the defeat of the ministerial candidate for the post of President of
the Chamber, when the news reached Paris of the Dutch inroad into
Belgium. This new development at once caused him to change his plans
and to decide to remain in office. Talleyrand was instructed to
explain in London that it was only the necessity for immediate action
which had induced the French government to order a French corps to
enter Belgium, without previous consultation with the Powers. Lord
Granville, at the same time, was informed that, upon the withdrawal of
the Dutch, the French troops would return to France.[140] The news of
the French intervention in Belgium aroused great excitement in London.
The funds fell, and Palmerston was sharply questioned upon the matter
in the House.[141] Ministers, however, reassured by the accounts of
the intentions of the French government transmitted by Granville, took
a cheerful view of the situation.[142] At a sitting of the conference,
on August 6, Talleyrand announced that Marshal Gérard's occupation of
Belgium would cease directly the Dutch should evacuate the country.
On this same occasion it was agreed that the scope of the French
operations should be decided by the conference and that, under no
circumstances, should they be extended to the right bank of the Meuse.
It was further resolved that siege should not be laid to either
Maëstricht or Venlo, on account of their proximity to the Prussian
frontier.[143]
But, when the Dutch withdrew and the French showed no disposition to
follow their example, the affair began to assume a very different
complexion. Sébastiani, changing his ground completely, declared that
Marshal Gérard's occupation must continue until the conclusion of a
definite treaty of peace between Holland and Belgium. In the Chamber,
Soult, the Minister of War, stated explicitly that the retreat of the
Dutch did not entail the evacuation of Belgium by the French army.
The unfavourable impression created by these words was not removed
by Casimir Périer's promise to Lord Granville, that he would say
something from the tribune calculated to diminish the importance of
the Marshal's pronouncement. Sébastiani's conversations with the
British ambassador, and the reports forwarded by Adair from Brussels
made it too clear that the French government purposed to avail itself
of the presence of its troops in Belgium for coming to a separate
agreement with King Leopold, respecting the immediate destruction of
the frontier fortresses. This was an arrangement which the Cabinet of
Lord Grey was determined to oppose, even to the point of war.[144]
Talleyrand, as was his invariable practise in these disputes between
France and England, left no stone unturned to dissuade his government
from embarking upon a course of conduct destined inevitably to revive
the old rivalry between the two countries. Were France to break her
word and to retain her troops in Belgium, he was convinced that
Lord Grey and his colleagues would be driven from office and their
successors would be men far less well disposed towards France.
Palmerston, he wrote, was assailed by questions in the House and
must before long make some definite statement. Sébastiani, in reply,
expressed regret for the difficulties by which Lord Grey was beset,
but maintained that the French government, were it to allow the army
to return home empty handed, would be confronted by a still more
unpleasant situation. Talleyrand, however, might announce that, in
consequence of the retirement of the Dutch, 20,000 of Marshal Gérard's
troops would be recalled and that the remaining 30,000 would be
concentrated at Nivelle.[145] The news of this partial evacuation
caused much satisfaction in London, but none the less Palmerston, on
August 17, instructed Lord Granville formally to demand the complete
withdrawal of the French army corps. He was directed to remind the
French government of its pledges and to point out that, by the
protocol of April 17, the four Powers had agreed to the principle
of the destruction of the frontier fortresses, "the satisfactory
execution of which arrangement could only be impeded by any measures
having the appearance of making the protracted occupation of Belgium
by the French army bear upon it. . . ." He was to speak "in terms
of friendship and goodwill, enforcing at the same time the just
expectations of His Majesty with firmness and decision."[146]
On August 23 the conference decided to impose an armistice upon
the Dutch and Belgians, to expire on October 10.[147] The French
government, however, declared that a mere undertaking by the King of
the Netherlands, not to begin hostilities afresh, could not provide a
guarantee for the maintenance of peace of sufficient weight to permit
of the complete withdrawal of the French army. General Baudrand,
moreover, was sent to London with a letter from Louis Philippe to
Talleyrand, in which the King expressed his displeasure with his
action in signing a document of that nature. Baudrand during his
stay in England had interviews both with Grey and Palmerston.[148]
He appears to have expatiated upon the outcry which would be raised
in the Chamber, were France to gain neither moral nor material
advantages, in return for the expense to which she had been put by her
intervention in aid of the King of the Belgians. Palmerston assured
him that his colleagues and himself were sincerely anxious that M.
Casimir Périer should remain in office, but, he added pointedly,
"when to keep in a ministry of peace it became necessary to comply
with the demands of the party which was for war, it was problematical
what decree of advantage was thereby to be acquired."[149] Talleyrand
appears to have been little moved by the censure passed upon him. He
contended that he had acted for the best, and that no fears need be
entertained that the Dutch would again attack Belgium. At the same
time he continued to urge the necessity of bringing the occupation
of Belgium to a close. "There is more real anxiety over here than I
have yet seen," he wrote on August 27. "People are all talking of an
interview between the Duke of Wellington and Lord Grey." A few days
later he again pleaded earnestly for evacuation, suggesting that the
withdrawal of the troops might be carried out so slowly that some
portion of them should still be in Belgium, at the expiration of the
armistice.[150]
In the meantime General La Tour-Maubourg had arrived at Brussels,
on August 18, furnished with the draft of a treaty which he was to
conclude with the Belgian government for the destruction of the
barrier fortresses. In the first instance it was probably intended
to keep his mission a secret, but different counsels seem to have
prevailed, and, a few days after his departure, Sébastiani informed
Granville of the reason of this officer's journey to Brussels. France,
he told the British ambassador, claimed the right to negotiate with
regard to the fortresses and it was hoped that powers would be given
to Sir Robert Adair to act with La Tour-Maubourg in the matter. This
request, when in due course Granville transmitted it to London, was
refused. Palmerston, in a long interview with Talleyrand, had already
declared, in the most uncompromising language, that the pretensions of
the French government to have a voice in determining the fate of these
fortresses, erected at the expense of Great Britain, Russia, Austria
and Prussia, could not be entertained.[151] Immediately on hearing of
La Tour-Maubourg's arrival at Brussels Sir Robert Adair, guessing the
object of his mission, sought an audience with Leopold. Both to the
King and to Meulinäer, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he asserted
emphatically that his government could never admit that the withdrawal
of Gérard's troops could be made to depend upon the conclusion of an
arrangement between France and Belgium, respecting the fortresses.[152]
Leopold was in a most difficult situation. Although he had
invoked the assistance of France and England the moment the Dutch
had announced their intention of beginning hostilities, he had
only invited Marshal Gérard actually to cross the frontier when
the misconduct of General Daine had seriously compromised his
position.[153] He appears to have greatly distrusted the intentions
of the French and to have proposed that England should occupy Antwerp
in the name of the five Powers. Three days later, however, he desired
Sir Robert Adair to consider this suggestion as withdrawn, stating
that he was satisfied with Belliard's assurances that the French
would withdraw, as soon as the Dutch should have effected their
retreat.[154] After the retirement of the Prince of Orange he was
pressed, on the one side, by Sir Robert Adair to declare that he no
longer required the presence of the French for his protection, whilst,
on the other hand, General Belliard urged him no less vigorously to
invite Marshal Gérard to remain in Belgium. Without doubt he was in
a most cruel dilemma. He had no army worthy of the name, and was at
the mercy of the Dutch should they return to the attack. Moreover,
he had every reason to apprehend that the Republican and Orangist
factions would regard the disturbed condition, to which the invasion
had reduced the country, as a favourable opportunity for putting their
designs into execution. Against the external and internal perils by
which he was threatened he could only look for active assistance to
the French. England was very jealous of French intervention in the
Low Countries, but he had no grounds for supposing that Lord Grey
would stir a finger to defend him from a rebellion of his subjects.
