PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48.
Whilst France and England had been quarrelling over the Spanish
marriages, events of greater importance had been taking place in
Central Europe. The Polish nationalists had planned an insurrection
which was to break out simultaneously in Prussian and Austrian Poland.
At Posen, the authorities obtained early intelligence of the projected
rising, and were enabled to suppress it without difficulty. But in
Gallicia, in February, 1846, the Austrian military commander was
suddenly called upon to deal with a formidable rebellion. Colonel
Benedek,[883] however, by allowing the Polish peasants to wreak their
hatred upon their landlords, succeeded in dividing the forces opposed
to him and in subduing one revolution by another. The free town of
Cracow was the scene of severe fighting, and, after the defeat of the
insurgents, was occupied by Russian troops. The measure was to be
merely temporary, and the town, it was announced, would be evacuated,
directly order should be restored. But, when it was evident that the
Spanish marriage question had hopelessly divided France and England,
the Northern Courts adopted a different attitude. On November 15,
1846, the Austrian, the Prussian and the Russian ministers in London
informed Palmerston that the independent existence of Cracow was
incompatible with the public tranquillity of Europe, and that, in
consequence, it had been decided that the Republic should, in the
future, form part of the Austrian Empire.[884] A similar communication
was, at the same time, made to the French government. The Republic of
Cracow having been constituted by a treaty between Austria, Russia,
and Prussia, on May 3, 1815, these three Powers maintained that
they had a right to undo what they had done, without consultation
with the other Powers which were parties to the general settlement
of 1815.[885] Both France and England at once entered a formal
protest. M. Guizot, having attained his object in Spain, was now bent
upon re-establishing "the cordial understanding," and would gladly
have made a joint representation to the three Powers with great
Britain.[886] But his hope that the annexation of Cracow would prove
the means of reuniting France and England was not realized. Palmerston
contented himself with directing Normanby to furnish the French
government with a copy of the remonstrance which he addressed to the
Court of Vienna.[887]
Metternich was not disturbed by these representations. It was out of
the power of England to enforce her views, and Louis Philippe and M.
Guizot were careful at once to reassure him about their veritable
intentions. Public indignation had been aroused in France by the
extinction of the little republic and, under the circumstances, it
had been necessary to protest officially. But let the Chancellor
understand, Louis Philippe informed the Austrian ambassador, that
the remonstrance which M. de Flahaut had been instructed to make at
Vienna was "merely talk which could hurt no one."[888] Metternich,
however, although he was thus speedily relieved from all anxiety as
to the attitude which the western Powers purposed to adopt towards
his proceedings in Gallicia, had much cause for uneasiness in other
directions. Germany was seething with discontent, and the King of
Prussia, by deciding to summon the combined Estates, was evincing
a regrettable disposition to acquiesce in the popular demand for a
greater measure of political rights. In Italy affairs presented a yet
more alarming appearance. For the past fourteen years the Peninsula
had been outwardly at peace. But Metternich's vigilance had not been
lulled to sleep by this seeming acquiescence in existing conditions.
A movement, he was well aware, was in progress infinitely more
dangerous than the local insurrections planned in the secrecy of the
_Carbonari_ lodges. Mazzini, by means of his society of _Young Italy_,
and Gioberti, d'Azeglio and Balbo, by their writings, were teaching
the people to dream of independence and of national unity. Hitherto
Metternich, in his policy of repression, had always been able to count
upon the whole-hearted support of the different Italian governments.
But now the Sovereign of the most important State in the Peninsula
was strongly suspected of encouraging the propagation of these new
doctrines.
Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, had, as the Prince of Carignano,
displayed Liberal tendencies. In the Piedmontese rebellion of 1821
his conduct had been equivocal, but, since his accession, in 1831, he
had shown a firm determination to uphold the absolutist traditions
of his House. Nevertheless, he now permitted both d'Azeglio and
Balbo to reside unmolested within his dominions and, in spite of
Metternich's remonstrances, his police scarcely interfered with the
free circulation of their subversive writings. In the summer of 1846,
it was already apparent that the relations between the Courts of Turin
and of Vienna were no longer upon their former friendly footing.
Ostensibly a question of tariff was the only cause of dispute. In
reality, however, it was Charles Albert's increasing sympathy with
the Italian national movement which was the reason of the prohibitive
duty, placed by Metternich, upon the wines of Piedmont.[889] Matters
were in this state when, on June 1, 1846, the Pope, Gregory XVI.,
died. Fifteen days later, Cardinal Mastai-Ferretti, Archbishop of
Imola, was elected to succeed him, and assumed the title of Pius IX.
The condition of the Papal States was deplorable. The finances were
in disorder, and the government depended for its existence upon the
protection of Austria and upon the presence of its Swiss auxiliary
troops. The new Pope, it was hoped, would consent to the introduction
of certain necessary measures of reform. The expectation that Pius
IX. would not pursue the reactionary policy of his predecessor proved
well founded.[890] On July 16, 1846, a month after his election,
His Holiness proclaimed a general amnesty for political offences.
The educated classes had eagerly absorbed the doctrines of Balbo,
d'Azeglio, and Gioberti, and the Liberal tendencies manifested by
the new Pope aroused an immense enthusiasm. Nor was his popularity
confined to his own dominions. The quiet and unpretending priest
suddenly found himself magnified into a national hero. Patriots, who
had begun to look to Charles Albert as the future liberator of Italy,
now placed all their hopes in Pius IX. It was not possible for him
to withstand the enthusiasm which his concessions had called forth.
In the spring of 1847, a modified liberty was granted to the press,
and the formation of a Council of State, to be chosen by the Pope
from elected provincial delegates, was decreed. Lastly, on July 5,
the establishment of a civic guard was announced. The Grand Duke of
Tuscany, fearful that invidious comparisons would be drawn between
his methods of government and those of His Holiness, made haste to
initiate similar reforms at Florence.[891]
In the opinion of Louis Philippe, the death of Gregory XVI. amounted
to a public misfortune. A Liberal Pope could not but add materially
to the political unrest which had suddenly affected the whole of
Europe.[892] Nevertheless, neither he nor M. Guizot were as yet
prepared to join with Austria in counselling the Papal government
to resist the popular demand for reforms. France was at the time
represented at Rome by a man of considerable ability and learning,
Count Rossi, an Italian political exile and a naturalized Frenchman.
In the first instance he was instructed to counsel the adoption of
a strictly _juste milieu_ policy.[893] The new Papal government
should be based upon the principles of an enlightened conservatism.
His Holiness would be well advised promptly to introduce certain
much-needed reforms into his system of administration. Let him
beware, however, of listening to those who would propose violent and
ill-considered changes. Above all, let him avoid giving unnecessary
offence to Austria.[894] But, after his quarrel with England over the
Spanish marriages, M. Guizot decided to revise his Italian policy.
In every part of the world France and England were opposed to each
other. M. Guizot's own relations with Lord Normanby were very far
from friendly. The public denial of the French minister that he had
used certain words, imputed to him by the British ambassador, had
been followed by a personal quarrel, which had only been arranged by
the intervention of Count Apponyi, the Austrian ambassador.[895] At
Madrid, the consequences of the distasteful marriage forced upon the
young Queen were already apparent. Isabella was practically separated
from her husband, and her relations with General Serrano were a cause
of scandal. French and British rivalry was actively maintained by
Bresson and by Bulwer, who, with the full knowledge of Palmerston, was
deeply involved in all the intrigues of the palace.[896] At Athens,
where King Otho had been compelled to grant a constitution, Lyons and
Piscatory, the British and French ministers, were closely identified
with different political parties. In South America, a dispute between
Lord Howden and Comte Walewski threatened to put an end to the
mediation of France and England in the war, which for some time past
had been in progress between Buenos Ayres and Monte Video.[897]
M. Guizot, under these circumstances, resolved to make approaches
to Austria. The British government alone was disposed to sympathize
sincerely with the Liberal movement which was causing so much anxiety
to the absolute Courts. If only he could arrive at an agreement with
Metternich as to the policy to be adopted towards German, Swiss
and Italian affairs, England would be isolated completely. But the
negotiation of such an understanding was a delicate matter. An
alliance between the government of the "Citizen King" and the Cabinet
of Vienna, for the maintenance of despotism and of the settlement of
1815, was an unnatural combination which might prove fatal to its
promotor. Public opinion in France was on the side of the peoples
struggling for political freedom. M. Thiers, the leader of the
Opposition, had loudly declared that this was only the principle upon
which French policy could be based. M. Guizot, therefore, considered
it advisable, in his intercourse with Metternich, not to make use
of the ordinary channels of communication, but to employ a secret
agent. In the spring of 1847, accordingly, he sent to Vienna, a
certain Klindworth,[898] who on several former occasions appears to
have been entrusted with confidential missions by the French Foreign
Office. He was to assure Prince Metternich that the French government
was determined to uphold the territorial _status quo_, and was
prepared to co-operate with Austria in opposing the introduction of
any fundamental changes in the system of government of the different
Italian States.[899]
M. Guizot, furthermore, entered into a direct correspondence with
Prince Metternich. But no precise agreement as to their respective
policies was concluded.[900] Guizot appears to have been mainly
concerned to assure the Austrian Chancellor of the high esteem which
he entertained for his perspicacity and judgment. Nor did he, on
occasions, disdain to employ language which can only be described as
that of fulsome adulation.[901] Metternich could not be otherwise
than pleased and flattered by the advances thus made to him. He was
not, however, disposed to set an undue value upon the protestations of
M. Guizot. He had little doubt that, were Austria to invade the Papal
States, France would at once dispatch an army to Italy, proclaiming
that she had taken His Holiness under her protection. But, although
no formal compact resulted from M. Guizot's overtures at Vienna,
his desire to propitiate Prince Metternich was reflected in his
instructions to his agents at the different Italian Courts. By the
spring of 1847, it was evident that the Italian Liberal movement was
regarded with nearly as much disapproval by the government of Louis
Philippe as by the Cabinet of Vienna.
Metternich was under no illusions as to the true meaning of the events
which were taking place in Italy. Above the popular expressions
of joy at the reforms, conceded by the Pope or by the Grand Duke
of Tuscany, rose the threatening cry for the expulsion of the
foreigner. Unless the Liberal movement could be crushed, the Emperor,
he perceived clearly, would have to fight to retain his Italian
possessions. "Nationality," he bade Buol warn Charles Albert, "was
the new device which the revolutionists had inscribed upon their
banners."[902] Resolutely he prepared for the struggle which he saw
was impending. Troops were poured into Lombardy and the Austrian
garrison at Ferrara was strengthened. Moreover, he was strongly
suspected of fomenting a counter-revolutionary plot at Rome, with the
object of forcibly displacing the Liberal advisers of His Holiness,
and of surrounding him with members of the reactionary party. The
discovery of this conspiracy, in which the governor of Rome was
involved, caused an immense excitement. No certain evidence could
be procured of the participation of Austrian agents in the affair.
It was significant, however, that the garrison of Ferrara received
a substantial accession of strength on the very day fixed upon by
the conspirators for the execution of their plans.[903] But, if
Metternich's connection with the Roman plot of July 1847 may be held
to be not proven, his intention to provoke the Liberal and national
party into some ill-considered act of violence, which should furnish
him with a pretext for armed intervention, admits of no doubt.
Hitherto, as specified by the treaty, the garrison at Ferrara[904]
had been confined to the citadel. But now the Austrians proceeded to
occupy the whole town, the troops adopting a most insulting attitude
towards the population, and especially towards the civic guard. But
this clumsy device for bringing on a collision failed in its object.
