OF THE OBJECTS OF ALLEGIANCE.
But though, on some occasions, it may be justifiable, both in sound
politics and morality, to resist supreme power, 'tis certain that, in
the ordinary course of human affairs, nothing can be more pernicious
and criminal; and that, besides the convulsions which always attend
revolutions, such a practice tends directly to the subversion of
all government, and the causing an universal anarchy and confusion
among mankind. As numerous and civilized societies cannot subsist
without government, so government is entirely useless without an exact
obedience. We ought always to weigh the advantages which we reap from
authority, against the disadvantages: and by this means we shall become
more scrupulous of putting in practice the doctrine of resistance. The
common rule requires submission; and 'tis only in cases of grievous
tyranny and oppression, that the exception can take place.
Since, then, such a blind submission is commonly due to magistracy,
the next question is, _to whom it is due, and whom we are to regard
as our lawful magistrates_? In order to answer this question, let us
recollect what we have already established concerning the origin of
government and political society. When men have once experienced the
impossibility of preserving any steady order in society, while every
one is his own master, and violates or observes the laws of interest,
according to his present interest or pleasure, they naturally run into
the invention of government, and put it out of their own power, as far
as possible, to transgress the laws of society. Government, therefore,
arises from the voluntary convention of men; and 'tis evident, that the
same convention which establishes government, will also determine the
persons who are to govern, and will remove all doubt and ambiguity in
this particular. And the voluntary consent of men must here have the
greater efficacy, that the authority of the magistrate does _at first_
stand upon the foundation of a promise of the subjects, by which they
bind themselves to obedience, as in every other contract or engagement.
The same promise, then, which binds them to obedience, ties them down
to a particular person, and makes him the object of their allegiance.
But when government has been established on this footing for some
considerable time, and the separate interest which we have in
submission has produced a separate sentiment of morality, the case
is entirely altered, and a promise is no longer able to determine
the particular magistrate; since it is no longer considered as the
foundation of government. We naturally suppose ourselves born to
submission; and imagine that such particular persons have a right to
command, as we on our part are bound to obey. These notions of right
and obligation are derived from nothing but the _advantage_ we reap
from government, which gives us a repugnance to practise resistance
ourselves, and makes us displeased with any instance of it in others.
But here 'tis remarkable, that in this new state of affairs, the
original sanction of government, which is _interest_, is not admitted
to determine the persons whom we are to obey, as the original sanction
did at first, when affairs were on the footing of a _promise_. A
_promise_ fixes and determines the persons, without any uncertainty:
but 'tis evident, that if men were to regulate their conduct in this
particular, by the view of a peculiar _interest_, either public or
private, they would involve themselves in endless confusion, and
would render all government, in a great measure, ineffectual. The
private interest of every one is different; and, though the public
interest in itself be always one and the same, yet it becomes the
source of as great dissensions, by reason of the different opinions
of particular persons concerning it. The same interest, therefore,
which causes us to submit to magistracy, makes us renounce itself in
the choice of our magistrates, and binds us down to a certain form of
government, and to particular persons, without allowing us to aspire
to the utmost perfection in either. The case is here the same as
in that law of nature concerning the stability of possession. 'Tis
highly advantageous, and even absolutely necessary to society, that
possession should be stable; and this leads us to the establishment of
such a rule: but we find, that were we to follow the same advantage,
in assigning particular possessions to particular persons, we should
disappoint our end, and perpetuate the confusion which that rule is
intended to prevent. We must therefore proceed by general rules, and
regulate ourselves by general interests, in modifying the law of
nature concerning the stability of possession. Nor need we fear, that
our attachment to this law will diminish upon account of the seeming
frivolousness of those interests by which it is determined. The
impulse of the mind is derived from a very strong interest; and those
other more minute interests serve only to direct the motion, without
adding any thing to it, or diminishing from it. 'Tis the same case
with government. Nothing is more advantageous to society than such
an invention; and this interest is sufficient to make us embrace it
with ardour and alacrity; though we are obliged afterwards to regulate
and direct our devotion to government by several considerations which
are not of the same importance, and to choose our magistrates without
having in view any particular advantage from the choice.
