SULTAN AND PASHA
It will be remembered that, in the autumn of 1833, both France
and Great Britain ineffectually protested against the treaty of
Unkiar-Skelessi. But so long as Russia and Austria were closely
united, neither Palmerston nor Broglie were prepared to enforce their
demands by actual measures of hostility. Both, however, were resolved
vigilantly to watch the course of events at Constantinople, and to
interpose should the Russian fleet return to the Bosphorus. Being thus
anxious to avoid a collision with Russia, it became their policy to
prevent a fresh outbreak of hostilities between the Sultan and Mehemet
Ali, in order that the Tsar should be furnished with no excuse for
intervention. It was soon apparent, however, that the preservation of
peace between Mahmud and his powerful vassal would prove a difficult
matter. Already, in the summer of 1834, only a little more than a year
after the conclusion of the Convention of Kiutayeh, there was once
more grave danger of an armed conflict between the Sultan and the
Pasha of Egypt.
In 1832, the Syrians had welcomed Ibrahim as their deliverer from
Turkish misrule. But no sooner had they become the subjects of the
Pasha, than their disenchantment began. The introduction of the
conscription into Syria was fiercely resented. In the spring of 1834,
the whole country was in a state of rebellion, and it required
sixteen months of arduous operations, attended with much bloodshed,
before Ibrahim could disarm the tribes, and restore the authority of
his father over the revolted districts.[424] But in the eyes of the
Sultan, the insurrection was an opportunity for attacking Ibrahim
under favourable conditions, and for wiping out the humiliations of
the former campaign. Accordingly, he prepared to renew the struggle,
and it was only in deference to the protests of the Powers that he
refrained from carrying out his intention.[425] At the same time the
consuls at Alexandria insisted that Mehemet Ali must strictly comply
with the conditions of the Convention of Kiutayeh, and afford Mahmud
no pretext for beginning hostilities. Nevertheless, on September 4,
1834, the Pasha officially informed the agents of the Powers that he
was resolved to proclaim his complete independence.[426] He soon,
however, perceived the necessity of postponing the execution of this
design, in face of the unanimous declaration of the different Cabinets
that he must abandon "a project which the policy of Europe could not
allow him to realize."[427]
But, although the five Powers thus combined to check the ambitious
schemes of Mehemet Ali, the suspicion with which the policy of
Russia towards Turkey was regarded by France and England was in no
way diminished. So strained were the relations of Great Britain and
Russia, at the beginning of 1834, that Nicholas, notwithstanding
his inveterate dislike of Louis Philippe, allowed Nesselrode to
make certain discreet advances towards France. These half-hearted
overtures, however, led to no results. Although Broglie indulged in
less provocative language than the British minister, and deprecated
the idea of another naval demonstration in Levantine waters, he was
in complete agreement with Palmerston in the eastern question.[428] A
personal dispute served to increase the tension which existed between
the Imperial Cabinet and the English government. Notwithstanding
Prince Lieven's intimation that the Tsar would greatly dislike the
appointment,[429] Palmerston had allowed Sir Stratford Canning
to be gazetted as ambassador to the Russian Court. Nesselrode,
thereupon, informed Mr. Bligh, the British _chargé d'affaires_, that
Sir Stratford would not be received. His "suspicious, overbearing
and irritable disposition" appears to have been the reason assigned
for the objections which were made to his appointment. Palmerston,
however, absolutely refused to send any one else in his place. "The
whole thing," he believed or affected to believe, "was a mere remnant
of the _Apostolical_ and Holy Alliance abomination of the name of
Canning."[430] But Nesselrode was equally unyielding and no British
ambassador was, in consequence, accredited to the Russian Court.
Matters continued upon this footing until Nicholas, in the spring
of 1834, decided to recall Prince Lieven from London and merely to
appoint a _chargé d'affaires_ to replace him. The departure of the
Lievens created a great sensation, and was by many people regarded
as a prelude to a complete rupture between Russia and Great Britain.
The ambassador was a commonplace person, but his wife[431] was a
conspicuous figure in the fashionable and political world. Besides
being well acquainted with most of the prominent diplomatists in
Europe, she had, during her long stay in England, enjoyed the
confidence of Grey, Aberdeen and other statesmen. It may be imagined
how bitterly she deplored the necessity of exchanging a life, replete
with political interest in London, for an existence at the Court of
St. Petersburg, bereft of all the excitement in which she delighted.
It was to her influence, she considered, that Palmerston owed his
appointment as Foreign Secretary, and she never forgave him for his
share in the events which led up to her husband's recall.[432]
Whilst the Duke of Wellington was at the Foreign Office, during Sir
Robert Peel's "Hundred Days," Anglo-Russian relations perceptibly
improved. The Duke's views upon the question of the Dardanelles
differed from those which Broglie and Palmerston had hitherto
entertained. In his opinion England and France should endeavour to
effect the closure of the straits to the warships of all nations. The
evil arising from the passage of Russian ships from the Black Sea
to the Mediterranean would not, he maintained, be diminished by the
opening of the Dardanelles to the fleets of the Powers. Accordingly,
he cancelled Palmerston's secret instructions of March 10, 1834,[433]
authorizing Ponsonby, should the Porte ask for assistance against
Russia, to call upon the Mediterranean squadron to enter the
Dardanelles. Moreover, apart from this particular question, it was
not fitting, in the eyes of the Duke, that "the King's ambassador
should have the power of placing the country in a state of war
with another Power."[434] Wellington also proposed to restore the
diplomatic relations of the two countries to their normal condition
by the despatch of an ambassador to St. Petersburg. But his selection
of Lord Londonderry for this post was disapproved of by the House of
Commons. Londonderry was an ultra-Tory who was supposed to have used
unsympathetic language about the Polish insurrection, and, had he not
voluntarily declined the mission, the government would certainly have
suffered a defeat upon the question of his appointment.[435]
Palmerston, upon his return to the Foreign Office in the spring
of 1835, was struck by the soundness of the Duke's opinion upon
the subject of the Dardanelles.[436] Ponsonby was, in consequence,
given no further authority over the movements of the Mediterranean
squadron. No man at this time was more absolutely persuaded of the
Machiavellian character of Russian policy than Lord Ponsonby. Neither
words nor deeds could shake his opinion upon that point. Although the
Russian envoy at Constantinople had co-operated with his colleagues in
preventing a renewal of the struggle between the Sultan and the Pasha,
the British ambassador was none the less convinced that Nicholas was
secretly scheming to create a pretext for intervention. Again, when M.
de Boutenieff assisted him in obtaining redress for the ill-treatment
of a British subject at the hands of the Turkish police, he explained
his conduct by suggesting that "the Russian minister was perhaps taken
by surprise, and that those honourable feelings, which are natural
to him, operated upon him."[437] Nor would he allow that the Cabinet
of St. Petersburg was actuated either by disinterested or generous
motives when, in 1836, it consented to remit some of the indemnity due
from Turkey and to evacuate Silistria. That fortress, he declared, was
of no value to Russia, and, by relinquishing it, she "would obtain
the advantage of making the world believe in her moderation."[438]
Being thus convinced that the Tsar and his advisers entertained the
most sinister designs against the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, he
concluded that a secret understanding must exist between Russia and
Mehemet Ali, the powerful and disaffected vassal of the Sultan.
The effect of Lord Ponsonby's alarmist despatches was to some extent
counteracted by the more statesmanlike reports of Lord Durham, his
nephew by marriage. The Duke of Wellington's intention to send an
ambassador of St. Petersburg had enabled the Whigs, upon their return
to power, to despatch Lord Durham in that capacity to the Russian
capital. Durham, during the two years he was in Russia, travelled
through the southern provinces and made an exhaustive study of the
resources of the country. The result of his observations and enquiries
convinced him that Russia's power for offensive war had been greatly
exaggerated. Furthermore, he was persuaded that the Tsar Nicholas
and almost all intelligent Russians were sincerely desirous of
establishing a good understanding with England, and had altogether
abandoned the idea of acquiring Constantinople. In short, he saw no
reason why "a rival and an enemy should not be converted into a friend
and an ally."[439]
Meanwhile, Palmerston and Broglie had been quietly endeavouring to
induce Austria to join with France and Great Britain in guaranteeing
the integrity of Turkey. But Metternich, having contracted the
secret agreement with Russia[440] for the maintenance of the Ottoman
Empire, was not disposed to incur the Tsar's displeasure by entering
into a second compact. Broglie, finding that his advances met with
no response, suggested that France and England should separately
conclude a treaty for the object which both their governments had at
heart and invite Austria to adhere to it. Palmerston[441] acquiesced
in this plan, but was unable to obtain the assent of his colleagues
to its execution. Before any further discussion of the subject could
take place Broglie fell, and the Presidency of the Council and the
direction of Foreign Affairs passed into the hands of M. Thiers.
The new minister professed to be as anxious as his predecessor to
preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but it was apparent, at
once, that his first political object, to which all other questions
of European diplomacy would for the present be subordinated, was the
negotiation of a marriage between the Duc d'Orléans and an Austrian
Archduchess.[442]
With the downfall of the Duc de Broglie the harmony, which had
hitherto characterized French and British relations, began to
diminish. Both Whigs and Tories had scrupulously abstained
from raising the delicate question of the French occupation of
Algiers.[443] Broglie and the _Doctrinaires_ were opposed to the
permanent retention of the colony, and a considerable section of the
Chamber looked upon it as a useless and expensive encumbrance. M.