The British government, indeed, had declined to send the fleet to the
mouth of the Scheldt. The desire to afford the French no pretext
for remaining in Belgium undoubtedly dictated this refusal, which
nevertheless increased Stockmar's distrust of Palmerston's policy.
Adair soon discovered that, in his endeavours to obtain the speedy
departure of the French, he could expect no assistance from Leopold.
He could discern, he reported, no sense of shame nor of humiliation in
the attitude of ministers or of the people generally. They appeared to
regard the presence of Marshal Gérard's troops simply as a means of
extorting better terms from the Dutch.[155]
When Palmerston was informed of La Tour-Maubourg's mission he at once
directed Adair to remonstrate against any separate negotiation between
France and Belgium, on the question of the fortresses. But his first
interview with Meulinäer, after the receipt of his instructions,
convinced Adair that "this delicate matter had already proceeded so
far that no choice was left to him except to object _in toto_ to every
sort of communication on the subject." A solution of the difficulty
was discovered, however, in a suggestion, brought forward by the
British minister, that "the King of the Belgians should declare to
the King of the French, through M. de La Tour-Maubourg, that he was
taking measures, in concert with Great Britain, Austria, Russia and
Prussia, for the demolition of some of the fortresses erected since
1815." A few days later Adair was informed that General Goblet would
be despatched to London to negotiate a convention, whilst Leopold, on
September 8, affixed his signature to a document, wherein he undertook
to instruct his plenipotentiary to act in accordance with the wishes
of the French government in the matter of the selection of the
fortresses to be dismantled.[156]
But in Paris the ambassadors of the four Powers had protested formally
against the protracted occupation of Belgium by a French army.
Palmerston, in forwarding to Granville a memorandum of the points he
was to urge in his conference with Sébastiani, directed that this
document "was not to be handed to that minister as a note, but that
it was to be read to him confidentially . . . a course which has been
adopted out of delicacy, and under the conviction that we shall hear
in a few days that the French government has, of its own accord, given
orders for the evacuation of Belgium."[157] These representations
obtained the desired effect. At Brussels Leopold suddenly discovered
that the presence of Marshal Gérard's soldiers were no longer
necessary for his safety.[158] The announcement in the _Moniteur_,
of September 15, of the ministerial decision to recall the army from
Belgium was the signal for a violent outburst in the newspapers
against the poltroonery of the government, in yielding to the
dictation of the conference.[159] In London satisfaction at the French
withdrawal was marred by the publication of a long list of officers,
appointed by Marshal Soult, to inspect and organize the Belgian army.
This circumstance was seized upon by the Opposition as an opportunity
for attacking the foreign policy of the government. The Reform Bill
was before the House of Lords and party spirit was running high. "King
Leopold's intention to employ French officers in his army," declared
Lord Londonderry, "was more prejudicial to his independence than
the retention of 12,000 French troops in Belgium." His Lordship then
proceeded to review Talleyrand's career, and to asperse his conduct,
under the various _régimes_ which he had served, with a virulence of
language which has never since been used in that dignified assembly
about the ambassador of a friendly Power. "There was a flirtation," he
asserted amidst much laughter, "going on between the government and
France which he thought most improper. . . . To see ministers running
to consult with that individual (Talleyrand) was creating a disgust
which he thought most natural." The Duke of Wellington, however, spoke
up strongly for Talleyrand. In the many transactions upon which they
had been engaged together, he assured the House that the Prince had
always conducted himself with honour and uprightness. "He believed
that no man's public and private character had been so much maligned
as that of that illustrious individual."[160] Talleyrand was deeply
moved by the Duke's conduct on this occasion. "He was especially
grateful to him," he told Lord Alvanley, who the next day found him
perusing an account of the debate, "because he was the only public man
in the world who had ever said a good word for him."[161]
Following closely upon the announcement that the French government had
agreed to evacuate Belgium came the intelligence of the defeat of the
Poles and of the entry of the Russians into Warsaw. The news was the
signal for the outbreak of disturbances in Paris. Sébastiani's famous
statement to the Chamber "_l'ordre règne à Varsovie_," was denounced
with indignation by the demagogues. Both he and Casimir Périer were
surrounded by a furious mob upon the Place Vendôme, and were for a
time in no little danger. The rioters interrupted the performances at
the theatres, crying out that all places of amusement must be closed
on a day of mourning. The marked reluctance of the national guards
to act against their fellow-citizens imparted a serious aspect to
the situation. But the regular troops retained their discipline and
dispersed the rabble.[162] At the first outbreak of the rebellion
in Poland the French government had sought to induce England to
join with it in a proposal to mediate between the Emperor and his
revolted subjects. Talleyrand, however, who was always disposed to
create difficulties for Russia, was obliged to report regretfully
that British ministers were extremely averse to embarking upon any
diplomatic action calculated to add to the Tsar's embarrassments.[163]
In March, 1831, a false report had reached London and Paris of the
total defeat of the Poles, whereupon Sébastiani again instructed
Talleyrand to urge, in the most pressing language, the British
government to unite with France in insisting upon the humane treatment
of the rebels. Palmerston, believing the insurrection to be at an
end, readily promised to direct Lord Heytesbury to support the
representations upon their behalf which the Duc de Mortemart had been
enjoined to make at St. Petersburg.[164] Heytesbury, accordingly,
intimated to Count Nesselrode that, were any measures to be adopted
towards Poland at variance with existing engagements, both Great
Britain and France would be under the necessity of remonstrating
formally. The Kingdom of Poland, it should be remembered, had been
constituted in 1815 under the guarantee of the five Powers, and it
was, in consequence, possible to contend, with some show of reason,
that all of them were equally concerned in the maintenance of the
liberties conceded to the Poles, under the terms of the Vienna
treaty. Heytesbury's conversations with Count Nesselrode convinced
him, however, that, although the letter of that agreement might be
observed, the Polish constitution would be virtually abolished. But,
in reporting the nature of the intentions by which he conceived
the Russian government to be animated, the able and experienced
diplomatist who then represented Great Britain at St. Petersburg was
at pains to point out the difficulties of the Tsar's position. In
Russia there was a strong public opinion which even the autocratic
Nicholas could not afford to disregard. Were former conditions to
be restored in Poland, and were the authors of the cold-blooded
assassinations at Warsaw to be permitted to escape unpunished,
great indignation would be aroused throughout the Empire. His
representations had been well received, but he was plainly allowed to
see how deeply the St. Petersburg Cabinet regretted the existence of
the close understanding between France and England, which his action
had revealed. He could perceive clearly from the demeanour of his
Austrian and Prussian colleagues that neither the Court of Vienna nor
of Berlin would be disposed to interfere upon behalf of the Poles.
