MEHEMET ALI
Scarcely had the withdrawal of the French troops from Belgium been
effected, than grave news was received from the east. At Konieh,
in Asia Minor, on December 21, 1832, Ibrahim Pasha, the son of
Mehemet Ali, the rebellious viceroy of Egypt, was reported to have
inflicted so signal a defeat upon the Turkish army, as to place it
beyond the Sultan's power to resist his advance to the shores of the
Bosphorus. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, with all the fearful
complications which it would entail, appeared to be upon the point of
taking place.
The Sultan, Mahmud II., had always been keenly alive to the necessity
of remedying the decrepit condition of his Empire. But only a Peter
the Great could have eradicated effectually the many evils from which
Turkey was suffering, and Mahmud was merely an Oriental despot. All
through his reign, however, he set himself resolutely to destroy the
almost independent power which some of his Pashas had begun to assume
over the provinces which they governed. He imposed the European dress
upon his ministers and officials, he introduced the French system of
drill into his army, and he exterminated the janissaries, when they
rebelled against his innovations. Even at a time of profound peace
reforms of this superficial character could have effected little
real improvement. Under the actual conditions under which they were
carried out they proved a cause of anarchy and a further source of
weakness to the State.
In 1821 the Sublime Porte was called upon to deal at the same time
with the rebellion of Ali, the celebrated "Lion of Janina," and with
the more serious national rising of the Greeks. After the struggle in
the Morea had been carried on for three years, with ruthless barbarity
on both sides, the Sultan was reluctantly compelled to invoke the
aid of his too powerful vassal, the Pasha of Egypt. The intervention
of the well-equipped fleet of Mehemet Ali deprived the Greeks of the
sea power, which had been the secret of their success. Nevertheless,
Ibrahim's invasion of the Morea in 1825, by compelling the Powers
to interfere, gave Greece her independence. The romantic episodes
of the struggle, the classic memories with which the theatre of war
was associated, had gained for the insurgents the popular sympathies
of the western nations. The philhellenism of the French and English
people gradually drove Villèle[269] and Canning to concert measures
for terminating the conflict with Nicholas, whose subjects were eager
to strike a blow on behalf of their co-religionists.
Negotiations proceeded slowly, but, on July 6, 1827, Great Britain,
France and Russia bound themselves by treaty to obtain the autonomy
of the Morea. Moreover, in a secret article, it was provided that
an armistice was to be proposed to both sides to be enforced by
such means as might "suggest themselves to the prudence of the High
Contracting Parties." Three months later, on October 20, the allied
fleets of the three Christian Powers, under the command of Codrington,
the senior admiral, were face to face with the Mussulman armada in the
Bay of Navarino. Immediate hostilities were probably not intended,
but a dispute about the position of a fire-ship led to an exchange
of shots. Before nightfall the "untoward event" had come to pass--the
Turkish and Egyptian fleets had been destroyed completely.
Mahmud in his fury proclaimed a holy war, and declared null and void
the convention of Akkerman, which he had recently concluded with
Russia for the settlement of certain points, long in dispute between
the two Powers. Canning was dead and Wellington was determined to
abstain rigidly from anything in the nature of hostile action against
Turkey. Nevertheless, under the conditions which had been created by
Canning's departure from the traditional policy of his party, he could
do nothing to prevent Nicholas from appealing to the last argument
of princes. On May 6, 1828, the Russians crossed the Pruth and the
war began, which British and Austrian diplomacy had always striven
to avert. The Turks, however, in a struggle with their hereditary
foes displayed unexpected powers of resistance, and it was not until
September 14, 1829, when Constantinople appeared to lie at the mercy
of the invaders, that peace was concluded at Adrianople.
In accordance with his promises to the Powers, Nicholas had exacted
no cession of territory in Europe. But Turkey had been compelled to
grant a practical independence to the Danubian principalities, to pay
a heavy war indemnity and to surrender to Russia Anapi and Poti on
the eastern shore of the Black Sea. Moreover, the Sultan was forced
to acknowledge the complete independence of Greece, which was placed
under the guarantee of Great Britain, France and Russia. The loss of
the Morea was a serious blow to the Porte. Not only was the Turkish
navy deprived of its finest recruiting ground, but the countenance
given by the Powers to the rising of the Greeks necessarily had a most
disturbing effect upon all the Christian subjects of the Sultan.
Whilst the power of the Sultan was thus sensibly diminished, Mehemet
Ali, who had taken no part in the Russian war, was preparing to avail
himself of the embarrassed condition of the Empire for the prosecution
of his own designs. This remarkable man was born at Cawala, a small
seaport town in Roumelia, in 1769, the year which gave birth to
Napoleon Bonaparte and to Wellington. His father was a yeoman farmer
and he himself, in early life, was a small trader in tobacco. In 1798,
however, Bonaparte's descent upon Egypt gave him his opportunity.
