I have not as yet received a definitive answer from the Count de

Vergennes to my last Memorial and subsequent applications, but I learn

from M. Necker, that the following will be the distribution of what

relates to his department, viz. that two millions will be sent in the

frigate with me, one million on board the Indian, and that it is

besides in agitation to make an arrangement with Spain for assigning a

sum of specie at Vera Cruz, to be transported from thence by a frigate

to be ordered on that service from one of the West India Islands.

I have reason to apprehend an unfavorable answer to my request, that

the military effects from the public arsenals should be granted on

credit. The expense of these articles will make a considerable

deduction from our pecuniary resources. Your Excellency will observe

that the same difficulties exist with respect to these objects, as

with regard to the manufactures of cloth, the great deposits of them

all being situated in the interior country, remote from the sea. The

cargo of the Marquis de Lafayette, that of the Indian, (including the

additional purchases, which I have directed to be made in order to

complete her tonnage) and the supplies collected at Brest, or on their

way thither, will nearly include the most essential articles of the

Board of War's estimate. The purchases in France are made under the

direction of an Intendant in the War Department. Those in Holland are

made by M. de Neufville & Son, whom I employed because they appeared

to possess the confidence of our Minister Plenipotentiary in that

country.

I found great difficulties and delays likely to attend the plan of

casting howitzers of English calibre in France. The scarcity of

materials, the great danger of a want of precision in the proportions,

and the facility with which we cast shells in America, induced me to

substitute six inch howitzers of French calibre, to those demanded by

the Board of War. This size, in the opinion of the most experienced

artillerists, is preferable to the larger, their effects being the

same, and their inferior size rendering them much more manageable, as

well as less expensive of ammunition. A certain number of shells will

accompany the howitzers, but it will be necessary that the Board of

War should give immediate orders for making a larger provision of

them. Their dimensions may be taken from those with the French

artillery under General Rochambeau.

The same reasons as those above mentioned, determined me to substitute

the French twelve-inch mortar to the thirteen inch of English calibre,

as there was no other way of procuring them but by having them cast,

and the same observation is to be made with respect to their shells as

with respect to those of the howitzers. A store-ship, freighted by

government, is to proceed under convoy of the frigate on board which I

shall sail, and will be charged with such supplies as can be collected

in time at Brest.

As soon as I shall have accomplished all that requires my presence

here, which I flatter myself will be in a few days, I shall proceed to

Brest, to do everything that can depend on me for hastening the

departure of the frigate. I shall in the mean time despatch Captain

Jackson, an officer of great intelligence and activity, who

accompanied me from America, with instructions to exert his utmost

efforts to get the Indian to sea without loss of time.[18]

I have the honor to be, with the greatest veneration, &c.

JOHN LAURENS.

FOOTNOTES:

[17] Missing.

[18] For a correspondence on this subject between Dr Franklin and

Captain Jackson, see _Franklin's Correspondence_, Vol. III. pp. 121,

232.

* * * * *

_Memorial from John Laurens to the Director-General of Finance._

The underwritten, special Minister of the United States of North

America, renews his representations to the Director-General of

Finance, upon the necessity of augmenting the present remittance of

pecuniary succors destined for America. He cannot repeat too often,

that upon the quantity and seasonableness of these succors, the fate

of his Majesty's allies must necessarily depend.

He entreats him to recollect, that in the first discussion with regard

to the sum, the difficulties which opposed an immediate remittance,

more proportionate to the urgent necessities of the United States,

were unconnected with reasons of finance. With respect to the

apprehension of exposing ourselves to simultaneous risks that would be

too considerable, which was the principal reason alleged, he thinks

himself warranted in saying, that comparing the sum with the risk, the

strictest laws of prudence would not be violated in shipping the

amount of six millions on board of two frigates, well armed and good

sailors, despatched from ports distant from each other.

The plan of procuring money from Vera Cruz or the Havana, the success

and speedy execution of which were regarded as certain, would have

dispensed government from making any very considerable remittance

from hence at the present moment, but as according to the

Director-General's own account, there is reason to apprehend a delay,

which would render this plan delusive, the underwritten sees no other

remedy, than in augmenting the sums remitted from hence, as far as the

present means of conveyance will authorise, and seconding this first

remittance by a definitive arrangement for having it closely followed

by the remainder.

With regard to the distribution between the two ships, the

underwritten would prefer committing the most considerable portion of

the specie to the frigate in Holland, on account of her very superior

force.

He has the honor to apprize the Director-General, that he has

authorised Mr W. Jackson, Captain of infantry in the service of the

United States, to give receipts for the sum destined to be shipped in

Holland, and that he will himself sign receipts for the sum to be

shipped at Brest.

