THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
The Cabinets of Lord Grey and of M. Casimir Périer had always regarded
the execution of the separation treaty as a measure which must
necessarily follow its ratification by the five contracting Powers.
But, during the spring and early summer of 1832, ministers, both in
France and in England, were confronted by an internal situation of
exceptional gravity. The Lords, on April 14, had passed the second
reading of the third Reform Bill by a narrow majority. On May 7,
however, three days after Russia had ratified the Belgian treaty,
Lord Lyndhurst successfully carried against the government a motion
postponing the clause which disfranchised the boroughs. The Cabinet,
therefore, decided to advise the King "to advance to the honour of the
peerage such a number of persons as might ensure the success of the
Bill in all its essential principles."[226]
In the early days of the struggle the King had been a keen advocate
of parliamentary reform. But the violent opposition which the measure
had excited had sensibly altered his feelings. Nor was it only with
respect to the Bill that His Majesty was beginning to entertain
misgivings. The conduct of foreign affairs had, for some time past,
caused him grave anxiety. He perceived, he wrote to Lord Grey, a
dangerous tendency on the part of the government to subscribe to
all the democratic theories which found favour in Paris. He realized
the importance of good relations with France, and he was prepared to
admit that it might be due to the existence of such an understanding
that war had been avoided in the Belgian question. But he mistrusted
France and could not believe that she had abandoned her schemes of
conquest and of territorial expansion. He held, therefore, that it
was impolitic to "unite too closely with her in the prosecution of
measures tending to give umbrage and alarm to other Powers."[227]
In consequence of these criticisms Lord Grey signified his willingness
to resign. But a second letter from the King and a conversation,
in which His Majesty assured him that he still enjoyed his full
confidence, induced him to remain in office. A fortnight later,
however, when the King declined to follow the advice, contained in the
Cabinet minute of May 8, to create a sufficient number of peers to
enable the Bill to pass, the government resigned. But the excitement
throughout the country and the attitude of the House of Commons
compelled Lord Lyndhurst and the Duke of Wellington to abandon all
hope of forming a ministry. In face of their inability to carry out
the task with which he had entrusted them, the King had no alternative
but to send for his late ministers and to give them the guarantees,
which they made an indispensable condition to their acceptation of
office. Lord Grey, however, was spared the necessity of resorting to
the powers which the crown had placed at his disposal. In deference
to the King's wishes[228] Wellington and the chief opponents of the
measure agreed to stay away from the House, and on June 4, in their
absence, the Bill was passed into law.
France was less fortunate. Her domestic difficulties were only
temporarily overcome after grave disorder and much bloodshed. The
cholera, brought back by the Russian armies from Turkey, had spread
westwards. The disease, which made its first appearance in England
in the latter months of 1831, did terrible execution in Paris during
the spring and summer of 1832. M. Casimir Périer, who had been in bad
health for some time past, was its most illustrious victim. His death,
on May 16, 1832, was the signal for a furious outburst of hostility
on the part of the parliamentary opponents of his system. At the same
time the avowed enemies of the Orleans monarchy, both Republican and
Carlist, actively prepared to take advantage of the situation. _The
Society of the Friends of the People_, in defiance of the police,
held meetings at which armed insurrection was preached openly. "I was
present at one of them," wrote Heinrich Heine, "the smell reminded me
of an old file of the _Moniteur_ of 1793 grown dirty from too much
reading."[229]
The funeral, on June 5, of General Lamarque, the most prominent
advocate in the Chamber of the union of Belgium with France, was
chosen by the revolutionary leaders as a favourable occasion for
striking their blow. But the authorities were upon the alert and both
regular troops and national guards were quickly upon the scene of
action. Nevertheless, it was not until artillery had been brought up
that, on the following day, June 6, the great barricade at the Cloître
Saint-Merri was stormed and that this formidable insurrection was
finally suppressed. Nor was it only in the streets of Paris that the
government had to deal with an armed rising. On June 4 the Duchesse de
Berri, the mother of the Duc de Bordeaux, the lawful King of France
in the eyes of the Carlists, raised the standard of rebellion in La
Vendée. But her insurrection, which had been undertaken against the
advice of the wiser of the Carlists and of the old Royalist leaders
in the West, was, in a few days, stamped out completely. The defence
of the Château de la Pénissière, where a handful of Carlist gentlemen
made a brave stand against overwhelming odds, imparted, however,
a tinge of heroism to this, the last and the least famous of the
Royalist rebellions of La Vendée.