Thiers, however, thought otherwise. He was in favour of "nationalizing
the Arabs"--an expression which Mr. Aston[444] interpreted to mean
that he was contemplating their extermination. No sooner was he in
office than he began to prepare an expedition against the Bey of
Constantine, with whom the French authorities had a long-standing
dispute. At the same time, whilst protesting that he had no thought of
extending French domination over either Tunis or Tripoli, he refused
to recognize the sovereignty of the Sultan over those regencies. To
support this policy he sent Admiral Hugon to Tunis to oppose, by force
if necessary, the entry of the Ottoman squadron into the bay. "I
really believe," privately wrote the British _chargé d'affaires_ to
Lord Palmerston, "that in order to gain popularity he wishes for a war
with Turkey, provided he could make it appear that it was undertaken
to protect French interests."[445]
Whilst M. Thiers thus set himself to consolidate the French rule over
Algeria a secret negotiation was initiated, at Constantinople and at
Cairo, for the purpose of establishing, under the guarantee of the
French government, the relations of the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt
upon a more secure foundation. Campbell appears to have received
the first intelligence of what was taking place from his Austrian
colleague. The news caused him to pay a visit to M. Ferdinand de
Lesseps,[446] who, in the absence of M. Mimaut, was acting as French
consul-general. Lesseps was in a great state of indignation, and in
his wrath was inclined to be communicative. M. Thiers, he confided
to Campbell, before he left Paris, had told him that an important
negotiation was in progress, but that he would not discuss it with
him as, upon his arrival at Alexandria, he could learn all about it
from a perusal of the documents at the consulate. Mimaut, however,
had carefully removed every paper relating to the affair, and he was,
in consequence, in complete ignorance of all that had passed. He had
endeavoured, he added ingenuously, to make Boghos Bey believe that
he was acquainted with the transaction, but the astute secretary of
the Pasha had discovered the true state of the case and had promptly
changed the conversation.[447]
Soon after Campbell's interview with Lesseps, on December 11, 1836,
Sarim Effendi, who was described by Mehemet Ali as a confidential
agent of the Sultan, arrived at Alexandria. Ostensibly his mission was
concerned with questions of arrears of tribute. In reality, however,
he appears to have been empowered to propose some repartition of
territory. The statements upon the subject which Campbell succeeded
in extracting from Mehemet Ali were conflicting. At one time he told
the British consul that the Sultan was willing to invest him with the
hereditary government of Egypt and the Pashalic of Acre, whilst, on
another occasion, he asserted that the hereditary tenure of all the
territories which he actually occupied had been offered to him, on
condition that he would undertake to reduce his army.[448] In Paris
Lord Granville was unable to obtain any information about this affair.
In answer to his enquiries he was told that Roussin had, "with the
object of saving the dignity of the Sultan, held out to the Pasha
the prospect of obtaining for his son the reversion of his Syrian
possessions, in return for the abandonment of the other territories
which he occupied." But he was assured that the admiral had acted
without instructions from his government, which had, on the contrary,
"discountenanced his proceedings."[449]
If Mahmud really empowered Sarim Effendi to make substantial
concessions to the Pasha, such conduct on his part is altogether
inconsistent with the sentiments of implacable hostility which he had
constantly entertained towards his powerful vassal. In the spring of
1836 he had shown a strong disposition to renew the struggle, and
had sent a secret agent to London to solicit help. His appeal was
rejected, but Palmerston intimated that the British government was
constrained to urge him to keep the peace from fear that his military
resources would be unequal to the contest, rather than from any desire
to see the _status quo_ in Syria maintained.[450] Finding that no
assistance would be forthcoming from England, Mahmud may have listened
to the advice of the French government to make further concessions
to Mehemet Ali, in order to put an end to the armed peace which was
draining his depleted treasury. But the conditions, whatever they
may have been, which were proposed to the Pasha were not accepted.
Nevertheless, the negotiation, although it led to no direct results,
had an important influence upon the march of events. It disclosed to
Mehemet Ali that France and England were pursuing different objects in
the East, and gave him grounds for hoping that he need no longer fear
a combination of the two naval Powers against him.
But, although the Sultan may have been disappointed and annoyed at
the refusal of Great Britain to assist him actively, he could derive
comfort from the knowledge that the power of Mehemet Ali was regarded
with misgivings in England. Ponsonby's influence at the Porte grew
in proportion as it became more and more evident that his government
disapproved of the Egyptian occupation of Syria, and was prepared
to uphold the sovereignty of Turkey over Tunis and to resist French
encroachments. On the other hand, the Russian ambassador, who declared
unceasingly that under no circumstances must the _status quo_, as
established by the Convention of Kiutayeh, be disturbed, found his
authority diminish. Early in 1836, shortly before the arrival in
England of the Sultan's secret agent, Palmerston had despatched
General Chrzanowski, an able and experienced Polish officer, to
Asia Minor. He had served in the Turkish campaign of 1828-1829, and
was, Palmerston considered,[451] "just the sort of man to be of the
greatest use to Reshid Pasha."[452] But as the Russians, by whom he
was looked upon as a deserter, would greatly resent his employment,
he was instructed to avoid Constantinople, and to proceed direct to
Smyrna. He would never appear to have been given a command or to
have been employed officially by the Sultan, who probably scarcely
ventured to defy his powerful neighbour so openly. He was allowed,
however, to travel about Asia Minor, and to study the strategical
situation. He was thus enabled to furnish Palmerston with excellent
military advice, in return for the salary which Lord Ponsonby
was instructed to pay him, from the moment of his arrival in the
East.[453] Several Prussian officers, among them a certain Major von
Moltke, destined to become very famous, were at this time serving with
the Turkish army, to the re-organization of which, in preparation for
the coming struggle, Palmerston unceasingly urged the Sultan to devote
his whole attention.
Whilst instructing Ponsonby to impress upon the Turkish ministers
the necessity of increasing the efficiency of the army, Palmerston
was intent on creating embarrassments for Mehemet Ali. The economic
system, which he had established in Egypt, and which he was imposing
upon Syria, presented an excellent field for hostile criticism. By
often very equivocal methods the Pasha had gradually expropriated the
former freeholders, and had converted them into his own tenants. He
would then buy at a fixed rate their produce, and thus, before long,
the sale of almost all articles of prime necessity became a monopoly
of the State. At first his system appeared to work well, but, when
he began to pile up his armaments, he met the increased expenditure
which they entailed by reducing the price, which he had hitherto paid
to the unfortunate occupiers of the soil. In order to compensate
themselves these people were necessarily compelled to raise the
price of all articles which the government did not take from them.
In 1838 Colonel Campbell computed that, as the result of the Pasha's
administration, articles of ordinary consumption in Egypt were from
six to ten times dearer than they had been under the rule of the
Mamelukes. Moreover, Mehemet Ali, ever since the year 1816, had been
busily endeavouring to convert Egypt into a manufacturing country.
With this object he had imported at great expense skilled workmen and
machinery from France and England. The native labour required was
obtained in the same manner as the army was recruited. Men, women and
children were impressed and compelled to work in the factories. But by
their unskilfulness they injured the machinery, nor did the articles
which they turned out pay the cost of manufacture. The result of this
experiment was that some 30,000 peasants, who might with advantage
have been engaged in agriculture, were forced to labour unprofitably
in the factories of the government. The Pasha, however, was too
ignorant of the most elementary principles of political economy to
understand the folly of these proceedings, in which he was encouraged
to persevere by the foreign merchants, who sold him machinery or who
bought his cotton and his indigo upon very advantageous terms.[454]
The British government had always been desirous to put an end to the
old system of _capitulations_,[455] and to negotiate a new commercial
treaty with the Porte. But as many influential persons in Turkey were
interested in the preservation of existing abuses, the proposals of
successive ambassadors had constantly been eluded. At the beginning
of 1838, however, Palmerston directed Ponsonby to bring the matter
forward again, and to lay great stress upon the prejudicial effect
which the abolition of monopolies throughout the Ottoman Empire would
not fail to have upon the personal position of Mehemet Ali.[456] This
argument attained the desired result. Mahmud quickly resolved that
no vested interests should be allowed to interfere with a commercial
arrangement, which must either seriously embarrass Mehemet Ali or,
should he refuse to adhere to it, bring him into conflict with Great
Britain. The Sultan's consent having been obtained, Ponsonby entrusted
to Henry Bulwer the negotiation which was brought to a satisfactory
conclusion on August 19, 1838.[457]
In the meantime, it had not escaped the vigilance of the Indian
government that the protracted resistance of the Wahabites was
weakening, and that Mehemet Ali was upon the point of making
himself master of the whole of Arabia. The importance of Aden as
an intermediate coaling station between Bombay and Suez had been
realized, and it happened, most opportunely, that a quarrel[458]
between the ruler of that port and the East India Company enabled the
Governor-General to take action at the very moment when the absorption
of the Yemen by the Pasha was imminent.[459] The management of the
affair was confided to Captain Haines of the Bombay navy, who, early
in 1838, was able to inform Ibrahim that the Sultan of Aden had ceded
the port to the East India Company "_par simple motif d'amitié et de
son cosentement_."[460] Nevertheless, the expedition sent from India
to take possession of the place encountered, on January 16, 1839, a
fierce resistance which was only overcome after a sharp engagement.
Palmerston, upon receipt of the news of its cession, at once directed
Campbell to warn Mehemet Ali that any movement of his troops against
Aden would be treated as an attack upon a British possession. The
Pasha, although unable wholly to conceal his chagrin, accepted the
situation with a good grace.[461]
Ever since the beginning of the year 1838, great military preparations
had been in progress both in Egypt and Syria. The consuls, had in
consequence, been instructed to inquire of Mehemet Ali the reason of
his armaments. It was whilst they were engaged in warning him that any
aggression upon the Sultan would bring down upon him the vengeance of
the Powers that the news arrived of the submission of Nejd, the great
central district of Arabia, extending from Medina and Mecca to the
Persian Gulf.[462] It was impossible to calculate what might result
from the enhanced prestige which he had thus acquired in the eyes of
the faithful. The immediate effect was seen, a few days later, when
he sent for the consuls and announced to each of them separately his
unalterable resolution to proclaim his independence. "The interests of
his family," he declared to Campbell, "imperiously called upon him to
fix their future state, and it was _les larmes aux yeux et le coeur
serré_ that he had taken his present resolution." Nevertheless, he
would wait a reasonable time in the full persuasion that the British
government would take such steps as would permit of an amicable and
satisfactory settlement.[463]
The Cabinets of the Powers were not greatly disturbed by the Pasha's
threats. Palmerston alone showed any anxiety to arrange the military
measures which might be put into force against Mehemet Ali, should he
proceed to carry out his declared intentions.[464] But it was soon
evident that the Pasha had no desire to bring on a crisis. Although he
continued to impress upon the consuls that he was fully as determined
as ever to obtain for his children the succession of the countries
which he governed, he at the same time announced his intention of
proceeding to Upper Egypt to inspect his gold mines. Furthermore,
he duly transmitted his yearly tribute to the Sultan. Nevertheless,
his military preparations were not relaxed and reinforcements were
continuously despatched to Ibrahim in Syria. It was clear that he
had no intention of affording the Powers a pretext for taking active
measures against him, but hoped, by keeping them and the Porte in a
constant state of apprehension, to weary them into conceding him some
of his demands.[465] In pursuance of this astute policy he accepted
the British commercial treaty with the utmost unconcern. He was
confident, he assured Campbell, that he could derive a larger revenue
from duties on exports and imports than he had ever obtained under
his system of monopolies.[466] M. Molé, on the other hand, testified
his surprise and annoyance at the success which had attended Lord
Ponsonby's negotiations. He was greatly afraid, he told Granville,
that Mehemet Ali would now be provoked into an immediate declaration
of independence. But, upon learning that the Pasha had announced his
intention of adhering to the terms of the British treaty, he promptly
instructed Roussin to conclude, on behalf of France, a similar
arrangement with the Porte.[467]
Whilst the aims and ambitions of Mehemet Ali were once more
attracting the attention of the Powers, Anglo-Russian relations again
assumed a threatening aspect. Both the British and Indian governments
had, for some time past, been disturbed by the ascendency which Russia
was acquiring over the Court of Teheran, and by the intrigues of her
agents in Afghanistan. Encouraged by Count Simonitch, the Russian
envoy, the Shah, who entertained pretensions to the sovereignty of
Afghanistan, at the close of the year 1837, marched against Herat.
