CHAPTER VIII

THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE

Henry Bulwer,[578] who during the absence of Lord Granville from

Paris was in charge of the embassy, was agreeably surprised at the

calmness with which M. Thiers received the news of the conclusion

of the treaty. At their first interview, after the arrival of

Guizot's despatch, he contented himself with expressing a pained

astonishment that England should have treated her ally with so little

consideration. The affair would, he feared, arouse the greatest

indignation throughout the country and, for the present, he must

beg him to observe the strictest secrecy about it.[579] A few days

later, in the course of a long and confidential conversation with

Louis Philippe, Bulwer was enabled to judge of the King's opinion of

the situation. Adopting the contention, which Thiers was instructing

Guizot to urge in his conferences with Palmerston, that no definite

proposals for settling the eastern question had ever been made to the

French government, Louis Philippe complained of the secret manner

in which the treaty had been negotiated. "Ah, Mr. Bulwer," said he,

"I know you wished to read me a lesson, I know it, but it may be a

perilous one for all parties." Assuming a more confidential tone, the

King then proceeded to explain the difficulties by which he might

be confronted. It would not be easy, he feared or affected to fear,

to maintain peace. Thiers, he had reason to believe, would wish him

to go to war, and in that case he might be placed in a very delicate

position. "How do you think I should stand," he asked plaintively,

"were Thiers at the head of a large parliamentary party to announce

that he had resigned, sooner than submit to the dishonour of France?"

It was to be hoped that the coercion which the four Powers proposed

to apply to Mehemet Ali would either at once prove effectual, or fail

completely and be promptly abandoned. The sooner the affair could

be settled the better. For his part, only this was a circumstance

which Bulwer must never disclose to M. Thiers, he had taken steps to

induce the Pasha to refrain from ordering Ibrahim to pass the Taurus

mountains.[580] On August 3, before leaving Paris for the Château

d'Eu, Louis Philippe discussed the situation in the same spirit with

Lord Granville.[581]

The conclusion of the Treaty of July 15 was announced in London on

the 25th, and two days later, the news was published in the Paris

papers. The expectation of the King and of M. Thiers that it would

arouse a dangerous excitement was fully realized. The _bourse_ was

panic-stricken and securities fell heavily. The Chambers were not

sitting, but the press with one accord gave voice to the popular

indignation. The decision of the four Powers to adopt, without

consultation with France, hostile measures against her _protégé_

Mehemet Ali, was denounced as a national insult which must be wiped

out in blood. The tone of the _Constitutionel_, which was notoriously

inspired by the President of the Council, was nearly as bellicose

as that of the _National_, the organ of the republican and military

party. M. Thiers, if he did not actually encourage, certainly did

nothing to allay, the excitement, which was increased, on August 1, by

the publication of a Royal ordinance decreeing substantial additions

to both the army and the navy.

In London the affair only began to attract much public interest, when

the extent of the resentment which it had aroused in Paris became

known. The High Tories, who had always disliked the French alliance,

were delighted to think that that combination was at an end. The more

moderate members of the party, however, who followed the leadership

of Wellington, Peel and Aberdeen, whilst agreeing as to the necessity

of driving Mehemet Ali from Syria, regretted that means had not been

found of inducing France to adhere to the treaty. _The Times_,[582]

which was very antagonistic to Palmerston, supplied its readers, on

August 3, with an article by Henry Reeve in which he expressed a

sincere hope that relations with France "would not be imperilled for

the sake of a desperado like Mehemet Ali," and, at the same time,

suggested that throughout the negotiations the Foreign Office had not

improbably been the dupe of Russia. The Radicals adopted this view,

and furthermore, deprecated any intervention in Turkish affairs.

It was only in their quarter of the House that the policy of the

government encountered any real hostility. But even their attack was

not pressed with much spirit, and Palmerston, on August 6, a few days

before the prorogation of Parliament, had no difficulty in repelling

Joseph Hume's allegation that the insurrection in the Lebanon had been

fomented by British agents.[583]

Guizot, in the meanwhile, had had several conferences at the Foreign

Office, and had discussed the situation with both Melbourne and

John Russell. The position which the French government intended to

assume was set forth in a _memorandum_ which he was instructed to

read to Lord Palmerston. No formal proposals for a treaty, M. Thiers

contended, had ever been made to France. Various suggestions, it was

true, for settling the Turco-Egyptian question had been put forward,

with none of which she had been able to agree. She had always looked

upon Mehemet Ali as an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, and

considered his strength as necessary to the preservation of Turkey.

Hence she had constantly opposed the idea of wresting Syria from him

by force, and she was now disposed to think that the four Powers

had scarcely realized the magnitude of the task upon which they had

embarked so light-heartedly. "Treat Lord Palmerston," wrote M. Thiers,

"as he treated you. Read out to him this written declaration. Question

him boldly. Ask him whether he has any plans for helping the rising

in Syria, and what measures he proposes to adopt should the Pasha

return a flat refusal to the Sultan's demands? Press him hard. Place

him in the position of having to confess that he has acted in a very

foolhardy fashion. . . . Be careful, however, to frame your questions

in such a way that, should he decline to answer them, you are not

compelled to announce a rupture of relations. For the moment France

must restrain herself."[584]

There is no reason to suppose that Guizot displayed any lack of skill

in the performance of his prescribed task. He was, however, unable

to report that he had achieved the smallest measure of success.

Palmerston, whilst expressing his deep regret that a divergence of

opinion should have alienated the two Cabinets, and admitting the

hope, which Guizot himself was convinced was sincere, that their

separation would be of brief duration, was clearly determined to carry

out the treaty to the letter. As regards the military situation in

Syria--the point upon which M. Thiers laid the greatest stress--he

was full of confidence. Ibrahim, surrounded by a hostile population

and deprived of communication by sea with Egypt, would, he felt

certain, be reduced to impotence. Melbourne, however, displayed

far less confidence, and the Austrian and the Prussian ministers,

with whom Guizot also conversed, adopted an almost apologetic tone.

Indeed, throughout this affair, it would seem that the appellation of

"time-serving dog" applied by Charles Greville to Neumann might with

equal justice have been applied to Bülow, his Prussian colleague.[585]

Whilst news from the East was eagerly awaited Guizot was summoned

to the Château d'Eu, where he would be enabled to confer with both

the King and M. Thiers. From the subsequent proceedings of the chief

actors in these transactions, as well as from the somewhat meagre

account of his visit which M. Guizot has given in his _Mémoires_,

it is not difficult to surmise the nature of the plan which it was

resolved to adopt. France was to arm upon an imposing scale, and her

representatives at the different Courts were to assume an attitude of

dignified resentment. Such a course possessed a twofold advantage.

Abroad, it could not fail to have a great effect upon the timid

Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, and might even incline them to withhold

their ratification of the treaty. At home, warlike preparations would

be popular, and might prevent people from enquiring too closely into

the policy which had resulted in the isolation of France. Moreover, M.

Thiers was glad of the opportunity, which the crisis afforded him,

of strengthening the army and of repairing the effect of many yeas of

military neglect.

But, although the King and his minister were thus resolved to show

a menacing front to Europe, Guizot was supplied with confidential

instructions of a most pacific character. Palmerston, they were

convinced, had grossly miscalculated the strength of Mehemet Ali,

and it was to be hoped that the unexpected difficulties which the

execution of the treaty could not fail to encounter would produce a

great revulsion of feeling, not only at the continental Courts, but

among the majority of the members of the British Cabinet. Should,

therefore, M. Guizot perceive signs of a disposition to adopt a less

uncompromising attitude towards Mehemet Ali and to draw nearer to

France, he was to encourage it by all means in his power. Provided

the Treaty of July 15 could be declared to be at an end, the French

government would gladly join with the Powers in guaranteeing

the integrity of Turkey, on the basis of the maintenance of the

conditions of the Convention of Kiutayeh. M. Thiers, it will be

seen, was thus ready to consent to restrict Mehemet Ali to the life

government of both Syria and Egypt, a state of affairs to which he

had always declared that it was useless to expect him to submit. As

an alternative to this solution of the difficulty, France might be

invited to mediate on behalf of the Pasha with the allied Powers. In

that case the hereditary tenure of Egypt and the life government of

Syria for Mehemet Ali would be the basis of the negotiation.[586]

This was another arrangement which a few weeks before M. Thiers had

rejected as altogether inadmissible. The Comte Walewski, a natural son

of Napoleon, who had been sent upon a special mission to Egypt, on

August 2, for the purpose of counselling the Pasha to refrain from

beginning hostilities, was, accordingly, instructed to suggest to

Mehemet Ali that he should defer his dispute with the four Powers and

the Porte to the mediation of France.

