war, there is danger to apprehend, that evils actually felt in
prosecuting it may weaken the cause which began it, evils founded not
on immediate sufferings, but on a speculative apprehension of future
sufferings from the loss of their liberties; there is danger that a
commercial and free people, little accustomed to heavy burthens,
pressed by impositions of a new and odious kind, may not make a proper
allowance for the necessity of the conjuncture, and may imagine they
have only exchanged one tyranny for another.
"8. That from all the foregoing considerations result, 1st, the
absolute necessity of an immediate, ample, and efficacious succor of
money, large enough to be a foundation for substantial arrangements of
finance to revive public credit, and give vigor to future operations.
2dly, the vast importance of a decided effort of the allied arms on
this continent the ensuing campaign, to effectuate once for all the
great object of the alliance, the liberty and independence of these
United States. Without the former, we may make a feeble and expiring
effort the next campaign, in all probability the period to our
opposition; with it we should be in a condition to continue the war as
long as the obstinacy of the enemy might require. The first is
essential; both combined, would bring the contest to a glorious issue,
crown the obligations which America already feels to the magnanimity
and generosity of her ally, and render the union perpetual by all the
ties of gratitude and affection, as well as mutual interest, which
alone render it solid and indissoluble.
"9. That next to a loan of money, a constant naval superiority is the
most interesting; this would instantly reduce the enemy to a
difficult, defensive war, and by removing all prospects of extending
their acquisitions, would take away the motives for prosecuting it.
Indeed, it is not to be conceived, how they could subsist a large
force in this country if we had the command of the seas to interrupt
the regular transmission of supplies from Europe. This superiority,
with an aid of money, would enable us to convert the contest into a
vigorous offensive war. I say nothing of the advantages to the trade
of both nations, nor how much it would facilitate our supplies. With
respect to us, it seems to be one of two deciding points, and it
appears to be the interest of our allies, abstracted from the
immediate benefits to this country, to transfer the naval war to
America. The number of ports friendly to them and hostile to the
British, the materials for repairing their disabled ships, the
extensive supplies towards the subsistence of their fleet, are
circumstances which would give them a palpable advantage in the
contest of the sea. No nation will have it more in its power to repay
what it borrows than this. Our debts are hitherto small. The vast and
valuable tracts of unlocated lands, the variety and fertility of
climates and soils, the advantages of every kind, which we possess for
commerce, insure to this country a rapid advancement in population and
prosperity, and a certainty (its independence being established) of
redeeming in a short term of years the comparatively inconsiderable
debts, it may have occasion to contract. Notwithstanding the
difficulties under which we labor, and the inquietudes among the
people, there is still a fund of inclination and resource in the
country equal to great and continued exertions, provided we have it in
our power to stop the progress of disgust, by changing the present
system, and adopting another more consonant with the spirit of the
nation, and more capable of activity and energy in measures of which a
powerful succor of money must be the basis.
"The people are discontented, but it is with the feeble, oppressive
mode of conducting the war, not with the war itself; they are not
unwilling to contribute to its support, but they are unwilling to do
it in a way that renders private property precarious, a necessary
consequence of the fluctuation of the national currency, and of the
inability of government to perform its engagements oftentimes
coercively made. A large majority are still firmly attached to the
independence of these States, abhor a re-union with Great Britain, and
are affectionate to the alliance with France. But this disposition can
ill supply the means customary and essential in war, nor can we rely
on its duration amidst the perplexities, oppressions, and misfortunes,
that attend the want of them."
From those extracts it will appear to your Excellency, that the fate
of America depends upon the immediate and decisive succor of her
august ally, in the two points of a specific loan and a naval
superiority. The most accurate calculation of the expense requisite
for a vigorous campaign, and the interior means which Congress have of
defraying that expense, prove that there is a deficiency of the full
sum solicited by Congress. The grant of six millions, which his
Majesty is pleased to make under the title of a donation to the United
States, will be acknowledged with the liveliest emotions of gratitude
by affectionate allies, at the same time it would be frustrating the
gracious intentions of his Majesty towards his allies, and betraying
the common cause of France and America, to encourage a belief, that
the above mentioned aid will enable the United States to surmount the
present perilous juncture of our affairs. The reasoning in the
foregoing extracts will evince how inadequate the sum is to the
present exigency.
I must likewise remark to your Excellency, that the credit in bills of
exchange is subject to difficulties and disadvantages, which render
such a resource very unfit for the conduct of the war. Bills are
obnoxious to the vicissitudes and speculations of commerce, and it is
easy to foresee, that his Majesty's allies would be great sufferers by
their drafts, and at the same time be incapable of giving that vigor
and energy to their operations, which would be derived from specie.
