THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING
In 1830 England was still suffering acutely from the financial crisis
of five years before. The losses of the capitalists entailed distress
upon the working classes in the shape of unemployment and diminished
wages. The misery of the people led to the commission of acts of
violence and incendiarism upon a scale unparalleled in the recent
history of England. The advocates of parliamentary reform drew their
best arguments, in support of their cause, from the wretched condition
of the country. The elections, rendered necessary by the death of
George IV., began in the very week which saw France in the throes of
her revolution. By the Opposition the victory of the Parisians was
acclaimed enthusiastically as the triumph of a neighbouring people
over despotism and aristocratic privilege. The downfall of Polignac
was celebrated as a crushing blow to Wellington. The belief that the
Duke had connived at, if not directly inspired, the French King's
attempted _coup d'état_, was not confined to ignorant people, but was
professed by the leaders of the Whig party.[12] Whilst this supposed
connection of Wellington with Polignac increased the voting power
of the Opposition, Tory patrons of rotten boroughs, incensed at his
Catholic policy, withheld from him their support. The Duke returned
from the elections with a diminished majority, and one, moreover,
which, such as it was, in no way represented the real opinion of the
country.
Wellington had been chiefly instrumental in effecting the restoration
of the Bourbons after Waterloo. The news of their expulsion could not,
under these circumstances, fail to cause him some personal regret.
But, in addition, he was too well acquainted with French affairs not
to be aware that the triumph of the democratic party was a grave
menace to the peace of Europe. On the other hand, however, far from
being, as was supposed, upon confidential terms with Polignac, the
French expedition to Algiers had strained seriously the official
relations which alone subsisted between them. But any reluctance,
which he and his colleagues might have entertained, to recognizing
the new _régime_ in France, had to give way before the popular
enthusiasm which the revolution called forth throughout England. The
Duke, accordingly, lost no time in advising the King to acknowledge
Louis Philippe. It was a policy, he maintained, which not only
offered the best prospect of preserving peace, but which would meet
with the approval of all the great Powers.[13] Consequently, when
on August 22 General Baudrand arrived in London, bringing with him
a letter from Louis Philippe to William IV., he was accorded a good
reception in ministerial circles. Although he fancied he could detect
a little coldness in Wellington's manner, his mission achieved a
complete success. After a stay of about a week in London he returned
to Paris, taking back with him King William's answer together with a
box ornamented with a portrait of that monarch set in diamonds.[14]
Meanwhile, on August 18, Charles X. and the members of his family
had arrived at Spithead on board _The Great Britain_, the American
vessel chartered by the French government to convey them to England.
The state of public feeling made it inadvisable that they should
proceed to London or even land at Portsmouth, and they were, in
consequence, taken, a few days later, by steamer to Lulworth Castle,
in Dorsetshire, which had been prepared for their reception. The
mob which had cheered exultingly as Castlereagh's body was borne
through the streets to its last resting-place at Westminster Abbey,
which, two years later, was to threaten Wellington with violence on
the anniversary of Waterloo, would have shown scant respect for the
misfortunes of the fallen King.
Ever since the days of her crowning disaster at Wagram, Metternich
had directed the foreign policy of Austria. Clement Wenceslas von
Metternich, Chancellor of the Court and of the State, was descended
from a family of counts of the empire and was born at Coblentz in
1773. His predecessors in office, old Kaunitz, the minister of Maria
Theresa, Thugut, Cobenyl, and Stadion, had in vain attempted to cope
with republican and imperial France. Without doubt, Metternich in
the final struggle with Bonaparte was assisted by circumstances not
of his own creation, nevertheless he unquestionably proved himself,
on many occasions, a crafty, wary adversary, who could await his
opportunity patiently. The flattery which was lavished upon him at the
peace and the prominent part which he was enabled to play in the great
territorial settlement at Vienna stimulated greatly his natural vanity
and presumption. In addition, as he grew older, he began to indulge
more and more in long philosophical disquisitions upon every kind of
political subject. But under his pedantic manner, he retained always
his alert resourcefulness and shrewd common sense. In the words of
Sir Frederick Lamb, who had transacted much business with him, "he was
far too practical a man to regulate his conduct by his doctrines, and
far too ingenious a one to be at a loss for a doctrine to cover his
conduct."[15]
Without doubt, Metternich was a man of aristocratic and conservative
instincts, but, had he been differently disposed, the conditions
of the Empire must have rendered very difficult the adoption of a
Liberal policy. At the Congress of Vienna Austria had renounced all
claim to her former possessions in the Low Countries and in Western
Germany, and had withdrawn to the south and south-east to exercise an
uneasy dominion over Slavs and Italians. Progress on national lines
was hardly possible in an empire thus constituted, and circumstances
contributed to facilitate the imposition of a strictly conservative
system. The Liberal impulse, to which the War of Liberation had given
birth in Prussia, had no counterpart in Austria, nor had Francis
II., like Frederick William III., even in his darkest days, promised
constitutional reforms. At the peace, accordingly, Austria reverted
uncomplainingly to her old absolutist traditions.