JOHN LAURENS.

_Paris, April 29th, 1781._

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, May 15th, 1781.

Sir,

Since I had the honor of writing to your Excellency on the 24th ult.

my prospects of pecuniary succor have suffered a very unfavorable

change, first in the suspension and I apprehend the total failure of

the plan of procuring a sum of specie at Vera Cruz, to be transmitted

immediately from thence for the service of the United States. This

arrangement which the Spanish agent at this Court was at first very

desirous of making with M. Necker, and which would have been a

convenience to the finance of this country, was prevented from being

carried into execution by the arrival of intelligence, that the

treasure had been safely transported from Vera Cruz to the Havana; in

consequence of which the agent declined engaging to furnish the money

on any other terms than by a schedule of bill of exchange, payable at

six months' sight. M. Necker has since made him an offer of a profit

on the money to be supplied at the Havana, and the agent has written

to his Court on the subject, but it does not appear to me, that the

offer is likely to be accepted. As soon as I was apprized of this, I

delivered the preceding Memorial to the Director-General of Finance.

In addition to this disappointment we have received notice from

Holland of the total refusal of the Dutch to countenance the proposed

loan of ten millions on account of the United States. M. Necker was of

opinion, that the Dutch would lend more readily on this footing than

to France alone, as there would be a double security; but the event

has proved, that its being a concern of the United States was

sufficient for political reasons to occasion the overthrow of the

business. I have uniformly insisted from the beginning upon the

necessity of securing this aid to the United States from the finances

of France, and while I pleaded the fertility of her resources, and

facility of borrowing in her own name, I have enlarged upon the fatal

consequences to which we should be exposed by referring the matter to

an uncertain and dilatory operation. I apprehend some new efforts are

making on the subject of the loan. His Majesty in the mean time

engages to supply the failure of the loan from the finances of his

kingdom. The future transmissions of specie are to be concerted

between the Minister of Marine and the Director-General of Finance,

and Count de Vergennes has promised me to urge them upon the subject.

I have not been able to obtain any greater augmentation of the sums

destined to be embarked at Brest and in Holland, than half a million

at the first, and nearly the same sum at the latter.

With respect to the maritime succors so repeatedly solicited, I am

authorised only in general terms to assure Congress, that such

dispositions are made for detaching from the West Indies, as give

every reason to hope a naval superiority will exist on the part of the

allies in America; that the fleet will probably remain on that station

three months, and that it will be time on my arrival to commence the

most vigorous preparations for co-operating with it.

Immediately on closing this packet, I shall set out for Brest, and use

my utmost efforts to accelerate our sailing. My frigate is ready in

the roads. If any delay arises it will be owing to the store ship,

which she will have under convoy.

I have the honor to be, with the greatest respect,

JOHN LAURENS.

_P. S._ Those despatches will be delivered to your Excellency by

Captain Jackson of the first South Carolina regiment, whose zeal for

the service made him cheerfully undertake the journey to Holland, for

the purpose of accelerating the departure of the Indian, and to whom I

am much indebted for his assistance in this country.

J. L.

* * * * *

COUNT DE VERGENNES TO JOHN LAURENS.

Translation.

Versailles, May 16th, 1781.

Congress has directed Mr Laurens to solicit from the King an aid of

money, and to request his guarantee for a loan. In consequence his

Majesty has been pleased to grant six millions tournois,[19] in form

of a gift, and he has likewise agreed to be security for a loan of ten

millions, to be opened in Holland, for account of Congress; and if

that loan should meet with difficulties, he has even resolved to

supply it out of his own finances, as soon as possible. The six

millions, which his Majesty has granted, have been employed in the

following manner; two million five hundred thousand livres are sent to

Brest, there to be shipped; one million five hundred thousand are sent

to Amsterdam, to be likewise shipped there; about two millions are to

be employed in payment for the goods, which Mr Laurens was directed to

purchase. Besides the sum above mentioned, his Majesty has been

pleased to grant Dr Franklin four millions to discharge the bills of

exchange drawn on him by Congress. In case the loan, which is to be

opened in Holland on account of the Americans, should fail of success,

his Majesty will be under the necessity of supplying it. It is

understood, that the United States shall repay his Majesty the sum of

ten millions, in order to fulfil the engagements, that shall be

entered into in Holland.

The operations of the campaign, of which his Majesty has given a plan

to the commander of his fleet in America, form the second object, in

which the United States are interested; and without being able to fix

the attention of Congress or General Washington upon the moment when

his fleet shall appear on the coast of North America, he assures them,

that the success of their armies makes a principal part of his views

for the ensuing campaign. It is therefore proper, that, upon the

arrival of Colonel Laurens, the United States should put themselves in

condition to take advantage of the operations of his fleet in America.

