate particulars that of 1840."[793] He daily adjured M. Guizot
to reflect most seriously upon the danger of deferring any longer his
reply to the British government. "People in England are discussing
alliances and talk of nothing but war. M. de Nesselrode is staying at
Brighton. He affects to be unconcerned with politics. But it is said
that he remains here in order that he may be upon the spot, should
a serious disagreement arise between France and England. If that be
his object, fortune may have favoured his designs in a remarkable
manner."[794]
The British Parliament was to be prorogued on September 5, and,
unless an announcement could be made in the Queen's Speech that a
settlement had been arrived at, war, it was generally felt, could
scarcely be avoided. Even M. Guizot began to realize that, if the
peace was to be preserved, he must propose some form of reparation.
On several occasions Jarnac had hinted that the British government
might very possibly be satisfied, were a pecuniary indemnity to be
offered to Mr. Pritchard.[795] Unquestionably, the payment of a sum
of money would be regarded in France as less objectionable than most
other forms of reparation. But, having proposed to the King and the
Cabinet that the affair should be settled on those lines, and having
obtained their assent, M. Guizot still deferred transmitting an offer
of pecuniary compensation to London. In a despatch, dated August 29, a
copy of which was to be given to Lord Aberdeen, he stoutly maintained
the right of the authorities at Tahiti to expel Mr. Pritchard from
the island. His imprisonment, however, and certain other acts of
which M. d'Aubigny had been guilty, could not be defended, and that
officer would, in consequence, receive in due course a notification
of the censure which the government had passed upon his conduct. He
could concede no more, he told Lord Cowley, and he fully intended
to retire from office, if further redress were to be demanded.[796]
Nevertheless, he appears privately to have informed M. de Jarnac
that he was transmitting a second despatch, containing an offer of
a money payment to Mr. Pritchard, which he was to communicate to
Lord Aberdeen, should the British government regard the reprimand,
administered to M. d'Aubigny, as an inadequate reparation. This,
as he doubtless expected, was the view taken of his first despatch
by the Cabinet in London. Jarnac, in consequence, lost no time in
assuring Lord Aberdeen that an offer of a pecuniary indemnity would
be made. Had he not taken this responsibility upon himself, he was
convinced that the customary announcement that "friendly relations
existed with other countries" would have been omitted from the Queen's
Speech, and "the whole of Europe would have been thrown into a state
of perturbation." On the following day, September 4, he placed in the
hands of Lord Aberdeen the official offer of the French government
to indemnify Mr. Pritchard by the payment of a sum of money, the
amount of which was to be determined by the admirals commanding the
French and British fleets in the Pacific. Aberdeen pronounced the
proposed satisfaction "rather slender," but assured him that he
might now consider the matter as settled.[797] Twenty-four hours
later Parliament was prorogued, and the happy termination of the
Pritchard affair was announced in the Speech from the Throne. "The
danger," wrote Queen Victoria to the King of the Belgians, had been
"imminent."[798]
The settlement of the Tahiti dispute was quickly followed by the
welcome news that France had concluded peace with the Emperor of
Morocco. Marshal Bugeaud, on August 14, had won a decisive victory
over the Moors on the river Isly, whilst at sea the Prince de
Joinville, after silencing the forts of Tangier, had, on August 15,
destroyed the defences of Mogador. Neither the King nor M. Guizot
desired to prosecute the campaign any further. They had obtained
all the advantages which they could hope to derive from active
hostilities. They had proved that they were not to be deterred, by
the irritation which their action had called forth in England, from
inflicting a severe punishment upon the Moors. The national thirst
for military glory had been sufficiently appeased by the successes
which had already been achieved. Under these circumstances, they were
not disposed to be exacting in their conditions. Provided the Emperor
would submit to the terms set forth in their original _ultimatum_,
they would not insist upon an indemnity, but would recall their troops
and forthwith suspend hostilities. The Court of Fez promptly acceded
to these moderate demands, and, on September 10, 1844, a treaty of
peace was signed at Tangier.
The cessation of hostilities between France and Morocco removed much
of the resentment which recent events in the Mediterranean and in
the Pacific had aroused in England. Notwithstanding that, at the end
of August, 1844, the two countries had been upon the brink of war,
Louis Philippe, early in October, was enabled to return the visit
which Queen Victoria, the year before, had paid him at the Château
d'Eu. During his stay in England the King was installed with much
magnificence as a Knight of the Garter at Windsor, and, on every
occasion on which he was seen in public, was accorded a hearty welcome
by the people. Isabella's marriage still occupied the foremost place
in his thoughts. That question, however, had made but little progress,
in spite of the overthrow of Espartero and of the triumph of Christina
and the _Moderados_.