The _first_ of those principles I shall take notice of, as a foundation
of the right of magistracy, is that which gives authority to all the
most established governments of the world, without exception: I mean,
_long possession_ in any one form of government, or succession of
princes. 'Tis certain, that if we remount to the first origin of every
nation, we shall find, that there scarce is any race of kings, or form
of a commonwealth, that is not primarily founded on usurpation and
rebellion, and whose title is not at first worse than doubtful and
uncertain. Time alone gives solidity to their right; and, operating
gradually on the minds of men, reconciles them to any authority, and
makes it seem just and reasonable. Nothing causes any sentiment to have
a greater influence upon us than custom, or turns our imagination more
strongly to any object. When we have been long accustomed to obey any
set of men, that general instinct or tendency which we have to suppose
a moral obligation attending loyalty, takes easily this direction, and
chooses that set of men for its objects. 'Tis interest which gives the
general instinct; but 'tis custom which gives the particular direction.
And here 'tis observable, that the same length of time has a different
influence on our sentiments of morality, according to its different
influence on the mind. We naturally judge of every thing by comparison;
and since, in considering the fate of kingdoms and republics, we
embrace a long extent of time, a small duration has not, in this
case, a like influence on our sentiments, as when we consider any
other object. One thinks he acquires a right to a horse, or a suit
of clothes, in a very short time; but a century is scarce sufficient
to establish any new government, or remove all scruples in the minds
of the subjects concerning it. Add to this, that a shorter period of
time will suffice to give a prince a title to any additional power
he may usurp, than will serve to fix his right, where the whole
is an usurpation. The kings of France have not been possessed of
absolute power for above two reigns; and yet nothing will appear
more extravagant to Frenchmen than to talk of their liberties. If we
consider what has been said concerning _accession_, we shall easily
account for this phenomenon.
When there is no form of government established by _long_ possession,
the _present_ possession is sufficient to supply its place, and may
be regarded as the _second_ source of all public authority. Right
to authority is nothing but the constant possession of authority,
maintained by the laws of society and the interests of mankind; and
nothing can be more natural than to join this constant possession to
the present one, according to the principles above mentioned. If the
same principles did not take place with regard to the property of
private persons, 'twas because these principles were counterbalanced
by very strong considerations of interest; when we observed, that all
restitution would by that means be prevented, and every violence be
authorized and protected. And, though the same motives may seem to
have force with regard to public authority, yet they are opposed by a
contrary interest; which consists in the preservation of peace, and the
avoiding of all changes, which, however they may be easily produced in
private affairs, are unavoidably attended with bloodshed and confusion
where the public is interested.
Any one who, finding the impossibility of accounting for the right of
the present possessor, by any received system of ethics, should resolve
to deny absolutely that right, and assert that it is not authorized
by morality, would be justly thought to maintain a very extravagant
paradox, and to shock the common sense and judgment of mankind. No
maxim is more conformable, both to prudence and morals, than to
submit quietly to the government which we find established in the
country where we happen to live, without inquiring too curiously into
its origin and first establishment. Few governments will bear being
examined so rigorously. How many kingdoms are there at present in the
world, and how many more do we find in history, whose governors have no
better foundation for their authority than that of present possession!
To confine ourselves to the Roman and Grecian empire; is it not
evident, that the long succession of emperors, from the dissolution
of the Roman liberty, to the final extinction of that empire by the
Turks, could not so much as pretend to any other title to the empire?
The election of the senate was a mere form, which always followed the
choice of the legions; and these were almost always divided in the
different provinces, and nothing but the sword was able to terminate
the difference. 'Twas by the sword, therefore, that every emperor
acquired, as well as defended, his right; and we must either say, that
all the known world, for so many ages, had no government, and owed no
allegiance to any one, or must allow, that the right of the stronger,
in public affairs, is to be received as legitimate, and authorized by
morality, when not opposed by any other title.
The right of _conquest_ may be considered as a _third_ source of the
title of sovereigns. This right resembles very much that of present
possession, but has rather a superior force, being seconded by the
notions of glory and honour which we ascribe to _conquerors_, instead
of the sentiments of hatred and detestation which attend _usurpers_.
Men naturally favour those they love; and therefore are more apt to
ascribe a right to successful violence, betwixt one sovereign and
another, than to the successful rebellion of a subject against his
sovereign.[11]
When neither long possession, nor present possession, nor conquest take
place, as when the first sovereign who founded any monarchy dies; in
that case, the right of _succession_ naturally prevails in their stead,
and men are commonly induced to place the son of their late monarch
on the throne, and suppose him to inherit his father's authority. The
presumed consent of the father, the imitation of the succession to
private families, the interest which the state has in choosing the
person who is most powerful and has the most numerous followers; all
these reasons lead men to prefer the son of their late monarch to any
other person.[12]
These reasons have some weight; but I am persuaded, that, to one who
considers impartially of the matter, 'twill appear that there concur
some principles of the imagination along with those views of interest.