But in addition to these instructions Guizot carried back with him to

London a letter from Louis Philippe to his son-in-law, the King of

the Belgians. Leopold was at Windsor Castle, consumed with anxiety

at the thought of the dangers to which a European war must expose

his newly established Kingdom. Louis Philippe's letter of August 13

was plainly intended to be read by Queen Victoria, and was drawn up

with the object of seriously alarming her, and of prejudicing her

against Palmerston. "The situation in which France finds herself,"

wrote the King, "is neither of her choice nor of her creation. It

was said of the death of the Duc d'Enghien that it was worse than a

crime, it was a blunder. I say now of the Treaty of July 15, that it

is worse than a blunder, it is a misfortune of which the consequences

are incalculable. The situation is particularly painful for me who

have always scouted the notion that England could ever enter into

an alliance without France. I find I am wrong. For the present we

can only wait and see. But there is one thing we must do and that is

to arm, and we are doing so vigorously. Our _rôle_ must be one of

expectation. We must see what England means to do, before deciding

what France shall do, either in the way of restoring or preserving the

balance of power."[587]

A few hours before M. Guizot departed from England to visit the King

at Eu, a steamer left the Thames having on board Louis Napoleon, who,

with some fifty followers, a tame eagle and a bundle of proclamations,

purposed to overthrow the Orleans Monarchy. His destination was

Boulogne, where a subaltern officer of the garrison had been drawn

into the plot. On the morning of August 6, the Imperial Pretender

disembarked at Vimereux and presented himself before the 42nd regiment

upon the barrack square. But his appearance aroused no enthusiasm.

Finding that their plans had miscarried, the conspirators attempted

to regain their ship. Their flight was, however, intercepted by the

police and the national guards, who captured the whole party and

lodged them in the gaol. Four years before Louis Napoleon had made

a similar attempt at Strasburg. On that occasion he had not been

brought to trial, but had simply been placed on board a ship and sent

off to America. This second offence, however, could not be treated

with the same leniency. On September 28, he was arraigned before the

peers and sentenced to perpetual imprisonment in the fortress of Ham.

The affair excited little public interest and was generally treated

with contemptuous indifference. Certain French newspapers, however,

published accounts of meetings between the Pretender and Palmerston,

and declared that his attempt must have been connived at by the

British government. But at his first interview with Baron Bourqueney,

who had come over to London to take charge of the embassy during the

absence of Guizot, Palmerston was enabled to pledge his word of honour

that, for "the past two years, neither he nor Lord Melbourne had set

eyes upon Louis Bonaparte or upon any of the adventurers by whom he

was surrounded."[588] His assurance was readily accepted and the

matter was quickly forgotten.

Upon his return to London, Guizot found awaiting him an invitation to

Windsor. Among the party at the Castle were the King of the Belgians,

Melbourne, Palmerston, and Wellington. Leopold, to whom Guizot at

once delivered Louis Philippe's letter, applied himself diligently to

the task of extricating his father-in-law from his difficulties. With

the view of terminating the isolation in which France was placed, he

proposed that the convention of the four Powers for the pacification

of the Levant should be merged in a larger instrument, to which she

might be a party. But Palmerston, with whom he had a long conference,

whilst acknowledging the advantages to be derived from a general

agreement to uphold the integrity of Turkey, declared emphatically

that no plan of that kind could be considered, until the Treaty of

July 15 should have been executed in all its details. On August 20, at

the termination of his visit, Guizot carried back with him to London

the conviction that Leopold's efforts had in no way modified the

situation. He had, however, been able to derive some small consolation

from the evident desire of the Queen and of Prince Albert to treat him

with unusual consideration, whilst he had noted with satisfaction that

Melbourne had appeared depressed and even Palmerston seemed out of

spirits.[589]

From the French point of view the news from Syria was of a distinctly

reassuring character. The insurrection in the Lebanon, upon the wide

development of which Palmerston was supposed to have confidently

depended for the realization of his plans, had been suppressed without

difficulty by Ibrahim Pasha. This circumstance, combined with the

efforts of King Leopold, revived the active opposition of those of

Palmerston's colleagues who disapproved of his eastern policy. They

urged, accordingly, the expediency of making some friendly advances

towards France. Palmerston consented with an unexpected alacrity

to meet their wishes. He had not answered Thiers' _memorandum_ of

July 21, and he now proposed that he should reply to it and thus

re-open communications with the French government. But his long

despatch of August 31, was scarcely so conciliatory as some of his

fellow-ministers would have desired. It was in effect an amplification

of the _memorandum_ which, on July 17, he had read out and handed to

M. Guizot. It gave a luminous account of the negotiations and set

forth the British case with admirable clearness, but only in the

concluding paragraphs was a vague hope expressed that, after the

complete execution of the Treaty of July 15, France would once more

resume her place in "the union of the five Powers."[590] The document

was intended for publication and, in drawing it up, Palmerston had

been more concerned to convince his countrymen of the justice of his

cause than to conciliate the French government. As the event was to

prove, he had judged correctly in supposing that a lucid exposition

of his policy would greatly strengthen his hand, and enable him to

counteract the intrigues of the French party, in the Cabinet. When,

about a month later, his despatch was communicated to the press, it

silenced the opposition of all fair-minded persons.[591] Guizot,

suspecting at once the real object which Palmerston had in view, lost

no time in urging upon Thiers the necessity of presenting, no less

skilfully, the French case to the public.[592]

The conclusion of the Treaty of July 15 was known at Constantinople

on August 3. The Porte, acting under the advice of the ambassadors

of the four Powers, proceeded without loss of time to carry out its

conditions. Rifat Bey, accompanied by Mr. Alison of the British

embassy, was despatched to Egypt with the Sultan's _ultimatum_, and

measures were promptly taken for rendering effective aid to the

Syrian insurgents.[593] At the same time as the documents relating

to the treaty were sent to Constantinople, the instructions of the

Admiralty were forwarded to Sir Robert Stopford, commanding the

British Mediterranean Squadron. All communication by sea was to be

cut off between Egypt and Syria. If the Pasha's fleet should be

discovered within the harbour of Alexandria, it was not to be allowed

to leave. Should an Egyptian squadron be cruising off the Syrian

coast, the admiral was to use his own discretion as to the means to be

employed for carrying out the intentions of his government. Peaceful

persuasion was to be tried in the first instance, but, should it

prove ineffectual, force must be resorted to without hesitation. Five

thousand stands of arms from the stores at Malta were placed at his

disposal, for distribution among the insurgent mountaineers. Lastly,

Stopford was warned to be on his guard against "any sudden movement

of the French squadron, in consequence of orders which might be sent

from Paris, under the first impulse of irritation which the French

government would naturally feel at finding itself placed in a separate

and isolated position."[594]

The French naval force in the Mediterranean was at this time extremely

efficient[595] and, in point of numbers, slightly superior to the

British. Ever since the beginning of the year, Palmerston had made the

strength of the Toulon fleet the subject of numerous representations

to the French government.[596] Should, therefore, warlike counsels

prevail in Paris the initial advantages of the naval situation would

be on the side of France. But, as early as July 25, Palmerston was so

satisfied that no danger of that kind was to be apprehended, that he

desired that Stopford should be informed that the French government

had clearly "no intention of opposing by force the measures which

the allies had resolved to execute."[597] That officer, on receipt

of his instructions, had proceeded to Alexandria, both to support by

his presence the demands which Rifat Bey was pressing upon the Pasha

and to prevent the egress of the Egyptian fleet. A few days before

his arrival, the squadron, which Mehemet Ali had recently sent to the

coast of Syria,[598] had hastily returned to Alexandria, upon the

advice, as it was believed, of the French admiral.

Whilst he was in these waters, Stopford was joined by Admiral Bandiera

with two Austrian frigates, one of which was commanded by the

Archduke Charles Frederick. Commodore Charles Napier, famous for his

destruction of the Miguelite Meet, had at the same time been detached

to the coast of Syria with five sail of the line and some smaller

vessels. Arriving off Beyrout, on August 12, Napier found that the

insurrection, which he had been informed was in full progress, had

been suppressed. Nevertheless, two days later, he took up a position

"abreast of the town" and sent an officer on shore to notify to the

governor that the four Powers had decided to restore Syria to the

Sultan, and to demand that the arms taken from the inhabitants of

the Lebanon should be restored to them. Furthermore, he issued a

proclamation calling upon the Syrians to return to their allegiance to

the Sultan, and proceeded to detain a number of small vessels carrying

provisions and military stores for the use of Ibrahim's army. But, as

the twenty days allowed Mehemet Ali for considering the demands of

the Porte had not yet expired, he did not consider himself justified

in beginning actual hostilities. Finding, therefore, that Soliman

Pasha[599] was not disposed to comply with his summons and that his

proclamation produced no effect, he withdrew his squadron to a better

anchorage and employed his time in reconnoitring the coast.[600]

M. de Pontois, the French ambassador to the Sublime Porte, had, in

the meanwhile, not been idle. On August 16, on receipt presumably of

instructions from M. Thiers, he sent his _dragoman_ to Reshid Pasha,

the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The message, of which M.