Following quickly upon the defeat of the republicans in Paris and of
the Carlists in the West, came the news that the Duc de Reichstadt,
the heretofore King of Rome, was dying of consumption at Vienna. But
Metternich, in transmitting this information, desired that Louis
Philippe's attention should be especially directed "to his successor
in the eyes of the Bonapartists." The young Louis Bonaparte, he
begged him to remember, was not under the safeguard of the Emperor
of Austria, but, on the contrary, "was deeply involved in all the
machinations of the revolutionary societies."[230] Few people,
however, shared Metternich's forebodings, and the death of the Duc
de Reichstadt, which took place on July 22, 1832, was generally
considered, even by staunch Imperialists, to have disposed effectually
of the chances of a Bonapartist restoration.[231] But neither the
successful suppression of two rebellions, nor the decease of a
dangerous pretender to the throne could make up for the loss of the
President of the Council. The death of M. Casimir Périer had deprived
the Cabinet of its strength and prestige. Louis Philippe, whilst
doing full justice to the courage and abilities of his late minister,
was perhaps not altogether sorry that his masterful personality no
longer presided at the council table. The _rôle_ of a constitutional
monarch was never to his taste. He longed always to take a direct
part in the management of public affairs, and rather liked his people
to think that his was the hand which guided the ship of State. He
was, therefore, in no great hurry to appoint a new President of the
Council. He soon perceived, however, that a prolongation of this state
of affairs would be prejudicial to the best interests of the monarchy
both at home and abroad.
For the past two months the London conference had been engaged upon
fruitless efforts to induce the King of the Netherlands to agree to
the separation treaty. Moreover, His Majesty's obstinacy was not
the only difficulty with which the representatives of the Powers
had to deal. The Belgians clamoured loudly for the execution of the
treaty, and declared that, so long as the Dutch retained possession
of Antwerp, they must decline to discuss any modification of its
conditions.[232] Oblivious of their disasters of the year before, they
even began to talk of ejecting the Dutch by force, and, as though to
prove the seriousness of their intentions, proceeded to enrol Polish
officers in their army, and to make other warlike preparations.[233]
Although determined that the main conditions of the treaty must be
left untouched, the members of the conference were anxious that
the minor points in dispute should form the subject of amicable
discussions between the Dutch and Belgian representatives. It was on
this principle that all their proposals had been made. But neither at
the Hague nor at Brussels was any disposition evinced to listen to
reasonable suggestions for a compromise.
At last, on July 10, the plenipotentiaries decided to forward their
final proposals to the Hague and to announce, at the same time, that,
if they were not accepted, no further modifications of the original
treaty would be submitted. Little hope, however, was entertained that
the King's obduracy would be overcome without a resort to force.
But before proceeding to adopt more active measures the British
government decided to dispatch Lord Durham upon a special mission to
St. Petersburg. Ill-health had recently compelled Lord Heytesbury to
relinquish his post, and his successor had not as yet been appointed.
The King of the Netherlands, it was believed, still trusted that
the Tsar would intervene on his behalf, should France and England
begin hostilities against him. Lord Durham was therefore charged
to endeavour to persuade the Emperor Nicholas "to give immediate
instructions to the Russian plenipotentiaries at the conference to
co-operate cordially and effectually in whatever measures might
appear best calculated to effect an early execution of the treaty."
He was to state most positively that France and England, under any
circumstances, were resolved to fulfil the engagements which they had
contracted towards Belgium. Lastly, he was to explain the views of His
Majesty's government upon Italian, German and Polish affairs.[234]
Seeing that it was the object of the British government to conciliate
the Tsar, in order to induce him to take part in measures which could
not be otherwise than extremely distasteful to him, it is strange that
this particular minister should have been selected for the mission.
As one of the most advanced politicians in the Cabinet Lord Durham
would hardly seem to have been the person best qualified to propitiate
the Emperor Nicholas. But at the time his suitability was perhaps
only a secondary consideration. On the question of the creation of
peers to enable the Reform Bill to pass, he had seriously differed
from Lord Grey, his own father-in-law, and it may have been the wish
to avoid a complete rupture between them that prompted his despatch
to St. Petersburg. The Emperor, however, whatever may have been the
real nature of his feelings with respect to Durham's appointment,
evinced not the slightest resentment. On the contrary, he appeared
to be at pains to pay him the greatest honours and, during the whole
period of his six weeks' stay in the Russian capital, the ambassador
was the object of his most flattering attentions. Durham, who was
highly gratified by the warmth of the Imperial reception and by the
marked deference with which he was treated, was, for his part, no
less anxious to create a favourable impression. When removed from
the turmoil of party politics he rarely failed to display those
statesmanlike qualities which he unquestionably possessed. Yet in
spite of all his efforts, on this occasion, his embassy, in so far
as its immediate objects were concerned, proved a complete failure.
Under no circumstances would the Tsar agree to join in any hostile
action against Holland. But, whilst the autocrat assured him that such
was his irrevocable determination, he told him that he was equally
resolved not to oppose those measures which other Powers might see
fit to adopt, in order to obtain the execution of the separation
treaty.[235] This categorical statement of Nicholas' intention not
to interpose, should coercion be applied to Holland, was the one
satisfactory piece of news which Lord Durham was enabled to transmit.