Before the siege had been long in progress both the British and
Russian ministers arrived upon the scene--the one to endeavour to
bring about a cessation of hostilities, and the other to direct the
operations of the Persian army. Whilst Macneil and Simonitch thus
strove for supremacy in the camp of Mohammad, Eldred Pottinger, a
subaltern of the Indian army, who had reached Herat disguised as a
horse-dealer, stimulated by his example the courage of the garrison.
At the same time Captain Witkewitch, a secret agent of Count
Simonitch, arrived at Cabul, for the purpose of drawing Dost Mohammad
into the Russo-Persian alliance and of counteracting the influence of
Alexander Burnes, who, like his Russian rival, was in Afghanistan upon
a mission which was described as commercial. The idea of a Russian
agent established at Cabul, free to intrigue with Ranjit Singh, the
Maharajah of Lahore, and supported by the whole weight of Mohammedan
Persia, seriously alarmed Lord Auckland, the Governor-General.[468]
To combat this danger he conceived the fatal plan of sending an
Anglo-Indian army into Afghanistan to overthrow the Barakzai dynasty,
and to set up in the place of Dost Mohammad an exiled Sadozai prince,
a pensioner of the Indian government.
The conduct of the Russian agents in Persia and Afghanistan was made
the subject of a note which, on October 26, 1838, Clanricarde,
the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, was directed to deliver
to Count Nesselrode. The Russian Chancellor, whilst deprecating
the construction placed by Palmerston on some of Count Simonitch's
actions, admitted that he had exceeded his instructions and undertook
to recall him.[469] This promise was duly carried out. Consequently,
when Witkewitch arrived at St. Petersburg he was coldly informed
that he must forthwith return to his post at Orenburg. In despair at
finding that the negotiations, which he had conducted so skilfully,
were to be disavowed, the unfortunate man blew out his brains.[470]
Only a little more than two years later Burnes, his rival, perished at
Cabul at the hands of an infuriated mob.
The assurances and explanations of Count Nesselrode were accepted as
satisfactory by Lord Palmerston. The visit of the Tsarewitch, the
future Alexander II., to London, in the spring of 1839, contributed
still further to restore harmonious relations. Nevertheless, the
general situation which confronted Palmerston was disquieting.
Russia, which by means of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi had assumed
the exclusive protectorship of Turkey, now appeared to exercise a
dangerous ascendency over the Court of Persia. Although the Shah
had been compelled to raise the siege of Herat, and although the
proceedings of Simonitch and Witkewitch had been disavowed, there was
room for grave anxiety. Distant as was the frontier line of the Sutlej
from the most advanced Cossack posts, the presence of Russian agents
in the intervening States foreboded trouble. At Lahore, Hyderabad and
Cabul, the appearance of a new power in Central Asia could not fail
to be eagerly discussed.
But it was not alone the advance of Russia beyond the Caspian which
gave those responsible for the safety of British India cause for
uneasy reflection. At this time, when the introduction of steam as a
means of transport was making the question of rapid communication a
matter of the first importance, Mehemet Ali was building up an Arab
Empire which already extended from Khartum to the Taurus mountains
and the Persian Gulf. Whether in the future the Indian mail would be
carried over the Isthmus of Suez, or whether Colonel Chesney should
succeed in establishing steam communication by way of the Euphrates,
the ruler of Egypt was master of either route. Nor did he stand
alone. Whilst busily engaged in strengthening her own position as
a Mediterranean power, England's most formidable naval rival was
showing a marked disposition to befriend him. In Syria France was
the acknowledged protector of the Catholics, and her influence was
reported to have increased of late years.[471] From Algiers she was
extending her grasp over the whole north coast of Africa, whilst in
Spain she was striving to re-establish that predominating influence
which she had formerly exercised. It seemed possible that France, in
alliance with Spain and Mehemet Ali, might yet be enabled to realize
Napoleon's dream of converting the Mediterranean into a "French lake."
When Mehemet Ali had announced his intention of shaking off his
allegiance, Mahmud had seemed to defer to the pacific counsels of the
Powers, and had refrained from ordering his troops in Asia Minor to
invade Syria. But, before the spring of 1839, it was clear that he
was resolved to appeal to arms, and that all the efforts of diplomacy
to prevent a renewal of the conflict would be fruitless. It was not
alone his bitter hatred of his rebellious vassal which prompted the
Sultan to disregard the advice of the ambassadors at Constantinople.
His sole claim to the Khalifate rested upon the protection of Mecca,
and, inasmuch as Mehemet Ali was in possession of the Holy Cities,
were he to declare himself independent, Mahmud must forfeit his
right to command the temporal obedience of Mohammedans. Already
Constantinople was seething with disaffection, and he is said to have
been aware that a plot had been formed to depose him and to enthrone
his son, under the guardianship of Mehemet Ali.[472]
Mahmud was dying from a complication of disorders, but he gave his
whole expiring strength to his military preparations. Men, horses
and guns were hurried across the Bosphorus and forwarded to Hafiz
Pasha in Asia Minor. Moltke with his plane-table was busily engaged
in exploring the country up to Nezib, "a small town hidden among the
olive trees close against the Syrian frontier."[473] At the news
that the Porte was bent upon war, Mehemet Ali, curtailing his visit
to Khartum, hastily returned to Cairo, whilst at Constantinople
the ambassadors made a last endeavour to dissuade the Sultan from
disturbing the peace.[474] But Mahmud was not to be diverted from his
object, and in Paris, on May 23, 1839, it was known that Hafiz Pasha
had crossed the Euphrates and that hostilities were about to begin.
French historians have generally imputed duplicity to the British
government in this affair. Palmerston, they say, whilst pretending
that he was anxious to dissuade the Sultan from war, was in point
of fact allowing Lord Ponsonby, his agent at Constantinople, to
encourage the Turkish ministers to break the peace. Ponsonby was
unquestionably opposed to the policy of maintaining the _status quo_
in Syria. In his opinion Mehemet Ali was the sore which was sapping
the strength of the Ottoman Empire, and, seeing that it was a British
interest that Turkey should be in a condition to resist Russia, he
held that England should assist the Sultan to crush his too-powerful
vassal.[475] It is undeniable that Palmerston allowed him a liberty
of action and of language which he would not have tolerated in any
other ambassador. There can be no doubt, moreover, that he regarded
the Egyptian question in very much the same light as Ponsonby. But
he differed from him in one very important particular, inasmuch as
he considered that the moment had not yet come when Mahmud could,
with a reasonable chance of success, try conclusions with the Pasha.
France, he was well aware, would never join in an attack upon Mehemet
Ali. Indeed, it was rather a question whether she would not openly
espouse his cause. The possibility of a combination between Russia and
France could not be dismissed as a development outside the range of
practical politics.[476] Hitherto, Nicholas' dislike of Louis Philippe
had rendered the chance of such a contingency very remote. But, were
England to adopt a separate policy in the east, it was improbable that
the Tsar would allow his personal animosity to stand in the way of an
alliance, which he might consider would serve the best interests of
his Empire. Accordingly, when, at the close of the year 1838, Reshid
Pasha, the _Reis-Effendi_, arrived upon a special mission to London,
he discovered, to his disappointment, that Palmerston was not prepared
to hold out any hopes that the British government would join in an
attack upon Mehemet Ali. Only, Palmerston explained, in the event of
the Pasha beginning hostilities, could England furnish the Sultan with
naval assistance. Mahmud being intent upon war, a purely defensive
alliance could be of no service to him, and was declined.[477] If the
bellicose policy of the Sultan had received any encouragement from
Lord Ponsonby, Reshid's conferences at the Foreign Office in London
must have made it clear that the ambassador had been using language
which he had no authority to employ. When, therefore, the Sultan
ordered Hafiz Pasha to advance, he was perfectly aware that he was
acting in opposition to the wishes of the British government, which
did not believe that he had an army capable of defeating Ibrahim's
Arab and Egyptian troops.
Directly it was known that the Turkish army had been set in motion
and that all hope of maintaining the peace must be abandoned, the
Soult Cabinet asked the Chamber for a credit of ten million francs.
The sum demanded was accorded by an overwhelming majority and, in
the debates which followed, the deputies were enabled to declare
their views upon the eastern question. The sympathies of the majority
were plainly on the side of Mehemet Ali, and ministers were given
clearly to understand, by the long succession of orators who in turn
ascended the tribune, that with the large sum which had been placed at
their disposal they must do something both great and glorious.[478]
Soult, in the meanwhile, had despatched two officers, the one to
Constantinople and the other to Alexandria, with instructions to
proceed, after conferring with Admiral Roussin and M. Cochelet, to
the headquarters of the two armies, in order to endeavour to bring
about a suspension of hostilities. The friendly feelings towards
England entertained by Marshal Soult, and the better understanding
with regard to Spanish affairs between the French and English
governments, which followed his assumption of office, have already
been mentioned. Their co-operation in the eastern question was no less
cordial. "We are in complete accord," said Palmerston to Bourqueney,
the French _chargé d'affaires_ in London; "our communications are not
those of one government with another but of two colleagues in the
same Cabinet."[479] It was decided that both the French and British
fleets should proceed to the Levant, and that the admirals should be
instructed to do all in their power to induce the opposing generals
to suspend hostilities. Both Soult and Palmerston, however, were
agreed that the great danger in the situation lay in the possibility
that Nicholas might avail himself of the outbreak of war for invading
Turkey, under the plea that Constantinople must be protected against
Ibrahim. They, accordingly, resolved to intimate to the Porte that, in
the event of Russian aid being invoked, or of a Russian fleet entering
the Bosphorus, permission should be given to the French and British
squadrons to pass through the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmora.[480]
Mehemet Ali, when the news arrived that the Turks had crossed the
Euphrates, displayed the greatest self-restraint. In his heart he
was, doubtless, eager for the fray, but he was determined that the
responsibility for the outbreak of the war should rest with the
Sultan. Accordingly, he delivered a written communication to the
representatives of the Powers, in which he undertook to withdraw
his troops to Damascus, provided the Turkish army would recross
the river.[481] It was only on June 10, upon receipt of a report
from Ibrahim that his cavalry had been attacked within the Egyptian
frontier, that he directed him to assume the offensive.[482] But three
days after these orders had been despatched Captain Caillier, the
officer sent off by Marshal Soult, arrived at Alexandria. He was the
bearer of despatches from the Marshal to M. Cochelet, instructing him
to declare to Mehemet Ali that the Powers were taking steps to settle
the eastern question, and that they must insist upon the immediate
withdrawal of the Egyptian army within the boundaries of Syria. The
Pasha, after some little hesitation, consented to write to his son
enjoining him not to pursue the Turks beyond the frontiers of Syria
and to halt wherever Caillier might come up with him.[483] But before
Marshal Soult's emissary could reach Ibrahim's headquarters that
general had completely defeated the Turks, on June 24, 1839, in a
great battle near Nezib.