Cor was the bearer, was to the effect that France was deeply offended

at the action of the Ottoman plenipotentiary in signing the Treaty of

July 15, and that she was resolved to support Mehemet Ali and actively

to oppose the measures of coercion which the allies were proposing

to apply to him.[601] M. de Pontois himself further declared to the

Russian minister that he regarded war between France and England

as inevitable. This threatening language was at once reported by

the representatives of the Powers to their respective Courts and

Lord Ponsonby, at the same time, sent to warn the British admirals

that an outbreak of hostilities with France was to be seriously

apprehended.[602] A few days later, however, the French ambassador,

whether in consequence of fresh instructions from Paris, or whether

because on considering the matter he was afraid he had said too much,

saw fit to disavow the language imputed to him.[603] This was the

attitude adopted by M. Thiers when, in due course, representations

on the subject of M. de Pontois' menaces were made to him by the

Powers. The full brunt of his ill-humour fell, as was usual, upon

the Austrian ambassador, who met with a very warm and disagreeable

reception. "_Vous pouvez dire à Reshid Pasha qu'il en a menti,_"[604]

was the only statement which Apponyi could extract from him. Guizot,

but in more courteous terms, conveyed the same explanation to Lord

Palmerston. No written communication having passed between M. de

Pontois and Reshid Pasha, the matter was allowed to drop.[605] It was

evident that whatever might have been the precise words used by M.

Cor, the message of the French ambassador to the _Reis-Effendi_ was

a rather clumsy attempt to frighten the Sultan into withholding his

ratification of the treaty.

France meanwhile was arming in most ostentatious fashion. On September

13 the fortification of Paris was decreed by a Royal ordinance. This

was a measure which had been under consideration for some time past,

but which had always been set aside on account of the difficulty

of inducing the Chambers to consent to the required expenditure.

Thiers, as a student of the campaign of 1814, had constantly advocated

it, whilst Louis Philippe was also in favour of it because, as

was generally believed, he hoped that a circle of forts round the

capital would greatly facilitate the suppression of any revolutionary

movement. M. Thiers gave his closest personal attention to the

military preparations. With the journalists and stock-jobbers, by whom

he was surrounded,[606] his conversation turned on war unceasingly. In

the early days of August he had hinted at a campaign upon the Rhine,

whilst the papers which he inspired denounced the treaties of 1815 and

talked of "natural frontiers." But his thoughts soon assumed a new

direction. The _débordement_,[607] when it came, would be in Italy,

where Austria was to be assailed at her most vulnerable point. Lying

on the floor, with his maps spread out before him, like the great

man about whom he had written so much, he planned vast military and

diplomatic combinations.[608]

Nor was Louis Philippe less warlike than his minister. All Paris heard

of the indignant and threatening language which he had used to the

Prussian and Austrian ambassadors. Taking them aside at the Tuileries,

he had bitterly reproached them for the ingratitude which their Courts

had displayed towards him. For ten years he had held the revolution in

check and his reward had been the Quadrilateral Treaty of July. But,

and at this point his voice could be heard far beyond the confines

of the room in which the interview took place, "they had better not

provoke him too far. He had discarded the red cap. Some day, perhaps,

they might be disagreeably surprised to find that he had resumed

it."[609] This threat, which was uttered as though it had escaped him

in the heat of passion, was well calculated to give Metternich much

cause for uneasy reflection. At the same time the King's eldest son,

the Duc d'Orléans, a keen and ambitious soldier, loudly proclaimed

that France had been insulted. With perfect sincerity he declared his

belief in the necessity of war. "If the worst came to the worst," he

told his friends, "he had rather be killed in action upon the Rhine,

than be shot in a street fight and die in the gutter."[610]

Under the influence of the revolutionary recollections evoked by

the anti-dynastic press, and of the threats of war to be waged upon

Jacobinical principles,[611] indulged in by the organs of M. Thiers,

public excitement in Paris rose to an alarming pitch. The situation

was complicated by a series of strikes in different trades. Bands

of men deprived of their employment marched through the streets

singing the _Marseillaise_. The secret republican societies fomented

the discontent of the working classes and fanned the flame of war.

Disturbances took place, and the authorities were apprehensive of an

attack by the mob upon the British embassy.

Towards the middle of September the news reached Paris that, in

consequence of the Sultan's demands, conveyed to him by Rifat Bey,

Mehemet Ali had invoked the protection and mediation of France.[612]

Furthermore, at the instance of the Comte Walewski, he had declared

his readiness to restore to the Sultan the island of Crete, the Holy

Cities and the province of Adana. Although maintaining his claim to

the hereditary tenure of Egypt, he had announced that he would be

satisfied, as regards Syria, were the government of Tripoli, Damascus

and Aleppo to be conferred upon his son Ibrahim for his life. Thiers

perceived, at once, that in these proposals lay his last chance of

preventing without war the full execution of the Treaty of July 15.

Notwithstanding that he still derided the notion that a blockade of

the coast would suffice to make Mehemet Ali relax his hold upon Syria,

in his heart he was, doubtless, beginning to suspect that he had

overestimated the military power of the Pasha. Napier's proceedings at

Beyrout and his detention of the Egyptian store ships and transports

had not been followed by that vigorous offensive, which, he had

always predicted, Ibrahim would assume the moment any act of war was

committed against him.

Hitherto M. Thiers, in his intercourse with the British _chargé

d'affaires_, with whom he was in private life on very friendly terms,

had never made use of those asperities of language and warlike threats

which he had sometimes indulged in with Werther and Apponyi. But,

on the morning of September 18, when Mr. Bulwer called upon him,

he resolved to adopt new tactics. As they paced up and down a long

gallery in his house at Auteuil, M. Thiers declared emphatically that

he considered the Pasha's last proposals both just and reasonable. If

England would agree to join with France in pressing their acceptance

upon the Porte and the Powers, there would once more be established

the intimate relations between the two governments which the

Quadrilateral Treaty had interrupted. But if not, then seeing that

Mehemet Ali had made these concessions at the instance of France, she

would "be bound to support him." As he concluded he looked Bulwer full

in the face and asked him whether he realized the full import of these

words. "Perfectly," replied he imperturbably, "you mean to declare for

the Pasha and go to war with us in his favour." Before they parted,

however, M. Thiers somewhat modified the gravity of his statement,

by saying that he had spoken as a private individual, not as the

President of the Council.

A few hours later Bulwer returned to Auteuil. Before leaving M. Thiers

he had told him that he would like him to see the account of their

conversation which he proposed to send to London. The despatch which

he, accordingly, placed in his hands began by stating that, in the

writer's opinion, the moment had come when M. Thiers purposed saying

to the King, "You must follow me even to war, or I will leave you

exposed to public opinion as expressed by the newspapers." It was

certain, however, that the King would not accept such a programme,

and that, were M. Thiers to place his resignation on those grounds,

it would be unhesitatingly accepted. This was very far from the kind

of message which Thiers wished conveyed to Lord Palmerston. "My dear

Bulwer," he said, "you are greatly mistaken, you will ruin your

promising career. The King is far more warlike than I am."[613] Bulwer

saw no occasion to argue that point, and, having produced the desired

effect, he readily agreed merely to relate to his chief the substance

of their morning's conversation. In a private and confidential

despatch, however, he stated that this interview had left a strong

impression upon his mind that M. Thiers had, in reality, an earnest

desire to maintain peace.[614]

These so-called concessions of Mehemet Ali were, Lord Palmerston

declared, unworthy of serious consideration. Whether Syria were

governed by Ibrahim or by Mehemet Ali was a matter of very little

importance. The object with which the treaty had been concluded must

be relentlessly pursued. Syria must be replaced under the direct rule

of the Porte. Until the Egyptian desert should intervene between the

territories of the Sultan and those administered by his too-powerful

vassal, there could be no permanent peace in the East. No arguments of

M. Guizot could induce him to adopt a less uncompromising attitude.

The Pasha's proposals indicated, he maintained, that he already

perceived the necessity of bowing to the inevitable, and that he

would, before long, yield to all the demands of the Powers.[615]

Certain of his colleagues, however, altogether dissented from this

view of the case. Mehemet Ali's concessions, they contended, had

created an opportunity for terminating the differences with France and

for drawing her into the negotiations.

The French party in the Cabinet had recently received a great

accession of strength. Lord John Russell, the Colonial Secretary

and the leader of the House of Commons, had cordially approved

of the Treaty of July 15. Nevertheless, early in September, he

appears to have been seized with grave misgivings as to the wisdom

of carrying out its provisions. A letter from Lord Spencer to his

brother the Duke of Bedford, expressing the fear that Palmerston's

policy would lead to a war with France, seems to have made a great

impression upon him.[616] Moreover, "Bear" Ellice[617] was actively

engaged in propagating alarmist rumours and in discoursing upon the

indignation which the Anglo-Russian alliance had aroused in France.