Young Ali sailed for the country in which he was so rapidly to acquire
fame, in the rank of second-in-command to a regiment of Bashi-Bazouks.
In the troublous times which followed, his military talents and his
statesmanlike qualities soon brought him into prominence. In 1804, the
sheikhs of Cairo elected him Pasha, and, two years later, a, _firman_
of the Sultan confirmed their selection. The last obstacle to his
complete ascendency over Egypt was removed, on March 1, 1811, by the
terrible affair known as the massacre of the Mamelukes. The Beys and
chiefs, to the number of 470, were invited to witness the ceremony of
investing his second son with the command of the army destined for
operations against the Wahabites. These men versed in all the wiles
and stratagems of eastern politics complied, and walked blindly into
the trap set for them by one who, they must have known, was their
deadly enemy. On leaving the citadel of Cairo they were relentlessly
shot down by a picked body of the Pasha's Albanian troops, at a point
where the road becomes a narrow winding pathway cut out of the rock.
Alone Emin Bey, by blindfolding his horse and by forcing him through a
gap and down a high, precipitous bank, succeeded in escaping from the
scene of slaughter.[270]
During the next few years Mehemet Ali won a high reputation in the
Moslem world by his wars against the Wahabites, and by his deliverance
of the Holy Cities of Medina and Mecca from these enemies of the
true faith. He had always entertained a great liking and admiration
for Europeans, and his experience of French and English troops had
impressed him with the superiority of western over eastern methods.
As early as 1803 he had begun to build up a fleet, and with the
assistance of Colonel Sèves, known in Egypt as Soliman Pasha, a former
aide-de-camp of Marshal Ney, he hoped to obtain an army trained and
disciplined on a European model. His efforts had been so far crowned
with success, that, but for the intervention of the Powers, his son
Ibrahim would, unquestionably, have crushed the Greek rebellion.
Mehemet Ali's curious experiment in state socialism can be discussed
more conveniently later on. Suffice it to say that, unsound as was
his economic system, and destined as it was largely to contribute to
his ultimate undoing, it, for a time, furnished him with ample funds
for the prosecution of his ambitious schemes. By nature he appears
to have been rather a kind-hearted than a cruel man. To some extent,
without doubt, he was an oppressor of the people, yet at the same time
he constantly protected them from the ill-treatment and exactions
of his officials. But, although he was too large-minded to find any
satisfaction in useless tyranny, when he conceived that reasons of
state called for their application, he would resort unhesitatingly
to the most ruthless measures.[271] In passing judgment on Mehemet
Ali, however, it must always be remembered that he was an altogether
illiterate man, who had only taught himself to read in middle life by
dint of great perseverance. Nor should it be forgotten that Egypt,
when he assumed the supreme control, was in a state of confusion and
anarchy almost impossible to realize.
It was not loyalty which had prompted Mehemet Ali to assist the Porte
to crush the Greek insurrection. In 1822 he had obtained the island of
Crete from the Sultan, and the Morea and the pashalics of Syria and
Damascus were to have been his rewards in 1825. The intervention of
the Powers had deprived him of the Morea, which he had always regarded
as one of the gates of Constantinople. After the Russo-Turkish war,
however, he felt confident of his ability to take forcible possession
of Syria, the eastern avenue of approach to the Imperial city. A
quarrel with Abdullah Pasha of Acre furnished him with an excuse for
setting his army and his fleet in motion. On November 1, 1831, a force
of about 10,000 Egyptians, under Ibrahim, entered Syria and laid siege
to the fortress of Saint-Jean d'Acre.
To the commissioner of the Porte sent to remonstrate with him for
thus invading a neighbouring pashalic, without the permission of the
Sultan, Mehemet Ali loudly protested the loyalty of his intentions.