In Italy Bonaparte had encouraged deliberately a spirit of
nationality. But the patriotic hopes, which he had raised, were
extinguished at the Congress of Vienna. Italy, Metternich decreed,
was to be henceforward merely "a geographical expression." By the
settlement of 1815 Austria acquired actually the provinces of Lombardy
and Venetia, but her influence extended far beyond these districts.
Austrian princes ruled over the Duchies of Tuscany, Modena and Parma.
Treaties which provided that Piacenza, Commachio and Ferrara should
be garrisoned by Austrian troops gave her military control of the
valley of the Po. Tuscany was forbidden to make either peace or war
without her consent, and the King of Naples was pledged to introduce
no constitutional changes, other than those sanctioned in the Austrian
dominions.
In the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, as it was termed, it was
Metternich's policy to make the Lombards "forget that they were
Italians." The Austrian code of laws was introduced without regard
to native customs and prejudices. The civil service was composed
almost exclusively of Germans, and the most trifling administrative
questions had to be referred to Vienna.[16] The stagnation engendered
by this system could not fail to have a demoralizing effect. At Venice
two-fifths of the population were in receipt of charitable relief,
the middle classes were without enterprise, the aristocracy fawned
upon the Austrians. On the other hand, in Lombardy and Venetia there
were few monks and a comparatively good system of popular education
existed. The people, moreover, enjoyed equality before the law which,
except in political cases, was justly administered. But as in all
Italian States, the police were arbitrary and interfering and the
censorship of the press was enforced rigidly.
The heterogeneous composition of the Austrian Empire, which demanded
a strictly conservative policy at home, prescribed no less urgently
the preservation of peaceful relations abroad. Since the conclusion
of the great war Metternich's foreign policy had had no other object
than the maintenance of the _status quo_, by the strict observation
of existing treaties. The revolutionary spirit was the most serious
danger to the settlement of 1815. Bonaparte might be dead or a
prisoner at St. Helena, but Metternich was under no illusion that
the peril had passed away for ever. The revolutionary monster still
survived and required ceaseless watching. Only, he conceived, by a
European Confederation, ruled over by a council of the Great Powers,
could complete security be obtained against the common enemy of all
established governments. Metternich's combination of the Powers "for
the maintenance of everything lawfully existing,"[17] which has
been held up to execration under the name of the Holy Alliance, was
an adaptation to practical politics of the fantastic scheme, which
Alexander had propounded, on September 26, 1815, after a review of
his army on the plain of Vertus. According to the Tsar's manifesto
the relations of all European sovereigns were in the future to be
guided by the teachings of Christ. They were to regard each other
in the light of brothers and to look upon their subjects as their
children. The policy of Metternich's Holy Alliance was set forth in
the famous preliminary protocol of the conference of Troppau, signed,
on November 19, 1820, by the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Russia, and
Prussia. "States," it was laid down, "which have undergone a change
of government due to a revolution, the results of which affect other
States, shall cease to be members of the European Alliance. If owing
to these alterations immediate danger threaten neighbouring States,
the Powers bind themselves to bring back by force of arms the erring
State into the folds of the Alliance."
Acting upon this principle, Austria, in 1821, invaded the Kingdom
of Naples and abolished the constitution which the _Carbonari_ had
compelled Ferdinand to accept, whilst Bubna, the Austrian general
commanding at Milan, entered Piedmont and suppressed the revolution
which had broken out at Turin. The Tsar, Alexander, during these
operations, held an army upon the Galician frontier ready to march
into Italy, should his assistance be invoked. The same policy, in
1823, dictated the French armed intervention in Spain, when the
constitution, which the Liberals had proclaimed three years before,
was abolished and the absolute rule of King Ferdinand VII. was
restored. But the determination of England "to abstain rigidly from
interference in the affairs of other States" deprived the alliance of
that appearance of complete unanimity which Metternich hoped would
convince the peoples of the futility of attempting revolutions. The
Greek insurrection, the quarrel between Russia and the Porte and the
conflict of national interests to which the Eastern question gave
rise, completed the work of disruption which Castlereagh and Canning
had begun.