France not Russia, he pointed out, was now looked upon as an object of
common danger.[165]
French sympathy for the Poles was so keen that, in July, Talleyrand
was again instructed to invite the English government to join with
France in proposing "a mediation in the bloody struggle raging in
Poland." Palmerston, in reply, appears to have suggested that the
French government should set forth its views upon the matter in
writing. Talleyrand, accordingly, transmitted this request and,
at the same time, begged Sébastiani to remember, when framing his
proposals, that "he was dealing with cold-blooded people and that
it would be well therefore to avoid the use of emotional language."
But, on July 22, Palmerston informed him that the Cabinet could not
entertain the suggestion of addressing to Russia any demand for a
cessation of hostilities, nor was he able to report better success
when, in September, whilst the Belgian difficulty was at its height,
he was once more directed to approach the British government upon the
subject of Poland. "No party in the Parliament," he wrote, "was in
favour of intervention, and the newspapers merely spoke of the Poles
in sympathetic language."[166] Heytesbury, who at St. Petersburg was
in a position to judge correctly of the national resentment which
any attempt at foreign interference in Polish affairs would create,
strove to convince his government of the unwisdom of impairing the
good relations of Russia and England by raising a question in which
no British interests were involved. Remonstrances, he was prepared to
admit, might effect an improvement in the condition of the people of
the Kingdom of Poland. But, even under these circumstances, the sum of
human misery, which the rebellion must entail, would not be lessened,
inasmuch as the revolted Russo-Polish provinces, not included in the
Kingdom, would be treated with increased severity.[167]
But, with the complete suppression of the insurrection, Lord Grey
and his colleagues assumed a more sympathetic attitude towards the
vanquished Poles. In a closely reasoned despatch Palmerston, on
November 23, formulated the arguments which Heytesbury was instructed
to press upon the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. The most important
passage in this long document was that in which the interpretation
was set forth which the English government placed upon the wording
of the treaty of Vienna. The futility of the plea that no specific
constitution had been guaranteed to Poland, a contention which
Heytesbury had warned his chief the Russian government would certainly
set up, was clearly exposed. "Surely," wrote Palmerston, "it was
no forced construction of the meaning of the treaty to consider
the constitution, which the Emperor had given, as existing under
the sanction of the treaty." The constitution contained no clause
reserving to the Sovereign the right of modifying its provisions. The
action of the Poles in declaring themselves separated from Russia
could not be held to absolve the Emperor from adhering to his compact.
"Wrongs committed by one side," he concluded, "were not to be punished
by the commission of wrongs on the other."[168]
Heytesbury, after prefacing his disagreeable task of communicating
these instructions by assurances that his government was only desirous
of tendering friendly advice to a former ally, proceeded to read
out to Count Nesselrode Lord Palmerston's despatch. "The Count,"
he reported, "listened with great attention and in silence, but
his silence was not the silence of assent." The Russian Chancellor
expressed his regret that the British government should have seen
fit to make representations of this nature, notwithstanding the
intimation, conveyed to it by Prince Lieven, that the Tsar could not
admit of foreign interference in the Polish question. The official
answer of the Imperial Cabinet was in due course communicated to
Palmerston by the Russian ambassador. As Heytesbury had foreseen,
Nicholas, "strong in the support of Austria and Prussia and in the
unanimous approbation of the Russian nation,"[169] refused to adopt
the interpretation of the treaty which it was desired to place upon it
in London and in Paris.
In the meantime, important progress had been made towards a settlement
of the Belgian question. At the end of August, Baron Stockmar,
Leopold's confidential adviser, proceeded to London to watch over
his interests in conjunction with Van de Weyer, the Belgian minister
at the Court of St. James'. Stockmar realized speedily that the
Belgians would have to suffer for the defeat inflicted upon them by
the Dutch. In the treaty of peace and separation, which the conference
was resolved must be concluded without delay, they could not hope to
obtain the favourable terms conceded to them in the convention of
the eighteen articles. Should they refuse to agree to the necessary
concessions, Palmerston warned him that the conference would be
broken up, and the King of Holland would be left free to fight out
his quarrel with Leopold. Stockmar, however, continually impressed
upon his master that this was a threat which he could safely afford
to disregard. The French had always considered the union of Holland
and Belgium and the creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands as a
diplomatic combination directed against them. Public opinion in France
might, therefore, be depended upon to compel the government to resist
any attempt on the part of the Dutch to reconstitute the kingdom by
force of arms. But, although he admitted that Leopold could only
expect active assistance from France, Stockmar strongly deprecated
the idea of using French intervention as a means of intimidating the
conference. Such a course, he was convinced, would simply incline
the four Powers to lean all the more towards Holland. Lords Grey and
Palmerston were well disposed, but they had to reckon with national
sentiment, which was more favourable to "England's ancient allies,"
the Dutch, than to the Belgians. Nevertheless, although the British
government might be unable to render him practical assistance,
Leopold, Stockmar considered, should strive to gain its moral support.
The prolonged occupation of Belgium by the French was to be deplored,
because it engendered the suspicion in London that the King was
over-anxious to place himself under the protection of France. In
order effectually to put a check upon both Dutch and French intrigues
Leopold, in Stockmar's opinion, would be well advised to propose for
the hand of a daughter of Louis Philippe.
After the French evacuation Stockmar urged unceasingly the necessity
of a speedy conclusion of a definite treaty of peace. Russia, he
pointed out, was no longer distracted by the Polish rebellion, and the
sympathies of the Tsar were entirely with the King of the Netherlands.
This was a circumstance bound to have a considerable influence upon
the policy of the Courts of Berlin and of Vienna. It was of the
highest importance, therefore, that Leopold should bring his ministers
and the Chambers to recognize that the conditions of separation,
set forth in the protocol of the eighteen articles, could no longer
be obtained, and that only those stipulations should be insisted
upon which were essential to the independent existence of Belgium.
