THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
The accession to power of Lord Grey was an event justly calculated
to raise the hopes of those who wished to see more cordial relations
established between France and England. The Whigs had been out of
office during the whole period of the Imperial wars; they had not
been concerned in the territorial settlement at the peace, nor were
they responsible for the measures which had been taken to ensure the
safe custody of Bonaparte after Waterloo. Many prominent members of
the party had avowed their sympathy for France, and, moreover, the
revolution of July had, unquestionably, contributed to the overthrow
of the Tories. Under the new _régime_ in France political power was
to rest with the _bourgeoisie_. It was by the support of the trading
and commercial classes that the Whigs purposed to carry out their
scheme of Parliamentary Reform. Nor were these the only circumstances
which seemed to indicate that the two countries would, in the future,
develop upon parallel lines. Although William IV. had succeeded to
the throne legitimately, whilst a revolution had placed the crown
upon the head of Louis Philippe, and although no two men could be
more different in character, there were, upon the surface, curious
points of resemblance between them. Both were, or were supposed to
be, Liberals, both were simple and unostentatious in their tastes and
habits, both had succeeded sovereigns of reactionary views who had
been rigid observers of courtly ceremony and etiquette.
"England," wrote Talleyrand in a despatch in which he reviewed the
situation created by the change of government, "is the country with
which France should cultivate the most friendly relations. Her
colonial losses have removed a source of rivalry between them. The
Powers still believe in the divine right of kings; France and England
alone no longer subscribe to that doctrine. Both governments have
adopted the principle of non-intervention. Let both declare loudly
that they are resolved to maintain peace, and their voices will not be
raised in vain."[41]
Lord Palmerston, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was in his
forty-sixth year. From 1811 he had continuously held the post of
Secretary-at-War in succeeding Tory administrations until the year
1828, when, with other _Canningites_, he had seceded from the Duke
of Wellington. He was an excellent linguist; indeed, in the opinion
of so competent a critic as Victor Cousin, there were not twenty
Frenchmen who could lay claim to his knowledge of their language.[42]
In the course of a visit which he had paid to Paris, in the year 1829,
Palmerston had made the acquaintance of most of the prominent members
of the Liberal party under the Restoration. From his conversations
with these men, who were now the masters of France, he had carried
away the conviction that they chafed bitterly at the treaties of 1815
and were determined, at the first opportunity, to extend the French
frontiers to the Rhine. General Sébastiani, who, on November 15, had
succeeded Marshal Maison as Minister for Foreign Affairs, had, whilst
in opposition, been one of the loudest advocates of a policy of
expansion.[43] The recollection of his boastful language and of the
aggressive schemes which he had heard him propound was always present
in Palmerston's memory, and was sensibly to influence his conduct of
his first negotiations with the French government.
The general outlook in Europe in the autumn of 1830 augured ill for
the continued maintenance of peace. Great military preparations were
reported to be in progress in Russia. Marshal Diebitsch, the hero
of the recent war with Turkey, was at Berlin upon a mission which,
although it was described, as "wholly extra official,"[44] excited
considerable apprehension in Paris. Insurrectionary movements, the
repercussion of the Revolution of July, had taken place in Saxony
and other States of Northern Germany. Metternich was said "to have
proposed certain armaments to the Diet, wholly out of proportion to
the necessities of the situation." The King of Prussia, although
he was universally credited with a sincere desire for peace, was
suspected, nevertheless, "of preparing quietly for war." The alarm was
not dispelled by the assurances which, in London, Prince Lieven gave
to both Palmerston and Talleyrand that the Russian armament was merely
a measure of precaution necessitated by treaty obligations with the
King of the Netherlands, and that, under no circumstances, would his
Imperial master take action except in combination with the Powers.[45]
On December 1 the French Chamber voted supplies for a considerable
increase of the army.
The suspicion that the three Northern Courts were meditating an
unprovoked attack upon France was unfounded. As Lord Heytesbury
pointed out, the cholera, which had made its appearance in the
Tsar's dominions, threw an insuperable obstacle in the way of
recruiting upon a large scale. Russia indeed, he considered, might
almost be looked upon as _hors de combat_.[46] Nor was Metternich
proposing to begin hostilities against France. "Austria's task,"
he instructed Esterhazy, the ambassador in London, "consists in
suppressing any insurrectionary movement in Italy." But should the
French interpose in favour of the revolutionists, their action must be
resisted vigorously. It was expedient, therefore, for the three great
continental Powers to hold their armies in readiness. "The British
government must be brought to understand that Austria cannot accept
the principle of non-intervention. England, as an insular State, can
adhere to it without danger, but when adopted by France it imperils
the existence of neighbouring Powers. The proclamation of such a
doctrine can be compared only to the complaints of thieves about the
interference of the police."[47] But, although the absolute Courts
were certainly innocent of any desire to provoke a war deliberately,
there were serious elements of danger in the situation. The King of
the Netherlands, without doubt, looked upon the outbreak of a great
European war as the only chance of regaining his Belgian provinces.
Charles X. was once more installed quietly in his old quarters at
Holyrood, but his adherents, the Legitimists, or Carlists, as they
were more usually termed, were convinced that a war must prove fatal
to the new _régime_ in France. Talleyrand suspected that they were in
league with the military party in Paris, and suggested that an agent
should be sent over to London to watch them. He had no complaints to
make about the assistance afforded him by the Home Secretary, who
placed all the information he could obtain about them at his disposal,
but, "in a country in which the police system was so bad, such reports
had little value."[48]
At the Congress of Vienna nearly the whole of those territories, known
as the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, had been constituted into the Kingdom of
Poland and assigned to the Tsar. Under the terms of the treaty, which
was guaranteed by the Five Powers, the crown of the Kingdom was to be
hereditary in the Imperial family of Russia. The Poles, however, were
to be granted a constitution, and were to be allowed to maintain a
national army. These stipulations were duly carried out by Alexander.
But, as the Tsar's Liberalism waned, the first conditions were
considerably modified, and, after the accession of Nicholas, the Poles
appear to have suspected, with perhaps good reason, that the Imperial
Cabinet purposed to abolish gradually all their special privileges.
Suddenly, on November 28, 1830, an insurrection broke out at Warsaw.
The Viceroy, the Grand Duke Constantine, was driven from the town and
several of his generals were murdered. The revolution spread rapidly
through the country, and, after some vain attempts to negotiate a
compromise, the Grand Duke retreated across the frontier with his
Russian troops. On December 5, Chlopicki, a popular Polish general,
who had served with distinction under Bonaparte, was proclaimed
Dictator. Nicholas, whilst collecting his troops to reconquer his
revolted kingdom, declared that the French revolutionary propaganda
and the creation of Lancastrian schools[49] were responsible for the
insurrection.[50]
The rebellion evoked the utmost enthusiasm in Paris. The designation
of "the Frenchmen of the North," which it became the fashion to apply
to the Poles, tickled the national vanity. It was remembered that
they had remained true to Bonaparte in his misfortunes, and that
the unsympathetic treatment which they had experienced at the hands
of the sovereigns at Vienna had been the penalty of their fidelity.