Metternich received the news of the revolution in Paris and of
the downfall of Charles X. at Koenigswart, his country seat in
Bohemia. Ever since the termination of the Russo-Turkish war he had
been striving to re-establish the concert of the Powers and, more
especially, to place the relations of Austria and Russia upon their
former friendly footing. Deeply as Austria was interested in all
developments affecting the integrity of Turkey, greatly as Metternich
mistrusted Nicholas' designs upon the Porte, the spread of Liberalism
constituted in his eyes an even graver danger. The Russian government
was intensely conservative and the people were little likely to be
affected by the revolutionary spirit of Western Europe. Were a serious
crisis to arise it was essential that Austria should be in a position
to look to St. Petersburg for support. A visit which Nesselrode, the
Russian Chancellor, paid to Carlsbad, in the summer of 1830, afforded
Metternich an opportunity of sounding him as to the views of his
Court, and it was upon his return from a satisfactory interview with
his old friend that he found awaiting him at Koenigswart the first
intelligence of Charles X.'s violation of the constitution. On August
6, when the complete triumph of the revolutionists in Paris was known
to him, Metternich determined to return at once to Vienna, making
another short stay at Carlsbad upon the way. At this, their second
meeting, both statesmen affixed their signatures to a short document,
which was to acquire a certain celebrity in the chanceries of Europe
under the name of the _chiffon de Carlsbad_. By this agreement the
basis was established of the policy which the absolute Powers were to
adopt towards France. No attempt would be made to interfere with her,
provided that she should abstain from seeking to infringe existing
treaties and from disturbing the internal peace of neighbouring
States.[18]
Soon after Metternich's return to Vienna, on August 26, General
Belliard arrived, bringing with him a letter from Louis Philippe to
the Emperor Francis. Some days were allowed to elapse before he was
admitted to an audience, but in the interval he had two interviews
with Metternich. The Chancellor accepted his assurances that the
King of the French would do all in his power to maintain peace at
home and abroad. At the same time, however, he gave him plainly to
understand that he had no confidence in Louis Philippe's ability to
carry out his intentions. Both the private and the official answers
of the Emperor were coldly expressed, but they contained the definite
assurance that he had no wish to interfere with the domestic affairs
of France, in which country he sincerely desired to see tranquillity
restored. He was determined to abide by treaties, and was gratified
to learn that His Majesty, the King of the French, was animated by
the same resolution. As Metternich, on September 8, placed these
documents in Belliard's hands he took the opportunity of impressing
upon him solemnly that his Imperial master, although he had decided
to acknowledge the sovereignty of Louis Philippe, viewed the events
which had taken place in France with the utmost abhorrence and was
convinced that the new _régime_ could have only a brief existence. In
truth Metternich was full of apprehensions, and, in a private letter
to Nesselrode, unburdened himself of the conviction that "the end of
old Europe was fast approaching."[19]
The Germanic Confederation had been formed with the object of
protecting Germany from external and internal dangers. The
thirty-eight States and the four free cities of which it was composed
were debarred from entering into any alliance with foreign governments
against another member of the Confederation and, in case of need,
were pledged to furnish contingents to the federal army. Austria and
Prussia, however, in order to preserve the independence of their
foreign policy, brought portions only of their territories into the
Confederation, which, in consequence, was not committed to the defence
of Hungary, Gallicia, Lombardy and Venetia, on behalf of Austria, or
to the protection of the Polish provinces of Prussia. Each State was
represented at the federal Diet at Frankfort, which assembly was in
no sense a federal parliament, but resembled rather a conference of
diplomatists, the ministers attending it being strictly bound by the
instructions furnished them by their respective Courts. Austria and
Prussia had only one vote apiece, Austria, however, held the perpetual
presidency.
Prussia in 1815 had been regarded as the champion of Liberalism. The
Constitutionalists, however, soon discovered that the hopes which
they placed in her were not destined to be realized. In the counsels
of Frederick William, the influence of Wittgenstein, the leader of
the reactionary party, and the friend of Metternich, soon superseded
that of Stein, Hardenburg and the heroes of the War of Liberation. The
conditions of the country, it must be admitted, were hardly suitable
to the immediate establishment of representative institutions. The
inhabitants of the nine provinces which, it had been decreed at the
Congress of Vienna, were to constitute the Kingdom of Prussia, were
not agreed as to the form of government under which they desired
to live. Until they had become Prussians, the Poles of the Duchy
of Posen, the Westphaliand, the Saxons, and the Rhinelanders had
existed under different codes of law and of administration. The
imposition of a uniform system upon the kingdom was a matter of urgent
necessity, and it was to administrative measures that the Prussian
government devoted its attention exclusively in the years which
followed Waterloo. It is clear that there was no strong demand for a
constitution among the mass of the people, and Frederick William III.
could listen, in consequence, without much danger, to Metternich's
warning that representative institutions must prove incompatible with
military strength.