The same enlightened policy and generous regard for the rights of
mankind, which prompted France to espouse the cause of America, still
dictate the conduct which she is to pursue; they demand every effort
on her part to prevent America from being reduced to the British
domination, her commerce, and those sources of wealth being restored
to the tyrant of the European seas, the ancient rival of France; but
on the contrary, the abasement of this rival, and the establishment of
a faithful ally, united by all the ties of gratitude, affection, and
the most permanent mutual interests. To those invaluable purposes give
me leave to repeat to your Excellency, that the decisive measures in
the foregoing extracts are necessary.
I submit to your Excellency, whether the objection to his Majesty's
favoring a loan in the name of Congress, may not be obviated by an
additional loan in the name of his Majesty, on account of the United
States, for which Congress will be accountable. The excellent state of
the finances of this kingdom, the exalted state of public credit, must
unquestionably give the greatest facility for this purpose, and it may
be clearly proved, that giving decisive succor in this article at the
present juncture will be infinitely more advantageous, than suffering
the war to languish, by affording partial and inadequate assistance.
Supposing that fortunate casualties, at this time very improbable,
should enable us to continue the war upon its present footing, I beg
leave to repeat to your Excellency, that the greatest promptness in
this business is essential. The British, by being in possession of two
States, fertile in grain, timber, and naval stores, have acquired new
animation, and fresh resources for the war, and every day, according
to present appearances, brings America nearer to the period of her
efforts.
JOHN LAURENS.
* * * * *
_Questions proposed to Colonel Laurens; with his Answers to them._
Paris, March 29th, 1781.
"1st. To what number can the United States increase their continental
troops?
"2dly. What will be the expense of the number fixed?
"3dly. This expense is to be distinguished into pay and appointments,
clothing, arms, ammunition, and provision.
"4thly. What does the artillery of the United States consist of, and
what is the number of carriages?
"5thly. What is the number of provision wagons?
"6thly. What are the plans of General Washington, in case his army
should amount to fifteen, twelve, or ten thousand men, independently
of the French troops?"
After answering the foregoing questions generally, both with respect
to the northern and southern army, I added the following remarks.
The plans of General Washington are absolutely subordinate to the
succors, which his Most Christian Majesty will be pleased to grant to
his allies. If Congress obtain the succor in money and military
effects, and the naval superiority which they solicit, they will be
enabled to revive public credit, to make solid arrangements of
finance, to give activity to the resources of the country, to augment
their troops, to appease their discontents, and to reinforce General
Washington with a select corps of ten thousand militia.
With the addition of this force and the French troops, the General
will be in condition to undertake the siege of New York. It is
unnecessary to say how glorious and decisive the success of this
operation would be for the common cause; it is equally unnecessary to
add, how much the promptness of succor from France would contribute to
it.
The expense of artillery required for this operation will be found in
the estimate delivered; that of clothing, &c. for the army in its
present state, will be found in deducting a quantity proportioned to
the number of men; but it is impossible to represent too strongly,
that this excess far from being superfluous, is absolutely necessary
to recruit the army in general; a precaution which is indispensable,
unless we should choose to hazard all upon the event of a single
operation. That the Congress besides, owes great arrearages of
clothing to the soldiers, and that as the estimate of Indian presents
has not been included in the present demand, we may be obliged perhaps
to sacrifice a part of the clothing now solicited, to maintain the
friendship of some of the tribes attached to France and America, and
that it is of the greatest importance to prevent them from joining the
hostile tribes, who in conjunction with the English tories ravage the
country, destroy our harvests, put to flight and massacre all the
inhabitants on the western frontier, from New York to Virginia. We may
more especially expect, that this diversion will be employed during
the siege of New York. It is to be added, that a number of men will be
found who have already served, who would eagerly rejoin their ancient
standards, provided they had the assurance of proper treatment,
instead of the misery and sufferings which they have hitherto
experienced. That the army would be augmented, notwithstanding the
daily loss in the trenches, by levies perfectly accustomed to fire.
The extreme weakness of the southern army is attributable to the
following causes.
1st. That two of the States that furnish quotas to this army are
invaded by the British.
2dly. That they have all a great many prisoners in the hands of the
enemy, and that their troops in general have been wasted, as well by
the excessive marches, which they have undergone in carrying succors
to the southward, as by the different misfortunes which have happened
there.
The naval superiority of the British, and the rapidity of their
movements by sea, secured to them the capture of Charleston, and all
their southern successes; enjoying the advantages they have had in
their power, to transport a body of troops, with all requisites in
ammunition and provision, from one end of the continent to the other
in fourteen days, to attack a feeble point; while the American
succors, wasted by a march of two months, commenced in the rigors of
winter, and without intermission from the fatigues of a campaign,
could only arrive to increase the public calamity, by being beat in
detail.