After the flight of the Regent Spain had passed under the rule of
Ramon Maria Narvaez, the Captain-General of Castile, an able and
unscrupulous adventurer. The Liberals, who had joined with the
_Moderados_ in encompassing the downfall of Espartero, were quickly
forced to realize the magnitude of their folly. Parliamentary
government was practically abolished, and any attempts to resist
the authority of the dictator were mercilessly repressed. Over two
hundred executions for political offences, during the space of one
year, broke the spirit of the democratic party, and gave the country
an outward appearance of tranquillity. The difficulty of selecting a
Regent in the place of Espartero had, in the meantime, been overcome
by the unconstitutional declaration of the Cortes, on November 8,
1843, that the Queen was of full age, although she had only entered
upon her fourteenth year. The question having thus been settled,
Christina, in the spring of 1844, left Paris and returned to Madrid,
accompanied by her husband, Nuñoz, henceforward to be known as the
Duke of Rianzarez.
In 1844 the eldest son of Don Carlos, the two sons of Don Francisco
de Paula, and Count Trapani, the brother of the King of Naples, and
of Christina herself, were, for all practical purposes, the only
unmarried male descendants of Philip V. If, therefore, the principle
proclaimed by Louis Philippe were to be adhered to, Isabella's choice
of a husband must be restricted to these four princes. To each one,
however, there were serious objections. Although a suitable candidate
in other respects, the son of Don Carlos was ineligible on political
grounds.[799] The idea of her daughter's marriage with either of the
sons of Don Francisco de Paula was most distasteful to Christina.
Notwithstanding that their mother, the Infanta Carlotta, was her
sister, she had for a long time past looked upon her as her worst
enemy. Nor had the death of this princess, early in 1844,[800] greatly
diminished the animosity with which she regarded this branch of the
family. But in addition to the feud which had existed for so many
years between Christina and their mother, both young men for different
reasons were objectionable in themselves. The appearance of the elder,
Don Francisco de Asis, Duke of Cadiz, was ridiculous and effeminate,
and he, moreover, was generally believed to be impotent. Christina,
however, appears to have regarded the loudly professed Liberalism
of Don Enrique, Duke of Seville, as a more serious objection to his
marriage with her daughter than the physical unfitness of his elder
brother. The fourth candidate, Count Trapani, was an unattractive,
backward youth of sixteen, whose life had hitherto been spent within
the walls of a Jesuit College at Rome. The difficulties, however,
in the way of his marriage with Isabella were mainly political.
Metternich greatly disliked the notion of a closer connection between
the absolute Court of Naples and the constitutional monarchy of
Spain.[801] Furthermore, the Spanish people despised the Neapolitans,
and could not fail to resent the idea of selecting the Royal Consort
from the Neapolitan branch of the Bourbons.[802]
Count Trapani, nevertheless, was chosen by Louis Philippe and M.
Guizot as the most suitable husband for Isabella. In the summer of
1844, the French agents, both at Naples and at Madrid, were instructed
to further his candidature by all means in their power.[803]
Christina's feelings on the subject cannot be precisely determined.
There can be little doubt, however, that she never gave the project
her hearty support. Probably she realized that it was impracticable
by reason of the dislike with which it was certain to be regarded by
Spaniards of all classes. It is significant that one of her first
acts, after her return to Madrid, was to assure Mr. Bulwer that she
had no intention of submitting to the dictation of Louis Philippe,
and that she still hoped to arrange the marriage of Isabella with
Leopold, the son of Prince Ferdinand of Coburg.[804] Henry Bulwer had
been appointed British minister at Madrid, soon after the downfall
of the Regent. Aberdeen appears to have been anxious that a man,
less wedded than Aston to Palmerstonian traditions, should carry
out the new policy of cordially co-operating with France for the
general welfare of Spain. The French government, once Espartero had
been expelled, had hastened to resume normal diplomatic relations
with the Court of Isabella. Accordingly, almost at the same time as
Bulwer was sent to Madrid, the Comte Bresson, whose proceedings at
Brussels in 1831 have been related, was transferred from Berlin to the
Spanish capital as French ambassador. Far from acting harmoniously
together, however, they appear to have cordially disliked each other.