In all his conversations the Tsar manifested his extreme dislike of
Louis Philippe and expressed his determination to render military
assistance to Austria and Prussia, should France attempt to interfere
in German affairs.[236] Lord Durham was not long in discovering that
no good purpose would be served by adverting to Poland. The greatest
indignation prevailed throughout Russia at the conduct of the
Poles, and he quite agreed with Lord Heytesbury that the Tsar dared
not disregard the national resentment which their insurrection had
provoked. Only force, he saw clearly, would induce him to admit that
other Powers had a right to interfere with his treatment of his Polish
subjects, and England most certainly had no intention of making the
question a case for war. He conceived, therefore, that he might depart
from the letter of his instructions and confine his observations upon
the subject to a mere informal expression to Count Nesselrode of the
interest felt by the British government in the general welfare of
Poland.[237]
Before the end of July, it was known in London that the King of
the Netherlands was determined to reject the proposals which the
conference had declared must be the last which could be submitted
to him. Nevertheless Palmerston, encouraged seemingly by the
language of Van Zuylen, the Dutch plenipotentiary, decided to make a
further attempt to avert the necessity of an appeal to force.[238]
Accordingly, he drew up a fresh scheme for the settlement of the
points in dispute, and showed it confidentially to the Dutch
representative. Van Zuylen professed to be on the whole well satisfied
with Palmerston's proposals, and held out distinct hopes that they
might serve as the basis of a definite agreement between Holland and
Belgium. But, before any progress could be made in the matter, it was
necessary to induce the Belgians to abandon their declared intention
of refusing to negotiate, until the Dutch should have evacuated the
citadel of Antwerp. In order to try to persuade the Belgian government
to adopt a less uncompromising attitude, Baron Stockmar, early in
August, proceeded to Brussels as the semi-official representative
of the conference. King Leopold's confidential adviser saw clearly
that the Belgians must appear in a very unfavourable light should the
negotiations break down, owing to their obstinate refusal to recede
from the position they had taken up. He had never approved of the
policy of the Meulinäer Cabinet, and had always deprecated the warlike
preparations upon which that minister had ostentatiously embarked.
As he constantly pointed out to the King, the chances of success in
a single-handed contest with Holland were necessarily very doubtful.
Moreover, under any circumstances, the Great Powers were pledged to
intervene to put an end to the struggle, and, in such a case, Belgium,
if the aggressor, would certainly be dealt with very harshly. One
measure, however, which Stockmar had constantly advocated, was now
an accomplished fact. In the month of May, the Princess Louise, a
daughter of the King of the French, had been affianced to Leopold,
and the marriage had been duly celebrated on August 9, at the Château
de Compiègne. But the newly married king showed as little disposition
to adopt the counsels of his father-in-law[239] as he had those of
the sagacious Stockmar. Indeed, the language of many leading Belgians
at this period suggested that they were encouraged to defy the
Powers, from the security which they considered was assured to them
by the family ties uniting their sovereign to the reigning House in
France.[240] Leopold, without doubt, had no share in so dangerous an
illusion, but his ministers had pledged themselves to the Chambers
to insist upon the surrender of Antwerp as a preliminary to any
fresh negotiations, and he seems to have thought that it would
be too unpopular a step to dismiss them on that account. Stockmar
returned to London on August 18. His visit to Brussels had failed
in its object, but he still continued to press his views upon King
Leopold. A prolongation of the _status quo_ constituted, he argued,
no disadvantage to Belgium. Although it was the case that the Dutch
held the citadel of Antwerp, which, by the terms of the treaty,
should have passed out of their possession, their retention of it
was counterbalanced by the Belgian occupation of parts of Limburg
and Luxemburg, which, under the conditions of separation, had been
assigned to Holland. Moreover, even the absolute Powers were prepared
to admit that a continued refusal on the part of the Court of the
Hague to evacuate Antwerp, would justify the Belgians in declining
to pay their share of the public debt, jointly contracted by the two
countries before their separation. Before long, the force of this
reasoning began to be appreciated at Brussels, where both Adair and
La Tour-Maubourg, the British and French ministers, were using their
best endeavours to persuade the King to conform to the wishes of their
respective governments. In diplomatic circles the conviction was
gaining ground that the King of the Netherlands was merely trifling
with the Powers, and that he had still no intention of bringing the
negotiations to a conclusion.[241] Should these suspicions prove
correct, Leopold probably realized that it must be to his advantage to
display a readiness to meet the wishes of the conference, at a time
when the members of it would necessarily be heartily disgusted at the
dilatory and evasive attitude adopted by the Cabinet of the Hague.