Successful as he had been in persuading Frederick William to withhold
a constitution from Prussia, Metternich could not prevent certain
rulers of the minor States from complying with Article XIII. of the
Federal Act, and from establishing representative government within
their dominions. In 1816, the Liberal Duke of Saxe-Weimar granted a
constitution, and his example was followed by the Kings of Bavaria
and of Wurtemburg and the Duke of Baden. A wave of Liberalism swept
over Northern Germany. The universities were affected profoundly by
the new ideas. In their lecture-rooms, professors denounced existing
governments and harangued their pupils in the language of demagogues.
The agitation culminated, on March 23, 1819, in the murder of the
dramatist and publicist Kotzebue, who was said to be in the pay of
Russia, by Karl Sand, a student of Jena University and a lecturer
to the _Burschenschaft_. This crime and an attempt to assassinate
Ibell, the minister of Nassau, gave Metternich the opportunity for
which he had been waiting. In the month of July of this same year he
had an interview with Frederick William at Teplitz, in the course
of which the King promised never to give Prussia a constitution, to
place his confidence only in ministers of the type of Bernstorff and
Wittgenstein, and to sanction such repressive measures as the Austrian
Chancellor might see fit to suggest. After a conference of the
ministers of the different States at Carlsbad, Metternich's decrees
were submitted to the Frankfort Diet, on September 20, 1819, and
adopted forthwith.
Under the provisions of the celebrated _Carlsbad decrees_, the ruler
of every German State was bound to appoint commissioners to regulate
the universities and to impose a censorship upon all newspapers and
matter printed within his dominions. Furthermore, a central tribunal
was established at Mainz to inquire into the doings of the secret
societies, and upon the members of this court was conferred the power
of arresting the subjects of any German sovereign, and of demanding
from any law court the production of documents. These decrees,
however, did not constitute the sum total of Metternich's measures
of precaution. In November, 1819, he convened a council of German
ministers at Vienna, when, under the pretext of defining the functions
of the Diet, sixty-five new articles of a repressive character were
introduced into the Federal Act. The general effect of the _Vienna
resolutions_, as these measures were termed, was to impose upon the
Federation the duty of defending absolutism by force of arms in small
States in which the sovereigns might prove incapable themselves of
maintaining a despotic form of government.
Metternich's manipulation of the Diet was the great triumph of his
home policy. By converting the Federation from a combination of
States into a league of sovereigns against their own subjects, he
averted the danger that it might promote the cause of Liberalism or of
national unity. From this time forward Metternich, to all appearance,
dominated the Court and the Cabinet of Berlin, and held in leading
strings the minor princes of the Confederation. Nevertheless, the
position of Austria as a German Power was weakening steadily. At the
Congress of Vienna he had craftily withdrawn the empire from the
post of danger, and had thrust upon Prussia the task of protecting
the western flank of Germany. To his secret satisfaction, he saw her
pour out her treasure to defend the frontier from which Austria had
recoiled. He believed that by his _Carlsbad decrees_ and his _Vienna
resolutions_ he had rendered national unity impossible, and had
condemned Northern Germany to the political stagnation in which the
empire appeared contented to repose. But the enlightened bureaucratic
system of Prussia was incomparably superior to that of Austria. In
educational matters she was the foremost State in Europe, and already
she was drawing the minor States into her system of internal free
trade--the famous _Zollverein_ which was to prove so important a
factor in the struggle for Prussian hegemony and national unity. Even
in 1830, acute observers could perceive that the people were stifling
within the narrow confines of their duchies, and that, when the day
of Germany's awakening should come, it would be to the Power standing
on guard upon the Rhine that they would look for leadership.[20] But
that hour had not yet struck, and, in the question of the attitude to
be observed towards France, after the Revolution of July, Prussia, as
was her wont, shaped her policy upon that of Austria. The Emperor's
acknowledgment of Louis Philippe carried with it, accordingly,
Frederick William's recognition of the King of the French.
At St. Petersburg it was not until August 19 that any mention of
the Revolution of July was allowed to appear in the newspapers. Two
days earlier a new levy of two men in five hundred had been called
up for service in the army, all Russians had been ordered to leave
France, Frenchmen had been refused admission to Russia, and any
display of the tricolour had been forbidden. But Lord Heytesbury,[21]
the British ambassador, was informed that this increase of military
strength had no reference to French affairs, and that the recall of
Russian subjects from France was a simple measure of precaution.[22]
In the eyes of Nicholas any rising of the people against their
lawful sovereign was necessarily a highly offensive proceeding, and
in this instance it had the additional disadvantage of disturbing
a condition of affairs, the continued duration of which was very
favourable to the national policy of Russia. Under the different
governments of the Restoration an excellent understanding had been
established between the Courts of the Tuileries and of St. Petersburg.