Bresson is described by Bulwer,[805] in his _Life of Palmerston_, as
a person sprung from the middle classes, and "consequently vulgarly
pre-occupied with his position as ambassador." Bresson,[806] for his
part, considered his English colleague as "_pas élevé_," and as a man
against whom he must constantly be on his guard, lest he should take
some liberty with him.
At the close of the year of 1844, a further complication was added to
the many difficulties which surrounded the question of the Queen's
marriage. "I believe," wrote Lord Cowley,[807] "that Louis Philippe
is thinking of the marriage of Montpensier[808] with the sister of
Isabella." The supposition was perfectly correct. It is impossible,
however, to say with certainty when the King first decided to put
forward his son as a candidate for the hand of the Infanta Fernanda.
According to Guizot,[809] the suggestion was not made until the autumn
of 1844, and it was then propounded, he alleges, for the purpose of
reconciling Christina and the Spanish people to the insignificance
of the Neapolitan alliance. But it was always, he asserts, made
perfectly clear that the Montpensier marriage could not take place
until the Queen had married and borne a child. Be that as it may, it
was not considered advisable to inform Lord Aberdeen of this project.
During the next few months, however, the new matrimonial scheme was
the subject of many rumours, and, in the month of July, 1845, a visit
of the Duke of Rianzarez to Paris was so generally believed to be
connected with this affair, that it was felt that some explanation
must be given to the British government.[810] M. Guizot, accordingly,
informed Mr. Bulwer, who happened to be in Paris on his way to London,
that he wished Lord Aberdeen to know that "King Louis Philippe and
Queen Christina were desirous to settle the marriage for private and
personal reasons into which the Infanta's fortune entered." It would
not take place for some time, he assured him, and in any case not
until Isabella had had children.[811]
On September 8, 1845, Queen Victoria paid a second visit to Louis
Philippe at the Château d'Eu. Her Majesty, Prince Albert, Aberdeen and
Peel had been considerably disturbed by the news brought by Bulwer
from Paris. But on the very day of the arrival of the Royal party at
Eu, both the King and M. Guizot declared to Lord Aberdeen, "in the
most positive and explicit manner, that until the Queen was married
and had children, they should consider the Infanta precisely as her
sister, and that any marriage with a French prince would be entirely
out of the question. . . . I distinctly understood," wrote Aberdeen
to Peel a few hours after he had received these assurances, "that it
was not only a marriage and a child, but children that were necessary
to secure the succession. I thought this was as much as we could
desire at present, and that the question of a marriage with a French
prince might safely be left to be considered, whenever the contingency
contemplated should arrive. Many things may happen in the course of a
few years."[812]
On the very day that Queen Victoria arrived at Eu, the Duc and the
Duchesse de Nemours and the Duke d'Aumale left Pampeluna, where they
had been the guests of the Spanish Royal family. The real object
of their visit would never appear to have transpired.[813] Bulwer,
for reasons which in due course he explained to Aberdeen, was not
present at Pampeluna, and delayed returning to Spain until the French
princes had recrossed the frontier. The interview, he understood,
had been arranged for the purpose of "pushing on the marriage with
Count Trapani, a marriage most unpopular in the country." He had,
therefore, decided to stay away. By absenting himself, his government
would not incur "the odium which must stigmatize all those by whom
the Neapolitan match may be conceived to have been brought about." On
the other hand, should the visit of the French princes not achieve
the desired result, they would be unable to impute its failure "to
the intrigues of the British minister." Upon his return to Madrid,
Bulwer experienced great difficulty in obtaining any information
about the state of affairs. Bresson assured him that Isabella's
health "was declared to be such as to render her marriage for the
present inopportune."[814] Christina gave him to understand that
matters were still undecided. "But her language was not that of entire
confidence, and she seemed divided between the wish to say nothing
and the desire to say enough to prevent any subsequent charge of
want of frankness." Upon the whole, he was inclined to think that
some plan was contemplated, "which it was not yet judged expedient
to avow."[815] From divers sources he learnt that the Queen-Mother,
Bresson and Carini, the Neapolitan ambassador, were suspected of an
intention "privately to betroth Isabella to Trapani, and to force