In the words of the British minister at Florence, the newly enrolled
citizen soldiers "observed the most extraordinary moderation under the
most contumelious treatment."[905] The Austrian proceedings at Ferrara
called forth a strong protest from His Holiness, who, at the same
time requested Charles Albert to send a frigate to Civita Vecchia for
his personal protection. His Sardinian Majesty promptly complied with
this demand, whereupon, the French ambassador tendered an offer of
assistance on the part of his government. This proposal, however, was
declined, no doubt being entertained at Rome, that France and Austria
were acting together in Italian affairs.[906] Thus Metternich, by his
aggressive attitude, had only succeeded in creating a bond of union
between the Papal government and the Court of Turin.[907]
At the end of July, 1847, Metternich resolved to inquire of the
different Powers, which were parties to the treaties of 1815, whether
they, as "the principal guardians of the political peace,"[908]
intended to maintain the territorial divisions of the Italian
peninsula as settled by the Congress of Vienna. The revolution, he
told Lord Ponsonby, must now be considered as complete in the Roman
States and in Tuscany. A revolution, he explained, was accomplished,
once a government had been deprived of all power. But the real object
of the party which had triumphed at Rome was to create a united Italy.
The Emperor, however, while studiously respecting the independence of
the sovereign States of the Peninsula, was determined to preserve his
own Italian kingdom.[909] The British government, wrote Palmerston
in reply, holds that the stipulations of treaties must everywhere
be observed, and that no changes in an agreement can properly be
effected, except with the concurrence of all the Powers which are
parties to it. But Her Majesty's government, at the same time, is no
less strongly of opinion that the right to carry out internal reforms
is a right inherent to independent sovereignty.[910] A month later, on
September 11, when the threatening communications made by Count Buol
to the Court of Turin, and the proceedings of the military commander
at Ferrara suggested that Austria might be contemplating some act of
aggression against the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Papal dominions,
Palmerston reverted to this subject. "The crowns of Great Britain and
of Sardinia," he warned Metternich, "had long been bound together
by the ties of an intimate and faithful alliance, and Great Britain
could neither forget nor repudiate claims founded upon such honourable
grounds." The Papal States were an essential element in the political
independence of the Italian Peninsula, and no invasion of them could
take place "without leading to consequences of great gravity and
importance."[911]
At the time when Palmerston was holding this language, the British
government had decided upon a measure, which was afterwards the
subject of much criticism. In the month of April, the Papal _nuncio_
in Paris had expressed to Lord Normanby a fear that His Holiness would
experience great difficulty in carrying out his projected reforms.
It was plain that no assistance would be forthcoming from the French
government, and it was, in consequence, very necessary that the cause
of social improvement in Italy should receive "a more active moral
support from England." If there were constitutional objections to the
establishment of direct diplomatic relations with the Holy See,[912]
might not some one, he suggested, in the confidence of Her Majesty's
government, be sent to Rome for the purpose of communicating with
the Pope and his ministers?[913] The Russell Cabinet was strongly
in favour of acceding to this request, but the manner in which the
British government should extend its "moral support" was somewhat
difficult to determine. Palmerston advocated that Lord Minto, the
Lord Privy Seal, should be sent upon a special mission to Turin,
Florence and Borne. The Queen, however, raised certain objections
to this plan. In an able _memorandum_ Prince Albert pointed out
that to despatch a member of the government to Italy, to encourage
the rulers of the different States to adopt measures, which Austria
regarded as highly dangerous to her existence as an Italian power,
was "a most hostile step towards our old and natural ally." It would
be more friendly, he contended, and certainly more honest, to let
it be clearly understood at Vienna that an attack upon any Italian
Sovereign, who was desirous of effecting administrative reforms,
would be looked upon as a violation of treaties to which England
was a party. But His Royal Highness was ready to admit that, by
adopting such a policy, England would be morally bound to uphold the
independence of the Italian States, whereas the projected mission
of Lord Minto would not commit her actively to interfere on their
behalf.[914] After some further discussion and correspondence
Palmerston carried his point. On September 11, his already quoted
despatch was sent off to Vienna, and, a week later, Lord Minto was
supplied with his instructions and started upon his journey.
Moderate as was the language which Lord Minto was directed to
hold at the different Italian Courts, his mission was necessarily
regarded with extreme disapproval at Vienna. Yet Minto had no mandate
to encourage the movement in favour of Italian unity, nor was he
instructed to counsel the adoption of any measures which could be
regarded as even an indirect attempt to deprive the Emperor of his
Italian possessions. On the contrary, he was to insist upon the
necessity of maintaining the peace. At Turin, he was to warn Charles
Albert of the danger of allowing his natural irritation at the
interference of Austria in his affairs to betray him into some act,
which might furnish the Court of Vienna with a pretext for attacking
him. But Metternich, being determined to place an absolute check upon
the development of Liberal ideas, was naturally greatly annoyed that
a British minister should visit Florence, Rome and Turin for the
purpose of congratulating the Sovereigns upon the reforms which they
had already carried out, and of urging them to persevere in the same
course in the future.[915]
Another task, however, had been confided to Lord Minto, besides
that of counselling the Italian rulers to advance with prudence and
circumspection along the path of reform. On his way to Turin he
was instructed to visit Switzerland, where a very grave condition
of affairs had arisen. By the _Federal Pact_ of 1815 Switzerland
consisted of twenty-two sovereign and independent Cantons, each of
which possessed one vote in the Federal Diet. The repercussion of
the revolution of 1830, in France, was acutely felt in Switzerland,
and, about that time, the cantonal constitutions were revised in a
democratic spirit. Some nine years later, however, the Conservatives,
by raising the cry that religion was in danger, succeeded in many of
the Cantons in regaining their lost power. The victorious party made
no attempt, even in those Cantons where their ascendency was the most
complete, to repeal the Liberal legislation of the past few years.
On the contrary, in the very Catholic cantons of Lucerne and of the
Valais, the popular _veto_ and the _referendum_ were introduced. It
was plainly the opinion of the clergy that their influence over the
people would enable them to obtain, by means of these democratic
institutions, the rejection of any measure of which they disapproved.
In the Canton of Aargau, however, of which the population was half
Protestant and half Catholic, the clerical party failed to establish
its ascendency by peaceful means. An attempt was, accordingly, made to
overturn the existing government by force. But the insurrection proved
unsuccessful and the eight monasteries, the inmates of which were
proved to have been actively concerned in the plot, were suppressed.
The existence of these establishments had been guaranteed by an
article of the _Federal Pact_, and the action of the Grand Council of
Aargau, in decreeing their abolition, was, in consequence, brought
before the Federal Diet. The matter was not settled until the year
1843, when the Canton of Aargau agreed to restore four suppressed
female convents; a compromise which was accepted as satisfactory
by the majority of the Diet. But scarcely had this controversy,
which had evoked intense bitterness of feeling, been settled, then
disturbances broke out in the Valais. The clerical party in that
Canton contrived, after severe fighting, to overturn the Radical
government. The success of this revolution, it was clear, was largely
due to the secret assistance which the reactionaries had received from
the Grand Council of Lucerne. Such conduct was the more inexcusable
seeing that, at the time, Lucerne was the _directing Canton_ and,
therefore, the more bound to observe an attitude of impartiality.
The Jesuits were generally regarded as the chief instigators of the
affair, and throughout the greater part of Switzerland a feeling of
extreme hostility arose against them. But the men in power at Lucerne
were indifferent to the dislike with which the Order was regarded
by the majority of their countrymen, and they, forthwith, proceeded
to call in the Jesuits and to give them the complete control of all
the educational establishments in their Canton. Meanwhile, with the
admitted connivance of the Radical governments of Berne, Aargau and
Soleure, volunteers were being enrolled and, at the end of the year
1844, and again in April, 1845, armed bands, known as the _corps
francs_, deliberately attacked Lucerne. But, having concluded an
alliance with Uri, Zug, and Unterwalden, Lucerne successfully repelled
these invaders. In this same year the expulsion of the Jesuits from
the whole of Switzerland was moved in the Federal Diet.
As far back as the year 1832, the Cantons of Uri, Schwyz and
Unterwalden, had entered into a combination, known as the _League of
Sarnen_, with the object of resisting the democratic tendencies of the
age. The association was, subsequently, strengthened by the accession
of Fribourg, Zug, Lucerne, and, in 1844, of the Valais. Early in the
year 1846, the character of the league was transformed completely.
From a peaceful association it was converted into a military alliance,
for the purpose of upholding the right of every independent Canton to
live under such laws as its legislature might enact. The _Sonderbund_,
as this alliance of the seven Catholic Cantons was called, was at
once denounced as an infraction of Article VI. of the _Federal Pact_,
prescribing that "no alliance, prejudicial either to the general
confederacy or to the rights of other Cantons, could be formed by
separate Cantons among themselves." A motion to that effect was,
accordingly, brought forward in the Federal Diet, but no decision
in its favour was obtained. Before the next year, however, in some
cases by constitutional means, in others, as at Geneva, by force and
violence, the composition of the governments in several Cantons was
changed and Radical Grand Councils were installed in power. Under
these circumstances, a majority was easily obtained in favour both of
the expulsion of the Jesuits and of declaring the illegality of the
_Sonderbund_. The allied Catholic Cantons, however, refused to submit
to this decision of the Federal Diet and proclaimed their intention
of resisting, by arms if necessary, any attempt to interfere with
their independence. Thus, at the time when Lord Minto departed for the
continent, all the signs pointed to the probability that Switzerland
would, before long, be the scene of a bloody civil war.
The rapid advance of democracy in Switzerland had necessarily excited
the alarm of the absolute Courts. Moreover, between the years 1830
and 1840, not only the Cabinet of Vienna but the French government
had had, on several occasions, good cause to complain that, unchecked
by the authorities, political refugees were allowed to concert their
measures for disturbing the peace of neighbouring States. After 1840,
the internal disputes and the increasing lawlessness of the country
began to attract the serious attention of all the Powers responsible
for the settlement of 1815. Both Lord Aberdeen and M. Guizot were
agreed that, could the question of the Jesuits be arranged, the
chief element of danger in the situation would be removed. The
French minister consented readily to exert his influence to induce
the Pope to recall them. Let it be well understood at Rome, he wrote
to Rossi, on June 6, 1845, that, should a Radical government be
established at Geneva, there would be a majority in favour of the
expulsion of the Order in the Federal Diet. Make it perfectly clear
to His Holiness that "the fate of the disciples of Loyola is in the
hands of the followers of Calvin."[916] Prince Metternich was at this
time instructing the Austrian ambassador at Rome to employ similar
arguments. But Gregory XVI. showed no disposition to interfere, and
all hope had soon to be abandoned of obtaining his co-operation in the
affair.[917] In the following year, the overthrow of the Conservative
governments at Geneva and in the Canton of Vaud, and the prospect
that, in the ensuing session, the Radicals would be in a majority
in the Federal Diet, increased Metternich's uneasiness. Hitherto,
France had set her face resolutely against intervention in any shape
or form. But, in the autumn of 1846, Louis Philippe, being anxious
to assure himself of the neutrality of the Northern Courts in the
question of the Spanish marriages, the Austrian Chancellor took the
opportunity of proposing that the Powers should seriously take in hand
the affairs of Switzerland. M. Guizot was rather disposed to accede to
this suggestion, but the King, being still hopeful of re-establishing
"the cordial understanding," refused to sanction any participation
in measures which might lead eventually to armed intervention.[918]
In the spring of 1847, however, when it was clear that England had
no intention of forgetting the affront which she had received in the
matter of the Spanish marriages, and when, in consequence, M. Guizot
was desirous of effecting a close understanding with Austria, French
policy towards Switzerland was altered to suit the exigencies of the
situation.
The sympathies of Metternich and of all the absolute Courts were
necessarily on the side of the _Sonderbund_.[919] The continental
Cabinets were agreed that it would be highly dangerous, in the
unsettled state of Europe, to allow the league of the Catholic and
Conservative Cantons to be dissolved by their Radical neighbours.
Federal unity, Metternich maintained, was clearly the object for
which the democrats were striving, and it was on that account that
they desired to undermine cantonal independence. But any revision of
the _Federal Pact_ would, he argued, release from their engagements
the Powers which had guaranteed the neutrality and independence of
Switzerland, and would justify them in intervening. Louis Philippe and
M. Guizot, although fully disposed to endorse his views, dared not
venture to employ French troops to fight the battle of the Jesuits.
They, accordingly, insinuated that, if Austria were to take the first
step, public opinion in France might be reconciled to the notion of a
French intervention. This ingenuous proposal was promptly declined.