The presumptuous Abdullah, he swore, had "insulted his beard whitened
in the service of his sovereign," and, in the interests of the Porte,
he now proposed to chastise his arrogance. These assurances were,
however, estimated at their true value, and neither the Sultan nor
his ministers had had any doubts that the Pasha was now launched
upon a career of conquest.[272] The destruction of his powerful
vassal had, for many years past, been an object very near to Mahmud's
heart. To accomplish this purpose, he was prepared to strain to their
uttermost the exhausted resources of the empire. His favourite,
Hosrew, the _Seraskier_,[273] was the sworn enemy of Mehemet Ali,
and both the Grand Vizier and the _Capudan Pasha_[274] were the
creatures of this minister.[275] On the other hand, however, the
_Ulemas_ and the _Mullahs_ argued in favour of an arrangement with
the rebellious viceroy, even at the price of large concessions. The
three guaranteeing Powers had settled upon the boundaries of the new
Kingdom of Greece, and Sir Stratford Canning was about to arrive at
Constantinople to arrange the final conditions of separation with
the Porte. But, were peace to be maintained with the Pasha of Egypt,
contended the true Mussulman party, a united front could be turned to
Europe, and the concessions demanded, in respect of Greece, might be
scornfully rejected.[276]
Notwithstanding his wrath, this consideration appears to have carried
some weight with the Sultan. But his hesitation was not of long
duration. Hussein Pasha, a former janissary, and Mahmud's chief
instrument in the destruction of his comrades, was appointed to the
command of the troops in Syria. No pains were spared to render the
army of operations as efficient and as numerous as possible, and,
early in May, both Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim were declared outlaws.
Meanwhile, the siege of Acre had been proceeding, but the defence was
stubborn, and it was not until May 27, 1832, that Ibrahim carried the
fortress by storm. The victorious general now set his face northwards.
On June 15, Damascus opened its gates, and, on July 9, he defeated the
advanced Turkish troops at Homs. A week later, he entered Aleppo, and,
on July 29, routed Hussein Pasha himself, who had taken up a strong
position near Alexandretta. This victory left him free to pass the
Taurus mountains and to enter Asia Minor.
It was to the politic attitude which he had observed towards the
people of the country through which he had passed, rather than to any
superiority of his Arab troops over the Turks, that the success of
Ibrahim's invasion should be ascribed. In those wild and mountainous
districts any resistance on the part of the inhabitants must have
greatly impeded the advance of an army. Ibrahim, however, maintained
the strictest discipline, and paid promptly for all the requirements
of his troops. The people, contrasting his behaviour with the
treatment they had been accustomed to experience at the hands of the
Turks, were strongly impressed in favour of the Egyptians.[277] The
Emir Beshir, the powerful chief of the Lebanon, threw in his lot with
the invaders. The warlike Druses and the Maronites tendered Ibrahim
their services. Christians were won over by promises of equal rights,
and Moslems by the prospect of escaping from Ottoman oppression.
Ibrahim's troops were equipped in European fashion, but there was
nothing about their uniform which could offend the most rigid
Mussulman. He himself was dressed in the same simple manner as his
soldiers, and he affected always to be a strict observer of Turkish
customs. Although in private, in the company of the Christian officers
of his staff, he would often indulge freely in French wine, in public
he was never seen to drink anything stronger than water.[278]
Ibrahim's rapid succession of victories and his continued advance
filled the Sultan with consternation. Having resolved to throw all the
resources of the Empire into the struggle with Mehemet Ali he could
not afford to quarrel with the Christian Powers. Stratford Canning,
accordingly, experienced little difficulty in bringing the Porte
to agree to the conditions under which it was proposed that Greece
should be separated from Turkey. Soon after his arrival, however, on
May 17, in the course of a confidential talk, Mustafa-Effendi, the
Sultan's private secretary, let fall certain expressions indicative of
a desire on the part of his master to enter into a close and intimate
connection with England.[279] On August 7, 1832, on the occasion of
Sir Stratford's audience for the purpose of taking leave, the Sultan
"honoured him with the gift of his portrait suspended by a gold
chain and set in brilliants," a mark of His Highness' consideration
which, the ambassador reported, "was without precedent."[280]
Direct proposals for the conclusion of an alliance between England
and Turkey were immediately afterwards made to him both by the
_Reis-Effendi_[281] and by the Sultan himself.[282] Furthermore, M.
Maurojeni, the Turkish _chargé d'affaires_ at Vienna, was sent to
London to sound the British government upon the subject, and, on
October 18, Namic Pasha, a major-general of the Imperial Guard, set
out for England with a letter from His Highness to King William IV.
praying for naval assistance on the coast of Syria.[283]
Had the decision rested with Palmerston alone it is possible that
aid of some kind might have been furnished to the Porte. But the
majority of the members of the Cabinet were strongly averse to
embarking upon any fresh adventure, while the Belgian question was
still unsettled. Moreover, since the conclusion of the great war,
the naval establishments had been cut down to so low a point that it
would have been highly inconvenient to reinforce the Mediterranean
squadron. The British _chargé d'affaires_ at Constantinople was,
therefore, instructed to inform the Porte that "naval assistance was
a matter of greater difficulty than at first sight it would appear
to be." Nevertheless, the request was regarded as a striking proof
of the Sultan's confidence in British friendship, and His Majesty's
government would at once convey to Mehemet Ali "an expression of
regret that he should so far have forgotten what was due to his
Sovereign."[284] This was all the comfort which Mandeville was able
to give to the distracted Turkish ministers, at the moment when the
news reached Constantinople that the Grand Vizier had been completely
defeated at Konieh, that he himself was a prisoner in Ibrahim's hands
and that, in the words of the _Reis-Effendi_, "the Turkish army
existed no longer."[285]
A few days before the arrival of the news of the disaster at Konieh,
the Russian general, Muravieff, suddenly appeared at Constantinople.