The Eastern question, which had brought Russia to the verge of war
with England and which had interrupted the smooth course of her
relations with Vienna, had, on the contrary, drawn France towards
her. When, in the campaign of the previous year, Constantinople had
appeared to lie at the mercy of General Diebitsch, politicians as
opposed as Chateaubriand and Polignac had been disposed to look upon
the situation complacently, in the hope that the disruption of the
Turkish Empire might lead to a readjustment of the map of Europe,
which might enable France to rectify in her favour the treaties of
1815. Furthermore, since the intervention in Spain, in 1823, there had
been little cordiality between the Cabinets of London and Paris. This
estrangement had been intensified by the French occupation of Algiers,
the one important measure of foreign policy of the last government
of the Restoration. These circumstances rendered it very improbable
that Russia in the near future would have to confront a coalition of
the maritime Powers. But now that a new _régime_ had been set up in
France, the possibility of that dreaded contingency would have to be
seriously considered.
In spite of the Tsar's military preparations, Lord Heytesbury had no
fears that he proposed to attack France. Nicholas informed him that
he had directed his ambassador "to remain in Paris, but to remove
immediately from the house furnished to the Russian embassy by the
government of France." He was constantly to hold himself in readiness
to quit Paris at an hour's notice, and to leave at once, should
the English, the Prussian, the Austrian or the Dutch ambassadors
be compelled to depart. "_En âme et en conscience_ he never would
consider the Duc d'Orléans in any light except that of a usurper."
Nevertheless he had no intention of intervening, unless France were
to attempt to disseminate revolutionary doctrines in other countries
or to carry her arms beyond her frontiers.[23] In due course Baron
Atthalin arrived at St. Petersburg, bringing with him a letter from
Louis Philippe to the Tsar, and, on September 8, was received in
private audience by Nicholas. On this occasion the question of the
acknowledgment of the King of the French was avoided, the Emperor
being resolved to reserve the matter for further consideration. But
at Tsarskoye Selo, a week later, Nicholas, whilst regretting that
the British government should have so hastily decided to recognize
Louis Philippe, gave Lord Heytesbury to understand that his own
acknowledgment of the King of the French would not be deferred much
longer.[24]
In the meantime, an event had occurred which threatened seriously to
aggravate the embarrassments of the situation. The creation of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands occupied a most important place in the
territorial settlement following the overthrow of Bonaparte. British
statesmanship had been largely responsible for the union of Belgium
with Holland, and for the formation of a strong State of secondary
rank which was to act as a barrier against France. Under Wellington's
advice the great Powers, at their own expense, erected a line of
fortresses, connected with Prussian territory upon the left bank of
the Rhine, to protect the southern frontier of the new kingdom. From
a purely military point of view the plan may have been sound, but
to propose to mould the Belgians and the Dutch into a nation was to
treat as of no account the differences of race and of religion which
divided the two peoples. The Belgians soon began to complain that
they were very inadequately represented in all branches of the public
service. Questions relating to education, taxation, and the freedom of
the press increased their discontent. The Dutch, who could look back
proudly upon two centuries of independence, despised them as having
been constantly under the dominion of a foreign Power. In 1830 it was
generally recognized that the attempt to fuse the two peoples into one
nationality had failed. The Belgians, however, still remained loyal
to the House of Nassau and desired only administrative separation
under the reigning dynasty.
The Revolution of July in Paris created an immense excitement at
Brussels. The town was the favourite place of refuge for the political
offenders of all countries. Yet in spite of the prevailing unrest the
authorities neglected to take the most ordinary precautions against
a popular rising. A performance of Scribe's opera, _La Muette de
Portici_, which treats of the insurrection of the Neapolitans against
the Spaniards, furnished the spark which was to cause the explosion.
Serious rioting began on the night of August 25, and continued
throughout the following day. The military commander appears to have
acted with a strange irresolution, and on the 28th, the insurgents
being complete masters of the town, a deputation of notables carried
a respectful address to the Hague praying for the redress of their
grievances. The next three weeks were spent in fruitless attempts
to arrange a compromise. The Prince of Orange, who was personally
popular, visited Brussels, but his efforts to solve the question
met with no success. After the failure of his eldest son's mission
the King consented to dismiss van Maanen, the unpopular governor
of Brussels. But this concession was made too late. Encouraged by
emissaries of the revolutionary clubs in Paris, and emboldened by
the weakness of the government, the advocates of complete separation
pressed their demands with increasing violence. At last the King
ordered Prince Frederick of Orange to advance from the camp of
Vilvorde against the town. On September 23 the attack began. The
troops penetrated into the park, but failed to carry the barricades
which obstructed the streets beyond. After three days' fighting the
Prince abandoned the struggle and withdrew from the neighbourhood
of Brussels. The discomfiture of his army left King William no
alternative but to appeal for assistance to the Powers, whilst at
Brussels a provisional government declared Belgium independent, and
convened a national congress.