Moreover, it was a natural consequence of their hatred of the treaties
of 1815 that Frenchmen should feel drawn towards those countries
which, like Poland or Italy, had cause for dissatisfaction with the
conditions settled at the Congress of Vienna. Unquestionably this was
the secret of much of that sympathy for "oppressed nationalities"
which, from 1830 onwards, manifested itself so keenly in France. The
war party and other factions hostile to the monarchy encouraged the
popular ferment. Lord Stuart de Rothesay was disposed to think that
Louis Philippe and his ministers regarded the excitement with secret
approval, in the hope that it would distract public attention from
the impending trial of the ex-ministers of Charles X.[51] In addition
to Polignac himself three members of the Cabinet, who had signed the
ordinances of July, had failed to escape abroad. The King, however,
notwithstanding that the populace called furiously for their heads,
was determined to save their lives. This merciful intention he was
enabled to carry out successfully. On December 21 the peers adjudged
them guilty of high treason but, in deference to Louis Philippe's
wishes, sentenced them only to perpetual confinement. Meanwhile
Montalivet, the Minister of the Interior, had personally conducted the
prisoners back to Vincennes, where they were lodged in safety before
the mob, which thronged all the approaches to the Luxembourg, realized
that it had been baulked of its prey. The satisfactory conclusion of
this momentous trial was followed by an event of no less happy augury
for the future. Nettled by a resolution of the Chamber affecting his
position, La Fayette retired from the command of the national guard.
The government accepted his resignation with grave misgivings, but, to
the general surprise, the fickle multitude saw their hero replaced by
Mouton de Lobau with comparative indifference.
But of all the questions which threatened to disturb the peace of
Europe, that of Belgium, by reason of the conflict of national
interests to which it gave rise, was by far the most delicate. It
is not without cause that, for centuries, the Low Countries have
been the chief battle ground of the Powers. Bonaparte is supposed to
have described the possession of Antwerp as "a loaded pistol held
at England's head." Unquestionably, during the great war, England
had had experience of the difficulties of watching the coastline of
Belgium and Holland united to that of France. The lesson had not
been thrown away upon Lords Grey and Palmerston, who were fully
determined to resist, at all costs, the acquisition of any portion
of the Low Countries by a first-class military Power. On the other
hand France had excellent reasons for objecting to the system
under which the Kingdom of the Netherlands had been created, and
the barrier fortresses erected. In the words of General Lamarque,
the chief parliamentary spokesman of the war party, these defences
constituted, within four days' march of Paris, a _tête de pont_ behind
which the armies of a hostile coalition might assemble at leisure.
Moreover, France, in 1815, had been deprived of the fortresses of
Marienburg and Philippeville, both of which had been incorporated
into the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and it was hoped that in any
scheme of re-arrangement these two places would be restored to
her. All supporters of the new monarchy were keenly alive to the
immense satisfaction with which the smallest modification of the
hated treaties of 1815 would be received throughout the country. Men
of moderate views, such as Charles de Rémusat and Guizot, looked
upon "a brilliant diplomatic triumph" or "some acquisition of
territory towards Belgium" as conditions essential to the stability
of the Orleans throne.[52] On the other hand, it was the policy of
Austria, Prussia and Russia, as it was that of Great Britain, to
preserve intact the territorial settlement of 1815 and to resist the
aggrandisement of France. But the attitude of the Northern Courts
was also greatly influenced by the marriages which connected the
King of the Netherlands and the Prince of Orange with the Royal
family of Prussia and the Imperial House of Russia. In addition to
these considerations of relationship the sympathies of the absolute
sovereigns necessarily went out to a monarch struggling with a
rebellion of his subjects, and they could not but be reluctant to
participate in measures tending to legalize a revolution.
The first sitting of the conference of the five Powers upon Belgian
affairs took place at the Foreign Office in London, on November 4,
on which occasion it was decided to impose an armistice upon the
contending parties. According to the protocol, the Dutch and Belgian
armies "were to retire behind the line which, previous to the treaty
of May 30, 1814, separated the possessions of the sovereign prince
of the United Provinces from the territories which have since been
joined to them."[53] No further step of much importance was taken
until December 20, when Talleyrand proposed that the conference
should proclaim the independence of Belgium.[54] After a discussion
of seven hours' duration, the objections of the plenipotentiaries
of the absolute Powers were withdrawn, and the plan was acceded to
unanimously. A month later, on January 20, 1831, the frontiers of
Holland and Belgium were defined, and Belgium was declared neutral
under the guarantee of the Powers. At the sitting of January 27, the
plenipotentiaries apportioned the share of the general debt which each
State would be called upon to bear.[55]
The difficult question of selecting a sovereign for Belgium was
not lost sight of, whilst the delimitation of frontiers had been
proceeding. As early as October 19, Molé informed Lord Stuart
in confidence that M. Gendebien had brought proposals from the
provisional government in Brussels for the enthronement of one of
Louis Philippe's younger sons. But he assured the British ambassador
that, as France was about to confer upon the situation with the other
Powers, the offer would not be entertained for a moment.[56] Again
Talleyrand, on November 7, reported that "a kind of agent of the
provisional government" was in London seeking to ascertain whether the
elevation to the Belgian throne of the Duc de Leuchtenberg, a son of
Eugène de Beauharnais, would be permitted.[57] At first the Powers,
France included, had regarded the enthronement of the Prince of Orange
as the safest solution of the difficulty. But after the bombardment
of the town of Antwerp by the Dutch, at the end of October, he
became very unpopular, and, on November 24, the national congress
at Brussels resolved that all members of the House of Orange-Nassau
should be excluded from the throne.[58] In consequence, possibly,
of this action by the Belgian deputies, Lords Grey and Palmerston
appear to have mentioned the Archduke Charles of Austria to Talleyrand
as a suitable candidate. But he objected, reminding them that his
enthronement would constitute a restoration, which the most famous
of Whigs had once described as "the worst of revolutions." Moreover,
Metternich, who had no desire to extend the influence of Austria in
that direction, soon afterwards declared that the Archduke would
decline the crown, both for himself and for his children, were it to
be offered to him.[59] Talleyrand himself appears to have been the
first to suggest that Leopold of Saxe-Coburg might with advantage be
chosen to rule over the new State.[60] In putting forward this plan
he seems to have been actuated chiefly by a desire to please the
British government, but, for reasons which will be explained later,
his proposal met with very little response. Meanwhile, the language of
Mauguin and Lamarque in the Chamber, and the evident intention of the
military party to object to any settlement which should not admit of
the future union of Belgium with France, were rapidly impelling Louis
Philippe to adopt an attitude of opposition to Great Britain and the
other Powers.[61]
At the first sitting of the conference it had been decided that M.