On December 23 both he and Boutenieff, the Russian ambassador, had a
conference with the _Reis-Effendi_ and the _Seraskier_, and, on the
27th, the general was received in private audience by the Sultan,
to whom he presented a letter from the Tsar. No mystery was made of
the fact that Muravieff had been charged to proceed to Cairo, to
warn Mehemet Ali that, should he persist in refusing to make his
submission to the Sultan, he would bring down upon himself the wrath
of the Emperor Nicholas. But both Mandeville and Varennes, the French
_chargé d'affaires_, were soon satisfied, notwithstanding the secrecy
with which the Russian proceedings were surrounded, that an offer of
military assistance had been tendered to the Porte. Their information
was correct.[286] Boutenieff had offered to place a squadron of
the Black Sea fleet at the Sultan's disposal, but his Highness,
with profuse expressions of gratitude, had declined the proffered
assistance. Rather than accept help from Russia, he was prepared
to humble his pride and to send Halil Pasha to attempt to arrange
a settlement with his rebellious vassal. On January 5, 1833, this
decision was conveyed to Boutenieff, whereupon Muravieff at once set
out upon his mission to Mehemet Ali, the Sultan's envoy, Halil Pasha,
having already started upon his way to Alexandria.
There had, for a long time past, been a disposition in England
to regard French relations with Egypt with suspicion. Ever since
Bonaparte's descent upon the country, Egypt was believed to have a
sentimental attraction for the French. Now that by their acquisition
of Algiers, they had gained a footing upon the African shore of
the Mediterranean, this feeling of distrust had increased. It was
remembered that Polignac had seriously entertained the notion of
subsidizing Mehemet Ali and of employing a corps of Egyptian troops
in the Algerian expedition. During the course of Ibrahim's campaign
in Syria, both Stratford Canning and Mandeville had looked with sour
disapproval upon Varennes' efforts to persuade the Porte to allow
France to mediate between the Sultan and the Pasha.[287] But both
the French and English governments were agreed as to the necessity
of preserving the Ottoman Empire and were resolved to prevent, if
possible, the Porte from falling completely under the influence of
Russia. The Duc de Broglie, when he learnt that offers of assistance
had been made to the Sultan by Boutenieff, at once suggested the
joint mediation of France and England in the Turco-Egyptian dispute,
and was greatly disappointed to find that his proposal met with no
response in London. Palmerston, for the present, was content to direct
Lord Ponsonby to proceed from Naples to Constantinople, as ambassador
to the Porte, and to despatch Colonel Campbell to Egypt, in the
capacity of British agent and consul-general, with instructions to
communicate "freely and confidentially" with the French and Austrian
representatives at Alexandria.[288]
It was one of the ironies of the situation that, at this time, when
Russia was suspected of intending to put into execution long-matured
schemes against the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, her traditional
policy towards Turkey had in fact been completely reversed. As far
back as the year 1802 the minister, Kotchuby, taking as his text
Montesquieu's doctrine that no Power can have a better neighbour
than a weak State, had drawn up a memorandum to prove that the
preservation, not the destruction, of Turkey should be the object of
Russian policy. More recently, in 1829, when the terms of the peace
of Adrianople were under consideration, the members of the eastern
committee had endorsed Kotchuby's views, and the Tsar Nicholas had
reluctantly adopted their conclusions.[289] Muravieff's instructions
had been drawn strictly in this spirit. Mehemet Ali, Nesselrode laid
down, must not be allowed to reach Constantinople and to overthrow the
existing _régime_. Such a development would be opposed to the Imperial
policy, which aimed at maintaining Turkey in her present "stationary
condition." Should the Pasha succeed in establishing himself at
Constantinople, Russia would be placed "in contact with a strong and
victorious Power instead of a weak and defeated neighbour."[290]
Meanwhile, Ibrahim who was still at Konieh was believed to be on
the point of moving forward to Brusa.[291] Both to Colonel Duhamel,
Muravieff's aide-de-camp, and to a messenger despatched to him by M.