DE VERGENNES.

FOOTNOTES:

[19] These six millions were not obtained "in consequence" of Colonel

Laurens's solicitation, but were granted to Dr Franklin, before

Colonel Laurens's arrival. See _Franklin's Correspondence_, Vol. III.

p. 230, and also Colonel Laurens's letter above, dated March

20th;--also the following letter of September 2d.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Philadelphia, September 2d, 1781.

Sir,

Happy in this opportunity of renewing the assurances of my inviolable

duty and attachment to the United States, in Congress assembled, I

have the honor of submitting to them a supplementary report of the

negotiation, with which they were pleased to intrust me, by their

commission of the 23d of December, 1780.

Previous to my arrival in France, the letter from Congress of the 22d

of December to his Most Christian Majesty had been delivered, and the

application for succors supported by our Minister Plenipotentiary, the

result of which was a gratuitous donation from the King of France of

six millions of livres, to be drawn for by General Washington at

distant periods, and an offer to provide clothing and other supplies

for the army, the expense to be deducted from the donation above

mentioned. The disproportion between this and the necessities of the

United States upon which their demand was founded, as well as the

exceptionable manner of touching the money, determined me without

delay to renew the negotiation, in which I had the concurrence of our

Minister Plenipotentiary, and the advantage of his counsels.

After my first interview with the Count de Vergennes, I presented, in

form of a memorial, a copy of which has been transmitted to Congress,

an extract of a letter from General Washington, written in consequence

of my conference with him by order of Congress, making such small

additions as were suggested by the state of the business. The

advantage of the General's credit in Europe made me prefer his letter

to any common form of memorial, especially as he had treated the

principal objects of my mission in a manner no less full and explicit

than conformable to the ideas of Congress.

I accompanied it with the estimate of the Board of War, after making a

deduction of many articles, the demand of which I apprehended would

throw an unfavorable cast on the whole business. A translated

duplicate of the complete estimate had been long since delivered by Dr

Franklin. The Count de Vergennes exclaimed vehemently against the

exorbitance of the demand, to which the strength of our army was so

disproportioned, adding, that duplicate cargoes of such value could

not be afforded, and that the articles demanded would exhaust all our

money; for he refused to understand as I did, the intention of

Congress to solicit the supplies in addition to the loan.

Argument and expostulation on this subject were fruitless. In

pursuance of his definitive request, I formed a reduced list

accompanied by a letter, a copy of which has been transmitted. An

allowance was made for the Lafayette's cargo, as well as a very

imperfect sketch of it could enable me. This list was immediately

referred to the War Department. In all my interviews with the

Ministers, I endeavored to represent in their strongest light the

following important articles. That notwithstanding the unalterable

determination of the United States to support their independence,

notwithstanding the virtue and firmness of the citizens in general,

the immense pecuniary resources of Great Britain, and her constant

naval superiority were advantages too decisive to be counterbalanced

by any interior exertions on the part of the United States. That these

must infallibly impose a term to the efforts of a nation, whose

extended maritime and inland frontier rendered her obnoxious to sudden

descents and incursions on all sides; whose army was consequently

exposed to excessive marches, attended with insupportable expense of

money and waste of soldiers, that the exhausted state of their

finances reduced Congress to the impossibility of calling the natural

resources of the country into activity; that the aggravated calamities

of a war, which in its principles had been precautionary, began now to

produce dangerous uneasinesses and discontents; that we had concealed

enemies to contend against; that the British left no measures

unattempted either of open force or secret intrigue; and finally,

unless instant succor were afforded as solicited by Congress, that

France was in danger of losing all the fruits of the part she had

hitherto taken in the contest; that if instead of being actuated by a

generous and enlightened policy, the Court of France had

systematically protracted the war, in order that Britain and America

might mutually exhaust themselves, while she had reserved her power to

decide only in the last extremity, this period with respect to America

had arrived; that the importance of the objects of the war on one

hand, and the mischiefs of suffering Great Britain to re-annex to

herself the resources of America, demanded the greatest exertions;

that the honor of the King, as well as the national interest, was

engaged, and that, considering the flourishing state of the French

marine and finances, the succor solicited was as easy as, considering

our situation, it was indispensable.