Before the news of this disaster could reach Constantinople Mahmud was
dead, and when, shortly afterwards, the intelligence of the complete
defeat of Hafiz Pasha was brought to the Turkish ministers, they kept
the matter strictly secret. Abd-ul-Mejid, the sixteen-year-old son of
the deceased Mahmud, was proclaimed Sultan, and the ambassadors of
the Powers were invited to a conference on July 3. On this occasion
Nourri-Effendi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, announced that the
Porte had no reason to suppose that any engagement had yet taken
place between the two armies. Nevertheless, the Sultan purposed to
send "one of the eminent men of his Court" to offer Mehemet Ali a
full pardon for the past and to assure him of his favour in the
future. Furthermore, he was prepared to confer upon him the hereditary
government of Egypt, provided he would abandon Syria and the other
territories over which he now exercised his dominion. Pending the
result of this negotiation orders had been sent to Hafiz Pasha to
suspend hostilities.[484]
It was not until July 8 that the true facts were generally known
in Constantinople, and, on the evening of that day, Lord Ponsonby
was informed by the French ambassador of a fresh disaster. Admiral
Lalande, who with a small French squadron was lying at the entrance
to the Dardanelles, reported that the _Capudan Pasha_ had sailed away
with, he believed, the intention of delivering up his fleet to Mehemet
Ali. Osman Bey, the second in command of the Turkish squadron, had had
an interview with the French admiral,[485] and had declared that the
Sultan had been murdered by Halil and Hosrew Pasha, both of whom were
in league with the Russians. Under these circumstances the _Capudan
Pasha_ determined to place his ships in safety. On this pretext he
proceeded with all speed to Alexandria, where he delivered up to the
Pasha his whole fleet, consisting of twenty-one sail, of which eight
were of the line.
The indifference with which Admiral Lalande had heard of the
treacherous intentions of the _Capudan Pasha_, and the apathy
which had characterized his proceedings, could not fail to attract
attention. Marshal Boult himself, in discussing the surrender of
the Turkish fleet with Lord Granville, was forced to admit that
Lalande's conduct appeared to him inexplicable.[486] In the course
of the next few months, however, further light was thrown upon the
matter. An Armenian, a certain Avedick, the confidential _dragoman_
of the _Capudan Pasha_, was smuggled out of Alexandria on board a
British ship. This man, when he arrived at Constantinople, agreed to
disclose all he knew to Reshid Pasha. According to his statement,
Admiral Lalande, accompanied by the Prince de Joinville, came on
board the Turkish flagship, and held a consultation with Osman,
the _Reala Bey_,[487] who seems to have been the evil genius of
the _Capudan Pasha_. On learning of his intention to proceed to
Alexandria, the French officers, far from attempting to detain him,
applauded his resolution, bidding him only to be careful to avoid
H.M.S. _Vanguard_, which was in Besika Bay. Ponsonby, in forwarding
the papers connected with this affair, emitted the opinion that,
although many circumstances appeared to confirm the truth of the
_dragoman's_ story, "he could not feel it to be true of an honourable
man like Admiral Lalande."[488] Palmerston either adopted this view,
or more probably, deemed it impossible to base a formal representation
to the French government upon Avedick's unsupported statement. But
after the abdication and death of his father, the Prince de Joinville
saw fit to publish, under an assumed name in the _Revue des Deux
Mondes_;[489] an account of these transactions which confirmed the
_dragoman's_ allegations in every particular. Throughout the French
fleet there was, says His Royal Highness, a bitter hatred of England
and an intense desire to avenge former defeats. The Pasha of Egypt
was regarded as the ally of France in a struggle, which every man
hoped and believed, would take place in the near future. Admiral
Lalande was, therefore, clearly justified in encouraging the _Capudan
Pasha_ to surrender his fleet to Mehemet Ali. Although thirteen years
had elapsed since the events referred to in this article had taken
place, the Prince evidently experienced the greatest satisfaction
in remembering that Captain Walker, and the other British naval
instructors of the Ottoman fleet, had been carried off to Alexandria
on ships which were to be handed over to England's enemy, the Pasha of
Egypt.
These successive disasters, Lord Palmerston maintained, should make no
difference in the policy of the Powers. On the contrary, the battle
of Nezib had made it the more imperative that steps should be taken
to check the progress of the victorious Ibrahim.[490] Metternich
held the same opinion. Russia, however, appeared disposed to adopt
a different view of the situation. In 1838, when Mehemet Ali was
threatening to proclaim his independence, she had refused to acquiesce
in Palmerston's proposal that the Turco-Egyptian question should be
submitted to a conference of the Powers.[491] But in the following
spring, when it was plain that the Sultan was resolved to embark
upon war, she had not appeared disinclined to entertain Metternich's
suggestion that the seat of the negotiations should be established at
Vienna. "Each Cabinet," Metternich proposed, "might send its opinion
to its representatives at Vienna, leaving a certain latitude for
discussion, and from a comparison of the five opinions, one should
be sought in which all might coincide."[492] By this arrangement much
delay would be obviated, and the same advantages could be obtained as
by the summoning of the conference, to which Nicholas had objected.
But at the news that, as a consequence of the death of Mahmud and of
the defeat sustained by the Turkish arms at Nezib, the Porte purposed
to open a direct negotiation with the Pasha, the Cabinet of St.
Petersburg once more evinced a strong disinclination to assent to the
plan of establishing a European concert for the settlement of the
eastern question.[493] The disposition which Nicholas thus manifested
to diverge from the policy advocated by Great Britain and Austria, was
hastily seized by France as an opportunity for isolating Russia. The
Soult Cabinet, accordingly, insisted upon the necessity of counselling
the Porte to avoid any precipitate action, and only to treat with
Mehemet Ali through the intermediary of the Powers.[494] Palmerston,
as may be supposed, lost no time in expressing to the Marshal the
satisfaction which he derived from seeing that he was animated by
sentiments coinciding so completely with his own.[495]
In the meanwhile Akiff-Effendi, the Turkish envoy, sent to treat
with Mehemet Ali, had returned to Constantinople, after a fruitless
mission to Cairo. The Pasha had protested his loyalty to the young
Sultan, but he had none the less received the _Capudan Pasha_ and
his officers with open arms and clearly meant to retain the Ottoman
fleet. Moreover, he had declared emphatically that he must be invested
with the hereditary government of both Syria and Egypt, and had
expressed indignation that his old enemy Hosrew Pasha, the Grand
Vizier, had not been dismissed. He had, however, undertaken that, for
the present, Ibrahim should not advance into Asia Minor.[496] It was
clear to the ambassadors at Constantinople that the Porte, if left
to itself, would consent to all the Pasha's demands. "I consider the
Ottoman Empire to be delivered over to Mehemet Ali," wrote Ponsonby
on July 26.[497] But, on the following day, Baron Stürmer received
despatches from Vienna.[498] Metternich had either foreseen, or had
obtained early information, that the Turkish ministers would make
further concessions, and he, accordingly, informed the _Internuncio_
that the five Powers were determined to resist the pretensions of
Mehemet Ali, and directed him to urge his colleagues to unite with him
in representing to the Porte the necessity of allowing the conditions
of peace to be settled by the Powers. Lord Beauvale[499] and M. de
Sainte-Aulaire had, it is said, at Metternich's request, written in
the same strain to Ponsonby and to Roussin.[500] A meeting of the
representatives of the five Powers was immediately convened and a note
was drawn up, informing the Porte "that agreement among the five Great
Powers, on the question of the East, was secured," and inviting it to
suspend any definitive resolution without their concurrence. M. de
Boutenieff, the Russian minister, appears to have made no difficulty
about affixing his signature to this document, which was to be known
as the _collective note of July_ 27, 1839. When it was presented to
them, the Turkish ministers expressed the utmost gratitude, and
promised to suspend all negotiations and to inform Mehemet Ali that
the affair was now in the hands of the five Powers.[501]
The news that the _collective note_ had been delivered, and that it
had been accepted by the Porte in the desired spirit, afforded the
keenest satisfaction at Vienna and in London. Palmerston, agreeing
with Ponsonby, perceived that it had destroyed the Treaty of
Unkiar-Skelessi, and that the days of Russia's exclusive protectorship
over Turkey were at an end. One of the chief objects of his eastern
policy had thus been attained, and he could devote his whole attention
to the other--the curtailment of the power of Mehemet Ali. In Paris,
on the other hand, the situation created by the _collective note_
awoke serious misgivings. Since the battle of Nezib, French enthusiasm
for Mehemet Ali had increased alarmingly. "Men," wrote Véron,[502]
"defended the claims of the Pasha with the same fervour as, in 1828,
they had espoused the cause of Greek independence." Ministers, under
these circumstances, could only reflect ruefully that, now that France
was a party to the _collective note_, they must join with the Powers
in devising measures for depriving Mehemet Ali of the fruits of his
victories. Nor could they escape from the dilemma by disavowing
Admiral Roussin, seeing that he had only acted in strict accordance
with the policy which Soult himself had advocated, in the secret
hope of isolating Russia. But it was evident that the Cabinet of St.