As Stockmar had foreseen, the new treaty, known as that of the
twenty-four articles, which the conference proceeded to frame, imposed
harsher terms upon Belgium than those contained in the protocol of
June 26. That part of the province of Limburg which lay upon the
right bank of the Meuse was now assigned to Holland, and Belgium was
called upon to contribute an increased share of the public debt of
the two countries. In other respects also the Belgians had to suffer
for their military inferiority to the Dutch. Nevertheless, when all
efforts to induce the conference to modify its terms had proved
useless, Stockmar, scouting the notion of abdication, counselled
Leopold to agree to them. "Let the King," he wrote, "cry aloud against
the injustice which has been done him . . . Let him show that he went
to Belgium under perfectly different conditions . . . Let the Belgian
ministry cry out equally loud. But in the meantime let everything be
done to induce the Chambers to accept the treaty."
Leopold having let it be known that, were the deputies to refuse to
agree to the terms imposed by the conference, he would be driven to
abdicate, the Chambers, on November 3, authorized him to conclude
a formal treaty of peace and separation upon the basis of the
twenty-four articles. This document was accordingly signed in London,
on November 15, 1831, by the plenipotentiaries of Belgium and of the
five great Powers. The King of Holland refused to be a party to the
agreement, but, before the expiration of the armistice, he had been
warned that any act of hostility against Belgium would be treated as a
declaration of war against the Powers. In addition, by a supplementary
article, the contracting parties guaranteed to Belgium the execution
of the treaty. Ratifications, it was laid down, were to be exchanged
within the space of two months.[170] At various periods during these
negotiations Talleyrand had experienced considerable difficulty in
persuading the French government to agree to the decisions of the
conference. When at last it had reluctantly given its assent to the
conditions of separation he was at pains to show the advantages which
France would derive from the treaty. The Duchy of Bouillon, he
pointed out, no longer formed part of the Duchy of Luxemburg, whilst
the incorporation of Arlon with Belgium increased the strength of the
French frontier towards Longwy. Furthermore, the cession of half of
the Duchy of Luxemburg to Belgium placed the Germanic Confederation at
a greater distance from France and, inasmuch as the fortress was no
longer to form part of a military system,[171] it would cease to have
any importance. With regard to the repartition of the debt, which the
French government had objected to as pressing unduly upon Belgium,
Talleyrand contended that the general interests of Europe urgently
demanded a settlement of the whole question, and that the Belgians,
after their wretched display in the summer, had been treated with more
generosity than they had any right to expect.[172]
Whilst the conference had been framing the conditions of separation
between Holland and Belgium, the French government had brought forward
a scheme for a general disarmament. Sébastiani in the summer had
proposed a reduction of establishments to a normal peace footing, but
had found that the German Powers were unwilling to revert to ordinary
conditions of military strength, until the Polish insurrection should
be at an end. After the Russian entry in Warsaw, however, the French
overtures met with a ready response. The continental Powers agreed to
begin disarming on January 1, 1832, and to proceed until their armies
should be reduced to their peace establishments. Inasmuch as England
had not added to her naval or land forces she could not enter into an
agreement to disarm, but Lord Granville was instructed to communicate
to Sébastiani the satisfaction which so practical a manifestation of
peaceful intentions afforded to the British government.[173]
The question of the demolition of the barrier fortresses had been
proceeding side by side with the settlement of the conditions under
which Belgium was to be separated from Holland. Talleyrand, however,
was not admitted to these negotiations which were conducted between
the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia
and those of Belgium. The result of their deliberations was embodied
in a document, known as the Fortress Convention, which was signed
by the representatives of the five Powers concerned on December 14,
1831. When La Tour-Maubourg had been sent to Brussels, during the
French occupation of Belgium, he had been instructed to press for
the demolition of the fortifications of Ath, Mons, Menin, Charleroi
and Tournay. The Powers, however, elected to preserve the defences
of the two last-named towns and to dismantle in their place the
works of Philippeville and Marienburg. Palmerston, without doubt,
was mainly responsible for this decision which was to create great
dissatisfaction in Paris. He was resolved, under no circumstance, to
admit the principle of allowing France to have a voice in determining
which of the fortresses, erected at the expense of the four Powers,
should be destroyed. After her attempts to arrive at a separate
understanding with Belgium concerning them, he may have thought that
she required to be reminded of the true state of the case. Yet it
would appear that the mere fact that her plenipotentiary had not
appended his signature to the convention must have made her position
in the matter sufficiently clear to the world. But, in persuading the
members of the conference to substitute Philippeville and Marienburg
for Charleroi and Tournay, Palmerston was not actuated by a desire
wantonly to slight France. In the question of the destruction of the
Belgian fortresses Grey's Cabinet was in a very delicate position as
regards the Parliament.[174] An embittered opposition was bound to
demand to know on what grounds the government proposed to justify
its policy of sanctioning the demolition of fortifications, which
the greatest captain of the day had pronounced to be necessary to
the security of Europe. Now Wellington, it would appear, considered
Charleroi and Tournay as of more importance to the defence of Belgium
than Philippeville and Marienburg, and Lord Grey and his colleagues
could not afford to disregard his opinion. It must be remembered also
that, on several occasions during the course of the negotiations,
France had shown a strong desire to regain possession of these two
places of which she had been deprived after Waterloo, and it was hoped
that, were their fortifications to be demolished, they would cease to
offer the same attractions to her.[175]
Without doubt the decision of the Powers to deprive France of any
voice in the settlement of the question of the fortresses placed her
in a very anomalous position. She was a party to the treaty which
established the independence, defined the frontiers and guaranteed
the neutrality of Belgium, nevertheless Austria, Prussia, Russia
and Great Britain had proceeded to conclude at once a separate
convention with Belgium against her. By her own action, however, she
was debarred from bringing forward this aspect of the case as an
argument against her exclusion from the fortress agreement. Far from
raising any objections to the conduct of the four Powers in drawing
up the protocol of April 17, without consultation with her, she had
expressed the greatest satisfaction with its contents. At her request
it was communicated to her officially, in order that an allusion
might be made to it in the Speech from the Throne. Louis Philippe, in
opening the Parliament on July 23, 1831, accordingly announced the
early destruction of the barrier fortresses, as a proof that the four
Powers had abandoned the system established against France in 1815.