There are grounds for believing that the intrigue, of which he was

the soul, aimed at driving Palmerston to resign, in order that

Clarendon might replace him at the Foreign Office.[618] Be that

as it may, the inspiration of M. Thiers can plainly be discerned

in the correspondence of Mr. Ellice with both Russell and with

Melbourne.[619] Charles Greville also appears to have spent much time

with Guizot in inveighing against the presumptuous recklessness of

Palmerston and in discussing the votes and opinions of different

members of the Cabinet.[620] But the French ambassador could listen to

even more congenial sentiments in the social circle presided over by

Lord and Lady Holland. M. Thiers, a few weeks after Holland's death,

openly declared in the Chamber that, throughout this crisis, he had

always been able to depend upon the support of that statesman.[621]

It is impossible to say how far he was justified in making such a

statement. It is undeniable, however, that matters, which should have

been treated as Cabinet secrets, were known in Paris. In commenting

upon M. Thiers' amazing indiscretion, _The Times_,[622] which cannot

be charged with partiality to Palmerston, positively asserted, as

a notorious fact, that "every transaction within the doors of the

British council-chamber were as well known upon the _bourse_ as in

the deepest recesses of Downing Street or Whitehall." This statement

is to a great extent confirmed by Bulwer, who relates that, in

consequence of certain information which he had acquired in Paris, he

was enabled to warn Palmerston of an attack which was to be made upon

him in the Cabinet.[623] "The talking at Holland House," wrote Lord

Melbourne, "is irremediable. They cannot help it, and they are not

themselves aware how much they talk."[624] It was always a subject of

complaint against Palmerston that he would come to important decisions

and would embark upon grave measures of policy, without reference

to his colleagues. The conduct of certain of his "Whig friends

and grandees"[625] upon this occasion was, it must be admitted,

calculated to dispose him to confide in them as seldom as possible.

Negotiations, John Russell insisted, must be opened with France on the

basis of the Pasha's last proposals. If this course were not adopted,

he announced his intention of retiring from office. His resolution

was not to be shaken either by the remonstrances of Melbourne that

his resignation must destroy the government, or by Palmerston's

representations that his present conduct was inconsistent with his

former approval of the treaty.[626] The French party seemed to be on

the point of triumphing. Palmerston appeared to be placed between two

alternatives--he must either retire, or consent to suspend coercive

measures against Mehemet Ali and make conciliatory advances to France.

Nevertheless, contrary to expectations, a crisis was averted. Lord

John agreed greatly to modify his demands and Palmerston consented to

a slight compromise. "Russell," records Greville, "has disappointed

me. He is not the man I took him for."[627] But in point of fact an

influence, unsuspected by Greville, had been brought to bear upon

him. Melbourne had conveyed to him a message from the Queen that she

was not in a condition[628] to bear, without danger, the anxiety to

which she must be subjected by the course he threatened to pursue.

But Her Majesty placed her chief objection to anything in the nature

of a Cabinet crisis, at this particular moment, on other grounds than

those of her own state of health. She desired Lord John to reflect

most seriously upon the injury, which the country must suffer in the

eyes of foreign Powers, from so public an exhibition of ministerial

weakness and vacillation at a time of national emergency.[629]

Metternich had been greatly alarmed by the threatening aspect of

affairs, and had, some weeks before, submitted a paper to King

Leopold, for transmission to Louis Philippe, defining the attitude

which, in his opinion, the French government should adopt. Whilst

signifying her dissent from the policy of coercing Mehemet Ali, she

might, he suggested, declare her adherence to the main principle of

the treaty--the necessity of preserving the integrity of Turkey.

Should the event prove that the Pasha was not to be subdued by force,

she might announce her readiness to discuss with the Powers the means

by which, in the future, the security of the Ottoman Empire might

be maintained.[630] Palmerston, who was in possession of a copy of

this document, expressed himself as willing to make an overture to

the French government on the basis of Metternich's suggestions. At

a Cabinet Council, on October 1, this solution of the difficulty

was agreed to unanimously.[631] It was a small concession which

Palmerston could well afford to make. Before the French government

could be approached on the subject, the consent of the Powers, which

were parties to the Quadrilateral Treaty, would have to be obtained.

Brunnow, without doubt, would at once declare that he must refer the

matter to his Court, and long before an answer could be received

from St. Petersburg, the guns would have spoken in the East and the

whole situation would be altered. Nor was this expectation falsified.

The representatives of the Powers, following the lead of Brunnow,

announced that they were without instructions and must submit the

proposal to their Courts. But already the news had arrived of the

success with which hostilities had been opened in Syria.[632]

At Constantinople Mehemet Ali's reply to the demands made to him

by Rifat Bey was held to be unsatisfactory, and, with the full

approval of the ambassadors of the allied Powers, the Porte decided

to treat his counter-proposals in the light of a rejection of the

Sultan's _ultimatum_. He was, accordingly, declared deposed from the

governorship of Egypt and of the other territories which he ruled, and

a blockade was proclaimed both of the Syrian and Egyptian coasts. The

representatives of the Powers at the same time recalled the consuls

from Alexandria, and every effort was made to carry out promptly the

stipulations of the Treaty of July 15.[633] Sir Robert Stopford,

leaving a portion of his command to watch the Egyptian fleet, sailed

with the remainder of his force and the Austrian squadron to join

Napier off Beyrout, where Captain Walker, who had been placed in

command of the Turkish fleet, had already arrived. On September

11, the governor of Beyrout having been ineffectually summoned to

surrender, fire was opened upon the forts. After sustaining a heavy

bombardment, Soliman Pasha withdrew the garrison into the hills.

Two days before, a Turkish division and detachments of British and

Austrian marines had landed at Jounié Bay. Commodore Napier, under

whose direction these operations were carried out, entrenched his

force securely and proceeded to distribute arms and ammunition to the

mountaineers, who flocked into his camp in large numbers. Meanwhile,

Ibrahim, who with the main Egyptian army was not far distant, looked

on helplessly, and appeared to be incapable of offering any serious

resistance to the operations of the allies.[634]

The news from the East created a profound sensation in Paris. "The

cannon of Beyrout," wrote Heine,[635] "re-echoes painfully in the

heart of every Frenchman." Young men eagerly proffered their services

at the recruiting offices. At the opera and at the theatres excited

audiences insisted on singing the _Marseillaise_. On the question of

peace or war the Cabinet was supposed to be nearly equally divided.

M. Thiers was reported to have urged the necessity of energetic

action, but it was notorious that General Cubières, the Minister of

War, and Roussin, the Minister of Marine and the former ambassador

at Constantinople, were in favour of pacific measures. Henry Reeve,

the friend of Greville and the future editor of his famous journals,

was at this time in Paris. Politically he was in complete accord with

Lord Holland and the French party, and, during his stay in Paris,

was in regular correspondence with Lord Lansdowne, a member of the

Melbourne Cabinet, who, although not actively opposed to Palmerston,

only gave him a half-hearted support. Reeve was well acquainted with

most of the French ministers, and was on very friendly terms with

Léon Faucher and several other prominent journalists and politicians.

In fact, during these critical days, he may be said, in his own

words, "to have had his board and lodging in the Cabinet." He was

in constant communication with M. Thiers, "who was everything that

he could wish."[636] Consequently, he would ingenuously convey to

his patron[637] those opinions, which the crafty French minister

considered might with advantage be disseminated in governmental

circles in London.

Amidst all this excitement, whilst in Paris the _bourse_ was panic

stricken and in London the funds were falling, Palmerston remained

perfectly calm. He had never believed in the danger of a conflict

with France, and, in his opinion, the progress of events in the East

had rendered still more remote the chances of war.[638] He could not

admit that the French people or the French King would ever allow any

government to embark upon hostilities with the whole of Europe, in

order to preserve Syria for Mehemet Ali. He wrote reassuringly to the

Queen[639] to this effect, and strove to calm the apprehensions of his

colleagues and to instil into them some of his robust common sense.

But the edict of the Porte, by which Mehemet Ali had been deprived

of the government of Egypt, had once more stirred his opponents to

action. According to Lord John Russell, it was a measure which had

never been contemplated by the treaty and had clearly been adopted

in consequence of the violent counsels of Lord Ponsonby. Palmerston,

although he personally approved of the deposition of the Pasha, had,

nevertheless, immediately instructed Granville to inform M. Thiers

that it was merely a measure of coercion, and was not intended to

prejudge any arrangement which the Sultan might, hereafter, be

disposed to make in favour of Mehemet Ali, should he, "at an early

moment, accept the conditions of the treaty."[640] Lord John, however,

was not to be pacified. War, he asserted, appeared to be imminent,

and he insisted upon the necessity of holding a meeting of the

Cabinet.[641] Grave consequences, wrote Melbourne to the Queen, were

to be apprehended from the Council which he had called for October

10.[642]

But once again a crisis was averted. On the morning of the day on

which the meeting of the Cabinet was to take place, Guizot presented

himself at the Foreign Office with two despatches from M. Thiers. The

first, dated October 3, purported to be an answer to Lord Palmerston's

despatch of August 31. It was a long and rambling statement of the

French case. The chief argument consisted in an attempt to show that

France, throughout the negotiations, had never departed from the

principle embodied in the _collective note of July 27, 1839_. Then,

as now, France considered that that instrument had been drawn up for

the purpose of guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Turkey.