de Varennes, he returned the same answer. He was a soldier and must
obey his orders, his father alone could decide upon his movements. He
should be sorry to displease the Emperor Nicholas, but he must abide
by his instructions.[292] Ibrahim's uncompromising attitude overcame
the Sultan's hesitation. Boutenieff was informed that the promised
naval assistance would be thankfully accepted and that, in addition,
His Highness craved for the despatch of 30,000 Russian troops for
the defence of his capital. The Sultan knew well that to invoke the
military protection of the Tsar must lower him in the eyes of his
subjects and of every true Mussulman. But, upon the whole, he regarded
it as less dangerous than to allow Ibrahim to advance to the shores of
the Bosphorus. It was in vain, therefore, that Varennes and Mandeville
exerted themselves to induce the Porte to withdraw the demand for
Russian help.[293] "A drowning man," said the _Reis-Effendi_, "will
clutch at a serpent."[294]
Early in February Muravieff was back at Constantinople. The terms
which Halil Pasha had been empowered to offer had not been accepted,
but Mehemet Ali had promised Muravieff that, for the present, the
Egyptian army should not advance beyond Kiutayeh.[295] Upon the news
that no immediate forward movement on the part of Ibrahim was to be
apprehended, both the French and British ministers again endeavoured
to persuade the Porte to ask that the despatch of the Russian succour
might be delayed. According to the _Reis-Effendi_ such a request was
actually made to Boutenieff, who replied that he had no ship at his
disposal to send to Sevastopol, although a Russian brig of war was at
the time at anchor in front of the embassy.[296] On the other hand,
accounts of these proceedings, derived from Russian sources, state
that the question of postponing the departure of the fleet was never
seriously raised.[297] Be that as it may, on February 20, 1833, the
Russian squadron, consisting of four sail of the line, three large
frigates, a corvette and a brig, entered the Bosphorus and anchored at
Buyukdere.
Three days earlier, on February 17, Admiral Roussin, the newly
appointed French ambassador to the Sublime Porte, arrived at
Constantinople. Upon the appearance of the Russian fleet he at once
instructed his _dragoman_ to warn the Porte that, unless the admiral
in command were requested to depart within twenty-four hours, he
should consider his mission at an end. At the same time he tried
to induce the British minister to make a similar representation.
Mandeville, however, could only reply that he had no authority "to
hold language of so high and energetic a character." Roussin appears
to have seen very soon that he had acted with undue precipitation,
and that his own withdrawal would not hasten by an hour the departure
of the Russian ships. But his next step was scarcely more judicious.
On the 21st, he affixed his signature to a document guaranteeing that
Mehemet Ali would make peace with the Sultan, upon the terms proposed
by Halil Pasha and which had already been rejected. In return the
Sublime Porte was to undertake to refuse "foreign succour" of any kind
in the future.[298]
It was hoped to satisfy Mehemet Ali by conferring upon him the
government of the districts of Acre, Naplous, Jerusalem and Tripoli.
He, however, was resolved to extend his rule over the whole of Syria,
and to acquire, in addition, the pashalic of Adana and the seaports
of Selefkeh and Alaia. Adana possessed an especial value in his
eyes, by reason of its forests from which he proposed to obtain the
timber necessary for the building of his ships. He understood the
difficulties of the Sultan's position and he was well informed about
the rivalries of the Powers.[299] He perceived clearly that he was
never likely again to have so favourable an opportunity for pressing
his demands upon the Porte. On March 23, accordingly, Reshid Bey
arrived at Constantinople bringing a letter in which Mehemet Ali
rejected scornfully Admiral Roussin's proposals. He would rather, he
declared, meet with an honourable death than submit to be deprived of
territories which were his by right of conquest. At the same time,
Ibrahim was directed to march on Constantinople if, within five days
of Reshid's arrival, the Sultan should not have agreed to the required
concessions.[300]
Terrible consternation prevailed in the _Seraglio_, and great
was the perplexity at the French and British embassies. Roussin
counselled a complete surrender to Mehemet Ali, and Mandeville had
no alternative to propose. It was decided, finally, that a Turkish
plenipotentiary should proceed, accompanied by M. de Varennes, to
Ibrahim's headquarters at Kiutayeh with authority to offer the
pashalics of Damascus and Aleppo.[301] Ibrahim, however, would not
entertain the idea of a compromise, and Varennes could only report the
failure of his mission and advise the cession of Adana. In opposition
to the recommendations of Mandeville, but with the approbation of
Admiral Roussin, the Sultan consented to yield up to his vassal this
valuable district.[302] The preliminaries of this agreement, known as
the Convention of Kiutayeh were signed on April 8, 1833, and Ibrahim
forthwith began his preparations for retiring into Syria.