Under the influence of these various considerations his resolution
rose to the required point.[242] The Meulinäer government was
dismissed, General Goblet was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and powers were transmitted to Van de Weyer to enter into negotiations
with the Dutch plenipotentiary upon the basis of the new proposals,
_Le thème de Lord Palmerston_, as they were called by the diplomatists.
Accordingly, on September 20, M. Van de Weyer officially informed
the conference that he was authorized to discuss with the Dutch
plenipotentiaries the points in dispute between the two countries.
But in a note dated the same day, Van Zuylen, ignoring completely
the _thème de Lord Palmerston_, claimed the execution of the treaty
on the terms set forth in the Dutch counter proposal of June 30. The
conference, thereupon, called upon him definitely to state whether
he was empowered to negotiate with Belgium in accordance with the
proposals submitted by the British plenipotentiary. To this demand
he returned an answer which was unanimously held to be highly
unsatisfactory, and, on October 1, in consequence, the representatives
of the five Powers met to consider the steps which should now be
taken to bring matters to a conclusion. As had been foreseen, it was
clear at once that the prospects of arriving at an agreement were
hopeless. According to the absolute Powers, coercion must be confined
to a declaration authorizing the Belgians to withhold payment of
their share of the Dutch-Belgian debt, until the citadel of Antwerp
should be handed over to them. France and England, on the other hand,
deriding the notion that pressure of this kind would suffice to
overcome the obstinacy of the King of the Netherlands, called for the
application of sterner measures. To this demand the plenipotentiaries
of the northern Powers opposed the irrevocable resolution of their
respective Courts not to participate in any hostile acts against
Holland. In face of this irreconcilable divergence of opinion, the
conference broke up, the representatives of France and England
announcing the intention of their governments to take steps to ensure
the prompt execution of the terms of the separation treaty.[243]
But, although the concert of the Powers had thus ceased to exist,
there was still no distinct understanding between France and England,
as to the measures by which the Dutch were to be compelled to evacuate
Antwerp. Louis Philippe's continued inability to reconstruct his
Cabinet necessarily increased the reluctance of the British government
to agree definitely to combined action with France. When, towards
the end of June, the King had become convinced of the necessity of
strengthening the ministry his thoughts, in the first place, had
turned towards M. Dupin. His oratorical powers, the considerable
following which he commanded in the Chamber, and the support which he
had given to M. Casimir Périer, furnished excellent reasons for his
inclusion in a government which was to carry on the policy of the late
President of the Council. But insurmountable difficulties had arisen.
It is not clear whether M. Dupin's objections to joining the Cabinet
should be ascribed to conscientious doubts about the future policy of
the government, or merely to disappointed ambition, because the King
was not prepared to confer upon him the Presidency of the Council.
According to one account, he is said to have pointed to his hobnailed
boots and to have asked insolently whether they were to debar him from
transacting business with "_Milord_ Granville." But, whatever may have
been the true cause of his misunderstanding with his royal master,
their discussion unquestionably grew very heated and culminated in the
King seizing him by the collar and ejecting him from the room.[244] A
strong sense of personal dignity, however, was never a characteristic
of Louis Philippe, and, notwithstanding this scene, he soon reopened
negotiations with M. Dupin. But this second attempt to arrange
matters was attended with no better success than the first. Baffled
in this direction, Louis Philippe was compelled to make overtures to
the _Doctrinaires_. Under the Restoration this designation had been
applied to a small but distinguished group of politicians, of whom the
best known were Royer-Collard, Guizot, Broglie and Barante. All were
strong advocates of limited monarchy and, generally speaking, fervent
admirers of the British constitution. Their system of government was
based upon the theory that, in the modern France which the Revolution
had created, no _régime_ could endure which did not depend for support
upon the middle classes. The political principles which found favour
with the _bourgeoisie_, constituting as they did a _juste milieu_
between the reactionary sentiments of the old aristocracy and the
revolutionary tendencies of the labouring classes, were precisely
those to which, in the opinion of the _Doctrinaires_, all future
governments would have to conform. Accordingly, they had accepted
the Monarchy of July and both Broglie and Guizot had sat in Louis
Philippe's first Cabinet. But, holding that insurrection must be put
down with a firm hand, they had always supported Casimir Périer.
Louis Philippe had no great liking for the _Doctrinaires_. As strict
constitutionalists they were necessarily opposed to the direct
interference of the sovereign with the business of the State.