In point of fact the apprehensions of her aggressive spirit had been
intensified by the Revolution of July and, in deciding to demolish
some of the frontier defences of the Low Countries, the Powers had not
been actuated by any desire to propitiate the new _régime_. But once
the partition of the Kingdom of the Netherlands had been accomplished,
it was recognized that the Belgians alone could not keep in repair and
efficiently defend the twenty-three barrier fortresses. Ill-equipped
and insufficiently garrisoned they would not have contributed to the
protection of Belgium, but would have offered a constant temptation
to the French to lay hands upon them. If France, however, chose to
imagine that in this matter the policy of the Powers was dictated by
a desire to please her, it was unnecessary to inform her that she was
labouring under a delusion. It was probably the knowledge that the
fiction contained in the paragraph of the King's Speech, referring to
the fortresses, could not be maintained for long, which had induced
the French government to attempt to negotiate a separate agreement
with Belgium.[176]
Both Palmerston and Stockmar appear to have been convinced that
Talleyrand had prompted his government to protest against the fortress
convention.[177] But their suspicions with regard to him seem to have
been unfounded. In pursuance of his instructions, in his conversations
with Grey and Palmerston, he was bound to employ those arguments most
calculated to induce them to make some concessions to the wishes of
his Court, but his despatches show that he disapproved strongly of
the attitude he was directed to adopt. On December 15, in forwarding
a copy of the fortress treaty, the contents of which he knew would be
exceedingly displeasing to his government, he told Sébastiani plainly
that La Tour-Maubourg's mission to Brussels was largely responsible
for the determination of the four Powers to select the fortresses for
destruction, without regard to the wishes of France. That affair,
moreover, in his opinion, had been managed in a very clumsy fashion.
When the government decided to try to arrange a separate understanding
with Belgium, it should have conducted its negotiations in the
strictest secrecy.[178]
Sébastiani, for the reason which has already been explained, was
precluded from objecting openly to the exclusion of France from the
fortress convention, and was compelled to confine his protests to
remonstrances against the selection of Philippeville and Marienburg
for demolition. Talleyrand was instructed to contend that the
fortifications of these two places, having been erected before 1815,
could not be held to fall within the category of works constructed
at the expense of the Powers. Furthermore, he was to urge that it
was incompatible with the complete independence of Belgium, which
France was anxious to see established, that the Powers should specify
which fortresses King Leopold was to dismantle.[179] Talleyrand,
however, reported that Lord Palmerston was quite unshaken by these
arguments. The British minister gave him clearly to understand that
La Tour-Maubourg's proceedings at Brussels had impressed him most
unfavourably. At the same time, pointing out that Philippeville and
Marienburg were the fortresses in closest proximity to the frontier
of France, he hinted that the French government must have some secret
reason for objecting to their demolition. "Nevertheless," reported
Talleyrand, "I still believe that he is well disposed towards us. He
is, however, in a difficult position as regards the Commons. . . .
We must bring pressure to bear upon the Belgians."[180] Sébastiani's
fears that the policy of the Powers aimed at the re-establishment of
the Holy Alliance, were, he assured him, in language no less emphatic
than that used by Granville in Paris, entirely without foundation.
Far too much importance, he urged, was attached to the fortress
convention. The King's government, in his opinion, would be well
advised to accept it, and to declare publicly that its provisions
were in harmony with the protocol of April 17. Russia was no longer
occupied with the rebellion of the Poles, and the Northern Courts
were evincing a strong disposition to draw together closely. Under
these conditions, he regarded it as essential that France should
maintain friendly relations with England. "It was a matter of far
more real importance than the question of the fortresses."[181] But
his endeavours to soothe the irritation of his government met with
no success. He was instructed to announce in London that France,
seeing that satisfaction was denied her in the affair of the fortress
convention, would refuse to ratify the treaty of separation of
November 15, 1831. Furthermore, Casimir Périer, who, on account of
Sébastiani's state of health, had taken charge of the portfolio of
Foreign Affairs, declared that, "in view of the general uncertainty
respecting the course of events in Belgium and Holland, the signature
of the proposed convention of disarmament must be postponed."[182]
The French agents in the meanwhile had not been idle at Brussels. On
December 12 General Tiburce Sébastiani, the brother of the minister,
arrived. "Ostensibly," reported Adair, "he has come to visit this
town and Antwerp, but his real purpose is to prevent the accession
of the Belgian government to the fortress convention." This officer
certainly brought a letter for Belliard containing instructions
which justified the British minister's conclusions, but his mission
appears also to have been connected with some unfounded rumour, which
had reached the French government, that the Orangists were about
to put into execution their designs against Leopold's throne.[183]
That monarch now found himself once more, as he himself described
it, "between the hammer and the anvil."[184] Louis Philippe[185]
wrote indignantly complaining that the agreement of September 8,
entered into with La Tour-Maubourg, had not been complied with. In
vain Leopold produced the instructions, with which Goblet and Van
de Weyer, who had negotiated the convention, had been furnished,
and protested that the Belgian plenipotentiaries had been forced to
sign, under the threat that the Powers would refuse to ratify the
treaty of separation, should they persist in opposing their wishes
with respect to the fortresses. General Belliard, at the same time,
intimated that, were the Dutch again to attack Belgium, no assistance
from France could be expected. To Adair, who, on the other hand,
begged him to stand firm, Leopold had expressed his determination
to disregard the French objections and to adhere to the convention.
But at the threat that, were his Kingdom again to be overrun, France
would leave him to his fate, his resolution broke down and Goblet
was directed to announce in London that the Belgian ratification of
the fortress agreement would be withheld.[186] Stockmar, writing
from London, impressed upon King Leopold that his refusal to ratify
the convention of December 14 would be eagerly seized upon by the
absolute Powers as an excuse for withholding their adhesion to the
treaty of separation. Already the news that differences had arisen
between France and England, upon the subject of the fortresses,
had enabled Metternich to reply to Mr. Forbes, the British _chargé
d'affaires_, who had been instructed to urge him to transmit to London
the necessary authority for an exchange of ratifications, that France
was holding back and that it was important that all the Powers should
act together in the matter. Prince Metternich was torn between his
fears that the continued state of uncertainty as to the affairs of
the Low Countries might lead to a war, and his desire to propitiate
Russia. Nicholas was believed to have counselled the King of the
Netherlands to agree to the treaty, but to be resolved, none the less,
to withhold his own ratification until that sovereign's reluctance to
accept the conditions of separation should have been overcome.[187] M.