In the meantime, however, on April 6, a second division of the
Russian fleet had arrived in the Bosphorus and 5000 troops had been
disembarked on the Asiatic shore opposite to the British embassy
at Therapia. The Tsar Nicholas was greatly incensed at Admiral
Roussin's attempts to induce the Porte to ask for the withdrawal of
his squadron. Pozzo di Borgo was, in consequence, charged to protest
vigorously in Paris against the admiral's conduct, and the complaints
of the Russian ambassador were warmly supported by his colleagues of
Austria and Prussia. Broglie, although he might allow Lord Granville
to perceive that he was not altogether convinced of the wisdom of
Roussin's actions, invariably met the representations of the agents
of the Northern Courts with the reply that the admiral's conduct
was fully approved of by his government.[303] At Constantinople
Boutenieff declared emphatically that nothing short of the complete
evacuation of Asia Minor by the Egyptians would induce his Imperial
master to recall either his fleet or his troops to Sevastopol.[304]
When the list of the pashalics to which Mehemet Ali had been appointed
was officially made public, it was seen that no mention had been
made of the province of Adana. Upon hearing of this breach of the
Convention of Kiutayeh, Ibrahim promptly arrested the homeward
march of his army.[305] A few days later, however, on April 22,
a third division of the Russian fleet and a second detachment of
troops entered the Bosphorus. These reinforcements, which should
have added to the Sultan's powers of resistance, became, in effect,
the determining cause of his decision finally to give way about
Adana. Ever since the entry of Ibrahim into Asia Minor, the people
of Constantinople had been deprived of their usual sources of
supply. The necessity of provisioning the Russian fleet and _corps
d'armée_ had greatly aggravated the difficulties of the situation.
Confronted by the prospect of a famine and a rising of the populace,
Mahmud elected to humble his pride and to obtain the withdrawal of
the Egyptians at the price of the surrender of Adana.[306] Yet he
could not bring himself openly to nominate his rebellious vassal
to the governorship of this important province. Ibrahim was, in
consequence, officially appointed collector of the crown revenues of
the district. Mehemet Ali, provided he could exercise an effective
dominion over Adana, was content, in this instance, to waive his
claim to be styled its Pasha. In point of fact he was delighted that
matters had been so satisfactorily arranged. Under Campbell's threat
that, should he persist in claiming Adana, the coast of Egypt would
be blockaded by the British fleet, he had actually announced his
intention of withdrawing his demand, when the news arrived that the
Sultan had invested his son with the administration of the territory
in dispute.[307] Relations of amity were thus once more officially
established between the Sublime Porte and the Pasha.
On May 1 Lord Ponsonby, the newly appointed British ambassador,
arrived at Constantinople, preceding by three days Count Orloff, the
_generalissimo_ of the Russian military and naval forces in the Black
Sea and the Bosphorus, and Ambassador-Extraordinary to the Sublime
Porte. His appointment was due to the Tsar's desire to be represented
at Constantinople by some one who could be depended upon resolutely to
oppose Admiral Roussin. Boutenieff appears to have been considered as
somewhat deficient both in energy and strength of character. Orloff
had been furnished with very wide powers, but he was charged to regard
the task of convincing the Sultan and his ministers that their safety
entirely depended upon the degree of support which, in the future, the
Tsar might be disposed to afford them, as the primary object of his
mission. He must be admitted to have carried out his instructions most
faithfully. From the day of his arrival Russian influence was supreme
at the Porte and in the Divan. Roussin's request that French war ships
should be allowed to pass through the Dardanelles was peremptorily
refused. Ponsonby saw clearly that, for the time being, he must submit
to be overshadowed completely by the Russian ambassador. For the
present he could only gaze moodily from his windows at the Russian
encampment in the valley of Unkiar-Skelessi and endeavour to restrain
his French colleague from affording Orloff any excuse for delaying
the departure of his troops. At last, on July 9 and 10, the Egyptian
withdrawal behind the Taurus mountains having been completely carried
out, the Tsar's soldiers were embarked and his ships sailed out of the
Bosphorus.[308]
For some weeks prior to the departure of the Russian expedition,
it had been reported that an offensive and defensive treaty was on
the point of being concluded between the Tsar and the Sultan.[309]
The truth of this rumour was confirmed after Orloff had quitted
Constantinople. It would appear that it was the Sultan himself who
first suggested an alliance, at an audience accorded to Orloff shortly
after his arrival, and that Ahmed Pasha acted as the intermediary
between the palace and the Russian embassy in the very secret
negotiations which followed. The diplomatic instrument, known as the
Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, concluded between the Porte and Russia on
July 8, 1833, for a duration of eight years, consisted of six public
and one secret article. The public articles merely proclaimed the
existence of peace and friendship between the two Empires and provided
for their mutual succour in case of need. The whole importance of
the treaty lay in the secret clause in which it was stipulated that,
inasmuch as Russia had no intention of exercising her right to ask
for military assistance, the Porte, in return, would, "upon demand
and in accordance with the principle of reciprocity,"[310] close the
Dardanelles to the warships of all nations.