This attempt on the part of a neighbouring people to imitate "the
glorious days of July" was exceedingly gratifying to the republicans
and the military democratic party in Paris. Their orators and
journalists loudly declared that the revolt of the Belgians was an
opportunity both for extending the French frontiers, and for effecting
a breach in the treaties of 1815. Louis Philippe, however, was
resolved not to be drawn into an adventure of this kind. He knew that
the powers would never tolerate an invasion of the Low Countries,
and he realized that the French army was in no condition to oppose a
European coalition. Accordingly, as it was not in his power to silence
the cries for intervention or to repress the noisy sympathy for the
Belgians indulged in by a large section of the press, he determined
to give to foreign governments a practical proof of his pacific
intentions by despatching to London, as his ambassador, the aged
statesman who, sixteen years before, had figured so conspicuously at
the Congress of Vienna.
The Prince de Talleyrand was in his seventy-third year.
Notwithstanding the great services which, in 1814, he had rendered to
the cause of Legitimate Sovereignty, the Bourbons of the elder branch
had never been able to forget his conduct under the Republic and the
Empire. At the second Restoration he had been appointed President
of the Council, but had retired before the _Chambre introuvable_
and the Royalist reaction, and neither Louis XVIII. nor Charles X.
had given him a second opportunity of returning to office. Upon the
triumph of the popular party in July, he had promptly placed his
services at the disposal of Louis Philippe. But, in spite of his
Liberal opinions, Talleyrand retained the language, the habits, and
the appearance of a noble of the old _régime_. It might have been
expected that all the King's ingenuity would have been required to
impose so fine a gentleman upon a Cabinet, which counted among its
members the democratic M. Dupont and the elder M. Dupin, famous for
his hobnailed boots and his affectations of middle-class simplicity.
Louis Philippe's ministers, however, were agreed upon the necessity of
preserving the peace, and, when it was proposed at the Council table
that Talleyrand should be sent to London, no opposition was made to
the suggestion. Guizot, who was Minister of the Interior at the time,
supposes that those who disliked the appointment must have stated
their objections to the King in private.[25]
But if Louis Philippe and his ministers were determined to abstain
from any intervention in Belgium, they were bound to insist that
other Powers should adopt the same attitude. It was, therefore,
notified to foreign governments that French policy, in the future,
would be based strictly upon the principle of non-interference in
the domestic affairs of other nations. It was a system to which both
the great parties in England had declared their adherence, and its
adoption by France might, in consequence, be expected to facilitate
the establishment of cordial relations between the two countries.
But the declaration of such a principle could not fail to be highly
displeasing to the absolute Courts. Already movements of troops were
in progress in the Rhine provinces which suggested an intention on
the part of Frederick William of rendering military assistance to
his brother-in-law, the King of the Netherlands. Baron Werther, the
Prussian ambassador, although still without official credentials,
had been instructed to remain in Paris. Molé, Louis Philippe's first
Minister for Foreign Affairs, accordingly arranged to meet him at
a private house, where he gave him clearly to understand that the
entry of a Prussian army into the Low Countries would be regarded
as an act of war directed against France. This threat, which evoked
much indignation in Berlin and at Vienna, was effectual in inducing
King Frederick William III. to renounce any thoughts, which he may
have entertained, of reducing the Belgians to submission by force of
arms.[26]
Talleyrand arrived in London on September 24, and in a despatch,
sent off the next day, expressed his satisfaction at the reception
accorded him.[27] He was accompanied by the Duchesse de Dino, who
officiated as hostess at his table, and presided over his household.
In 1807, at the conclusion of the campaign in Poland, Talleyrand, then
Napoleon's Minister for Foreign Affairs, had obtained for his nephew,
Edmond de Périgord, the hand of Dorothée, the daughter of the last
reigning Duke of Courland. After a few years of married life, however,
husband and wife agreed to live apart, and Madame Edmond from that
time forward took up her residence with Talleyrand. She accompanied
him to Vienna, in 1814, and brought back from the Congress the title
of Duchesse de Dino. In return for the services he had rendered him,
the King of Naples had conferred this dukedom upon Talleyrand, who
had asked that the title might be assumed by his nephew. The duchess'
position in Talleyrand's household was so generally recognized that,
upon their arrival in London, King William IV., at Wellington's
request, allowed her to take rank as an ambassadress.[28] The Comte
Casimir de Montrond, another frequent guest at Valençay, and at the
house in the Rue Saint-Florentin, followed the ambassador to London.