Petersburg was reconciled to the necessity of allowing the eastern
question to be settled by the Powers, and it was to be apprehended
that both Russia and Austria would adopt the hostile attitude towards
Mehemet Ali which Palmerston had already assumed.
Palmerston had invariably proclaimed the opinion that the whole
of Syria must be restored to the Sultan, before a permanent peace
could be established in the East. The Egyptian desert, he had always
insisted, must be interposed between the Pasha and the territories
under the direct rule of the Porte.[503] Soult had hitherto contrived
to elude a discussion upon this point by declaring that France and
England must, in the first place, concert measures for checkmating the
designs of Russia upon the integrity of Turkey.[504] Palmerston, so
long as he was doubtful about the Tsar's intentions, had been content
to leave in abeyance the question of the future position of Mehemet
Ali. But his tone changed from the moment that he became aware that
Russia had adhered to the _collective note_. The French government on
various pleas had declined to entertain his proposal that the French
and English squadrons should combine for the purpose of obtaining
from Mehemet Ali the surrender of the Turkish fleet.[505] On August
20, however, in a dispatch which Mr. Bulwer, the British _chargé
d'affaires_ was directed to communicate to Marshal Soult, he insisted
that the restitution of the Turkish ships must be regarded as an
indispensable preliminary to any negotiations between the five Powers
and the Pasha. Furthermore, he declared that the decision as to the
measures, which should be taken to obtain this result, "should emanate
from Vienna, which was to be the central point of the negotiations
instead of London or Paris," and that Sir Robert Stopford would be
instructed to comply with whatever directions he might receive from
Lord Beauvale, "either with or without the co-operation of anyone of
the other squadrons."[506]
The French government, however, displayed a marked reluctance
to enter into any general discussion of the Egyptian question.
Notwithstanding that Soult had himself suggested Vienna as the seat of
the negotiation, when he was under the impression that Russia would
object to confer with the Powers on the affairs of the East, he now
deprecated the selection of that capital.[507] The French government,
reported Bulwer, on August 30, will refuse to consent to any measures
of coercion against the Pasha, "until the whole question--that portion
of it relative to the Dardanelles and Russia as well as that relating
to Egypt and Mehemet Ali--is decided."[508] About a fortnight later,
Bulwer was enabled to ascertain Louis Philippe's opinions upon the
situation. It was advisable, the King considered, to discover what
would satisfy the Pasha, and then to insist upon the Porte making the
required concessions. When Bulwer objected that such a course was
hardly consistent with the _collective note of July_ 27, His Majesty
gave him to understand that "in affairs of this kind, all notions of
honour and dignity among States need not be greatly considered. I want
peace," said he, "nothing but peace, and I see no way of preserving it
but by soldering up this affair as soon as possible." The discussion
then turned upon the military means which were available for the
coercion of the Pasha. "Naval measures," Louis Philippe declared,
"would prove insufficient; bayonets were needed, and we (England?)
had no bayonets to employ."[509]
The very high estimate which had been formed in France of the power of
Mehemet Ali was the chief reason of the attitude which her government
now proceeded to adopt. Palmerston, on the other hand, had no share
in the illusions which were very generally entertained as to the
strength of the Pasha. Nor had the battle of Nezib caused him to
alter his views. Yet neither Sir Robert Stopford,[510] the admiral
of the Mediterranean squadron, nor Colonel Campbell, the British
consul-general at Alexandria, agreed with him. Both were convinced
that the expulsion of Ibrahim from Syria would prove a most difficult
undertaking, and Campbell was to owe his recall to his strongly
expressed opinion upon this point.[511] Palmerston appears to have
placed the greatest faith in General Chrzanowski, the Pole, who for
the past three years had been attached to the British embassy at
Constantinople. This officer had made a careful study of the brief
campaign which had terminated at Nezib, and was not prepared to admit
that Ibrahim's victory was due to the superiority of the Egyptian army
over that of the Turks.[512] The result, he considered, would have
been very different had Hafiz Pasha elected to follow the advice of
Moltke, instead of listening to the foolish talk of the _Mullahs_,
who ranked as lieutenant-generals, and were present in large numbers
at his headquarters.[513] On the morning of June 24, when the battle
had only lasted an hour, no less than twelve Egyptian battalions fled
from the field, whilst three others deserted in a body to the Turks.
The panic, which set in shortly afterwards among the troops of Hafiz
Pasha, was caused by a change of position on the part of a brigade
of their own cavalry. It was significant that, although the battle
had consisted only of an artillery duel, and although the Egyptian
infantry had never been really engaged, Ibrahim had not ventured to
pursue. The report of General Jochmus,[514] a Hanoverian who had
served upon the staff of the British legion in Spain, and who was now
in the pay of the Foreign Office, pointed to the same conclusions.
Chrzanowski, moreover, was convinced that Ibrahim would be unable
to keep up his communications with Egypt, were he to be deprived
of the command of the sea. A corps of 15,000 Turkish troops acting
in combination with the disaffected tribes, and supported by the
British fleet, would, he believed, suffice to compel him to evacuate
Syria.[515]
Whilst symptoms of disagreement between the French and English
governments were beginning to appear, Russia made an unexpected
move. Shortly after the arrival at St. Petersburg of a despatch from
Count Medem, in which he reported that Marshal Soult had declared to
him that France would never consent to apply coercion to the Pasha,
Baron Brunnow, the Russian minister at Stuttgart, was sent upon a
special mission to London. "It would not be possible," Nesselrode
informed Clanricarde, "for the Emperor to have chosen any person
more thoroughly acquainted with the foreign affairs and policy of
Russia than the Baron."[516] The proposals, which upon his arrival in
London, on September 15, Brunnow was empowered to make, filled Lord
Palmerston with astonishment. The Imperial Cabinet, he was instructed
to declare, agreed with the English government in thinking that alone
the hereditary pashalic of Egypt should be conferred upon Mehemet Ali,
who must be made to restore to the Sultan Arabia, Syria and Crete. The
Emperor was ready to enter into a treaty to enforce these measures
upon the Pasha, and he, therefore, suggested that such military
operations as might be necessary in Syria or in Egypt should be
undertaken by Great Britain, France and Austria, whilst, in the event
of Ibrahim advancing to the Bosphorus, the defence of Constantinople
should devolve upon Russia. It was, however, to be clearly understood
that any assistance which Russia might afford would be given, not by
reason of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, but in virtue of engagements
about to be contracted between the Powers of Europe and the Sultan.
Furthermore, the Emperor was ready to adopt the view of the British
government and to consider "as a permanent principle and standing
rule," that the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles should be closed to the
war ships of all nations. Lastly, Baron Brunnow was authorized to
promise that, if Russia and England should come to an understanding on
these matters, the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi would not be renewed.[517]
The Tsar's sudden determination to abandon those advantages, which
he was supposed to have acquired by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi,
has always been ascribed to his desire to separate France and
England. Without doubt, this consideration entered largely into his
calculations. But he was also annoyed with Metternich and was anxious
to thwart his plan of establishing the seat of the negotiations
at Vienna. Moreover, it was now realized that Orloff's treaty was
a document of no practical value. Russia, by reason alone of her
geographical position, could never be prevented from exercising her
influence over the counsels of the Porte. Nor could the stipulation
that the Sultan must close the Dardanelles at the demand of Russia
be of any real utility, seeing that the maritime Powers had refused
to accept this condition, and that Turkey would be unable to carry
out her engagements in the face of their opposition. In a general way
the doctrine that a weak State makes an excellent neighbour might
be sound, but it was plainly inapplicable to Turkey--the custodian
of straits so vitally important to Russia as the Bosphorus and the
Dardanelles. Under these circumstances, there was much to be gained by
waiving the purely illusory advantage to be derived from the Treaty of
Unkiar-Skelessi, and by agreeing that the closure of the straits to
the warships of the Powers should be declared a law of nations.[518]
Brunnow made no secret of the fact that his Imperial master would be
only too pleased, were France to refuse to accede to his proposals.
His desire was soon gratified. When the project was communicated
to it by Lord Palmerston, the French government flatly declined to
entertain it. The Russian overture, wrote Marshal Soult, was clearly
a device for separating France and England, and it was with "feelings
of painful astonishment" that he perceived "a man of such enlightened
judgment as Lord Palmerston entertain it with so much complacency."
Russia, he proceeded, had betrayed her real intentions by insisting
that she alone should undertake the defence of Constantinople. If
her motives were such as she pretended, why this repugnance to the
idea of "the flags of the allied Courts floating side by side with
her own" in the Bosphorus? "Never," he concluded, "with our consent
shall a foreign squadron of war appear before Constantinople, unless
ours appears there also."[519] Whilst he thus declined absolutely to
consider Baron Brunnow's propositions, Marshal Soult put forward a
plan for the settlement of the questions in dispute between the Porte
and Mehemet Ali. But the solution of the difficulty, suggested by the
French government, when it came to be examined, was found to amount to
little more than an arrangement whereby the Pasha was to obtain the
hereditary tenure of Arabia, Syria and Egypt, in return for which he
was to restore to the Sultan the district of Adana.[520]
In Palmerston's opinion the entry of a Russian fleet into the
Bosphorus, or of a Russian army into Asia Minor, at the demand of the
Powers, was a very different proceeding to an intervention in virtue
of a separate engagement between the Porte and the Cabinet of St.
Petersburg. Had the decision rested with him alone he would gladly
have accepted the Russian proposal. But both it and Marshal Soult's
despatch had to be considered by the Cabinet, some of the members of
which held opinions very opposed to his own. Lord Holland and several
of his colleagues--"our Whig friends"[521] as Lord Palmerston called
them--were either completely indifferent to the Imperial aspect of the
question, or regarded it as a minor consideration. In their eyes the
point at issue was simply whether England should break with Liberal
France, in order to enter into a compact with autocratic Russia. The
French party in the Cabinet gained the upper hand and Palmerston
had to agree to certain concessions. He had already consented, in
deference to the wishes of France and Austria, to allow his demand
for the restoration by Mehemet Ali of the Turkish fleet to be merged
in the larger question of the territorial settlement, and he was now
obliged to inform Sébastiani that the English government would be
prepared to see, in addition to that of Egypt, the hereditary tenure
of the province of Acre, exclusive of the fortress, conferred upon
the Pasha. At the same time Baron Brunnow was to be told that Her
Majesty's government was ready to adopt the whole arrangement which
he had proposed, with the exception of one single point--should it be
necessary for a Russian force to enter the Bosphorus, a British force
must enter the Dardanelles.[522]
Brunnow had no instructions to discuss the question raised by the
English Cabinet, and he was, in consequence, obliged to bring his
mission to an unsuccessful conclusion. But he and Palmerston parted
from each other upon most excellent terms and with little doubt that
their negotiations were suspended, rather than finally broken off.