The royal authority seems to be connected with the young prince even in
his father's lifetime, by the natural transition of the thought, and
still more after his death; so that nothing is more natural than to
complete this union by a new relation, and by putting him actually in
possession of what seems so naturally to belong to him.
To confirm this, we may weigh the following phenomena, which are
pretty curious in their kind. In elective monarchies, the right of
succession has no place by the laws and settled custom; and yet its
influence is so natural, that 'tis impossible entirely to exclude it
from the imagination, and render the subjects indifferent to the son
of their deceased monarch. Hence, in some governments of this kind,
the choice commonly falls on one or other of the royal family; and
in some governments they are all excluded. Those contrary phenomena
proceed from the same principle. Where the royal family is excluded,
'tis from a refinement in politics, which makes people sensible of
their propensity to choose a sovereign in that family, and gives them
a jealousy of their liberty, lest their new monarch, aided by this
propensity, should establish his family, and destroy the freedom of
elections for the future.
The history of Artaxerxes and the younger Cyrus, may furnish us with
some reflections to the same purpose. Cyrus pretended a right to the
throne above his elder brother, because he was born after his father's
accession. I do not pretend that this reason was valid. I would only
infer from it, that he would never have made use of such a pretext,
were it not for the qualities of the imagination above-mentioned, by
which we are naturally inclined to unite by a new relation whatever
objects we find already united. Artaxerxes had an advantage above his
brother, as being the eldest son, and the first in succession; but
Cyrus was more closely related to the royal authority, as being begot
after his father was invested with it.
Should it here be pretended, that the view of convenience may be
the source of all the right of succession, and that men gladly take
advantage of any rule by which they can fix the successor of their
late sovereign, and prevent that anarchy and confusion which attends
all new elections; to this I would answer, that I readily allow that
this motive may contribute something to the effect; but at the same
time I assert, that, without another principle, 'tis impossible such
a motive should take place. The interest of a nation requires that the
succession to the crown should be fixed one way or other; but 'tis the
same thing to its interest in what way it be fixed; so that if the
relation of blood had not an effect independent of public interest, it
would never have been regarded without a positive law; and 'twould have
been impossible that so many positive laws of different nations could
ever have concurred precisely in the same views and intentions.
This leads us to consider the _fifth_ source of authority, viz.
_positive laws_, when the legislature establishes a certain form
of government and succession of princes. At first sight, it may be
thought that this must resolve into some of the preceding titles of
authority. The legislative power, whence the positive law is derived,
must either be established by original contract, long possession,
present possession, conquest, or succession; and consequently the
positive law must derive its force from some of those principles. But
here 'tis remarkable, that though a positive law can only derive its
force from these principles, yet it acquires not all the force of the
principle from whence it is derived, but loses considerably in the
transition, as it is natural to imagine. For instance, a government is
established for many centuries on a certain system of laws, forms, and
methods of succession. The legislative power, established by this long
succession, changes, all on a sudden, the whole system of government,
and introduces a new constitution in its stead. I believe few of the
subjects will think themselves bound to comply with this alteration,
unless it have an evident tendency to the public good, but will think
themselves still at liberty to return to the ancient government. Hence
the notion of _fundamental_ laws, which are supposed to be unalterable
by the will of the sovereign; and of this nature the Salic law is
understood to be in France. How far these fundamental laws extend, is
not determined in any government, nor is it possible it ever should.
There is such an insensible gradation from the most material laws to
the most trivial, and from the most ancient laws to the most modern,
that 'twill be impossible to set bounds to the legislative power, and
determine how far it may innovate in the principles of government. That
is the work more of imagination and passion than of reason.