Metternich had no idea of incurring the odium of invading Switzerland
and of allowing France to declare that similar action on her part had
been rendered necessary by the aggressiveness of Austria.[920] Thus
in Swiss, as in Italian affairs, M. Guizot and Prince Metternich,
notwithstanding the harmony of their sentiments, found it impossible
to devise any practical plan for concerted action.
England, as a party to the settlement of 1815, had an unquestionable
right to be consulted in any arrangement tending to alter the
political position of Switzerland in the European system. But, owing
to her geographical situation, she was less directly concerned
than France, Austria or Prussia in the internal condition of the
Confederation. The British government was, consequently, in a
position to regard the question from a more detached and impartial
standpoint. Moreover, the letters of Mr. Grote,[921] the historian
of Greece, to the _Spectator_, supplied the English public with far
better information about Swiss politics than was to be obtained in the
official press of continental States. Palmerston had no intention of
discussing the questions as to whether the alliance of the Catholic
Cantons should be looked upon as an infraction of the _Federal Pact_,
and as to whether the action of the Radical majority in the Diet, in
decreeing the expulsion of the Jesuits, constituted a violation of
cantonal sovereignty and independence. It is clear that, from an early
date, he adopted the view, propounded by Mr. Grote, that, whereas the
so-called Radical Cantons represented the wealth, the intelligence,
the industry, the population and the progressive elements of
Switzerland, the Cantons of the _Sonderbund_ were, in every respect,
the stationary and backward portions of the Republic. From these
premises it followed logically that, although it might be possible
for the allied Catholic Cantons to break up the Confederation, it
was not in their power to guide it or to hold it together.[922] He,
therefore, proposed both to Prince Metternich and M. Guizot, that they
should endeavour to persuade the Catholic leaders to dissolve their
alliance.[923] This solution of the difficulty, as may be supposed,
was not adopted by either of the statesmen to whom it was made. On
the contrary, Metternich at this time was arranging to furnish the
_Sonderbund_ with arms, and was seriously considering whether he
should place the services of an Austrian general at its disposal,
while M. Guizot was giving secret instructions for the despatch of
warlike stores to Lucerne from the arsenal at Besançon.[924]
Lord Minto, in his conversations with M. Ochsenbein, the President of
the Federal Diet, was charged to counsel forbearance and moderation.
"Her Majesty's government," wrote Palmerston, "as the sincere
and disinterested friend of Switzerland, could not but exhort all
parties to abate pretensions, however just they may be thought, and
to yield somewhat of rights, however valid they may be considered,
rather than begin an appeal to arms, the consequences of which it
would be easier to lament than to foresee." He was not prepared to
deny that the _Federal Pact_ might stand in need of revision. It
was alleged, however, that the Diet proposed "to sweep away the
separate sovereignty of the several Cantons in order to blend the
whole of Switzerland into one single Republic." He must, therefore,
remind the Swiss government that "the fundamental principle upon
which the arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna, in regard to
Switzerland, repose, is the separate sovereignty of the several
Cantons." Any attempt to alter the basis of the political organization
of the Republic would inevitably entail civil war and foreign
intervention.[925]
Yet, notwithstanding the pacific spirit in which Lord Minto's
instructions were drawn up, Palmerston has been freely accused of
inciting the Radical Cantons to begin hostilities. Animosity to
Louis Philippe and his principal minister, assert his detractors,
was at this period the mainspring of his policy. Thus, when the
French government evinced a disposition to favour the cause of the
_Sonderbund_, Palmerston, having satisfied himself of the military
superiority of the Radical Cantons, secretly urged them to attack
their weaker neighbours, in the hope that the forcible dissolution of
the Catholic alliance would entail the downfall of M. Guizot. This
charge has been reiterated in the recently published letters of Sir
Robert Morier. Mr. David Morier, Sir Robert's father, had been for
many years British minister in Switzerland. In the summer of 1847,
however, being in England on leave, he was not allowed to return to
his post, because, says his son, he was instinctively a peacemaker
and, therefore, no longer a suitable instrument to execute the policy
upon which Lord Palmerston had decided to embark.[926] But a perusal
of Mr. Morier's despatches suggests another, and an infinitely more
probable, explanation of his recall. When affairs in Switzerland were
beginning to assume a dangerous aspect, he is to be found expressing
views with which Lord Palmerston would have heartily agreed. Writing
to Lord Aberdeen, in June, 1844, on the subject of the Jesuits, Mr.
Morier points out that this intrusion of a powerful foreign agency
into all the concerns of the Confederation raises the question
whether, "self-preservation being the first law of States, the claim
of cantonal sovereignty should not be made to yield to the exigencies
of the general welfare." Again, some months later, speaking of the
introduction of the Jesuits into Lucerne, he warns his chief that
Lucerne "must be inscribed upon the list of Cantons with Fribourg,
Schwyz and the Valais, subjected, henceforward, through their Jesuit
institutions, to the influence of a foreign and anti-national power of
the most dangerous tendency to the peace of the Confederation."[927]
But, during the winter of 1846, an unprovoked assault was committed
upon one of his sons, Burnet Morier, by an excited Radical of Berne.
The young man with commendable promptitude felled his assailant to
the ground,[928] and, under these circumstances, Palmerston probably
considered that the affair need not be made the subject of an official
demand for reparation. Mr. Morier, however, thought otherwise,
and his indignation appears to have transformed him into a strong
supporter of the _Sonderbund_. The contrast between the sentiments,
contained in his _memorandum_ on Swiss affairs, submitted to the
Foreign Office in February, 1847,[929] and those expressed in his
earlier despatches, must have given Lord Palmerston food for serious
reflection. Without doubt, he must have come to the conclusion that a
man burning with resentment against the Radical leaders was hardly as
qualified, as his son seems to have supposed, to exercise a moderating
influence upon the passions of contending parties.
Lord Minto, having arrived in Switzerland, lost no time in placing
himself in communication with M. Ochsenbein. The election of this
person, who two years before had commanded the _corps francs_ in their
raid upon Lucerne, to the post of President of the Federal Diet, had
greatly exasperated the Catholics. Lord Minto, however, reported that
he found him most reasonable, and, to all appearances, sincerely
desirous of discovering some means of averting an outbreak of
hostilities. The Jesuits, he assured the English minister, constituted
the chief obstacle to a peaceful settlement, and, could they be
removed, all danger of war would disappear. Palmerston, on receiving
this information, at once instructed Minto, who by that time had
passed on to Italy, to use every endeavour, while at Rome, to persuade
His Holiness to intervene.[930] But, meanwhile, in Switzerland the
chances of maintaining the peace were hourly diminishing. Both sides
were now openly preparing for war, and, on October 29, the deputies of
the Catholic Cantons formally quitted the Federal Diet. On that same
day Lord Palmerston made a last effort to avert a rupture. He enjoined
the British _chargé d'affaires_ at Berne to seek out M. Ochsenbein
and to endeavour to prevail upon him to postpone the execution of any
irrevocable measure, until the result of Lord Minto's mission to Rome
should be known. M. Ochsenbein's only reply to this communication was
hastily to convene the Diet, which forthwith decreed the dissolution
of the _Sonderbund_ by the armed forces of the Federal executive.[931]
Two days later, on November 6, the Duc de Broglie, who had recently
succeeded Sainte-Aulaire, as ambassador in London, submitted a project
of intervention to Lord Palmerston. Let the Powers, proposed M.
Guizot, offer to mediate on the basis that the question of the Jesuits
should be settled by the Pope, and that the other points in dispute
should form the subject of a conference, at which each of the Cantons
should be represented. In the meantime, the contending parties would
be invited to suspend hostilities--a refusal to comply releasing the
Powers from their engagements to the Confederation and entitling them
to enforce their demands by whatever measures they might subsequently
agree to adopt.[932] Palmerston's official answer was not sent off to
Paris until November 16. It was in the form of a counter-proposition.
The British government, he declared, "could not go the length of
thinking" that the outbreak of civil war could release the Powers from
those pledges into which they had entered to maintain the neutrality
of Switzerland. Furthermore, it considered that the presence of the
Jesuits upon the territory of the Confederation, in opposition to the
wishes of the majority of the Cantons, constituted a real grievance.
Her Majesty's government, under the circumstances, before consenting
to join with France and the other Power in offering to mediate, must
make two conditions. In the first place, the removal of the Jesuits,
whether by a decision to be obtained from the Pope, or by an act of
sovereign authority on the part of the Cantons in which the Order was
established, must be the basis of any arrangement proposed by the
Powers to the contending parties. Secondly, it was to be distinctly
understood that a refusal by either side to accept mediation must not
be made the ground for armed interference in the internal affairs of
Switzerland.[933]
In Paris, at Berlin, and at Vienna, it had been intended to hold very
different language to M. Ochsenbein and his colleagues. Nevertheless,
M. Guizot, although stipulating for certain trifling modifications,
accepted the British proposal. The assent of Prussia and of Austria
was obtained, but it was given with the utmost reluctance.[934]
Palmerston was, in point of fact, completely master of the situation.
The condition of Germany was so unsettled, the appearance of affairs
in Italy was so alarming, that Metternich could not attack the
Radicals of Berne except in combination with France and, in the Swiss
question, Louis Philippe and M. Guizot dared not act with the absolute
Courts in opposition to the constitutional government of England.[935]
Nicholas, having no direct interest in the matter, was content to
adopt whatever course might commend itself to the Cabinet of Vienna.
The five governments being thus agreed, an _identic note_ was, on
November 26, drawn up in London for presentation to the President
of the Diet, and to the official organ of the _Sonderbund_ by the
representatives of the Powers in Switzerland. But, while ministers and
diplomatists had been talking and writing, the Federal executive had
acted. No sooner had the Diet, on November 4, decreed the forcible
suppression of the _Sonderbund_ than the Genevese general, Dufour,
who had at his disposal an army of 100,000 men and 260 guns, was
ordered to begin operations. The isolated canton of Fribourg having
been easily overwhelmed, the Federal commander advanced with his whole
force against Lucerne. Salis-Soglio, a Protestant of the Grisons,
whose army amounted to some 80,000 troops with 74 guns, awaited him
in a selected position between the Reuss and the Lake of Zug. The
decisive battle was fought on November 23, Dufour's victory was
complete. On the following day, the Jesuits and the executive council
having fled, Lucerne surrendered. The Valais, the last of the seven
Cantons to abandon the struggle, capitulated on the 29th. Twenty-five
days after the Diet had formally resolved upon its suppression, the
_Sonderbund_ ceased to exist.
In almost all accounts of these events Palmerston's proceedings
have been misrepresented. According to his detractors, he cunningly
inveigled the Powers into an exchange of views with the pretended
object of averting civil war in Switzerland, while in reality he was
secretly urging the Federal executive to open the campaign against
the _Sonderbund_.[936] Even Liberals, in sympathy with his policy,
describe him as having deliberately protracted the negotiations
in London, in order that the Radicals should be able to crush
the Catholic Cantons without fear of foreign interference.[937]
Palmerston, it is perfectly clear, was strongly opposed to direct
intervention and, moreover, was disposed to think that an unsolicited
offer on the part of the Powers to assist the Swiss to settle their
internal disputes would inflame their national pride, and rather
tend to aggravate, than to diminish, the gravity of the situation.
It is possible, therefore, that he may to some extent have delayed
the negotiations. But the alleged waste of time cannot at the most
have exceeded a very few days, seeing that the French note was only
submitted to him on November 9, and that his counter-proposal had been
agreed to by the Powers and was ready for transmission to Switzerland
on the 26th. To contend that Palmerston supposed that, by delaying
the negotiations for two or three days, he would enable the Radicals
to achieve their purpose, is to credit him with a knowledge of the
military weakness of the _Sonderbund_ which he most certainly did not
possess. If he in any way retarded the final drafting of the proposed
offer of mediation, it is infinitely more probable that he so acted in
the hope that Minto's efforts at Rome to induce the Pope to recall the
Jesuits from Lucerne might prove successful and that, in consequence,
the two parties might be able to settle their quarrel without an
appeal to arms and without foreign interference.