Moreover, they were unquestionably unpopular in the country. On this
occasion, however, when compelled by circumstances to seek their
assistance, he hoped to overcome this last objection by nominating
a popular soldier, in the person of Marshal Soult, to the presidency
of the council. All through his reign Louis Philippe was inclined to
place a military man at the head of the government. Not only were
appointments of this kind invariably well received, but he soon
discovered that soldiers, brought up in the school of Bonaparte,
were seldom troubled with constitutional scruples about the exact
position of the sovereign in a limited monarchy. But, at the same
time, he was careful to assure Lord Granville that the Marshal's
duties, as President of the Council, would be purely nominal. "Under
any circumstances," said Louis Philippe, "his appointment need excite
no apprehensions abroad, his love of peace is notorious, indeed, his
description of himself as _l'apôtre de la paix_ has almost passed into
a byword."[245] The Duc de Broglie, the son-in-law of Madame de Stael,
into whose hands the King proposed to confide the portfolio of Foreign
Affairs, was a cultivated man but of reserved and somewhat displeasing
manners. He enjoyed, however, a high reputation for honourable dealing
and integrity of purpose and was, moreover, on terms of friendship
with Lord Lansdowne and other prominent members of the Whig party.
His selection, therefore, might be expected to meet with the cordial
approval of the British government.
The Duc de Broglie, however, was not prepared to accept
unconditionally the task which the King proposed he should undertake.
After one of his first interviews with Louis Philippe he met Lord
Granville at Talleyrand's house in the Rue Saint-Florentin and
explained the situation to him. The French public, he told the
ambassador, were weary of the interminable negotiations about Belgium,
and it was only by a military exploit, such as the capture of the
citadel of Antwerp, that the Cabinet would be able to obtain the
support of the Chamber. It was useless to attempt to disguise the
grave character of the situation. Were the government to be overthrown
by a parliamentary majority, the King would be forced to depend upon
the Left, and be rendered powerless to control the violence of extreme
members of the party. The Duke went on to assure him that he was
not ignorant of the suspicion with which the entry of a French army
into Belgium would be regarded. There was no pledge, no guarantee,
however, which he would not be prepared to give that, eight days after
the capture of the citadel, every French soldier should be withdrawn
from Belgium.[246] This conversation had been regarded by Lord
Granville as quite unofficial, but, on the following day, October 5,
Sébastiani informed him that "the King purposed to defer concluding
his ministerial arrangements until the British ambassador should
be enabled to state the opinion of his government, respecting the
conditions under which alone the Duc de Broglie would undertake the
direction of foreign affairs."[247] It is evident, however, that other
counsels must have prevailed seeing that, on the morning of October
11, the _Moniteur_ contained the names of the members of the new
Cabinet. The despatches of Mareuil, the _chargé d'affaires_ in London,
respecting the intentions of the British government, were, it may be
presumed, considered so satisfactory as to render further assurances
unnecessary. The ministry presided over by Marshal Soult, assisted by
four such men as Broglie, Guizot, Humann, and Thiers, could almost
aspire to the name of "a government of all the talents."
The British government was in a difficult situation. The elections
were impending, and a Reformed Parliament, bent upon retrenchment and
the settlement of domestic questions, was little likely to regard
with favour any policy which might conceivably lead to serious
complications with foreign Powers. The very indifferent display of the
Belgians, in their short campaign of the year before, had deprived
them of all popular sympathy. In commercial circles, especially, the
idea of embarking upon hostilities against England's old allies,
the Dutch, was strongly deprecated.[248] Although the unreasonable
attitude of the King of the Netherlands, during the past twelve
months, had alienated from him the support of _The Times_[249] and
of many persons who derived their opinions from its columns, there
was unquestionably something to be said upon his behalf. He had
adhered to the protocols of January 20 and January 27, 1831, which the
plenipotentiaries had declared must form the basis of any separation
treaty. Nevertheless, in order to conciliate the Belgians, they had
gone back upon their decision, and both the convention of the eighteen
articles and the separation treaty of November 14, 1831, had been
framed upon different conditions.
The Tories had always supported the Dutch, and during the stormy
months which had preceded the passing of the Reform Bill, had
delivered some damaging attacks upon the foreign policy of the
government. It was certain that they would vehemently denounce any
combined action with France in the Dutch-Belgian question. Nor
would it be politic to disregard their attacks and merely to treat
them as the venomous outburst of party animosity. Notwithstanding
that the republicans had been crushed in the streets of Paris and
that the Carlist rebellion in La Vendée had been stamped out, the
situation in France undoubtedly presented many disquieting symptoms.
The hiding place of the Duchesse de Berri was still undiscovered,
and her presence in the west prevented the complete restoration
of tranquillity. The great difficulty which Louis Philippe was
experiencing in forming a government of moderate men afforded food
for yet more serious reflection. The possibility could not be ignored
that, in the near future, he might be compelled to select his
ministers from the Left--from the party, the leading members of which
proclaimed unceasingly that the treaties of 1815 must be abrogated and
that Belgium must be united to France.