The French government heard of the Baron's departure with intense
satisfaction, and, a few days later, on October 15, Sébastiani
communicated to Lord Palmerston a despatch, in which Marshal Soult
emphatically declared that the proposal to cede to Mehemet Ali the
Pashalic of Acre was inadmissible. So trifling a concession, he
averred, would merely drive the Pasha to seek to obtain by the sword
the frontiers to which he considered himself entitled. Palmerston
listened to the words of the ambassador in silence, and when he had
concluded his statement, informed him that the offer regarding Acre
must now be considered as definitely withdrawn.[523]
It was significant of the divergent courses upon which the two
governments were embarked that, almost at the same time, Admiral
Roussin was recalled from Constantinople, and Colonel Campbell from
Alexandria--the Frenchman because of his hostility to,[524] and
the Englishman because of his sympathy with, Mehemet Ali.[525] For
several weeks after Brunnow's departure from London, the situation
remained unchanged. Palmerston was content to wait in the confident
expectation that Nicholas would not refuse to accede to the British
proposal. The Soult Cabinet, convinced that no agreement between
England and Russia on the question of the Dardanelles was to be
apprehended, was equally satisfied to remain inactive. "In the French
councils," reported Bulwer, "there is a mixture of positiveness and of
vagueness--positiveness as to what will not be done, vagueness as to
what may be done."[526]
Early in December Sébastiani transmitted to his government the
information, which he had received from Palmerston, that the Emperor
had agreed to the English conditions, and that Brunnow would shortly
return to London to negotiate a convention. This news came as an
unpleasant surprise to the French Cabinet. Under the circumstances,
however, Soult could only express satisfaction at this most unexpected
concession, which, he admitted, completely altered the character of
the Russian proposals. But, at the same time, he cast the gravest
doubts upon the good faith of the Imperial Cabinet, and reiterated his
conviction that its real object was to effect a breach in French and
English relations.[527] In due course Brunnow arrived in London, and
in a note written at Holland House, on January 5, 1840, Palmerston
made Sébastiani acquainted with the result of his first deliberations
with the Russian envoy. "Brunnow," he informed him, "is empowered to
negotiate with the object of bringing about a permanent and definite
solution of the Turkish and Egyptian question, in order to ensure the
independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Baron Neumann has
arrived from Vienna and has expressed to us that Austria is entirely
with us and Russia in this important affair. I think I can say for
certain that Prussia will look at matters in the same light. It only
remains for us, therefore, to secure a European accord on a question
which is incontestably the most important that we have had to deal
with these last years. We sincerely hope that the co-operation of
France will not be refused. . . ."[528]
Louis Philippe and his ministers were convinced, however, that, when
the Powers came to consider the measures which would be required
for expelling the Pasha from the territories which he occupied,
they would soon discover the magnitude of the task upon which they
purposed to embark. Harsh conditions, they were confident, would never
be imposed upon him, once it was realized that their enforcement
would entail the invasion of Syria by a large Russian army. They
were, in consequence, not apprehensive, although fully informed that
negotiations were in progress, that any definite arrangement would
be concluded without their participation. Nevertheless, on January
27, 1840, Sébastiani[529] reported that Palmerston had replied in the
affirmative to Neumann's official inquiry as to whether, in the event
of the four Powers arriving at an agreement, and France withholding
her consent, the clauses of the treaty would be acted upon in spite of
her abstention. But, on the following day, the ambassador informed his
government that the English Cabinet had decided that the Porte must
be a party to any convention which might be concluded, and that the
negotiations would, in consequence, be suspended until the arrival of
the Turkish plenipotentiary. This was the last news of any importance
transmitted by Sébastiani. Soult and his colleagues, in order to
propitiate the _Doctrinaires_, whose support was essential to their
parliamentary existence, had insisted upon his recall and upon the
appointment of M. Guizot to the embassy in London.[530]
Although he had studied English constitutional history so deeply,
Guizot had never visited England, and, moreover, he had not before
been engaged upon a diplomatic mission. He had, however, formed a
friendship with Princess Lieven, who was well acquainted with most of
the chief statesmen and members of the _corps diplomatique_ of the
time, and who, besides, had been a leader of English society. After
her husband's recall from London,[531] the Princess quickly tired of
St. Petersburg, and, upon the plea of ill-health, took up her abode in
Paris. At Talleyrand's death in 1838, she moved into an apartment in
his famous house in the Rue Saint-Florentin, where her _salon_ soon
acquired a European celebrity. Her friendship with Guizot, which was
to endure to the day of her death, is said to have begun, in 1837, at
Chatenay, Madame de Boigne's house, near Paris. The Princess was at
the time fifty-three years of age, whilst the grave _Doctrinaire_ was
three years her junior.[532]
Guizot arrived in London on February 28, and, on the following day
in Paris, the Soult Cabinet was defeated and resigned. The King
was, in consequence, reluctantly compelled to commission M. Thiers
to form a government. Thiers, who himself assumed the direction of
Foreign Affairs, was probably honestly desirous of maintaining a
good understanding with England. But he was a convinced believer
in the military strength of Mehemet Ali, and was determined to
uphold his claim to the hereditary tenure of Syria. In his opinion,
the _collective note of July_ 27, 1839, was the cause of all the
difficulty; it was "the rut in which the coach had stuck."[533] But,
although he was secretly resolved to escape from the obligations
which his predecessors had contracted, he was not prepared openly to
repudiate them. On the contrary, he admitted readily that he was bound
to refrain from attempting to arrange matters between the Porte and
Mehemet Ali, except in co-operation with the other signatory Powers.
Should, however, the Sultan spontaneously agree to terms acceptable to
the Pasha, the Powers could hardly interfere to prevent a settlement
which the Porte itself pronounced satisfactory.[534] If such a result
could be brought about, the _collective note_ would become a dead
letter, and France would regain her full liberty of action. Moreover,
Mehemet Ali would attain the object of his ambition in a large measure
owing to the goodwill of the French government.
Soult had instructed Guizot to declare that France was sincerely
anxious to establish a permanent and lasting peace in the East. But
to attain the desired result, she was convinced that Mehemet Ali
must, at least, be given the hereditary tenure of Syria and Egypt. He
was to impress upon Palmerston that the real object of the "trifling
concessions," which Brunnow had been empowered to make, was to obtain
the signature of England to some agreement to which France would
refuse to adhere.[535] Thiers, in his first despatch, expressed his
approval of these instructions, and of the language which M. Guizot
had employed in carrying them out. He directed him to persevere with
his arguments and constantly to impress upon the British government
that France had no "_parti pris_," no "_système irrévocable_," nor
was she bound by either promises or engagements to the Pasha. Her
sole desire was to contribute to the establishment of peace upon a
firm and durable foundation. The coercion of Mehemet Ali would demand
a vast expenditure of military strength, and Lord Palmerston would,
doubtless, agree that the armed intervention of Russia would greatly
menace the independent existence of the Ottoman Empire.[536] Thiers,
whose judgment on this, as on many other occasions, was greatly
influenced by his hopes, was persuaded that the decision to call in a
Turkish plenipotentiary, and the delay which it entailed, signified
that the plans of Palmerston and Brunnow had encountered some serious
obstacle. But the longer the negotiations could be drawn out, the
better he would be pleased. Whilst matters were drifting to a deadlock
in London, his agents, he trusted, would be enabled quietly to effect
some definite arrangement at Constantinople or at Cairo.[537]
Guizot in his _Mémoires_ has described at length his proceedings in
London. As he himself admits, he entertained an exaggerated belief
in the strength of Mehemet Ali.[538] But, on the other hand, he had
not Thiers' serene confidence that England would never conclude an
agreement for the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian question without
the co-operation of France. On March 12, when relating a conversation
he had had with Lord Palmerston in one of the drawing-rooms at
Stafford House, he expressed the opinion "that the British government
regarded the present moment as a favourable opportunity for settling
affairs in the East, and that a sudden resolve might be taken to
act without us." Again, a few days later, he sent M. Thiers a
warning couched in more emphatic language. Full powers to conclude
a convention, Lord Palmerston informed him, had been transmitted to
Nourri-Effendi, the Turkish ambassador in Paris, who would shortly
arrive in London. "It is possible, therefore, that we may be on the
eve of important decisions. . . . The British government has two
interests at stake in the eastern question--the wish to keep Russia
from Constantinople and the fear of French influence in Egypt. . . .
The present moment is looked upon as favourable for the attainment
of these objects. By a singular combination of circumstances, Russia
is both prepared to abandon her pretensions to exercise an exclusive
protectorship over the Ottoman Empire, and to assist England to weaken
the Pasha of Egypt. . . . Great Britain, consequently, is far from
regarding the present situation as embarrassing, but on the contrary
deems it a most fortunate development which she must make use of to
the best advantage. . . . She is aware, however, that in prosecuting
this policy she may impair her good understanding with France. To
retain our friendship she will make some concessions, but I am
disposed to think that she has no intention of allowing the present
opportunity of attaining her ends in the East to escape."[539]
Matters, nevertheless, proceeded very slowly. Nor was the situation
altered by the arrival, early in April, of Nourri-Effendi. The Porte
in sending him to London only desired to make manifest its intention
of conferring with its allies. When the deliberations should begin in
earnest, it purposed to be represented by Chekib-Effendi, who had been
appointed Ottoman ambassador at the Court of St. James', and another
month must elapse before he could reach England. Guizot, however,
reported that he perceived a strong tendency upon the part of both
Austria and Prussia to draw closer to France. Bülow had asked him in
confidence whether the concession to Mehemet Ali of the governorship
of Syria for his life would meet with the approval of his government.
Neumann had also talked to him in the same strain. But Thiers was
little disposed to accept any compromise. These overtures, in his
opinion, were symptoms that the Powers were beginning to realize that
they were in a false position. Before long, he was certain, they
would adopt the French view of the question in its entirety. Until
some agreement should be arrived at with England, he recommended
that Guizot should abstain, as far as possible, from any discussions
with the ministers of the Northern Courts.[540] Nor was Palmerston's
suggestion admissible that the Turco-Egyptian difficulty should be
submitted to a conference of the Powers. Under existing conditions,
"the differences between France and her allies were too marked to
permit of any general deliberation conducing to a satisfactory
result."