It appears that, when it became necessary to inform the Turkish
ministers of the projected treaty, they one and all evinced the
greatest repugnance to the idea of an alliance with their hereditary
enemies. But, at the news that the British fleet was approaching the
Dardanelles, they withdrew their objections. They had besought the
British government for naval assistance in the struggle with Mehemet
Ali, and their request had been refused. The arrival, on June 25, in
the Bay of Tenedos of Sir Pulteney Malcolm's squadron, which, a few
months earlier, could have intercepted the communications with Egypt
and changed the course of the campaign, now only served to revive
painful recollections of Admiral Duckworth's proceedings in 1807.[311]
The question of access to the sea, which bathes the coasts of the
richest provinces of the Empire, must necessarily be a matter of the
highest importance to Russia. The principle of regarding the Black
Sea as a _mare clausum_ found a place in the treaty concluded between
the Porte and Russia, on December 23, 1798. It was again inserted
into the treaty of September 23, 1805, but with this important
addition--that to the Russian fleet was granted a right of passage to
the Mediterranean through the straits. These conditions, however, had
been terminated by the outbreak of hostilities in 1806, and in the
subsequent treaty of peace, signed at Bucharest on May 10, 1812, no
mention was made of the special privilege which Russia had obtained
seven years before. Again in the treaty of peace concluded between
Great Britain and Turkey, on January 5, 1809, England undertook to
observe "the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire," which declared
the straits of Constantinople closed to the warships of the Powers.
But this arrangement, which had ever since been regarded as a law of
nations, was suddenly terminated by the act, signed at the palace of
Unkiar-Skelessi, restoring Russia to the favoured position which she
had enjoyed for a brief space of time in 1805. No specific mention,
it was true, had been made of her right of passage to and from the
Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, although for obvious
reasons both Russian and Turkish ministers might prefer to elude a
direct statement on the subject, they unquestionably placed this
interpretation upon Orloff's treaty.[312] It was in this light also
that it was looked upon by Lord Palmerston and the Duc de Broglie.
At the suggestion of Broglie,[313] as it would appear, the French
and English governments resolved to instruct their representatives
at Constantinople to advise the Porte not to ratify the treaty. But,
should the Sultan confirm the signatures of his plenipotentiaries,
they were to hand in a note, pointing out that by the treaty the
relations of Turkey with Russia seemed to have been placed upon an
entirely new footing. In the event of this changed situation leading
to the armed interference of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey,
France and Great Britain were resolved to act as the circumstances
might appear to require, "equally as if the treaty above mentioned
were not in existence."[314] Directly it had been reported that this
note had been presented to the Porte, a copy of it was transmitted to
the French and British ministers at St. Petersburg, for communication
to the Imperial Cabinet. Nesselrode in reply contended that the treaty
was purely defensive and aimed solely at the preservation of Turkey.
It had, it was true, changed the relations of the two Empires towards
each other. It had converted a state of hostility and suspicion
into one of friendship and confidence. His Majesty the Emperor was
determined, should circumstances demand it, faithfully to carry out
the obligations which he had contracted, "as though the declaration
contained in the French and British notes did not exist."[315] In
return Lord Palmerston reiterated the dissatisfaction with which the
treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was regarded in England. This despatch was
in due course communicated to Count Nesselrode by Mr. Bligh, the
British _chargé d'affaires_, who, as he placed it in the hands of the
Russian chancellor, added that his government "was resolved not to
be drawn into a controversy upon a question in which it differed so
widely from the Imperial Cabinet."[316]
In the meantime, a meeting had taken place, in September, at
Münchengrätz, between the Tsar of Russia, the Emperor of Austria
and the Crown Prince of Prussia. The object of this interview
had been officially ascribed solely to a desire upon the part of
Nicholas to become better acquainted with the Emperor Francis.[317]
This explanation, which was received with contemptuous derision by
Palmerston,[318] and which Bligh "could scarcely read with becoming
gravity," deceived nobody. In point of fact weighty political matters
were the subject of the deliberations of these potentates and their
confidential advisers. The formation of a league of the three Northern
Courts to resist the doctrine of non-intervention had, ever since
the Revolution of July, been the favourite scheme of Nicholas and
Metternich. Frederick William III., however, was doubtful of the
wisdom of openly resuscitating the Holy Alliance. He was strongly
impressed with the dangers of a policy, which must necessarily draw
a sharp dividing line between the absolute and the constitutional
Powers. For this reason neither the King of Prussia nor his chief
minister travelled to the little town on the Bohemian frontier to
assist at the deliberations. But, after the two Emperors had set out
on their return to their respective capitals, Nesselrode journeyed
to Berlin and succeeded in inducing the King of Prussia to become a
party to the convention to which Nicholas and Francis had given their
adherence. By this treaty, signed at Berlin, on October 15, 1833,
the right of every independent sovereign to call to his aid another
sovereign was proclaimed. Should one of the three Courts see fit to
render material assistance to any sovereign, and should such action
be opposed by another Power, the three Courts would consider any
interference of this kind in the light of an act of hostility directed
against them all.