Whoever considers the history of the several nations of the world,
their revolutions, conquests, increase and diminution, the manner in
which their particular governments are established, and the successive
right transmitted from one person to another, will soon learn to treat
very lightly all disputes concerning the rights of princes, and will be
convinced that a strict adherence to any general rules, and the rigid
loyalty to particular persons and families, on which some people set
so high a value, are virtues that hold less of reason than of bigotry
and superstition. In this particular, the study of history confirms the
reasonings of true philosophy, which, showing us the original qualities
of human nature, teaches us to regard the controversies in politics as
incapable of any decision in most cases, and as entirely subordinate
to the interests of peace and liberty. Where the public good does
not evidently demand a change, 'tis certain that the concurrence
of all those titles, _original contract, long possession, present
possession, succession_, and _positive laws_, forms the strongest title
to sovereignty, and is justly regarded as sacred and inviolable. But
when these titles are mingled and opposed in different degrees, they
often occasion perplexity, and are less capable of solution from the
arguments of lawyers and philosophers, than from the swords of the
soldiery. Who shall tell me, for instance, whether Germanicus or Drusus
ought to have succeeded Tiberius, had he died while they were both
alive, without naming any of them for his successor? Ought the right
of adoption to be received as equivalent to that of blood, in a nation
where it had the same effect in private families, and had already,
in two instances, taken place in the public? Ought Germanicus to be
esteemed the eldest son, because he was born before Drusus; or the
younger, because he was adopted after the birth of his brother? Ought
the right of the elder to be regarded in a nation, where the eldest
brother had no advantage in the succession to private families? Ought
the Roman empire at that time to be esteemed hereditary, because of two
examples; or ought it, even so early, to be regarded as belonging to
the stronger, or the present possessor, as being founded on so recent
an usurpation? Upon whatever principles we may pretend to answer these
and such like questions, I am afraid we shall never be able to satisfy
an impartial inquirer, who adopts no party in political controversies,
and will be satisfied with nothing but sound reason and philosophy.
But here an English reader will be apt to inquire concerning that
famous _revolution_ which has had such a happy influence on our
constitution, and has been attended with such mighty consequences.
We have already remarked, that, in the case of enormous tyranny and
oppression, 'tis lawful to take arms even against supreme power; and
that, as government is a mere human invention, for mutual advantage
and security, it no longer imposes any obligation, either natural or
moral, when once it ceases to have that tendency. But though this
_general_ principle be authorized by common sense, and the practice
of all ages, 'tis certainly impossible for the laws, or even for
philosophy, to establish any _particular_ rules by which we may
know when resistance is lawful, and decide all controversies which
may arise on that subject. This may not only happen with regard to
supreme power, but 'tis possible, even in some constitutions, where
the legislative authority is not lodged in one person, that there
may be a magistrate so eminent and powerful as to oblige the laws to
keep silence in this particular. Nor would this silence be an effect
only of their _respect_, but also of their _prudence_; since 'tis
certain, that, in the vast variety of circumstances which occur in
all governments, an exercise of power, in so great a magistrate, may
at one time be beneficial to the public, which at another time would
be pernicious and tyrannical. But notwithstanding this silence of
the laws in limited monarchies, 'tis certain that the people still
retain the right of resistance; since 'tis impossible, even in the
most despotic governments, to deprive them of it. The same necessity
of self-preservation, and the same motive of public good, give them
the same liberty in the one case as in the other. And we may farther
observe, that in such mixed governments, the cases wherein resistance
is lawful must occur much oftener, and greater indulgence be given to
the subjects to defend themselves by force of arms, than in arbitrary
governments. Not only where the chief magistrate enters into measures
in themselves extremely pernicious to the public, but even when he
would encroach on the other parts of the constitution, and extend his
power beyond the legal bounds, it is allowable to resist and dethrone
him; though such resistance and violence may, in the general tenor of
the laws, be deemed unlawful and rebellious. For, besides that nothing
is more essential to public interest than the preservation of public
liberty, 'tis evident, that if such a mixed government be once supposed
to be established, every part or member of the constitution must have
a right of self-defence, and of maintaining its ancient bounds against
the encroachment of every other authority. As matter would have been
created in vain, were it deprived of a power of resistance, without
which no part of it could preserve a distinct existence, and the whole
might be crowded up into a single point; so 'tis a gross absurdity to
suppose, in any government, a right without a remedy, or allow that the
supreme power is shared with the people, without allowing that 'tis
lawful for them to defend their share against every invader. Those,
therefore, who would seem to respect our free government, and yet deny
the right of resistance, have renounced all pretensions to common
sense, and do not merit a serious answer.