Bresson, the first secretary of the French embassy in London, and
Mr. Cartwright, who held a similar position at the British embassy
at the Hague, should act as the commissioners of the Powers at
Brussels. Cartwright, however, had soon been recalled in order that
he might assume the duties of British minister at Frankfort, and Lord
Ponsonby had been sent to take his place at Brussels. Ponsonby was
the brother-in-law of Lord Grey and was reputed to be the handsomest
man of his time. There was a story that as a youth he had been set
upon by the mob in the Rue Saint-Honoré, in the early days of the
revolution, and that it was only the protests of the women, that he
was too good-looking to be hanged, which had saved him from "_la
lanterne_." Canning is said to have sent him to Buenos Ayres, in 1826,
upon his first diplomatic mission of importance, in order to please
George IV., whose peace of mind was disturbed by Lady Cunningham's
too evident admiration of him.[62] In Belgium, at this time, the two
chief political parties were the French party, consisting of the
advocates of a union with France, and the Orange party, the members
of which favoured the enthronement of the Prince of Orange. The first
were unquestionably by far the most numerous, but the Orangists, who
were to be found chiefly in business and commercial circles, were not
without power and influence. Bresson, from the first moment of his
arrival at Brussels, appears to have identified himself closely with
the aspirations of the French party, whilst Ponsonby espoused no less
zealously the cause of the Prince of Orange.[63] There was, thus,
keen rivalry and apparently much personal dislike between these two
representatives of the conference.
Louis Philippe would never appear seriously to have entertained
the notion of allowing one of his younger sons to accept the crown
of Belgium, or of consenting to the union of Belgium with France.
Lord Grey had given Talleyrand, who had been directed to sound the
British government upon the subject, clearly to understand that the
enthronement of a French prince would be regarded as a case for
war--a declaration, which, in the words of Sébastiani, "had at least
the merit of frankness."[64] Of all the possible candidates for the
Belgian crown Louis Philippe justly considered the Duc de Leuchtenberg
to be the most undesirable. To have allowed any one connected with the
Bonaparte family to become King of Belgium would have been exceedingly
dangerous to the French monarchy. "There are no personal objections to
him," wrote Sébastiani to Bresson, "but all considerations must give
way before the _raison d'état_."[65] The candidate for whose success
Louis Philippe was in reality most anxious, and whose selection
Sébastiani instructed both Bresson and Talleyrand to advocate
cautiously, was Prince Charles of Naples. This young prince was a
Neapolitan Bourbon, a brother of the Duchesse de Berri and a nephew
of the French queen, Marie Amélie, and Louis Philippe was always as
desirous as any king of the old _régime_ to promote the aggrandizement
of his family. But when Talleyrand mentioned his name to Lord Grey he
was told at once that his connection with the reigning House in France
constituted an insuperable objection,[66] whilst from Brussels Bresson
reported that "the Prince of Naples had no following."[67]
A second attempt, on the part of the provisional government at
Brussels to persuade Louis Philippe to accept the crown for his
son, was made in December 1830. On that occasion M. Van de Weyer
carried the proposal to Paris. British hostility was to be overcome
by the marriage of Nemours, the young prince whom it was proposed
to elevate to the throne, to an English princess, and by the
conversion of Antwerp into a free port and by the destruction of
its fortifications.[68] Louis Philippe declined the offer, but the
already-mentioned instructions sent to Talleyrand to ascertain the
views of the British government upon the subject were probably a
consequence of Van de Weyer's mission. Bresson, however, soon after
he had received Sébastiani's despatch, informing him of the King's
determination to refuse the crown for his son, expressed great
fear lest Leuchtenberg should be selected. His candidature was, he
reported, the result of a Bonapartist intrigue organized in Paris, but
the Belgians were tired of their unsettled condition and were anxious
that a ruler of some kind should be chosen.[69] Some ten days later he
forwarded intelligence of a more precise and of a yet more disquieting
nature. The French party, led by M. Gendebien, in consequence of the
refusal of Nemours, had now definitely adopted Leuchtenberg as their
candidate. Moreover, three notorious Bonapartist generals, Excelmans,
Lallemand and Fabvier, were reported to have arrived at Namur and
Liège. This news was followed the next day by a despatch in which he
complained of Ponsonby's activity on behalf of the Prince of Orange
and, at the same time, accused him of being favourable to the election
of Leuchtenberg.[70]
Louis Philippe was genuinely disquieted by Bresson's news. He was
resolved, he told Lord Granville, who, early in January, had replaced
Lord Stuart de Rothesay at the British embassy, to send the Comte de
Flahaut to London to impress upon the government the keen anxiety
with which he regarded the march of events at Brussels. By existing
treaties, he reminded him, no member of the Bonaparte family was
allowed to live in Belgium, and, in the course of conversation,
he hinted that a Neapolitan prince would be the best king for the
new State.[71] Flahaut was a distinguished general officer of the
empire and was, besides, the admitted father of that half-brother
of Louis Napoleon, who was to acquire celebrity under the name
of the Duc de Morny. During the greater part of the Restoration
period Flahaut had lived in London, where his attractive manners
and charm of conversation had made him a popular member of society.