She had always believed that the object which it had in view was to

enable the Sultan to escape from the exclusive protection of a certain

great Power. She had never understood that the policy of preserving

the Ottoman Empire was bound up with any question of "territorial

limitations, more or less advantageous, between the Sultan and the

Viceroy."[643] The second, and more important, despatch bore the date

of October 8, and dealt with the _firman_ of the Sultan deposing

Mehemet Ali from the government of Egypt. France, declared M. Thiers,

was prepared to leave the question of Syria to the chances of the

war, which had actually begun. But the edict expelling the Pasha from

Egypt was a different matter. It threatened to disturb the balance of

power in the East, and France could, therefore, not consent to see it

carried into execution.[644] Certain writers have pompously asserted

that, on this occasion, M. Thiers "formulated the _casus belli_." It

must be borne in mind, however, that he had already been informed by

Lord Granville of the light in which the British government regarded

the Porte's decree of deposition. Hence many of his contemporaries

treat his despatch of October 8 with derision. That famous document,

they contend, merely "forced an open door."[645]

The extreme moderation with which M. Thiers had expressed himself came

as a great surprise to the British government. M. Guizot, sincerely

as he desired to see peace maintained, was strongly of opinion that

so mild an exposition of the French case was strangely inconsistent

with the warlike attitude which his government had adopted, since

the beginning of the crisis. He contented himself, in consequence,

with placing M. Thiers' despatches in Lord Palmerston's hands, and

made no attempt to discuss or to defend the opinions expressed in

them.[646] Their contents, when communicated to the assembled British

ministers, removed at once the danger that acute differences of

opinion might lead to a disruption of the government. At the Cabinet

Council of October 10, it was simply decided that Lord Ponsonby

should be directed to urge the Porte to reinstate Mehemet Ali in

the governorship of Egypt and to make the appointment hereditary in

his family, provided he would consent to make an early submission

to the Sultan. At the same time, it was agreed that a copy of these

instructions should be sent to Lord Granville for communication to the

French government.[647]

But, in spite of the pacific language used by M. Thiers in his

despatches, the situation still gave cause for anxiety. The lower

classes in Paris had been greatly stirred by the Jacobinical

declamations of the Radical press. On October 15, as Louis Philippe

was entering the Tuileries, he narrowly escaped the bullet of an

assassin. The would-be regicide, an individual named Darmès,

when arrested and questioned, declared that he was by profession

"a conspirator and an exterminator of tyrants." This outrage

and other anarchical symptoms were not without effect upon the

_bourgeoisie_.[648] The signs of the times pointed clearly to the

probability that war abroad would be followed by a revolution at home.

Meanwhile, rumours were current that the government was preparing

some sudden act of aggression--an "_Anconade_"[649] as it was called.

It was said that the military occupation of some position in Turkey

was contemplated. The sudden recall, however, to Toulon of the French

fleet, which had been cruising in Greek waters, seemed to prove, not

only that the government could have no such intention, but that it

was desirous of avoiding the danger of any chance collision with the

British squadron operating off the Syrian coast. Nevertheless, after

the return home of Admiral Hugon's fleet, reports about the warlike

plans of M. Thiers assumed a more concrete form. Lord Granville,

on October 12, received information from a person, who stipulated

for a special remuneration should his intelligence prove accurate,

that the French government had decided to seize one of the Balearic

Islands.[650]

The strategic importance of these Spanish islands had been enhanced by

the French occupation of Algiers. Situated about midway between Toulon

and the African coast, they would, in the hands of France, enable her

to control the western Mediterranean. The British Foreign Office and

the Admiralty had, in consequence, been always on the alert, lest she

should by any means succeed in establishing herself at Port Mahon.

It had been ascertained that many of the inhabitants were not at all

averse to the idea of a French annexation of Minorca.[651] But, in

addition to the military advantages to be derived from the occupation

of the Balearic Islands, there were political reasons which made both

Palmerston and Bulwer suspect that M. Thiers might regard a _coup

d'éclat_ in Spain as a useful counterstroke to the Treaty of July

15.[652] The struggle between Christina[653] and the _Progressistas_

had been raging for some weeks past, and now appeared certain to

terminate in the complete defeat of the Queen Regent. Upon the subject

of Spanish affairs the British government held views which were

diametrically opposed to those entertained at the absolute Courts.

Any stroke directed against Espartero and the Radicals could not

fail to be applauded at Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. A French

intervention in Spain might, therefore, be the means of sowing discord

between Great Britain and her continental allies.

Lord Granville at once sent off a special messenger to Madrid to warn

the British minister of the blow which was impending, and Palmerston

also wrote to Mr. Aston to the same effect. Espartero,[654] when the

news was communicated to him, undertook to strengthen the garrison of

Port Mahon, and promised to resist manfully any French aggression.

Melbourne, at the same time, took the opportunity of remonstrating

strongly with Louis Philippe through the King of the Belgians.[655]

England, he wrote, could not sit still whilst France continued to arm

and to threaten. She must, if the present situation were prolonged,

take measures to safeguard her interests. This communication probably

reached Louis Philippe on October 19. So long as he had believed

that Mehemet Ali was capable of offering a serious resistance to

the allied Powers, he had approved of the menacing attitude of his

government. But, when the Pasha's impotence was made manifest, he

realized the expediency of adopting different tactics. He understood

the difficulties of M. Thiers' position. Already the more extreme of

the various groups composing his parliamentary majority were beginning

to testify their displeasure at the pacific tone of his despatch of

October 8, which had been published in the English papers. At the

approaching meeting of the Chambers heated and violent recriminations

were to be apprehended. Louis Philippe, however, had also perceived

that, notwithstanding the clamour of the newspapers, a healthy current

of public opinion was running in the direction of peace. People

were beginning to realize that, under existing conditions, war and

revolution were synonymous terms. Some of M. Thiers' colleagues had,

moreover, it is said, privately intimated that, if peace were to be

maintained, the King must take upon himself to dismiss his present

ministers.[656] But the adoption of this disinterested advice was

fraught with certain unpleasant consequences. For the past fortnight

the _Constitutionel_, M. Thiers' chief organ, had been insinuating

that all his efforts to uphold the honour and dignity of France

were frustrated by the Sovereign. The King was, therefore, under no

illusions as to the manner in which his minister purposed to cover his

retreat.

The Chambers were to assemble on October 28. M. Thiers, about a

week before, submitted to Louis Philippe a draft of the proposed

Speech from the Throne. It contained a distinctly warlike paragraph,

and announced that 150,000 more men would be called up for service

with the colours. The King objected, and whilst the matter was under

discussion, he received Lord Melbourne's letter. It is very possible

that a perusal of its contents may have served to overcome his last

hesitations. He refused to employ the language which his minister

proposed to place in his mouth. M. Thiers, thereupon, tendered his

resignation, which was promptly accepted. Marshal Soult agreed to form

a new government, of which the real head was to be M. Guizot, the

French ambassador in London, into whose charge the King had confided

the portfolio of Foreign Affairs.

M. Thiers was not wholly responsible for the position in which France

found herself at the time of his downfall. When he took office, the

mistakes of his predecessor had already carried the country a great

distance upon the road to isolation. Nevertheless, the brief period

of his second administration affords an instructive example of the

many mistakes which a very able man may commit. The two principal

objects which he set himself to achieve were utterly incompatible. He

sincerely desired to retain the friendship of Great Britain and, at

the same time, he proposed to establish Mehemet Ali as the ruler of an

independent State, which was to owe its separate existence to French

patronage. But, inasmuch as Lord Palmerston was resolved to drive the

Pasha out of Syria and greatly to restrict his power, he was obliged

to seek to attain his ends by tortuous methods. Thus, whilst he strove

to prolong and to embarrass the negotiations in London, he endeavoured

secretly, and in flagrant violation of the _collective note of July

27, 1839_, to cajole the Porte into conceding the demands of the

Pasha. He was able to persuade himself that the young Sultan and his

ministers, rather than follow the congenial advice of the Powers

which desired to curb the ambition of Mehemet Ali, would listen to

the unpalatable counsels of France, the friend of their arch-enemy

the Viceroy of Egypt. A policy founded upon so erroneous a conception

of human nature was fore-doomed to failure. The intrigues of the

French agents at Alexandria and Constantinople[657] were exposed, the

correspondence of M. Coste found its way into Lord Palmerston's drawer

at the Foreign Office, and the treaty between the four Powers and the

Porte was concluded on July 15.