Sir Robert Morier, however, asserts most positively that Palmerston
"instigated Peel to perform his celebrated feat of precipitating
the war of the _Sonderbund_."[938] In his _Mémoires_ M. Guizot has
reproduced a letter from M. de Bois-le-Comte, the French ambassador
to the Confederation, in which it is stated that, upon receipt of the
news from London that the Powers intended to propose mediation, Mr.
Peel sent the chaplain of the British legation to the headquarters of
General Dufour to apprise him of the state of affairs and to urge him
immediately to march upon Lucerne and try conclusions with the army of
the _Sonderbund_.[939] It is evident that, if there be any foundation
of truth in these stories, neither the instructions with which Lord
Minto, a member of the government, was supplied, nor the official
despatch of October 29, which was to be communicated to M. Ochsenbein,
can have been the expression of Lord Palmerston's real policy. His
veritable intentions must have been conveyed in private letters[940]
to the British _chargé d'affaires_ at Berne, it never having been
suggested that he employed any secret agent in the affair. The
question as to who acted as British minister to the Confederation, at
this period, is, therefore, of extreme importance. It is inconceivable
that Palmerston, if he really were engaged in prosecuting the
Machiavellian designs imputed to him, should not have replaced Mr.
Morier by an Arthur Aston, a Henry Bulwer, or some other tried and
trusted agent. But in point of fact the business of the legation,
during the whole of this critical time, was left in charge of a young
secretary, Mr. Peel. Now Peel was the eldest son of Sir Robert, who,
to the day of his death, never forgave Palmerston for his desertion of
the Tory party in 1828.[941] Is it credible that Palmerston can have
entrusted the conduct of an affair of the kind, suggested by M. Guizot
and Sir Robert Morier, to a comparative stranger, a young man of
twenty-five, the son of his political opponent and personal enemy?
Nevertheless, it is highly probable that Palmerston's despatch of
October 29, although written with a very different object, did,
in effect, precipitate the conflict between the Radical Cantons
and the _Sonderbund_. As Mr. Peel, without doubt, rightly divined,
M. Ochsenbein, notwithstanding the pacific language which he had
held to Lord Minto, had no real desire to see the dispute amicably
settled.[942] Federal unity was the end which he and his friends had
set themselves to attain, and they were convinced that nothing but
physical force would induce the Catholic and Conservative Cantons to
renounce their sovereign rights. By "blood and iron" alone could the
success of their policy be achieved. Hence the prospect that England
intended to exert herself at Rome, in favour of Papal intervention,
may have driven the Radicals of Berne to immediate action. They may
have argued that, should His Holiness consent to recall the Jesuits
and should the _Sonderbund_, in consequence, be peacefully dissolved,
an excellent opportunity would be lost of reducing the Conservative
Cantons to submission.
The _identic note_ of November 26, 1847, was to have been communicated
to the contending parties, on behalf of Great Britain, by Sir
Stratford Canning. His instructions, however, provided that he
should not present it if, upon his arrival in Switzerland, he should
find that the _Sonderbund_ had capitulated and that the war was at
an end.[943] Canning, in consequence, made no offer of mediation,
but remained about three weeks in Switzerland for the purpose of
impressing upon M. Ochsenbein and his colleagues the expediency of
treating the defeated Cantons with consideration, and of refraining
from any measures which might furnish other Powers with a pretext
for intervention. France, Austria, and Prussia, however, adopted a
different procedure. M. de Bois-le-Comte received the _identic note_
on November 29, and, forthwith, despatched a copy of it both to the
Federal Diet and to the leaders of the _Sonderbund_, notwithstanding
that Lucerne had already surrendered and that it was evident that the
Valais could not hold out much longer.[944] His example was followed
by the ministers of Austria and Prussia. To these communications
the executive at Berne, the members of which had expressed to Sir
Stratford Canning their gratification at the attitude adopted by Great
Britain, sent an answer couched in very decided language. The offer
of mediation was rejected, not only because hostilities had ceased,
but because it was impossible to recognize the principle upon which
the proposal was based. If the Confederation were at war with another
State, it might, or might not, entertain an offer of mediation, but it
could not admit, under any circumstances, the claim of the Powers to
treat as belligerents the Cantons of the _Sonderbund_. The treaties
by which the Confederation had been constituted provided only for one
Diet and for one Federal executive. The alliance of the seven Cantons
was simply an act of rebellion which the central government had been
strong enough to deal with effectually.[945]
The overthrow of the _Sonderbund_ and the haughty reply returned by
the Diet to the French, the Austrian, and the Prussian notes caused a
profound sensation. The inability of the absolute Courts and of the
government of M. Guizot to render assistance to the Cantons, which
had sought to resist the decrees of the majority in the Swiss Diet,
was made manifest to the world. Italian nationalists, German Liberals,
French reformers, acclaimed the victory of the Radical executive as
a triumph for their cause. In governmental circles, at Vienna and
at Berlin, there was no disposition to under-rate the gravity of
the situation. Largely owing to the restraining influence of Lord
Minto, central Italy still presented a certain outward appearance of
tranquillity.[946] But Sicily and Naples were in open revolution, and
King "Bomba," who had, hitherto, set his face sternly against all
reforms, was, in January, 1848, compelled to concede a constitution.
Meanwhile, throughout the Peninsula the feeling of hostility to
Austria was growing in intensity. Encouraged by Lord Minto, Sardinia,
Tuscany, and the Papal States agreed to abolish all internal lines
of customs and to form a commercial league, after the manner of the
German _Zollverein_.[947] The significance of this measure was clearly
perceived by Metternich. On December 14, he directed Diedrichstein
to acquaint Palmerston that the condition of Italy would necessitate
a large increase of the Austrian army in Lombardy.[948] "You and I,"
he confided to his old friend, Radetzky, "are not destined to end
our days in peace. . . . It has been reserved for the present age to
witness the spectacle of a Liberal Pope."[949]
The forcible dissolution of the alliance of the Catholic Cantons made
it the more necessary, the German Cabinets declared, for the Powers
vigilantly to watch over the proceedings of the Federal Diet. The
conference, which it had been proposed to hold upon Swiss affairs,
must, they insisted, still take place.[950] The British government,
however, altogether dissented from this view. The _Sonderbund_ no
longer existed, the Jesuits had fled, and Palmerston, therefore,
could see no occasion for any deliberations upon the domestic affairs
of the Confederation. England, in any case, he announced, must now
decline to take part in a conference. M. Guizot adopted a different
attitude. If Palmerston were resolved to pose as the patron of
Radicals and revolutionists, why should not he come forward as the
champion of order and stability? The Austrian, Count Coloredo, and
the Prussian, General von Radowitz, who had been despatched to Paris
by their respective governments, found him most favourably disposed.
It was very flattering to his vanity that at this crisis the Courts
of Vienna and of Berlin should be prepared to defer to his opinions
and should send their emissaries to Paris to consult him. But from
London he received a word of warning which made a considerable
impression upon him. It would evoke, wrote his friend the Duc de
Broglie, recollections of the Holy Alliance and savour overmuch of the
deliberations at Laybach and Verona,[951] were France to take part in
a conference which England had declined to attend.[952]
In his conversations with Coloredo and Radowitz, M. Guizot,
consequently, deprecated the notion of assembling a conference. Let
them for the moment, he urged, be content with formally declaring to
the Diet that the Powers were resolved not to suffer the violation of
the principle of cantonal sovereignty and independence. Should their
representations be unheeded, the question of active intervention
could be more conveniently discussed at a later date. He had, they
must not forget, his parliamentary position to consider. In the
coming session, M. Thiers was preparing to assail his foreign policy
with the utmost virulence. Metternich consented readily to adopt
these suggestions. Far from desiring to aggravate the difficulties
of M. Guizot, he considered it of supreme importance that he should
remain in office.[953] A joint note, dated January 18, 1848, was,
accordingly, drawn up and presented to the Federal executive. Coloredo
and Radowitz, thereupon, quitted Paris. It was clearly inexpedient
that these agents of the absolute Courts should be present in the
French capital, during the heated debates to which the reply to the
Address was expected to give rise. But their deliberations were to
be regarded as merely suspended, not as definitely concluded. In the
spring they were to return and resume their discussions. But this
plan was not destined to be realized. Before the time appointed for
their second meeting with M. Guizot, the storm burst and swept away
the Orleans Monarchy. The revolutionary contagion spread rapidly to
Berlin and to Vienna. Metternich, compelled to fly, sought refuge
in England, in company with Prince Wittgenstein, M. Guizot, and
other ultra-conservative statesmen. At the news of the downfall
of the redoubtable Chancellor the Milanese flew to arms. After a
memorable conflict of five days' duration, Radetzky retired upon the
Quadrilateral, to prepare for the struggle with Charles Albert, who
had thrown down the gauntlet to Austria and marched to the assistance
of the Lombards.
A history of Franco-British relations, during the reign of Louis
Philippe, is not concerned with the internal reasons which contributed
to his downfall. It is sufficient to point out that the existence of
the Orleans Monarchy was necessarily precarious, seeing that it was in
the nature of a compromise which had only been grudgingly acquiesced
in by the nation. The revolution by which it was overwhelmed was, in
the words of Lamartine, "_une revolution de mépris_." All classes were
thoroughly disgusted with the policy of M. Guizot and indignant at the
numerous public and private scandals[954] brought to light, during
the year 1847. In a constitutional State a change of government is
the remedy provided for such a condition of affairs. Louis Philippe,
however, was too attached to his system of personal government
willingly to part with a minister, who never attempted to restrict
him to the _rôle_ of a constitutional sovereign.[955] His last
Cabinet, he protested, to the day of his death, had the support of
the majority of the Chamber. But the servile body of placemen, which
formed the ministerial party, in no way represented the opinion of the
nation. The people with one accord condemned the proceedings of the
government and identified the King with the unpopular actions of his
principal minister. On February 23, 1848, a demonstration in favour of
parliamentary reform, followed by a tumult in the streets, sufficed to
destroy the discredited _régime_.
The rupture of "the cordial understanding" with England was followed
so closely by the downfall of the monarchy, as to suggest that there
must have been a connection between the two events. That the quarrel
with England was one of the contributory causes of the revolution is
almost universally admitted. English writers have generally referred
to the events of '48 with some complacency, as the just retribution
which promptly overtook Louis Philippe. So shrewd an observer as
Baron Stockmar appears to have been convinced that the revelations
in connection with the Spanish marriages did the "Citizen King" an
incalculable amount of harm in the eyes of the French people and
precipitated his overthrow.[956] Now, it is clear that the Spanish
marriages had one effect which took those who were responsible for
them completely by surprise. M. Guizot had confidently anticipated
that, whatever other consequences might flow from them, they would be
acclaimed as a great diplomatic triumph achieved at the expense of
England. But the event completely falsified his expectations. The men,
who in the question of the right of search, in the Pritchard affair,
and in many other matters, had constantly accused him of truckling
to England, were the first to denounce him for having sacrificed
"the cordial understanding" to a purely dynastic object. It is more
than probable that the indignation professed by M. Thiers and his
friends was not very sincere and was, to a large extent, assumed for
purposes of party politics. But their words, none the less, made a
deep impression upon the middle-classes which had hitherto steadfastly
supported the _régime_ of July. These people, says Lord Normanby,
were convinced that their material interests had suffered owing to
the rupture of the English alliance. The construction of railways in
France had led, as in England, to a wild outburst of speculation. The
undue inflation of prices was followed by the inevitable reaction.