I endeavored, above all, to hasten their determinations. The general

language held by the Ministry was, that the demands of Congress were

excessive; that to induce succor from their ally, there should be

greater exertions on the part of the United States; that the King had

the greatest good will towards them, but that the expenditures of the

war were immense; the necessity of supporting a maritime war in

different quarters, and the indispensable defence of his own colonies,

limited his power of giving assistance; that the public credit of

France, however good, had its limits, which it were dangerous to

exceed; that the administration of the American finances was not

calculated to inspire confidence; that a dangerous wound had been

given to our public credit by the resolution of the 18th of March,

1780, a measure, which, however judicious it might have been in time

of peace, was exceedingly pernicious in time of war; that the

application of Congress was tardy, and by its suddenness excluded

expedients which might otherwise have been employed for our relief;

that with regard to the national interest and honor, France had been a

great kingdom, and the King a powerful monarch, when America was

composed of feeble colonies.

To this kind of discourse I answered, by enlarging on the natural and

political disadvantages of America in the present contest, the fertile

resources of the British, their power and activity; the impossibility

of our supporting a paper credit without a foundation of specie,

adding, that the continental currency must have died a natural death

if it had not been checked at a late stage of depreciation, by the act

of Congress in question; that persons, who had clamored most on this

subject, had been instrumental in hastening the discredit of our

paper, by various commercial speculations, but that the downfall of

the currency must be attributed principally to a want of funds for its

support; for this object Congress were renewing their application in

the most pressing terms; that the King of France's glory could not but

suffer if the British triumphed in the present dispute, as his

consideration in Europe would be lessened by it; that his interests

besides, and those of his kingdom, would certainly be deeply wounded

by a re-accession of America to Great Britain, and that the same fleet

and army, which should prove decisive there, would be at hand to

possess themselves of the French islands.

The Marquis de Castries, Minister for the Marine Department, being

absent, and a vacation produced some delay, I waited on this Minister

immediately on his return to Court, and observed to him that the most

important decisions relative to the common cause of France and America

had been suspended on account of his absence; urged him particularly

on the great point of a naval superiority, reminding him, that the

British Marine was the principal instrument of their power; that the

efforts of the allies to reduce this force could nowhere be made with

such a prospect of success as on the American coast; that it would be

very easy after a decisive campaign in America, in which his personal

glory was so much interested, to transport a sufficient force from the

continent to reduce any British island; that in the mean time the

French islands would be in the most perfect security. He repeated

nearly what he had said at our first interview, with stronger

assurances of his prospect of a naval superiority the ensuing

campaign.

In a word I used every argument of national interest, and added such

personal motives as I thought applicable to the different Ministers.

On the 8th of April Count de Vergennes communicated to me his Most

Christian Majesty's determination to become security for a loan of ten

millions of livres, to be opened on account of the United States in

Holland; that he had immediately despatched a courier extraordinary to

M. de la Vauguyon with a letter relative to this business; that I had

reason to be satisfied with this in addition to the donation of six

millions, and four millions that had been appropriated to the payment

of bills drawn on Mr Franklin. I pressed him by many arguments to

leave an opening for the remaining five millions; exposed the false

policy of incomplete succors; observed that Congress had solicited no

more than was necessary; that there should be no other limits to the

present succor than the invincible bounds of possibility; that it was

not the condition on which the money was obtained, but the sum and

opportuneness of remitting it, that were above all important; that in

this point of view I would prefer converting the donation into a loan,

if it would make the advance more convenient to the French finances,

and facilitate the augmentation of the total sum, destined for the

United States. I repeated the same thing to the Director-General of

Finance, but their answer was, the King had passed his word and could

not retract.

I entreated both M. de Vergennes and M. Necker not to abandon the

United States to the operation of a loan, but to secure us from the

finances of France the sum in question, and above all, to make

immediate arrangements for the remittance of it.

In the mean time I pressed the Minister of Marine on the subject of

ships, but I found that it was far from the intention of the Court to

furnish the means for remitting any considerable sum immediately.

Count de Vergennes urged the imprudence of exposing such precious

succors to a simultaneous risk, and the necessity of dividing the

danger by successive remittances, adding besides, that as permission

had been given to draw, an allowance was to be made on this account,

and a provisional sum for payment retained; that pursuant to those

ideas it had been solemnly determined to send no more than two

millions in a frigate with me. I observed, that the first difficulty

would be obviated by proportioning the escort to the value of the

specie; with regard to the other objection, I gave it as my opinion,

that no bills would be drawn in consequence of the mode for touching

the donation of six millions. The Count said, that I was not

sufficiently impressed with what had been already done on our account,

and appealed to our Minister Plenipotentiary. In addition to the

warmest verbal remonstrances on the subject, I presented the Memorial,

a copy of which was forwarded to Congress.

The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 09 · 第 17 / 36 段