Moreover, during his residence in England, he had married Miss Mercer
Elphinstone, a great heiress of her day.[72] The mission, upon which
he was now despatched to London, was not confined merely to the
communication to the British government of Louis Philippe's fears
respecting a Bonapartist candidate for the Belgian throne. But, as
his instructions are not to be found among the diplomatic papers of
the period, the exact nature of the proposals he was empowered to
make can only be conjectured. In a private letter to Granville, on
February 8, Palmerston speaks of a suggested offensive and defensive
alliance between France and Great Britain "which was to be kept an
entire secret from all the world," to which proposal he had replied,
"that these alliances are not popular in England, but that if France
were attacked unjustly, England would be found upon her side."[73]
From the despatches of Granville and of Talleyrand it may be inferred
with certainty that some scheme was on foot whereby France was to
acquire a part of Belgium and, in return for her consent to this plan,
England was to have the right of garrisoning Antwerp, which was to be
declared a free port.[74] Talleyrand, whilst favourable to the idea of
converting Antwerp into a Hanseatic town, was very much opposed to the
notion of assisting England to regain a footing upon the continent. It
would be too high a price to pay, he contended, even for so popular a
measure as the extension of the French frontiers into Belgium.[75]
Whilst Flahaut was thus engaged in London, Colonel the Marquis de
Lawoëstine, a former _aide-de-camp_ of Sébastiani and a Belgian of
good family, had been despatched to Brussels. In his case also the
precise object of his errand can only be surmised. It is clear,
however, that M. Juste[76] is mistaken in supposing that he was
sent to urge the national congress to elect the Duc de Nemours. "In
general," wrote Sébastiani to Bresson, when announcing the despatch of
Lawoëstine, "you must say as little as possible about his mission, but
you need make no mystery about it to Lord Ponsonby,"[77] a sentence
which precludes the possibility that his journey to Brussels can have
been connected with the election of a son of Louis Philippe. Without
doubt Lawoëstine was primarily charged to combat the candidature
of Leuchtenberg, but it would seem that he was directed quietly
to oppose Prince Charles of Naples to him. "It will be difficult,"
answered Bresson upon receipt of Sébastiani's despatch, "to keep
secret the object of Lawoëstine's mission. The candidature of Prince
Charles of Naples has been talked about and the factions in Paris are
working against him. Even M. de Mérode[78] is threatening to abandon
Prince Charles and to vote in favour of the Duc de Leuchtenberg."[79]
Lawoëstine, after "seeing all the chief people," appears to have
returned to Paris to lay before the King the urgency of the situation,
whilst the tone of Bresson's despatches, during the next few days,
became yet more alarming. The bust of the Duc de Leuchtenberg, he
reported, had been crowned at the theatre amidst cries of "_Vive
August 1^{er}, Roi des Belges_." Only, he considered, by the
nomination of the Duc de Nemours could Leuchtenberg be combated
effectually.[80] Bresson himself, probably on either January 25
or 26, seems to have paid a hurried visit to Paris. On February 1
the national congress was to proceed to elect a King for Belgium,
and, presumably, he wished to obtain fuller instructions as to the
attitude he was to adopt in the different eventualities which might
arise. By this time the 11th protocol of the London conference, that
of January 20, 1831, defining the boundaries of Holland and Belgium,
had been received by Lord Ponsonby and himself for communication to
the provisional government. The conditions of separation, as laid
down in that document, fell far short of the hopes of the Belgians.
They claimed the districts of Luxemburg and Limburg, but the Powers
assigned these provinces to Holland. The King of the Netherlands was
also Grand Duke of Luxemburg and as such was a member of the Germanic
Confederation. His position had been recognized by the conference
which, in its protocol of December 20, 1830, had formally declared
its incompetence to interfere with territories forming part of the
Confederation, a decision which excited equal dissatisfaction in Paris
and in Brussels. If she could not obtain Luxemburg for herself, France
hoped to see this province withdrawn from the Germanic Confederation
and handed over to Belgium.
On January 29 Bresson reported his return to Brussels, having
performed the journey from the French capital in twenty-five hours.
He would appear to have been empowered by Louis Philippe himself to
assure the members of the national congress that, were Nemours to be
elected, he would be allowed to accept the crown. It is probable,
however, that he was instructed only to resort to this step should
he find it impossible to oppose Leuchtenberg successfully by other
means. It may be inferred that neither Bresson nor Lawoëstine felt
any enthusiasm about the election of a Neapolitan Bourbon, and were
only too anxious to bestir themselves actively on behalf of a French
prince. "Ponsonby supports Leuchtenberg as leading up to the Prince
of Orange," wrote Bresson on the day of his return.[81] "The effect
of Lord Ponsonby's communication to the congress of the protocol of
January 20 has been very great," reported Lawoëstine, who also was
back in Brussels. "The only way of preventing the election of the Duc
de Leuchtenberg is by bringing forward the Duc de Nemours. Even at the
risk of a war with the Powers this course should be adopted. Belgium
would be with us heart and soul, and we should begin the campaign in
possession of the 23 frontier fortresses, all of which are provided
with an immense _matériel_."[82]
On receipt of this news from his agents at Brussels Sébastiani, in
order, presumably, to influence the national congress in favour of
the French candidate, despatched a letter to Bresson the contents
of which were intended for communication to the Belgian deputies.
In this document, dated February 1, Sébastiani stated that France
could not give her consent to the delimitation of frontiers or to
the apportionment of the debt, as laid down in the 11th and 12th
protocols of the London conference, unless these conditions should
be deemed satisfactory by both the States concerned. The French
government, holding that the conference had been convened for
purposes of mediation only, could not allow it to assume a different
character.[83] On February 3 the Duc de Nemours was elected King
of the Belgians, and a deputation started at once for Paris to
communicate the news officially to Louis Philippe.
In the meantime Sébastiani, on February 2, had informed Talleyrand
that, were the Belgians to elect a son of Louis Philippe for their
King, he would decline to accept the crown, but the occasion was to be
utilized for bringing forward the Prince of Naples. He was confident
that, in order to escape from the complications entailed by Nemours'
election, the Powers, at present hostile to the Neapolitan prince,
would look upon his enthronement as a happy alternative. On February 4
he again affirmed the King's intention of declining the crown for his
son, but his despatch of the following day was replete with complaints
of Ponsonby's efforts upon behalf of the Prince of Orange, a course of
conduct which, he declared, would inevitably lead to civil war. Were
serious disturbances to break out in Belgium, France would be driven
to intervene, and it was, therefore, necessary for Lords Grey and
Palmerston to understand that the situation was extremely critical.[84]
Talleyrand, however, was doing all in his power to convince his
government of the disastrous effect which the rumours from Brussels
were having upon public opinion in London. His declaration to the
conference, on February 7, that the King of the French would refuse
the crown of Belgium for his son had made a very good impression,
and it had induced the plenipotentiaries to guarantee that, were
Leuchtenberg to be elected, he would not be acknowledged by their
respective Courts.[85] But, on the same day, he reported that the
Cabinet, after a prolonged sitting, had resolved to declare war upon
France, should the crown of Belgium be accepted by Nemours, and he
begged Sébastiani to reflect most seriously upon the consequences of
a naval conflict. Bresson's behaviour at Brussels, he complained, had
placed him in a very difficult position, and if the King could not
see his way to follow his advice, his continued presence in London
could no longer serve any useful purpose, Montrond, who by his desire
was returning to Paris, would tell the King and his ministers that
in London, at the clubs and in society, the prospects of a war with
France were the chief topic of conversation.[86]