King William IV., moreover, was strongly opposed to hostile action
against Holland. The "Jack Tar animosity"[250] which he always
entertained for the French blazed up afresh at the notion of England
and France engaging upon joint operations in the Low Countries. The
King's dislike to the policy of his ministers was encouraged by the
Howes and the Fitzclarences,[251] who used their best endeavours to
persuade him to refuse his consent to all measures of coercion. In
view of the little sympathy which the cause of Belgium evoked in the
country, and of the many difficulties by which they were beset, Lords
Grey and Palmerston might not improbably have felt disposed to adopt
some middle course, more in harmony with the views of the Court and
of the absolute Powers. But a refusal on their part to resort to
force, in order to obtain the execution of the treaty, would not have
restrained the French from beginning hostilities. "I should deceive
your Lordship," wrote Granville on October 19, "were I to hold out
any expectation that the British government, by withholding its
concurrence, could prevent a French army from entering Belgium."[252]
It was to be apprehended, however, that a refusal of the English
Cabinet to join with France in the application of coercion to Holland
might lead to the resignation of the Duc de Broglie. In that case
it was more than probable that the direction of French policy, at a
most important moment, might pass from the hands of a statesman of
moderate views into those of some politician of advanced opinions, in
whom it would be impossible to feel the same confidence. This was a
consideration which, without doubt, carried the greatest weight with
the English ministers and exercised a deciding influence over their
resolutions.
It was soon apparent that the withdrawal of their plenipotentiaries
from the conference would be the extent of the support which the
Northern Courts purposed to give to the King of the Netherlands.
The neutral attitude, which the Tsar had promised Lord Durham he
should adopt, rendered it certain that Austria would not move a man
to the assistance of Holland. Metternich was much concerned at the
recrudescence of a demand for more Liberal institutions in Germany, a
state of affairs which had called forth from the Diet fresh decrees
of a repressive character. The prevailing unrest, however, made it
the more desirable that the Dutch-Belgian question, with all the
possibilities of danger attaching to it, should be promptly settled.
Furthermore, the burden of military establishments was already
grievously straining the Imperial exchequer.[253] But, although
Metternich had no thought of opposing the action of the constitutional
Powers in the Low Countries, he chafed bitterly at the undignified
attitude which his Court was compelled to adopt. At one time he would
impute the whole blame for the situation which had arisen to the
plenipotentiaries at the conference who, by manifesting too plainly
their dread of war, had allowed Palmerston to see that he might,
without danger, conduct matters as he chose.[254] At other times
the Cabinet of Berlin was the object of his fretful complaints. Had
Prussia on the first outbreak of the insurrection at Brussels marched
an army into the Low Countries, the revolution would have been stamped
out, and all the subsequent trouble would have been avoided. France,
in that case, he professed to believe, might have threatened, but
would never have dared to intervene.[255]
The break-up of the conference and the intention avowed by the two
constitutional Powers of expelling the Dutch from Antwerp, although
not unexpected, caused considerable perturbation at Berlin. Ancillon,
the chief minister, declared that Prussia would agree to the weekly
deduction of a million florins from Belgium's share of the debt
due to Holland, for so long a period as the Dutch should retain
possession of the citadel of Antwerp. Nor would his Court be prepared
seriously to oppose a blockade of the Scheldt by the two maritime
Powers. The entry of a French army into the Low Countries, however,
was a different matter, and one which would compel Prussia to take
steps to safeguard her interests. But, neither the angry language of
M. Ancillon at Berlin nor the veiled threats indulged in by Baron
Werther in Paris, excited any real apprehension. Nevertheless, as
both the French and English governments were sincerely desirous of
conciliating the absolute Powers, it was resolved to propose that,
pending the settlement of the Dutch-Belgian question, Prussia should
occupy Venlo and that part of Limburg which the treaty had assigned to
Holland.[256]
It was not until October 22 that the convention, to regulate the
conditions under which France and England were to apply coercion
to Holland, was signed in London. The French government chafed
impatiently at this delay, for which King William's reluctance
to agree to the measures advocated by his ministers was chiefly
responsible. Notwithstanding Talleyrand's[257] explanations of the
delicate situation in which Lord Grey was placed, the Duc de Broglie,
on October 21, informed Lord Granville that his government could wait
no longer. The very existence of the Cabinet, he assured him, was at
stake. Unless he were to be in a position to announce to the Chambers,
which were about to reassemble, that definite steps were to be taken
in order to expel the Dutch from Antwerp, he and his colleagues would
assuredly be driven from office. If no news were received from London
within the next twenty-four hours, the Cabinet, he had no doubt,
would resolve to march an army against Antwerp, in the event of the
King of the Netherlands refusing to comply with a summons to evacuate
the citadel. This resolution would, however, be at once transmitted
to London, and would be kept entirely secret until the British
government should have had time to reply to it. But, to the great
joy of Louis Philippe and his ministers, the arrival, on October 29,
of the convention signed in London relieved them from the necessity
of deciding upon their course of action, without having previously
obtained the concurrence of the English government.[258]
By the terms of the convention of October 22, 1832, the King of the