In consequence of the objections of the King of Prussia, the plan of
transmitting this convention to the French government was abandoned.
But the principle, which it involved, formed the subject of separate
despatches, couched in more or less threatening language, which the
agents of the three Northern Courts in Paris duly communicated to
the Duc de Broglie. The Duke, however, declared emphatically that,
whatever her attitude might be as regards more distant States,
France would assuredly resist by force of arms any intervention in
Switzerland, Belgium or Piedmont. Moreover, he caused a circular to be
sent to all French representatives at foreign Courts clearly defining
the line of action which would be adopted in cases of intervention.
The boldness of his language came as a disagreeable surprise to
Metternich. The Northern Courts, when they made their communications
to the French government, had not intended to provoke a defiant
rejoinder of this kind.
At their meeting at Münchengrätz, however, the two Emperors had not
been concerned exclusively with the question of intervention, and with
their policy towards France. On September 18, 1833, Nesselrode and
Metternich signed a convention, pledging Russia and Austria to combine
for the preservation of the Ottoman empire. The contracting parties
specifically undertook to oppose any extension of the authority of
Mehemet Ali over the European provinces of Turkey. Lastly, should the
existing _régime_ at Constantinople be overturned, Russia and Austria
agreed to act in concert on every point relating to the establishment
of a new order of affairs.[319]
Unfortunately, Nicholas saw fit to insist that absolute secrecy
should be observed with regard to this convention, which might, with
so much advantage, have been communicated to the western Powers. He
probably feared that Russia's changed policy towards Turkey would be
ascribed to alarm, engendered by Admiral Roussin's hostile attitude
at Constantinople. Sincerely desirous as he was to conciliate the
English government, he would not consent to admit, so long as France
and Great Britain were intimately united, that Russia had renounced
her old ambition of establishing her power upon the Bosphorus.
But, although his pride would not allow him frankly to explain his
eastern policy to the British government, he was at pains to convince
Mr. Bligh of the purity of his intentions. He was a "_chevalier
anglais_," he reminded him at the conclusion of a long talk about the
Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and, pointing to his star of the Garter,
twice repeated the words "_Honi soit_ _qui mal y pense_."[320] But
assurances of this kind carried no weight with the English government.
Russia was universally believed to be moving steadily towards
Constantinople. The chief organs of the press accused her daily of
secretly preparing to conquer or to absorb the Ottoman empire. The
most extreme Radicals in the reformed Parliament, and Tory gentlemen,
the hunting friends of Matuszewic,[321] at Melton, were alike
convinced of the duplicity and of the aggressive character of Russian
policy.
It was necessarily a matter of the deepest interest to both Palmerston
and Broglie to ascertain the spirit in which Metternich would
regard the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. The despatches from Vienna,
however, speedily dispelled the hope that the dominant position
which Russia had acquired at Constantinople would meet with the
disapproval of Austria. Metternich's lips were sealed on the subject
of the Austro-Russian convention respecting Turkey, and he could,
in consequence, only declare emphatically that he felt no distrust
of Russia, and was satisfied that she harboured no hostile designs
against Turkey. If England, he reminded Lamb,[322] had not refused
the Sultan the assistance for which he had asked, he would not have
been driven to look to Russia as his sole protector against Mehemet
Ali. Neither Palmerston nor Broglie believed that these expressions of
confidence in the honest intentions of Russia represented Metternich's
real convictions. Both attributed his attitude to his intense fear
of revolution, which made him wilfully blind to the schemes which
Russia was maturing so craftily. But, so long as he should continue
in this frame of mind, they were agreed that it would be "imprudent
for Great Britain and France to found upon the treaty any measures
of decided hostility."[323] For the present, therefore, they were
content to exercise the greatest vigilance, and to be prepared for
fresh developments. Every endeavour, however, was to be made to open
the eyes of the Sultan to the real nature of his position, and to
induce him to withdraw from the fatal alliance into which he had been
inveigled. At the same time it was greatly to be desired that Russia
should be afforded no excuse for intervening under the stipulations
of Orloff's treaty. A fresh quarrel between the Porte and Mehemet Ali
was the only circumstance which could possibly justify such action
on her part. The whole influence of Great Britain and France must,
accordingly, be exerted to prevent the Pasha from committing any
renewed act of aggression.[324]