Talleyrand's friendship with this curious individual appears to have
begun under the Directory. In the terrible days which preceded the
downfall of Robespierre, Montrond had been an inmate of the prison
of Saint-Lazare. The fortunate possession of some ready money, a
rare commodity at the time, had, however, enabled him to effect his
escape, and that of the citizeness Franquetot, the heretofore Aimée de
Coigny, Duchesse de Fleury, the heroine of André Chénier's poem.[29]
After this miraculous deliverance, Aimée de Coigny, who under the
emigration laws had divorced the Duc de Fleury, married the man to
whom she owed her life. But, after a brief and most unsatisfactory
experience of matrimony with the gay _incroyable_, she again contrived
to obtain her freedom. Montrond's introduction to London society
appears to date from the year 1812, when, having incurred the grave
displeasure of Bonaparte, he succeeded in eluding the French police
and in reaching England. He seems to have become very rapidly a
well-known and popular member of the fashionable world in London.
During all this period of his life he is believed to have been totally
without regular means of subsistence, and to have existed solely by
play, assisted by an occasional windfall in the shape of employment
upon any secret political work which Talleyrand, when in favour, was
enabled to procure for him. But from the earliest days of the Monarchy
of July his circumstances began to improve. From this time forward he
appears to have drawn a pension of about £1000 _per annum_ from the
secret service funds of the French Foreign Office.[30] This allowance
is said to have been granted him in order that "he should speak well
of Louis Philippe in the London clubs." It was, moreover, strongly
suspected that he had obtained knowledge of certain of the King's
proceedings during the emigration which His Majesty had good reasons
for wishing to keep secret.[31]
The uneasiness aroused in London by the first news of the insurrection
in Brussels developed into serious alarm, when the triumph of the
revolutionists over the Royal troops became known. Wellington openly
declared that it was a "devilish bad business," and many people began
to fear that a great European war was inevitable.[32] The British
government, whilst prepared to accept as an accomplished fact the
complete separation of Belgium from the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
held that no changes must take place of a nature to interfere with the
efficiency of the barrier fortresses, these defences "being necessary
for the security of other States." After drawing up instructions to
this effect for Lord Stuart de Rothesay, Aberdeen intimated that
the government was desirous of conferring upon the situation "in
friendly concert with France and the other Powers."[33] Talleyrand
was of opinion that it was a matter for congratulation that the first
offer of co-operation should have come from England, and strongly
recommended that the proposal should be responded to cordially. An
entirely passive attitude, he wrote, must deprive France "of that
influence which they are disposed to ascribe to her over here."[34]
Meanwhile, in Paris, notices were appearing in the papers calling
upon men to enroll themselves to assist their Belgian brothers. The
_Society of the Friends of the People_ equipped a battalion which
actually set out for the northern frontier. La Fayette was still
the recognized leader of the ultra-Liberals, and his house was a
meeting-place for the _Carbonari_ and the revolutionists of every
country. But he was occupied chiefly in encouraging insurrectionary
movements in Spain and Italy. The union of Belgium with France
was advocated mainly in the ranks of the Bonapartist or military
democratic section of the party. The protestations of Louis Philippe
and Comte Molé were probably true that the government in no way
favoured their designs, and that strict orders had been given to the
prefects to prevent the passage of arms into Belgium. On the other
hand, however, their assertions to Lord Stuart were untrue that
they were innocent of conniving at the proceedings of the Spanish
revolutionists. Broglie and Guizot, both members of the Cabinet,
admit that in order to compel the King of Spain to acknowledge Louis
Philippe, facilities for assembling their followers upon French
territory were accorded to the Spanish insurrectionary leaders.
This rather disingenuous policy appears, without question, to have
contributed materially to the establishment of diplomatic relations
between Paris and Madrid at the end of the month of October.[35]
None of the Powers evinced any intention of responding to the King
of Holland's request for military assistance to subdue the revolted
Belgians. The English proposal that a conference should be held to
consider the situation was generally regarded as the best solution of
the question. "Austria and Prussia," wrote Talleyrand on October 11,
"intend to follow the lead of England with respect to Belgium, and
there can be little doubt that Russia will adopt the same course."[36]
The French government at this time was greatly incensed at the conduct
of the Cabinet of the Hague. No official appeal for help had been
sent to Paris, but in a letter to Louis Philippe the Prince of Orange
openly accused the French authorities of encouraging the disturbances
in Belgium, and suggested that the King should make a public
declaration of his intention not to meddle with the affairs of the Low
Countries. In return, the Prince undertook to use all his influence
with the Tsar in favour of the acknowledgment of the sovereignty of
the King of the French. At a Council of Ministers it was resolved
that Talleyrand should be instructed to bring the affair to the
notice of the British Cabinet, and that Molé should draw up a note
for presentation at the Hague, expressing surprise at the continued
silence observed towards the French government. Two days later,
however, the news was telegraphed from Strasburg that General Atthalin
had passed through the town, bringing with him the Tsar's recognition
of Louis Philippe. But, upon the general's arrival, the satisfaction
caused by this intelligence was diminished by the cold and formal
language of Nicholas's letter, and by his pointed omission to address
the King as "his brother," the designation generally employed by
sovereigns in their communications with each other.[37]
The proposal of the English government that a conference should
be held upon Belgian affairs having been accepted by the
Powers, it remained only to decide upon the town in which the
deliberations should take place. London, where for some time past
the representatives of Russia, France, and Great Britain had been
engaged in settling the frontiers and discussing the future of Greece,
appeared to be the capital in which, by reason of its proximity
to Brussels, the plenipotentiaries could assemble with the least
inconvenience. France alone dissented from this view, and urgently
demanded that the conference should be held in Paris. Aberdeen, when
Talleyrand communicated to him his instructions upon the subject,
would appear to have seen little to object to in the French proposal.