Netherlands was to be summoned to enter into an engagement by November
2 to withdraw his troops, before the 12th of the same month, from the
territory which the separation treaty had adjudged to Belgium. Should
he refuse to comply, France and England agreed to lay an embargo
upon the Dutch shipping within their respective harbours, to order
their cruisers to seize all Dutch vessels at sea, and to blockade the
coast of Holland with their combined fleets. If, by November 15, the
required evacuation should not yet have taken place, a French army
would enter Belgium. But its operations were to be limited strictly to
the capture of the citadel of Antwerp and the forts dependent upon it,
and, when this result should have been attained, it was to withdraw
immediately. At the same time, a note was to be addressed to the
government at Brussels calling for the evacuation of Venlo and those
places still occupied by Belgium, which, under the provisions of the
separation treaty, had been assigned to Holland.[259] This demand,
however, would be of a purely formal character, and was to be made
upon the understanding that it need only be complied with, should the
King of the Netherlands agree to the concessions required of him.[260]
Immediately upon receipt of the convention in Paris, the French
fleet at Cherbourg was ordered to unite with the British squadron at
Spithead. This junction was duly effected, and, on November 4, the
King of the Netherlands having declined to comply with the demand
which had been presented to him, the combined fleets set sail for
the mouth of the Scheldt, whilst, two days later, both governments
laid an embargo upon the Dutch shipping within their ports. The Duc
de Broglie, in the meanwhile, had instructed La Tour-Maubourg, the
French minister at Brussels, to negotiate a convention for the entry
of a French army into Belgium. The French government had always
insisted that the operations, for the reduction of the citadel of
Antwerp, must be carried out exclusively by its own troops. The
Belgian army was to be entirely separated from them, and was to
do no more than hold itself in readiness to repel an invasion,
should the Dutch make an incursion across their frontiers. King
Leopold reluctantly assented to these conditions, which necessarily
deprived his people of an excellent opportunity of wiping out their
humiliations of the year before. It came, therefore, as a disagreeable
surprise when, on the occasion of the exchange of the ratifications of
the convention, La Tour-Maubourg handed in a statement reserving to
the French government the right of demanding payment for the expenses
of the expedition. This claim, it was afterwards explained, would not
be enforced immediately, but would be allowed to stand over until
some future occasion. In Palmerston's opinion, however, the fact that
payment was to be deferred made the demand no less objectionable. Were
it to be admitted, Belgium must necessarily be placed in a position of
dangerous dependence upon France. His vigorous protests achieved the
desired result. After some discussion the French government agreed to
abandon its claim for the repayment of its expenses.[261] In all other
respects matters proceeded with perfect smoothness. In accordance
with the terms of the convention, on November 16th, a French force of
60,000 men, under the command of Marshal Gérard, crossed the Belgian
frontier and laid siege to the citadel of Antwerp, the Duc d'Orléans
and the Duc de Nemours, the two eldest sons of Louis Philippe,
accompanying the headquarters staff of the army of operations.
In London the application of coercion of so vigorous a nature was
far from evoking the universal applause which it called forth in
Paris. Among the general public the entry of Marshal Gérard's army
into Belgium was regarded with suspicion, and a meeting of London
merchants was held, and a petition was forwarded to the King, praying
that hostile measures might not be taken against the Dutch. The
Tories openly declared that they placed all their hopes in General
Chassé, the commandant of the citadel of Antwerp. If only that gallant
officer could contrive to repel the French, the Grey Cabinet, they
conceived, might be forced to resign. Possibly there were sanguine
members of the party who fancied that the prowess of a Dutch general
might pave the way to the repeal of the Reform Act. In the meantime
all their sympathies went out to a drunken sailor who, from the dock
in the police-court, proclaimed the union of the British flag with the
tricolour to be a national disgrace.[262]
The proposal that Prussia should occupy Venlo and parts of Limburg,
and the limitations which the convention of October 22 set upon the
scope of the French operations, somewhat reconciled the German Powers
to the forcible ejection of the Dutch from Antwerp.[263] Nevertheless,
after having in the first instance declared its readiness to take
temporary possession of portions of the disputed territory, the
Court of Berlin, at the instigation, it was suspected, of the Tsar,
declined to entertain the suggestion. Inasmuch as the acquisition of
the citadel of Antwerp by the Belgians depended upon the success of
the French arms, they could not reasonably be expected to yield up,
even to a third party, any territory which they actually occupied,
before the operations under Marshal Gérard should have achieved their
desired result. Accordingly, in the formal proposal of Talleyrand
and Palmerston, which was submitted to Bülow on October 30, it was
provided that the Prussian occupation of Venlo and parts of Limburg
and Luxemburg should begin, only when the French expedition should
have accomplished its object. Ancillon, however, declared that
this suggestion was altogether inadmissible. Prussia, it was true,
had signified her willingness to hold certain districts of the Low
Countries. But she had only consented to take temporary possession
of them for the security of her own interests during the French
operations against Antwerp. To occupy any portion of Holland, after
the withdrawal of Marshal Gérard's army, would amount, in effect, to
the application of military pressure to the King of the Netherlands
to compel him to accept the conditions of the separation treaty.