This unexpected depreciation in the value of the shares of the new
companies was not, however, ascribed to its true causes. Disappointed
speculators persuaded themselves that their losses were due to the
disinclination of the British public to invest in French railways,
owing to the change which the Spanish marriages had wrought in the
political relations of the two countries.[957]
But in so far as the revolution of '48 is concerned, the true
importance of the break-up of "the cordial understanding" consists in
the policy which M. Guizot, in consequence, saw fit to adopt. It is
undeniable that his attitude towards the Italian national movement and
in the Swiss question was severely condemned by the majority of his
countrymen, and proved most injurious to the monarchy. Men perceived
clearly that the only result of his unnatural alliance with the
Cabinet of Vienna had been enormously to diminish French influence at
Rome and at Turin. In Switzerland his policy was seen to have been
even more ineffectual.[958] All his efforts had been directed to the
preservation of the _Sonderbund_. Nevertheless, the alliance of the
reactionary cantons had been promptly and ignominiously dissolved,
whilst his proffered mediation had been rejected with a haughty
intimation that the victorious party intended to settle its affairs
without his interference. It has been urged, however, in his defence
that his difficulties were greatly aggravated by Lord Palmerston,
whose deliberate purpose it was to thwart him on every occasion. A
secret alliance, it has been said, existed between the British Foreign
Minister and M. Thiers. Gossip on this subject had been rife ever
since the close of the year 1844. It would seem that about that time
some friendly messages from Palmerston were conveyed to M. Thiers by
Sir John Easthope,[959] the proprietor of the _Morning Chronicle_,
which was generally regarded as Palmerston's especial organ. In the
following year, when M. Thiers visited London, Sir Anthony Panizzi,
an Italian political exile, and the chief librarian of the British
Museum, took great credit to himself for having cemented a good
understanding between the two statesmen.[960] Palmerston afterwards
denied absolutely that their interviews were in any way connected
with a "conspiracy against M. Guizot."[961] Greville, however,
accuses him of having, during the controversy on the subject of the
Spanish marriages, permitted Lord Normanby to supply M. Thiers with
the diplomatic documents bearing upon the question. Greville was
so ready to believe anything discreditable about Palmerston that
he cannot, as a rule, be looked upon as an altogether trustworthy
witness. But, at the time referred to, he was in a position to speak
of his own knowledge of what was taking place, inasmuch as he was
in Paris for the express purpose of trying to re-establish "the
cordial understanding" and was, moreover, the guest of Lord Normanby
at the British embassy.[962] His testimony, therefore, coupled with
the corroborative evidence to be found in the published letters of
Panizzi, does suggest that certain of Thiers' very damaging criticisms
of M. Guizot may have been inspired by Lord Palmerston.[963] But,
had the policy of M. Guizot been supported by public opinion, the
intrigues of a foreign minister with his chief political opponent
would have tended to strengthen, rather than to weaken, his position.
The whole affair, indeed, is not of much importance. Some of Thiers'
newspaper articles may have been based upon information improperly
supplied to him by the agents of Lord Palmerston, but his great
speech on the Spanish marriages was not delivered until February 4,
1847,[964] when the British _blue book_ was at the disposal of any one
who might desire to purchase it.
But the more serious charge has been made that Palmerston's whole
policy, at this period, was subordinated to his desire to avenge
the defeat he had sustained in the Spanish marriages.[965] His
attitude in the Swiss and Italian questions has been fully explained.
It is difficult to see how any British minister could have acted
differently. Had Aberdeen been in office, it may safely be surmised
that, out of consideration for Austria, he would not have advocated
the despatch of one of his colleagues upon such a mission, as was
confided to a member of Lord John Russell's government. But, without
doubt, he would have furnished his agents at the Italian Courts with
instructions substantially the same as those drawn up for the guidance
of Lord Minto. In the Swiss affair both Aberdeen and Palmerston sought
to avert civil war and foreign intervention by inducing the Pope to
recall the Jesuits from Lucerne. There is, in short, a continuity in
the British policy, whether conducted by Aberdeen or by Palmerston,
not to be found in that of M. Guizot. His _rapprochement_ with the
Cabinet of Vienna obliged him to adopt towards the Liberal and
national movements in progress throughout Europe the views of Prince
Metternich. The precise reasons which induced him to make overtures
to Austria can only be conjectured. Having shattered "the cordial
understanding," he may have thought that he must be able to show that
he had substituted for the English, the Austrian, alliance. Perhaps
he may have had some idea of isolating England, by means of the close
relations which he proposed to establish between the government of the
"Citizen King" and the absolute Courts. But, be his motives what they
may, his dealings with Metternich, in 1847, were unquestionably one of
the chief reasons of the revolution of '48.[966]
For the first time, between the years 1830 and 1848, the attempt was
seriously made by the French and English governments to establish,
as a primary principle of policy, the necessity of maintaining close
and intimate relations between the two countries. The result, on the
whole, disappointed expectations. The great work of Talleyrand's old
age, the cementing of a good understanding between the Whigs and
the Orleans' Monarchy, without doubt, deterred the absolute Courts
from intervening in French affairs after the Revolution of July.
Unquestionably, also, it averted a great war in the question of the
separation of Belgium from Holland. But, on subsequent occasions, it
did not prevent grave differences of opinion from arising between
the two governments. The time had not yet come when "the cordial
understanding" could be placed upon a firm and durable basis. The
maintenance of the settlement, agreed to after the great war, was
still the foundation of British policy in Europe. France, on the
other hand, chafed bitterly at the conditions imposed upon her by the
Congress of Vienna. Even among the peace-loving middle-classes the
hope was fondly entertained that the man would arise who, "_à grands
coups de sabre_," should destroy the treaties of 1815 and give back
to France her "natural frontiers." Bonapartism was a living force
by reason of the existence of this feeling. Louis Philippe and his
ministers sought to allay the restlessness which it engendered by
an active policy in the Mediterranean and in more distant waters.
Suspicions and jealousies, the consequences of more than a hundred
years of war and rivalry, were thus kept alive. French and British
officials, whether of high rank or of low degree, continued to regard
each other with instinctive hostility. Bulwer was no less anxious
to outwit his colleague, Bresson, than was Pritchard to thwart his
fellow-consul, Meerenhout. Nevertheless, the policy which finally
broke up the alliance was not a policy which commended itself to the
French people. Palmerston's views upon European affairs, between 1846
and 1848, accorded far more with the sentiments of the majority of
Frenchmen than did those of M. Guizot; and his quarrel was not with
the French nation, but with the government of Louis Philippe.
INDEX
Abd-el-Kader, Algerian chief, 358
Abdullah Pasha, 150
Abd-ul-Mejid, Sultan of Turkey, 242
Aberdeen, Earl of, 34, 37, 38, 116, 222, 281, 327, 331, 332, 333, 334,
339, 340, 342, 343, 344, 345, 347, 348, 349, 352, 354, 355, 356, 357,
358, 359, 360, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 371, 372, 373, 375, 376,
377, 379, 380, 382, 385, 392, 401, 404, 421, 426, 442
Adair, Sir Robert, 76, 79, 82, 83, 84, 100, 101, 127
Adelaïde, Madame, sister of Louis Philippe, 9, 401
Ahmed Pasha, 165
Akiff-Effendi, 246
Albani, Cardinal, 104
Albert, Prince Consort of Queen Victoria, 287, 365, 372, 384, 417
Alexander I., Tsar of Russia, 19, 44
Alexander, Tsarewitch, _afterwards_ Alexander II., 236
Ali Pasha, 146
Alison, Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople, 289
Althorp, Viscount. _See_ SPENCER, EARL
Alvanley, Lord, 86
Ancillon, Johann Peter, 111, 112, 136, 141
Apponyi, Count, 66, 68, 273, 292, 295, 411
Argüelles, Agustín, 218
Aston, Arthur, 217, 226, 307, 339, 340, 344, 371, 432
Atthalin, General, Baron, 27, 36, 344
Aubigny, Captain de, 361, 365, 366
Auckland, Earl of, 235
Aumale, Duc d', son of Louis Philippe, 338, 373
Avedick, Armenian _dragoman_, 244
Azeglio, Marquis de, 408, 409
Bagot, Sir Charles, 76, 113
Balbo, Count Cesare, 408, 409
Balmaceda, Carlist chief, 215
Bandiera, Admiral, 290
Barante, Baron de, 130
Baudrand, General, 15, 81
Beauharnais, Eugène de, 48
Beauvale, Lord, 17, 107, 108, 111, 112, 114, 169, 247, 250, 322
Becker, German poet, 312
Bedford, Duke of, 297
Belliard, General, 21, 61, 83, 100, 101
Benedek, Colonel, 406
Berri, Duc de, 62, 350
Bern, Duchesse de, 51, 120, 134, 197
Bernetti, Cardinal, 104, 106, 107
Bernstorff, Count, 24
Berryer, Pierre-Antoine, 350
Beshir, Emir, 152
Bligh, British _chargé d'affaires_ at St. Petersburg, 166, 168, 221
Boghos Bey, 227
Boigne, Comtesse de, 259
Bois-le-Comte, French Ambassador to the Swiss Confederation, 431, 434
Bordeaux, Duc de, 9, 62, 120, 350, 351
Bourqueney, Baron, 241, 286, 321, 322, 323, 326
Boutenieff, Russian Minister at Constantinople, 154, 155, 156, 157,
158, 161, 162, 223, 247
Bravo, Gonzalez, 217
Bresson, Comte, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 371,
374, 375, 379, 380, 383, 384, 387, 388, 390, 391, 394, 395, 397, 398,
399, 401, 411, 444
Broglie, Duc de, 35, 39, 130, 131, 132, 135, 137, 138, 156, 160, 165,
167, 169, 177, 178, 181, 184, 188, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 219, 221,
222, 225, 226, 334, 428, 436
Bruat, Admiral, 360, 361
Brunnow, Baron, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 261, 267, 300, 319
Bubna, Field-Marshal, 19
Bugeaud, Marshal, Duc d'Isly, 358, 367
Bülow, Baron, 114, 141, 263, 266, 274, 275, 276, 283
Bulwer, Henry, Lytton, _afterwards_ Lord Dalling, 232, 249, 250, 257,
279, 280, 295, 296, 298, 307, 333, 337, 339, 341, 370, 371, 372, 373,
374, 375, 378, 379, 380, 385, 386, 388, 390, 393, 396, 400, 411, 432,
444
Buol, Count, 413, 415
Burnes, Sir Alexander, 235, 236
Cabrera, Ramon, 202, 210, 214, 215, 216
Caillier, Captain, 242
Calatrava, Josè Maria, 203, 205, 207
Calomarde, Spanish statesman, 173, 174
Campbell, Colonel, 156, 162, 226, 227, 230, 232, 233, 234, 251, 257
Canning, George, 20, 50, 63, 144, 146, 147, 352, 403
Canning, Sir Stratford, _afterwards_ Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 151,
153, 155, 174, 175, 177, 221, 433, 434
Carini, Neapolitan Ambassador at Madrid, 374
Carlos, Don, Pretender to the Spanish throne, 173, 174, 176, 178, 179,
182, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 191, 192, 193, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210,
211, 214, 342, 343, 344, 348, 369, 377, 386, 394, 403
Carlotta, Infanta, 369
Cartwright, Thomas, 49, 50
Castlereagh, Viscount, _afterwards_ Second Marquis of Londonderry, 16,
20
Cea, Bermúdez, Spanish statesman, 174, 175, 177, 178, 336
Chad, British minister at Berlin, 110, 112
Charles X., King of France, 1, 4, 6, 8, 16, 20, 21, 30, 39, 43, 45
Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, 408, 409, 413, 414, 418, 437
Charles, Archduke of Austria, 49, 336
Charles Frederick, Archduke of Austria, 290
Charles, of Naples, Prince, 51, 55, 57, 59, 69
Charlotte, Princess, daughter of George IV., 69
Chassé, General, Baron, 76, 140, 142
Chateaubriand, Vicomte de, 26, 64, 350
Chekib-Effendi, 263, 267, 271
Chesney, Colonel Francis, 237
Chlopicki, General, 44
Chrzanowski, General Adalbert, 229, 251, 252
Clanricarde, Marquis of, 236, 252, 319, 320
Clarendon, Earl of, 177, 184, 186, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 203, 207,
208, 210, 216, 217, 265, 266, 275, 297, 336, 396
Cochelet, Adrien-Louis, 241, 242, 269, 272, 273
Codrington, Admiral, Sir Edward, 146
Coloredo, Count, 436, 437
Concha, General, 338
Constantine, Paulovitch, Grand Duke, 144
Cor, _dragoman_ to French Embassy at Constantinople, 291, 292
Cordoba, General, 201
Cortazar, Modesto, 216
Coste, Jacques, 270, 310
Cousin, Victor, 41
Cowley, Earl, 185, 343, 345, 347, 363, 366, 371, 379, 396
Cubières, General de, 302
Cunningham, Marchioness of, 50
Daine, General, 76, 83
Darmès, regicide, 306
Décazes, Duc, 39, 340
Dedel, Dutch Envoy in London, 266
Deutz, Agent of Duchesse de Bern, 197
Diebitsch, Marshal, Count, 26, 42, 64
Diedrichstein, Baron von, 435
Dino, Duchesse de, 32, 199, 266
Dost Mohammad, Amir of Kabul, 235
Drummond-Hay, British Consul at Tangier, 360
Duckworth, Admiral, 164
Dufour, General, 430, 432
Duhamel, Colonel, 157
Dupetit-Thouars, Admiral, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 360
Dupin, André Marie Jean Jacques, 31, 129
Dupont, Jacques, 31, 39
Durham, Earl of, 123, 124, 135, 224
Easthope, Sir John, 440
Eliot, Lord, _afterwards_ Earl of St. Germans, 184, 185
Ellice, Edward, 265, 297, 321
Elphinstone, Miss Mercer, 53
Emin Bey, 148
Enrique, Don, Duke of Seville, 370, 379, 384, 385, 388, 389, 390, 397,
398, 403
Escalera, General, 207
España, Count of, 214
Espartero, General Baldomero, 206, 207, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216,
217, 307, 335, 338, 339, 340, 341, 343, 344, 346, 347, 368, 369, 371,
378, 404
Etterhazy, Prince, 43
Evans, Sir George de Lacy, 187, 202, 211
Excelmans, General, _afterwards_ Marshal, 52
Fabvier, General, Baron, 52
Fanshawe, Captain, 315
Faucher, Léon, 302
Ferdinand VII., King of Spain, 20, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 190,
191, 192, 403
Ferdinand I. (IV.), King of the Two Sicilies, 19
Ferdinand II. ("Bomba,") King of the Two Sicilies, 264, 374, 435
Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, King Consort of Maria II., Queen of
Portugal, 190
Ferdinand, Duke of Saxe-Coburg, 371, 379, 382, 384, 395
Fernanda, Infanta, 372, 377, 391, 394, 395, 397, 398, 400, 401
Fethi Ahmed Pasha, 270, 273
Fezensac, Duc de, 209
Flahaut, General, Comte de, 53, 54, 265, 407
Forbes, British _chargé d'affaires_ at Vienna, 101
Francis II., Emperor of Austria, 17, 21, 26, 68, 166
Francis IV., Duke of Modena, 64
Francisco de Paula, Infante, 369, 375, 385, 393
Francisco de Asis, Don, Duke of Cadiz, _afterwards_ king Consort of
Isabella II., Queen of Spain, 370, 379, 384, 387, 391, 395, 396, 397,
398, 401, 402, 403
Frederick William III., King of Prussia, 17, 22, 23, 24, 26, 31, 32,
68, 167, 274
Frederick William IV., King of Prussia, 166, 408
Frederick William, Crown Prince of Prussia. _See_ FREDERICK WILLIAM IV.