Casimir Périer, in the meanwhile, however, was beginning to realize
that Palmerston was determined not to yield to the outcry about the
fortresses, and that were France, on that account, to decline to
ratify the treaty of separation not only would the labours of the
London conference for the past year be rendered nugatory, but the good
relations which had been established with England would be seriously
impaired. Moreover, should the negotiations break down, Lord Grey
might be compelled to resign, and he had good reason to apprehend,
that a change of government in England would be followed quickly
by his own downfall. An important group of deputies in the Chamber
gave him their votes, only because they believed that his alliance
with the Whigs ensured the maintenance of peace. But this reason for
their support of him would disappear on the day on which the Tories
should return to office.[188] Under these circumstances Talleyrand
was directed to obtain from the representatives of the four Powers
"some declaration calculated to reassure the King's government as to
the spirit in which the fortress convention had been drawn up." This
result was achieved by means of a document in which it was affirmed
that the arrangements respecting the fortresses were consistent with
the independence, neutrality and sovereignty of Belgium, and that that
country stood upon an equal footing as regards the five guaranteeing
Powers. Casmir Périer declared himself well pleased to receive this
empty satisfaction and, forthwith, announced his intention of adhering
to the treaty of separation.[189] On January 31, accordingly, the two
western Powers exchanged ratifications with Belgium and, at the same
time, it was resolved to keep open the protocol, in the hope that the
Northern Courts would before long confirm the signatures of their
plenipotentiaries.[190]
Scarcely had this difficulty been settled when grave complications
arose in another direction. The promises of the Pope, that reforms
would be introduced into the administration of local affairs in
Romagna, had not been carried out. The intention manifested by
the Roman government to disregard its pledges was followed by
a recrudescence of unrest in the Legations. M. Casimir Périer,
accordingly, proposed that, were foreign intervention to be required
to maintain the authority of His Holiness, a French corps should
occupy Ancona. But Metternich demurred, and, as an alternative,
suggested that a French naval force should be sent to the Adriatic to
act in combination with the Austrian squadron. On February 1, however,
the news arrived that the Austrians had entered Bologna, whereupon
M. Casimir Périer at once ordered a French regiment to be embarked
at Toulon for Ancona. Were that town to be occupied by the Austrians
before the French expedition could arrive, the troops, Lord Granville
was informed in confidence, would be landed at Civita Vecchia. The
action of the French government would, M. Casimir Périer declared to
the British ambassador, hasten the departure of the Austrians and
induce Prince Metternich to press the Court of Rome to adopt those
reforms by which alone permanent tranquillity could be established in
the Legations.[191]
The more detailed information as to the course of events in Romagna,
transmitted by Sainte-Aulaire and the British consul at Rome,
suggested the existence of a secret understanding between His
Holiness and the Cabinet of Vienna. At Forli the Pontifical troops
were reported to have shot down in cold blood peaceful and unarmed
inhabitants, and their behaviour created the impression that they were
anxious to produce disorder, in order to furnish Cardinal Albani,
the Legate, with a pretext for invoking the aid of Austria.[192]
Suspicions on this score were heightened by the fact that, although
Marshal Radetzky only received the application for assistance on
January 23, his orders, in which he styled himself commander-in-chief
of the army of Italy, were dated on the 19th, four days before the
arrival of the cardinal's demand for intervention.[193] Upon learning
of these proceedings the Comte de Sainte-Aulaire at once notified
to Cardinal Bernetti, the State Secretary, that the entry of an
Imperial army into the Papal States would be followed by the immediate
occupation of Ancona by a French force. Bernetti appears reluctantly
to have acquiesced, but, after the expedition had sailed from Toulon,
acting, without doubt, at the dictation of the Austrian ambassador,
he formally protested against the disembarkation of any French troops
within the dominions of the Pope.[194] When the news first reached
Vienna that the French had taken steps to occupy Ancona, Metternich,
concealing his annoyance, was at pains to impress upon the public
that this measure was the result of a previous understanding with
Austria.[195] On the other hand, at St. Petersburg the intelligence
that the French had intervened in Italy was held to have rendered war
inevitable, and Nicholas forthwith declared his intention of giving
armed assistance to Austria.[196] From London Talleyrand reported
that Palmerston spoke very guardedly when he sought to ascertain the
views of the British government upon the matter. In his own opinion,
and this aspect of the case he on more than one occasion brought to
the notice of M. Casimir Périer, it was much to be regretted that the
demonstrations in Italy had taken place before Austria should have
ratified the Belgian treaty. The accounts, moreover, of the lawless
proceedings of the French commander at Ancona, which soon began to
arrive, created a very general alarm. Not only had the troops forced
their way into the citadel, but a proclamation was issued by Captain
Gallois, drawn up in terms so hostile to Austria, as to amount
practically to a declaration of war. That individual, however, who was
either a member of, or in league with, the French secret societies,
the agents of which were striving to stir up a revolution in Italy,
was promptly disavowed and the fact of his recall to France was
communicated to foreign governments. Nevertheless, wrote Talleyrand,
the affair has created a most painful impression. "The territory of
an independent sovereign has been violated at a time of profound
peace and the tricolour has been hoisted over a fortress which does
not belong to France."[197] In a conversation which he had had with
William IV. at a _levée_, His Majesty spoke to him most strongly about
the impropriety of these proceedings which, ministers also informed
him, had greatly increased their difficulties in both Houses. They
could have added with perfect truth that their relations with their
sovereign had suffered considerably owing to this affair.[198]
The Austrian policy of deliberately encouraging misgovernment in the
Italian States and of placing every obstacle in the way of reforms
was hateful to Lord Palmerston. Apart from other considerations he
was convinced that a continuance of this state of affairs must,
sooner or later, drive France to intervene in such a manner as to
render a war inevitable with Austria.[199] Already, on February
20, before he had received the news of the arrival of the French
expedition at Ancona, he had directed Mr. Seymour, the British
minister at Florence, to proceed to Rome "to represent the anxiety
of His Majesty's government to see those causes, which have produced
so much difficulty, effectually removed." He was to urge that no
measures would appear "to afford so good a hope of success as a
complete adoption of those reforms which were pointed out in the
memorandum of May 21, 1831." Lastly, he was to impress upon Cardinal
Bernetti that, "if the reports be true that the ranks of the papal
troops, which recently entered the Legations, have been replenished
by emptying the prisons of criminals and by calling down the lawless
bands from the mountains, the Roman government cannot divest itself
of a deep responsibility for the melancholy events which marked the
entry into Cesena and Forli. The innocent blood which was wantonly
shed in the streets of those towns might well be accepted as a full
atonement for the political offences of the people of Romagna."[200]
When the story became known of the manner in which the French entry
into Ancona had been carried out, Palmerston readily agreed to do all
in his power to soothe the irritation of Austria and to assist to
remove the bad impression created by Captain Gallois' lawlessness.