Such a proceeding would be wholly inconsistent with the policy which
the Court of Berlin had invariably pursued, and to which it was
resolved to adhere. Prussia, therefore, would content herself with the
concentration of an army of observation upon the Meuse, for so long a
period as the French might see fit to remain in Belgium.[264]
In the meantime the siege of the citadel of Antwerp had been
proceeding steadily, although hardly with the rapidity which the
British government, in its impatience to see the affair concluded,
could have wished.[265] At last, after having sustained a very heavy
bombardment and having done all that honour required, General Chassé,
on December 22, agreed to surrender. But the two detached forts of
Lillo and Liefkenshoek, which, owing to the opening of the dykes,
could only have been reduced by a long blockade, were not included in
the capitulation. The arrangements connected with the transference of
the fortress to the Belgian military authorities were quickly carried
out, and, on December 27, the French army began its homeward march.
The operations of Marshal Gérard had placed the Belgians in possession
of the citadel of Antwerp, and had infused vitality into the Soult
government, but they had not succeeded in overcoming the reluctance
of the King of the Netherlands to adhere to the separation treaty.
It remained to be seen whether the embargo which France and England
continued to maintain, and the loss entailed by the non-payment of
the Belgian share of the Netherlands debt, would suffice to break
down his obstinacy. After this state of affairs had continued for
some four months distinct symptoms began to manifest themselves in
Dutch commercial circles of discontent at the prolongation of the
crisis. About this same time also the Russian and Prussian Cabinets
became imbued with the notion that the conclusion of the Dutch-Belgian
affair might lead to a separation between France and England. Their
intimate union had grown up in the course of the negotiations, the
final settlement of the question, it was hoped, might cause them to
drift asunder. The agents of the northern Courts at the Hague were,
accordingly, instructed to urge the King to terminate definitely his
troublesome quarrel with Belgium and the maritime Powers.[266]
This combination of internal and external pressure was more than the
Dutch Cabinet could withstand. On May 21, 1833 a convention was signed
in London by the plenipotentiaries of Holland, on the one side, and
those of Great Britain and France, on the other, stipulating that,
so long as the relations between Holland and Belgium should not be
settled by a definite treaty, His Netherlands Majesty would never
begin hostilities against Belgium, and would leave the navigation
of the Scheldt entirely free. France and England in return engaged
to remove the embargo, immediately upon the ratification of this
convention.[267]
The convention of May 21, 1833, was, in effect, an agreement for
the maintenance of the _status quo_. It constituted, however, a
condition of affairs very favourable to the Belgians. The retention
of the districts of Limburg and Luxemburg, which, according to the
twenty-four articles, should have formed part of Holland, compensated
them amply for the small inconveniences imposed upon them by the
refusal of the Court of the Hague to acknowledge their independence
and the sovereignty of their King. Five years later, in 1838, this
fact was brought home to them when, the King of the Netherlands having
announced his intention of adhering to the separation treaty, the
Powers insisted upon the surrender to him of those territories. By
that time, however, Leopold had obtained the recognition of all the
great European Courts with the exception of that of Russia, whilst,
relieved from the fear of aggression on the part of the Dutch, his
kingdom had already begun to thrive and to prosper greatly.
It was the firm and skilful hand of Palmerston which had guided the
conference through a sea of dangers to the creation of a free and
independent Belgium. But if the chief credit for the successful
termination of these protracted negotiations should be given to the
English statesman, second honours, without doubt, should be assigned
to Talleyrand. The veteran diplomatist was no friend to Belgium, but
he was a consistent supporter of the British alliance. The exceptional
position, which his age and his reputation permitted him to assume,
enabled him on many occasions to uphold successfully the English
policy against his own sovereign and his government. In 1814, at the
Congress of Vienna, friendship with England had been the object of
his untiring efforts. But, if he looked upon a close understanding
with that Power as highly advantageous to the restored Bourbons, he
regarded it as a matter of vital necessity to the Monarchy of July. An
intimate union with England, he was convinced, was Louis Philippe's
best security against the malevolent hostility of the Northern Courts.
The Belgian conference had shown that, in the person of Lord
Palmerston, a worthy successor to Canning had entered the arena of
European politics. As was the case with that statesman, Palmerston
soon came to be regarded with the bitterest dislike in the Courts and
Cabinets of the absolute Powers. Metternich hoped devoutly that the
Tories might soon be back in office, and, not without good reason,
expressed a pious wish that never again might a conference take
place in London.[268] The real weakness of the absolute Courts had
transpired all too clearly in the course of the negotiations.