But M. Thiers was guilty of another error. He, the student of war,

the _Napoleon civil_, as Metternich named him, altogether failed

to understand the strategic situation in the East. Unlike Lord

Palmerston, who foresaw that the Pasha's position in Syria would be

untenable, from the moment that he was deprived of the command of

the sea, Thiers conceived it possible that Ibrahim could assume the

offensive in Asia Minor, and at the same time maintain, in the midst

of a hostile population and through a most difficult country, his

communications with Egypt. His plans were, accordingly, based upon

the supposition that the Powers would experience serious difficulty

in expelling the Egyptians from Syria. The Pasha's resistance, he

was confident, would not be overcome before the winter, and would,

doubtless, necessitate the intervention of a Russian army. But, were

the Tsar to despatch a large force to Asia Minor, national jealousies

and suspicion would be aroused. Then France, having completed her

military preparations, could enter upon the scene and impose her

will upon a disunited and disheartened coalition. In pursuance of

this plan, M. Thiers made divers attempts to draw the chief Italian

States into an alliance with France. But his proposals were unheeded

both at Turin and at Naples.[658] In one direction only would his

overtures appear to have met with any response. King Otho, the young

Bavarian prince whom the protecting Powers had placed upon the throne

of Greece, attracted by the prospect of obtaining Crete, seems to have

promised to invade Thessaly, whenever France should give the signal

for a general outbreak of hostilities.[659]

But all these schemes were rendered abortive by the state of impotence

to which Ibrahim was reduced by the arrival of the British fleet in

Syrian waters. After the success of Stopford's operations at Beyrout,

M. Thiers was forced either to resign or to plunge France, with King

Otho for her only ally, into a war with the whole of Europe. It is

impossible to believe that he can ever have thought seriously of

adopting this last alternative. But Louis Philippe's unalterable

resolution to maintain the peace made it safe for him to advocate a

bellicose policy, seeing that he would never be called upon to carry

it out. By proposing certain warlike measures, such as the seizure of

the Balearic Islands and a large increase of the army, he intended to

compel the King to dismiss him. Thus he would be enabled to escape

from the difficulties in which he was involved, whilst upon Louis

Philippe would rest the reproach of having tamely submitted to the

dictation of Lord Palmerston.

The injury done to the House of Orleans was not, however, the

only consequence of M. Thiers' proceedings in 1840. His warlike

declamations and the frequent allusions in his newspapers to the left

bank of the Rhine awoke recollections in Germany which had slumbered

for a generation. The amazing popularity of Becker's _Song of the

Rhine_[660] testifies to the strength of the national sentiment which

the French threats had aroused. The significance of this, and other

manifestations of German feeling, did not escape Prince Metternich.

"M. Thiers," he wrote bitterly, "likes to be compared to Napoleon.

With respect to Germany he resembles him closely, indeed, he may

justly be said to surpass him. In six weeks he has accomplished as

much in that country as the Emperor during ten years of war and

oppression."[661]

The Soult-Guizot Cabinet had been formed upon the basis of the

maintenance of peace. But innumerable difficulties confronted it.

Whilst pursuing a strictly pacific policy, ministers could not afford

to disregard the national susceptibilities which the events of the

past few months had aroused. Guizot, accordingly, before leaving

London, and after his return to France, declared constantly that the

fate of the new ministry was in the hands of the British government.

If only he could be enabled to state that the Powers were prepared to

make concessions to M. Thiers' successors, which they would not have

made to M. Thiers himself, he was confident that he could defeat his

opponents. But, if it were resolved rigorously to execute the treaty

against Mehemet Ali, he and his colleagues would surely be overwhelmed

and the King would be forced to call the war party into his counsels.

Without doubt, his friends Reeve and Greville proved most useful in

propagating this opinion.[662] Palmerston, however, was quite unmoved.

He scouted the notion that France would resort to extreme measures

in defence of the Pasha, and he was determined that the British

interests, involved in the expulsion of Mehemet Ali from Syria, should

not be sacrificed in order to strengthen the parliamentary position of

a foreign government.

At the time of M. Thiers' resignation, his despatch of October 8 was

still unanswered. But, before M. Guizot had been long installed at

the Foreign Office, he received Lord Palmerston's reply to it. The

contents of this document caused him the greatest irritation. After

exposing with remorseless logic the fallacies of M. Thiers' arguments,

Palmerston laid down the principle that the future government of

Egypt concerned the Porte alone. He has generally been blamed for

not employing a more conciliatory tone in this, his first important

communication with M. Guizot, who was not responsible for the opinions

of his predecessor in office. Palmerston, however, had two distinct

objects in view, and it is open to question whether he would have

attained his ends, had he employed less uncompromising language. His

despatches, both of November 2 and November 20, were clearly written

with the purpose of convincing M. Guizot of the necessity of regarding

Syria as altogether lost to Mehemet Ali, and of thus putting an end

to the efforts which were being made to preserve for him the southern

portion of Palestine. Secondly, by intimating that the Pasha's

reinstatement in the government of Egypt would depend upon his prompt

compliance with the Sultan's demands, Palmerston evidently intended to

force M. Guizot to exert all his influence over Mehemet Ali in favour

of a complete surrender.[663]

Events, meanwhile, had been moving rapidly in Syria. Before the

middle of October the Turkish flag waved once more over Beyrout and

Saïda, the ancient Sidon, whilst Napier, at the head of a Turkish

division and some detachments of British and Austrian marines,

completely defeated and put to flight the redoubtable Ibrahim. As

early as October 5, Palmerston had desired the Lords of the Admiralty

to advise Sir Robert Stopford of the importance of promptly restoring

the fortress of Acre to the Sultan.[664] The allied commanders appear

to have been somewhat undecided as to the propriety of attacking this

famous stronghold, the key of Syria. In view of the lateness of the

season, Stopford himself was very reluctant to embark upon operations

against it.[665] But Palmerston's despatch overcame his irresolution

and induced him to listen to the bolder counsels of Napier, Walker,

and Jochmus. Acre, which had successfully resisted Bonaparte and which

had held Ibrahim in check for six months, surrendered, on November 3,

to the British admiral after an engagement of a few hours' duration.

The moment the news reached London, Stopford was directed to send "a

competent officer" to Mehemet Ali to signify to him that, provided he

would restore the Turkish fleet and give an undertaking in writing to

evacuate Syria, Adana, Arabia, the Holy Cities and Crete, the Powers

would recommend the Porte to reappoint him to the governorship of

Egypt.[666] But, before these instructions could take effect, Napier,

who had arrived off Alexandria with his squadron, had seen fit to

conclude, upon his own responsibility, an agreement with Mehemet Ali.

In this unauthorized convention, which was signed on November 27, it

was stipulated that the Pasha should surrender the Turkish fleet and

evacuate Syria, on the understanding that the four Powers in return

would guarantee to him the hereditary tenure of the Pashalic of

Egypt.[667]

Napier, who was a strong Radical, appears to have been privately urged

by certain members of the Cabinet to seize the first opportunity of

concluding a peace with Mehemet Ali.[668] But, whatever his reasons

may have been for acting in so irregular a manner, the main provisions

of his treaty, unquestionably, accorded with the instructions sent

to Stopford on November 14. Palmerston, in consequence, decided

to signify his approval of the arrangement, with one important

reservation.[669] Under no circumstances "could Great Britain

singly, or the four Powers jointly, guarantee to a subject a grant

of administrative authority made to him by his Sovereign, within

the dominions of that Sovereign." But at Constantinople Napier's

proceedings aroused the greatest indignation, and the Sublime Porte,

with the full concurrence of the ambassadors of the Powers, pronounced

the convention null and void.[670] The same course was adopted by

Stopford, who sent Captain Fanshawe, his flag captain, to Alexandria

to declare that the convention of November 27 could not be ratified,

and that Mehemet Ali must submit unconditionally to the terms which

the Powers were prepared to offer to him.[671]

Mehemet Ali could not do otherwise than yield. The fall of Acre had

decided the fate of Syria. Fanshawe's task was thus easy of execution,

and, on December 16, he arrived at Constantinople bringing with him

a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier, in which the Pasha

conceded every demand and, with regard to Egypt, threw himself upon

the generosity of the Sultan.[672] The Turkish ministers, however,

were little disposed to show mercy to a fallen enemy who, in the days

of his strength, had caused them so much anxiety. Nor were the British

ambassador and the Austrian _internuncio_ in favour of treating

Mehemet Ali leniently. But Metternich had been terribly alarmed by the

French armaments, and had sent strict instructions to his agent at

Constantinople to terminate the eastern question with as little delay

as possible. Baron Stürmer was, in consequence, reluctantly obliged

to counsel the Porte to confer upon the Pasha the hereditary tenure

of Egypt. Ponsonby, however, was more tenacious of his opinions, and,

although Palmerston, after the Cabinet Council of October 10, had

directed him to advise the Turkish government to grant the heredity to

Mehemet Ali,[673] he declined to join with his colleagues in pressing

the Porte to adopt this measure. He was doubtful, he declared, whether

the Pasha's letter to the Grand Vizier should be regarded as an act of

complete submission. Before pronouncing a decided opinion upon that

point, he must wait in order to see whether the Pasha by his actions

intended to prove the sincerity of his promises.[674] But, on January

10, 1841, he received Palmerston's despatch on the subject of Napier's

convention, wherein it was distinctly laid down that Great Britain

approved of the principle of conferring the heredity upon Mehemet

Ali.[675] This second intimation of the views of his government was

too clear for even Ponsonby to venture upon disregarding it. He was,

in consequence, obliged to advise the Porte to make the required

concession. The Turkish ministers no sooner perceived that the

Powers were unanimously in favour of it, than they promised to take

the necessary steps for investing Mehemet Ali with the hereditary

government of Egypt.[676]