Seymour was further instructed to inform Cardinal Bernetti that the
British government was fully satisfied that the French occupation
of Ancona was but a temporary measure, which the condition of the
Legations had occasioned. He was to reiterate the necessity for the
immediate introduction of the promised reforms and "to draw the
serious attention of the Roman government to the fact, that the course
which it was pursuing with respect to the Legations, had already had
the effect of turning the eyes of the population of those provinces
towards Austria. . . . The system of administration established in
Lombardy and Venetia, although not free from defects, was looked upon
with envy by the subjects of the Pope.[201] At Vienna Sir Frederick
Lamb was directed to assure Prince Metternich that the occupation of
Ancona would cease as soon as His Holiness should have carried out his
engagements.[202]
Metternich, reported Lamb, received the news of the French proceedings
at Ancona very calmly. He expressed himself as confident that Gallois'
actions would be disavowed by his government. "The Emperor," he
declared, "would be justified in falling upon the French at Ancona,
but he was too great a sovereign to receive an insult from the
captain of a frigate or the colonel of a regiment." It was to England
that Austria looked for support at this crisis. She ruled the seas and
it rested with her to decide whether, or not, France should hold the
command of the Mediterranean. About a week after this conversation had
taken place Metternich informed Lamb that he was perfectly satisfied
with the explanations which Marshal Maison had been instructed to
give, and that no demand would be made to the French government for
the evacuation of Ancona, so long as the Austrians continued to occupy
the Legations.[203]
This condition of affairs was allowed to prevail for some years. Both
Powers retained their troops in the Papal States, and the embarrassing
necessity under which the French government was placed of making
the occupation of Ancona depend upon the presence of an Austrian
garrison at Bologna constituted Metternich's revenge for M. Périer's
intervention in Italy.
The attention of the _corps diplomatique_ had not been concentrated
exclusively upon the complications to which the French proceedings
at Ancona might give rise. Early in the month of February it was
known that Count Orloff had been despatched by the Tsar on a special
mission to the Hague. It was in deference to the wishes of Nicholas
that the Courts of Vienna and of Berlin had decided to withhold their
ratification of the treaty of separation of November 15, 1831, and
the keenest curiosity prevailed as to the instructions with which
the Tsar's emissary had been furnished. In respect to the condition
of affairs in the Low Countries Russia was in a somewhat peculiar
situation as regards England. During the Napoleonic war Russia had
borrowed at Amsterdam a sum of 25,000,000 florins. At the peace
the King of the Netherlands and the King of Great Britain agreed
respectively to bear one-half of the charge of this debt. But it was
provided that, should at any time the King of the Netherlands be
deprived of his sovereignty over the Belgian provinces, this charge
should cease. The contingency referred to in the treaty had come
about, under circumstances never contemplated by the statesmen by whom
it had been drawn up. They had hoped to give Russia a direct interest
in preserving the union, but it was now the British government
which desired to see it abolished and the Tsar who wished it to be
maintained. Without doubt, according to the letter of the treaty,
England was no longer bound to pay a share of the Russian-Dutch
loan. Judged by the spirit of it, however, she could not honestly
escape from the charge which she had undertaken to bear. This last
construction of the agreement was adopted by Palmerston, who admitted
the British liability in a new convention, by the terms of which
the Tsar guaranteed that, should the stipulations made for the
independence and neutrality of Belgium be endangered by the course
of events, he would contract no other engagements without a previous
agreement with his Britannic Majesty. Palmerston had thus earned the
gratitude of the Tsar and had, in addition, made it difficult for him
to intervene actively on behalf of the King of Holland.[204] Ministers
were debarred, however from referring to this inner history of the
affair in Parliament, where their policy in the matter of the Russian
loan was severely attacked both by the Tory Opposition and by the
Radicals, who deprecated the notion of voting pecuniary assistance to
the autocratic government of Russia.
The Count Alexis Orloff, whose journey to the Hague was the subject
of so much speculation in the chanceries of Europe, was the natural
son of a younger brother of Gregory Orloff, the lover of Catherine
II. and a prominent actor in that palace revolution of 1762, which
cost the Emperor Peter III. his throne, and very probably his
life. After serving in the Napoleonic wars, the Count Alexis had
gained the lasting gratitude of his imperial master by his resolute
behaviour, which had contributed not a little to upset the designs
of the _Decembrists_, as those military conspirators were termed,
who, in 1825, had sought to prevent the accession of Nicholas. Ever
afterwards, in consequence, Alexis Orloff was selected by the Tsar for
the most delicate and secret missions. No notice of his departure was
given to any member of the _corps diplomatique_ at St. Petersburg.
Count Nesselrode, after he had started, merely informed Lord
Heytesbury that he had been sent to the Hague to extract a categorical
statement from the King of the Netherlands as to whether he would
accept the treaty of separation, and, in the event of his declaring
that he would withhold his consent, to signify to him that he must
not look to Russia for support.[205] This was in substance all that
Mr. Chad, the British minister at Berlin, could discover about the
objects of Orloff's mission during the Count's stay in the Prussian
capital. But he noted that the general effect of his visit to Berlin
had been to incline the Prussian government to espouse more warmly
the cause of the King of the Netherlands, a result which, he pointed
out, was inconsistent with the purpose which the Tsar's emissary was
alleged to have in view.[206] Fuller information, however, on that
score was soon forthcoming from Vienna. On February 25, Sir Frederick
Lamb was able to transmit to Lord Palmerston a copy of Orloff's
secret instructions. These contained a clause to the effect that the
Emperor of Russia would not recognize the King of the Belgians, until
he should have been acknowledged by the King of the Netherlands.
Furthermore, the Count was directed to protest against any measures
of coercion, which France and England might decide to adopt against
Holland, and to declare that the Tsar would regard all concessions,
obtained by such means, as null and void. Lastly, whilst in London,
whither he was to proceed when he had completed his task at the Hague,
Orloff was "to assist by all means in his power the endeavours which,
for the past twelve months, Prince Lieven and Count Matuszewic[207]
had been making to prevent a union of the British Cabinet with that of
the Palais Royal."[208]
During his stay at Berlin, Orloff tried to win over the Prussian
government to the Tsar's views upon the Belgian question. But his
attempts were unsuccessful. Ancillon, the chief minister, was greatly
alarmed at the disturbance of the European Concert to which he feared
the Russian policy must lead. Were Austria, Prussia and Russia to
make their ratification of the separation treaty depend upon the
acceptation of its conditions by the King of the Netherlands, the
Powers must necessarily fall into two opposing groups: France and
Great Britain on the one side, and the three Northern Courts on the
other. Rather than help to create so perilous a situation, Prussia
would, with much regret be obliged to "_aller en avant_ _et de
ratifier_." Ancillon seems to have succeeded in extracting from
Orloff a promise that he would for the present, at least, refrain
from communicating the secret clauses of his instructions to the
King of the Netherlands, and to have directed the Prussian minister
at St. Petersburg to endeavour to persuade Nicholas to cancel them.