It does not belong to my present purpose to show, that these general
principles are applicable to the late _revolution_; and that all the
rights and privileges which ought to be sacred to a free nation, were
at that time threatened with the utmost danger. I am better pleased to
leave this controverted subject, if it really admits of controversy,
and to indulge myself in some philosophical reflections which naturally
arise from that important event.
_First_, We may observe, that should the _lords_ and _commons_ in our
constitution, without any reason from public interest, either depose
the king in being, or, after his death, exclude the prince, who, by
laws and settled custom, ought to succeed, no one would esteem their
proceedings legal, or think themselves bound to comply with them.
But should the king, by his unjust practices, or his attempts for a
tyrannical and despotic power, justly forfeit his legal, it then not
only becomes morally lawful and suitable to the nature of political
society to dethrone him; but, what is more, we are apt likewise to
think, that the remaining members of the constitution acquire a right
of excluding his next heir, and of choosing whom they please for his
successor. This is founded on a very singular quality of our thought
and imagination. When a king forfeits his authority, his heir ought
naturally to remain in the same situation as if the king were removed
by death; unless by mixing himself in the tyranny, he forfeit it for
himself. But though this may seem reasonable, we easily comply with the
contrary opinion. The deposition of a king, in such a government as
ours, is certainly an act beyond all common authority; and an illegal
assuming a power for public good, which, in the ordinary course of
government, can belong to no member of the constitution. When the
public good is so great and so evident as to justify the action, the
commendable use of this license causes us naturally to attribute to the
_parliament_ a right of using farther licenses; and the ancient bounds
of the laws being once transgressed with approbation, we are not apt
to be so strict in confining ourselves precisely within their limits.
The mind naturally runs on with any train of action which it has begun;
nor do we commonly make any scruple concerning our duty, after the
first action of any kind which we perform. Thus at the _revolution_,
no one who thought the deposition of the father justifiable, esteemed
themselves to be confined to his infant son; though, had that unhappy
monarch died innocent at that time, and had his son, by any accident,
been conveyed beyond seas, there is no doubt but a regency would have
been appointed till he should come to age, and could be restored to
his dominions. As the slightest properties of the imagination have
an effect on the judgments of the people, it shows the wisdom of the
laws and of the parliament to take advantage of such properties, and
to choose the magistrates either in or out of a line, according as the
vulgar will most naturally attribute authority and right to them.
_Secondly_, Though the accession of the Prince of Orange to the throne,
might at first give occasion to many disputes, and his title be
contested, it ought not now to appear doubtful, but must have acquired
a sufficient authority from those three princes who have succeeded
him upon the same title. Nothing is more usual, though nothing may,
at first sight, appear more unreasonable, than this way of thinking.
Princes often _seem_ to acquire a right from their successors, as well
as from their ancestors; and a king who, during his lifetime, might
justly be deemed an usurper, will be regarded by posterity as a lawful
prince, because he has had the good fortune to settle his family on
the throne, and entirely change the ancient form of government. Julius
Cæsar is regarded as the first Roman emperor; while Sylla and Marius,
whose titles were really the same as his, are treated as tyrants and
usurpers. Time and custom give authority to all forms of government,
and all successions of princes; and that power, which at first was
founded only on injustice and violence, becomes in time legal and
obligatory. Nor does the mind rest there; but, returning back upon
its footsteps, transfers to their predecessors and ancestors that
right which it naturally ascribes to the posterity, as being related
together, and united in the imagination. The present King of France
makes Hugh Capet a more lawful prince than Cromwell; as the established
liberty of the Dutch is no inconsiderable apology for their obstinate
resistance to Philip the Second.
[10] This proposition must hold strictly true with regard to every
quality that is determined merely by sentiment. In what sense we can
talk either of a _right_ or a _wrong_ taste in morals, eloquence, or
beauty, shall be considered afterwards. In the mean time it may be
observed, that there is such an uniformity in the _general_ sentiments
of mankind, as to render such questions of but small importance.
[11] It is not here asserted, that _present possession_ or _conquest_
are sufficient to give a title against _long possession_ and _positive
laws_: but only that they have some force, and will be able to cast
the balance where the titles are otherwise equal, and will even be
sufficient _sometimes_ to sanctify the weaker title. What degree of
force they have is difficult to determine. I believe all moderate men
will allow, that they have great force in all disputes concerning the
rights of princes.
[12] To prevent mistakes I must observe, that this case of succession
is not the same with that of hereditary monarchies, where custom has
fixed the right of succession. These depend upon the principle of long
possession above explained.