Wellington, however, refused to entertain the suggestion, for a
moment. It was highly important, the Duke contended, that matters
should be settled promptly, and he was confident that he could induce
the ministers attending the conference to agree to the French and
English proposals, provided they were to meet in London. On the other
hand, were Paris to be the scene of their deliberations, they would
insist upon referring every question to their respective Courts.
Talleyrand, who considered that there was much sound reason in the
Duke's contention, was nevertheless directed to reiterate his demand.
But his further representations only evoked the reply that the English
Cabinet regarded Paris as _un terrain trop agité_, and at a subsequent
interview, on October 25, in the presence of the ambassadors of
Austria and Prussia, the Duke assured him that the Powers were
unanimous in opposing the notion of discussing the affairs of the
Low Countries amidst the _tourbillon révolutionaire_ of the French
capital.[38]
In his conversations with Lord Stuart de Rothesay in Paris, Molé,
in order to gain his ends, had recourse to a singular argument.
Talleyrand himself, he explained, constituted the true reason why the
government was desirous that the Belgian conference should not take
place in London. He never would have been accredited to the Court of
St. James' had ministers foreseen how greatly the public would resent
his appointment. To allow him to represent France at a very important
conference would expose the Cabinet to attacks which must prove
fatal to its existence. "This extraordinary reason for objecting to
our proposition," wrote Aberdeen, "does not appear to His Majesty's
government to be entitled to serious consideration." Molé nevertheless
continued to press his point with much warmth, and it was only after
several more interviews with Lord Stuart that he began to talk of
sending a second plenipotentiary to the London conference to be
associated with Talleyrand.[39] This plan, which was probably not put
forward seriously, was certainly never carried into execution. At the
end of October, the Cabinet was reconstructed, and Molé resigned the
portfolio of Foreign Affairs. After his retirement no further allusion
appears to have been made to the alleged inconvenience of Talleyrand's
presence at the London conference. Molé was perhaps jealous of
allowing him to conduct these important negotiations, in which he
probably desired himself to play the chief part. He was a highly
cultivated man, with much charm of manner, and of an ancient family,
and in Imperial days had enjoyed the favour of the Emperor, and had
held important positions. Under the Restoration he had been Minister
of Marine in Richelieu's first administration, and in this capacity
had incurred Louis XVIII.'s displeasure by intriguing against his
favourite the Duc Décazes.
The Cabinet, known as that of August 11th, had never been a united
body. Guizot, Broglie, Molé and Casimir Périer constituted the
Conservative element, whilst Laffitte and Dupont were opposed to all
measures which savoured of resistance to progress upon democratic
lines. The riots of October 17 and 18, in Paris, the mob's protest
against the apparent intention of the government to abolish the
death penalty in political cases, in order to save the lives of the
imprisoned ex-ministers of Charles X., brought matters to a crisis.
Seeing that the King decidedly inclined to the views of Laffitte and
the so-called party of _laissez-aller_ the Conservatives, advising
him to give the policy of their dissenting colleagues a fair trial,
tendered their resignations. Laffitte was accordingly charged with the
task of reconstructing the Cabinet.[40]
On November 2, the day on which the composition of the new French
ministry was published in the _Moniteur_, King William IV. formally
opened the British Parliament. In the Speech from the Throne, the
Belgians were described as "revolted subjects" and the intention was
expressed of repressing sternly disturbances at home. In the House of
Lords, Grey deprecated the employment of such language, and, in reply,
Wellington made his declaration against Reform. A fortnight later,
upon a motion of Sir Henry Parnell for referring the Civil List to a
select committee, the government was placed in a minority. The Duke
thereupon resigned and advised the King to send for Grey. Lord Grey
undertook to form a ministry upon the understanding that he was to
bring forward a measure of Reform.