Although Louis Philippe and Sébastiani repeatedly assured Lord
Granville that there was no intention of accepting the crown for
Nemours,[87] it was not until February 17 that the King officially
received the members of the deputation and signified to them his
refusal. The interval, between their arrival in Paris and their
formal interview with Louis Philippe, appears to have been employed
in vain attempts to induce them to pronounce themselves in favour
of the Neapolitan prince. "We have tried to make them see," wrote
Sébastiani to Talleyrand, "the advantages which would accrue to all
parties from the enthronement of Prince Charles of Naples."[88]
But, in the meantime, his letter to Bresson of February 1, in which
he had declared that the French government could not adhere to the
11th and 12th protocols of the conference, had been published in the
Belgian newspapers and had caused Palmerston to instruct Granville to
demand an explanation. The ambassador was to point out that, "when
a government sees fit to disavow the acts of its plenipotentiary,
it should acquaint the parties with whom the engagement has been
made of the fact, not, as in this case, communicate its disavowal to
third parties." Palmerston's despatch concluded with the intimation
that "His Majesty's government had only allowed the conference to
continue because it was convinced that satisfactory explanations would
be forthcoming." Instructions of a like nature were received by the
Russian, the Prussian and the Austrian ambassadors."[89]
Sébastiani, whilst pretending that Bresson had no authority to make
public his letter, maintained that the London conference had no power
to do more than mediate between the contending parties, and that
France "could not be a member of a revised Holy Alliance which was
to decide arbitrarily upon the affairs of nations." Furthermore he
declined to recall M. Bresson from Brussels, unless Lord Ponsonby
were removed at the same time.[90] Fresh instances were soon
forthcoming, however, of Bresson's opposition to the decisions of the
conference of which he was nominally the agent. Since the conclusion
of the armistice between the Belgians and the Dutch, disputes had
been frequent as to the infractions of its conditions. The Dutch,
in violation of the terms imposed by the Powers, held the citadel
of Antwerp and closed the navigation of the Scheldt, whilst, as a
reprisal, the Belgians set up a blockade of Maëstricht. The conference
had, in consequence, instructed its representatives at Brussels to
warn the provisional government that, unless communications were
opened between Maëstricht and the surrounding country, the Federal
Diet would be invited to raise the blockade by force of arms. But
M. Bresson, alleging as a reason for his conduct _des motifs à lui
personnels_, declined to sign the note which Lord Ponsonby duly
presented to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.[91] Lord
Granville was in consequence directed to inform Sébastiani that the
conference could no longer regard M. Bresson as its agent.[92] When
the contents of Palmerston's despatch were read out to him Sébastiani
declared that he should retain him at Brussels as French minister.[93]
This was, however, but an empty threat. Bresson, since Louis
Philippe's refusal to allow his son to be proclaimed King, was most
unpleasantly situated towards the members of the national congress,
to whom he had given the most positive assurances that, were Nemours
to be elected, he would be permitted to accept the crown. It is very
probable that in order to overcome the hesitation of his government he
may deliberately have expressed exaggerated fears about the prospects
of Leuchtenberg's enthronement. The complete subsidence[94] of the
agitation on behalf of the Bonapartist candidate certainly accords ill
with the alarming reports about the strength of the movement in his
favour which he had transmitted to Sébastiani. But it would appear
that when he paid his visit to Paris, at the end of January, he was
himself deceived by Louis Philippe, and that his promises to the
Belgian deputies, that Nemours would accept the crown, were made under
the honest impression that the King's objection had been withdrawn.
"You know the august mouth from which issued my last orders," he
wrote to Sébastiani on February 9. "You heard them. Do not fear,
they shall remain hidden at the bottom of my heart. But I cannot go
back upon my footsteps. I cannot be the agent of another change of
policy. I must ask you to replace me. I can sacrifice my interests,
not my honour."[95] "The painful and difficult situation in which
you are placed," answered Sébastiani, "is well understood here, but
the King does full justice to your conduct and to your zeal for his
service."[96]
On March 6 Bresson formally transmitted to London his resignation of
the post of commissioner to the conference and returned to Paris,
being replaced at Brussels, as the agent of the French government,
by General Belliard. The rapid advancement which awaited him was to
compensate him amply for the loss of this appointment. But it was not
alone from foreign governments that Sébastiani received complaints
about these proceedings at Brussels. Talleyrand expressed the greatest
indignation at the ignorance in which he had been kept of the
instructions sent to Bresson. The whole affair, he pointed out, had
placed him in a false position with Palmerston and the ministers of
the Powers, and had laid him open to the most injurious suspicions.
It must appear either that he was unacquainted with the intentions of
his government, or that he was in league with Bresson to deceive the
conference.[97]
In the meantime, Paris had been the scene of disturbances which were
to change completely the course of French policy. On February 14, the
anniversary of the death of the Duc de Berri, the Carlists decided to
hold a memorial service in the church of Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois.
But the ceremony was interrupted by a mob, which had collected at the
rumour that a portrait of the Duc de Bordeaux[98] had been crowned.
The church and the palace of the archbishop were sacked, and much
valuable and beautiful property was destroyed. The authorities made
only the feeblest attempts to restrain the rioters, and cast the
whole blame for the disorder upon the Carlists.[99] Moreover, as a
concession to the rabble, all crosses were removed from in front of
churches, the bust of Louis XVIII. was destroyed at the Louvre, and
Louis Philippe even sanctioned the erasure of the lilies from his
coat of arms. The indignation with which these despicable signs of
weakness were greeted, soon convinced him, however, that he might
with safety abandon his policy of truckling to the mob. For some time
past, the hopes of all lovers of order had been centred in, Casimir
Périer, as the one man capable of maintaining peace abroad, and of
combating anarchy at home. Negotiations were accordingly begun, and,
on March 14, the _Moniteur_ announced that Laffitte had been replaced
as President of the Council by Casimir Périer, who had, besides,
assumed the duties of Minister of the Interior. With two exceptions
the members of the new Cabinet had all held office in the Laffitte
administration. But so little were the rules of the party system
observed, that they were quite prepared to enter a government, formed
upon principles diametrically opposed to those which had guided the
policy of the former Cabinet. Casimir Périer was pledged to the stern
repression of internal disorder, and to the maintenance of external
peace. In addition, he had asked that the King should be absent from
meetings of the Cabinet--request to which Louis Philippe had given a
grudging and a qualified assent.[100]
The news that M. Casimir Périer had assumed office was received
with feelings of intense relief at the Courts and in the Cabinets
of Europe.[101] The new President of the Council belonged to a
family of high repute in banking and commercial circles. Under the
Restoration he had been an eloquent and much respected member of the
Liberal party. Heinrich Heine, who disliked the French as keenly as
he admired the English statesman, has declared that Casimir Périer
strangely resembled George Canning in personal appearance. In both
he perceived the same expression of "invalidity, over-excitement and
lassitude."[102] Sébastiani's continued retention of the portfolio of
Foreign Affairs was also a subject for congratulation. In spite of his
Corsican excitability, he had, upon the whole, won the confidence of
the ministers with whom he had had business to transact. "The Dips,"
wrote Lady Granville to her sister, "are all pleased that Sébastiani
remains, he is decidedly pacific."[103]
The state of affairs in Europe, at the time of the formation of
Casimir Périer's government, still bore a most disquieting appearance.