Two days before this concession was extorted from the Porte, Mehemet

Ali surrendered the Ottoman fleet to the commissioners sent to receive

it. Furthermore, he gave the necessary orders for the evacuation of

Crete and the other territories which he had promised to restore to

the Sultan. His son Ibrahim, with the remnants of the army of Syria,

had by this time arrived at Gaza, on the Egyptian frontier. He had

himself been attacked by jaundice, and his troops had suffered cruelly

in their retreat.[677] But their losses would have been far heavier,

had it not been for the Napier Convention. The British officers

employed in Syria had considered themselves in honour bound to observe

the armistice, which was one of the conditions of that irregular

agreement.[678]

Mehemet Ali having thus made his submission, it remained only to

determine the conditions under which the hereditary governorship of

Egypt should be conferred upon him. The Porte was very naturally

desirous to circumscribe in every possible way, the powers which it

had reluctantly consented to delegate. Some weeks, accordingly, were

spent in discussing the affair with the ambassadors. But, at last, on

February 13, 1841, the Porte issued a _firman_ of investiture, and

sent off a special envoy to Egypt to present it to Mehemet Ali.[679]

The French government, meanwhile, rigidly abstained from any kind of

interference, M. Guizot from the tribune of the Chamber declared his

intention of preserving the peace, whilst at the same time maintaining

the armaments which, by reason of her isolation, France could not

afford to reduce. The Opposition inveighed fiercely against the

attitude which the government proposed to adopt. M. Thiers gave his

version of the negotiations and protested that, had he been able to

remain in office, he would have armed upon a gigantic scale, not only

in order to prevent the execution of the Treaty of July, but in order

to obtain a revision of the territorial settlement of 1815. To support

their statements, he and his former colleagues recklessly divulged

the contents of confidential documents, and disclosed military

secrets.[680] Nevertheless, ministers obtained a majority in both

Chambers on the question of their foreign policy. The attention of the

assembly, during the remainder of the session, was chiefly directed

to matters connected with the fortification of Paris. The enormous

expenditure entailed by that measure, and by the other military

preparations of M. Thiers had a very sobering effect upon the popular

Chamber. The crisis, it was computed, would cost the country not less

than one hundred and fifty millions of francs.[681]

No sooner had M. Guizot emerged successfully from the initial stages

of the parliamentary struggle, than he applied himself diligently to

the task of bringing back France into the Concert of the Powers.

The German Courts, he was well aware, were most anxious to terminate

a situation pregnant with dangerous possibilities. In the eyes of

Metternich and of Baron Werther, the Prussian minister, the isolation

of France threatened the peace of Europe, and, in order to put an

end to it, they were prepared to settle "_tant bien que mal_,"[682]

the eastern question. Under ordinary circumstances the Tsar Nicholas

might have been expected to oppose the resumption by France of her

place in the Concert of the Powers. But he had now strong reasons

of his own for desiring that her isolation should cease. He had

instructed Brunnow to undertake that the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi

should not be renewed, because experience had proved that it was of no

practical value.[683] The Cabinet of St. Petersburg had arrived at the

conclusion that, for the better protection of the southern provinces

of Russia, the question of the Dardanelles should be regulated by some

European agreement. But no compact of that nature would be likely to

endure, unless France were to be made a party to it.[684]

Although it suited Nicholas that France should re-enter the European

Concert, his dislike of Louis Philippe, and of the _régime_ of July

was as strong as ever. Whilst proposing to close the eastern question

with some "final transaction to which France might be invited to

adhere,"[685] he also suggested that the treaty for the pacification

of the Levant should be converted into a quadruple alliance,

"providing against the contingency of an attack by France upon the

liberties of Europe." His main reason, he informed Lord Clanricarde,

for making this proposal, was to establish a close understanding with

Great Britain.[686] Metternich had not "the spirit of a gentleman,"

and neither England nor Russia ought to place any confidence in

him.[687] The British government, however, was unable to entertain the

suggestion. "All formal engagements of the Crown," Lord Clanricarde

was instructed to explain, "must be submitted to Parliament, and

Parliament might not approve of an engagement which should bind

England prospectively." Nor was there any way in which this difficulty

could be overcome. It would not be removed by the verbal agreement

into which the Imperial Cabinet had declared its readiness to enter,

should the constitutional obstacles to the conclusion of a more

formal compact prove insuperable. "A verbal engagement would bind the

ministers who made it, but might be disavowed by their successors,

and thus the Russian government might be led to count upon a system

of policy which might not eventually be pursued. . . . Under these

circumstances," concluded Lord Palmerston, "it seems to Her Majesty's

government that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg should be satisfied to

trust to the general tendency of the policy of Great Britain, which

leads her to watch over the maintenance of the balance of power."[688]

Whether or not M. Guizot obtained any inkling of the Tsar's proposals,

he appears to have ascertained quickly that the three absolute

Courts wished to close the eastern question in order that France

should resume her place in the Concert. But he was very far from

certain whether Lord Palmerston's views coincided with those of

his continental allies. He was not without fear that it might be

the secret intention of Great Britain to drive Mehemet Ali out of

Egypt. From the moment he had taken office, he had declared that the

fate of Syria must be left to the chances of war, but that no French

government could acquiesce in the expulsion of the Pasha from his

Egyptian governorship. So long, however, as France maintained her

armaments Metternich would be most unlikely to consent to any further

measures of hostility against Mehemet Ali. Thus by playing upon the

fears of the German Courts, he could bring considerable pressure to

bear upon Palmerston. Nor was it only in this way that he proposed

to counteract the schemes which he suspected the British minister of

harbouring. Lord Holland was dead, and the French party was greatly

discredited, but he could still depend upon the assistance of "Bear"

Ellice,[689] Greville and his other English friends, whenever an

opportunity of thwarting Palmerston should arise. For the purpose of

organizing as much opposition as possible to the Foreign Secretary, he

had, in the month of November, 1840, despatched Baron Mounier upon a

special mission to London.[690] At the same time Baron Bourqueney, the

French _chargé d'affaires_, was instructed confidentially to discuss

the situation with his colleagues, but, under no circumstances, was

he to make any direct proposals to Lord Palmerston. He was constantly

to declare that the isolation of France must continue, so long as the

treaty of July should be in existence.

M. Guizot had made no mistake in supposing that Palmerston would

rather have seen Mehemet Ali deposed than invested with the

hereditary tenure of Egypt. But, as he pointed out to the Ottoman

ambassador, it was his rule in all affairs "to be content with what

was practical,"[691] and Lord Beauvale's despatches from Vienna

made it clear that Metternich would never consent to take part in

expelling the Pasha from Egypt.[692] Palmerston, therefore, accepted

the situation and was prepared to be satisfied with an arrangement

which restricted the authority of Mehemet Ali to his Egyptian

Pashalic. He was opposed to the plan, which had been proposed at

one time, of inviting France to participate in the final settling

between the Sultan and the Pasha. As the avowed protector of Mehemet

Ali she could not, he contended, fail to bring a dangerous element

of discord into the conference.[693] Nevertheless, at the beginning

of January, 1841, Baron Bourqueney, after having been his guest for

a few days at Broadlands, felt convinced that "he was really anxious

to discover some way of bringing back France into the concert,

although he was still undecided as to the manner in which it should

be effected."[694] The correctness of this surmise was before long

confirmed by the event. After the decision of the four Powers to press

the Porte to confer the heredity upon Mehemet Ali had been embodied

in the _collective note_ of January 30, 1841, Palmerston himself took

the initiative and invited Baron Bourqueney to call upon him at the

Foreign Office, in order to discuss future arrangements.

The conferences which were thus begun on February 18 continued until

March 5, and resulted in the framing of two diplomatic instruments.

The first, termed the protocol, was only to be signed by the

representatives of the Powers which were parties to the Treaty of

July 15, 1840. The difficulties which had induced the Porte to invoke

the assistance of the four Courts being now at an end, the wish was

recorded "of expressing in the most formal manner the respect due to

the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has,

at all times, been prohibited for ships of war of foreign Powers to

enter the straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus." With this

principle, which was of general and permanent application, France was

to be formally invited to concur. The second document consisted of a

treaty, known as The Convention of the Straits, according to which the

Sultan undertook to close the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the

warships of all foreign nations, and the Sovereigns of Great Britain,

France, Prussia, Austria and Russia pledged themselves to uphold this

ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire.[695]

M. Guizot, after the plenipotentiaries had agreed to certain small

verbal alterations, pronounced himself satisfied with both documents.

Nevertheless, the full powers to sign, which Baron Bourqueney was

expecting to receive, were not transmitted. For the present, he

was merely authorized to initial the convention.[696] The news had

reached Paris that Mehemet Ali was greatly displeased with the

conditions attached to his _firman_ of investiture, and that he had,

in consequence, refused to accept it. The decree in question had never

been submitted to the approval of the ambassadors at Constantinople,

and it now appeared that the heredity, which it professed to confer,

was of an entirely fictitious nature. At the death of Mehemet Ali, it

was provided that his successor was to be chosen by the Sultan from

among any of his descendants. Furthermore, the appointment of all

officers of the Egyptian army, above the rank of captain, was to be

regulated by the Porte. Lastly, the Pasha complained that the amount

of the tribute imposed upon him was far too heavy. Rather than submit

to conditions so humiliating he would once more appeal to arms.[697]

Three months elapsed before the points in dispute could be settled.