Gallois, Captain, 105, 107
Gendebien, Alexandra, Joseph, 48, 52
George IV., King of Great Britain, 14, 50, 69
Gérard, Marshal, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 139, 140, 141, 142
Gioberti, Vincenzo, 408, 409
Glücksberg, Duc de, 340, 341, 345
Goblet, General, 84, 100, 101, 128
Granville, Earl of, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60, 67, 69, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79,
80, 82, 85, 95, 99, 103, 129, 131, 132, 134, 137, 160, 181, 185, 188,
193, 194, 196, 202, 205, 208, 209, 228, 234, 244, 279, 280, 303, 304,
305, 306, 307, 336
Granville, Countess of, 63
Gregory XVI., Pope, 409, 410, 421
Greville, Charles, 64, 70, 265, 283, 297, 299, 302, 312, 321, 329, 441
Grey, 2nd Earl, 39, 40, 46, 49, 51, 57, 74, 79, 80, 81, 83, 89, 92,
96, 98, 102, 116, 118, 119, 123, 134, 137, 140, 172, 183, 199, 222,
265
Grey, 3rd Earl, 381
Grote, George, 423, 424
Guizot, François, 31, 35, 39, 47, 130, 132, 191, 259, 260, 261, 263,
264, 265, 266, 267, 273, 274, 275, 277, 278, 279, 282, 283, 284, 285,
286, 288, 292, 296, 297, 304, 305, 309, 312, 313, 318, 320, 321, 323,
324, 326, 329, 332, 333, 334, 337, 339, 341, 345, 347, 348, 349, 352,
353, 355, 356, 357, 359, 360, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 370, 372,
374, 375, 376, 379, 383, 384, 386, 387, 388, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394,
398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 404, 407, 410, 411, 412, 413, 421, 422, 423,
424, 425, 428, 429, 431, 432, 434, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 444
Haines, Captain, 232.
Hafiz Pasha, 228, 240, 242, 243, 251, 252
Halen, General Van, 344
Halil Pasha, 155, 158, 159, 243, 269
Hay, Admiral, Lord John, 201, 207, 213
Heine, Heinrich, 63, 120, 302
Heytesbury, Lord, 26, 27, 28, 42, 68, 87, 88, 89, 90, 110, 123, 125
Hinüber, General, 72
Hobson, Captain William, 351
Hodges, Colonel, 269, 272
Holland, Lord, 255, 266, 275, 298, 302, 321, 327
Holland, Lady, 298
Hosrew Pasha, 150, 243, 247, 268, 269, 272, 273
Howard de Walden, Lord, 189, 190
Howden, Lord, 411
Hugon, Admiral, 226, 306
Humann, Jean-Georges, 132
Hume, Joseph, 281
Hussein Pasha, 151
Ibell, Charles, 24
Ibrahim Pasha, 145, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159,
160, 161, 219, 220, 232, 234, 240, 241, 242, 245, 247, 251, 252, 253,
268, 269, 271, 280, 283, 287, 291, 294, 295, 296, 301, 310, 311, 314,
317
Isabella II., Queen of Spain, 174, 176, 180, 186, 204, 206, 208, 211,
213, 216, 335, 337, 338, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 347, 348, 368, 369,
370, 371, 374, 375, 377, 378, 379, 382, 383, 387, 388, 391, 394, 396,
397, 400, 401, 402, 403, 405, 411
Isturiz, Francisco, Javier de, 202, 379
Jarnac, Philippe de Bohan-Chabot, Comte de, 349, 360, 361, 362, 363,
364, 365, 366, 375, 376, 383, 384, 386, 388, 391, 392, 394, 402
Jochmus, General, 252, 314
Joinville, Prince de, son of Louis Philippe, 189, 244, 338, 356, 358,
359, 364, 367
Klindworth, secret diplomatic agent, 412
Kotchuby, Russian minister, 156
Kotzebue, Augustus, 24
La Fayette, Marquis de, 5, 9, 11, 35, 46
Laffitte, Jacques, 4, 9, 39, 62, 63
Lalande, Admiral, 243, 244, 245
Lallemand, General, Baron, 52
Lamarque, General, Comte, 46, 120
Lamartine, Alphonse de, 438
Lamb, Sir Frederick. _See_ BEAUVALE, LORD
Lamoricière, General Christophe Léon Louis Juchault de, 358, 360
Lansdowne, Marquis of, 181, 266, 275, 302
La Tour-Maubourg, Marie-Charles-César de Faÿ, General, Marquis de, 82,
84, 95, 98, 99, 100, 127, 139
Lawoëstine, Colonel, Marquis de, 54, 55, 56
Leon, General Diego, 338
Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, _afterwards_ Leopold I., King of the Belgians,
49, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 79, 82, 84, 85, 91, 92, 93, 99, 100,
101, 126, 127, 139, 143, 285, 287, 300, 307, 367, 384
Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, Prince, 371, 375, 377, 379, 385, 391, 392,
395, 402
Lesseps, Viscomte Ferdinand de, 227, 345, 346
Leuchtenberg, Duc Auguste de, 48, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 189
Lieven, Prince, 42, 90, 115, 221
Lieven, Princess, 222, 259, 265, 274
Lobau, Marshal Mouton de, 46
Londonderry, 3rd Marquis of, 74, 85, 223
Louis XVIII., King of France, 6, 7, 30, 39, 62, 340
Louis Philippe, King of the French, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15,
21, 22, 26, 27, 28, 30, 34, 35, 40, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56,
57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 67, 69, 81, 92, 97, 100, 121, 124, 129, 130,
131, 134, 137, 144, 173, 177, 182, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192,
193, 195, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 204, 205, 207, 209, 212, 214, 220,
239, 250, 258, 264, 265, 279, 285, 287, 292, 293, 300, 305, 307, 308,
309, 311, 319, 327, 329, 331, 335, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343,
344, 347, 348, 350, 351, 355, 356, 357, 358, 365, 368, 369, 370, 371,
372, 374, 375, 376, 379, 382, 383, 384, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392,
393, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 407, 410, 413, 422, 423,
425, 429, 437, 438, 439, 443, 444
Louise, Princesse, daughter of Louis Philippe, consort of Leopold I.,
King of the Belgians, 126, 392
Loulé, Marquise de, 189
Lushington, Doctor, 334
Lützow, Count, 67
Lyndhurst, Lord, 118, 119
Lyons, Sir Edmund, 411
Maanen, Cornelius van, 29
Macneil, British minister at Teheran, 235
Mahmud II., Sultan of Turkey, 145, 146, 147, 150, 152, 153, 157, 159,
161, 163, 165, 169, 219, 220, 227, 228, 229, 232, 237, 238, 239, 240,
242, 246
Maison, Marshal, Marquis, 41, 64, 66, 67, 108
Malcolm, Sir Pulteney, 164
Mandeville, British _chargé d'affaires_ at Constantinople, 154, 155,
157, 158, 160
Maria II., Queen of Portugal, 171, 173, 174, 176, 189, 190
Maria Amalia of Saxony, 3rd wife of Ferdinand VII., King of Spain, 172
Maria Christina, 4th wife of Ferdinand VII. and Queen Regent of Spain,
172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 186, 192, 194, 195, 202, 203, 206, 207, 209,
213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 307, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 343, 344,
346, 348, 368, 369, 370, 372, 374, 376, 378, 379, 382, 383, 384, 385,
387, 389, 392, 395, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401
Marie Amélie, Queen of the French, Consort of Louis Philippe, 9, 51,
391
Mareuil, French _chargé d'affaires_ in London, 132
Maroto, General Rafael, 211, 212, 213, 214
Martínez de la Rosa, Francisco, 178, 180, 184, 187, 190, 192
Matuszewic, Count, 111, 115, 169
Mauguin, François, 49
Maurojeni, Turkish _chargé d'affaires_ at Vienna, 153
Mazzini, Giuseppe, 408
Medem, Count, 252
Meerenhout, French consul at Tahiti, 352, 353, 354, 444
Mehemet Ali, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158,
159, 161, 164, 168, 169, 170, 171, 219, 220, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230,
231, 232, 233, 234, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 245, 246, 247,
248, 249, 250, 251, 253, 255, 256, 260, 261, 262, 263, 266, 267, 268,
269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 276, 277, 278, 280, 281, 282, 284, 285, 290,
291, 294, 295, 296, 297, 299, 300, 301, 303, 305, 308, 309, 310, 312,
313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 403
Melbourne, Viscount, 183, 186, 205, 266, 275, 282, 283, 286, 287, 297,
298, 299, 303, 307, 309, 326
Mendizabal, Juan Alvarez, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 201, 202
Mérode, Comte Félix de, 55
Metternich, Clement Wenceslas, Prince, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 42, 43, 49, 65, 67, 68, 101, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 112, 114,
121, 135, 144, 166, 167, 168, 169, 198, 204, 225, 245, 247, 254, 266,
269, 293, 300, 310, 312, 316, 319, 320, 321, 322, 324, 326, 332, 336,
342, 343, 344, 370, 393, 407, 408, 409, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416,
418, 421, 422, 423, 424, 429, 435, 437, 442, 443
Meulinäer, Dutch statesman, 82, 84, 126, 128
Miguel, Dom, usurping King of Portugal, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177,
178, 179
Miller, Major-General, 354
Mimaut, French consul-general at Alexandria, 227, 272
Minto, Earl of, 417, 418, 421, 424, 425, 427, 428, 431, 432, 433, 435,
442
Miraflores, Marquis of, 378, 396
Mohammad, Shah of Persia, 235, 236
Molé, Louis, Comte, 31, 35, 36, 38, 39, 48, 196, 204, 205, 207, 212,
234, 329, 336
Moltke, Major Helmuth von, _afterwards_ Field-Marshal, 230, 238, 251