his acceptance upon the Cortes." Narvaez had been induced to support
their unconstitutional designs, "in the belief that he would be more
necessary with an unpopular, than with a popular prince."[816]
Meanwhile, M. Bresson at Madrid and M. Guizot in Paris were greatly
dissatisfied with the aspect of affairs. The King of Naples had always
been reluctant to allow his brother to be put forward as a suitor
for the hand of the Queen of Spain. He distrusted Louis Philippe
exceedingly, he was fearful of offending the Court of Vienna, he was
on bad terms with his sister Christina, and, in point of fact, had not
officially acknowledged the sovereignty of Isabella. Nevertheless,
under the vigorous pressure brought to bear upon him from Paris, he
agreed to renew diplomatic relations with the Court of Madrid, and
to empower his ambassador to discuss his brother's marriage. But,
having surmounted the difficulties at Naples, Louis Philippe and
M. Guizot were confronted by more serious obstacles at Madrid. As
time went on, the unpopularity of the Neapolitan match tended rather
to increase than to diminish. So universal was the dislike to this
connection that Guizot judged it prudent to warn Bresson to maintain
friendly relations with Don Francisco de Paula,[817] seeing that it
might be necessary before long to insist upon Isabella's marriage
with one of his sons. As the prospects of the Bourbon candidates grew
less favourable the Coburg marriage, greatly to the annoyance of
Louis Philippe, began to be discussed as a necessary alternative. The
impending visit of Prince Leopold to his brother the King of Portugal
gave rise to many rumours. There was an intrigue on foot, reported
Bresson, to promote the chances of that prince, and Bulwer, he was
convinced, was more or less concerned in it.[818]
Under these circumstances M. Guizot decided to direct M. de Jarnac to
confer upon the situation with Lord Aberdeen. He was to intimate to
him that, in fulfilment of the compact at Eu, he should now bestir
himself actively on behalf of the Bourbon candidates, and make it
perfectly clear to the Coburgs that no member of their family could be
allowed to marry Isabella. This was more than Aberdeen was prepared
to undertake. He, however, assured M. de Jarnac upon his honour that
the Coburgs should receive no encouragement either from the Court or
from the government, and promised him that they would be advised to
abandon their supposed intention of visiting Madrid.[819] Aberdeen
was at this time in receipt of Bulwer's despatch of October 30,
1845, informing him of his suspicion that Christina and Narvaez
were purposing to accomplish the Trapani marriage, in violation of
the article of the constitution which prescribed that the sovereign
must communicate his intention of contracting a matrimonial alliance
to the Cortes. He at once replied by charging him to express to the
general the sincere hope of the British government that no such plan
was under consideration. "Say to him," he wrote in conclusion, "that
you are instructed to offer no opposition to the marriage of the Queen
to Trapani, provided it be openly accomplished according to legal
forms, still less are you authorized to espouse the cause of any other
candidate."[820]
Mere friendly neutrality, however, could be of little service to
Louis Philippe and M. Guizot. A further disappointment, moreover,
was in store for them. At the end of January, 1846, General Narvaez,
who, as a supporter of the Neapolitan alliance, had been growing
very unpopular, resigned office after a violent quarrel with his
fellow-ministers.[821] When the news reached Paris that the one man
who might have effected the Trapani marriage was no longer at the
head of affairs, it was decided to make another, and a more direct,
attempt to force the British government to take action on behalf
of the Bourbon candidate. Jarnac was, accordingly, supplied with a
document, which he was to read to Lord Aberdeen. This extraordinary
paper, known as the _Memorandum of February 27_, 1846, set forth the
following conclusions: "The Count Trapani is greatly compromised: 1.
By the demonstration which has been made against him; 2. By the fall
of General Narvaez. The sons of Don Francisco de Paula are greatly
compromised: 1. By their mistaken conduct; 2. By their intimacy with
the Radical party; 3. By the dislike of the Queen-Mother and of the
young Queen herself to them. The sons of Don Carlos are for the time
out of the question. The actual situation of the descendants of Philip
V. is consequently bad. Efforts are being made to marry Prince Leopold
of Coburg either to the Queen Isabella or to the Infanta Fernanda.
Lisbon is the chief seat of these machinations. It is said that Prince
Leopold, who is to leave Lisbon on February 24, intends to visit
Madrid. Many circumstances appear to confirm the truth of this rumour.