In the month of March, Palmerston's brother, Sir William Temple, the
British minister at Naples, had been instructed to insist upon the
immediate execution of the King's promise to abolish the sulphur
monopoly and to ask for an indemnity on behalf of the English
merchants who had suffered by its imposition. Upon King Ferdinand's
refusal to comply with this demand, Admiral Sir Robert Stopford was
directed to blockade the coast and to seize and send to Malta such
Neapolitan merchant vessels as he could capture. Thiers, having
ascertained that his offer would be acceptable to both parties,
proposed to mediate in the dispute. He was glad of the opportunity,
which was thus afforded him, of displaying both that France and
England were still upon excellent terms and of extending French
influence in Italy. Thiers' mediation was successful. The Neapolitan
Court conceded the British demands, and, early in July in consequence,
the blockading squadron was free to carry out Palmerston's policy in
another direction. Soon after it had accepted his offer to settle
the sulphur dispute, Thiers made a second proposal to the English
government. In this instance he was probably desirous simply of
acquiring popularity at home.[541] On May 10, Guizot formally asked
that the remains of Napoleon might be handed over to a deputation of
officers and conveyed back to France, on board a French warship, for
interment in Paris. Palmerston made no difficulty about immediately
complying with this request.
The extraordinary confidence of both Louis Philippe and of M. Thiers
that, under no circumstances, would Great Britain separate herself
from France in the eastern question[542] reposed upon their joint
conviction that Palmerston's colleagues in the government would never
allow him to disturb the harmony of French and English relations. Mr.
Ellice,[543] the brother-in-law of Lord Grey, and a former Cabinet
minister, was largely responsible for encouraging this erroneous
belief, which was to bring the two countries to the verge of war.
Since about the year 1835, "Bear Ellice," as he was generally known,
by reason of his connection with the Canadian fur trade, had been much
in Paris. Although he appears to have disliked the responsibilities
of office, he was keenly interested in public affairs and was
an inveterate political gossip. Grey, who was well aware of his
brother-in-law's vanity and peculiarities, nicknamed him _le grand
faiseur_. In Paris he frequented Princess Lieven's _salon_, where
he was consulted and listened to with a deference which he enjoyed
exceedingly.[544] Not only was he very intimate with M. Thiers, but,
according to Creevey,[545] "Louis Philippe could scarcely bear to
have him out of his sight." "I hear," wrote Palmerston at a most
critical time, "that Thiers says he has three agents upon whom he can
rely--Guizot, Flahaut[546] and Ellice."[547]
Guizot had quickly discovered that the Cabinet was not united upon the
eastern question. At Holland House, where he was a constant guest,
neither his host nor hostess concealed from him their antagonism
to Palmerston. Clarendon, notwithstanding the insight into Louis
Philippe's diplomacy which he had acquired at Madrid, was a declared
opponent of any solution of the Turco-Egyptian difficulty which might
endanger the French alliance. Charles Greville, with whom Guizot
appears to have become very friendly, had no scruples about informing
him of any dissensions in ministerial circles. The vindictive clerk
of the council detested Palmerston and distrusted his policy. Dedel,
the Dutch minister, in talking over these events a year or two later
with the Duchesse de Dino,[548] expressed the opinion that Guizot's
great mistake lay in imagining that intrigue played as large a part
in public affairs in London as in Paris. Palmerston, he told her, had
proofs of his proceedings, which would have justified him in demanding
his recall. This last statement is probably somewhat exaggerated.
Guizot, however, whatever he may have done, appears to have judged the
situation with great discernment. "Not to mention Lords Holland and
Clarendon," he wrote to Thiers on June 1, "Melbourne and Lansdowne
would be very loath to see the French alliance dissolved. . . Yet
Palmerston, I believe, is as firm as ever, and I am far from certain
whether those of his colleagues who disagree with him would stand up
to him very firmly, when it comes to the point."[549]
The overtures which Bülow and Neumann had made to Guizot were followed
by a definite proposal from Austria. Metternich was alarmed. He
believed that Palmerston had formed a totally erroneous opinion of
the military situation. He was certain that naval assistance alone
would not enable the Turks to regain possession of Syria. He had no
intention of allowing Austrian troops to be employed in the East, and
Russia had recently sustained reverses in the Caucasus which might
make it difficult for her to send an imposing force into Asia Minor.
Great Britain was engaged upon warlike operations in Afghanistan, and
was, besides, threatened with trouble in China and Canada. It would
be, therefore, an arduous undertaking to attempt to coerce the Pasha
without the co-operation of France. To obtain her assistance, he
suggested that Syria should be divided into two portions. The southern
half, including the fortress of Acre, might, he proposed, be given
to Mehemet Ali. But, should the French government be not satisfied
with this concession, Austria would agree to enforce these conditions
upon the Pasha in combination with England and Russia and without the
participation of France.[550]
Palmerston reluctantly decided to agree to the Austrian proposal and,
on May 8, officially informed Guizot that the British government
adhered to it. But this concession only served to strengthen Thiers'
belief that the Powers would before long adopt his views completely.
Chekib-Effendi had not yet arrived, and there was, therefore, no
necessity for returning an immediate answer. Even when the Turkish
plenipotentiary reached London, Palmerston appeared to be in no hurry
to resume the negotiations. On the other hand, Guizot was inclined
to think that the representatives of the other Powers were growing
restless. Even Brunnow seemed disposed to adopt a more conciliatory
attitude, and there appeared to be a growing feeling that no
settlement could be concluded without the assent of France. Thiers'
answer to the Austrian plan of partitioning Syria could not, however,
be indefinitely postponed, and, on June 16, he directed Guizot to tell
Lord Palmerston that he could not entertain it. "We could not," he
wrote, "suggest it to Mehemet Ali; he would refuse it, and we could
not refute his arguments which we should ourselves consider to be
sound and well founded." He was greatly struck by the account which
Guizot had sent him of Brunnow's attitude, "which could only be
ascribed to disasters in Circassia. It was clear that Russia was not
ready to embark upon serious operations elsewhere."[551]
When Thiers thus declined to consider the Austrian proposal,
he believed that his hopes of bringing about secretly a direct
arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha were about to be
realized. Mehemet Ali had been unable wholly to conceal his
disappointment on learning of the _collective note of July_ 27, 1839.
When it was officially communicated to him by the consuls of the
Powers, he declared firmly that there could be no peace until the
hereditary tenure of Syria should be conferred upon him and until
his enemy Hosrew Pasha, the Grand Vizier, should be dismissed from
office.[552] Since then, he had sometimes angrily asserted that
he would wait no longer and that he should order Ibrahim to march
upon Constantinople, whilst, on other occasions, he had shown a
disposition to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. Throughout the
winter and the spring he pressed on his military preparations. Some
of these, however, proved very unsuccessful--an attempt to form a
national guard in Egypt itself breaking down completely.[553] At the
same time he appears to have experienced great difficulty in keeping
Ibrahim's army in Syria supplied with money, food, and clothing,[554]
whilst, to add to his embarrassments, in the spring, the Druses and
other tribes began to display renewed symptoms of disaffection.[555]
Palmerston, now that he no longer feared the separate intervention
of Russia, would probably have been well pleased could the Pasha have
been provoked into some act of aggression against the Sultan. But he
was too sagacious to be moved from his attitude of prudent inaction
by the threatening language of Campbell's successor, Colonel Hodges,
which, however, caused some alarm at Vienna and at St. Petersburg,
where neither Metternich nor Nesselrode entertained Palmerston's
contemptuous disbelief in the military power of Mehemet Ali.[556]
M. Thiers seems to have been wilfully blind to the difficulties of
the Pasha's position, and to have persuaded himself that it was from
respect to the wishes of the French government that Ibrahim abstained
from advancing into Asia Minor.
M. Cochelet, the French consul-general, was probably instructed[557]
to urge Mehemet Ali to refrain from hostilities, to limit his demands
to the hereditary tenure of Syria and Egypt and, generally, to depend
upon the good offices of France for the attainment of his wishes. M.
Thiers, however, was well aware that his plan of bringing about a
direct arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha would encounter
far more serious difficulties at Constantinople than at Cairo.
Ever since the arrival of M. de Pontois, the successor of Admiral
Roussin, Ponsonby had constantly reported that the French minister was
endeavouring to persuade the Porte to conclude a peace with Mehemet
Ali, without reference to the Powers.[558] But the advice of M. de
Pontois had hitherto been disregarded. Hosrew, Reshid, and Halil
Pasha, the most influential of the Turkish ministers, were very
hostile to Mehemet Ali and firm supporters of the British policy.
Soon after his accession to office, Thiers appears to have decided to
supplement the efforts of the recognized representative of the French
government by those of an unofficial agent. At the beginning of May,
a correspondence was opened between M. Jacques Coste[559] and Fethi
Ahmed Pasha, the Minister of Commerce and brother-in-law to the young
Sultan. Under ordinary circumstances there would be nothing to excite
attention in the fact that a prominent French journalist should write
on political matters to a Turkish statesman, whom he had known as
Ottoman ambassador in Paris. But the close intimacy which notoriously
existed between M. Coste and M. Thiers gives importance to this
particular correspondence. Certainly both Palmerston and Ponsonby and,
indeed, Ahmed Pasha himself, who delivered the original letters into
the hands of the British ambassador, appear to have been satisfied
that the sentiments and advice contained in them emanated from M.
Thiers.[560]
The primary object which M. Coste had in view was to persuade Fethi
Ahmed Pasha that it was essential for the Porte promptly to conclude
a peace with Mehemet Ali. All the powers, he contended, were pursuing
selfish ends with the sole exception of France, and she was both
resolved not to intervene herself and not to allow any other Power
to interfere actively in the Turco-Egyptian dispute. Her hands were
free and she was strong enough to enforce her will upon Europe. The
perfidy of England's policy was manifest. As in 1839, Great Britain
now proposed to incite the Porte to make war upon the Pasha. If she
could achieve this object she would, of a surety, encourage Russia to
intervene in order to crush the Egyptians, whilst at the same time she
would insist at Vienna and in Paris upon the necessity of preventing
the occupation of Constantinople by the armies of the Tsar. Should she
be enabled to carry out her Machiavellian plan of bringing about a
general war she purposed, in the confusion, quietly to lay hands upon
Egypt, which she had long coveted for herself. He was sorry to hear
that Chekib-Effendi, when passing through Paris, had declared to M.