At the beginning of February, 1831, General Diebitsch entered Poland
at the head of a strong Russian army, and, on the 25th, there was
fought at Grochov one of the fiercest battles of the century, with
results rather favourable to the Poles. At the same time the Italian
States were in a condition of acute discontent. The Duke of Modena
had been compelled to invoke Austrian assistance against his revolted
subjects, and, on February 5, the _Carbonari_ raised the standard of
rebellion at Bologna. The States of the Pope extended from the Latin
coast across the Campagna to the marches of Ancona, and, spreading out
into the plains of Romagna, were bounded by the Po. In the opinion of
Chateaubriand,[104] who was ambassador at Rome in 1828, one of the
chief defects of the Papal government lay in the fact that "old men
appoint an old man, and he in turn makes none but old men cardinals."
This feature of the Pontifical rule seems to have attracted the
attention of Charles Greville[105] when he visited Rome, in 1830. "The
cardinals," he records, "appear a wretched set of old twaddlers, all
but about three in extreme decrepitude. On seeing them and knowing
that the sovereign is elected by and from them, nobody can wonder
that the country is so miserably governed." But it was the doctrine
that only ecclesiastics could administer a government of divine
appointment which constituted the radical vice of the Papal system.
Cardinals ruled over the four Legations of Romagna--Bologna, Ferrara,
Ravenna and Forli. Generally speaking, their administration was both
bigoted and corrupt. The finances were constantly in a condition of
hopeless confusion--a circumstance hardly to be wondered at, seeing
that a prelate in charge of the Exchequer is said to have refused to
study political economy, because some of the text books were upon
the _Index_. The roads were bad, few in number, and infested with
brigands. Taxation was light, but trade was hampered by customs
barriers. An arbitrary and interfering police system was supplemented
by the Holy Office of the Inquisition, which still repressed heresy
among Roman subjects, although it did not venture to meddle with
foreigners. Lastly, it was estimated that not more than two _per
cent._ of the population attended school.
Bologna was the most flourishing manufacturing town in the dominions
of His Holiness, and Ancona the only port which could boast of a
real trade. Probably it was because of their comparative prosperity
that the people of Romagna were in a chronic state of unrest. The
Pontifical troops, sent to suppress the insurrection, quickly proved
their inability to carry out the task, and His Holiness appealed to
Vienna for assistance. Sébastiani, so soon as he received intelligence
that this request had been made, instructed Marshal Maison to warn
Metternich that France could not consent to the entry of Austrian
troops into the Papal States, and, on February 24, he informed Apponyi
in Paris that, in accordance with its principle of non-intervention,
the French government would regard the passage of the Piedmontese or
Roman frontiers by an Imperial army as a declaration of war.[106]
But Metternich had already sent off the Comte Athanase d'Otrante, a
son of Fouché, the famous regicide and Minister of Police, to Paris,
with documents to prove that the Italian insurrections were fomented
by the Bonapartists. It was always in the power of Austria, he
pointed out significantly, to put an end to the republican agitation
in Italy, Spain, Germany or France, by simply allowing the Duc de
Reichstadt, the heretofore King of Rome, to be proclaimed Emperor
of the French.[107] It was perfectly true that the Bonapartes were
concerned in the Italian revolutionary movement. Both Prince Charles
and his brother Prince Louis Napoleon held commands in the rebel army
at Civita Castellana. Without doubt this was a circumstance calculated
to induce Louis Philippe to exercise the greatest caution. It was
decided, accordingly, to despatch the Comte de Sainte-Aulaire to Rome
to urge upon the Papal government the expediency of withdrawing from
ecclesiastics the administration of the provincial affairs of Romagna,
and of confiding the management of local business to the nobility and
middle classes. Maison was to press the Cabinet of Vienna to join
with France in persuading His Holiness to inaugurate these reforms,
whilst in London Talleyrand was to seek to obtain the co-operation of
the British government. Palmerston, who looked upon the condition of
Italy as a perpetual menace to the peace of Europe, readily consented
to instruct Sir Brooke Taylor, the British Minister at Florence, to
proceed to Rome to take part in the conference.[108] Metternich agreed
with equal alacrity to the French proposals. But it was not his policy
to allow reforms of any kind to be introduced into Italy, and he was
fully resolved that the deliberations should lead to no results of any
consequence. "We risk nothing," he wrote to Apponyi. . . . "Count
Lützow[109] is a man of character, he knows what is practicable."[110]
But the good effect of Metternich's consent to confer with the Powers,
upon the condition of affairs, in the Papal States, was dispelled
by a false report which reached Paris of the conclusion of a treaty
between Austria and His Holiness. This news was followed, on March
18, by the intelligence that an Imperial army had entered Bologna.
War, Sébastiani informed Granville, was now inevitable. Nevertheless,
in the evening, when the ambassador read over to him the account of
their conversation which he proposed to send to London, he suggested
that the words "war was very probable" should be substituted for his
statement that "war was inevitable."[111] For the next fortnight the
situation continued to wear a most critical appearance. At a Cabinet
Council, held on March 28, it was resolved to demand the evacuation
of the Papal States, and to ask the Chambers for a vote of credit, to
enable the King to mobilize the army. Casimir Périer,[112] however,
reassured Lord Granville by telling him that the Austrians would
assuredly have crushed the insurrection in Romagna before Maison's
instructions could reach Vienna, and that the message to the Chambers,
far from being a measure calculated to bring about war, would, on
the contrary, assist the King to preserve peace. Were the government
to appear indifferent to the entry of the Austrians into the Papal
States, the military party would at once raise the cry that ministers
wanted peace at any price. Louis Philippe himself expressed to the
British ambassador the greatest confidence that hostilities would
be avoided. The preservation of the temporal power of the Pope,
he went on to tell him, was a cardinal feature of French policy.