Meanwhile, the French government resumed its attitude of complete

aloofness, and M. Guizot declared that no powers to sign could be

sent to London, so long as the possibility existed that coercion

might once more be applied to the Pasha under the terms of the Treaty

of July. To the great annoyance of the German Courts, Palmerston

was resolutely opposed to any declaration that the objects of that

treaty had been attained. A premature dissolution of the alliance,

he maintained, would only encourage Mehemet Ali to adopt a more

defiant attitude, and must increase the difficulties of adjusting his

relations with the Sultan.[698] "A question," he insisted, "could not

be really finished merely by saying that it was so."[699] Metternich

was compelled reluctantly to admit the force of this argument.[700]

But, whilst he acknowledged the necessity of maintaining the alliance,

his agents insinuated freely that Palmerston desired to embarrass the

negotiations, in order to drive Mehemet Ali to commit some act of

violence.

The conduct of Lord Ponsonby, it must be admitted, suggested that

his chief had no great wish to discover a peaceful solution of the

Egyptian question. When the news arrived at Constantinople that

Mehemet Ali had refused to accept the _firman_, he at once advised

the Porte to hold no further communication with him. The Sublime

Porte, he declared, need no longer fear the military power of

Mehemet Ali. "His destruction might be the consequence[701] of his

again venturing to defy the Sultan." The patience with which Lord

Palmerston submitted to Ponsonby's deviations from his instructions

is undeniably suspicious. It is practically certain, however, that

no secret understanding existed between them. Palmerston's personal

views with regard to Mehemet Ali accorded so completely with those

of his agent, that he was induced to regard with a lenient eye his

reluctance to carry out a distasteful task. But, whilst treating him

with great forbearance, he never allowed Lord Ponsonby to impose his

opinions upon him. On January 26, 1841, in a despatch endorsed by

Queen Victoria with the significant words "highly approved,"[702] he

told him plainly that his counsels to the Porte were not in harmony

with his instructions. Again, on March 16, he prescribed the necessity

of overcoming the obstacles to a settlement so emphatically, that

Ponsonby wrote in reply, that he perceived that "the end which he was

expected to attain was the arrangement of this affair with Mehemet Ali

at any rate" (_sic_).[703] Nor can it reasonably be contended that

his tone changed after the Pasha's refusal to accept the conditions

of the _firman_ of investiture. On the contrary, in his instructions

of April 10, he laid stress upon the necessity of adjusting the

points in dispute with as little delay as possible, and absolutely

dissented from Ponsonby's view that the Sultan should hold no direct

communication with Mehemet Ali.[704]

Ponsonby was, therefore, obliged to join with his colleagues in

advising the Porte to modify the _firman_ of February 13. Their

representations, combined with an intimation from Baron Stürmer that

Austria[705] would withdraw from the alliance if her counsels were

disregarded, soon produced the desired effect. On April 14, Ponsonby

was able to report that the Divan had decided that the succession

of Mehemet Ali should be regulated in accordance with the principle

of primogeniture, that he should have the power of dealing with the

promotion of all officers below the rank of brigadier-general, and

that the amount of his tribute should be reduced.[706] Nevertheless,

some weeks elapsed before the Porte could be induced to embody

these concessions in a new _firman_. For this delay Ponsonby was in

no way responsible. On the contrary, he appears to have entered a

vigorous protest against the procrastinating policy of the Turkish

ministers.[707] Greatly to Metternich's annoyance, however, Palmerston

persisted in refusing to declare that the objects of the Treaty of

July had been fully achieved. The French government, therefore,

continued to withhold from Baron Bourqueney the authority to sign the

Convention of the Straits. But M. Guizot was consumed with anxiety

to conclude the affair, and in consequence of Palmerston's attitude

he was now compelled to instruct his agents in Egypt to urge Mehemet

Ali to accept the amended _firman_, which they were to declare was no

longer open to any reasonable objections.[708]

Mehemet Ali was too astute to offer any further resistance. On July

8, 1841, Ponsonby's singularly laconic despatch reached London,

announcing "the satisfactory intelligence"[709] that the Pasha had

accepted the new _firman_, and had made a complete submission to the

Sultan. The representatives of the Powers which were parties to the

Treaty of July, thereupon, affixed their signatures to the protocol,

which they had initialed four months before, announcing that the

objects of their alliance had been fully attained. Three days later

the isolation of France was formally terminated. On July 13, the

plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia and

France signed the Convention of the Straits by which their respective

Sovereigns pledged themselves to uphold the principle of the closure

of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the warships of the Powers.

The conclusion of the Convention of the Straits was the last important

act of the Melbourne government. After sustaining a defeat on the

sugar question, on May 18, ministers, in the subsequent motion of want

of confidence brought forward by Sir Robert Peel, found themselves

in a minority of one. At the general elections which followed, the

Conservatives obtained a decisive victory. The Whigs, in consequence,

retired from office, and Lord Palmerston was replaced at the Foreign

Office by Lord Aberdeen.

Palmerston's conduct of the Turco-Egyptian affair has been the

subject of much adverse criticism. M. Thureau-Dangin and other French

writers have asserted that his eastern policy, in 1840, was based

upon the desire deliberately to injure France. The Treaty of July,

they contend, was simply a retaliation upon Louis Philippe, because

he had declined to interfere more actively in the civil war in Spain.

Nor does Palmerston escape censure at the hands of the chief English

historian of this period. Sir Spencer Walpole,[710] re-echoing the

views of Lord Holland and the French party, charges him with having

sacrificed the greater to the lesser object. The good understanding

with France, which Palmerston compromised so recklessly, was a

matter, he argues, of far more importance to England than any question

connected with the rule of the Sultan or of the Pasha over Syria and

Arabia. Furthermore, he accuses him of inconsistency. His alliance

with the absolute Courts, in 1840, was a complete negation of the

policy which, in 1834, had led him to conclude the Quadruple Treaty

with Liberal France for the maintenance of constitutionalism in Spain

and Portugal.

To these different charges there are certain obvious answers. It

has been shown that Palmerston, far from maliciously desiring to

exclude France from the treaty for the pacification of the Levant,

honestly endeavoured to persuade her to combine with Great Britain,

and the other Powers in the affair. It was only when he perceived

that M. Thiers was secretly working to establish conditions in the

Mediterranean, which could not fail to have a prejudicial effect

upon his country's highest interests, that he decided to act without

her. He by no means undervalued the importance of good relations

with France, but, in order to preserve them, he was not prepared to

shut his eyes to proceedings which might some day imperil the safety

of British India. The public statements of M. Thiers and of certain

of his colleagues are alone sufficient to justify Lord Palmerston's

policy in 1840. Under the question as to whether Syria and Arabia

should be restored to the direct rule of the Sultan, which Sir Spencer

Walpole dismisses as a secondary consideration, lay the question as to

whether a great naval Power should gain a footing upon the shores of

the Persian Gulf.

The reasoning by which the same writer seeks to justify his accusation

of inconsistency is still more unconvincing. The Treaty of July was

concluded for a definite purpose which involved no repudiation of

the principles underlying the Quadruple Treaty of 1834. Yet Sir

Spencer Walpole, apparently, regards it as a betrayal of Liberalism

that England, in a question of eastern policy, should have separated

herself from a constitutional Power and have allied herself with

the absolute Courts of Russia, Austria and Prussia. Under any

circumstances such a contention would be difficult to uphold, but

when applied to France, in 1840, it becomes altogether inadmissible.

Neither Louis Philippe nor his principal ministers were Liberals in

the proper sense of the word. Treaty engagements notwithstanding,

their attitude towards the cause of liberty in Spain, although not so

openly proclaimed, was almost as unsympathetic as that of the Cabinets

of the autocratic monarchies. Louis Philippe, Molé, Guizot and even

Thiers, when they did not actively oppose it, did nothing to assist

the development of popular government in Europe.

But whatever verdict may be passed upon Palmerston's Egyptian policy,

his rare skill and determination in carrying it out must command

universal admiration. Although ruin, disgrace and perhaps impeachment

must have been the penalty of failure, he never wavered in his

resolution to execute his treaty in all its details. His indomitable

spirit stimulated the courage of his allies abroad and triumphed over

the opposition of his fellow-ministers at home. When he quitted the

Foreign Office British prestige stood at a height which it had not

reached since the Battle of Waterloo. His most persistent detractors

had been forced to admit the correctness of his military judgment and

his prescience in treating as of no account the warlike threats of

Louis Philippe and of M. Thiers.

"Palmerston," wrote Reeve regretfully, "has bowled out every

one."[711] Charles Greville was moved to enthusiasm. "The elder

Pitt," he records, "could not have manifested more decision and

resource. Success is much more attributable to Palmerston than to our

naval and military commanders, and, probably, solely to him."[712]