JOHN LAURENS.
* * * * *
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Versailles, April 9th, 1781.
Sir,
Since I had the honor of writing to your Excellency, on the 23d
ultimo, I have employed the most unremitting efforts to obtain a
prompt and favorable decision relative to the objects of my mission.
After many difficulties and delays, with the details of which it is
needless to trouble Congress, the Count de Vergennes communicated to
me yesterday his Most Christian Majesty's determination to guaranty a
loan of ten millions, to be opened in Holland, in addition to the six
millions granted as a gratuitous gift, and the four millions
appropriated for the payment of bills of exchange drawn by Congress on
their Minister Plenipotentiary. The purchase money of the clothing,
which must be an affair of private contract, and the value of the
military effects which may be furnished from the royal arsenals, are
to be deducted from the six millions.
I shall use my utmost endeavors to procure an immediate advance of the
ten millions from the treasury of France, to be replaced by the
proposed loan, and shall renew my solicitations for the supplies of
ordinance and military stores on credit, that the present of six
millions may not be absorbed by those objects, and the purchase of
necessary clothing. The providing this article I fear will be attended
with great difficulties and delays, as all the woollen manufactories
of France are remote from the sea, and there are no public magazines
of cloth suitable to our purposes. The cargo of the Marquis de
Lafayette will I hope arrive safe under the convoy of the Alliance;
and by satisfying our immediate necessities prevent the delays above
mentioned from having any disagreeable consequences.
The Marquis de Castries has engaged to make immediate arrangements for
the safe transportation of the pecuniary and other succors destined
for the United States, and has repeatedly assured me, that the naval
superiority will be established on the American coast the ensuing
campaign. The French fleet, he informs me, was on the 27th ultimo
sixty leagues west of Cape Finisterre, proceeding to its destination,
in good order and with a favorable wind.
I do myself the honor to transmit to your Excellency extracts of the
most conspicuous letters of an intercepted mail, taken in a packet
bound from Falmouth to New York. Your Excellency will have been
informed, that the Court of London have referred the offered mediation
of Russia, between England and the United Provinces, to a general
pacification. I have been some days stationary at Versailles for the
facility of seeing the different Ministers, and accelerating their
deliberations. Being just apprized of an opportunity from Nantes to
America, I take the liberty of sending this short provisional letter,
lest upon my return to Passy I should not have time to write more
fully.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN LAURENS.
* * * * *
_Memorial from Colonel John Laurens to Count de Vergennes._
The underwritten, special Minister of the United States of America,
has the honor to represent to his Most Christian Majesty in behalf of
Congress and by their orders, that the crisis is extreme, and that it
demands prompt and decisive succors.
The United States claim with confidence the power and good will of
their august ally. They had requested,
1st. A loan of twentyfive millions.
2dly. A naval superiority on the American coast.
3dly. Arms and ammunition, materials for clothing, equipments and
tents, estimates of which have been laid before the Ministry.
The underwritten, being informed by the Count de Vergennes of the
King's intentions with regard to pecuniary succors, earnestly offers
in the name of the Congress the homage of the most lively gratitude,
but at the same time it is his duty to represent, that although this
succor tends to the object which his Majesty has in view, it is
nevertheless demonstrated in the present state of affairs, that it is
insufficient, considering the urgent necessities of the army and the
administration, its engagements and debts, the exhausted condition of
America, the absolute deficiency of resources and specie, and the
enormous expense essential to the vigorous support of the war. It is
on this account, that the underwritten earnestly entreats his Majesty
to grant, on credit to the United States of America, the artillery,
arms, ammunition, &c. which shall be drawn from his Majesty's arsenals
and magazines, as a very considerable sum must be absorbed for the
payment of clothing and other articles to be collected in France.
The underwritten further entreats his Majesty to consider, that the
operation of a loan in Holland cannot be terminated in less than three
months, that the delay of this result may commit the safety of
America, and the common cause, lose the fruit of all the expense and
sacrifices hitherto made; a single instant is precious, the least
delay becomes of the most dangerous consequence, while the successes
of the British multiply their resources and give them new energy.
The loan which will be opened in Holland under the auspices of his
Majesty, favored by the guarantee which he is pleased to grant, cannot
fail of success.
The underwritten flatters himself, therefore, that his Majesty will
find no inconvenience in ordering the immediate advance of ten
millions to be delivered at the disposal of the United States, which
will be returned to his royal treasury by means of the loan in
question.
Events of the greatest importance depend upon this disposition equally
good and indispensable. The underwritten would think himself deficient
in his duty, if he did not persevere in entreating his Majesty to
adopt and order it.