Montalivet, Comte de, 45
Montpensier, Duc de, son of Louis Philippe, 371, 372, 377, 383, 387,
391, 393, 394, 397, 398, 400, 401, 402
Montrond, Comte Casimir de, 32, 58
Morier, Burnet, 426
Morier, David, 425, 426, 432
Morny, Duc de, 53
Mortemart, Duc de, 87
Mounier, Baron, 321
Muñagorri, Basque lawyer, 210, 212
Muravieff, General, 154, 155, 156, 158
Mustafa-Effendi, 153
Namic Pasha, 153
Napier, Commodore, Sir Charles, 175, 290, 295, 301, 313, 314, 315,
316, 317, 360
Napoleon, Prince Charles, 66
Napoleon, Prince Louis, _afterwards_ Napoleon III., 53, 66, 121, 285,
286
Narvaez, General Ramon Maria, 211, 335, 346, 368, 374, 376, 378, 379,
383
Nemours, Duc de, son of Louis Philippe, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60,
61, 139, 189, 373
Nesselrode, Charles Robert Count, 20, 22, 87, 88, 90, 110, 125, 156,
165, 166, 167, 168, 220, 221, 236, 252, 269, 365
Neumann, Baron, 258, 263, 266, 273, 283
Nicholas I., Tsar of Russia, 20, 26, 27, 28, 36, 44, 68, 73, 88, 90,
101, 105, 108, 109, 112, 113, 116, 123, 124, 135, 140, 146, 147, 154,
156, 157, 160, 163, 166, 168, 220, 223, 224, 239, 241, 246, 253, 257,
319, 356, 357, 429
Normanby, Marquis of, 391, 393, 407, 411, 416, 439, 441
Nourri-Effendi, 242, 262, 263
Nuñoz. _See_ RIANZAREZ, DUKE OF
Nuñoz, brother of Duke of Rianzarez, 390
Ochsenbein, Ulrich, 424, 427, 428, 429, 432, 433
O'Donnell, General, 216, 338
Olozaga, Salustiano de, 339
Orange, Prince Frederick of, 29
Orange, William, Prince of, 29, 36, 47, 48, 50, 52, 57, 70, 76, 83
Orléans, Duc de. _See_ LOUIS PHILIPPE, King of the French
Orléans, Duc de, eldest son of Louis Philippe, 139, 198, 204, 225, 293
Orloff, General, Count Alexis, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115,
116, 162, 163, 170, 254
Osman Bey, 243
Otho, King of Greece, 311, 411
Otrante, Comte Athanase de, 65
Pageot, French diplomatist, 341, 342, 343
Palmella, Duke of, 189
Palmerston, Viscount, 41, 42, 46, 49, 53, 58, 59, 60, 61, 66, 70, 72,
75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95, 96, 98,
99, 102, 105, 106, 107, 109, 112, 113, 115, 116, 125, 128, 134, 136,
139, 141, 143, 144, 153, 156, 166, 169, 173, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181,
182, 186, 187, 189, 192, 194, 195, 196, 199, 201, 202, 204, 208, 209,
213, 217, 219, 221, 222, 223, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233,
236, 238, 239, 240, 241, 244, 245, 246, 248, 249, 251, 253, 254, 255,
256, 257, 258, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 270, 273, 274,
275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 281, 282, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290,
292, 296, 297, 298, 299, 302, 303, 304, 305, 307, 309, 310, 311, 312,
313, 314, 315, 320, 321, 322, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 330, 331, 332,
333, 336, 352, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 388, 389, 390, 391,
392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 406, 407,
411, 415, 416, 417, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433,
435, 436, 440, 441, 442, 444
Palmerston, Lady, 382
Panizzi, Sir Anthony, 441
Parnell, Sir Henry, 39
Pedro I., Emperor of Brazil, 171, 172, 173, 175, 176, 178, 189
Peel, Sir Robert, 183, 186, 222, 281, 327, 331, 357, 360, 372, 373,
380, 381, 401, 432
Peel, Robert, son of Sir Robert, 431, 432, 433
Périer, Casimir, 39, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 72, 75, 78, 79, 81, 86, 100,
102, 103, 105, 108, 112, 118, 120, 121, 129, 130
Périgord, Comte Edmond de, 32
Piscatory, French minister at Athens, 411
Pius IX., Pope, 409, 414
Polignac, Prince Jules de, 3, 14, 15, 26, 45, 155
Pomare, Queen of Tahiti, 352, 353, 354, 361, 365
Ponsonby, Viscount, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56, 59, 60, 71, 72, 156, 162, 223,
224, 229, 230, 231, 232, 234, 239, 240, 243, 244, 247, 248, 269, 270,
273, 291, 303, 305, 316, 324, 325, 326, 415
Pontois, French ambassador at Constantinople, 269, 291, 292
Pottinger, Eldred, 235
Pozzo di Borgo, Charles, Count, 160
Prim, Brigadier-General, _afterwards_ Marshal, 346
Pritchard, George, 353, 354, 355, 356, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365,
366, 367, 444
Quesada, General, 203
Radetzky, Field-Marshal, Count, 104, 435, 437
Radowitz, General von, 436, 437
Ranjit Singh, Maharajah of Lahore, 235
Rayneval, Alphonse Gérard de, 187, 195, 197
Reeve, Henry, 281, 302, 312, 329
Reichstadt, Duc de, son of Napoleon I., 67, 121
Rémusat, Comte Charles de, 5, 47
Reshid Bey, 159
Reshid, Mustafa, Pasha, 229, 239, 240, 244, 269, 273, 291, 292
Rianzarez, Duke of, 369, 372, 387
Riego, Rafael del, 179
Rifat Bey, 288, 290, 294, 301
Rigny, Admiral, Comte de, 178, 179
Rives, American minister in Paris, 5
Rodil, General, 179
Rossi, Comte Pellegrino, 410, 421
Roussin, Albin Reine, Admiral, Baron, 75, 158, 159, 160, 162, 168,
172, 228, 234, 241, 247, 248, 257, 272, 302
Royer-Collard, Pierre Paul, 130
Russell, Lord John, 282, 297, 299, 303, 380, 381, 383, 392, 416, 442
Sainte-Aulaire, Louis-Clair de Beaupoil, Marquis de, 66, 104, 193,
247, 333, 380, 428
Saldanha, Marshal, Duke of, 189
Salis-Soglio, Ulrich von, 430
Salvandy, Comte de, 340, 341
Sami Bey, 272, 273
Samos, Prince of, 272
Sand, Karl Ludwig, 24
Sarim-Effendi, 227, 228, 272
Sarsfield, General Pedro, 207
Sartorius, Sir George, 172, 175
Sébastiani, General, _afterwards_ Marshal, 41, 51, 52, 54, 57, 58, 59,
60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 77, 79, 80, 82, 85, 86, 87, 89,
94, 98, 99, 100, 132, 256, 257, 258, 259, 348
Sébastiani, General Tiburce, 100
Serrano, General, 411
Sèves, Colonel. _See_ SOLIMAN PASHA
Seymour, George, 106, 107
Simonitch, Count, 235, 236
Soliman Pasha, 149, 291, 301
Sotomayor, Duke of, 382
Soult, Marshal, Duc de Dalmatie, 79, 85, 131, 132, 142, 197, 212, 240,
241, 242, 243, 246, 248, 249, 250, 252, 254, 255, 256, 257, 259, 260,
309, 356
Southern, secretary to British legation and _chargé d'affaires_ at
Madrid, 194, 215, 337
Spencer, Earl, 183, 297
Stockmar, Baron, 77, 84, 91, 92, 93, 98, 101, 115, 116, 125, 126, 127,
439
Stopford, Admiral, Sir Robert, 249, 251, 264, 278, 289, 290, 301, 311,
314, 315
Stuart de Rothesay, Lord, 34, 35, 38, 45, 48, 53
Stürmer, Baron, 247, 316, 326
Talleyrand-Périgord, Prince de, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 41,
42, 43, 48, 49, 51, 54, 57, 58, 59, 61, 66, 70, 71, 72, 76, 77, 78,
79, 80, 81, 82, 86, 87, 88, 93, 94, 95, 98, 99, 102, 105, 115, 116,
137, 141, 144, 178, 179, 180, 198, 259, 443
Taylor, Sir Brooke, 66
Temple, Sir William, 264
Terceira, Duke of, 176
Thiers, Louis-Adolphe, 4, 8, 132, 197, 198, 201, 203, 204, 225, 226,
227, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273,
274, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 288, 291, 292, 294, 295, 296,
297, 298, 302, 304, 305, 306, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 318, 328,
329, 412, 437, 439, 440, 441
Toreno, Count, 192, 337, 343, 396
Trapani, Count, 369, 370, 373, 374, 376, 378, 379, 384, 387, 402
Turner, Lieutenant, 208, 210, 212
Varennes, French _chargé d'affaires_ at Constantinople, 154, 155, 157,
160
Véron, Doctor Louis-Désiré, 248
Verstolk van Soelen, Johan Gijsbert, Dutch statesman, 71, 113
Victoria, Queen of Great Britain, 212, 285, 299, 303, 325, 348, 350,
356, 367, 368, 372, 373, 391, 392, 417
Villèle, Jean-Baptiste de, 146
Villiers, George. _See_ CLARENDON, EARL OF
Vogoride, Prince Nicolae, 272
Walewski, Comte, 284, 294, 411
Walker, Captain, 245, 301, 314
Wellington, Duke of, 14, 15, 28, 32, 34, 37, 41, 81, 86, 96, 116, 119,
147, 183, 185, 222, 223, 224, 281, 287, 331, 332, 357
Werther, Baron, 31, 136, 295, 319
Weyer, Silvain van de, 52, 91, 100, 116, 117, 128
William I., King of the Netherlands, 29, 43, 47, 55, 70, 71, 72, 74,
75, 76, 77, 80, 91, 93, 101, 109, 110, 112, 113, 115, 122, 123, 125,
127, 133, 135, 137, 138, 141, 142, 143
William IV., King of Great Britain, 15, 32, 39, 40, 106, 118, 134,
137, 153, 183
Witkewitch, Captain, 235, 236
Wittgenstein, Prince, 22, 24, 437
Wylde, Colonel, 187, 200, 201, 210, 213
Zumalacárregui, General, 183, 200
Zuylen, Baron van, 125, 128
FOOTNOTES:
[1] H. Heine, _Letters from Paris_ (translated by Leland), I. pp. 62,
63, 66, 67, 68, and 354.
[2] The "_pré carré_," the sea, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees.
[3] N. Senior, _Conversations with Thiers, Guizot, etc._, I. pp. 288,
323, and 334.
[4] L. Blanc, _Histoire de dix ans._, I. p. 383.
[5] F. Daudet, _Revue des Deux Mondes_. 1^{er} décembre, 1909. "La
police politique sous la Restauration."
[6] Guizot, _Mémoires_, II. pp. 12-16.