If the present state of affairs be prolonged we may find ourselves
compelled, in order that our policy in Spain may not receive a check
which we are determined not to suffer, to declare ourselves liberated
from all engagements with regard to either marriage. Such a situation
would arise, were the marriage of the Queen or the Infanta with Prince
Leopold of Coburg or with any other prince, not a descendant of Philip
V., to appear probable or imminent. In that case we should take
immediate steps to ward off the blow by demanding the hand of either
the Queen or the Infanta for the Duc de Montpensier. We are sincerely
desirous of averting the necessity of resorting to so extreme a
measure. We see only one way in which the crisis can be avoided. The
English Cabinet must co-operate actively with us in promoting the
claims of one of the descendants of Philip V., no matter which, and in
arranging his marriage with Queen Isabella, and in preventing, in the
meanwhile, the marriage of the Infanta either with Prince Leopold or
with any other prince, not a descendant of Philip V."[822]
Aberdeen appears to have listened in silence and to have made no
protest against the unwarrantable assumptions contained in this
document. No copy of it was given to him, nor would he seem to have
asked for one.[823] Meanwhile, strange events were taking place in
Spain. The Miraflores Cabinet was quickly overthrown and, on March
17, 1846, Narvaez was once more at the head of the government. His
return to power was quickly followed by the promulgation of decrees
restricting the liberty of the press and suspending the sittings of
the Cortes.[824] Bulwer was convinced that it was decided forthwith
to betroth Isabella to Trapani, regardless of public opinion and of
legal forms.[825] But, if Narvaez ever contemplated a _coup d'état_
of this nature, he soon relinquished the idea. His tenure of office
was of very brief duration. On April 5 he was dismissed and ordered
to quit Madrid immediately. The mystery which surrounds these sudden
changes of government has never been satisfactorily unravelled. It
is certain that they were connected, more or less directly, with
Isabella's marriage. At first sight it would seem as though Christina
had resolved to discard Narvaez, because she perceived that he
was powerless to effect the Trapani marriage. Nevertheless, this
apparently obvious explanation is probably erroneous. The Queen-Mother
was never really desirous that her daughter should marry her uncle,
Trapani. But she wished to ruin Narvaez, whose secret aim it was to
diminish the influence of the Court and of the Church.[826] It is
possible, therefore, that she may have insisted upon his supporting
the Neapolitan alliance in order simply to discredit him. In this
crafty fashion she may have hoped to rid herself of the man who, she
had once declared, "was more arrogant than Espartero."[827]
On April 8, 1846, the following message[828] was received in Paris
from M. Bresson, who, doubtless, had some person in his employ in
close attendance upon Isabella. "_La reine est nubile depuis deux
heures._"[829] Whether or not this news was communicated to Lord
Cowley by M. Guizot, it was certainly known at once at the British
embassy. Christina could no longer invoke physical reasons for
delaying her daughter's marriage. But, meanwhile, the number of
Bourbon candidates was rapidly diminishing. Trapani was too unpopular,
and Don Enrique, Duke of Seville, the younger son of Don Francisco de
Paula, had recently been concerned in an insurrection in Gallicia,
and had been ordered to leave Spain. The only available husband for
Isabella among the descendants of Philip V. was, therefore, Don
Enrique's elder brother, Don Francisco, Duke of Cadiz, whom both
she and her mother disliked and despised. Christina, under these
circumstances, resolved to revert to the matrimonial combination
which she had constantly regarded as the best. The moment was not
unfavourable for openly defying Louis Philippe. Narvaez, the minister
who had always been looked upon as the chief tool of the French Court,
was in disgrace, and Isturiz, his successor, was her devoted servant.
She accordingly determined to propose to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg that
Isabella should marry his son, Prince Leopold. After informing him of
its contents, she gave the letter containing this offer to Mr. Bulwer,
asking that it might be conveyed to Lisbon by his messenger. The
British minister complied with her request and reported the affair to
his chief.
Lord Aberdeen was seriously annoyed, and at once informed M. de
Sainte-Aulaire of what had passed, assuring him that he should
administer a severe rebuke to Mr. Bulwer. Bulwer, he considered, had
violated his instructions, both in undertaking to transmit the offer
to Lisbon and in concealing Christina's proceedings from M. Bresson.
In consequence of the strictures passed upon his conduct, Bulwer
offered to resign. Aberdeen, however, in a friendly letter insisted
upon his remaining at his post.[830] A few days later, on June 29,
1846, Sir Robert Peel announced that he and his colleagues had retired
from office, and that Lord John Russell had undertaken to form a
government. On June 25, on the very day on which their Corn Bill had
been carried through the House of Lords, ministers had been defeated
in the Commons by a Radical and Protectionist coalition. In the new
administration the seals of the Foreign Office passed into the keeping
of Lord Palmerston.