The arrival of this sum is necessary to give a vigorous impulse to the
organisation of administration in the present state of things, renew
the tone of parts which have lost their energy, and revive public
credit by making the resources of the country concur in the expenses
of the war, which resources cannot be turned to account without coin
to determine them.
If it is impossible to make it a part of the general arrangement to
grant safe means of conveyance for the whole of this sum, the
underwritten entreats his Majesty to cause as considerable a portion
as possible to be remitted immediately, and to fix a very early date
for the departure of the remainder.
The underwritten further earnestly solicits, that a naval superiority
be permanently maintained on the American coast. The practicability
and success of all military operations and the event of the war,
depend directly and even exclusively on the state of the maritime
force in America.
The British, by preserving this advantage, will be able to accomplish
all their plans by the rapidity of their movements. The facility of
transporting themselves everywhere secures them a series of successes,
which are rendered still more decisive by the certainty of finding no
opposition in defenceless points.
It is by these means that they have been able lately to possess
themselves of a very important maritime point in North Carolina, and,
by effecting a sudden junction between two divisions of their army,
have been able to penetrate to the granary of that State. This
position is the more favorable to the enemy, as he encloses between
his army and the port of Wilmington, of which he is master, a
considerable number of Scotch colonists attached to the interests of
England, and who will be determined, perhaps, by his successes to
declare themselves openly. Such consequences are to be expected from
great successes in all civil wars. If his Majesty thinks proper to
oppose a naval superiority to the British, they will be obliged to
recall their troops from the interior country to reunite for the
defence of the most important maritime points, the communication
between which will be cut off, and the choice of attacks left to the
allies.
The abasement of Great Britain, the dismemberment of its empire, the
inestimable commercial advantages arising to France, present great
interests, and merit powerful efforts. If this opportunity be
neglected, if too much be left to chance, if time be lost, and the
means employed be insufficient, the British pride will know neither
bounds nor restraint; our object will be missed perhaps forever; it is
easy to foresee how fatal the consequences would be to the French
islands.
The underwritten renews the assurances of the most inviolable
attachment on the part of the United States. Whatever may be the
decision of his Majesty on these representations, his goodness towards
his allies will never be effaced from their hearts; they will support
the common cause with the same devotion to the last extremity, but
their success must necessarily depend upon their means.
JOHN LAURENS.
_Paris, April 18th, 1781._
* * * * *
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Paris, April 24th, 1781.
Sir,
I had the honor of addressing to your Excellency a letter on the 9th
instant, conformably to which I presented the Memorial now sent, after
preparing the way for it by as many conferences as an intervening
vacation would permit. In the course of these I discovered that it was
impossible to obtain any further detachment of ships of force from
hence; consequently, that the sum of specie to be sent immediately to
America would be limited by the means of conveyance, and that
successive epochs must divide a risk, which would be too considerable
if simultaneous.
In pursuance of these ideas Count de Vergennes declared to me, that it
had been solemnly determined to send no more than two millions in a
frigate with me, and to have the remainder transmitted afterwards at
different periods; this sum appeared to me so inconsiderable, compared
with our necessities, that I thought it my duty to make the warmest
remonstrances on the subject, and the succeeding day I delivered the
Memorial above mentioned. In the mean time I have been employed in
engaging a conveyance from Holland, which is so unexceptionable as to
enable me to demand with confidence an additional sum for the first
remittance of specie. The conveyance alluded to is the Indian, a
vessel having the dimensions of a seventyfour gun ship, mounting
twentyeight French thirtysix pounders on her main deck, and twelve
twelves on her quarter deck and forecastle, sold by the Chevalier de
Luxembourg to the State of South Carolina for the term of three years,
loaded in part with articles of clothing, &c. on said State's account,
nearly ready for sea, but reduced to the impossibility of sailing for
want of ten thousand pounds sterling to discharge an accumulation of
debts contracted in port. In these circumstances Captain Gillon, her
present commander, has applied to me in the most pressing terms for
assistance, and has offered to cede me the cargo which he has on
board, on condition of furnishing the means of extricating himself
from his present difficulties. As there appeared to me a happy
coincidence in this matter, of the interests of the State and the
Continent, I determined to accept his offer, annexing certain
conditions, as will be seen in the enclosure.[17]
The advantages in favor of the continent are in the first place a very
important and considerable gain of time in forwarding supplies of
clothing, as no considerable quantity could have been obtained at the
proper seaport of France at an earlier date than the 10th of June.
Secondly, the excellence of the conveyance removes a powerful
objection on the part on the Ministry against augmenting the first
remittance of specie.
The advantages on the part of the State are, that she will be able to
avail herself of the services of her ship, of which without the
present interposition there would not be the least prospect, and
besides, she will derive her share in common with the other members of
the Union from the general advantages.