[7] The son of the Duchesse de Berri. The Duc de Berri had been
murdered at the Opera House on February 13, 1820, and his son had been
born in the following September. The Duc de Bordeaux was therefore
the grandson of Charles X. and the nephew of the Duc d'Angoulême, the
Dauphin. He is better known by the title of the Comte de Chambord.
[8] L. Vitet, "La monarchie de" 1830, _Revue des Deux Mondes_. 1^{er}
décembre, 1860.
[9] L. Blanc, _Histoire de dix ans._, I. pp. 384-388.
[10] H. Heine, _Letters from Paris_ (translated by Leyland), I. pp.
141, 142.
[11] Metternich, _Memoires_, V. pp. 26-28.
[12] Affaires étrangères 631, Angleterre, Baudrand à Molé, août 28,
1830. H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, I. p. 330. _Edinburgh Review_,
October, 1830. Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 131-134. C. Greville,
_Journals_, II. pp. 94, 95. _Correspondence of Princess Lieven with
Earl Grey_, II. Grey to Princess Lieven, July 29, 1830.
[13] _Despatches and Correspondence of Wellington_, VII. Wellington to
Aberdeen, August 12th, 1830, pp. 162-169, _Memorandum upon Relations
with France_. C. Greville, _Journal_, II. p. 21.
[14] Affaires étrangères 631, Angleterre: Baudrand à Molé, 23 août,
1830; Vaudreuil à Molé, 28 août, 1830.
[15] F.O. Austria 243, Lamb to Palmerston, September 3, 1833.
[16] Bolton King, _History of Italian Unity_, I. pp. 51-61.
[17] Metternich, _Memoires_, IV. p. 222: Metternich à Esterhazy, 7
août, 1825.
[18] Metternich, _Memoires_, V. pp. 10-17.
[19] Metternich, _Memoires_, V. pp. 17-30.
[20] E. Quinet, _De l'Allemagne_. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, V. Premier
semestre.
[21] William A'Court, first Baron Heytesbury (1779-1860).
[22] F.O. Russia 186, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, August 17, 18, 19, 1830.
[23] F.O. Russia 186, Heytesbury to Aberdeen (most secret and
confidential), August 20, 1830.
[24] F.O. Russia 186, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, September 8, 14, 1830.
[25] Guizot, _Mémoires_, II. pp. 86-87.
[26] Broglie, _Souvenirs_, IV. pp. 41-42.
[27] Affaires étrangères, 631 Angleterre. Talleyrand à Molé, 25
septembre, 1830. Barante, _Souvenirs_, IV. p. 9.
[28] C. Greville, _Journals_, II. p. 57.
[29] _La Jeune Captive._
[30] There is an interesting article on the subject of Montrond, by
H. Welschinger, in the _Revue de Paris_ of the 1^{er} février, 1895,
entitled "Un ami de Talleyrand." His name figures constantly in T.
Raikes' _Journal_, _Chroniques de Madame de Dino_, C. Greville's
_Journals_, H. Greville's _Diary_, Gronow's _Recollections_, etc.
[31] T. Raikes, _Journal_, I. p. 268, and III. pp. 153-154. Among the
papers discovered at the Tuileries, after the Revolution of 1848, and
published in the _Revue Retrospective_, p. 37, Montrond's name appears
opposite a sum of 36,000 francs in the accounts of the secret service
funds of the Foreign Office for the year 1842.
[32] Affaires étrangères, 631 Angleterre, Vaudreuil à Molé 31 août,
1830. Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 144-147.
[33] F.O. France 405, Aberdeen to Stuart, October 3, 1830.
[34] Affaires étrangères, 681 (_bis_) Angleterre Talleyrand a Molé, 3,
6, 8 octobre, 1830.
[35] F.O. France 405, Aberdeen to Stuart, October 12, 1830. F.O.
France 414, Stuart to Aberdeen, October 1, 8, 11, 1830, Guizot,
_Mémoires_, II. pp. 95-98. Broglie, _Souvenirs_, IV. pp. 28-29. L.
Blanc, _Histoire de dix ans._, II. pp. 103-114.
[36] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) Angleterre, Talleyrand à Molé,
11 octobre, 1830.
[37] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) Angleterre, Molé à Talleyrand,
13 octobre, 1830. F.O. France 414 & 415, Stuart to Aberdeen, 12, 15
October, 1830.
[38] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) Angleterre, Molé à Talleyrand,
9, 20 octobre, 1830; Talleyrand à Molé, 15, 23, 25 octobre, 1830; 1
novembre, 1830.
[39] F.O. France 405, Aberdeen to Stuart, October 22, 1830. F.O.
France 415, Stuart to Aberdeen, October 18, 22, 25, 31, 1830.
[40] Broglie, _Souvenirs_, IV. pp. 87-91. Guizot, _Mémoires_, II. pp.
128-135.
[41] Affaires étrangères, 681 (_bis_) Angleterre, Talleyrand à
Sébastiani, novembre 27, 1830.
[42] N. Senior, _Conversations with Thiers, Guizot, etc._, II. p. 280.
C. Greville, _Journals_, III. p. 210.
[43] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, I. pp. 315-316, 322; II. p. 8
[44] F.O. Russia 186, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, September 4, 1830.
[45] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) Angleterre, Maison à Talleyrand,
13, 15, 22 novembre, 1830. F.O. France 416, Stuart to Aberdeen and
Palmerston, November 22, 26, 29, 1830.
[46] F.O. Russia 187, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, October 12, 1830.
[47] Metternich, _Memoires_, V. pp. 43-48 and 51-57; Metternich à
Esterhazy, 21 octobre, 1830. _Memoire pour Orloff_, 6 octobre, 1830.
[48] Affairs étrangères, 601 (_bis_) et 632, Angleterre, Talleyrand à
Molé, 29 octobre, 1830; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 20 novembre, 1830,
10, 21 novembre, 1831.
[49] Schools upon the system advocated by Joseph Lancaster
(1778-1838), _i.e._ upon the monitorial system. (_Dictionary of
National Biography._)
[50] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) Angleterre, Talleyrand à
Sébastiani, 28 décembre, 1830. Metternich, _Memoires_, V. p. 79,
Metternich à Ficquelmont, 31 décembre, 1830.
[51] F.O. France 417, Stuart to Palmerston, December 10, 1830.
[52] Barante, _Souvenirs_, IV. pp. 174 and 187, Rémusat à Barante,
2 avril, 1831; Guizot à Barante, 8 avril, 1831. Cf. also N. Senior,
_Conversations with Thiers, Guizot, etc._, Conversation with Victor
Cousin, May 20, 1856.
[53] _State Papers_, XVIII. pp. 728, 729.
[54] _State Papers_, XVIII. pp. 749, 750. Affaires étrangères, 631
(_bis_) Angleterre, Talleyrand, à Sébastiani, 20 décembre, 1830.
[55] _State Papers_, XVIII. pp. 759-773.
[56] F.O. France 415, Stuart to Aberdeen, October 19, 1830.
[57] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) Angleterre, Talleyrand à Maison,
7 novembre, 1830.
[58] _State Papers_, XVII. p. 1242.
[59] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) Angleterre, Talleyrand à
Sébastiani, 27 novembre, 1830; Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 25 décembre,
1830. Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Sébastiani à Bresson, 25 déc,
1830.
[60] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) Angleterre, Sébastiani à
Talleyrand, 2 décembre, 1830; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 30 décembre,
1830.
[61] F.O. France 416, Stuart to Palmerston, December 31, 1830; January
3, 1831.
[62] Lord Lamington, _In the Days of the Dandies_, pp. 127, 128.
_Dictionary of National Biography_, Ponsonby, John, Viscount
(1770-1855).
[63] Affaires étrangères, 187 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 19
décembre 1830; 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 8, 14, 18 janvier,
1831 (particulière et confidentielle).
[64] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) and 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani
à Talleyrand, 3, 10, 19 janvier, 1831; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 7
janvier, 1831.
[65] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Sébastiani à Bresson, 19
janvier, 1831.
[66] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 17
janvier, 1831.
[67] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 6
janvier, 1831.
[68] Affaires étrangères, 187 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 6
décembre, 1830.
[69] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 6
janvier, 1831.
[70] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 17
janvier, 1831 (particulière); 18 janvier, 1831 (particulière et
confidentielle).
[71] F.O. France 426, Granville to Palmerston, January 21, 1831.
[72] T. Raikes' _Journal_, III. p. 182.
[73] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. pp. 37-40; Palmerston to
Granville, February 8, 1831.
[74] F.O. France 426, Granville to Palmerston, January 14, 21, 22,
1831.
[75] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 25
janvier, 1831.
[76] T. Juste, _Sylvain Van de Weyer_, pp. 135-137 and notes.
[77] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Sébastiani à Bresson, 19
janvier, 1831.
[78] The leader of the Catholic party in Belgium.
[79] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 21
janvier, 1831.
[80] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 22, 24
janvier, 1831.
[81] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 29
janvier, 1831.
[82] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Lawoëstine à Sébastiani, 29
janvier, 1831.
[83] F.O. Belgium 4, Ponsonby to Palmerston, February 4, 1831.
[84] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 2,
4, 5 février, 1831.
[85] _State Papers_, XVIII. pp. 774-775.
[86] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 7,
9, 10 février, 1831.
[87] F.O. France 426, Granville to Palmerston, February 4, 9, 1831.
[88] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 8
février 1831.
[89] F.O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, February 8, 1831.
[90] F.O. France 426 and 427, Granville to Palmerston, February 11,
12, 1831.
[91] F.O. Belgium 4, Ponsonby to Palmerston. February 11, 1831.
[92] F.O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, February 25, 1831.
[93] F.O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, February 28, 1831.
[94] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 12
février, 1831.
[95] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 9
février, 1831.
[96] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Sébastiani à Bresson, 12
février, 1831.
[97] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 13
février, 1831.
[98] The Comte de Chambord, the posthumous son of the Duc de Berri, in
whose favour Charles X. and the Duc d'Angoulême had abdicated.
[99] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 27
février, 1831.
[100] F.O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, March 14, 1831.
[101] Metternich, _Mémoires_, V. pp. 128-130; Metternich à Apponyi, 21
mars, 1831. H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. pp. 51-53, Palmerston
to Granville, March 15, 1831.
[102] H. Heine, _Letters from Paris_ (translated by C. Leland), I. pp.
114, 115, 118.
[103] _Letters of Harriet, Countess Granville_, II. p. 93, Lady
Granville to Lady Carlisle, March 14, 1841.
[104] Chateaubriand, _Mémoires_, IV. p. 451.
[105] C. Greville, _Journal_, I. pp. 310-311.
[106] F.O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, February 21, 24, 1831.
[107] Metternich, _Memoires_, V. pp. 157-161; Metternich à Apponyi,
16, 19 février, 1831.
[108] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand,
I^{er} mars, 1831; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 8, 24 mars, 1831. F.O.
France 427 and 428, Granville to Palmerston, March 7, 21, 1831.
[109] The Austrian ambassador at Rome.
[110] Metternich, _Memoires_, V. p. 125, Metternich à Apponyi, 12
mars, 1831.
[111] F.O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, March 18, 1831.
[112] F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, March 28, 1831.
[113] Louis Philippe evidently considered that the large majority of
his subjects had no religion at all.
[114] F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 1, 1831.
[115] F.O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, March 14, 1831.
[116] F.O. Russia 191, Heytesbury to Palmerston, March 21, 1831.
[117] F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 4, 1831.
[118] Affaires étrangères, 682 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 24
mars, 1831. F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, March 25, 1831.
[119] F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 1, 1831.
[120] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 80-127.
[121] C. Greville, _Journals_ (I), II. p. 133. Affaires étrangères,
632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 4 avril, 1831.
[122] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 28
mars, 1831.
[123] F.O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, March 18, April 1,
1831. F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 1, 1831.
[124] _State Papers_, XVIII. pp. 798-796. Affaires étrangères, 132
Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 17 avril, 1831. F.O. France 424,
Palmerston to Granville, April 17, 1831. F.O. France 428, Granville to
Palmerston, April 22, 1831.
[125] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 12
août 1831. F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 8, 11, 1831.
[126] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 3
mai, 1831.