Five or six millions of his subjects professed the Roman Catholic
religion,[113] and he was determined to remain upon good terms with
the head of the Church.[114] The King of Prussia, Lord Granville was
satisfied, was resolved to take no part in the struggle, should the
Austrian intervention in Italy lead to a collision with France.[115]
Heytesbury, on the other hand, reported that Nicholas, although the
cholera was raging in Russia and notwithstanding that he had still
the Polish war upon his hands, had announced his determination "to
bring the whole force of his Empire to the assistance of his Austrian
ally."[116] But Metternich, in the meanwhile, had empowered Apponyi
to declare that no treaty had been concluded, and to support his
statement by the production of a copy of His Holiness' appeal for
help to the Emperor Francis. Moreover, he promised that the Legations
should be evacuated "as soon as they should have been purged of the
_Carbonari_ vermin with which they were infested."[117] In effect the
Austrians experienced little difficulty in dispersing the insurgents
and in restoring a semblance of tranquillity in the disturbed
districts, whilst at Rome His Holiness undertook to initiate certain
reforms, in accordance with the spirit of the proposals which the
western Powers urged him to adopt. By July 17 the complete withdrawal
of the Imperial troops from the territories of the Pope had been
carried out.
The effect of Casimir Périer's assumption of office upon the course
of the Belgian negotiations was soon apparent. Nothing more was
heard of the candidature of Prince Charles of Naples. "As a member of
the elder branch of the Bourbons, France," wrote Sébastiani, "would
reject him with indignation."[118] Under these circumstances the
French government decided to exert its influence in favour of Leopold
of Coburg, although his enthronement, Louis Philippe assured Lord
Granville, would not be well received in France. He will be looked
upon as an English viceroy, but, insinuated the King, the nation
could be reconciled to the choice of this prince, were it possible
to announce that those portions of her northern territory, of which
she had been deprived by the treaties of 1815, were to be restored to
France.[119]
Leopold, the youngest son of Francis Duke of Coburg, was born in
1790. On May 2, 1816, he married the only daughter of George IV., the
Princess Charlotte, who died the following year, five hours after
giving birth to a dead child. As a widower, the Prince continued to
live in England in enjoyment of the pension of £50,000 a year which
Parliament had settled upon him for life. In 1829 he was chosen
by the Powers for the throne of Greece, but, after signifying his
acceptation of the crown, he saw fit to change his mind, alleging
that the frontiers, which the conference purposed to impose upon the
new State, were regarded as unsatisfactory by the Greek nation. There
would appear to have been good reasons for his withdrawal, but it,
nevertheless, caused the greatest annoyance to the Tories who were
then in office. The Whigs, although less bitter against the _Marquis
Peu-à-Peu_, as George IV. nicknamed him, had certainly no very high
opinion of his ability to fill a difficult position.[120] It was
clear, however, that all hope must be abandoned of inducing the
Belgians to accept the Prince of Orange for their King. This Prince
had been spending the winter in London where, according to Greville,
"he made a great fool of himself and destroyed any sympathy there
might have been for his political misfortunes."[121] In the words
of Talleyrand, Palmerston was, in consequence, prepared to accept
"_sans chaleur_,"[122] the candidature of Leopold of Coburg, whilst
maintaining that, before electing their Sovereign, the Belgians must
adhere to the 11th and 12th protocols, which laid down the conditions
under which their country was to be separated from Holland.[123]
On April 17 Talleyrand was in a position to announce to the conference
that France now gave her unqualified assent to the proposed terms of
separation. On this occasion it was resolved, at the suggestion of
the French plenipotentiary, that, should Belgium decline to adhere
to the conditions in question, which the King of the Netherlands had
accepted, all relations should be broken off between the five Powers
and the Belgian authorities. To prove the satisfaction which this
changed attitude on the part of the French government afforded them
the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, Russia and Great Britain
met, and recorded their agreement to the principle of the destruction
of the barrier fortresses, the protocol of this conference of the four
Powers being communicated in confidence to Talleyrand.[124]
The question of the nature of the coercion which should be applied
to the Belgians, should they persist in laying claim to Luxemburg,
was not easy of solution. The Grand Duchy formed part of the Germanic
Confederation, and therefore it should have devolved upon the Federal
Diet to take the steps required for restoring the sovereignty of the
King of the Netherlands. Sébastiani, however, deprecated the idea of
employing German troops for the purpose of enforcing the decisions
of the conference. But on the understanding that both the strength
of the contingent, which was to enter Belgium, and the date on which
the military operations were to begin should be settled by the five
Powers, the French government withdrew its objections.[125] Prince
Leopold, at the same time, informed the members of the deputation,
who had come to London to offer him the crown of Belgium, that he
could not listen to their proposals, until the national congress
should have accepted the conditions of the 11th and 12th protocols.
No persuasion could move him from this resolution which met with the
full approval of the British government. Talleyrand, however, as a
compromise appears to have suggested the plan of proposing to the
King of the Netherlands the cession of the province of Luxemburg,
without the fortress, in return for a pecuniary indemnity.[126]
This solution of the difficulty was considered so practicable by
Lord Ponsonby that, upon his own responsibility, he left Brussels
and journeyed to London to urge its adoption. The conference, in
consequence of his representations, agreed to open negotiations
with the King of the Netherlands for the purchase of Luxemburg and
for "so much of the province of Limburg as would connect Maëstricht
with North Brabant."[127] But when June 1, the date which had been
assigned as that on which the Belgians must signify their agreement
to _les bases de separation_, went by without a favourable answer
having been received from Brussels, the conference withdrew Ponsonby
and decided to resort to measures of coercion. The action of the
national congress, in electing Prince Leopold King of the Belgians on
June 4, had no effect upon the decision of the Powers. "It has been
used," wrote Palmerston, "as a fresh opportunity for putting forward
pretensions to portions of the territory of the King of Holland and
by implication, at least, of repeating their determination to gain
possession of them by force."[128]
But, as the moment approached for setting in motion General Hinüber's
Federal _corps d'armée_, the French government evinced symptoms
of alarm. Sébastiani begged Talleyrand to try by all means in his
power to discover some less objectionable method of terminating
the difficulty. The King and his ministers, he assured him, placed
their entire trust in his wisdom and vast experience.[129] Casimir
Périer impressed upon Lord Granville that he would be powerless to
restrain the army, were the Prussians and the Dutch to attack the
Belgians "ranged under the tricolour." "Sufficient allowance," he
pleaded, "was not made for the weakness of a government sprung from a
revolution."[130] Talleyrand, however, reported that, in spite of his
efforts and of those of Prince Leopold to make the Belgians listen
to reason, they refused obstinately to accept the conditions imposed
upon them. At the Hague there was, he believed, a keen desire to bring
on a general war, whilst the Tsar Nicholas was not sorry that the
attention of the western Powers should be diverted from Poland to the
Low Countries. In England men's minds were concentrated exclusively
upon the Reform Bill, and the knowledge that France and Great Britain
were confronted by grave domestic problems undoubtedly encouraged
the Belgians to defy the conference. Under these circumstances, his
favourite scheme, the partition of the country, appeared to him the
only practicable solution of the question. But on this occasion the
idea of acquiring some part of Belgium offered no attractions to the
French government. "We are disposed to think," answered Sébastiani,
"that any partition would recall that of Poland, and would not be
popular."[131]
The determination of the Powers to impose by force of arms the terms
of the protocols of January 20 and 27 was, however, growing weaker.