Metternich, reported Lamb, regarded the matter in the same light as
Ancillon, and was resolved to assimilate his policy to that of the
Court of Berlin. It was presumably for the purpose of thwarting the
Russian plan that a copy of Orloff's secret instructions was placed in
the hands of the British ambassador.[209]
When France and England had ratified the treaty of separation,
Palmerston at once instructed the British representatives at Vienna
and at Berlin to urge the Austrian and Prussian Courts to follow the
example of the western Powers. Metternich, wrote Lamb, eluded the
question, and insisted upon the necessity of waiting to hear the
result of Orloff's mission.[210] At Berlin, Mr. Chad was enjoined
to remind M. Ancillon that the action of the Prussian government in
refusing to ratify was a violation of its promises.[211] In M. Casimir
Périer's opinion, the policy of the absolute Courts was dictated by
the hope that a second rejection of the Reform Bill by the House of
Lords might lead to a change of government in England.[212] In the
meanwhile, Count Orloff had arrived at the Hague on February 20.
At Berlin, he had intimated that under no circumstances would his
stay in Holland be prolonged beyond ten days.[213] Nevertheless, the
period which he had assigned for the duration of his visit was greatly
exceeded. There was reason to believe, however, that communications
had reached him from his Court which, if they did not absolutely
annul, unquestionably modified his instructions and brought them
more into harmony with the views of the constitutional Powers.[214]
Without doubt, the repugnance evinced at Vienna and at Berlin to break
with the London conference was largely responsible for the changed
disposition of Nicholas. But the arrival at St. Petersburg, after
Orloff had left, of the draft of a proposed new treaty of separation,
in which the King of the Netherlands put forward the most absurd
pretensions, would seem to have impressed the Tsar most unfavourably.
He appears to have grown very suspicious that the Dutch Court, acting
under the inspiration of the French legitimists, was striving to
embroil the Great Powers in a war.[215]
Palmerston, under these circumstances, decided to exercise an
increased pressure upon the wavering resolution of the Northern
Courts. The sittings of the conference, he announced, would be
suspended until the signatory Powers of the treaty of separation
should have ratified that agreement. Furthermore, on March 16, Sir
Charles Bagot, the British ambassador, was instructed to protest
against Count Orloff's continued stay at the Hague.[216] The threat
that the London conference would be dissolved appears to have excited
considerable alarm at Berlin.[217] Although the obstinacy of the King
of the Netherlands was proof against all remonstrances, Palmerston's
action, which had the support of the French government, was probably
successful in bringing Orloff's mission to an end. In any case,
on March 22, Verstolk, the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs,
officially informed Nicholas' envoy that the King could not accept
the separation treaty of the twenty-four articles as it existed. No
sooner had he made this statement than Count Orloff at once handed
him the declaration which he had been instructed to deliver. The note
in question was to the effect that, although His Imperial Majesty
would not participate himself in any measures of coercion to force
the King to accept the treaty, he should not oppose those steps which
his allies might resolve to take in order to impose its conditions
upon Holland. Directly they learnt that Orloff had delivered his
declaration, the Austrian and Prussian ministers sent separate notes
to M. Verstolk, notifying the adhesion of their respective Courts to
the course pursued by the Russian Cabinet. Orloff, two days later,
took leave of the King and started for London.[218]
The failure of Orloff's mission deprived the Austrian and Prussian
Cabinets of all reasonable excuse for withholding their assent to the
treaty. Indeed, before the Russian agent had taken his departure from
the Hague, Metternich informed Sir Frederick Lamb that the Austrian
ratification would be forwarded to London without further delay. The
presence of the French in Italy, and the fear that the course upon
which the absolute Courts had embarked would tend to promote a close
alliance between England and France were factors in the situation,
which, in the opinion of the British ambassador, had greatly
influenced Metternich's decision.[219] Accordingly, on April 18, at
the London Foreign Office the Austrian and Prussian plenipotentiaries
exchanged ratifications of the treaty of November 15, 1831, with
the representative of Belgium. The Prussian minister, Bülow, had
been furnished with a discretionary power either to proceed with the
matter or to await the Russian ratification, and he appears to have
yielded to the pressure brought to bear upon him by Palmerston and
Talleyrand.[220] Both the Prussian and Austrian ratifications were
accompanied by reservations with respect to the rights of the Germanic
Confederation in Connection with any cession or exchange of a portion
of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.[221]
It was resolved, as on former occasions, to keep open the protocol
in order that Russia might still be enabled to become a party to
the treaty. Lieven and Matuszewic, the Russian plenipotentiaries,
had authority to ratify, but with reservations respecting three
articles of the treaty which concerned the navigation of the Scheldt,
the construction of a road, and the share of the debt to be borne
by Belgium. But, were a limited ratification of this description
to be accepted, Russia would necessarily be placed in a different
situation as regards Belgium to that occupied by the other contracting
parties. This was a development to which Palmerston was altogether
opposed. On the other hand, he was desirous above all things to avoid
the necessity of excluding Russia from the treaty. The rift in the
European Concert, which such a result would disclose, must encourage
the King of the Netherlands to resist the decisions of the conference
and might endanger the general peace. The representatives of the
Powers, not excepting Orloff, Lieven and Matuszewic were, however,
sincerely anxious to discover a way out of the difficulty. At Brussels
it was contended with some reason that the limited ratification
of Russia might be held to invalidate the treaty as a whole. But
Stockmar, the counsellor of Leopold, pointed out that the existing
governments in France and England considered that their acts of
ratification bound them indissolubly to the treaty. The struggle over
the Reform Bill had, however, entered upon its final stage, and it was
doubtful whether Lord Grey and his colleagues would emerge from it
successfully. Under these circumstances, urged Stockmar, it was well
to remember that both Wellington and Aberdeen had declared that they
should not consider the treaty of the twenty-four articles as binding,
until it should have been ratified by all the signatory Powers. Were
Grey to fall, and were a Tory Cabinet to be formed, Russia very
probably might altogether refuse to ratify.[222]
On May 4 the deliberations of the conference at the Foreign Office
were prolonged far into the night. Talleyrand's powers of persuasion,
Palmerston's determined will and skill in argument were alike directed
to the task of devising some solution of the problem, which all
parties might accept with dignity. The desired result was at last
attained by means of an explanation of the purpose of the Russian
reservation, which was inserted into the protocol. According to this
declaration, the Russian plenipotentiaries asserted that their Court
had no other intention than to leave open the matters contained in the
three articles in question for subsequent settlement by Holland and
Belgium. Under these conditions, Van de Weyer agreed to accept the
Russian ratification with the proviso, which was also to be embodied
into the protocol, that his Court laid claim to the full benefit of
the engagements contracted towards Belgium by the five Powers. That
same night Orloff departed from England.[223] Nicholas had been very
gratified by the flattering welcome which had been accorded to his
favourite in London society.[224] His satisfaction on this point
contributed, doubtless, to the happy termination of the negotiation.
But the statesmanlike conduct of Van de Weyer was, at the time, little
appreciated in political circles in Brussels, where he was censured
for accepting the limited ratification of Russia.[225]