Thiers that it would be better that England should take Egypt, than
that it should continue in the possession of a rebellious vassal of
the Sultan. Such reasoning was deplorably unsound. "That which England
takes she keeps," whereas, in the future, it should be an easy task
for the Sultan to compel the descendants of Mehemet Ali to give back
the territories which must now be surrendered temporarily. Writing on
June 8, M. Coste suggested, as a compromise, that Syria might be given
to Ibrahim and Adana to another son of the Pasha. They would certainly
quarrel among themselves, and the Porte might avail itself of their
dissensions for expelling them altogether. Let the Sultan be assured
of the wisdom of the old saying, "_diviser pour regner_."[561] This
curious correspondence continued intermittently until the fall of M.
Thiers in September. But after the end of June, Coste's communications
became less frequent and were less cordially expressed. On July 8
he explained that the silence with which his well-meant advice had
been received "had placed him in an awkward position with M. Thiers,"
whilst to Prince Vogoride, a son of the Prince of Samos, another of
his correspondents, he conveyed his surprise and annoyance that his
letters, written "_en quelque sorte sous la dictée d'un tres haut
personnage_" should have elicited no response.[562]
Whilst the French agents at Constantinople were thus striving to
render nugatory the provisions of the _collective note_, another
attempt to achieve the desired result was being made in a different
quarter. The Sultana Mother was believed to have been concerned in
the secret negotiation conducted by Sarim-Effendi,[563] under the
patronage of Admiral Roussin and M. Mimaut, during M. Thiers' first
administration, and her support was now obtained to the plan of a
direct arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha. The sudden
dismissal, on May 19, of Hosrew, the Grand-Vizier, was the result
of her intrigues.[564] The first news of this event was conveyed to
Mehemet Ali by M. Cochelet. The Pasha at once declared that the fall
of his old enemy had removed the last obstacle to a satisfactory
conclusion of his quarrel with the Sultan. He should, he announced,
forthwith send back the Turkish fleet, and Sami Bey, his confidential
secretary, should proceed without delay to Constantinople to make the
necessary arrangements.[565] Nevertheless, some three weeks elapsed
before the Pasha's emissary started upon his journey, and it was
only on June 13, on the eve of his departure, that the object of
his mission was disclosed to Colonel Hodges and the other agents of
the Powers.[566] But Cochelet, on May 26, duly reported this new
development to his government in a despatch, a copy of which M. Thiers
transmitted to M. Guizot with instructions that its contents must, for
the present, be kept strictly secret. In spite of these precautions,
however, Cochelet's confidential communication appears to have been
divulged to Apponyi, the Austrian ambassador in Paris, who, on June
16, was enabled to inform Neumann in London of the negotiation which
had been initiated between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan.[567] Meanwhile,
at Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby had discovered that a potent
influence was at work to induce the young Sultan to surrender Syria
in exchange for his fleet. But, encouraged by the British ambassador,
both Reshid and Fethi Ahmed Pasha declared that they should resign,
were any compact of that kind to be concluded, and their firm attitude
defeated the insidious schemes of the Sultana Mother, and rendered
abortive the mission of Sami Bey.[568]
M. Thiers, however, was confident that the news of Hosrew's dismissal
would be followed quickly by the intelligence that the Sultan and
the Pasha had settled their differences amicably. This unexpected
development would, he was convinced, place a totally new complexion
upon the Turco-Egyptian question. But in point of fact, Palmerston
had been informed by Neumann of the negotiation which was to be
opened between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan. Thus, when the news
reached London of the mission of Sami Bey to Constantinople, he was
fully prepared for it. Far from being suddenly confronted by the
embarrassing prospect that the settlement of the affair was about to
pass out of his control, he was, on the contrary, enabled to adduce
the proceedings of the French agents at Constantinople and at Cairo,
as a reason for promptly concluding a treaty for the protection of
the young Sultan from the machinations of his enemies.
Thiers' illusions were by no means shared by Guizot. The ambassador
divined correctly that the crisis of the affair was approaching. Since
the rejection of the Austrian proposals Palmerston, he reported, had
pointedly avoided all discussion of the eastern question with him.
But from the moment that the news arrived that a direct negotiation
was in progress between Cairo and Constantinople he had been very
busy. This last development, moreover, had made a great impression
upon the representatives of the Powers, and those of them, who had
lately been inclined to adopt the French view of the question, were
now, it was evident, less favourably disposed. Cabinet councils had
been held, dissensions had arisen, and Palmerston, he believed, had
threatened to resign. It was probable, he considered, that Great
Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia would agree to some form of
joint action in the East, and that France would be formally asked
whether or not she would participate in whatever measures they might
resolve to adopt.[569] This idea that no treaty would be actually
concluded until France should have been invited to adhere to it, was
the one point upon which M. Guizot may be held to have misled M.
Thiers. Princess Lieven, who was staying at Stafford House, is said
to have encouraged his delusion. She appears to have tried to extract
from Bülow, the Prussian minister, some information about the progress
of the negotiations. Her enquiries, however, only elicited from him
the fact that he was still without the new letters of credence which
the recent death of Frederick William III. had rendered necessary.
From this circumstance Guizot seems to have inferred that there was
no immediate danger of the conclusion of a treaty between the four
Powers, inasmuch as Bülow had not yet been officially accredited to
the Court of St. James'.[570]
As Guizot had correctly surmised, Palmerston experienced the
greatest difficulty in inducing his colleagues to adopt his views.
Both Holland and Clarendon strongly deprecated the conclusion of
any treaty to which France would not be a party, and Melbourne and
Lansdowne seemed disposed to agree with them. Palmerston, thereupon,
placed his resignation in the hands of the Prime Minister.[571]
In a long letter, on July 5, in which he recapitulated the whole
history of the Turco-Egyptian question, he explained the reasons
which made it impossible for him to remain at his post. Were Great
Britain to elude the engagements which she had contracted towards
the Sultan, because France was not prepared to co-operate with the
other signatory Powers, Russia would resume once more "her separate
and isolated position" towards Turkey. England, he contended, would
thus by her own deliberate act, re-establish that protectorship of
Russia over Turkey, which had for so long been a cause of apprehension
to other Powers. "The ultimate results of such a decision would be
the practical division of the Ottoman Empire into two separate and
independent States, whereof one would be a dependency of France and
the other a satellite of Russia." Never would he consent to be an
instrument for the execution of a policy which, he believed, must
entail disastrous consequences upon his country. Unless, therefore,
his colleagues were prepared to pursue the course which he advocated
he must retire, even though his resignation should lead to a break up
of the government.[572]
The most recent intelligence from the East had, moreover, supplied
Palmerston with an argument which had a great effect in overcoming the
resistance of his opponents in the Cabinet. A formidable insurrection
was reported to have broken out in Syria, where the tribes were in
open rebellion against Mehemet Ali. He could, therefore, contend that
the treaty, which he urged his colleagues to conclude with Russia,
Austria and Prussia, was a Liberal measure, inasmuch as it meant
the delivery of an oppressed people from a tyrannical ruler. This
last consideration, combined with the desire to avoid the crisis
which must result from the resignation of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, induced the dissenting members of the Cabinet reluctantly
to assent to Palmerston's proposals.[573] Accordingly, on July 15,
"a convention for the pacification of the Levant" was signed by the
plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, on
the one side, and that of the Sublime Porte on the other. In view of
the expediency of speedily affording military succour to the Syrians,
it appears to have been agreed that Bülow should be considered as
empowered to act on behalf of his Court.
By the convention which was thus concluded the four Powers
undertook actively to assist the Sultan to reduce the Pasha to
submission--Austria and Great Britain engaging to intercept all
communication by sea between Egypt and Syria. To this instrument was
annexed a _Separate Act_ in which were laid down the terms which the
Porte purposed to offer to Mehemet Ali. The hereditary tenure of
Egypt was to be conferred upon him together with the governorship
for life of the greater part of the pashalic of Acre. But, if he
should not accede to these conditions within a space of ten days,
the offer of Acre would be withdrawn. A further delay of ten days
would, however, be accorded him in which to consider the second
proposal which would be limited to the hereditary pashalic of Egypt.
If, after the specified term had elapsed, he should still refuse to
accept the proffered conditions, the Sultan would be free to bring
the negotiations to a conclusion and "to follow such ulterior course
as his own interests and the counsels of his allies might suggest
to him." In a third document, known as _The Reserved Protocol_, it
was laid down that, inasmuch as "the state of affairs in Syria, the
interests of humanity and grave considerations of European policy"
made it desirable that active operations should begin with as little
delay as possible, the naval measures to which Austria and Great
Britain were pledged would be initiated at once, without waiting for
the ratification of the convention.[574]
The decision of the four Powers to conclude this treaty had not been
communicated to M. Guizot. French historians have adduced the secrecy
which was observed as a proof of Palmerston's malevolent intentions
towards France. But no other course could have been pursued with
safety. It was certain that France would not take part in coercing the
Pasha,[575] and it was no less certain that she would warn him of the
measures which the allies were proposing to adopt against him.[576]
Inasmuch, therefore, as it was advisable that the naval commander in
the Mediterranean should receive his orders before Mehemet Ali could
be aware of the nature of the pressure which was to be brought to bear
upon him, it was impossible to acquaint M. Guizot with the resolution
of the Powers. Nor was the expediency of enabling the British fleet
to forestall any hostile move on the part of the Pasha the only
reason which made secrecy desirable. Although Palmerston was not
apprehensive that the French government would proceed to extremities,
it was possible that M. Thiers might decide actively to support the
Pasha. In that case war could not be avoided and it was very necessary
that Sir Robert Stopford should receive the earliest information of
the intentions of his government. No communication, accordingly, was
made to the French ambassador until the couriers from London had
obtained a start of forty-eight hours. But, on July 17, Palmerston
invited M. Guizot to call at the Foreign Office, where he read out
to him a _memorandum_ acquainting him with the convention which had
been concluded. The numerous efforts which had been made to induce
France to co-operate with the other Powers were insisted upon, and
great regret was expressed that she had not seen fit to comply with
the several proposals which had been communicated to her. Palmerston
then proceeded to explain the general nature of the measures of
coercion which it was intended to apply to Mehemet Ali, without,
however, supplying the ambassador with a copy of the treaty. Guizot,
after disputing the accuracy of certain statements contained in the
_memorandum_, took his departure. The situation was so grave that he
must receive instructions from his government before he could discuss
it.[577]