In their desire to avoid a general war they agreed to depart from a
decision, which they had once pronounced to be irrevocable. The event
was to prove that by this concession they had sensibly increased the
danger of that armed conflict between the nations, which they were so
anxious to avert. At the sitting of the conference, on June 26, the
plenipotentiaries, "in the interests of the general peace," affixed
their signatures to a protocol of eighteen articles for acceptance
by Holland and Belgium.[132] The altered conditions, although they
did not fulfil all their aspirations, were far more favourable to the
Belgians than the terms of the former _bases de_ _séparation_. The
most important modification consisted in a provision for maintaining
a _status quo_ in Luxemburg, pending the negotiations which were to
be carried out between Belgium, on the one hand, and Holland and
the Germanic Confederation, on the other. Prince Leopold, when the
protocol of the eighteen articles was laid before him, agreed to
accept the crown provided, always, that the national congress could
be brought to assent to the new conditions which it set forth. After
several stormy debates in the assembly this stipulation was complied
with, and on July 11, a deputation arrived in London to conduct the
King to Belgium.
Leopold had been assured that, even should the King of the Netherlands
decline to accept the eighteen articles, the Powers would none the
less recognize him as the Sovereign of Belgium. But, when the refusal
of King William was known in London, the plenipotentiaries of Austria,
Prussia and Russia declared that their respective governments had
decided to withhold their recognition of him. Leopold, however, wisely
determined to adhere to his resolution and to be satisfied with the
acknowledgment of France and Great Britain. Before finally leaving
London he informed Lord Grey of his intention to renounce his English
pension. Claremont was to be kept up and all his debts were to be
paid, but, when these conditions had been fulfilled, his trustees
would pay the balance of his annuity into the English exchequer.
His decision to act in this manner was quickened, without doubt,
by learning that in the House of Lords, Londonderry, an Opposition
peer, purposed to raise the question of his retention of his English
pension.[133]
During the month of July an affair of some delicacy was amicably
settled between the Cabinets of London and Paris. For some time
past the government of M. Périer had been trying to obtain redress
for the indignities to which French subjects, especially those
suspected of affiliation to masonic lodges, were exposed in Portugal.
Palmerston admitted the justice of the French complaints and raised no
objections when it was proposed to send a fleet to Lisbon to demand
satisfaction.[134] On July 8, accordingly, Admiral Roussin forced the
entrance to the Tagus and ranged his squadron within gunshot of the
quays of Lisbon. The Portuguese government, under these circumstances,
was compelled to accede to the demands which the admiral had been
instructed to make, and the French fleet, shortly afterwards,
withdrew, carrying off with it, however, several Portuguese vessels of
war. But, although the affair gave rise to no complications between
England and France, it was seized upon by an embittered Opposition in
London, as an opportunity for denouncing the failure of the government
to protect England's "most ancient ally."[135]
The refusal of the King of the Netherlands to accept the new
conditions of separation, as defined in the protocol of the eighteen
articles, was communicated to the conference by the Dutch minister,
Verstolk. The despatch, dated July 12, 1831, concluded with the menace
that, "were any Prince to accept the crown of Belgium without having
acceded to _les bases de séparation_ as laid down in the protocol of
January 20, he would be regarded as in a state of war with His Majesty
and as his enemy."[136] The representatives of the Powers appear to
have treated these ominous words very lightly. An intimation was
conveyed to the Hague that hostilities must not break out afresh, but
no active measures were taken to prevent a rupture of the peace. It
was soon evident, however, that the King was fully resolved to put
his threat into execution. On August 1, Chassé, the Dutch general
commanding the citadel of Antwerp, denounced the armistice and gave
notice that hostilities would begin on the 4th. Leopold at once
appealed for help to France and England, and then placed himself at
the head of a wing of his army upon the Scheldt. But the retreat of
General Daine, commanding the Belgian division upon the Meuse, who
abandoned his positions without firing a shot, compelled the King to
fall back to Louvain. Here he made his dispositions for withstanding
the Dutch inroad, but, in spite of the gallant example which he set
his men, his army, at the first contact with the enemy, fled in wild
confusion. In the meantime, however, Marshal Gérard had entered
Belgium in command of 50,000 French troops, and, when Leopold was
upon the point of being surrounded, Sir Robert Adair, the British
minister at Brussels, prevailed upon the Prince of Orange to suspend
hostilities. The Dutch, shortly afterwards, began their retreat
closely followed by the French, and, by August 20, the last of the
invaders had evacuated the territory of Belgium.
It had been an easy matter to bring the actual hostilities to a close,
but the Dutch raid had none the less created precisely that situation
which British diplomacy had always striven to avoid. The French were
now in complete possession of Belgium. Palmerston, indeed, strongly
suspected them of having instigated the King of the Netherlands to
break the peace. Sir Richard Bagot, the British ambassador at the
Hague, inclined to the belief that a secret understanding existed
between the Dutch and French governments. "Talleyrand," wrote
Palmerston in a private letter to Granville, "proposed to me some time
ago that we should goad the Dutch on to break the armistice, cry
out shame upon them, fly to the aid of the Belgians, cover Belgium
with troops and settle everything as we choose." "It would seem,"
reported Granville, "that the King of Holland rather expected from the
French government approbation than opposition to his invasion."[137]
It is not improbable that the Cabinet of the Hague may have been
led to believe that a rupture of the armistice would meet with
approval in Paris. But, in order to have furthered French designs,
it should have taken place at an earlier date. Talleyrand's proposal
to Palmerston, it is clear, must have been made in June, when he was
telling Sébastiani that he could devise no other plan for settling
the question of Belgium but that of partition. Once Leopold had been
enthroned, however, he knew full well that no British government
could acquiesce in the appropriation by France of any portion of his
kingdom. The Dutch invasion, which might have served French policy,
had it occurred whilst matters were still unsettled in Belgium, became
simply an embarrassment and a certain cause of discord between France
and England, after Leopold's arrival at Brussels.[138] Talleyrand,
therefore, who regarded the maintenance of cordial relations between
the two countries as an object of far higher importance that any
extension of French frontiers into Belgium, strove by all means in
his power to second the efforts of the British government to bring
the French occupation to a close as speedily as possible. But, whilst
Palmerston attributed to French intrigues the Dutch attack upon
Belgium, he himself was suspected by Stockmar[139] of having known of
the King of Holland's plans and of having connived at the invasion. A
few weeks later, however, when in London upon a confidential mission,
Leopold's trusted counsellor satisfied himself that Palmerston was
wholly innocent of any double dealing in the affair.